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PETITIONER:

CHEERANTHOODIKA AHMMEDKUTTY AND ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

PARAMBUR MARIAKUTTY UMMA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/2000

BENCH:

K.T. Thomas & D.P. Mohapatra

JUDGMENT:

Appeal (civil) 3067 of

Thomas J.

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Though the appellants in these two appeals are two

different persons it would be advantageous to dispose of

these two appeals together by a common judgment, on account

of a common factor involving in both cases.

When Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 came into force there

was prohibition in holding land in excess of the ceiling

limit fixed thereunder. Taluk Land Board is one of the

authorities under the Act to fix the area of the land in

possession of landholders. One Moosakutty Haji made a

declaration of the various lands in his possession. (His

widow is arrayed as respondent No.1 in these appeals since

Moosakutty Haji had died). The Taluk Land Board found that

the said Haji had 877.500 acres of land and on it premise

determined that the excess land in his possession (beyond

the ceiling limit) was 788.72 acres. Moosakutty Haji was

directed to surrender the said excess land.

While so, the appellants in Civil Appeal No.3067 of 1997

(the office bearers of Vallambram Juma Masjid) put-forth a

claim that an area of 6.82.500 acres of land in Survey

No.629 of Wandoor Amsan was erroneously recorded as the land

in the possession of t he said Moosakutty Haji. According

to the appellants, the said land was leased by the landowner

to other persons long before the commencement of the Act and

in 1984 the Land Tribunal, Wandoor had granted Certificate

of Purchase as per Section 72-K of t e Act to the tenants

thereof. The tenants have gifted the said land to the

aforementioned Juma Masjid as per registered documents

executed in 1986. Appellants, therefore, contended that the

said area should be de-linked from the account of Moosakutty

Haji.

A similar claim was made by the appellants in CA No.8475

of 1997 on the following facts:

An area of 1.5 acres in Survey No.357/1 was outstanding

on lease with two persons (Krishnan and Achuthan) long

before the commencement of the Act and those persons

assigned their rights in favour of the appellants. The Land

Tribunal issued a Certificate of Purchase in suo motu

proceedings No.88/97. Thus the aforesaid 1.5 acres of land

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could not have been included in the account of Moosakutty

Haji, according to the appellant.

It seems the Taluk Board ignored the Certificate of

Purchase and counted the aforesaid area of land in the

account of Moosakutty Haji and then determined the excess

land surrenderable by him. The High Court in revision

petition filed by the appellants u nder Section 105 of the

Act did not interfere with the aforesaid finding of the

Taluk Land Board. Learned single judge of the High Court

any tenancy prior to 1.4.1964 the Taluk Land Board was right

in not acting on the Certificate of Purchase issued by the

Land Tribunal. Under the circumstances it could not be

treated as conclusive. Even otherwise has observed thus:

"In the absence of any material to show it was not accurate

on its face."

Similar observations were made about the claim put

forward by the appellant in the other appeals also.

Ultimately the appellants did not succeed in their claims

and hence they have challenged the order of the High Court

in these appeals filed by special leave.

Shri T.L.Vishwanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel for

the appellant contended that learned single judge of the

High Court has not taken into account the legal implications

of Section 72-K of the Act which rendered a Certificate of

Purchase as "conclusive proof of the assignment to the

tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and

the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or the portion

thereon to which the assignment relates."

When the enactment enjoined that any evidence would be

treated as conclusive proof of certain factual position or

legal hypothesis the law would forbid other evidence to be

adduced for the purpose of contradicting or varying the

aforesaid conclusiveness. This is the principle embodied in

Section 4 of the Evidence Act, when it defined "conclusive

proof."

"Conclusive proof. - When one fact is declared by this

Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on

proof of that one fact, regard the other as proved, and

shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of

disproving it,"

Of course, the interdict that the court shall not allow

evidence to be adduced for the purpose of disproving the

conclusiveness, will not prevent a party who alleges fraud

or collusion from establishing that the document is vitiated

by such factors. Exc ept regarding the said limited sphere

the conclusiveness of the document would remain beyond the

reach of controvertibility.

In this context a reference can be made to Chettiam

Veettil Ammad and another Vs. Taluk Land Board and others

(AIR 1979 SC 1573) where a two Judge Bench of this Court has

observed that "if a certificate of purchase is issued by the

Land Tribunal to any s uch person and he tenders it in

proceedings before the Taluk Land Board, the Board is

required by law to treat it as conclusive proof of the fact

that the right, title and interest of the landowner (and

intermediary) over the land mentioned in it has bee assigned

to him. It is however not the requirement of the law that

the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the

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surplus or other land held by its holder so as to foreclose

the decision of the Taluk Land Board."

Learned Judges then stated that by using the expression

"conclusive proof" it only means that no contrary evidence

shall be effective to displace it, unless so-called

conclusive proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be

shown. After referring to Halsbury's Laws of England (para

28, Vol. 17 of 4th edn.) it was further observed that "it

will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard

the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely

on the ground that it has not been issued n a proper

appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record or

that the Tribunal's findings suffers from any procedural

error."

In the present case no party has averred that the

Certificates of Purchase were collusively obtained. In

fact, even the authorised officer who was to make a report

under Section 105-A of the Act mentioned in the report that

the said areas were covered by pertinent to point out that

the authorised officer did not even suggest that the

certificates were procured collusively. Even the Taluk Land

Board did not hold that the certificates of purchase were t

certificates of purchase referred to above. It is e product

of any fraud or collusion. It was unnecessary for the High

Court to have remarked that the certificates were procured

collusively as nobody had alleged them to be so.

The Taluk Land Board appears to have sidelined those two

legally formidable conclusive proof while considering the

claims put forward by the appellants. In the absence of any

material to doubt the correctness of the Certificates of

Purchase learned sing le judge should have given due weight

to those documents as law enjoins. At any rate the party

who relied on the certificates had no burden to prove that

the certificates were issued after due deliberations or that

there was no collusion or fraud in iss ing the same. The

Taluk Land Board and the High Court had put the burden on

the appellants to substantiate the validity and correctness

of the certificates. The said approach is fallacious and

hence unsupportable.

In the result, we allow these appeals and uphold the

claim of the appellants in regard to lands for which the

claims were made.