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CGHC010380242024 2026:CGHC:33378

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Order Reserved on : 07.07.2026

Order Delivered on : 03.08.2026

WPC No. 5555 of 2024

Mohammad Salman S/o Mohammad Subhan Aged About 32 Years R/o

Gandhi Chowk, Camp-2, Bhilai, Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

--- Petitioner

Versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh, through Secretary, Department of Urban

Administration and Development, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal

Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Division Commissioner Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh

3 - Municipal Corporation Through Commissioner, Bhilai, District Durg,

Chhattisgarh.

4 - Bhojram S/o Late Kushnaji Aged About 46 Years, Parshad, Ward

No. 17, R/o Street No. 1, Paanch Rasta, Supela, Bhiali, Tehsil And

District Bhilai, Chhattisgarh

5 - Chandan Yadav S/o Late Shankar Lal Yadav Aged About 33 Years

R/o Sharda Para, Camp-2, Bhilai, Tehsil And District Bhilai,

Chhattisgarh.

6 - Chhattisgarh State Election Commission, Through Secretary,

Sector-19, Kotara Bhantha, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur

Chhattisgarh (Intervenors).

7 - District Election Officer, Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh

Lamba, Advocates

For State/Respondents

No.1 and 2

:Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, Additional Advocate

General

For Respondent No.3 :Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate

For Respondents No.4

and 5

:Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate

For Respondents No.6

and 7

:Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Senior Advocate

assisted by Ms. Shruti Bariar, Advocate

WPC No. 1808 of 2025

Chandan Yadav S/o Shankar Lal Yadav Aged About 34 Years R/o H.No.

394, Kishan Chowk, Shardapara, Camp 2, Sector 1, Bhilai, District

Durg, Chhattisgarh- 490026.

---Petitioner

Versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Urban

Administration, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Post

Office Rakhi, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Divisional Commissioner Division Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Collector-Cum-District Election Officer District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

4 - Municipal Corporation Bhilai through its Commissioner, Bhilai,

District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

5 - Shri Neeraj Pal Mayor, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, District Durg,

Chhattisgarh.

6 - Mohammad Salman alias Engineer Salman S/o Mohammad

Subhan Aged About 32 Years R/o 115, Sharda Para, Naya Ward 35,

Camp 2, Bhairaw Basti, Near Janta School, Bhilai, Tehsil And District

Durg, Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate

For State/Respondents

No.1 to 3

:Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, Additional Advocate

General

For Respondent No.4 :Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Senior Advocate

assisted by Ms. Shruti Bariar, Advocate

For Respondent No.6 :Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh

Lamba, Advocates

Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

CAV Order

1.Since both the writ petitions arise out of the same set of facts,

involve an interconnected controversy, and raise common

questions of law and facts, they are being heard together and are

being decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience

and clarity, the parties shall be referred to by their respective

names instead of their array in the respective writ petitions.

2.In Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, Mohammad Salman is the

petitioner, whereas in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, he has

been arrayed as respondent No.6. Similarly, Chandan Yadav, who

is the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, was arrayed

as respondent No.5 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. The

State authorities are common parties in both the writ petitions;

however, their array differs in the respective petitions. In Writ

Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, the State of Chhattisgarh is arrayed

through respondents No.1 and 2, whereas in Writ Petition (C)

No.1808 of 2025, the State authorities have been arrayed as

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respondents No.1 to 3. The Municipal Corporation, Durg, is

respondent No.3 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. The State

Election Commission has been impleaded as respondents No.6

and 7 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and as respondent

No.4 in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025.

3.The controversy involved in the present writ petitions centres

around the election to the office of Councillor of Ward No. 35,

Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.),

and the subsequent proceedings culminating in the removal of the

returned candidate, Mohammad Salman, on the allegation that

the Social Status (Other Backward Class) Certificate on the

strength of which he contested the election was fraudulently

procured and had never been issued by the competent authority.

4.The controversy involved in the present writ petitions pertains to

the election to the office of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda

Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).

Mohammad Salman, being a citizen of India, participated in the

said democratic process and contested the election for the post of

Councillor from the aforesaid ward, claiming himself to belong to

the Kunjda caste, which is recognized as a caste falling under the

category of Other Backward Class (OBC). On the basis of the

said caste status and eligibility, Mohammad Salman contested the

election and was declared elected by the voters of Ward No.35.

The subsequent challenge to his caste status, the proceedings

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initiated pursuant thereto, and the consequential actions taken by

the authorities constitute the subject matter of the present

litigation. After participating in the democratic process,

Mohammad Salman was declared elected by the electorate and

assumed the office of Councillor of Ward No.35. He thereafter

continued to discharge his duties and functions as an elected

representative.

5.Subsequently, an objection was raised by Chandan Yadav and

another person before the competent authority challenging the

entitlement of Mohammad Salman to hold the office of Councillor.

It was alleged by them that Mohammad Salman did not actually

belong to the Kunjda caste and that the caste certificate relied

upon by him for contesting the election had been obtained

fraudulently and by misrepresentation of facts. On the basis of the

said complaint/appeal, proceedings were initiated against

Mohammad Salman before the competent authority for verification

of his caste status of the complaint made against him.

6.After completion of the proceedings, the competent authority, vide

order dated 06.05.2024, directed removal of Mohammad Salman

from the post of Councillor of Ward No.35. Aggrieved by the said

order, Mohammad Salman preferred an appeal before the

competent appellate authority. However, the said appeal was

dismissed vide order dated 04.09.2024, thereby affirming the

order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the competent authority. The

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challenge to the aforesaid orders dated 06.05.2024 and

04.09.2024 forms the subject matter of Writ Petition (C) No.5555

of 2024, filed by Mohammad Salman.

7.During the pendency of the aforesaid controversy, Chandan

Yadav, who had raised the dispute regarding the election and

caste status of Mohammad Salman, approached this Court by

filing Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025. The grievance raised by

Chandan Yadav in the said writ petition is that despite his being

declared as the returned candidate in the election process and

despite the removal of Mohammad Salman from the office of

Councillor, the authorities have failed to conduct and permit the

oath-taking ceremony of Chandan Yadav as Councillor of Ward

No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation.

8.Chandan Yadav has contended that after completion of the

election process, he was declared elected in accordance with law

and his name was duly notified in the official Gazette. According

to him, the mandate given by the voters through a democratic

election process cannot be defeated by the inaction of the

authorities. He has further challenged the action of the

respondents in issuing the communication/order dated

18.03.2025, whereby Mohammad Salman, despite having been

removed from the post of Councillor, was nominated as a member

of the Mayor-in-Council. According to Chandan Yadav, such action

of the authorities is arbitrary, illegal, contrary to the statutory

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scheme, and amounts to permitting a person who has ceased to

hold the office of Councillor to continue enjoying the benefits and

privileges attached to the said office.

9.Thus, while Mohammad Salman, in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024, has questioned the legality and validity of the orders dated

06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 whereby he was removed from the

office of Councillor, Chandan Yadav, in Writ Petition (C) No.1808

of 2025, has questioned the subsequent inaction of the authorities

in recognizing and administering oath to him as the elected

Councillor and has also challenged the consequential action of

permitting Mohammad Salman to continue as a member of the

Mayor-in-Council.

10.Both the writ petitions, therefore, arise from the same election

dispute concerning Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal

Corporation, involve the same set of parties, and the reliefs

claimed by the parties are directly connected with each other. The

decision in one petition would have a direct bearing upon the

adjudication of the other. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are

clubbed together and are being decided by this common order.

11.In Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, the petitioner has prayed for

following relief(s) :-

“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to quash the order dated 04/09/2024

(ANNXURE P1) and Order dated 06/05/2024

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(ANNEXURE P2) passed by the respondent

no. 1 and 2 against the petitioner.

10.2 That any other relief which this Hon'ble

Court deems fit and proper may also be

granted in favor of the petitioner safeguarding

their interest.”

12.In Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, the petitioner has prayed for

following relief(s) :-

“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,

direction thereby calling for the records of the

entire case.

10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,

direction in the form of mandamus thereby

directing the respondents to immediately

arrange for oath taking ceremony of the

petitioner for taking oath as Councillor of

Ward No.35, Shardapara Ward of Bhilai

Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).

OR ALTERNATIVELY

That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,

direction thereby directing the respondents to

take decision on the representation of the

petitioner for taking oath dated 13/03/2025

within stipulated period.

10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,

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direction in the form of certiorarified

mandamus thereby quashing and setting

aside the letter dated 18/03/2025 and further

directing the respondents to permit joining of

the private respondent as Councillor of Ward

No.35, Shardapara Ward Bhilai Municipal

Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).

10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court

deems fit and proper, may also kindly be

granted to the petitioner, in the interest of

justice.”

Common Facts of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and Writ

Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025

13.The facts, in brief, are that the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai

consists of elected Councillors and is governed by the provisions

of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short,

‘Act of 1956’). In exercise of the powers conferred under the

relevant provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, the

State Government issued a Gazette Notification dated

22.03.2021, notifying the ward-wise reservation for the election of

Councillors of Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. As per the said

notification, Ward No.35, Sharda Para Ward, was reserved for

candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class category.

14.Pursuant to the election programme, Mohammad Salman, also

known as Engineer Salman, submitted his nomination form for

contesting the election to the post of Councillor from Ward No.35,

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Sharda Para, on 02.12.2021 along with the requisite documents.

In his declaration submitted along with the nomination form,

Mohammad Salman claimed himself to be belonging to the Other

Backward Class category, namely Kunjda caste. Chandan Yadav

also submitted his nomination form for contesting the said election

from the same ward.

15.After completion of the election process and declaration of results,

Mohammad Salman was declared as the returned candidate for

Ward No.35, Sharda Para, and his election was notified in the

official Gazette dated 24.12.2021. Thereafter, he joined as

Councillor and continued to discharge his duties as an elected

representative. Chandan Yadav was declared as the candidate

securing the second highest number of votes, immediately next to

Mohammad Salman.

16.Subsequently, allegations were raised against Mohammad

Salman regarding his caste status. It was alleged that although

Ward No.35 was reserved for Other Backward Class candidates,

Mohammad Salman did not possess a valid caste certificate

issued by the competent authority and, therefore, was not eligible

to contest and hold the office of Councillor from the said reserved

category. On the basis of such allegations, Chandan Yadav and

others initiated proceedings seeking removal of Mohammad

Salman from the office of Councillor under the provisions of the

Act of 1956.

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17.As no effective action was taken on the representation/application

filed by Chandan Yadav, he approached this Court by filing Writ

Petition (C) No.1015 of 2024. This Court, vide order dated

19.02.2024, directed the Divisional Commissioner, Durg, to

consider and decide the proceedings initiated under Section 19(1)

(a-1) of the Act of 1956 within a stipulated period. The said order

was subsequently challenged by Mohammad Salman by filing

Review Petition No.78 of 2024, however, the same was dismissed

vide order dated 25.04.2024, and the proceedings before the

Divisional Commissioner were permitted to continue.

18.During the pendency of the proceedings before the Divisional

Commissioner, Durg, Mohammad Salman also approached this

Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.1309 of 2024, questioning the

initiation and continuance of proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1)

of the Act of 1956. However, the said writ petition was disposed of

by order dated 05.03.2024, and thereafter the review petition and

writ appeal preferred against the said order were also

dismissed/withdrawn.

19.Thereafter, the Divisional Commissioner, Durg proceeded with the

matter, recorded the statements and affidavits of the respective

parties, and after hearing both sides, passed an order dated

06.05.2024, whereby the application preferred by Chandan Yadav

and others was allowed and Mohammad Salman was removed

from the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai

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Municipal Corporation.

20.Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of removal, Mohammad Salman

approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.2642 of 2024.

However, this Court, vide order dated 11.06.2024, declined to

interfere with the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner

and granted liberty to Mohammad Salman to avail the statutory

remedy of appeal before the competent authority.

21.Pursuant thereto, Mohammad Salman preferred an appeal before

the competent appellate authority. After considering the rival

submissions and material available on record, the appellate

authority, vide order dated 04.09.2024, dismissed the appeal

preferred by Mohammad Salman and affirmed the order of

removal passed by the Divisional Commissioner. The appellate

authority recorded that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his

entitlement to contest the election from the reserved category and

also failed to produce a valid caste certificate issued under the

provisions of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled

Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status

Certification) Act, 2013 (for short, ‘Act of 2013’).

22.The aforesaid orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 have

been challenged by Mohammad Salman in Writ Petition (C)

No.5555 of 2024, wherein he has questioned the legality, validity

and correctness of the proceedings resulting in his removal from

the post of Councillor.

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23.After removal of Mohammad Salman, the office of Councillor of

Ward No.35, Sharda Para, fell vacant. The vacancy was

thereafter communicated to the State Election Commission, which

issued an election programme for filling up the vacant post of

Councillor in accordance with Article 243 of the Constitution of

India and Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. Pursuant to the

election notification dated 20.01.2025, the election process was

initiated for Ward No.35.

24.In the said election process, Chandan Yadav submitted his

nomination form and participated in the election. He was declared

elected by the Returning Officer, and an election certificate in

Form-14 under Rule 39(1) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal

Corporation Rules, 1994 (for short, ‘Rules of 1994’), dated

31.01.2025, was issued in his favour declaring him as the elected

Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para. The election of Chandan

Yadav was thereafter notified by the State Election Commission

through Gazette Notification dated 24.02.2025.

25.However, despite being declared elected and his election having

been notified in the official Gazette, Chandan Yadav was not

permitted to take oath and assume charge as Councillor of Ward

No.35. According to Chandan Yadav, such inaction on the part of

the authorities has resulted in denial of the mandate given by the

electorate and has prevented him from discharging his

constitutional and statutory duties as an elected representative.

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26.It is also the grievance of Chandan Yadav that during the

pendency of the proceedings, Mohammad Salman, after

challenging his removal, obtained interim protection in Writ

Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. However, upon the Court being

apprised of the subsequent election process and the constitutional

bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, it

was clarified that the interim order would operate only in respect

of the benefits claimed by Mohammad Salman on the basis of

OBC status and would not affect the election process.

27.Chandan Yadav has further challenged the subsequent action

whereby, despite removal of Mohammad Salman from the post of

Councillor and withdrawal of all charges and responsibilities from

him, the Mayor of the Municipal Corporation, vide communication

dated 18.03.2025, nominated Mohammad Salman as an in-

charge member of the Culture, Tourism, Entertainment and

Heritage Production Department under the Mayor-in-Council.

According to Chandan Yadav, such nomination is contrary to

Section 37 of the Act of 1956, as members of the Mayor-in-

Council can only be nominated from amongst elected Councillors.

28.Thus, while Mohammad Salman, in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024, has questioned the orders dated 06.05.2024 and

04.09.2024 whereby he was removed from the post of Councillor,

Chandan Yadav, in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, has sought

enforcement of his rights as an elected Councillor and has

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challenged the failure of the authorities to administer oath to him

as well as the consequential nomination of Mohammad Salman in

the Mayor-in-Council despite his removal.

Submissions on behalf of Mohammad Salman (Petitioner in W.P.

(C) No.5555/2024 and Respondent No.6 in W.P.(C) No.1808/2025)

29.Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh Lamba, learned counsel

appearing for Mohammad Salman, the petitioner in Writ Petition

(C) No.5555 of 2024 and respondent No.6 in Writ Petition (C)

No.1808 of 2025, would submit that the entire controversy in the

present batch of writ petitions arises out of the election held for

the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai

Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.), which was reserved

for candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class (OBC)

category. It is submitted that Mohammad Salman, who belongs to

the Kunjda caste, a community recognized as falling within the

OBC category, contested the election from the said reserved ward

after due verification of all requisite documents by the competent

election authorities and was duly declared elected by the

electorate. It is submitted that his election was conducted strictly

in accordance with law and after scrutiny of his nomination

papers, including the documents relating to his caste status.

Therefore, there was no occasion for any subsequent authority to

question his eligibility to contest the election merely on the basis

of vague and unsubstantiated allegations. They would further

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submit that Mohammad Salman has been a resident of Bhilai,

District Durg, Chhattisgarh, and belongs to the Kunjda caste. The

said caste has been recognized as an Other Backward Class

community under the applicable Government notifications. It is

submitted that Mohammad Salman has never attempted to obtain

any undue benefit by creating a false caste identity, as there was

no occasion for him to do so. It is argued that a person belonging

to the Kunjda caste would have no reason whatsoever to fabricate

a caste certificate of the same caste, particularly when his caste

status is consistently reflected in his educational and other

contemporaneous documents.

30.Learned counsel would submit that the caste claim of Mohammad

Salman is not based on any recent declaration made only for the

purpose of contesting the election. It is submitted that the school

records and other documents pertaining to Mohammad Salman

clearly mention his caste as Kunjda. Thus, the allegation levelled

by the private respondents that Mohammad Salman has

fraudulently projected himself as belonging to the Kunjda caste is

wholly baseless and contrary to the documentary evidence

available on record. It is further submitted that Mohammad

Salman was elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para in

the year 2021, and at the relevant point of time there was no

objection raised by any person regarding his caste status. His

nomination papers were accepted only after scrutiny by the

Returning Officer and the competent election authorities. Learned

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counsel would submit that had there been any defect or alleged

invalidity in the caste certificate produced by Mohammad Salman,

his nomination itself would have been rejected at the initial stage

and he would not have been permitted to contest the election.

31.Learned counsel would contend that after Mohammad Salman

successfully completed his tenure as an elected Councillor for a

substantial period, the private respondents, who were

unsuccessful candidates in the election, initiated proceedings

after an unexplained delay of nearly three years. It is submitted

that such proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of

law, initiated with an ulterior motive to remove an elected

representative after losing the democratic mandate. The

challenge raised by the private respondents is not based upon

any genuine grievance but is motivated by personal rivalry and

political considerations. It is further submitted that the proceedings

initiated against Mohammad Salman before the Divisional

Commissioner were wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel

would submit that the issue relating to validity, genuineness and

cancellation of a caste certificate is governed by the provisions of

the Act of 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. Under the

statutory scheme, only the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee

is empowered to examine the correctness of a social status

certificate and to declare the same to be false or invalid after

following the prescribed procedure. The Divisional Commissioner,

while exercising powers under the Act of 1956 could not have

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assumed the role of a Caste Scrutiny Committee and could not

have adjudicated upon the caste status of Mohammad Salman.

32.Learned counsel would submit that under Section 6(3) of the Act

of 2013, the District Level Certificate Verification Committee is

required to examine the relevant material and thereafter refer the

matter to the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee

wherever necessary. Unless the caste certificate is cancelled by

the competent Scrutiny Committee, the same continues to hold

validity and the holder of such certificate cannot be treated as

disqualified. It is submitted that, in the present case, the caste

certificate of Mohammad Salman has never been cancelled by the

District Level Verification Committee or by the High Power Caste

Scrutiny Committee. Therefore, the very foundation of the

proceedings initiated by the Divisional Commissioner is legally

unsustainable. Learned counsel would submit that the Divisional

Commissioner has proceeded on an erroneous assumption of

jurisdiction and has passed the order of removal without there

being any declaration by the competent authority that Mohammad

Salman does not belong to the OBC category.

33.Learned counsel would further submit that Section 19(1)(a-1) of

the Act of 1956, which empowers removal of a Councillor in

certain circumstances, can be invoked only when it is established

that the Councillor has incurred disqualification in accordance with

law. The expression “if it is found that” occurring in the said

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provision necessarily requires a prior lawful determination by the

competent authority regarding the alleged disqualification. In the

absence of any order passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee

declaring the caste certificate of Mohammad Salman to be false,

the Divisional Commissioner had no authority to remove him from

the elected office of Councillor. They would submit that the

impugned orders dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional

Commissioner and 04.09.2024 passed by the appellate authority

are therefore liable to be set aside as being without jurisdiction,

contrary to the statutory provisions and violative of the principles

of natural justice. The authorities have failed to appreciate that the

caste dispute could not have been decided in proceedings relating

to removal of a Councillor and that such determination falls

exclusively within the domain of the Caste Scrutiny Committee. It

is further submitted that the election of Mohammad Salman could

not have been questioned by filing proceedings before the

Divisional Commissioner after expiry of the prescribed period.

Learned counsel would submit that the Constitution of India,

under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, creates a

specific bar against interference by Courts or authorities in

electoral matters except through the mechanism of an election

petition. The validity of an election to a Municipality can only be

challenged before the competent Election Tribunal in the manner

prescribed by law.

34.In this regard, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the

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judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Babita

Balmiki Vs. Amrika Bai & Others, reported in 2017 (1) CGLJ

603, and submitted that the issue regarding qualification or

disqualification of an elected candidate, including whether such

candidate belongs to the reserved category for which the seat

was notified, can only be examined by the Election Tribunal in an

election petition.

35.Learned counsel would submit that the private respondents

neither challenged the election of Mohammad Salman by filing an

election petition under Section 441 of the Act of 1956, nor

approached the competent Election Tribunal within the prescribed

period of limitation. Instead, after a delay of nearly three years,

they initiated proceedings before the Divisional Commissioner,

which was impermissible in law. They would further submit that

the reliance placed by the private respondents on certain alleged

discrepancies in the records maintained by the revenue

authorities is wholly misplaced. It is argued that Mohammad

Salman cannot be held responsible for any alleged mistake or

discrepancy in the official records maintained by the revenue

department. The burden cannot be shifted upon the elected

Councillor for any alleged administrative error committed by the

authorities maintaining such records. It is also submitted that the

caste documents produced by Mohammad Salman and his

ancestors clearly demonstrate that the caste of his family has

consistently been recorded as Kunjda. Several documents

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pertaining to his father, grandfather and forefathers, including old

documents dating back decades, reflect the same caste status.

Therefore, there was no basis to conclude that the caste

certificate obtained by Mohammad Salman was fabricated or

forged.

36.Learned counsel would further submit that the subsequent

developments during the pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024 are also relevant. This Court, after hearing all the parties,

including Chandan Yadav, passed an interim order dated

28.01.2025 staying the operation and effect of the orders dated

06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 whereby Mohammad Salman had

been removed from the post of Councillor. Pursuant thereto,

Mohammad Salman resumed his duties as Councillor of Ward

No.35. It is submitted that after restoration of the status of

Mohammad Salman as Councillor pursuant to the interim order

passed by this Court, the election process initiated for filling up

the said seat could not have been proceeded with. The authorities

themselves acknowledged the effect of the interim order and

stayed the election process. Therefore, Chandan Yadav cannot

seek a direction for oath-taking as Councillor when Mohammad

Salman continues to hold the office by virtue of the interim

protection granted by this Court.

37.Learned counsel would submit that permitting Chandan Yadav to

take oath as Councillor would result in a situation where two

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persons would simultaneously claim the office of Councillor for the

same ward, which is legally impermissible. Any such direction

would virtually nullify the interim order passed by this Court in Writ

Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. It is further submitted that the

subsequent nomination of Mohammad Salman as a member of

the Mayor-in-Council was made only after he resumed the office

of Councillor and was legally holding the said office. Therefore,

the challenge raised by Chandan Yadav to the said nomination is

misconceived and based upon an incorrect assumption that

Mohammad Salman had ceased to be a Councillor.

38.Learned counsel would lastly submit that Chandan Yadav has not

approached this Court with clean hands and has deliberately

suppressed the material facts relating to the interim order dated

28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and the

subsequent proceedings. It is submitted that the writ petition filed

by Chandan Yadav is nothing but an attempt to indirectly nullify

the orders passed by this Court and to secure a relief which would

defeat the interim protection granted to Mohammad Salman.

Therefore, learned counsel prays that Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024 filed by Mohammad Salman be allowed and the orders

dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 be quashed, and consequently

Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav be

dismissed as being devoid of merit and contrary to the settled

legal position.

23

Submissions on behalf of the State/Respondents No.1 to 2 in W.P.

(C) No.5555 of 2024 and Respondents No.1 to 3 in W.P.(C) No.1808

of 2025

39.On the other hand, Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, learned Additional

Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State

authorities/respondents No.1 and 2 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024 and respondents No.1 to 3 in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of

2025, would submit that the writ petitions preferred by the

respective petitioners are devoid of merit and no interference

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted in the

facts and circumstances of the present case. He would submit

that the present controversy has arisen out of the election

conducted for the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Bhilai Municipal Corporation, which was reserved for the

candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class category. It is

submitted that Mohammad Salman contested the election from

the said reserved ward claiming himself to belong to the Kunjda

caste, which falls under the OBC category, and was declared

elected as Councillor. However, subsequently, a complaint was

made before the competent authority raising serious objections

regarding his caste status and alleging that he was not entitled to

contest the election from the reserved category.

40.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the

proceedings initiated against Mohammad Salman were not

24

initiated arbitrarily or without authority of law. The same were

commenced on the basis of the complaint made by the aggrieved

persons and were conducted by the competent authority in

exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Act

of 1956. It is submitted that the Divisional Commissioner, Durg,

after providing adequate and sufficient opportunity of hearing to all

concerned parties, considered the material available on record

and thereafter passed a detailed order dated 06.05.2024,

whereby Mohammad Salman was removed from the post of

Councillor. It is further submitted that the order passed by the

Divisional Commissioner was challenged by Mohammad Salman

before the competent appellate authority and the said appeal was

also considered in accordance with law. After examining the entire

material available on record, the appellate authority, vide order

dated 04.09.2024, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order

passed by the Divisional Commissioner. Therefore, according to

the learned Additional Advocate General, both the orders

impugned in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 are well-reasoned

quasi-judicial orders passed after due consideration of the

relevant facts and applicable statutory provisions.

41.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the scope

of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

against an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority is limited.

Unless the petitioner demonstrates patent illegality, jurisdictional

error, violation of principles of natural justice, or perversity in the

25

decision-making process, this Court would not substitute its own

view in place of the findings recorded by the competent

authorities. It is submitted that Mohammad Salman was granted

adequate opportunity during the proceedings before the Divisional

Commissioner as well as the appellate authority. All relevant

documents relied upon by him were taken into consideration and

he was permitted to place his defence. Therefore, the allegation

that the proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles

of natural justice is wholly misconceived. The authorities have

followed the procedure prescribed under law and have passed the

orders after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

42.Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that

Mohammad Salman, while invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction

of this Court, has not approached with clean hands and has

suppressed material facts. It is submitted that a person seeking

equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must

disclose all relevant facts and cannot seek discretionary relief

while withholding material information from the Court. It is

submitted that the order passed by the State

Government/appellate authority dated 04.09.2024 was passed

after considering the entire factual background, including the fact

that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his entitlement to hold

the reserved post of Councillor. The appellate authority found that

there was no valid caste certificate produced by Mohammad

Salman which could establish his entitlement to contest the

26

election from the OBC reserved category.

43.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the

contention raised by Mohammad Salman regarding the

jurisdiction of the Divisional Commissioner is misconceived. It is

submitted that the proceedings were not merely relating to

verification of caste status but were proceedings under the

provisions of the Act of 1956 concerning the continuance of an

elected Councillor who was alleged to have incurred

disqualification. The competent authority was therefore justified in

examining whether Mohammad Salman was legally entitled to

continue on the post of Councillor. It is further submitted that the

argument regarding the necessity of reference of the matter to the

High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee is also misconceived in the

present proceedings. According to the learned Additional

Advocate General, the authorities were required to examine

whether Mohammad Salman possessed the necessary

qualification and eligibility for holding the office of Councillor from

the reserved category, and after considering the material available

on record, the competent authorities rightly arrived at the

conclusion that he was not entitled to continue.

44.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the

subsequent events are also required to be taken into

consideration while deciding both the writ petitions. It is submitted

that after removal of Mohammad Salman from the post of

27

Councillor, the post of Councillor of Ward No.35 became vacant.

Consequently, the vacancy was communicated to the State

Election Commission, which initiated the process of by-election for

filling up the vacant seat. It is submitted that pursuant to the

election notification issued by the Chhattisgarh State Election

Commission, Chandan Yadav participated in the election process

and was declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda

Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation. His election was duly notified

by the State Election Commission through Gazette Notification

dated 24.02.2025. Therefore, according to the learned Additional

Advocate General, the grievance raised by Chandan Yadav in

Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 has arisen out of subsequent

developments and deserves to be considered in that background.

45.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that Writ

Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav has become

infructuous in view of the subsequent order dated 28.01.2025

passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, whereby this Court

stayed the effect and operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024

and 04.09.2024 passed against Mohammad Salman. It is

submitted that the said interim order was passed without the

complete factual position regarding the initiation of the by-election

process being brought to the notice of the Court. It is submitted

that the interim order dated 28.01.2025 was passed purely as an

interim measure and the same cannot be construed as conferring

any final right upon Mohammad Salman to continue as Councillor.

28

The validity and effect of the said interim order would be subject

to the final adjudication of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024.

46.Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that in

view of the interim protection granted to Mohammad Salman, the

authorities were placed in a difficult situation as the election

process had already commenced pursuant to the vacancy caused

by his removal. The subsequent election notification and

declaration of result in favour of Chandan Yadav were statutory

acts performed in accordance with law. It is submitted that the

constitutional scheme under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of

India provides a specific mechanism for challenging municipal

elections and the Court may consider the effect of such

constitutional provisions while examining the reliefs claimed by

the parties.

47.Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that so far as

the challenge raised by Chandan Yadav regarding the oath-taking

ceremony is concerned, the same cannot be considered in

isolation and has to be examined in the light of the interim order

passed by this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. Any

direction permitting Chandan Yadav to take oath would have the

effect of rendering the interim order passed in favour of

Mohammad Salman ineffective, which cannot be permitted unless

the interim order itself is modified or vacated. It is further

submitted that the nomination of Mohammad Salman as a

29

member of the Mayor-in-Council was a consequential

administrative action taken on the basis of the then existing status

and position of Mohammad Salman. Since the order of removal

had been stayed by this Court, Mohammad Salman was treated

as continuing in office, and therefore, no illegality can be

attributed to the action of the authorities.

48.Learned Additional Advocate General would lastly submit that both

the writ petitions deserve to be considered in the light of the

subsequent developments and the statutory framework governing

municipal elections. It is prayed that Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024 filed by Mohammad Salman be dismissed as no

jurisdictional error or illegality has been demonstrated in the

orders passed by the competent authorities, and consequently,

Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav also

does not call for any interference. Alternatively, the matters may

be decided keeping in view the interim order passed by this Court

and the subsequent election process undertaken by the State

Election Commission.

Submission on behalf of Municipal Corporation, Bhilai

Respondent No.3 in W.P.(C) No.5555/2024

49.Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, would submit that

the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai is only a formal party in the

present proceedings and no substantive relief has been claimed

30

against it by the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that the

grievance raised by the petitioner is essentially against the actions

and orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2/State authorities,

and the answering respondent-Municipal Corporation has neither

passed any order adverse to the petitioner nor taken any

independent action against him. It is further submitted that the

Municipal Corporation, Bhilai is an autonomous statutory body

having its own independent identity and functions within the

framework of the Act of 1956. Since no relief has been sought

against the answering respondent and no specific allegation has

been made against it, the Municipal Corporation has chosen not

to file any detailed reply.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents No.4- Bhojram and

Respondent No.5-Chandan Yadav in W.P.(C) No.5555 of 2024 and

Petitioner-Chandan Yadav in W.P.(C) No.1808 of 2025

50.Mr. Animesh Verma, learned counsel appearing for respondent

Nos. 4 and 5 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 and petitioner in

Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, would submit that the controversy

involved in the present batch of writ petitions is required to be

examined from two perspectives. Firstly, the legality of the

removal of the private respondent from the post of Councillor of

Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, and

secondly, the consequential right of the petitioner, who has been

duly elected in the by-election conducted pursuant to the vacancy

31

created thereafter, to assume office and discharge his duties as

Councillor. He submits that the petitioner in Writ Petition (C)

No.1808/2025 has been elected after following the complete

statutory procedure prescribed under the Act of 1956 and the

election programme notified by the Chhattisgarh State Election

Commission. The election was conducted under the supervision

and control of the State Election Commission, and thereafter, the

petitioner was declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35,

Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, vide Gazette

Notification dated 24.02.2025 issued under Section 22 of the Act

of 1956. Therefore, the petitioner has acquired a statutory and

constitutional right to hold the office and discharge the functions

attached thereto.

51.Learned counsel submits that despite such declaration, the

petitioner has not been permitted to take oath and assume charge

only on account of the pendency of Writ Petition (C)

No.5555/2024 and the interim order dated 28.01.2025 passed

therein. It is submitted that the said interim order cannot be

interpreted as conferring any automatic right upon the removed

Councillor to continue in office or as nullifying the election process

which had already commenced and culminated in the declaration

of the petitioner as elected Councillor. He further submits that the

effect and operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024 passed by the

learned Divisional Commissioner and dated 04.09.2024 passed

by the appellate authority were stayed by this Court only as an

32

interim measure, but the said order does not amount to

restoration of the earlier Councillor to office. Once the order of

removal had been acted upon, the seat had fallen vacant, the

vacancy was notified by the State Election Commission and a

fresh election was conducted, the petitioner having been declared

elected cannot be denied the benefit of such democratic process.

52.Learned counsel submits that the entire election process is

governed by the constitutional mandate contained under Article

243-ZA of the Constitution of India. The State Election

Commission has the exclusive authority of superintendence,

direction and control over municipal elections. Therefore, once the

election process was completed and the petitioner was declared

elected, the executive authorities were bound to recognise and

give effect to such declaration. In support of the aforesaid

submission, learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India v.

Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held that the Courts should not ordinarily interfere with

the election process once it has commenced and the process

must be permitted to culminate in accordance with law. Learned

counsel submits that the principle underlying the said judgment is

that the sanctity of the electoral process has to be maintained and

the mandate expressed by the electorate cannot be defeated by

administrative action.

33

53.Learned counsel further places reliance upon the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief

Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has recognised the wide powers of the Election

Commission to ensure free and fair elections and has held that

the electoral process is a matter of constitutional importance. It is

submitted that the election conducted pursuant to the vacancy of

Ward No.35 was within the exclusive domain of the State Election

Commission and the declaration of the petitioner as elected

Councillor cannot be rendered ineffective by any administrative

inaction.

54.Learned counsel further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan

Uzzaman, (1985) 4 SCC 689, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has observed that the democratic process must be

protected and Courts should not adopt an approach which results

in frustrating the mandate of the electorate. Learned counsel

submits that the residents of Ward No.35 have exercised their

franchise and elected the petitioner, and therefore, denying him

the opportunity to function as Councillor amounts to denying

representation to the electorate.

55.Learned counsel submits that the private respondent cannot claim

automatic restoration merely on the basis of the interim order

passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024. The interim order only

34

suspends the operation of the impugned orders and does not

create a positive direction restoring the private respondent to

office. The petitioner, on the other hand, derives his right from a

completed election process. He places reliance upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam v.

Barak Upatyaka Damsanghathan, (2015) 3 SCC 628 , wherein

the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an interim order must be

understood in the context in which it is passed and cannot be

construed to grant substantive relief which has not been finally

adjudicated. Learned counsel submits that applying the said

principle, the interim order dated 28.01.2025 cannot be

interpreted to revive the office of the removed Councillor or nullify

the subsequent election.

56.Learned counsel further submits that if the private respondent was

aggrieved by the election of the petitioner, the remedy available to

him was by way of an election petition as provided under Section

441 of the Act of 1956. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India, cannot be utilised to indirectly challenge

the election of a returned candidate. In support of this submission,

learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691, wherein

it has been held that the right to challenge an election is purely a

statutory right and can be exercised only in the manner prescribed

by law. Learned counsel submits that respondent No.6 cannot

bypass the statutory remedy of election petition and seek to

35

obstruct the functioning of the petitioner through collateral

proceedings.

57.Learned counsel further submits that the allegations regarding the

caste status of the private respondent are already the subject

matter of adjudication in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024. However,

even assuming that the private respondent succeeds in the said

writ petition, such proceedings cannot automatically confer any

right upon him to displace the petitioner, who has already been

elected through a fresh election conducted by the competent

constitutional authority. He further submits that the challenge

raised by the private respondent regarding the caste certificate is

also without substance. The learned Divisional Commissioner had

not undertaken any exercise of determining the caste of the

private respondent. The enquiry was limited only to ascertain

whether the private respondent possessed a valid caste certificate

issued by the competent authority. Upon verification, the

concerned SDO (Revenue) informed that the alleged caste

certificate relied upon by the private respondent was not issued

from his office and the revenue case number mentioned therein

related to another person.

58.Learned counsel submits that the provisions of the Act of 2013

and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumari

Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal

Development, (1994) 6 SCC 241, would have no application in

36

the present case. It is submitted that the directions issued in

Madhuri Patil (supra) apply where a caste certificate has been

duly issued by the competent authority and thereafter its validity is

required to be verified. In the present case, the very issuance of

the certificate is disputed and the competent authority has stated

that no such certificate was ever issued in favour of the private

respondent. He further places reliance upon the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhubaneswar Development

Authority v. Madhumita Das, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 644 ,

wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that protecting an

ineligible person results in perpetuation of illegality and adversely

affects the rights of eligible persons. Learned counsel submits that

the same principle would apply conversely in the present matter,

as the petitioner is a duly elected candidate and his right cannot

be defeated on account of an interim order obtained in collateral

proceedings. He also places reliance upon the judgments of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bharat Singh Batham v. Life

Insurance Corporation of India, (2021) 3 MPLJ 337, Hemant

Batham v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P. No.30444/2025) and

Abhishek Agariya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P.

No.28917/2021), wherein it has been held that where the very

foundation of a caste certificate is under challenge and the

document itself is alleged to be forged or fabricated, the matter

stands on a different footing and the procedure applicable to

verification of a genuine caste certificate would not apply.

37

59.Learned counsel submits that the present case is not a case of

cancellation of a genuine caste certificate but a case where the

alleged certificate relied upon by the private respondent was

never issued by the competent authority. Therefore, the private

respondent cannot claim protection under the law meant for

genuine certificate holders. He further submits that the petitioner

in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025 has no connection with the

dispute regarding caste certificate and is only seeking

enforcement of his right flowing from a valid election. The

petitioner has been elected by the voters of Ward No.35 and his

oath-taking cannot be withheld indefinitely on account of a dispute

between the private respondent and the authorities. It is also

submitted that the continuation of the present situation would

result in Ward No.35 remaining without effective representation,

thereby causing prejudice to the residents of the ward. The

elected representative cannot be prevented from functioning

unless there exists a valid order setting aside his election.

60.Therefore, learned counsel prays that Writ Petition (C)

No.1808/2025 filed by the petitioner be allowed and the

respondents be directed to administer oath to the petitioner as

Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation

Bhilai, and permit him to discharge his duties in accordance with

law. It is further prayed that Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 filed

by the private respondent challenging the orders dated

06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 be dismissed and the interim order

38

passed therein be suitably modified so as not to obstruct the

functioning of the duly elected Councillor.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents No.6 and 7-

Chhattisgarh State Election Commission in W.P.(C) No.5555 of

2024 and Respondent No.4 in W.P.(C) No.1808 of 2025

61.Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned Senior Advocate assisted by

Ms. Shruti Bariar, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.

6 and 7 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 and respondent No.4 in

Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, would submit that the writ petition

filed by Mohammad Salman in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 is

devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed, whereas the writ

petition filed by Chandan Yadav in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025

is also not maintainable in view of the subsequent developments

and the statutory bar contained under the Constitution of India. It

is submitted that both the petitions arise out of the dispute relating

to the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal

Corporation, Bhilai, and the subsequent election conducted

pursuant to the vacancy created after the removal of petitioner

Mohammad Salman from the said post.

62.Learned Senior Counsel would submit that Mohammad Salman,

who was elected as Councillor from Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, had contested the election from an

OBC reserved seat. However, on the basis of proceedings

initiated under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, the Divisional

39

Commissioner, Durg, after due consideration of the material

available on record, passed an order dated 06.05.2024 removing

him from the post of Councillor. The said order was thereafter

affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 04.09.2024. It

is submitted that pursuant to the removal of Mohammad Salman,

a vacancy arose in Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal

Corporation, Bhilai. The said vacancy was duly communicated to

the Chhattisgarh State Election Commission, which, in exercise of

its constitutional powers under Article 243-ZA of the Constitution

of India, initiated the process for conducting a bye-election.

Accordingly, the State Election Commission issued election

notification dated 20.01.2025.

63.Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that during the

pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 preferred by

Mohammad Salman, this Court passed an interim order dated

28.01.2025 staying the effect and operation of the orders dated

06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024. However, the fact regarding issuance

of election notification dated 20.01.2025 and commencement of

the election process was not brought to the notice of this Court by

the petitioner. Therefore, Mohammad Salman cannot claim any

advantage on the basis of an interim order obtained without

placing the complete factual position before the Court.

64.Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the interim order dated

28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 did not

40

result in automatic restoration of Mohammad Salman as

Councillor nor did it nullify the election process which had already

commenced. Once the vacancy was notified and the constitutional

authority i.e. the State Election Commission had commenced the

election process, the same could not have been interfered with

except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the

election law. It is submitted that as per the election programme,

28.01.2025 was the last date for filing nomination papers. Two

candidates submitted their nomination forms and Mohammad

Salman was not one of the candidates. Thereafter, on 31.01.2025,

after withdrawal of nomination by one candidate, Chandan Yadav,

petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, was declared elected

as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation,

Bhilai, by the Returning Officer. It is further submitted by learned

Senior Counsel that Chandan Yadav, having been duly elected in

the election conducted by the competent constitutional authority,

cannot seek assumption of office through a writ petition when the

very election and declaration of result are governed by the

provisions of election law. Any challenge to the election can only

be made by way of an election petition and not by invoking

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

65.Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance upon the judgment

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India

Vs. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216, wherein it has been held

41

that once the election process has commenced, Courts should not

interfere with the election proceedings and the jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution must be exercised with restraint so

as not to interrupt, obstruct or protract the election process.

66.Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Anugrah Narain Singh & Another Vs. State

of U.P. & Others, (1996) 6 SCC 303, wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held that matters relating to elections cannot

be adjudicated in writ proceedings once the election process has

commenced and the aggrieved person must avail the statutory

remedy of election petition.

67.Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Article 243-

ZG(b) of the Constitution of India creates an express

constitutional bar against interference by Courts in municipal

elections except by way of an election petition. It is submitted that

the word "election" includes the entire process commencing from

issuance of election notification till declaration of result. Therefore,

after commencement of the election process pursuant to

notification dated 20.01.2025, no interference could have been

made by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He would

submit that Chandan Yadav, petitioner in Writ Petition (C)

No.1808/2025, has an alternative statutory remedy under the Act

of 1956, if he intends to question any aspect relating to the

election. Therefore, a direction for conducting oath ceremony or

42

permitting him to function as Councillor cannot be issued in the

present writ petition.

68.Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Mohammad

Salman cannot claim restoration of his position merely on the

basis of pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 because the

post of Councillor had already fallen vacant, the vacancy had

been notified, and the election process had culminated in

declaration of Chandan Yadav as the returned candidate. The

rights flowing from a valid election cannot be defeated by a mere

interim order passed in collateral proceedings. It is lastly

submitted that the State Election Commission and other

authorities have acted strictly in accordance with the constitutional

mandate and statutory provisions. The election of Chandan Yadav

has been conducted in accordance with law and, therefore, no

direction as sought by him in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025 is

warranted. Similarly, the challenge raised by Mohammad Salman

in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 has become devoid of

substance in view of subsequent events and the election

conducted for filling up the vacancy.

69.I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties

and perused the pleadings and material on record with utmost

circumspection.

70.From perusal of the order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the

Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department,

43

Government of Chhattisgarh, in an appeal preferred under

Section 19(3) of the Act of 1956, it transpires that the appellate

authority considered the challenge made by petitioner Mohammad

Salman against the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the

Divisional Commissioner, Durg, whereby he was removed from

the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal

Corporation, Bhilai, on the ground that he failed to establish that

he belonged to the OBC reserved category. The appellate

authority, after considering the material available on record,

including the Social Status Certificate relied upon by the petitioner

and the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg,

recorded a finding that no valid caste certificate under Section 4 of

the Act of 2013 had been issued in favour of the petitioner. It was

further observed that in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, the

burden of proving the claim of belonging to the reserved category

was upon the petitioner, which he failed to discharge.

Consequently, the appellate authority upheld the order dated

06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg,

removing the petitioner from the post of Councillor under Section

19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956.

71.Further, from perusal of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the

learned Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg in Case

No.133/B-128/2023-24, it appears that the proceedings were

initiated on an application filed by Bhojraj and Chandan Yadav

under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, seeking removal of

44

the petitioner Mohd. Salman, elected Councillor of Ward No.35,

Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, on the ground that he

had contested the election from an OBC reserved seat on the

basis of an invalid caste certificate. The learned Divisional

Commissioner, after granting opportunity of hearing to the parties

and considering the material available on record, proceeded to

examine the validity of the caste certificate relied upon by the

petitioner.

72.It is reflected from the order that the learned Commissioner relied

upon the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer

(Revenue), Durg, whereby it was informed that the caste

certificate issued is the basis of case bearing No.363/B-121/2015-

16 dated 15.06.2016, relied upon by the petitioner, was not

recorded in the relevant Daaira Register in the name of Mohd.

Salman, but was found recorded in the name of one Nomita

Deshmukh, daughter of Yuvraj Deshmukh. Taking note of the

provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, the learned

Commissioner held that the burden to establish that the petitioner

belonged to the reserved category was upon him and that the

petitioner had failed to prove the genuineness and validity of the

OBC certificate issued by the competent authority.

73.While dealing with the objection raised by the petitioner regarding

reference of the matter to the High Level Scrutiny Committee, the

learned Commissioner considered the law laid down by the

45

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), wherein

the procedure for verification of caste certificates was prescribed.

However, it was observed that the said mechanism would apply

only when a caste certificate has been issued by the competent

authority and the issue relates to its genuineness. The learned

Commissioner further relied upon the judgment of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court in Abhishek Agariya v. State of Madhya

Pradesh & Others, W.P.(C) No.28917 of 2021, decided on

05.10.2023, wherein it was held that all non-genuine documents

cannot be treated as forged documents, but where the issuing

authority itself certifies that the caste certificate was never issued

from its office, the matter would not fall within the ambit of

verification by the Scrutiny Committee as contemplated in

Madhuri Patil (supra).

74.The learned Commissioner also considered the judgment of this

Court in Smt. Babita Balmiki v. Amrika Bai & Others, 2017 (1)

C.G.L.J. 603 (DB) and the judgment in Vidyadhar Aghariya v.

State of Chhattisgarh & Others, AIR 2015 (NOC) 724

(Chhattisgarh), relied upon by the petitioner, but distinguished

the same on facts. It was held that in the present case the very

issuance of the caste certificate by the competent authority was in

dispute and, therefore, the question of sending the matter for

caste scrutiny did not arise.

75.Consequently, the learned Divisional Commissioner recorded a

46

finding that the petitioner had failed to establish that he belonged

to the OBC category for which Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, was reserved and, exercising

jurisdiction under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, directed

his removal from the office of Councillor. The said order was

subsequently affirmed by the Secretary, Urban Administration and

Development Department, Chhattisgarh, vide order dated

04.09.2024 passed in an appeal preferred under Section 19(3) of

the Act of 1956.

76.It transpires from the order dated 28.01.2025 passed by Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 that

an interim protection was granted in favour of the petitioner

Mohammad Salman. The petitioner had challenged the order

dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg

Division, Durg, whereby he was removed from the post of

Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai, under Section

19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, as well as the subsequent appellate

order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the State Government. The

Court, while considering the rival submissions, observed that the

finding recorded by the Divisional Commissioner regarding the

caste status of the petitioner was based solely on the report dated

07.03.2024 submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),

Durg. The Court further observed that the issue relating to the

validity of the social status certificate ought to have been

examined by the District Level Caste Scrutiny Committee

47

constituted under the Act of 2013, and that without such scrutiny,

an adverse conclusion regarding the caste status of the petitioner

could not have been drawn.

77.Accordingly, considering the facts and circumstances of the case,

the Court, as an interim measure, stayed the effect and operation

of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional

Commissioner, Durg, and the appellate order dated 04.09.2024

passed by the State Government, till further orders. Thus, the

interim order dated 28.01.2025 operates in favour of the

petitioner–Mohammad Salman by restoring interim protection

against his removal from the post of Councillor.

78.It is pertinent to note that although this Hon’ble Court, vide order

dated 28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024,

had stayed the effect and operation of the order dated 06.05.2024

passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, and

the subsequent appellate order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the

State Government, the said interim order could not be brought to

the notice of the election authorities before completion of the

election process. In the meantime, pursuant to the election

notification dated 20.01.2025, the process for conducting the by-

election had already commenced and the last date for filing

nomination was 28.01.2025. Since no communication regarding

the interim order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court

was received by the concerned authorities at the relevant point of

48

time, the election proceedings continued in accordance with the

notified election programme. Consequently, after withdrawal of

nomination by one of the candidates on 31.01.2025, the Returning

Officer declared the remaining candidate, namely Chandan

Yadav, as the returned candidate for Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Bhilai, on the same day. Thus, the declaration of election result in

favour of Chandan Yadav was not in defiance of the order dated

28.01.2025, but was a consequence of the election process which

had already reached its concluding stage before receipt of

intimation of the interim order by the election authorities.

79.At this stage, it would be apposite to examine the statutory

framework governing the controversy. The principal issue involved

in the present batch of writ petitions centres around the scope and

ambit of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The said provision

confers power upon the Divisional Commissioner to remove an

elected Councillor where it is found that the Councillor does not

belong to the category for which the particular seat was reserved.

The provision has been incorporated by the Legislature with the

avowed object of preserving the sanctity of reservation in local

self-government institutions and to ensure that a public office

reserved for a particular class of citizens is not occupied by a

person who is not legally entitled to claim such reservation.

80.The legislative intent behind incorporation of Section 19(1)(a-1) of

the Act of 1956 is manifest. Reservation in favour of Scheduled

49

Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and other

reserved categories is a constitutional mechanism intended to

secure adequate representation to historically disadvantaged

sections of society. Such constitutional protection would become

illusory if persons not belonging to the reserved category are

permitted to occupy offices reserved exclusively for those

communities by producing incorrect, fabricated or otherwise

invalid documents. Therefore, the Legislature has consciously

created a separate statutory remedy empowering the Divisional

Commissioner to examine whether an elected Councillor

possessed the requisite eligibility to contest from a reserved

constituency.

81.The principal contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad

Salman is that the Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to

examine his eligibility and that the dispute necessarily required

reference to the District Level Verification Committee or the High

Power Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted under the Act of

2013. This submission, though attractive at first blush, cannot

withstand judicial scrutiny in the peculiar facts of the present case.

82.In the present case, Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal

Corporation, Bhilai, stood reserved for candidates belonging to

the Other Backward Class category. Mohammad Salman

contested the election claiming himself to belong to the Kunjda

caste, which is recognised as an OBC community in the State of

50

Chhattisgarh. It was only on the strength of such claim that he

became eligible to contest the election from the said reserved

ward. Consequently, once serious allegations were raised that the

social status certificate relied upon by him had never been issued

by the competent authority and did not genuinely belong to him,

the statutory jurisdiction under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of

1956 stood rightly invoked.

83.Section 19 of the Act of 1956 reads as under:-

“19. Removal of Councillors.-(1) The

Divisional Commissioner may, at any time,

remove any elected [....] councillor :-

(a) if his continuance as a councillor is not, in

the opinion of the Divisional Commissioner,

desirable in the interests of the public or the

Corporation; or

(a-1) if it is found that he does not belong to

the reserved category for which the seat was

reserve, or;]

(b) if the Corporation has, by a resolution

supported by at least two-third of the total

number of councillors; recommend that a

councillor is not fit to continue as a councillor

on account of misconduct in the discharge of

his duties or disgraceful conduct and should

therefore be removed.

(2) The Divisional Commissioner may, while

ordering the removal under sub-section (3) of

Section 23 or this section, also order that

51

such councillor, shall not be eligible to

become a councillor of a Corporation for a

period which shall be specified in the order

and which shall not exceed five years :

Provided that no resolution recommending

the removal of any councillor shall be passed

by the Corporation nor any such order of

removal shall be passed by the Divisional

Commissioner unless such councillor has

been given a reasonably opportunity of

showing cause why a recommendation

should not be made for his removal or why he

should not be removed from his office.

(3) An appeal against the order passed under

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of this

section or Section 18 shall lie to the State

Government within 30 days of the date on

which the order is conveyed to the aggrieved

party. The State Government may after giving

a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass

such order on the appeal as it may think fit.”

84.A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it abundantly

clear that the jurisdiction of the Divisional Commissioner is not

intended to adjudicate election disputes in the conventional

sense. Rather, the provision empowers the Commissioner to

enquire into a statutory disqualification arising after or in relation

to the election where it is found that the elected Councillor was

never entitled to occupy the reserved office because he did not

belong to the category for which the seat had been earmarked.

52

85.The expression "if it is found" employed by the Legislature

assumes considerable significance. The Legislature has advisedly

not confined such enquiry to the findings of an Election Tribunal.

Instead, it has authorised the Divisional Commissioner to

independently enquire into the existence of the statutory

disqualification after following principles of natural justice. Thus,

whenever credible material is produced demonstrating that an

elected Councillor does not belong to the reserved category, the

Commissioner is duty-bound to examine the matter and arrive at

an independent conclusion.

86.Such power cannot be rendered otiose by importing limitations

which the Legislature itself has consciously omitted. Acceptance

of the contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad Salman that

the Commissioner could not enquire into the issue at all would

virtually defeat the very object behind insertion of Section 19(1)(a-

1), for every person obtaining election from a reserved

constituency by producing false documents would continue to

hold office merely because no election petition had been filed.

Such an interpretation would defeat both the statutory scheme

and the constitutional mandate underlying reservation.

87.Sub-section (3) of Section 19 further provides a statutory

appellate remedy against every order passed by the Divisional

Commissioner under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The

appellate jurisdiction has been conferred upon the State

53

Government, thereby providing a complete mechanism of

adjudication under the statute itself.

88.The jurisdiction conferred upon the Divisional Commissioner

under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 is neither incidental

nor ancillary to the election process; rather, it is an independent

statutory power intended to examine whether the very eligibility on

the strength of which an elected representative occupied a

reserved seat survives judicial and factual scrutiny. Once the

competent authority, after affording due opportunity of hearing and

after considering the material available on record, records a

finding that the elected Councillor does not belong to the reserved

category for which the seat was reserved, the statute itself

mandates the consequence that such Councillor becomes liable

to be removed from office. The provision, therefore, creates not

merely a procedural mechanism but also a substantive statutory

consequence.

89.Further, Section 23 of the Act of 1956 reads as under :-

“23. Resignation of Speaker & Councillors.-

(1) The Speaker or any Councillor may resign

his office by tendering his resignation in

writing to the Mayor who shall forward the

same to the Divisional Commissioner and if

the Speaker or such Councillor, as the case

may be, desires he may also send a copy of

his resignation directly to the Divisional

Commissioner.

54

(2) On receipt of the resignation under sub-

section (1), the Divisional Commissioner shall

;-

(i) if satisfied about its genuineness, accept

the resignation and notify the fact of such

resignation and the occurrence of casual

vacancy by reason of such resignation in the

Gazette;

(ii) if not satisfied about its genuineness, not

accept the resignation for reasons to be

recorded in writing.

(3) If it appears to the Divisional

Commissioner that any Councillor having

become liable for removal under Section 19

has tendered his resignation to escape such

removal, then notwithstanding anything

contained in this section, the Divisional

Commissioner may order his removal in

accordance with the provisions of the said

section and thereupon the Councillor shall be

deemed to have been removed from the date

he resigned his office.”

90.A bare perusal of Section 23 of the Act of 1956 makes it manifest

that the resignation of the Speaker or a Councillor does not

become effective merely upon submission of a written resignation.

The statutory scheme envisages a complete procedure whereby

the resignation is first tendered in writing to the Mayor, who is

required to forward the same to the Divisional Commissioner.

Upon receipt of such resignation, the Divisional Commissioner is

55

under a statutory obligation to satisfy himself as to its

genuineness. It is only upon recording such satisfaction and

accepting the resignation that the Divisional Commissioner is

required to notify the fact of acceptance and the resultant casual

vacancy in the Official Gazette. Conversely, if the Divisional

Commissioner is not satisfied about the genuineness of the

resignation, he is empowered to refuse acceptance by recording

reasons in writing. Sub-section (3) further confers a special power

upon the Divisional Commissioner to decline to give effect to a

resignation where it appears that the Councillor has tendered the

same with a view to escaping removal under Section 19, and

instead to proceed with removal in accordance with law. Thus, the

legislative intent is clear that a resignation under Section 23

attains legal efficacy only upon its acceptance by the Divisional

Commissioner after due satisfaction regarding its genuineness

and the consequential notification in the Official Gazette; until

such statutory requirements are fulfilled, the resignation cannot be

said to have become operative in the eyes of law.

91.Equally significant is the scheme of Section 23(3) of the Act of

1956. The said provision makes it abundantly clear that once a

Councillor incurs the statutory disqualification and an order of

removal is passed by the competent authority, the office held by

such Councillor cannot continue to remain occupied. The

inevitable consequence is that the seat falls vacant and the

vacancy is required to be filled in accordance with the election law

56

by the competent Election Commission. Thus, Sections 19 and 23

operate in complete harmony with each other, while Section 19 of

the Act of 1956 identifies and adjudicates the statutory

disqualification, Section 23 of the Act of 1956 provides for the

legal consequence flowing from such adjudication. Both

provisions constitute an integrated statutory scheme intended to

maintain the purity of electoral representation in reserved

constituencies.

92.This Court is of the considered opinion that the expression "does

not belong to the reserved category" occurring in Section 19(1)(a-

1) of the Act of 1956 is of wide amplitude. It is not confined merely

to cases where the caste of a candidate is subsequently

invalidated by a Scrutiny Committee. The expression is wide

enough to include a situation where the very document on the

basis of which the candidate claimed eligibility is demonstrated to

be forged, fabricated or never issued by the competent authority.

To hold otherwise would defeat the very object sought to be

achieved by the Legislature and would permit an individual to

continue occupying a constitutionally reserved public office on the

strength of fraudulent documents until separate proceedings

before another authority attain finality. Such an interpretation

would not only frustrate the statutory object but would also

encourage abuse of the reservation policy.

93.Applying the aforesaid statutory scheme to the facts of the present

57

case, this Court finds that the Divisional Commissioner has

exercised the jurisdiction strictly within the four corners of Section

19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The proceedings were initiated

pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court in Writ Petition (C)

No.1015 of 2024. Notices were issued to all concerned parties;

adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded; documentary as

well as oral material was considered; and thereafter a categorical

finding of fact has been recorded that the social status certificate

relied upon by Mohammad Salman was never issued by the office

of the competent Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue). The

competent issuing authority itself has unequivocally stated that no

such caste certificate was ever issued in favour of Mohammad

Salman and that the particulars contained therein relate to an

altogether different person. The finding is further fortified by the

registration of FIR No.103 of 2024 alleging use of forged

documents.

94.Once the competent issuing authority itself disowns the issuance

of the caste certificate, the controversy no longer remains one

requiring verification of social status by the High Level Caste

Scrutiny Committee. The present case is fundamentally different

from a case where a genuine caste certificate is issued by the

competent authority but its correctness or validity is questioned.

Here, the very existence and genuineness of the certificate stand

demolished by the issuing authority itself. Therefore, the argument

that the matter ought to have been referred to the District Level

58

Verification Committee or the High Level Caste Scrutiny

Committee deserves outright rejection.

95.Accordingly, after the Divisional Commissioner passed the order

dated 06.05.2024 directing removal of Mohammad Salman from

the office of Councillor, the petitioner availed the statutory remedy

by preferring an appeal before the Secretary, Urban

Administration and Development Department, Government of

Chhattisgarh. The appellate authority re-appreciated the entire

material available on record including the report submitted by the

Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, the documents relied

upon by Mohammad Salman and the findings recorded by the

Divisional Commissioner.

96.The appellate authority ultimately concurred with the findings

recorded by the Commissioner that the petitioner failed to

establish his entitlement to contest the election from an OBC

reserved constituency. It further recorded that the Social Status

Certificate relied upon by the petitioner was not traceable in the

official records and the competent authority had specifically

reported that no such certificate had ever been issued in favour of

Mohammad Salman. Consequently, the appellate authority

dismissed the appeal by order dated 04.09.2024. Therefore, both

the original authority as well as the appellate authority have

concurrently recorded findings of fact against Mohammad Salman

after granting full opportunity of hearing. It is well settled that

59

concurrent findings recorded by statutory authorities, particularly

findings based upon appreciation of documentary evidence, are

not liable to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless

demonstrated to be perverse, arbitrary or wholly unsupported by

evidence. Upon careful examination of the records produced

before this Court, no such perversity is demonstrated.

97.The contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad Salman that

the entire proceedings were not maintainable and that the only

remedy available to the aggrieved parties was to institute an

election petition under Section 441 of the Act of 1956 does not

merit acceptance. This issue is no longer res integra.

98.It is pertinent to notice that even before the proceedings

culminating in the impugned order were initiated, Chandan Yadav

had approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of

2024 seeking consideration of his complaint regarding the

continuance of Mohammad Salman as Councillor despite his

alleged ineligibility to contest from the reserved seat. A Coordinate

Bench of this Court, by order dated 19.02.2024, while considering

the statutory scheme of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956,

categorically held that where the allegation is that an elected

Councillor does not belong to the reserved category for which the

seat stood reserved, the statute itself provides a specific remedy

before the Divisional Commissioner.

99.The Co-ordinate Bench further distinguished such proceedings

60

from an election dispute under Section 441 of the Act of 1956.

The Court observed that a challenge to the validity of the electoral

process and an enquiry into statutory disqualification arising from

false claim of reserved status operate in entirely different fields.

While an election petition questions the legality of the election

process itself, proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of

1956 examine whether the elected person possessed the

essential eligibility prescribed by statute to continue in office.

100.The aforesaid distinction is of considerable significance. The

Legislature itself has consciously created two distinct remedies

dealing with two entirely different situations. Therefore, it is

impermissible to obliterate the statutory distinction by insisting that

every case involving fraudulent claim of reservation must

necessarily be tried only through an election petition.

101.The submission that the Divisional Commissioner lacked

jurisdiction to enquire into the caste status of Mohammad Salman

also deserves to be rejected. It is required to be appreciated that

the Commissioner has not undertaken an anthropological

determination of the caste of Mohammad Salman nor has he

adjudicated upon any disputed question relating to his genealogy

or ethnic origin. The enquiry conducted by the Commissioner was

confined to determining whether the petitioner had produced a

valid and legally issued social status certificate entitling him to

contest the election from an OBC reserved constituency.

61

102.The foundation of the petitioner's eligibility rested entirely upon

one social status certificate bearing Revenue Case No.363/B-

121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016. During enquiry, the competent

Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, after verification of official

records, categorically reported that the said certificate had never

been issued from his office and that the concerned revenue case

number related to another individual altogether, namely Nomita

Deshmukh.

103.Once the issuing authority itself certifies that the document relied

upon by the elected candidate was never issued from its office,

the Commissioner was fully justified in concluding that the

petitioner had failed to establish his eligibility under Section 19(1)

(a-1) of the Act of 1956. Such an enquiry cannot be equated with

determination of caste by a Caste Scrutiny Committee.

104.The distinction between a case involving verification of an

admittedly issued caste certificate and a case involving a

document which is alleged never to have been issued by the

competent authority assumes decisive importance in the present

matter.

105.The elaborate procedure contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil

(supra) and subsequently incorporated in the Act of 2013 is

intended to examine the correctness of an existing caste

certificate validly issued by a competent authority. Such procedure

presupposes the existence of a genuine certificate requiring

62

verification. The present case stands on an entirely different

footing. Here, the competent revenue authority itself has

categorically certified that the caste certificate relied upon by

Mohammad Salman was never issued from its office.

Consequently, there existed no genuine certificate capable of

being referred to the District Level Verification Committee or the

High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee. In absence of an existing

certificate, the question of its verification simply does not arise.

106.The Divisional Commissioner as well as the appellate authority

have rightly relied upon this distinction while declining to refer the

matter to the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee. This Court

finds no legal infirmity in the said approach. Acceptance of the

contrary argument would lead to an anomalous situation where

even documents found to be non-existent or fabricated in official

records would necessarily require reference to the Scrutiny

Committee, thereby defeating the purpose of the statutory

provisions and encouraging fraudulent claims to public office.

107.Having considered the statutory framework and the rival

submissions, this Court now proceeds to examine whether the

findings recorded by the Divisional Commissioner, as affirmed by

the appellate authority, suffer from any jurisdictional error,

perversity or patent illegality warranting interference under Article

226 of the Constitution of India.

108.From a careful perusal of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by

63

the Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, it is evident that the

authority did not proceed on mere suspicion or conjectures.

Rather, the proceedings were conducted after issuing notice to all

concerned parties, permitting them to file pleadings, affidavits and

documentary evidence and thereafter affording adequate

opportunity of hearing. The order demonstrates that the Divisional

Commissioner has dealt with every contention advanced on

behalf of Mohammad Salman and has assigned cogent reasons

while arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to

establish his eligibility to contest the election from a seat reserved

for the Other Backward Class category.

109.The principal basis of the claim of Mohammad Salman was the

Social Status Certificate purportedly issued by the Sub-Divisional

Officer (Revenue), Durg, bearing Revenue Case No.363/B-

121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016. During the enquiry, the Divisional

Commissioner sought verification from the issuing authority itself.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, after examining the

original revenue records and Daaira Register maintained in the

office, categorically reported that the aforesaid certificate had

never been issued in favour of Mohammad Salman. On the

contrary, the revenue case number relied upon by him pertained

to another individual, namely Nomita Deshmukh, daughter of

Yuvraj Deshmukh. Thus, the very foundation on which

Mohammad Salman asserted his eligibility stood demolished by

the official records of the issuing authority itself.

64

110.The petitioner was afforded full opportunity to rebut the said

report. However, except making a general assertion that he

belonged to the Kunjda community, he failed to produce any

contemporaneous record issued by the competent authority

substantiating that the disputed social status certificate had in fact

been issued in his favour. No explanation worth acceptance was

forthcoming as to how the revenue case number relating to

another person came to be reflected on the certificate relied upon

by him. Such a serious discrepancy goes to the root of the matter

and strikes at the very legitimacy of the petitioner's claim to

occupy a seat reserved for the OBC category.

111.Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel appearing for

Mohammad Salman on the contention that the dispute essentially

related to the determination of his caste and, therefore, the

authorities ought to have referred the matter to the District Level

Verification Committee or the High Level Caste Scrutiny

Committee constituted under the Act of 2013. This submission,

though attractive at first blush, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny

when examined in the backdrop of the facts of the present case.

112.It is trite that the mechanism prescribed under the Act of 2013, as

well as the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) is attracted where there exists a

social status certificate admittedly issued by the competent

authority and the correctness of the caste claim is required to be

65

verified. Such verification may involve examination of

genealogical records, anthropological traits, historical documents

and other relevant evidence. However, the present case does not

involve such an enquiry. Here, the issuing authority itself has

categorically stated that the certificate relied upon by Mohammad

Salman had never been issued from its office. Therefore, the

controversy is not whether Mohammad Salman actually belongs

to the Kunjda caste, but whether the document on the basis of

which he claimed eligibility to contest from a reserved

constituency is genuine at all.

113.These two issues operate in distinct legal fields. Where the

existence of the certificate itself is denied by the issuing authority,

the matter does not fall within the scope of "verification"

contemplated under the Act of 2013. A verification proceeding

presupposes the existence of a validly issued certificate. If the

official records themselves disclose that no such certificate ever

came into existence, there remains nothing which could be

referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification.

114.The distinction has rightly been appreciated by the Divisional

Commissioner while placing reliance upon the decision of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abhishek Agariya (supra), wherein

it has been held that cases involving non-existent or fabricated

certificates stand on an entirely different footing from cases

requiring verification of an existing certificate. This Court finds

66

itself in respectful agreement with the aforesaid principle.

115.The submission that the Commissioner could not have relied upon

the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) also

deserves to be rejected. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),

Durg, was none other than the competent authority maintaining

the original records relating to issuance of social status

certificates. The report submitted by such authority was based

upon verification of the official registers maintained in the ordinary

course of official business. Such public records enjoy a

presumption of correctness unless displaced by cogent evidence.

116.Significantly, Mohammad Salman did not produce any original

office record, dispatch register, certified extract or any

communication issued by the competent authority demonstrating

that the disputed certificate had actually been issued in his favour.

Nor did he seek production of any contrary official record capable

of discrediting the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer.

117.In writ proceedings, this Court does not sit as an appellate

authority over factual findings recorded by statutory authorities.

Unless such findings are shown to be perverse, arbitrary or based

on no evidence whatsoever, interference would not be justified. In

the present case, the conclusions recorded by both the Divisional

Commissioner and the appellate authority are founded upon

official records maintained by the issuing authority and cannot be

characterised as either arbitrary or perverse. Consequently, this

67

Court finds no reason to substitute its own opinion for the

concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below.

118.The next contention urged on behalf of Mohammad Salman is that

the proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 were

barred in view of the remedy of an election petition available

under Section 441 of the Act of 1956. This submission is equally

devoid of merit. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, while

deciding Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of 2024, has already examined

the very same objection and has categorically held that

proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) constitute an independent

statutory remedy intended to deal with cases where an elected

Councillor is alleged not to belong to the reserved category for

which the seat stood reserved. The distinction drawn by the

Coordinate Bench is both logical and legally sound.

119.An election petition ordinarily examines the legality of the election

process, improper acceptance or rejection of nomination, corrupt

practices or other grounds recognised by election law. On the

other hand, Section 19(1)(a-1) deals with a statutory

disqualification affecting the continuance of an elected Councillor

in office. The Legislature, being conscious of the importance of

preserving reservation in local bodies, has specifically empowered

the Divisional Commissioner to enquire into such questions

independently. If the argument of Mohammad Salman is

accepted, Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 would become

68

redundant. Every case where a person occupies a reserved office

by producing false or invalid documents would necessarily be

relegated to the election tribunal, rendering the special statutory

mechanism enacted by the Legislature wholly otiose. Such an

interpretation cannot be accepted.

120.It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that every

provision enacted by the Legislature must be given meaningful

effect and no provision should be interpreted in a manner that

renders it nugatory. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in

holding that proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of

1956 are independent of proceedings under Section 441 of the

Act of 1956 and both operate in separate spheres.

121.Viewed from another angle, acceptance of the petitioner's

contention would have serious consequences upon the

constitutional scheme governing reservation in democratic

institutions. Reservation of seats in favour of Scheduled Castes,

Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes is intended to

secure meaningful political participation of the weaker sections of

society. Such constitutional protection cannot be permitted to be

diluted by allowing persons who fail to establish their eligibility to

continue occupying reserved offices merely on technical pleas

relating to jurisdiction.

122.The facts of the present case clearly reveal that Mohammad

Salman derived his eligibility to contest the election exclusively

69

from the social status certificate relied upon by him. Once the

competent authority itself reported that such certificate had never

been issued and the petitioner failed to establish otherwise

despite full opportunity, the inevitable consequence under Section

19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 was that he could no longer continue

to occupy the reserved office of Councillor. This Court, therefore,

finds that both the Divisional Commissioner as well as the

appellate authority have correctly appreciated the statutory

provisions and the material placed on record. Their concurrent

finding that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his entitlement

to contest the election from the OBC reserved seat neither suffers

from perversity nor from any jurisdictional infirmity. Consequently,

the challenge laid to the orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024

cannot be sustained.

123.Further, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

determination made by the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee

with regard to the caste status of Mohammad Salman also cannot

be sustained in the present proceedings, as the issue involved

before this Court is not as to whether Mohammad Salman

belongs to any particular caste on the basis of any subsequent

enquiry conducted by the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee,

but the real controversy revolves around the validity and

genuineness of the caste certificate submitted by Mohammad

Salman along with his nomination papers at the time of contesting

the election for the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda

70

Para, Bhilai.

124.The election of Mohammad Salman was based upon the caste

certificate produced by him claiming himself to be belonging to

Kunjda caste, which is included in the Other Backward Class

(OBC) category. Therefore, the relevant consideration before the

competent authority was whether the said caste certificate, on the

basis of which Mohammad Salman claimed reservation benefit

and contested the election from a reserved category seat, was

genuine, valid and issued in accordance with the prescribed

procedure or not.

125.The subsequent exercise undertaken by the High Level Caste

Scrutiny Committee for determination of caste status of

Mohammad Salman cannot substitute or cure the illegality

attached to the caste certificate which was produced at the time of

filing nomination papers. The eligibility of a candidate to contest

an election from a reserved category seat has to be examined on

the basis of the statutory requirements and documents submitted

by such candidate at the relevant point of time. If the very

foundation, i.e. the caste certificate relied upon by the candidate,

is found to be invalid or forged, the consequences prescribed

under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 would

automatically follow.

126.The High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee is empowered to verify

the caste status of an individual; however, such determination has

71

to be made strictly in accordance with the statutory procedure and

by considering the relevant material placed before it. In the

present case, since the controversy before this Court pertains to

the legality of the caste certificate produced along with nomination

papers and the consequential disqualification arising therefrom,

the determination made by the High Level Caste Scrutiny

Committee does not have any bearing on the issue which is

required to be adjudicated in the present writ petition. The

question before this Court is confined to examining whether

Mohammad Salman had validly claimed the benefit of reservation

on the basis of a genuine caste certificate at the time of election

and whether the subsequent action taken by the competent

authority under the Act of 1956 suffers from any illegality or not.

127.The second issue which falls for consideration before this Court is

regarding the validity of the subsequent election process initiated

for filling up the vacancy caused due to removal of Mohammad

Salman from the office of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Bhilai.

128.From the material available on record, it is evident that after

passing of the order of removal of Mohammad Salman under

Section 23(3) of the Act of 1956, the Election Commissioner

initiated proceedings for conducting a fresh election for filling up

the vacant seat of Councillor. However, the fact regarding initiation

of such election proceedings was not brought to the notice of this

72

Court when the order dated 28.01.2025 was passed.

129.It is an admitted position that the order dated 28.01.2025 passed

by this Court was limited in its scope, whereby the effect and

operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 passed

by the Commissioner were stayed. The said interim order was

passed in relation to the challenge made to the removal

proceedings initiated against Mohammad Salman and did not

prohibit or restrain the statutory authorities from taking steps for

conducting an election to fill up a vacancy which had already

occurred on account of removal of an elected Councillor.

130.Once the office of Councillor became vacant, the Election

Commissioner, being the authority empowered under the relevant

provisions of law, was required to initiate the election process for

filling up the said vacancy. The initiation of election proceedings

and conduct of election thereafter fall within the exclusive domain

of the election authorities.

131.It is a settled principle of law that once the election process has

commenced, the constitutional bar contained under Article 329 of

the Constitution of India comes into operation and the Courts

ordinarily cannot interfere with the electoral process. Article 329(b)

of the Constitution of India specifically provides that no election to

Parliament or State Legislature shall be called in question except

by an election petition, and the said principle has consistently

been extended to ensure that the election process, once set in

73

motion, reaches its logical conclusion without judicial interference.

132.The object behind such constitutional restriction is to prevent

disruption of the election process and to ensure that the

democratic exercise is completed in accordance with law.

Therefore, once the election proceedings for Ward No.35, Sharda

Para, Bhilai were initiated by the competent authority, this Court

cannot examine the legality of such proceedings in the present

writ jurisdiction.

133.In view of the aforesaid legal position, the election conducted for

filling up the vacant post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda

Para, Bhilai and the consequential declaration of Chandan Yadav

as elected Councillor without contest cannot be said to be illegal

or contrary to law. The order dated 28.01.2025 did not operate as

a bar against conducting a fresh election, as the vacancy had

arisen due to the statutory consequence of removal of

Mohammad Salman and the election process was initiated by the

competent election authority in accordance with law. Accordingly,

this Court is of the considered opinion that the election process

initiated for filling up the vacant seat of Councillor of Ward No.35,

Sharda Para, Bhilai could not have been interdicted by this Court

in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, particularly in view of the constitutional mandate contained

under Article 329 of the Constitution of India.

134.Once the caste certificate relied upon by Mohammad Salman for

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claiming reservation benefit as a candidate belonging to Kunjda

caste (OBC category) was found to be forged and invalid, the

consequential action taken by the competent authority cannot be

faulted. The submission of an invalid caste certificate for obtaining

benefit of reservation strikes at the very root of the eligibility of a

candidate to contest from a reserved category seat.

135.The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is

that once the petitioner had produced a Social Status Certificate

claiming that he belonged to the Kunjda caste (OBC), neither the

learned Divisional Commissioner nor the Sub-Divisional Officer

(Revenue), Durg, could have recorded any adverse finding

regarding the validity of the said certificate. According to the

petitioner, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), the question relating to

the correctness or validity of a caste certificate can be adjudicated

only by the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted

under the Chhattisgarh Social Status Certification Act, 2013. It is,

therefore, contended that the report dated 07.03.2024 submitted

by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, stating that the

caste certificate relied upon by the petitioner was not traceable in

the official records and stood recorded in the name of another

person, was wholly without jurisdiction and could not have formed

the sole basis for passing the order dated 06.05.2024 removing

the petitioner from office of Councillor under Section 19(1)(a-1) of

the Act of 1956.

75

136.The aforesaid submission, though attractive at first blush, cannot

be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

The procedure contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra)

comes into operation where a caste certificate has in fact been

issued by the competent authority and the dispute pertains to

verification of the social status of the holder of such certificate.

However, the present case stands on an entirely different footing.

The report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),

Durg, categorically records that the alleged caste certificate

bearing Case No.363/B-121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016, relied

upon by the petitioner, was not found entered in the relevant

Daaira Register in the name of Mohammad Salman; rather, the

corresponding entry related to one Nomita Deshmukh, daughter

of Yuvraj Deshmukh.

137.Thus, the issue was not merely one of verification of caste status,

but of the very existence and genuineness of the document relied

upon by the petitioner. Once the issuing authority itself certified

that no such certificate had ever been issued in favour of the

petitioner, the matter ceased to be one requiring adjudication by

the Caste Scrutiny Committee under the principles laid down in

Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra). In such circumstances, the

competent authority was fully justified in reporting that the

document relied upon by the petitioner was not a genuine caste

certificate, and the learned Divisional Commissioner was

competent to consider such material while exercising jurisdiction

76

under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 for determining

whether the petitioner possessed the essential eligibility to contest

the election from a ward reserved for the Other Backward Class

category.

138.It is well settled that there exists a clear distinction between a

false social status certificate and a non-genuine or fabricated

social status certificate. A false certificate is one which has in fact

been issued by the competent authority, but its issuance has been

procured by the applicant by suppressing material facts or by

furnishing incorrect or misleading information regarding his caste

or social status. In such cases, the document is a genuine official

certificate, though its procurement is alleged to be fraudulent,

thereby requiring verification by the competent Caste Scrutiny

Committee. On the other hand, where the competent authority

itself certifies that the alleged caste certificate was never issued

from its office or that the particulars contained therein do not

correspond with the official records maintained by it, the dispute is

not merely one of verification of social status but relates to the

very authenticity and existence of the document relied upon by

the claimant.

139.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

it is evident that the report dated 07.03.2024 submitted by the

Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, categorically records that

the Social Status Certificate bearing Case No.363/B-121/2015-16

77

dated 15.06.2016, relied upon by the petitioner Mohammad

Salman, was not entered in the relevant Daaira Register in his

name. On verification of the official records, the corresponding

entry was found recorded in the name of Nomita Deshmukh,

daughter of Yuvraj Deshmukh. Thus, the competent authority itself

reported that no such caste certificate had ever been issued in

favour of the petitioner. In such circumstances, the controversy

did not relate to verification of the petitioner's caste status on the

basis of a validly issued certificate, but to the genuineness of the

very document relied upon by him for contesting the election from

a ward reserved for the Other Backward Class category.

140.Once the issuing authority itself reports that the alleged caste

certificate was never issued from its office and that the official

records do not support the petitioner's claim, the question of

referring such a document to the District Level or High Power

Caste Scrutiny Committee does not arise. The mechanism

contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) is attracted only

where a caste certificate has been issued by the competent

authority and the dispute concerns verification of the social status

of its holder. The said procedure cannot be invoked where the

very issuance of the certificate is denied by the issuing authority

itself. Therefore, the learned Divisional Commissioner committed

no jurisdictional error in acting upon the report of the Sub-

Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, while exercising powers under

Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, for determining whether the

78

petitioner possessed the statutory eligibility to contest the election

from an OBC reserved constituency.

141.The petitioner has also sought to contend that the issue relating to

his social status ought to have been referred to the competent

Caste Scrutiny Committee under the provisions of the Act of 2013.

However, except making such a contention, no material has been

placed on record to demonstrate that the petitioner's Social Status

Certificate was ever pending for verification before the competent

Scrutiny Committee or that any proceedings in that regard had

been initiated. In the absence of any documentary material

substantiating such a plea, the contention remains a mere

assertion and cannot dislodge the findings recorded by the

competent authorities on the basis of the official records.

Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the submission that the

impugned orders are vitiated for want of reference to the Caste

Scrutiny Committee.

142.The provisions of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 provide for

disqualification in case a person is found to have been elected on

the basis of false or invalid caste claim, whereas Section 23(3) of

the Act of 1956 empowers the competent authority to remove

such Councillor from office in accordance with law. Therefore,

once the foundational document, i.e. the caste certificate, is found

to be forged, the statutory consequences prescribed under the Act

are bound to follow.

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143.The subsequent election conducted for filling up the vacancy

created due to removal of Mohammad Salman was not only

permissible but was a statutory requirement to ensure continuity

of representation of the Ward. The election of Chandan Yadav as

Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai was conducted in

accordance with the procedure prescribed under law and there is

no illegality warranting interference by this Court.

144.Accordingly, having considered the entire factual and legal

position, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised by

Mohammad Salman. Consequently, Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024 is hereby dismissed.

145.As a consequence of dismissal of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of

2024, the challenge made to the subsequent election conducted

for Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai does not survive. The

election conducted by the competent authority pursuant to the

vacancy caused due to removal of Mohammad Salman was valid

and in accordance with the provisions of law. Therefore, the claim

raised by Chandan Yadav in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025

deserves acceptance.

146.The subsequent election having been conducted in accordance

with the statutory provisions and there being no legal impediment

in declaration of the result, Chandan Yadav has rightly been

declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,

Bhilai.

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147.Accordingly, Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan

Yadav is hereby allowed and it is held that the election of

Chandan Yadav as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai

is valid and in accordance with law.

148.There shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/--

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh

The date when the

judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment is

uploaded on the website

Operative Full

07.07.2026 03.08.2026 ------ 03.08.2026

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Head-Note

Removal of an elected Councillor from a reserved seat on the

basis of a Social Status Certificate found to have never been issued by

the competent authority and where the issuing authority itself disowns

the certificate, reference to the Caste Scrutiny Committee under the Act

of 2013 is not required. The Divisional Commissioner is competent to

determine the statutory disqualification under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the

Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and the consequential

election cannot be interfered with once the election process has

commenced.