S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 759

CHI NT AMAN RAO

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

RAM KRISHNA

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

[SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,

MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J

Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of

Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act (LXIV of 1948), ss. 8, 4-Law

prohibiting bidi manufacture during agriwltural season-Validity

-Restriction of fundamental right to carry on trade or business­

Reasonableness of restrictions-Test of reasonableness-Jurisdiction

of court to consider whether restrictions are reasonable-Constitution

of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g), 19(6).

The Central ProvinceB and Berar Regulation of Manufacture

of BidiB (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, a law which

was in force at the commencement of the Constitution of India,

provided that

11

the Deputy Commissioner may by notifica.tiou fix

a. period to be an agricultural season v.rith respect to such villages

as may be specified therein" and lhat "the Deputy CommiB­

sioner may by general order which Bhall extend to such villageB

as he may specify, prohibit

the

manufacture of bidiB during the

agricultural season.'' The Act provided further that

11

no person

reBiding in a village Bpecified in Buch order Bhall during the agri­

cultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and

no manufacturer shall during the

said season employ

any perBon

for the manufacture of bidis." An order waB issued by the

Deputy CommiBBioner under the proviBions of the Act forbidding

all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the

manufacture

of bidis during a particular season. A manufacturer

of bidiB and

an employee in a bidi factory residing in one of the

Baid villageB applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ

of mandamus alleging that since the Act prohibited the petitionerB

from exercising their fundamental right

to carry on their trade

or businesB which was guaranteed to them by cl.

(1) (g) of Art. 19

of the ConBtitution, the Act

waa void :

Held, (i)

that the object of the Btatute, namely, to provide

meaBures for the

Bupply of adequate labour for agricultural

pur­

poBeB in bidi manufacturing areaB of the Province could well

have been achieved by legislation reBtraining

the employment of

agricultural labour in the manufacture of bidiB dnring the

agricul·

tural seaBon without prohibiting altogether the manufacture of

bidis. As the provisions of the Act had no reaBonable relation

1950

Nov.S.

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950}

1!1:50 to the object in view, the Act was not a law imposing "reasonable

restrictions" within the meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19 and was

Ohintamat1. Rao therefore void.

'· (ii) The law even to the extent that it could be said t~

The State of authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural

Madhya labour cannot be held to be valid because the language employed

Pradesh. was wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without

the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affect·

ing the right, and so long as the possibility of its being applied

for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled

out, it must be held to be wholly void.

The phrase

"reasonable restriction" connotes that the limi­

tation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not

be arbitrary

or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in

the interests

of the public. The word

"reasonable" implies in­

telligent care

and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course

which reason dictates.

Legislntion which arbitrarily or exces­

sively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of

reasonableness and unless it strikes a. proper balance between

the freedom guaranteed in Art. 19 (!) (g.! and the social control

permitted

by cl. (6) of Art. 19, it must be held to be wanting in

that quality.

Held also, that the determination by the Legislature of

what

constitutes a. reasonable restriction is not final and conclusive.

The Supreme Court has power to consider v.i'bether the restric­

tions imposed

by the Legislature are reasonable within the

meaning of Art. 19, cl. \6)

'1nd to declare the law void if in its

opinion the restrictions are no·t reasonable.

ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 78 and 79

of 1950.

Application under article 32 of the Constitution of

India for a writ of mandamus.

G. N. Joshi, for the petitioners.

S. M. Sikri, for the respondent.

1950. November 8. The judgment of the Court

was delivered by

MahajanJ. MAHAJAN ].-These two applications for enforce-

ment of the

fundamental right guaranteed under article

19 (1) (g) of the

Constitution of India have been made

by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi

manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of

Madhya Pradesh).

It is contended that the law in

force in

the State authorizing it to prohibit the manu­

facture of bid is in certain villages including the one

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 761

wherein the applicants reside is inconsistent with the 1950

provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is conse-· --

entl o · d Ohintaman Rao

qu y V I . v,

The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Th• St•t• of

Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, Madhya

LXIV of 1948, was passed on 19th October 1948 and PradBSh.

was the law in force in the State at the commencement

Mahaja.n.J.

of the Constitution. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are

in these terms:-

" 3. The Deputy Commissioner may by notification

fix a period to be an agricultural s~ason with respect

to such villages as

may be specified therein.

4.

(1) The Deputy

Commissioner may, by general

order which shall extend to such villages as he may

specify, prohibit the manufacture

of bidis during the

agricultural season.

(2) No person residing in a village specified in

such order shall during the agricultural season engage

himself in

the manufacture of bidis, and no

manu­

facturer shall during the said season employ any person

for the manufacture of bidis."

On the 13th June 1950 au order was issued by the

Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of

the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain vil­

lages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis. On·

the 19th June 1950 these two petitions were presented

to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution

challenging the validity of the order as it prejudicially

affected the petitioners' right of freedom

of occupation

and business. During the pendency of the petitions

the season mentioned in the

order of the 13th June ran

out. A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural

season··· 8th October to 18th November 1950-was

issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms.

This order was also challenged in a supplementary

petition.

Article

19 (1) (g) runs as follows:-

"All citizens shall have the right to practise any

profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade

or business."

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950]

1950 The article guarantees freedom of occupation and

- business. The freedom guaranteed herein is, however,

Ohintaman Rao subject to the limitations imposed by clause (6) of

Th• ;·;.

1

, of article 19. That clause is in these terms:-

Madhya " Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall

Pradesh. affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it

imposes, or prevent the State from making any law

.1:lakajan J.

imposing, in the interests of the general public, reason-

able restrictions on the exercise of

the right conferred

by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in

the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any

existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any

authority to prescribe, or prevent the

State from

making any law prescribing or empowering any

authority to prescribe, the professional or technical

qualifications necessary for practising

any profession

or carrying on any occupation, trade or

business."

The point for consideration in these applications is

whether

the

Central Provinces and Berar Act LXIV of

1948 comes within the

ambit of this saving clause or

is in excess of its provisions. The learned counsel for

the petitioners contends that the impugned Act does

not impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of

the fundamental right in the interests of the general

public

but totally negatives it. In order to judge the

validity of this contention it is necessary to examine

the impugned Act and some of its provisions. In the

preamble to the Act, it is stated that it has been

enacted to provide measures for

the supply of adequate

labour for agricultural purposes

in bidi manufacturing

areas.

Sections 3 and 4 cited above empower the

Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of

bidis during the agricultural season. The contravention

of any of these provisions is made punishable by

section 7 of the Act,

the penalty being imprisonment

for a

term which may extend to six months or with

fine

or with both. It was enacted to help in the grow

more food campaign

and for the purpose of bringing

under

the plough considerable areas of fallow land.

The question for decision is whether the

statute

under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily

•

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 763

interferes with private business and imposes unreason- I95o

able and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon

0

. -

f 1

· · h d h h hintamanRao

law u occupation ; m ot er wor s, whet er t e total v.

prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture The Stat• of

of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a Madhya

reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights men- Pradesh.

tioned in article 19 (1) lg) of the Constitution. Unless

it is shown

that there is a reasonable relation of the Mahajan J.

provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right

of freedom of occupation and business cannot be

curtailed by it.

The phrase

"reasonable restriction " connotes that

the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of

the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive

nature, beyond what

is required in the interests of the

public. The word

" reasonable" implies intelligent

care and deliberation,

that is, the choice of a course

which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily

or excessively invades

the right cannot be said to

con­

tain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes

a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in

article

19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by

clause

(6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting

in

that quality.

Clause (6) in the concluding paragraph particularizes

certain instances of the nature of the restrictions

that

were in the mind of the constitution-makers and which

have

the quality of reasonableness. They afford a

guide to the interpretation of the clause and illustrate

the extent and nature of the restrictions which

according to the statute could be imposed on the

freedom

guaranteed in clause (g). The statute in sub­

stance and effect suspends altogether the right

mentioned in article

19 (I) (g) during the agricultural

seasons and such suspension may lead to such

dislocation of the industry as to prove its ultimate ruin.

The object of the statute is to provide measures for

the supply of adequate labour for agricultural pur.

poses in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province and

it could well be achieved by legislation restraining the

employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture

764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]

1950 of bidis during the agricultural season. Even in point

- of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if

Chintomon Rao · t d 1 · f th h f k · th

v. 1t amoun e to a regu at10n o e ours o wor m e

Th• stat• of business. Such legislation though it would limit the

Madh11a field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis

P•adosh and regulate the hours of the working of the industry,

would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of

the Mohainn J. business of manufacture and might well have been

within the

ambit of clause (6). The effect of the

pro­

visions of the Act, however, has no reasonable relation

to

the object in view but is so drastic in scope that it

goes much in excess

of that object. Not only are the

provisions of the statute in excess of the requirements

of the case

but the language employed prohibits a

manufacturer of bidis from employing

any person in

his business, no

matter wherever that person may be

residing.

In other words, a manufacturer of bidis

residing in this

area cannot import labour from

neigh­

bouring places in the d1strict or province or from out­

side the province. Such a prohibition on the face of it

is of an arbitrary nature inasmuch as it has no relation

whatsoever to the object which the legislation seeks to

achieve

and as such cannot

be said to be a reasonable

restriction on the exercise

of the right. Further the

statute seeks to prohibit all persons residing in the

notified villages during the agricultural season from

engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis.

It

cannot be denied that there would be a number of

infirm

and disabled persons, a number of children, old

women

and petty shop keepers residing in these

villages who are incapable of being used for agricultural

labour. All such persons are

prohibited by law from

engaging themselves in the manufacture

of bidis; and

are thus being deprived of earning their livelihood.

It is a matter of common knowledge that there are

certain classes of persons residing in every village who

do not engage in agricultural operations. They and

their womenfolk

and children in their leisure hours

supplement their income

by engaging themselves in

bidi business. There seems no reason for prohibiting

them from carrying on this occupation. The

statute as

•

·.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 765

it stands, not only compels those who can be engaged 1950

in agricultural work from not taking to other avoca-

0

--

t

. b

t

· 1 h'b't h h hintaman Rao

ions, u it a so pro 1 1 s persons w o ave no connec- v.

tion or relation to agricultural operations from engaging The State of

in the business of bidi making and thus earning their Madhya

livelihood. These provisions of the statute, in our Prad .. h.

opinion, cannot be said to amount to reasonable restric-

tions on the right of the applicants and

that being so, Mahajan J.

the statute is not in conformity with the provisions of

Part III of the

Constitution. The law even to the

extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition

of restrictions in regard to agricultural Jabour cannot be

held valid because the language employed

is wide

enough to cover restrictions both within

and without

the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative

action affecting the right.

So long as the possibility

of its being applied

for purposes not sanctioned by

the

Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held

to be wholly void.

Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh

contends

that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was

the proper judge of the reasonableness of the

restric­

tions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone

knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone

could say what kind

of legislation could effectively

achieve the end in view

and would help in the grow

more

food campaign and would help for bringing in

fallow

land under the plough and that this

Court sit­

ting at this great distance could not judge by its own

yardstick

of reason whether the restrictions imposed in

the circumstances of the case

were reasonable or not.

This argument runs counter to the clear provisions of

the

Constitution. The determination by the legis­

lature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is

not final or conclusive ;

it is subject to the supervision

by

this

Court. In the matter of fundamental rights,

the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights

guaranteed

by the

Constitution and in exercising its

functions

it has the power to set aside an Act of the

Legislature if it

is in violation of the freedoms guaran.

teed

by the

Constitution, We are therefore of opinion

9ij

1950

766 SUI'REM:E COURT RE.PORTS (1950]

that the impugned statute does not stand the test of

reasonableness and is therefore void.

Chi.'IJ-tama:n Rao

v. The result therefore is that the orders issued by the

Tiu State of Depl,lty Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th

Mndhya September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective.

Prad•.••· We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the

M,ah.ajan J.

1950

Nov. li.

provisions contained in section 4 of the Act aga~n.st the

petitioners in

any manner whatsoever. The

pet1ttone>s

will have their costs of these proceedings in the two

petitions.

Agent for the petitioners

Rajinder Narain.

Petitions allowed.

m Nos. 78 and 79:

Agent for the respondent

m

P.A. lv/~hta.

RAM GOPAL

II.

Nos. 78 and 79:

NAND LAL AND OTHERS

[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA­

SEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]

Hindu Law-Gift to female owner-Construction-Gift for

maintenance-Estate conveyed, whether absolute or limited-Use of

the word 'Malik', effect of. ·

In construing a document whether in English or in verna­

cular the fundamental rule is

to ascertain the intention from the

words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered

but tbat is only for the purpose of finding out the intended

meaning

of the words which have

actually been employed.

To convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express

power of a.lienaticn need be given ; it is enough if words of such

amplit11de are used as would convey full rights of ownership.

The term 'Malik' when used in a will or other document as

descriptive of the position which a. devisee or donee is intended to

hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of lull

proprietary rights, including a. full right of alienation, unless there

is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances

to indicate that such f11ll 11roprietory rights were not intended to

be conferred,