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2026:CGHC:17328

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Judgment Reserved on 09/04/2026

Judgment Delivered on 16/04/2026

ARBA No. 40 of 2018

1 - Chief General Manager Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Raipur Circle

Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - District Telecom Manager Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Ambikapur, District

Surguja, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Sub Divisional Officer Telecom, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Ambikapur,

District Surguja, Chhattisgarh.

... Appellant(s)

Versus

M/s Talat Construction Kharasia Naka, Ambikapur, District Surguja,

Chhattisgarh.

Respondent(s)

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant(s) :Mr. Sandeep Dubey and Mr. Manas Vajpai,

Advocates

For Respondent(s) :Ms. Hamida Siddiqui and Ms. Astha Patel,

Advocates

Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , J

C A V Judgment

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1.This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (for short “the Act, 1996”) is directed against the order dated

11.09.2018 passed by the learned District Judge, Surguja (Ambikapur) in

Misc. Civil Case No. 65/2017, whereby the application preferred by the

appellants/BSNL under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 has been dismissed

and the arbitral award dated 15.04.2017 passed by the learned Sole

Arbitrator has been affirmed.

2.For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to in

accordance with their status before the learned Arbitrator, i.e., the

respondent herein shall be referred to as the “claimant” and the

appellants herein shall be referred to as the “respondents”.

3.(a)Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellants – Bharat

Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), invited tenders bearing Tender Notice

No. W-2/34/Tender/TDM/Ambikapur/Cable Construction Work/10-/ for

laying underground cables, jointing them etc., at different locations/sites

within the jurisdiction of Telecom District Ambikapur, with an estimated

cost of ₹25,00,000/-. The respondent/claimant M/s Talat Construction,

being the lowest bidder, was awarded the tender and an agreement dated

06.11.2010 came to be executed between the parties.

(b)According to the claimant, only work to the extent of ₹62,388/-

was executed by him and despite submission of bills, the payment was

not released. It was further contended that the Earnest Money Deposit of

₹62,500/-, which was subsequently converted into Security Deposit, was

not refunded. The claimant further asserted that the balance work

amounting to ₹24,37,612/- was not awarded to him and therefore

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claimed loss of profit at the rate of 15% thereon along with interest,

aggregating to ₹6,59,337/-.

(c)The respondents/BSNL, while admitting execution of agreement,

specifically denied issuance of any work order beyond the limited work

and contended that no right accrued in favour of the claimant for

execution of the entire contract. It was further pleaded that the Security

Deposit amount had already been refunded pursuant to sanction order

and that non-award of further work was on account of vigilance enquiry.

4.The learned Sole Arbitrator, upon adjudication of the claim filed by the

Claimant on 23/08/2013, partly allowed the same by its award dated

15/04/2017 and directed payment of ₹62,500/- towards Security Deposit

and ₹2,43,761/- towards loss of profit, along with interest @ 10% per

annum from 13.03.2013 till realization and further costs amounting to

₹2,00,000/-.

5.The appellants challenged the said award under Section 34 of the Act,

1996; however, the learned District Judge dismissed the application

holding that the scope of interference is limited and no ground under

Section 34(2) is made out. Hence, this appeal by the appellants/BSNL.

6.(a)Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the

impugned arbitral award as well as the order passed under Section 34 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are wholly unsustainable in

law, being vitiated by patent illegality, perversity, and complete disregard

of the contractual terms governing the parties.

(b)It is contended that although the claimant was declared the lowest

bidder and an agreement was executed, no work order was ever issued in

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respect of the balance work owing to seizure of papers in respect of the

vigilance inquiry. In absence of issuance of a work order, no enforceable

contractual right accrued in favour of the claimant to execute the entire

work. Consequently, the very foundation for claiming damages by way

of loss of profit is absent, and the learned Arbitrator has gravely erred in

entertaining and allowing such a claim.

(c)It is further submitted that the award of ₹2,43,761/- towards

alleged loss of profit is wholly arbitrary and unsupported by any

evidence, as the claimant failed to establish either breach of contract or

actual loss suffered. In respect of alleged loss of profit, no pleading has

been made claimant and neither the issue was framed nor any evidence

was adduced in this regard. Therefore, the alleged loss of profit rests on

mere conjectures and surmises and is contrary to settled principles of

law.

(d)Learned counsel would further argue that the learned Arbitrator

has acted in clear contravention of the terms and conditions of the

contract and the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT). The relevant clauses,

including Clause 5(ii) and Clause 13.3, have been completely

overlooked, and the award has been passed beyond the scope of the

contract, thereby amounting to a jurisdictional error.

(e)It is also submitted that the grant of interest @ 10% per annum is

expressly barred by the contractual stipulations, which prohibit payment

of interest on the Security Deposit. In fact, the amount so deposited by

the claimant towards the EMD has already been returned to him much

before filing of the claim i.e. 19/03/2013. The learned Arbitrator, by

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awarding interest contrary to the agreement, has travelled beyond the

contract and exceeded his jurisdiction. He would submit that as per

Clause 8.1 of the tender document, it is crystal clear that no interest

shall be paid by the BSNL on the bid security for any period, whatsoever

and as such, the interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator is contrary to

the provisions of the tender documents.

(f)Learned counsel further submits that the claimant himself

admitted lack of complete records; nevertheless, the learned Arbitrator

proceeded to allow the claims without any cogent or reliable evidence.

Such findings are perverse and indicative of non-application of mind.

(g)It is also contended that the learned District Judge under Section

34 has failed to discharge its jurisdiction in accordance with law, as it

merely reiterated the limited scope of interference without examining

whether the award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or violation

of contractual terms and is in conflict with the “Public Policy of India”

as contained in Section 34 (2)(b) of the Act. The impugned order,

therefore, reflects a mechanical exercise of jurisdiction and is liable to be

set aside. In support of his contention, he would place reliance upon the

decisions of Union of India & Others v. Larsen and Tubro Limited (L

And T), AIR 2026 SC 1284 and M/s Unibros v. All India Radio, AIR

2023 SC 5231.

(h)According to the learned counsel for the appellants during

pendency of the claim case before the learned Sole Arbitrator, Section

29A was inserted on 23/10/2015. The said provisions speaks about the

time limit for arbitral award. According to the said provisions, the

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arbitration shall be made by the Arbitral Tribunal within a period of

twelve months and with the consent of the parties, the same may be

extended for a further period not exceeding six months and the said

amendment applies in the pending arbitration. In support of his

contention, he would place reliance upon the decision rendered by the

Supreme Court in the matter of Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly Tata

Sons Limited) v. Siva Industries and Holding Ltd. & others, (2023) 5

SCC 521.

7.(i)Learned counsel for the respondent/claimant, ex adverso, would

submit that the arbitral proceedings in the present case are governed by

the unamended provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,

as the arbitration commenced much prior to the coming into force of the

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. It is contended

that in terms of Section 21 read with Section 43(2) of the Act, 1996,

arbitral proceedings commence on the date when a request for reference

to arbitration is received by the opposite party. In the present case, the

notice invoking arbitration was issued and received in the year 2012, and

the learned Sole Arbitrator came to be appointed in the year 2013. Thus,

the arbitral proceedings undeniably commenced prior to 23.10.2015, i.e.,

the date on which the Amendment Act of 2015 came into force.

(ii)Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd,

(2018) 6 SCC 287, it is submitted that the provisions introduced by the

2015 Amendment Act are prospective in nature and would apply only to

arbitral proceedings commenced after the said amendment, unless the

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parties agree otherwise. It is further submitted that the aforesaid

principle has been consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division) v. GAIL

(India) Ltd. (2018) 12 SCC 471 and Ssangyong Engineering &

Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131.

(iii) Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the

present arbitral proceedings are governed entirely by the Principal Act of

1996 (unamended), and consequently, the provisions introduced by the

2015 Amendment particularly Section 29A prescribing time limits for

making the award have no application to the present case. It is thus

contended that the arbitral award dated 15.04.2017 cannot be assailed on

the ground that it was rendered beyond the time limits introduced by the

amendment, as such provisions are inapplicable to arbitrations which

commenced prior to the amendment.

(iv)Learned counsel would further submit that the appointment of the

learned Sole Arbitrator having attained finality under Sections 11(6) and

11(7) of the Act, the arbitral proceedings and the award rendered therein

cannot be invalidated on grounds de hors the statutory framework

applicable to the case. Learned counsel would submit that the scope of

interference in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is very

limited and the Court cannot travel beyond the pleadings and the

evidence placed before the Arbitral Tribunal and the grounds specified

under Section 34(2) of the Act. According to the learned counsel the

amendment Act, 2015 does not apply to the arbitral proceedings already

commenced and cannot be given effect retrospectively rather would

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apply prospectively. In support of her contention, learned counsel for the

respondent would place reliance on the judgment rendered by the

Supreme Court in the matter of M/s. Canara Nidhi Limited v. M.

Shashtkala & Others, AIR 2019 SC 4544 and Delhi High Court in the

matter of Republic of India through Ministry of Defence v. M/s Agusta

Westland International Ltd., CS(COMM) No. 9/2019 decided on

09/01/2019.

8.I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the

entire record with due care and circumspection.

9.The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants

pertains to the applicability of Section 29A of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, as introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation

(Amendment) Act, 2015, whereby a time limit has been prescribed for

making the arbitral award. It is contended that since the arbitral award in

the present case came to be passed on 15.04.2017, i.e., subsequent to the

enforcement of the Amendment Act, the same is beyond the statutory

period prescribed under Section 29A and is, therefore, liable to be set

aside.

10.Controverting the same, learned counsel for respondent has submitted

that the arbitral proceedings in the present case had commenced much

prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act, 2015 and,

therefore, the provisions of Section 29A, being prospective in nature,

would not be applicable to the present case.

11.By placing reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court as also

the decision renderred by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of

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Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Jindal India Thermal Power

Limited, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2611, the Supreme Court in the matter

of Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd (Supra) has held that since Section 29A (1) of the

Act, as amended, is remedial in nature, it should be applicable to all

pending arbitral proceedings as on the effective date i.e. 30/08/2019. In

the case at hand, the arbitral proceedings commenced on 23/08/2013 and

the award was passed on 15/04/2017 and as such, the provisions of the

Section 29A (1) of the Act would not be applicable.

12.A plain reading of Section 26 of the Amendment Act makes it

abundantly clear that the provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act do not

apply to arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with Section 21

of the principal Act, prior to the coming into force of the Amendment

Act. Consequently, where arbitral proceedings have commenced before

the enforcement of the 2015 Amendment Act, the provisions of Section

29A would have no application.

13.Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the present case, it is

not in dispute that the arbitral proceedings had commenced much prior

to 23.10.2015, i.e., the date on which the Amendment Act, 2015 came

into force. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

the provisions of Section 29A, being prospective in nature, are not

applicable to the present arbitral proceedings. Consequently, the

contention raised by the appellants that the arbitral award is liable to be

set aside on account of being rendered beyond the period prescribed

under Section 29A deserves to be, and is hereby, rejected.

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14.The next question which arises for consideration is with regard to the

scope of interference with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the extent to which this

Court, in an appeal under Section 37, can examine the findings recorded

by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.

15.Since the appellate power u/s 37 of the Act, 1996 would be controlled

and would be within the purview of limitation provided u/s 34 of the

Act, 1996 to challenge the arbitral award, it would be relevant to refer

the provisions of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 which is reproduced herein

below:

34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-

(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made

only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance

with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if -

(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that-

(i) a party was under some incapacity. Or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the

law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing

any indication thereon, under the law for the time

being in force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given

proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or

of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable

to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not

contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the

submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on

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matters beyond the scope of the submission. to

arbitration;

Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to

arbitration can be separated from those not so

submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which

decisions matters not contains submitted to

arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the

arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the

agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was

in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the

parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement,

was not in accordance with this Part; or

(b) the Court finds that-

(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of

settlement by arbitration under the law for the time

being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public

policy of India.

Explanation 1- For the avoidance of any doubt, it is

clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy

of India, only if, -

(i) the making of the award was induced or affected

by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section

75 or section 81, or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy

of India law or;

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of

morality or justice.

Explanation 2.- For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to

whether there is a contravention with the fundamental

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policy of Indian Law shall not entail a review on the merits

of the dispute.

(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than

international commercial arbitrations, may I also be set aside by

the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent

illegality appearing on the face of award:

Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the

ground of an erroneous application of the law or by

reappreciation of evidence.

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three

months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had

been made under section 33, from the date on which that request

had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within

the said period of three months it may entertain the application

within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court

may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party,

adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in

order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the

arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion

of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the

arbiral award.

(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only

after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application

shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing

compliance with the said requirement.

(6) An application under his section shall be disposed of

expeditiously and in any event, within a period of one year from

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the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served

upon the other party."

16.A perusal of the aforesaid provision would make it clear that the scope of

interference with an arbitral award is extremely limited and

circumscribed by the grounds enumerated under Section 34(2) of the

Act. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34, does not

act as an appellate authority and cannot reappreciate evidence or

substitute its own view for that of the learned Arbitrator.

17.It is well settled that where an arbitral award is found to be perverse,

based on no evidence, or rendered in clear contravention of the terms of

the contract, the same would fall within the ambit of “patent illegality”

under Section 34(2A) of the Act and would also be in conflict with the

“Public Policy of Indian, thereby attracting interference by the Court.

18.In the considered opinion of this Court, the submission advanced by the

learned counsel for the respondent that the arbitral award does not

warrant any interference in view of the limited scope under Section 34

cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. As shall be

demonstrated hereinafter, the findings recorded by the learned Arbitrator,

particularly with regard to the grant of loss of profit, are not supported

by any pleadings, cogent evidence and are contrary to the contractual

stipulations governing the parties. Such findings are ex facie

unsustainable in law and fall within the well-recognized grounds of

patent illegality and conflict with the public policy of India.

19.The Supreme Court in the matter of Unibros (Supra) has held that:-

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“The First Award was interfered with by the High Court for

the reasons noted above. The Arbitrator, in view of such

previous determination made by the High Court, could have

granted damages to the appellant based on the evidence on

record. There was, so to say, none which on proof could

have translated into an award for damages towards loss of

profit. A claim for damages, whether general or special,

cannot as a matter of course result in an award without

proof of the claimant having suffered injury. The arbitral

award in question, in our opinion, is patently illegal in that

it is based on no evidence and is, thus, outrightly perverse;

therefore, again, it is in conflict with the "public policy of

India" as contemplated by section 34(2)(b) of the Act”

20.The next question which arises for consideration is whether the learned

Arbitrator was justified in awarding a sum of ₹2,43,761/- towards loss of

profit in favour of the claimant.

21.Further the Supreme Court in Unibros (Supra), has held as under:

15.we would like to briefly address the appellant's claim

of loss of profit. In Bharat Cooking Coal (supra), this Court

reaffirmed the principle that a claim for such loss of profit

will only be considered when supported by adequate

evidence. It was observed:

"24. ... It is not unusual for the contractors to claim

loss of profit arising out of diminution in turnover on

account of delay in the matter of completion of the

work. What he should establish in such a situation is

that had he received the amount due under the

contract, he could have utilised the same for some

other business in which he could have earned profit.

Unless such a plea is raised and established, claim

for loss of profits could not have been granted. In this

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case, no such material is available on record. In the

absence of any evidence, the arbitrator could not

have awarded the same."

(emphasis ours)

16. Το support a claim for loss of profit arising from a

delayed contract or missed opportunities from other

available contracts that the appellant could have earned

elsewhere by taking up any, it becomes imperative for the

claimant to substantiate the presence of a viable opportunity

through compelling evidence. This evidence should

convincingly demonstrate that had the contract been

executed promptly, the contractor could have secured

supplementary profits utilizing its existing resources

elsewhere.

22.It has been further held that to sustain a claim for loss of profit, the

claimant must establish, by leading cogent and convincing evidence, the

existence of a viable opportunity whereby it could have utilised its

resources elsewhere and earned profit. In absence of such evidence, the

claim for loss of profit cannot be sustained.

23.The case of the claimant is that although the agreement was executed

between the parties, the balance work was not allotted to him and,

therefore, he is entitled to loss of profit to the extent of 15% of the

remaining contract value. Per contra, the respondents have categorically

contended that no work order was issued for the balance work and,

therefore, no enforceable right accrued in favour of the claimant to

execute the same.

24.In the present case, it is not in dispute that no work order was ever issued

in respect of the balance work. In absence of issuance of a work order,

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no concluded contract came into existence for execution of the

remaining work and, therefore, the question of breach thereof does not

arise. Consequently, the very foundation for claiming damages by way

of loss of profit is absent. Even there is no pleading about the loss of

Profit, if any.

25.Further, a perusal of the record would reveal that the claimant has neither

laid any specific pleadings with regard to loss of profit nor led any

evidence to substantiate the same. No material has been placed on record

to demonstrate that the claimant had suffered any actual loss or that any

alternative profitable opportunity was lost. The award of loss of profit by

the learned Arbitrator is thus based on mere conjectures and surmises.

26.The learned Arbitrator has also failed to consider the terms and

conditions of the contract governing the parties, which did not guarantee

allotment of the entire work to the claimant. By awarding loss of profit

in absence of any contractual or evidentiary basis, the learned Arbitrator

has travelled beyond the scope of the contract. Such an award, being

based on no evidence, would squarely fall within the ground of “patent

illegality” under Section 34(2A) of the Act and would also be liable to be

set aside as being in conflict with the public policy of India.

27.In the considered opinion of this Court, the award of loss of profit, being

based on no evidence and rendered in contravention of the contractual

terms, is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award

and is also in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law, thereby

attracting interference under Section 34 of the Act.

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28.The next issue which arises for consideration is with regard to the award

of interest @ 10% per annum granted by the learned Arbitrator.

29.It is well settled that the Arbitral Tribunal is bound by the terms of the

contract and cannot grant any relief in contravention thereof. Any award

passed in disregard of the contractual stipulations would fall within the

ambit of patent illegality. For the sake of convenience, Clause 8.1 of the

NIT is reproduced hereunder:

“8.1The bidder shall furnish, as part of his bid, a bid

security (EMD) for an amount of Rs. 62500.00 (Rs. Sixty

Two Thousand Five Hundred only). No interest shall be

paid by the BSNL on the bid security for any period,

whatsoever.

30.A perusal of the aforesaid clause would clearly reveal that the payment

of interest on the Security Deposit was expressly barred. In spite of such

a stipulation, the learned Arbitrator has proceeded to award interest in

favour of the claimant, which is clearly contrary to the contractual

provisions governing the parties. In the present case, the award of

interest being in the teeth of the contractual bar cannot be sustained and

is liable to be set aside.

31.In the present case, it is an admitted position that the arbitral proceedings

commenced on 23.08.2013 and concluded with the passing of the award

on 15.04.2017, i.e., well before the coming into force of the amended

regime. Accordingly, the provisions of Section 29A(1) of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 are not attracted to the present proceedings.

Thus, the reliance placed by the appellant upon the decision rendered by

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the Supreme Court in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is not applicable to

the facts of the present case.

32.In light of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered view that since

the arbitral proceedings were initiated prior to the enforcement of the

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, the provisions of

Section 29A are clearly inapplicable and the objection raised by the

appellants on that count does not merit acceptance. However, upon

examining the award on the touchstone of Section 34 of the Act, it

becomes evident that the impugned arbitral award suffers from patent

illegality going to the root of the matter and also contrary to the public

policy of India. The learned Arbitrator has awarded loss of profit in

favour of the claimant despite the claimant neither laid any specific

pleadings nor adduced any cogent evidence to establish actual loss or the

existence of any alternative profit-making opportunity. The award of loss

of profit, thus, rests on mere conjectures and surmises and is wholly

unsustainable in law.

33.As far as refund of security deposit is concerned, the Arbitrator has

rightly passed the award directing refund of the security deposit. As the

appellant/BSNL failed to produce any receipt of refund of security

deposit to the Claimant, hence, the Claimant/respondent is entitled for

the security deposit of Rs. 62,500/-, but the same is payable without

interest in view of Clause 8.1 of the NIT.

34.Further, the learned Arbitrator has acted in manifest disregard of the

terms and conditions of the contract, which did not guarantee allotment

of the entire work to the claimant. By granting such relief de hors the

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contract, the Arbitrator has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction. Equally

unsustainable is the award of interest, which has been granted in the

teeth of an express contractual bar prohibiting payment of interest on the

Security Deposit. It is trite that an arbitral tribunal, being a creature of

contract, is bound by its terms and cannot grant any relief in

contravention thereof.

35.In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the

learned Arbitrator are not only based on no evidence and pleadings but

are also perverse and in clear conflict with the contractual stipulations

governing the parties. Such an award squarely falls within the ambit of

patent illegality under Section 34(2A) of the Act and is also in conflict

with the Public Policy of India. The learned District Judge, while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 34, has failed to examine these

glaring infirmities and has dismissed the application in a cursory and

mechanical manner by merely reiterating the limited scope of

interference, without appreciating that the present case falls within the

well recognized exceptions warranting judicial intervention.

36.Consequently, the order dated 11.09.2018 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the

learned District Judge, Surguja (Ambikapur) in Misc. Civil Case No.

65/2017 and the Award passed by the Arbitrator dated 15/04/2017

(Annexure-A/2) cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. The

appellant/BSNL is directed to refund the security deposit of Rs. 62,500/-

to the respondent/Claimant within a period of 30 days from today.

However, the Claimant is not entitled any interest thereon in view of

Clause 8.1 of the NIT.

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37.Accordingly, the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 stands allowed to the extent indicated

hereinabove. No order as to cost(s).

Sd/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru)

Judge

Rahul/Gowri