2025 INSC 1071

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

[@ SLP (C) NO. 13348 OF 2025]

C.P. FRANCIS … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

C.P. JOSEPH AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. CR Pius and Philomina Pius possessed, as absolute owners, an extent

of 7.875 cents of property in survey no. 60/6 of Elamkulam village and 3.233

cents in survey no. 60/6 of Elamkulam village, Kanyanoor Taluk, Ernakulam

District, as described in plaint A and B schedules. On 24.11.2004, CR Pius

died. On 27.11.2008, Philomina Pius died. The children/grandchildren of

Pius and Philomina are the parties to the present litigation, and their

genealogy is illustrated as follows:

C.R. Pius

(co-testator)

Died on

24.11.2004

Philomina

Pius (co-

testatrix)

Died on 24.11.2008

C.P.Francis

-

Appellant/

Defendant No.1(DW-1)

C.P Joseph

R1/P1

(DW-3-

Scribe)

C.P.Raphel -

R2/P2

C.P.George -

R3/P3

C.P.Sebastia

n -R4/P4

(PW-1)

Desty

Thomas -

(R5/P5)

Clara Jacob

-R6

Mariya

(Deceased)

Kavitha

Antony -

R7/Defenda

nt no.3

Savitha

Sachin -R8/

Defendant

no.4

2

3. On 15.12.1999, Philomina Pius executed a registered settlement deed

in favour of CP Sebastian/Fourth Plaintiff, whereunder, she has settled an

extent of 4 cents out of 7 cents in favour of the fourth plaintiff and retained

3.235 cents (Plaint B Schedule). Pius, admittedly, has been the absolute

owner and possessor of Plaint A schedule property. On 27.01.2003, CR Pius

and Philomina Pius executed the registered joint will in favour of CP

Francis/Appellant for the Plaint A and B schedule properties. Antony (DW6),

husband of Kavitha Antony/Defendant No. 3, and Ponsy (DW5), wife of

Appellant, have subscribed their signatures as attestors. The salient features

of the will dated 27.01.2003 are noted as follows:

3.1 All three daughters have been given their share and married off. The

fourth plaintiff was given 4 cents of the land as per the settlement deed

dated 15.12.1999. Hence, they are not entitled to any right in the plaint

schedule.

3.2 The properties in the plaint schedule A will be bequeathed to D1 after

the death of one of the testators, and after the death of the second

testator, properties in the plaint schedule B will be bequeathed to the

Appellant.

3.3 That Appellant has to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to Maria, Rs. 50,000/- to

daughter Thresia, Rs. 50,000/- to daughter Clara, Rs. 1,00,000/- to

Son Joseph, Rs. 1,00,000/- to son Raphael, and Rs. 1,00,000/- to son

George, within 5 years of death of both the parents. Reportedly, if the

said amount is not paid to the respective children, they can have a

charge on the schedule properties to recover the amounts.

4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the Civil Appeal filed OS No. 722/2009 before

the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, against the Appellant and three others for the

3

reliefs of partition of the plaint schedule properties into eight equal shares by

meets and bounds and allotment of 1/8

th

share to each one of the children of

Pius and Philomina. The plaint prays for the perpetual injunction restraining

the Appellant from alienating the property or creating third-party interests.

5. OS No. 722/2009 was dismissed on 03.09.2011. Respondent Nos. 1 to

5 filed AS No. 6 of 2012, and the learned Additional District Judge vide the

decree and judgment dated 26.08.2013 dismissed the appeal. Respondent

Nos. 1 to 5 filed RSA No. 94/2014 before the High Court of Kerala at

Ernakulam. Through the impugned judgment, the second appeal was allowed,

and hence, the Civil Appeal was filed at the instance of the 1

st

defendant. The

impugned judgment placed reliance on Section 67 of the Indian Succession

Act, 1925 (‘the Act’). It allowed the appeal by recording a finding that one of

the attesting witnesses/Ponsy (DW5) is the wife of the Appellant, and

consequently, by operation of Section 67 of the Act, the testamentary

succession in favour of Appellant, being void, fails as a testamentary

succession.

6. We have heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. V. Chitambaresh and Mr.

Mathai M. Paikaday, and the Learned Counsel Mr. Akshay Sahay for the

Appellant and Respondents.

7. It is argued for the Appellant that the impugned judgment exceeded the

jurisdictional limitation of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘the

CPC’).

7.1 The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law

raised in the memorandum of appeal. However, the second appeal has

been allowed on an additional question of law framed by the Court,

which reads as follows:

4

“Whether Ext. A4/B3 Will is void under Section 67 of the Indian

Succession Act in view of the attestation of the same, who is

the first defendant, and, DW6, who is the husband of the third

defendant, since benefits are reserved in the said Will in favour

of those defendants?”

7.2 The impugned judgment refers to an opportunity of further hearing

given to the counsel on the additional question of law framed by the

Court. According to him, the same should not have been at the first

instance framed or answered. To be precise, the additional question of

law was framed without any basis in the pleadings or evidence, and was

not even put as a suggestion to the witnesses. The parties to the

litigation are brothers and sisters. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have chosen

to regulate the succession to Plaint A and B schedule properties from

testamentary to intestate succession. The emphasis was on the capacity

of late Pius and Philomina in executing a valid and binding will

regulating the succession to the scheduled properties. Therefore, the

Appellant was invited to join issue on the proof of Exhibits B-2 and B-

3. The Appellant discharged the burden to claim testamentary

succession to the suit properties. The findings of fact on valid execution

and sound disposing state of testators are concurrent findings of fact

by all three courts. The High Court relied on Section 67 of the Act and

declared Exhibit B-3 as a void bequest in favour of the Appellant. The

High Court's findings grant a new prayer based on an entirely new

reasoning. In this light, it is contended that Respondent Nos. 1 to 5

have chosen a plea, namely, that the testators were not having a sound

disposing state of mind, and that the registered will dated 27.01.2003

5

is not out of their free will. The impugned judgment, adverting to a new

case, ought not to have ignored the validly executed and proved will. An

argument has been advanced on the interpretation of Section 67, and

also that the grounds available to challenge Section 67 of the Act as

violative of equality of law and equal protection of law under Article 14

of the Constitution of India. The courts are under an obligation to give

effect to the disposition contemplated by the testator once the execution

of the will dated 27.01.2003 is proved in accordance with law. He prays

for the setting aside of the impugned judgment.

8. Mr. Mathai M. Paikaday, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 5,

contends that though the impugned judgment refers to an additional question

of law, it is, in fact, a substantial question of law framed by the High Court

under Section 100(5) of the CPC. The impugned judgment records that further

opportunity was afforded to the parties to address the Court on the additional

question of law framed by the Court. There is substantial compliance with

Section 100 of the CPC. He further argues, to sustain the findings recorded

on the additional question of law, that the finding is not based on an incorrect

plea or fact. There is no gainsaying that DW5 is the wife of the Appellant, and

pleadings and issues are absent on the applicability of Section 67 of the Act.

A plain reading of Section 67 makes the bequest in favour of the Appellant

void. Section 67 has been on the statute book for 100 years, and the effect of

being void once the circumstances are satisfied has stood the test of time. The

learned senior counsel argues that the points urged by the Appellant do not

fall within the ambit of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, much as the

succession to the suit schedule is guided by intestate succession and all the

children of Pius and Philomina would be entitled to a 1/8

th

share. Advocate

6

Akshay Sahay, appearing for Respondents, adopts the argument of the

Appellant and contends that the other attesting witness is also the son-in-law

of the executants of the will. The wish and desire of the testators must be

respected, and the opening of intestate succession would defeat the last wish

of late Pius and late Philomina.

9. We have taken note of the submissions and perused the record. Before

we take up the submissions of the learned counsel, we preface the journey of

the parties in the present litigation by setting out the pleadings and the

resulting issues between the parties.

10. The plaint in OS No. 722 of 2009 is summarised by retaining the cause

pleaded by Respondent Nos. 1 to 6:

10.1 The plaintiffs sought partition of the properties into eight equal shares,

along with a permanent prohibitory injunction against alienation. The

plaintiffs contend that, though the deed dated 15.12.1999 was styled

as a settlement deed, it was expanded for the marriage of two sisters.

The plaintiffs assert that their father, C.R. Pius, suffered from physical

and mental ailments, including cerebral palsy, senile changes, and

Parkinson's disease, from 1998 until his death, rendering him mentally

incapable of making rational decisions. They, hence, state that the said

will carries no legal validity, as the first defendant, his wife and the third

defendant’s husband misrepresented the mother.

10.2 They note that the joint will was falsely created and forged by the first

defendant, his wife (DW5), and the husband of the third defendant

(DW6) through misrepresentation and undue influence over their

incapacitated father and elderly mother. They claimed the mother was

too old to understand the document properly.

7

10.3 The plaintiffs asserted that their parents died intestate, and therefore,

all children held joint ownership and possession of the plaint schedule

properties. The defendants are trying to alienate the property on the

basis of the alleged will, ignoring the plaintiffs’ 1/8

th

share each in the

plaint schedule properties. Furthermore, the plaintiffs are not

interested in continuing with joint possession and therefore seek

partition.

10.4 The plaintiffs alleged that the cause of action arose on 24.11.2004

(father’s death) and 27.11.2008 (mother’s death).

11. The first defendant, to resist the claim of intestate succession, has set

up Exhibit B-2, a registered settlement deed. The pleadings in the written

statement are summarised as follows:

11.1 The defendants refuted the claims of the plaintiffs and asserted that the

plaintiffs have never obtained any ownership, co-ownership or are in

joint possession of the plaint schedule property. The defendants

asserted that the plaintiffs are only entitled to get the monetary claims

as stipulated in the registered will. If the claims are unfulfilled within

the 5-year period after the will comes into force, the defendants can

create a charge over the properties.

11.2 They state that the plaintiffs have admitted the execution of the

settlement deed dated 15.12.1999, in which late Pius and the 1

st

defendant are the witnesses, and the executant is late Philomina.

Hence, it is admitted that they were capable of executing the

documents. The settlement deed was executed after Pius and

Philomena decided to execute a joint will in respect of the remaining

properties. Thus, their mental capacity to execute the joint will is

8

admitted. They further contend that the plaintiffs cannot blow hot and

cold at the same time, and are estopped in fact and law.

11.3 It is asserted that the 1

st

defendant took over the possession of the

plaint schedule after the death of Pius on 24.11.2004, and Philomina

did not have any objection regarding this possession. The only right

created in favour of the plaintiffs is the monetary claims (mentioned in

the will), and a substantial amount was also paid as the plaintiff’s share

during their marriage.

11.4 The defendants claim that the settlement deed was executed in favour

of the fourth plaintiff for the construction of a residential building for

the fourth plaintiff and not for the marriage of two sisters of the fourth

plaintiff. The defendants further asserted that he looked after his father

and mother until his death.

11.5 The defendants contend that after the execution of the will on

27.01.2003, the father was still alive for a period of one year and some

months in good health. During this period after execution of the will,

there was no objection by the plaintiffs or the testators.

12. The Trial Court framed the following issues:

“1) Whether the will bearing No. 22/2003 of S.R.O Ernakulam

is valid and genuine?

2) Whether the plaint schedule property is partable? If so what

is the share of each party?

3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of permanent

prohibitory injunction as prayed for?

4) Relief and cost.”

13. The categorical findings of the Trial Court are that:

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13.1 The execution of the will was valid and genuine, and it also concluded

that C.R. Pius was capable of making rational decisions at the time of

the will’s execution. He was not suffering from any mental disease. This

was supported by the evidence of DW7 (Neurologist), who deposed that

Pius was not suffering from any ailment or from any kind of mental

disease. In fact, Pius had witnessed the settlement deed executed in

1999, thereby proving his sound mental capacity.

13.2 No evidence was present that the execution of the will by Philomina Pius

was vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation. It considered the evidence

of DW1 to DW4 and concluded that the execution of Exhibit B-3 is not

vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation.

13.3 DW5 (Appellant’s wife) complied with Section 63(c) of the Act, testifying

that she witnessed the testators' signatures and signed in their

presence. Despite DW6’s (Antony) non-compliance with Section 63(c) of

the Act (animo attestandi), the combined evidence of DW3 (scribe), DW4

(Sub-Registrar), and DW5 sufficiently proved attestation of Exhibit B-3.

13.4 It held that the presence or active participation of the Appellant or his

wife (DW5) as a witness did not raise doubt on the genuineness of the

will or the testamentary capacity of the testators.

13.5 Based on the valid will, the plaint schedule properties were deemed not

partible, and other legal heirs were only entitled to the specified

monetary amounts.

13.6 Hence, it dismissed the suit for partition.

14. In AS No. 6 of 2012, the Appellate Court, on the competence, capacity,

and the execution of Exhibit B-3 in a free and sound disposing state of mind,

affirmed the findings of the Trial Court.

10

14.1 The Appellate Court affirmed that Pius was mentally and physically

capable of making rational decisions, considering that no record of

treatment between 14.09.2002 and 06.11.2004 for any ailment was

placed. Thus, the plaintiffs' contention that he was in poor health is

unfounded. The court stated that the argument that he was in a

vegetative state was not established.

14.2 The court accepted DW5’s (Appellant's wife) testimony regarding the

will's execution and DW4 ’s (Sub Registrar) testimony that the

executants signed before attesting witnesses, substantiating proper

attestation under Section 63 of the Act. DW6’s testimony was not relied

upon as he did not witness the executant's signature.

14.3 The fact that the will remained un-cancelled by the parents until their

deaths (Pius died 1 year 10 months after execution, mother much later)

was deemed to probabilise its voluntary execution without coercion. The

court upheld the reason for excluding the 4

th

plaintiff (Sebastian) due

to his prior receipt of land via the settlement deed. It noted that specific

monetary provisions for other children indicated the parents’ due

deliberation.

14.4 The first appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court that the will

was genuine and free from suspicious circumstances.

15. The contentions canvassed by the respective counsel would present the

following points for consideration.

Point 1: Whether the High Court, while invoking the Proviso to Section 100(5)

of the CPC, was correct in referring to and applying Section 67 of the Act?

Point 2: Whether Section 67 of the Act is attracted to determine the

succession to the suit schedule property or not?

11

16. The points for consideration are independent. The need and necessity

to take up point no. 2 arises from the consideration and conclusion recorded

on point no. 1.

POINT 1

17. The impugned judgment records that an additional substantial

question of law (sic) was framed and opportunity was provided to the counsel

to address the Court on the said question of law. Section 100 of the CPC reads

as follows:

100. Second appeal.--(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided

in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being

in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree

passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court,

if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a

substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate

decree passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal

shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in

the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial

question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that

question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated

and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be

allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub -section shall be

deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court

to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any

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other substantial question of law, not formulated by it,

if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

(Emphasis supplied)

18. In the above background, before we examine the procedure followed by

the High Court, a few precedents on the point are noted. The principles

emanating from precedents on Section 100(5) of the CPC can be summed up

as follows:

18.1 A substantial question of law must be grounded in the parties’

pleadings and the findings of lower courts. Thus, it must be exercised

if it is so fundamental that it goes to the very root of the matter.

1

18.2 The jurisdiction to frame a new question of law is exceptional and

should not be exercised routinely unless there is a strong and

convincing reason to do so.

2

18.3 The proviso allows the court to hear an appeal on

“any other substantial question of law,” which implies that at least one

substantial question of law must have been formulated at the

admission stage. The power to reformulate or add a question arises only

if a substantial question of law has already been framed.

3

18.4 The High Court must be “satisfied” that the new question is

a substantial question of law and not a mere legal plea.

4

18.5 The court is mandatorily required to record its reasons for framing an

additional substantial question of law.

5

1 Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179.

2 Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, (2019) 19 SCC 415.

3 Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat, (2006) 6 SCC 271; Kirpa Ram v. Surendra Deo Gaur, (2021)

13 SCC 57.

4 Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438.

5 R. Nagraj (Dead) through LRs. and Anr. v. Rajmani and Ors, (2025) INSC 478.

13

18.6 The opposite party (the respondent) must be given a fair and proper

opportunity to contest the new question. Parties must be put on notice

and be allowed to present their arguments on the newly framed

question. Framing a question while dictating the judgment without

hearing the parties would be improper.

6

19. The ratio of the precedents is that the High Court is competent and

endowed with discretionary jurisdiction to formulate a substantial question

of law not stated when the second appeal was admitted. The High Court is

entitled to formulate an additional substantial question of law for reasons to

be recorded if the High Court is of the view that the case involves such a

question of law. The proviso to sub-section 5 of Section 100 of the CPC comes

into operation in exceptional cases, albeit for strong and convincing reasons

to be specifically recorded by the High Court. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have

pleaded a lack of a sound disposing state of mind to late Pius. The pleadings

refer to the line of treatment given to the late Pius. The plea needed for

invoking Section 67 of the Act, either by choice or inadvertence, is not pleaded

by Respondent Nos. 1 to 5. Issue No. 1 deals with whether Exhibit B-3-will is

valid and genuine. Mr Mathai does not dispute that the issue ought to have

been different, and from the expressions used in the issue, consideration falls

under Section 100(5) of the CPC.

20. We have perused the plaint, and the plaint refers to the will and the

allegation that “[s]ince the will executed by fraud and misrepresentation upon

the ailed mother and forced upon the ailed father, it carries no legal validity,

and it is to be neglected.” The plea under Section 67 of the Act can be an

additional or alternative plea, which would have resulted into an additional

6 Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, (2023) 17 SCC 624 .

14

issue, and an establishment of a relationship, where one of the attestors to

the legatee of the will would have fallen for consideration. Introducing Section

67 at the stage of Second Appeal does not merely raise a new legal argument;

rather, it creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs. The original case

required the defendant to prove the testators’ mental capacity and also the

absence of suspicious circumstances in bringing into existence Exhibit B-3.

A case under Section 67 of the Act would require the Appellant to meet a

completely different legal challenge, one which is based on the identity of an

attesting witness and the legal consequences arising from the said identity.

21. Section 141 of the Evidence Act, 1872 defines a ‘leading question as

any question that “suggests” the answer which the person questioning expects

to receive.’ We have perused the evidence of DW1 and DW5 , and the

suggestion which is otherwise available is not put to the witnesses. The

importance of a suggestion in oral evidence of a party can crisply be

summarised as follows:

21.1 In Browne v. Dunn,

7

the English House of Lords established a rule of

practice which dictates that if a cross-examiner intends to later adduce

evidence or make submissions that contradict the testimony of a

witness, they must first put the substance of the contradiction to the

witness during cross-examination. The purpose is to afford the witness

a fair opportunity and is rooted in the principle of Audi Alteram Partem.

This principle has also been upheld in Indian decisions.

8

7 (1893) 6 R 67.

8 See, Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, AIR 2013 SC1204

15

21.2 In a 1954 decision of the Bombay High Court,

9

it was noted that failing

to suggest contrary points during cross-examination can weaken a

party’s position and can be interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the

witness’s testimony. While the case pertained to criminal defamation,

this principle has also been applied in civil litigation. For instance, in

Radha Kishan Aggarwal v. Network Ltd,

10

the Delhi High Court held

that since no suggestion was given to the plaintiffs’ willingness to

dispute the market rent, the witness’s testimony on rent was accepted

as true.

21.3 Absence of a suggestion to a witness may not be the deciding factor in

determining the outcome of a plea. However, in the wheel of

consideration of all facts in issue and their legal implication, the

absence of suggestion constitutes an important cog in the wheel of

consideration. We hasten to add that the timing, absence of suggestion,

relevance and its impact are left to the experience, wisdom and

discretion of the Judge appreciating a case.

22. We have perused the evidence of DW1, the propounder of Exhibit B-3,

and DW5, an attesting witness to Exhibit B-3. The evidence is bereft of at least

a suggestion that would be expected in a matter as serious as the present.

The Court has power and jurisdiction to suit or non-suit a party on the

adduced pleadings, issues and evidence, but not on a totally new and

unexpected case, more particularly at the stage of Section 100. The root of the

matter is not an abstract legal issue floating freely, but it is fundamentally

anchored to the specific cause of action and the factual matrix pleaded by the

9 Yeshpal Jashbhai Parikh (Original Accused) v. Rasiklal Umedchand Parikh (Original

Complainant, Opponent, 1955 AIR BOM 318.

10 2011 SCC OnLine DEL 3896; See also, JS Bhalla v. GJ Bhawnani, 23 (1983) DLT 125.

16

parties. From the beginning, the plaintiffs’ case was built on a factual

challenge; wherein, they contend that (i) the testators lacked a sound

disposing state of mind, and (ii) the will was a product of forgery,

misrepresentation, and undue influence. These two aspects have been

successfully established by the Appellant, and the findings favour the

Appellant

23. Therefore, in fine, we record that in the circumstances of this case, the

High Court fell in error by not recording reasons for framing the additional

substantial question of law. The additional substantial question of law may

be an abstract application of Section 67 without verifying the foundational

facts and circumstances. The admission of a party must be in the manner

known to law. An admission in pleading and evidence is certainly an

admission. By appreciating an admission, the Court is entitled to apply the

consequence of law. In the analysis, we notice that the relationship of DW5

with DW1 is either assumed by the Court or not contested by the parties on

any of the grounds available, namely, want of pleadings, etc., before the High

Court. The above consideration leads to the irrefutable conclusion that an

additional substantial question of law is framed without pleadings, issues and

reasons and a finding is recorded. The Court is now confronted with a will

duly executed and proved, and not given effect to by applying Section 67 of

the Act. It is axiomatic, but still referred to in often quoted decisions,

11

that

the wish of a testator as expressed through a duly proved will is upheld by

the Court, but not open up succession contrary to the arrangement made by

the testator. Thus, the point is answered in favour of the Appellant and

11 Gnanambal Ammal v. T. Raju Ayyar, 1950 SCC 978; 2. K.S. Palanisami v. Hindu

Community in General & Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, (2017) 13 SCC 15.

17

consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside. For the above reasons,

point no. 2 is not, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,

examined and answered.

24. The conclusion to the above points does not give quietus to the

obligations fastened on the Appellant by late Pius and late Philomina. Exhibit

B-3 stipulated a few obligations for discharge by the Appellant. The parties

have been agitating over whether testamentary or intestate succession is

applicable to the plaint schedule. With the findings recorded by the present

judgment, testamentary succession is again opened. The Appellant has

neither deposited nor paid the amount directed in Exhibit B-3 to any of the

other beneficiaries. The parents made a contemporaneous arrangement in

bequeathing the suit schedule to the Appellant. The testamentary succession

finally opens through the present adjudication, and therefore, it is incumbent

upon the Appellant to compensate the other legatees within three months

from today as summarised in the following table:

PARTY NAME AND

POSITION IN CIVIL

APPEAL

AMOUNT STIPULATED IN

THE WILL

COMPENSATION AWARDED BY

THIS COURT

Maria (Deceased)

[Represented by

Kavitha Antony/R3

and Savitha

Sachin/R8]

Rs. 1,00,000/-

Rs. 10,00,000/-

Desty Thomas/R5 Rs. 50,000/-

Rs. 5,00,000/-

Clara Jacob/R6 Rs. 50,000/-

Rs. 5,00,000/-

C.P. Joseph/R1 Rs. 1,00,000/-

Rs. 10,00,000/-

C.P. Raphael/R2 Rs. 1,00,000/-

Rs. 10,00,000/-

18

C.P. George/R4 Rs. 1,00,000/-

Rs. 10,00,000/-

25. In default of payment, the amount determined by this Court will carry

an interest of 6% per annum, and also charge for realising the same will be

on the plaint schedule.

26. We hasten to add that extraordinary care and caution have to be

observed in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India. It does not confer a right of appeal, but it vests with this Court a vast

discretion, which is only to be exercised by considerations of justice, call of

duty and the eradication of injustice. This overriding power is exercised only

in exceptional cases where special circumstances exist.

27. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and there is no order as to

costs.

………..……….…………………J.

[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH ]

…..…....…………………………J.

[S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi;

September 03, 2025.