COLOUR-CHEM LTD. A

v.

A.L. ALASPURKAR AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 5, 1998

[S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B

Labour Law:

Maharashtra Recognition of TradeUnions and Prevention of Unfair

Labour Practices Act,

1971: Schedule IV Item I (g)-Unfair labour practice-C

Scope of-Workman found guilty of major misconduct of sleeping while on

duty keeping the machine in a working condition-Held: Sch IV Item I (g)

deals with misconduct of a minor or technical character and does not cover

major misconduct, even after taking into account the nature

of misconduct

or past record

of service of the employee if it is found by the court that the

punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate

to the charge held proved D

'A against the employee-The .comma after the words "misconduct of a minor

or technical character" cannot be read as "or"-In the circumstances of the

case, Sch. IV Item I (g) not attracted.

"'·

Schedule JV Item I (g)-Victimisation:_Meaning of-Victimisation in

fact and Victimisation in law explained. E

Schedule IV Item I (g)-Victimisation-Plant Operators along with JO

mazdoors found sleeping at 3.30 a.m. keeping the machine in a working

condition without pouring raw material therein-Delinquent Plant Operators

dismissed from service for a major misconduct-Held: Having regard

to the

nature

of misconduct, even if it is a major misconduct, and the past record F

of the employees, the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate

or is such which

no reasonable employer would ever impose it in like

circumstances-Hence, such a punishment amounts

to unfair labour practice

of legal victimisation-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946--Jndustrial

Disputes Act,

1947.

Misconduct-Workman sleeping while on duty keeping the machine in

a working condition-Punishment of dismissal from service-Management

raised plea

of losing confidence in such workman-Labour Court reinstated

workman 3 and 4 with

40% and 50% back wages respectively till the date

G

of award and 100% till actual reinstatement-Held: The work which the

workman were doing was not

of any confidential nature-Hence, the question H

663

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A of the management losing confidence in the workman does not arise­

Punishment of dismissal from service shockingly disproportionate-labour

Court quite justified

in ordering reinstatement with continuity of service­

But in

view of the gravity of misconduct the workman deserve to be further

punished-Hence, even after the award

of the labour Court instead of

100%

B hack wages only 40% and 50% wages directed to be paid to workman 3 and

4 respectively till actual reinstatement pursuant

to present order of the Supreme Court.

Interpretation of Statues:

Welfare Legislation-Provisions-Two constructions-Possibility of-

C Held: If two constructions are reasonably possible, that which furthers the

policy and object

of the Act and which is more beneficial to the employees has to he preferred-But if the provision is capable of only one construction

plain meaning has

to he given effect to.

D

Words and Phrases :

"Victimisation "-Meaning of-In the context of Sch. IV Item 1 (g) of the

Maharashtra Recognition

of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair labour

Practices Act,

1971.

E Respondent nos. 3 and 4 were working in the plant of the appellant-

eompany as Plant Operators. At about

03.30. a.m. when they were on duty

in the night shift, the Plant-i'1-Charge, on a suf!lrise visit, found res1>ondent

nos. 3. and 4 and 10 mazdoors as well as the Shift Supervisor sleeping

though the machine was kept working.

For the said misconduct a domestic

F enquiry was held after which both these respondents were dismissed from

service. Respondent nos.

3. and 4 filed complaints before respondent no. 2-

authority under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Unions and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971. The contention

of these complainants was

that they were victimised and the

appellant­

management had committed diverse unfair practices as contemplated under

G Clauses (a), {b), {d), (f) and (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act.

The Labour Court held

that respondent nos. 3 and 4 had committed

misconduct alleged against them. However, the Labour

Comi found that

looking to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved against the

complainants the punishment of dismissal from service was grossly

H disproportionate and therefore, it amounted to unfair labour practice on the

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COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 665

part of the aJJJJeliant as covered hy Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the A

Act. As a result the Labour Court JJassetl an order of reinstatement of

res)londent nos. 3 and 4 with 40% anti 50% hack wages respectively till

the date of the award of the Lahour Court anti thereafter with 100% back

wages till reinstatement. The revisional court, namely, the Industrial Court

tlismissetl both the revision applications filetl hy the appellant anti respondent B

nos. 3 and 4. The High Court dismissed the writ JJetition filetl by the apJJCllant.

Hence this aJJJICal.

On behalf of the apJJellant-management it was contended that the

provisions of Item l(g) of Schedule IV of the Act would aJ11>ly only if the

misconduct committed hy the res11ontlent nos. 3 and 4 was a minor misconduct C

or is of a technical nature; that since the Lahour court had found that the

mi~contluct of respondent nos. 3 anti 4 was a major misconduct anti, therefore,

the Labour Court was not .iustified in taking the view that the apJJellant was

!,'Uilty of unfair labour Jlractice covered hy the said clause; that even assuming

that the said clause was attracted looking to the nature of the misconduct

anti the JJast record of sen·ice of the resJJontlent' nos. 3 anti 4 it could not be D

said that the punishment of dismissal was shockingly disJJroportionate; that

the misconduct of resJJontlent nos. 3 anti 4 hatl created a situation where the

machine was kept working without JJOuring raw material therein which

would have created a hazard with the possibility of an exJJlosion; anti that

since the aJJJJellant had lost confidence in re'sJJontlent nos. 3 and 4

comJlensation coultl he awartlctl instead of reinstatement.

E

On behalf of the respondent nos. 3 anti 4 it was contentletl that clause

(g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act would also cover even major misconduct

iffor such misconduct the orders of discharge or dismissal were passed by

the employer without having regard to the nature of the particular misconduct

or the past record of service of the employees; and that this was not a fit case F

in which compensation coultl be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as that

woultl spell economic disai.1er to these workmen who were already out of job

since 1983,

that is, for more than 14 years.

The following

JlOints arose for determination hy this Court:-

1. Whether Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act is aJlJllicable G

to the facts of the present case.

2. If not whether the ap11ellant can be said to have been guilty of

having committed unfair labour Jlractice as Jler Clause (a) of Item

1 of Schedule IV of the Act on the basis of which the ortler of the H

666

A

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

Labour Court as confirmed by the higher courts can be supported.

3. Whether the order of reinstatement with back wages as passed by

the Lahour Court and as confirmed hy the higher courts is Ju~iificd

on the facts and circumstances of the case.

B Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra

Recognition of Trade Unions and Pre,'ention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,

1971 deals with

unfair labour practice said to have been committed by an

employer who discharges

or dismisses an employee for misconduct of a

minor nature or technical character and while doing so no regard is kept

C to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved against the delinquent or

without having regard to the past record of sen'ice of the employee so that

under these circumstances the ultimate punishment imposed on the delinquent

would

he found hy the Court to he a shockingly disproportionate punishment.

It is not

possible to agree with the contention of the respondent-workmen

D that the said clause would also cover even ma.ior misco!J.duct if for such

misconduct the orders of discharge

or dismissal arc passed by the employer

without having regard to the

nature of the particular misconduct or the

l>a~1

record of the employees and if under these circumstances it is found by the

court that the punishment imposed is a shockingly disproportionate one. It

is true that after the words 'for misconduct of a minor or technical character'

E there is found a comma in Clause (g), hut if the contention of the respondent­

workman

is to be accepted the comma will have to he replaced by 'or'. That

cannot be done in the context and settings of the said

clause as the said

exercise

a1>art from being impermissible would not make a harmonious

reading of the provision. The comma as found in the

clause after providing

F for the nature of the misconduct only indicates how the same nature of the

misconduct referred to in the first

part of the

clause results in a shockingly

dis1>ro1>ortionate punishment if certain relevant factors as mentioned in the

subsequent

part of the

clause, are not considered by the employer.

G

[675-B-H; 676-A]

Hindustan Lever Ltd v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, [1995] 6 SCC 326, relied

on.

Pm1durang Kashinath Want v. Divisional Controller, MSRTC, Dhule,

(1995) 1 CLR 1052 (Born) and Maharashtra State Road Transport

Corporation

v. Niranjan Sridhar Grade, (1985)

50 FLR (Born), approved.

H 1.2. It is true that this being a labour welfare legislation liberal

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COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 667

construction should be placed on the relevant provisions of the Act. It is also A

true that if two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the

Section, it follows that the construction, which furthers the policy and object

of the Act and is more beneficial to the employee, has to be preferred. But

there

is another canon of interpretation that a Statute or for that matter even

a

particular Section has to be interpreted according to its plain words and B

without doing violence to the language used by the Legislature. Clause (g)

of Item 1 of

Schedule IV of the Act is not reasonably capable of two

constructions. The one and only subject matter of Clause

(g) is the misconduct

of a minor or technical character. The remaining

11arts of the clause do not

indicate any separate subject

matter like the major misconduct. But they are

all adjuncts and corollaries or appendages of the principal subject, namely,

C

minor or technical misconduct which in given set of cases may amount to

resulting in shoCkingly disproportionate punishment if they are followed by

discharge

or dismissal of the delinquent. [677-B-G)

The Workmen of Mis Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India

(Pvt.) Ltd.

v. The management & Ors., [197JJ 1 sec 81J, referred to. D

2.1. The term 'victimisation' is neither defined in the present Act nor

in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 nor in the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947. Therefore, it has to

be given a general dictionary meaning. Thus .

if a person is made to suffer by some exceptional treatment it would amount

to victimisation. The

term 'victimisation' is of comprehensive import. It may E

be victimisation in fact or in law. Factual victimisation may consist of diverse

acts

of employers who

ar!! out to drive out and punish an employee for no

real reason and for extraneous reasons. Looking to the

nature of the charges

levelled against respondent nos. J

and 4, therefore, even in the light of their

past record of service it could not be said that for such misconduct they were

liable to be dismissed form service.

It must, therefore, held that if the F

punishment of dismissal or discharge is found shockingly dispropo11ionate

by the Court regard being

had to the particular major misconduct and the

past record of service of the delinquent

or is such as no reasonable employer

could ever impose in like circumstances, it would be unfair labour practice

by itself being an instance

of victimisation in law or legal victimisation G

independent of factual victimisation, if any. Such an unfair labour practice

is covered by the present Act by Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the

Act. [679-G;

680-A-E)

2.2. In the present case no reasonable management could have punished

a delinquent workman who in the late hours of the night shift by about OJ.JO H

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A a.m .. had gone to sleep keeping the machine in a working condition especially

in the absence of any gross misconduct reflected by

the past record of

service, with the extreme penalty of dismissal. This was a 11eculiar case in

which the

Plant-in-Charge found in the earl~' hours of the dawn entire work

force of to mazdoors and 2 operators like the respondents and the supen'isor

B all asleep. So far as 10 mazdoors were concerned they were let off for the

very misconduct by mere warning while the respondents were dismissed

fro.n service.

It is, of course, true that the respondents were assigned more

responsible duty as

compared to mazdoors, hut in the background of

surrounding circumstances and especially in the light of their past record

of service

there is no escape form the conclusion that the punishment of

C dismissal imposed on them for such misconduct

was grossly and shockingly

dispropo1iionatc.

By imposing such grossly disproportionate punishment on

the respondents the appellant management had tried to kill a fly with a

sledgehammer.

Consequently it must be held that the appellant was guilty of

unfair labour practice Such an act was squarely covered by Clause (a) of Item

1

of

Schedule IV of the Act being legal victimisation, if not factual

D victimisation. (661-E-H; 662-A-B]

Hind Construction

& Engineering Co. Ltd v. Their

Workmen, [1965)

2 SCR 85 and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhaguhhai Balubhai Patel & Ors.,

[1976) 2SCR 280, followed.

E Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn., P. 1197, referred to.

3.1.

When the 1mnishment of dismissal was shockingly

di1>proportionate to the charges held 11roved agaiiist respondent nos. 3 and

4 reinstatement with continuity of scn'icc was the least

that could have been

ordered

in their favour. There is no question of the appellant losing confidence

F in respondent nos. 3 and 4. It was not the case of the management while

framing the charge sheets against the workmen. The contention

that

apart

from going to sleep in the early hours of the morning when the night shift

was coming to a close the machine was ke11t working and that would have

created

hazard for the working of the

11lant and 11ossibility of an explosion

G was likely to arise even though mentioned in the written objections before

the

Labour

Court, was never pressed in service for consideration before the

Labour Court at the stage of arguments, nor any decision was invited on this

aspect. Nor such contention was also canvassed by the appellant in revision

before

the Industrial

Court or before the High Court. This contention,

therefore, must . be treated to be clearly an afterthought. All that was alleged

H by its witness before the Court was that because of the respondents going

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COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 669

to slee11 and allowing the machine to work without 11ouring raw material. A

'•-\- therein the 11roduction went down to some extent. That has nothing to do with

the working of the unattended machine becoming a hazard or inviting the

possibility of any ex11losion. Under these circumstances and especially looking

to the past record of se11•ice of the respondents it could not he said that the

management would lose confidence in these workmen. The work which they

B

were doing was not of any confidential nature which an operator has _to carry

out in the plant. It was a manual work which could be entrusted to anyone.

Consequently the submission that in lieu of rein~1atement compensation may

he awarded to the res11ondents, cannot he countenanced. It must, therefore,

he held

that the Labour Com1 was quite justified in ordering reinstatement --... of respondent-workmen with continuity of service. [682-C-H; 683-A-B] c

3.2. However, because of the misconduct committed by them of slee11ing

while on duty in the night shift the Labour Court has imposed the penalty

of depriving the workmen, respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively, of 60% and

50% of the hack wages. After the award they have been granted 100% back

.A wages till rein~1atement. But, as respondent nos. 3 and 4 went to slee11 while D

on duty and that too not alone hut in the company of the entire staff of 10.

mazdoors, they deserve to he further punished by being deprived of at lea~1

some part of back wages even after the award of the Labour Court till actual

reinstatement. Interest of justice would be served if respondent no. 3 is

~

directed to be paid only 40% of the back wages even after the award of the

E

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Labour Court till actual reinstatement punuant to the 1>resent order. Similarly

'1

respondent no. 4 will be entitled to only 50% back wages even after the date

of the Labom' court's award till actual reinstatement as per the 11resent

order. In addition thereto the appellant management will he entitled to give

written warnings to both these res1>ondent when they are reinstated in

•

semce not to re11eat such misconduct in future. The imposition of this type F

~

of penalty would be sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the case and

will 011erate as suitable corrective for the respondent-employees. They have

suffered enough since

more than 14 years. They are out of service for

all

these 14 years. At the time when they went to sleep in the night shift they

were pretty young.

Now they have naturally grown up in age and with passage

G

of years more maturity must have dawned on them.

Under these circumstances

r

the cut in the back wages as imposed by this Court would be quite sufficient

"(

.,~, to act as deterrent for them so that such misconduct may not be committed

• by them is future. [683-B-F] ..

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 510of1992.

H

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 13. 9. 91 of the Bombay High Court

. ~· in W.P. No. 3863of1989.

Narayan B. Shetty, H.S. Parihar, Kuldeep S. Parihar and P.N. Anaokar for

the Appellant

B Mrs. Indra Jaisingh, B.N. Singhvi and Brij Bhushan for the Respondent

Nos. 3-4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellant-management by obtaining special

C leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has brought in

challenge the order of

the High

Court of Bombay dated 13th September 1991

dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and confirming the order of the

Labour Court as further confirmed in revision by the industrial Court, Bombay.

By the impugned order respondent nos.3 and 4 herein who were workmen in

D the concern of the appellant were ordered to be reinstated in service with 40%

and 50% back wages respectively till the date of the award of the Labour

Court and thereafter with cent per cent back wages till reinstatement.

A

few relevant facts leading to these proceedings are

required, to be

noted

to highlight the grievance of the

appellant-management against the

E impugned order.

Background Facrs

Respondent nos.3 and 4 were working the plant of the appellant as

Plant Operators. On the night between 5th and 6th May 1982 when they were

F on duty in the night shift, at about 03.30 a.rn. when the Plant-in-Charge one

Shri Chandrahasan made a surprise visit, he found respondent nos.3 and 4

and 10 mazdoors as weli as the Shift Supervisor sleeping though the machine

was kept working. The Shift Supervisor was found sleeping in the cabin while

respondent

nos.3 and 4 operators and

10 rnazdoors were found sleeping on

the terrace of the factory. For the said misconduct a domestic enqliiry was

G held, after chargesheeting respondent nos.3 and 4 charge-sheets of even date

were issued

on 18th May 1982. After the domestic enquiry both these respondentS by order dated 04th June 1983 were dismissed from service.

Respondent

nos. 3 and 4 filed complaints before respondent no 2-authority

under the provisions

of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Union &

H Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. 1971 [hereinafter referred to as 'the

,i...:_·

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 671

Act']. The contention of these complainants was t11at t11ey were victimised A

..- and tlie appellant-management had committed diverse unfair practices as

y- contemplated under Clauses (a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV

of t11e Act. The appellant contested these complaints. The Labour Court in

the light

of tl1e evidence recorded came to the conclusion

tliat the appellant-

company had proved that the complainants had committed misconducts alleged

B

:.(

against them as per t11e charge-sheets dated 18th May 1982. It also held that

the complainants failed

to prove that tl1ey were dismissed by way of unfair

labour practices covered by Clauses (a),

(b), (d) and (f) of Item 1 of Schedule

IV of the Act. However, it held that tl1e appellant had committed unfair labour

practice as

per Clause (g) of Item 1 of the said Schedule. Contention of the

complainants

t11at they were discriminated against

was rejected. It was also c

found t11at the appellant failed to prove that the complainants were gainfully

employed since their dismissals on 04th June 1983. The Labour Court in short

found that looking

to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved

against the complainants the punishment of dismissal was grossly

disproportionate and, therefore, it amounted to unfair labour practice on the

D

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part of the appellant as covered by Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of

the Act. As a result, tl1e Labour Court passed an order of reinstatement with

appropriate back wages as seen earlier. The said order

of t11e Labour Court

resulted

in two revisions,

one on behalf of the workmen and another on behalf

of the management. The revisional court namely the Industrial Court dismissed

both the revision applications and confirmed the order

of tl1e Labour Court.

E

The appellant carried the matter in writ petition before the High Court which

as noted earlier came

to be dismissed. That is how

tile appellant is before us.

We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant as well as

learned senior· counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4 who are tile only contesting

., parties, respondent nos. 1 and 2 being the a~tllorities under the Act who have F

""

adjudicated the dispute are only formal parties.

Rival Contentions

Learned senior counsel Shri Narayan B. Shetty for the appellant

G

submitted that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court and also the

r High Court have patently erred in applying t11e'provisions of Item I Clause

(g)

of Schedule

IV of tile Act in the present case. It was submitted that on

a proper construction

of the said provision the said clause would apply only

if the misconduct committed by the respondents was a minor misconduct or

is

of technical nature. That tl1e Labour Court had found that t11e misconduct H

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] l S.C.R.

A of respondent nos.3 and 4 was a major misconduct and the said finding v. as

not disturbed or dissented from

by the revisional authority or by the High

·('--

Court. Under these circumstances tl1e Labour Court was not justified in taking

the view that the appellant was guilty

of unfair labour practice covered by

the said clause and when the Labour

Court held that on oilier alleged unfair

B

labour practices the complainants had made out no case, the complaints filed

by the respondents were liable

to be dismissed. He alternatively submitted tliat even assuming that tlle said clause was attracted looking to tlle nature

of the misconduct and tl1e past service record of the respondents it could not

be said that

tl1e punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate.

Even on

tllat ground tlle complaints were liable to be dismissed. It was lastly

c

contended tl1at in any view of tlle matter this was not a fit case where

reinstatement could have been ordered and instead compensation could have

been awarded

to the respondents in lieu of reinstatement as

tlleir misconduct

had created a situation in which the machine was kept working and the

respondents had gone

to sleep while on duty. The result was

tllat apart from

D

lesser production the unattended machine in working state had created a

hazardous situation wherein the plant would have been blown

off and an

,....:

explosion would have resulted, as tl1e chemical industry of tlle appellant

where tlle respondents were working is a.hazardous industry.

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Refuting these contentions learned senior counsel. Smt, Indira Jaisingh

E

for respondent nos, 3 and 4 contended tllat on a proper construction of

Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of tlle Act it is rightly held by tlle High

Court tllat tlle said clause is squarely attracted to tlte facts of tlle present case

as it covered apart from misconduct of minor

or technical character all

oilier

misconducts where looking to tlle nature of tlte misconduct or tlle past record

of service it appeared to the Court that the punishment iniposed was shockingly

F disproportionate to tlte charges held proved against tlte delinquent workmen. ,.

She further contended tltat in any case shockingly disproportionate y

punishment in the light of tlle nature of tlte misconduct alleged and proved

would itself amount to unfair labour practice or victimisation as held by this

Court in tlle case of Hind Construction & Engineering Co Ltd. v. Their

G

Workmen, (1965] 2 SCR 85. She also submitted that while considering Clause

(g) of ltern 1 of Schedule IV of the Act tlle Court should adopt beneficial rule

of construction as tltls is a labour welfare legislation. In tltis connection she

pressed

in service two decisions of this

Court to which we will make a

reference hereinafter. She also submitted tltat proportionality of tlle punishment

could always

be considered by courts dealing with labour legislations and

tlle

H court had• ample jurisdiction in appropriate cases to set aside such

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 673

disproportionate punishment in the light of the charges held proved against A

~·

the delinquents concerned. She next submitted that as t11e Labour Court had

found that the respondent-complainants were not shown to have been gainfully

employed

in t11e meantime there was no reason for not awarding full back

wages at least from the date

of the award of the Labour Court as the award

of

40% and 50% back wages to respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively till t11e

B

date of the award had remained final as the complainants had not challenged

the said award of back wages before the High Court. She also submitted that

once the punishment is found to be grossly disproportionate to

t11e charges

levelled and proved against the delinquents, the order

of

rei~statemcnt was

perfectly justified and there was no question

of appellant losing confidence

in the respondent-complainants and .consequently

t11is is not a fit case in c

which compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as t1.1at would

spell economic disaster to these workmen who are already out

of job since

1983,

tllat is, for more than 14 years.

In rejoinder it was contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant

·J...

that the same learned Judge of the High Court who decided t11e present case

had subsequently taken t11e· view of the construction of Clause (g) of Item

D

I of Schedule IV of the Act that the same would cover only minor misconducts.

He also relied upon another judgment

of the High Court on the same lines.

He also contended

tllat the Labour Court had repelled the contention on

behalf

of the respondent-complainants that the management had committed

E

unfair labour practice of victimisation covered by Clause (a) of Item 1 of

Schedule IV of the Act and if Clause (g) thereof did not apply to such major

misconducts complaints were required to

be dismissed·.

Points for Determination

~

In view of t11e riforesaid rival contentions the following points arise for

F

y

our determination.

I. Whether Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of the Act is applicable

to

t11e facts of

tile present case.

G

2. If not, whethf;r the appellant can be said to have been guilty of

.. r

having committed unfair labour practice as per Clause (a) of Item

I

of Schedule IV of the Act on the basis of which the order of the

labour Court as confirmed by the higher courts

can be supported.

3. Whether the order of reinstatement with back wages as passed by H

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674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

the Labour Court and as confirn1ed by the higher courts is justified

on the facts and circumstances

of the case.

We shall deal with these points seriatim,

Point No.I

For resolving the controversy centering round this point it is necessary "'-

to have a look at the rcJeyant statutory provisions of the Act. The Act was

passed

by the Maharashtra Legislature in 1971 as Act No. 1of1972. Amongst

its diverse objects and reasons one of the reasons for enacting the said Act

was for defining and providing for prevention

of certain unfair

labour practices

C to constitute courts (as independent machinery) for carrying out the pmposes

mentioned therein one of which being enforcing provisions relating

to unfair

labour practices. Unfair labour practices is defined by

Section 3 sub-section

(16) of the

Act to mean, 'unfair labour practices' as defined in section 26'. Section 26 of the Act Jays down that, "unless the context requires otherwise,

D 'unfair labour practices, mean any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III

and IV". We are not concerned with Schedules II and III which deal with

unfair Jabour practices on the part

of the employer and trade unions. We are

directly concerned with

Schedule IV which deals with general unfair Jabour

practices on the part

of the employers. The relevant provisions of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act read as under :

E

F

G

"l. To discharge or dismiss employees

(a) by way of victimisation:

(b) ..................... ..

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having

any regard

to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past

record of service of the employee,

so as to amount to a shockingly

disproportionate

punishment."

So far as the aforesaid Clause (g) is concerned the Labour Court has held that

H tl1e misconduct alleged against the respondents and held proved before it

,..

_-f·

·(

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR (S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 675

was not a misconduct of minor or technical character as they were found A

sleeping on duty and were also guilty of negligence in keeping the machine

in working state without putting necessary raw m.aterial therein. As the

aforesaid finding

of the Labour

Court about the nature of misconduct of

respondent nos. 3 and 4 was confirmed by the revisional court and as that

finding

was not challenged by the respondents before the High

Court we B

shall proceed for the present discussion on the basis that respondent nos.

3 and 4 were guilty of major misconduct. The moot questiOQ, therefore, which

falls for consideration is whether on the express language of Clause (g) the

said provision gets attracted or not. A conjoint reading of different sub-parts

of

the aforesaid provision, in our view, leaves no room for doubt that it deals

with an unfair labour practice said to have been committed by an employer C

who discharges or dismisses an employee for misconduct of a minor or

technical character

and while doing so no regard is kept to the nature of the

misconduct alleged and proved against the delinquent or without having

regard

to the past service record of the employee so that under these

circumstances

the ultimate punishment imposed on the delinquent would be D

found by the

Court to be a shockingly disproportionate punishment. It is not

possible to agree with the contention of learned senior counsel for the

respondent-workmen that· the said clause would also cover even major

misconducts if

for such misconducts the orders of discharge or dismissal are

passed by the employer without having regard to the nature of the misconduct

or

the past record of the employees and if under these circumstances. it is E

found by the court that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate

one. It is true that after the words

·for misconduct of a minor or technical

character' there is found a comma in Clause (g), but if the contention of

learned senior counsel is to be accepted the comma will have to be replaced

by ·or'. That cannot be done in the context and settings of the said clause F

as the said exercise apart from being impermissible would not make a harmonious

reading of the provision. Even that apart, in the said Clause (g) the Legislature

has used the word 'or' while dealing with the topic of non-consideration by

the employer while imposing the punishment the relevant factors to be

considered, namely, either the non-consideration of the nature of the particular

misconduct or

the past record of service of the employee, which would make G

the punishment appear to be shockingly disproportionate to the charge of

misconduct held proved against the delinquent. Thus the term 'or' as employed

by the Legislature in the said clause refers to the same topic, namely

non­

consideration of relevant aspects by the employer while imposing the

punishment. Consequently it cannot be said to have any reference to the

nature of the misconduct, whether minor or major. It must, 'therefore, be held H

676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) J S.C.R.

A that the comma as found in the clause after providing for the nature of the

misconduct only indicates how the same nature of the misconduct referred

to in the first part ~f the clause results in a shockingly disproportionate

punishment if certain relevant

factors, as mentioned in the subsequent part

of the clause, are not considered by the employer.

If the contention of learned

senior counsel for the respondents was right all the sub-parts of clause (g)

B have to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. That would result in a

very anomalous situation.

In such an eventuality the discharge or dismissal

of an employee in case of a major misconduct without regard to the nature

of the particular misconduct or

past record of service may by itself amount

to shockingly disproportionate punishment.

Consequently for a proved major

C misconduct; if past service record is not seen, the punishment of discharge

or dismissal by itself may amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.

Such an incongruous result is not contemplated by Clause (g) of Item I of

Schedule

IV of the Act. Such type of truncated operation of the said provision

is contra-indicated by the very texture and settings of the said clause.

Once

the said clause deals with the topic of misconduct of a minor or technical

D character it is difficult to appreciated how the said clause can be construed

as covering also major misconducts for which there is not even a whisper in

the said clause. On a harmonious construction of the said clause with all it

sub-parts, therefore, it must be held that the Legislature had contemplated

while enacting

the said clause punishment of discharge or

dismissal· for

E misconduct of minor or technical character which, when seen in the light of

the nature of

the particular minor or technical misconduct or the past record

of the employee would amount to inflicting of shockingly disproportionate

punishment.

Jn this connection we

may mention that the same learned Judge

B.N. Srikrishna. J., in a latter decision in the case of Pandurang Kashinath

F

Wani v. Divisional Controller, MS.R.T.C. Dhule & Ors., (1995) I CLR 1052

has taken the view that Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of the Act refers

to minor or technical misconducts only. The same view was also taken by

another learned Judge Jahagirdar. J., in the case of Maharashtra State Road

Transport Corporation

v. Niranjan

Sridhar Gade and another, (I 985) 50 FLR

(Born) I. So far as this Court is concerned the same Act came for consideration

G in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kale and others, (1995)

6 SCC 326. It is, of course, true that the question with which this Court was

concerned was a different one, namely, whether before any final discharge or

dismissal order is passed, a complaint could be filed under the Act on the

ground that

the employer was contemplating to commit such unfair labour

practice, if ultimately

the departmental proceedings were likely to result into

H final orders of dismissal or discharge attracting any of the clauses of Item I

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 677

of Schedule IV of the Act. However while considering the scheme of the Act A

-~

especially the very same Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act a Bench of this

'°'

Court consisting of G.N. Ray. J. and one of us S.B. Majmudar. J. in paragraph

26 Qf the Report assumed that the said clause would cover minor misconducts.

Learned senior counsel for the respondents was right when she

contended that this being a labour welfare legislation liberal construction

B 4

~ should be placed on the relevant provisions of the Act. She rightly invited

our attention to paragraph

41 of the Report of the aforesaid case in this

connection. She also invited our attention to a decision

of this

Court in the

case

of The Workmen of Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India

(Pvt)

Ltd. etc v. The Management and others etc., [1973] l SCC 813 especially the

c

observations made in paragraph 3 5 of the Report. It has been observed

therein that

if two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the

section, it followed that the construction which furthers the policy and object

of the Act and is more beneficial to t11e employee, has to be preferred. But

it is furtl1er observed in the very said paragraph that there is another canon

of interpretation that a Statute or for that matter even a particular section, has D

. .(

to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to

the language used by the legislature. In our view, Clause (g) of Item 1 of

Schedule IV of the Act is not reasonably capable of two constructions. Only

one reasonable construction is possible on the express language of Clause

(g), namely, that it seeks to cover only those types of unfair labour practices

E

where minor misconducts or technical misconducts have resulted in dismissal

or discharge of delinquent workmen and such punishment in the light of the

nature

of misconduct or past record of the delinquent is found to be shockingly

disproportionate to the charges

of minor misconduct or charges of technical

misconduct held proved against the delinquent.

One and only subject-matter

of Clause (g) is the misconduct of minor or technical character. The remaining F

....

parts of tl1e clause do not indicate any separate subject-matter like the major

"' misconduct. But they are all adjuncts and corollaries or appendages of the

principal subject, namely, minor

or technical misconduct which in given set

ofcases may amount to resulting in shockingly disproportionate punishment

if they are followed by discharge or dismissal of the delinquent. The first

G

point, therefore, will have to be answered in the negative in favour of t11e

appellant and against the respondent-delinquents.

Point No. 2

However this is not the end of the matter. Looking to the nature of the

charges levelled against the delinquent-respondents

it has to be appreciated H

'

678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A that all that was alleged against them was that they were found sleeping in

the wee hours

of the night shift almost near dawn at

03.30 a.m. having kept

the machine in a rul111ing condition without seeing to it that proper rnw

material was inserted therein. Even on the basis that it was a major misconduct

which was alleged and proved, looking

to the past record of the service of

B the delinquents no reasonable employer could have imposed puriishment of

dismissal. The past record was to the effect that respondent no. 3 was once

found allegedly gambling in the factory premises but was in fact found

to be

playing cards on a Diwah day which was a public holiday, while the only past

misconduct alleged against respondent no. 4 was that on one occasion he

was warned for negligent discharge

of duty. Looking to the nature of the

C charges levelled against them, therefore, and even in the light of their past

service record

it could not be said that for such misconducts they were liable

to be dismissed from service. Such punishments patently appear

to be grossly

disproportionate

to tl1e nature of the charges held proved against tl1em. That

finding reached by the Labour

Court on facts remains unassailable. Once that

conclusion is reached even apart from non-application

of

Clause (g) of Item

D I of Schedule IV of the Act. Clause (a) of Item I of the said Schedule of the

Act gets squarely attrncted as it would amount to victimisation on the part

of the management which can be said to have imposed a most unreasonable

punishment on

tl1ese

·employees. In this coI111ection learned senior counsel

for the respondent-workmen has rightly pressed in service a decision

of a

E Bench of three learned Judges of this

Court in tl1e case of Hind Construction

(suprn). In that case this Court was considering the jurisdiction and power

of tl1e Industrial Court during the time when Section 11-A of the Industrial

Disputes Act,

194 7 was not on the

Statute Book. Considering the nature of

the punishment imposed on the workmen, who had gone on strike, because

F

they had not reported for duty on a day which otherwise was a holiday but

which was declared by tl1e management to be a working day, this Court

speaking through Hidayatullah, J. made the following pertinent observations

at page

88 of the Report :

" ... But where tl1e punishment is shockingly disproportionate, regard

being had

to the particular conduct and the past record or is such,

G as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances,

t11e Tribunal may treat tl1e imposition of such punishment as itself

showing victimization or unfair labour practice ......

"

It has to be kept in view that tllese observations were made by tllis Court

H at a time when unfair labour practices were not codified either by tl1e Industrial

-~

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAIMUDAR. J.] 679

Disputes Act or even by the present Act. The present Act tried to codify A

unfair practices on t11e part of t11e employer by enacting the Act in 1972 and

even the Industrial Disputes Act being the Central Act also followed

t11e

Maharashtra Act and taking a leaf from the book of Maharashtra Legislature,

Parliament introduced the concept

of unfair labour practices by inserting

Chapter V-C by Act

No. 46of1982 w.e.f. 21st August 1984. Sections 25-T and

25-U of the Industrial Disputed Act deal with 'Prohibition of unfair labour B

practice' and 'Penalty for co111111itting unfair labour practices' respectively.

The term

'unfair labour practice' was defined by the Industrial Disputes Act

by inserting

Section 2(ra) with effect from the very same date, i.e. 21st August

1984 by

t11e very same Act, i.e., Act No. 46 of 1982 to mean, 'any of the

practices specified in the Fifth Schedule'. The Fifth

Schedule of the Industrial C

Disputes Act, which saw the light of the day pursuant to the very same

Amending Act, deals with 'unfair labour practices' which are a mirror image

and replica

of the unfair labour practices contemplated and codified by the

present Maharashtra Act. But apart from these subsequent statutory provisions

which tried to codify unfair labour practices on the part

of the employers, the

basic concept

of victimisation as laid down by t11is Court in Hind Construction's D

case (supra) holds the field and is

not whittled down by any subsequent

statutory enactments. Not only

it is not given a go-by but it is reiterated by

t11e present Act by enacting Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act

meaning thereby any discharge

or dismissal of an employee by way of

victimisation would be unfair labour practice.

The

tem1 'victimisation' is not defined by the present Act. Sub-section (18)

of Section 3 of the Act which is the Definition Section lays down tliat, 'words

E

and expressions used in this Act and not defined therein, but defined in the

Bombay Act, shall, in relation to an industry to which

t11e provisions of the

Bombay Act apply, have the meanings assigned to

t11em by the Bombay Act; F

and in any other case, shall have t11e meanings assigned to t11em by the

Central Act'. Bombay Act is the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and

t11e Central Act is the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as laid down by Definition

Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. The term 'victimisation' is defined neither

by the Central Act nor by

t11e Bombay Act. Therefore, the tenn 'victimisation' G

has to be given general dictionary

mear1ing. In ·concise 0:-..ford Dictionary, 7th

Edn., ilie tem1 'victimisation' is defined at Page 1197 as follows :

'"make a victim; cheat; make suffer by dismissal or other exceptional

treatment"

H

680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) l S.C.R.

A Thus if a person is made to suffer by some exceptional treatment it would

amount to victimisation. The term 'victimisation' is of comprehensive import. r"-·

It may be victimisation in fact or in law. Factual victimisation may consist of

diverse

acts of employers who are out to drive out and punish an employee

for no real reason and for extraneous reasons. As for example a militant trade

B

union leader who is a thorn in the side of the management may be discharged

or

dismissed for that very reason camouflaged by another ostensibly different

reason.

Such instances among to uufair labour practices on account.of factual

victimisation. Once that happens Clause (a) of Item I of Schedule IV of the

Act would get attracted, even apart from the very same act being covered by

uufair labour practices envisaged by Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the very

c same Item l of Schedule IV. But it cannot be said that Clause (a) of Item l

which

deals with victimisation covers only factual victimisation. There can be

in addition legal victimisation and it is this

type of victimisation which is

contemplated by the decision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra). It

must, therefore, be held that if the punishment of dismissal or discharge is

D

found shockingly disproportionate by the Court regard being had to the

particular major misconduct

and the past service record of the delinquent or

)-0

is such as no reasonable employer could ever impose in like circumstances,

it would be uufair labour practice

by itself being an instance of victimisation

in Jaw or legal victimisation independent of factual victimisation, if any.

Such

an uufair labour practice is covered by the present Act by enactment of

E

Clause (a) of Item l of Schedule IV of the Act as it would be an act of

victimisation in

law as clearly ruled by this Court in the aforesaid decision. On the same lines is a latter decision of this Court in the case of Bharat Iron

Works

v. Bhagubhai Baiubhai Patel &

Ors., [1976) 2 SCR 280 wherein a

Bench of three learned

Judges speaking through Goswami, J. laid down the

F

parameters of the term 'victimisation' as understood in Jabour laws and as

contemplated by industrial jurisprudence. It has been observed that ordinarily

~

a person is victimised if he is made a victim or a scapegoat and is subjected

'f

to persecution, prosecution or punisi1ment for no real fault or guilt of his own.

If actual fault or guilt meriting punishment is established, such action will be

rid of the taint of victimisation.

The aforesaid observations obviously refer

G

to factual victimisation. But then follows further

clucidfition of the term

'victimisation' to the following effect :

"Victimisation may partake of various types, as for example, pressurising

an employee to leave the union or union activities, treating an employee

in a discriminatory manner or inflicting a grossly monstrous punishment

H

which no national person would impose upon an employee and the

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 681

like .... " A

""I"

· The aforesaid observations in this decision fall in line with the observations

in

the earlier decision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra). Consequently

it must be held that when looking to the nature of the charge of even major

misconduct which is found proved if the punishment of dismissed or discharge

as imposed is found to be grossly disproportionate in the light of the nature B

of the

miscondtlct or the past record of the employee concerned involved in

the misconduct or is such which no reasonable employer would ever impose

in like circumstances, inflicting of such punishment itself could be treated as

legal victimisation. On the facts of the present case there is a clear finding

reached

by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the Industrial Court that

c

. the charges levelled against the respondent-delinquents which were held

proved

even though reflecting major misconducts, were not such in the light

of their past service record

as would merit imposition of punishment of

dismissal. This factual finding would obviously attract the conclusion that by

imposing such punishment the appellant-management had victimised the

~

respondent-delinquents. Imposition of such shockingly disproportionate D

punishment by itself, therefore, has to be treated as legal victimisation apart

from not being factual victimisation as on the latter aspect the Labour Court

has held against the respondent-workmen and that finding has also remained

well sustained

on record. Thus it must be held that the management even

though not guilty of factual victimisation

was guilty of legal victimisation in

E

the light of the proved facts which squarely attracted the ratio of the decisions

of this Court in Hind Construction (supra) and Bharat

Iron Works (supra).

It

is easy to visualise that no reasonable management could have punished

a delinquent

workman who in the late hours of the night shift by about

03.30

_ _,

a.m. had gone to sleep keeping the machine in a working condition especially

~

in the absence of any gross misconduct reflected by the past service record, F

'( with the extreme penalty of dismissal. It is also interesting to note that this

was a peculiar case in which the Plant In-charge found during his surprise

visit

at

03.30 a.m. in the early hours of the dawn entire work force of 10

mazdoors and 2 operators like the respondents and the supervisor all asleep.

It is also pertinent to note that so far as 10 mazdoors were concerned they

G

were let off for this very misconduct by mere warning while the respondents

.were dismissed from service. It is, of course, true that the respondents were

assigned more responsible duty as compared to mazdoors, but in the

background of surrounding circumstances

and especially in the light of their

past

service record there is no escape from the conclusion that

the punishment

of dismissal imposed on them for such misconduct was grossly and shockingly H

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A disproportionate, as rightly held by the Labour Court and as confinned by the

revisional court and the High Cowt. By imposing such grossly disproportionate

punishment on the respondents the appellant-management had tried to kill a

fly with a sledge hammer. Consequently it must be held that tl1e appellant was

guilty of unfair labour practice. Such an act was squarely covered by Clause

(a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act being legal victimisation, if not factual

B victimisation. The ultimate finding of the Labour Court about maintainability

of the complaint can be supported on this ground. The second point is

answered in the affinnative ag~inst tlie appellant and in favour of the

respondent·-workmen.

C Point No. 3

So far as t11is point is concerned it has to be held that when t11e

punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate to the charges held

proved against'them reinstatement

with continuity of service was the least

that

could have been ordered in their favour. There is no question of appellant

D losing confidence in them. In

tliis connection learned senior counsel for tlie

appellant tried to submit tliat apart from going to sleep in the early hours of

tlie morning when tlie night shift was coming to a close tlie machine was kept

working and that would have created a hazard for tlie working of the plant

and possibility of eiq>losion was likely to arise. So far as tliis contention is

E concerned it must be stated that this was not tlie case of tlie management

while framing tlie charge-sheets against the workmen. Not only tliat, there is

not a whisper

about

t.'1.e said eventuality and possibility in tlie evidence led

by the management before the Labour Court. But that apart no such contention,

even tliough mentioned in tlie written objections before tlie Labour Court,

was ever pressed in service for consideration before tlie Labour Court at tlie

F stage of arguments, nor any decision was invited on tliis aspect. No such

contention was also canvassed by tlie appellant in revision before tlie

industrial Court or before the High Court. This contention, tlierefore, must be

treated to be clearly an afterthought and appears to have been rightly given

up in subsequent stages of the trial by tlie management itself. All that was

G alleged by its witness before the Court was that because of the respondents

going to sleep and allowing the machine to work without pouring raw material

, tlierein tlie production went down to some extent. That has notliing to do

witll tlie working of tlie unattended machine becoming a hazard or inviting

possibility of

any explosion.

Under tliese circumstances and especially looking

to the past service record of the respondents it could not be said that tlie

H management would lose confidence in tliese workmen. The work which tliey

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 683

were doing was not of any confidential nature which an operator has to carry

A

~ out in the plant. It was a manual work which could be entrusted to anyone.

Consequently the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant, that

in lieu

of reinstatement compensation may be awarded to the respondents,

cannot

be countenanced. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour

Court

was quite justified in ordering reinstatement of respondent-workmen with

B

continuity of service. However because of the misconduct committed by

them,

of sleeping while on duty in the night shift the Labour

Court has

imposed the penalty

of depriving the workmen, respondent nos. 3 and 4

respectively,

of

60% and 50% of the back wages. After the award they have

been granted 100% back wages till reinstatement. But, in our view, as

respondent

nos. 3 and 4 went to sleep while on duty and that too not alone

c

but in company of the entire staff of

10 mazdoors, they deserve to be further

punished

by being deprived of at least some part of back wages even after ' the award of the Labour Court till actual reinstatement. Interest of justice

/

would be served, in our view, if respondent no. 3 is directed to be paid only

40% of the back wages even after the award of the Labour Court till actual

;-{ reinstatement pursuant to our present order. Similarly respondent no. 4 will D

be entitled to only 50% back wages even after the date of the Labour Court's

award till actual reinstatement as per the present order. In addition thereto the

appellant-management will

be entitled to give written warnings to both these

respondents when they are reinstated in service not to repeat such

misconducts in future. The imposition

of this type of additional penalty, in

E

our view, would be sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the case and

will operate

as suitable corrective for the respondent-employees. They have

suffered enough since more than

14 years. They are out of service for all

these 14 years. At the time when they went to sleep in the night shift they

were pretty young. Now they have naturally grown up in age and with

~ passage of years more maturity must have dawned on them. Under these F

'\" circumstances the cut in the back wages as imposed by the Labour Court and

as further imposed by

us would be quite sufficient to act as deterrent for them

so that such misconducts may not be committed by them in future. The.third

point is answered as aforesaid

•by holding that the order of reinstatement is

justified but the order

of back wages as ordered by the Labour

Court requires

G

r-

to be modified to the aforesaid extent.

In the result, this appeal is dismissed subject to the slight modification

that respondent nos. 3 and 4 will be entitled to reinstatement and continuity

of service but so far as back wages are concerned, even after the order of

the Labour

Court instead of 100% of back wages, respondent no. 3 will be

H

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A entitled to 40% back wages till reinstatement and respondent no.4 will be

entitled to 50% back wages till actual reinstatement pursuant to the present r--

order. They will also be suitably warned in writing by the appellant as

aforesaid. We direct the appellant

to. reinstate the respondents concerned

·

within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order at its end.

The office shall send a copy

of this order to the appellant for information and

B necessary action. Pursuant to the interim order of this

Court pending this

apneal the appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 78,000 for being paid to the

respondent-workmen towards their claim of back wages as awarded by the

Labour Court and as confirmed by higher courts. Deducting the said amount

the balance

of back wages as payable to the respondents concerned pursuant C to the present order shall be worked out and this amount of back wages with

all other consequential monetary benefits flowing from the order

of

reinstatement shall be made available by the appellant to the respondents

concerned within a period

of eight weeks from the receipt of a copy of this

order at its end.

It is

also made clear that because of the grant of continuity

of service to the respondents all other future benefits like promotion, retiral

D benefits etc. according to rules and regulations of appellant-management will

also

be made available to the respondent-workmen.

Orders accordingly. In the

facts and circumstances

of the case there will be no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

r -

' ..