As per case facts, dealers were granted exemption from State Sales Tax for goods produced by large/medium scale industrial units within a a specified period under a Government Order. A ...
COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX,
JAMMU AND KASHMIR ETC. ETC ..
V.
M/S PINE CHEMICALS LTD. AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
OCTOBER 24, 1994
[M.N. VENKA TACHALIAH, CJ, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEV AN
REDDY, JJ.]
A
B
Central Sales Tax Act-Sub-section (2A) of Section 8-J&K General
Sales Tax Act-Government Order No. 159-/nd. dated March 26, 1971-
/nterpretation of Section 8 (2A) -Claim of benefit of sub-sec. (2A) of C
Section 8-Dealers assessees already granted exemption under
Government Order No. 159-Whether benefit of sub-section (2A) is
available even where goods are exempted with reference to industrial unit
and for a specified period as granted under Government Order No. 159-
Held, No-Whether an exemption of the nature granted under Government D
Order No. 159 is an exemption from the tax 'generally' within the meaning
of Section 8 (2A) ·-Held, No.
These petitions were filed seeking the review of this Court's
judgment and Order dated January 16, 1992 in Pine Chemicals Ltd. and
Ors. Etc. Etc. v. Assessing Authority and Ors. Etc. Etc.,(1992] 2 SCC 683. E
By this judgment, this court allowed the appeals preferred by the
dealers setting aside the judgment
of the High Court, while holding that
the dealers -assessees were entitled to claim the benefit of the provision
contained
in sub-section (2A) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act
in view of the exemption granted to them under GQvernment
Order No.
159-Ind. dated March 26, 1971 passed under the Jammu and Kashmir F
General Sales Tax Act.
For attracting the exemption provided
by the Government
Order,
it had to be established that the goads, the sale or purchase of which
was claimed
to be exempt from tax, were manufactured by a large or
medium scale Industry and that the said goods were manufactured and G
sold within five years from the date the said industrial unit had gone
into production.
The question for consideration
is whether the Bench which decided
Pine Chemicals was right in holding that the benefit of the said sub
section was available even where the goods were exempted with
H
123
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A reference to industrial unit and for a specified period, viz., period of
five years from the date the relevant unit goes into production. In other
words, the question was whether an exemption of the nature granted
under Government
Order No. 159 was an exemption available
"only in
specifi,ed circumstances or under specified conditions" within the
meaning
of the explanation to Section 8 (2A), as contended by the State
B or was it a case where the goods were exempted from the tax "generally" within the meaning of Section 8 (2A), as contended by the
dealers.
c
D
E
F
G
H
Allowing the review petition, this Court
HELD : 1.1. The idea behind sub-section (2A) of Section 8 of the
Central Sales Tax Act, is to exempt the sale/purchase of goods from the
Central Sales Tax where the sale or purchase of such goods is exempt
generally under the State Sales Tax Law. Sub-section (2A) requires
specifically
that such exemption must be a general exemption and not
an exemption operative
in specified circumstances or under specified
conditions.
The exemption under the Government Order No. 159 dated
March
26, 1971, is not with reference to goods or a class or category of
goods but with reference to the industrial unit producing them and their
manufacture
and sale within a particular period For the purposes of the
Government
Order, the nature, class or category of goods is irrelevant;
it may be any goods.
It is concerned only with the industrial unit
producing them and the period within which they
are manufactured
and sold. In such a case it
is not an instance where the sale is of goods,
th~ sale or purchase of which is under Sales Tax Law of the appropriate
State, exempt from tax generally. Exemption provided by Government
Order No. 159 is not with reference to goods but with reference to the
industrial unit. The exemption granted under the Government
Order
does not
sat!sfy the requirements of Section 8 (2A). (129-B-F, 130-A)
. Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. State of Haryana, (1976) 4 SCC 27
and
International Cotton Corporation
(P) Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. Commercial Tax
Officers and Ors., (1975) 3 SCC 585, relied on.
1.2. The Bench
in the judgment under review agreed that the
existence
or otherwise of the three limitations under the explanation
referred to on claiming exemption under Section 8 (2-A) of the Central
Sales Tax Act will therefore, have to be tested with reference to the
transaction
of sale or purchase as the case may be,
"but then qualified
the words sale
or purchase, as the case may
be", by adding "of the
COMMR. OF SALES TAX v. PINE CHEMICALS LTD. 125
dealer who claims the exemption in respect of his intrastate sale or A
purchase of the same goods". It was further added: 'thus the specified
circumstances and the specified conditions referred to
in the
explanation should
with reference to the local turnover of the same
dealer who claims exemption under Section 8 (2A) of the Central Sales
Tax Act." It is not possible to agree Sub-section (2A) speaks of sale or B
purchase of goods being exempt generally under the State Sales Tax
enactment; it does not speak of exemption qua the dealer, much
less
qua the unit manufacturing such goods. In the Judgment under review,
it has been further observed that
"the facts which the dealer has to
prove to get the benefit of the Government Orders are intended only to
identify the dealers and the goods
in respect of which the exemption is C
sought and they are not
tonditions or specifications of circumstances
relating to the turnover sought to
be exempted from payment of tax
within the meaning of those provisions. The specified circumstances
and the specified conditions referred to
in the explanation should relate
to the transaction of sale of the commodity and not identification of the
D
dealer or the commodity in respect of which the exemption is
claimed."
The above reasoning is at variance with the clear and simple language
employed
in
Section 8 (2-A). The language of the sub-section does not
bear
or
adiµit the construction placed upon it in the judgment under
review. The judgment under review suffered from a manifest
error of
law, an
error apparent on the face of the record, and, therefore, liable E
to be reviewed. In the interest of law, it is necessary that the said error
is rectified. (131-E-H, 132-A-C)
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION Review Petition (C) Nos.
1372-73of1993 etc.
(Under Article 137 of the Constitution oflndia.)
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 2309-10of1989 etc. etc.
From the Judgment and ·order dated 23.9.88 of the Jammu and
Kashmir
in
W.P. No. 87of1981 and in C.M.P. No. 2519of1988.
M.L. Verma, G. Viswantha Iyer, Ashok H. Desai, Ashok Mathur, M.A. ·
Firoz, Kishan Mahajan, P.H. Parekh, S. Fazl and Ms. Smitha for the
F
G
Petitioner/ Appellants. H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A K.K. Venugopal, A.S. Nambiar, Raja Ram Aggrawal, B.V. Desai,
B
c
D
E
F
G
Shobhan Thakore,
Smt. Shanta Vasudevan, P.K. Manohar, B.V. Desai and
E.C. Agrawala for the Respondents.
The Judgment
of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J. These petitions are filed by the
Commissioner
of
Sales Tax, Jammu and Kashmir and others seeking the
review
of this Court's judgment and order dated January 16, 1992 reported
in [1992] 2
S.C.C. 683 (Pine Chemicals Ltd and Ors. etc. etc. v. Assessing.
Authority and Ors. etc. etc.). The matter arose under the Jammu and
Kashmir General Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act. By the
aforesaid judgment, this Court allowed the appeals preferred by the dealers
setting aside the judgment
of the Jammu and Kashmir High
Court:.
The judgment under review dealt with and pronounced upon four
submissions.
It held:
(I) Notwithstanding the
fa<;t that the Government Order No. 159-Ind.
dated March :26, 1971 does not invoke or refer to Section 5 of the Jammu
and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, arid notwithstanding the defect, if any,
in the form, it is and must be understood as an order granting exemption
under and with reference to Section 5
of the said Act.
(2) That the said Government
Order is effective by itself. It did not
require any other or further order to make it effective and enforceable.
(3) SRO No. 448 dated October 22, 1982 did not have the effect of
superseding the aforesaid exemption notification.
(4) The dealers-assessees are entitled to claim the benefit
of the
provision contained
in sub-section (2A) of Section 8 of the Central
Sales
Tax Act in view of the exemption granted to them under Government Order
No. 159.
Though the learned counsel for the review petitioners sought to impugn
the correctness
of all the four findings in the judgment, we did not allow
him to
do so and restricted him only to the fourth submission. This we did
for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter.
We shall, therefore, confine our
discussion only to the said aspect.
Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act deals with the rate of tax. Sub
H section (2A), relevant for our purposes, reads thus:
COMMR. OF SALES TAX v. PINE CHEMICALS LTD. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 127
"8. (2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- A
section (1-A) of Section 6 or in sub-section (1) of this
section, tax payable under this Act by a dealer on his
turnover insofar as the turnover
or any part thereof relates
to the sale
of any goods, the sale or, as the case may be, the
purchase
of which is, under the sales tax law of the
appropriate State, exempt from tax generally
or subject to B
tax generally at a rate which is lower than four percent
(whether called a tax
or fee or by any other name), sha!I be
nil or, as the case may be, shall be calculated at the lower
rate.
Explanation:-For the purpose of this sub-section a sale or C
purchase of any goods shall not be deemed to be exempt
from tax generally under the sales tax law
of the appropriate
State
if under that law the sale or purchase of such goods is
exempt only in specified circumstances or under
specified
conditions or the tax is levied on the sale or purchase of
such goods at specified stages or otherwise than with D
reference to the turnover of the goods."
A reading of the sub-section yields the following features:
(a) The sub-section opens with a
non-obstante clause which gives an
over-riding effect to the rule contained therein over the provisions E
contained in sub-section
(IA) of Section 6 and in sub-section (1) of Section
8 itself;
(b) where the turnover (or any part thereof)
of a dealer relates to the
sale
of any goods, the sale or purchase of which is under the sales tax law
of the appropriate State exempt from tax generally or is taxable at a rate F
lower than four percent;
(c) the Central sales tax shall equally be exempt
or shall be charged at
such lower rate, as the case may be;
( d) the explanation which defines the expression
"generally" occurring G
in the sub-section clarifies that a sale or. purchase of any goods shall not be
deemed to be exempt from tax generally under the State sales tax law
if
under such law (i) the sale or purchase of such goods is exempt only in
specified circumstances or under specified conditions
or (ii) the tax is .
levied on the sale or purchase
of such goods at specified stages or otherwise
than with reference to the turnover
of the goods. H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A We may at this stage set out the relevant portion of Government Order
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
No. 159, which provides for exemption. It reads:
"Sanction is accorded to the grant of the following
incentives and · facilities to Large and Medium Scale
Industries
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir : ................. .
(2) Grant
of exemption from the State Sales Tax both on
raw materials and finished products for a period
of five
years from the date the unit goes into
production."
By a subsequent Government Order dated August 25, 1971 the clause
(2) was substituted. The substituted clause (2) reads thus:
"2. Grant of exemption from the sales tax both on raw
materials and finished products.
The State Sales Tax paid by Large and Medium Stale
Industries on the raw materials procured by them for the
initial 5 years
of the production would be refunded to such
industries. Similarly such industries will
be granted
exemption from the payment
of any State sales tax on their
finished products for a period
of five years from the date the
unit goes into
production."
For attracting the exemption provided by the government order, it has
to
be established that (i) the goods, the sale or purchase of which is claimed
to
be exempt from tax, are manufactured by a large or medium scale
· industry and (ii) that the said goods are manufactured and sold within five
years from the date the said industrial unit has gone into production.
The simple question before
us is whether the Bench which decided
Pine Chemicals is right in holding that the benefit of the said sub-section is
available even where the goods are exempted with reference to industrial
unit and for a specified period, viz., period
of five years from the date the
relevant unit goes into production.
In other words, the question is whether
an exemption
of the nature granted under Government
Order No. 159 dated
March 26, 1971 is an exemption available "only in specified circumstances
or under specified conditions" within the meaning of the explanation to
Section 8 (2-A), as contended by the State or
is it a case where the goods
are exempt from the tax
"generally" within the meaning· of Section 8 (2-A),
as contended
by the respondents-dealers? We are of the opinion that the
, __
'
COMMR. OF SALES TAX v. PINE CHEMICALS LTD. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 129
respondents-dealers' contention cannot be accepted in view of the clear and A
unambiguous language of the sub-section.
The idea behind sub-section (2-A) of Section 8 of the Central Sales
Tax Act, which we have analysed hereinbefore,
is to exempt the
sale/purchase
of goods from the Central
Sales Tax where the sale or
purchase
of such goods is exempt generally under the
State sales tax law. B
We must give due regard and attach due meaning to the expression
"generally" which occurs in the sub-section and which expression has been
defined
in the explanation. If the said expression had not been there, it could probably have been possible to argue that inasmuch as the goods sold
by a particular manufacturer-dealer are exempt from the State tax
in his
hands, they must equally be exempt under the Central Act. But sub-section
C
(2A) requires specifically that such exemption must be a general exemption
and not an exemption operative
in specified circumstances or under
specified conditions. Can
it be said that the goods sold by the dealers in this
case are exempt from tax generally under the State sales tax enactment?
The answer can only
be in the negative. Such goods are exempt from tax
only when they are manufactured in a large or medium industrial unit D
within five years of its commencement of production and sold within the ,
said period, i.e., in certain specified circumstances alone. The exemption is
not a general one but a conditional one. The exemption under the
Government Order No. 159 is not with reference to goods or a class or
category
of goods but with reference to the industrial unit producing them E
and their manufacture and sale within a particular period For the purposes
of the government order, the nature, class or category of goods is irrelevant;
it may be any goods. It
is concerned only with the industrial unit producing
them and the period within which they are manufactured and sold. Can it be
said in such
a case that it is an instance where the sale is of goods, the sale
or purchase
of which is under sales tax law of the appropriate
State, exempt F
from tax generally? Certainly not. Exemption provided by Government
Order No. 159, to repeat, is not with reference to goods but with reference
to the industrial unit. So long as it is (i) a large or medium scale industry
and (ii) it manufactures and sells goods within the five years
of its going
into production, the sale
of such goods is exempt irrespective of the nature
or classification of goods. Similar goods may be manufactured by another G
unit but if it does not satisfy the above two requirements, the goods
manufactured and sold by it would not be entitled to exemption from tax.
Indeed, the goods manufactured by that very unit would not be eligible for
exemption
if they are manufactured after the expiry of five years from the
date it goes into production and/or sells them beyond the said period. The
period
of exemption may also vary from unit to unit depending on the date H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
of commencement of production in each unit. For the above reasons, we arc
of the opinion that the exemption granted under the aforesaid government
order does not satisfy the requirements
of
Section 8 (2-A).
We may point out that this was also the view taken by this court
in two
earlier cases.
In Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v.
State of Haryana, [1976]
4 S.C.C. 27, the question was whether the poles and cables sold by the
appellant therein to Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking were exempt from
central sales tax
by virtue of the fact that
Section 5 (2) (a) (iv) of the Punjab
Sales Tax Act exempted "sales to any undertaking supplying electrical
energy to the public under a licence or sanction granted or deemed to have
been granted under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,
of goods for use by it
in the generation or distribution of such
energy" from the State tax. The
claim
of the appellant was negatived by Ray, C.J., speaking for himself and
Beg and Jaswant
Singh, JJ., holding that the exemption granted under
Section 5 (2) (a) (iv) of the State Act was not a general exemption but an
exemption operative only
in
specified circumstances and under specified
conditions.
It was pointed out that the specified circumstance in that case
was that the sale must be to an undertaking engaged
in supplying electrical
energy to the public under a licence and the specified condition was that the
goods purchased by the undertaking must be used for generation or
distribution
of electrical energy. If any of these circumstances are not
satisfied,
it was pointed out, the sale of such goods was not exempt from
tax.
It was emphasised that
"general exemption means that the goods
should be totally exempt from tax before similar exemption from the levy
of
Central sales tax can become available. Where the exemption from taxation
is conferred by conditions or in certain circumstances there is no exemption
from tax
generally". (emphasis added). In our respectful opinion, the ratio
of this decision clearly concluded the question arising in Pine Chemicals
age.inst the assessees inasmuch as it was not a case where goods were
"totally exempt from tax." It was a case where the exemption operated or
was attracted only
if it was established that such goods were manufactured
in a large or medium industrial unit within five years of its going into
production
and were sold within that period. As pointed out hereinbefore,
the exemption was not with reference to goods but with reference to the
unit manufacturing the goods.
In International Cotton Corporation
(P) Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. Commercial
Tax Officer, Hubli and Ors., [1975] 3 S.C.C. 585, Bench of this court
comprising four learned Judges observed that "the object of sub-section
(2A)
of
Section 8 is to exempt transaction of sale of any goods if they are
wholly exempt from tax under the sales tax law
of the appropriate
State and
COMMR. OF SALES TAXv. PINE CHEMICALS LTD. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 131
make the said sales chargeable at lower rates where under the Sales Tax Act A
of the State the sale transactions are chargeable to tax at a lower rate .... ",
though it is true, the point raised and determined in that case was ~ different
one.
In our respectful opinion, the decision in Indian Aluminium which was
a decision rendered by a Bench
of three learned Judges was binding upon
the Bench which decided the
Pine Chemicals. (This Bench too comprised
three learned Judges.)
It is, however, interesting to notice that when the B
above two decisions were brought to the notice of the Bench, it referred to
the ratio
of the said decisions but neither followed it nor made any attempt
to distinguish it but proceeded to make it a basis for their decision
notwithstanding the fact that the said ratio ran exactly counter
to the one
adopted by the Bench. The two decisions did not certainly support the
interpretation adopted
in the judgment under review.
On the contrary, they, C
and in particular the decision in Indian Aluminium, militated against the
said interpretation. It
is for this reason, coupled with the fact that the
interpretation placed in the judgment under review on
Section 8 (2-A) may
affect a large number
of cases all over the country, that we agreed to re
examine the issue, which we would not have agreed to ordinarily.
D
We
may now refer to and examine the basis on which the judgment
under review holds that the exemption granted by Jammu and Kashmir
Government Order No. 159 is a general exemption within the meaning of
Section 8 (2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The Bench agreed that "the
existence or otherwise of the three limitations under the explanation above
referred to on claiming exemption under Section 8 (2-A) of the Central E
Sales Tax Act will therefore, have. to be tested with reference to the
transaction
of sale or purchase as the case may
be" but then qualified the
words "sale or purchase, as the case may be", by adding "of the dealer who
claims the exemption
in respect of his intrastate sale or purchase of the
same
goods." It was further added: "thus the specified circumstances and
the specified conditions referred to
in the explanation should be with F
reference to the local turnover of the same dealer who claims exemption
under
Section 8 (2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act". In our respectful
opinion, however, sub-section (2-A) speaks
of sale or purchase of goods
being exempt generally under the
State Sales Tax enactment; it does not
speak
of exemption qua the dealer, much less qua the unit manufacturing G
such goods. The exemption notification issued by the Jammu and Kashmir
Government granted the exemption qua the industrial unit manufacturing
the goods and the period within which they manufactured and sold and
not
qua the goods. In the judgment under review, it has been further observed
that "the facts which the dealer has to prove to get the benefit of the
government orders are intended only to identify the dealer and the goods
in H
'
'
A
B
c
D
·E
F
G
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
respect of which the exemption is sought and they are not conditions or
specifications of circumstances relating to the turnover sought to be
exempted from payment
of tax within the meaning ofthose·provisions. The
specified circumstances and the specified conditions referred to in. the
explanation should
relate to the transaction of sale of the commodity and
not identification
of the dealer or the commodity in respect of which the
exemption
is
claimed." With respect, we are unable to appreciate the above
reasoning which
is at variance with the clear and simple language employed
in
Section 8 (2-A). -The language of the sub-section does not bear or admit
the construction placed upon it
in the judgment under review. We are
therefore,
of the opinion that the judgment under review suffers from a
manifest error
of law, an error apparent on the face of the record, and,
therefore, liable to be reviewed.
We are also of the opinion that in the
interest
of law, it is necessary that the said error is rectified.
Sri Raja Ram Aggarwal, learned counsel for one of the respondents
as'sessees submitted that the object behind Section 8 (2-A) was to bring
about uniformity
in the matter of incidence and rate of tax between the State sales tax enactment and Central sales tax enactment. He submitted that
where a particular sale or purchase
is exempt
from tax under the State sales
tax enactment, it should equally be exempt under the Central enactment.
While the bro3:d objective underlying Section 8 (2-A) is certainly the· one
pointed out by the learned counsel,
it is not possible or permissible to
ignore the clear and unambiguous language employed
in
Section 8 (2-A).
The sub-section does not say that wherever a particular sale· or purchase of
goods is exempt from tax under the State enactment, it would equally be
exempt from tax under the Central enactment. It imposes a further and a
very important requirement, viz., that the sale or purchase
of goods, in
respect of which exemption is claimed under the Central Act, should
b1..
exempt from tax generally under the State enactment. Not stopping with
that, the sub-section proceeds to explain and define what
do the words "exempt from tax generally under the sales tax law of the appropriate State"
mean? In this view of the matter, acceptance of the contention urged by Sri
Aggarwal would be a case of over-simplification and violative of the
express language employed
in the sub-section.
Sri K.K. Venugopal urged strongly that the error, if any, in the
judgment under review
is not an error apparent on the face of the record,
that it
is also a possible view and that, in any event, it cannot be said that
the view taken
in the judgment under review is a view which could not
have been possibly taken. Learned counsel pointed out that a large number
H of High Courts have taken the same view and hence, the error, if any, in the
COMMR. OF SALES TAX v. PINE CHEMICALS LTD. [JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 133
judgment under review is not an error apparent on the face of the record. A
With respect, we cannot agree. To us, the language employed in the sub
section looks quite clear and unambiguous.
It does not admit of any other
interpretation than the one placed
by us. More important, it was already
construed by a Bench
of co-ordinate jurisdiction in Indian Aluminium
earlier. Another Bench of four learned Judges had also understood the
purport
of the said sub-section in the same manner -vide International B
Cotton Corporation. In the light of the said binding decisions, it was not
open, with great respect, to the Bench deciding
Pine Chemicals to place the
interpretation it did on the sub-section.
We may reiterate that we have not allowed the learned counsel for the
review petitioners to question the correctness
of the first three points C
decided in the judgment under review. We are told that Section 8 (B) of the
Jammu and Kashmir General
Sales Tax Act permits refund of sales tax only
in cases where the dealer has not collected the same and that the question
whether the dealers herein did or did not collect the tax
in respect of
transactions concerned herein has been left open by this court though a
finding against the dealer was recorded by the High Court.
We are also told D
that proceedings for refund are now pending where the
State has taken the
defence based on Section 8 (B)
of the
State enactment. We need express no
opinion
in that behalf.
So far as Review Petition Nos. 1374-76 of 1993 in Civil Appeal Nos.
3148-50of1989 (pertaining to Mis. K.C. Vanaspati) are concerned, we are E
told that the said case did not involve the interpretation of Section 8 (2-A)
of the Central Sales Tax Act. These review petitions, therefore, stand on a
different footing altogether.
For the above reasons, Review Petitions
(C) No. 1372-73 of 1993 in
Civil Appeals No. 2309-10of1989, Review Petition (C) No. 1381 of 1993 F
in Civil Appeal No. 3151 of 1989, Review Petition No. (C) 1377of1993 in
Civil Appeal No. 3151 of 1989 are allowed and the civil appeals preferred
by the dealers dismissed to the extent indicated above. Review Petitions (C)
No. 1374-76of1993 in Civil Appeals No. 3148-50of1989 are dismissed.
No costs.
Review Petitions (C) No.
/753-55 of 1993 in Civil Appeals No. 5073-
75of1985.
G
Civil Appeals No. 5073-75 of 1985 were disposed of by a Bench
comprising one
of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.) and N. Venkatachala, J.
following the judgment in Pine Chemicals, at the same time pointing out H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A the error in the reasoning relating to the meaning of Section 8 (2-A) of the
Central Sales Tax Act adopted in Pine Chemicals. Pine Chemicals was
decided by a Bench
of three learned Judges and was thus binding upon a
Bench
of two-Judges. Inasmuch as the judgment in
Pine Chemicals is now
being set aside insofar as the interpretation
of
Section 8 (2-A) is concerned
and because the only issue involved in Civil Appeals No. 5073-75of1985
B was the one relating to the meaning and applicability of the said sub
section, these review petitions are liable to be allowed for the very same
reasons
as are recorded in Review Petitions No. 1372-73 of 1993 and are
accordingly allowed herewith. The judgment under review
is set aside and
Civil Appeals
No. 5073-75 of 1985 preferred by the dealers-assessees are
dismiss~d. No costs.
c
A.G. Review petitions allowed.
Legal Notes
Add a Note....