COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG & ANR,

V,

MST. KATJJI & ORS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1987

[M.P, THAKKAR AND B.C. RAY, JJ,]

Indian Limitation Act, 1963; s,5-Condoning delay in filing

appeal-Existence

of 'sufficient cause'-Determination of-State seek­

ing condonation

of delay-To be treated equitably,

An appeal by the

State, against a decision enhancing compensa­

tion in respect

of acquisition of lands for a public purpose, raising

important questions as regards principles of valuation, was dismissed

by the High Court as time barred, being four days beyond time, by

rejecting an application for condonation of dalay.

The

State appealed to this Court by special leave.

Allowing the appeal,

HLED: 1.1 The expression 'sufficient cause' employed

by the

legislature in s.5

of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic

A

B

c

D

to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of E

matters on merits. [388E-F]

1.2 The

State which represents the collective cause of the community,

does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The doctrine of equality

before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant,

are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an F

equitable manner. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the

spirit

and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation

of the expression 'sufficient cause'.

So also the same approach has to be

evidenced in its application to matters

at hand with the end in view to do

even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which

scuttles a decision

on merits.

[390B·C] G

2.

In the instant case, sufficient cause exists for delay in institut-

ing the appeal in the High Court. Delay is, therefore, condoned. The

matter is remitted to the High Conrt for disposal on merits.

[390C-D I

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 460 H

- of 1987.

387

:~

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4. 1986 of the Jammu &

A and Kashmir High Court in Civil 1st Appeal No. 54 of 1985.

Altaf Anjad, Adv. General and S.K. Bhattacharya for the

Appellants.

B S.M. Aquil and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondents.

c

The Order of the Court was delivered by

THAKKAR, J. To condone, or not to condone, is not the only

question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the

"sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality

in the said context

is another.

An appeal preferred by the

State of Jammu & Kashmir arising

out of a decision enhancing compensation in respect of acquisition of

lands for a public purpose to the extent of nearly

14 lakhs rupees by

D making an upward revision of the order of

800% (from Rs.1000 per

kanal to Rs.8000 per kanal) which also raised important questions as

regards principles of valuation

was dismissed as time barred being 4

-"'-

days beyond time by rejecting an application for condonation of delay. ·+ ·-_

Hence this appeal by special leave.

E

The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by

enacting Section 5

1

of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to

enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of

matters on

'merits'. The expression

"sufficient cause" employed by the

legislature

is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in

F a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of

justice-that being

the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.

It is

common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably

liberal approach

in matters instituted in this Court. But the message

does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts

in the

hierarchy.

And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is

G realized that:-

I. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provi­

sions

of

o;der XX.I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the

prescribed period

if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficiet1t cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such

H period." '

-

ANANTNAG v. MST. KATJI [THAKKAR, J.] 389

I. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging

an appeal late.

A

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious

matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause

of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is

condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause B

would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3.

"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean

that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not

every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine

must be applied

in a rational common sense pragmatic

c

manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations

are pitted against each other, cause

of substantial justice

deserves to be preferred for the

other side cannot claim D

to have vested right in injustice being done because of a

nun-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay

is occasioned deli­

berately,

or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala

fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact E

he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on

account

of its power to legalize injustice on technical

grounds but because it

is capable of removing in justice

and

is expected to do so. F

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was

sufficient cause for condoning the delay

in the institution of the

appeal.

The fact that it was the

'State' which was seeking condonation

and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of

equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a G

litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law )s administered

in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step­

motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for con­

donation

of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an

impersonal machinary (no one in charge

of the matter is directly hit or

hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in-H

A

B

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

herited bureaucratic m"ethcidology imbued with the note-making, file

pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less dif­

ficult

to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event,

the

State which represents the collective cause of the community, does

not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to

be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the

course

of the interpretation of the expression

"sufficient cause". So

also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to mat­

ters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in

preference

to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.

Turn­

ing to the facts of the matter giving rise .to the present appeal, we are

satisfied

that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the

C

High Court dismissing the appeal before it

as time barred, is there­

fore, set aside. Delay is condoned.

And the matter is remitted to the

High

Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits

after affording reasonable opportunity. of hearing to both the sides.

D

Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

+-.