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PETITIONER:

D. S. GAREWAL

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

11/12/1958

BENCH:

WANCHOO, K.N.

BENCH:

WANCHOO, K.N.

DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)

DAS, S.K.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:

1959 AIR 512 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 792

CITATOR INFO :

RF 1967 SC 212 (26)

R 1968 SC 754 (20)

RF 1970 SC 150 (11)

RF 1973 SC1461 (450,566)

RF 1975 SC 446 (6)

R 1982 SC1126 (9,11)

R 1983 SC 937 (32)

F 1985 SC 421 (26)

ACT:

All-India Services-Act passed by provisional Parliament-

Constitutional validity-Presidents' power of adaptation-

Parliament, if authorised to delegate power to Central

Government-Rules, validity of-Institution of enquiry-

Competence of the State Government All-India Services Act

(LXI of 1951), ss. 3, 4-- All India Services (Discipline and

Appeal) Rules, r.5 --Constitution of India, Arts. 312, 392.

HEADNOTE:

The point for determination in this appeal was whether the

All India Services Act, (LXI of 1951), enacted by the

provisional Parliament, was a constitutionally valid

legislation. As there was only one House during the

transitional period, the President in exercise of his powers

under Art. 392 of the Constitution passed the Constitution

(Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II, on January 26, 1950,

and made, amongst others, an adaptation of Art. 312(1)

omitting the following therefrom,-" XXX if the Council of

States has declared by resolution supported by not less than

two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is

necessary or expedient in the national interest to do so XXX

". The appellant, who was appointed to the Indian Police

Service in 1949, held the post of Superintendent of Police

in the Punjab in 1957 when he was reverted as Assistant

Superintendent of Police and informed that action was

proposed to be taken against him under r. 5 of the All India

Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, framed under

s. 3 Of the All India Services Act, (LXI of 1951). He was,

thereafter, placed under suspension and an Officer was

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directed to hold a departmental enquiry against him. On

receipt of notice of the said enquiry, he moved the High

Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and challenged the

constitutional validity of the Act and the legality of the

enquiry. The High Court held against him and hence this

appeal. It was contended on behalf of the appellant, (1)

that the President had exceeded his power under Art. 392 in

amending Art. 312 in the way he did; (2) that the

provisional Parliament was incompetent to enact the impugned

Act as there was no compliance with the condition precedent

to such an Act being passed under Art. 312; (3) that the

Rules were repugnant to Art. 312 as they were made at a time

when the adaptation was no longer in force; (4) that the

Parliament had no authority to delegate its function under

Art. 312 to the Central Government (5) that, at any rate, S.

3 Of the Act was vitiated by excessive delegation and (6)

that the Punjab Government had no authority under the Rules

to institute the proceedings.

793

Held, that the contentions were all without substance and

must be rejected.

The power given to the President by Art. 392 Of the Con-

stitution was wide enough to enable him to make any adapta-

tion by way of modification, addition or omission he

considered necessary or expedient with respect to a

particular Article and if he did so in one way and not the

other, it could not be said that he had exceeded his power.

As the adaptation of Art. 312 by omission of the condition

precedent was thus valid, no question of any compliance with

it could arise and the provisional Parliament was quite

competent, to pass the impugned Act.

Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of

Bihar, [1952] S.C.R. 89, held inapplicable.

The reappearance of the omitted part of Art. 312 before the

framing of the Rules by the Central Government under the

Act, could in no way affect their validity since the Act

itself was valid and a permanent measure and the Rules

derived their force from the Act.

It was well settled that the Legislature was competent to

delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules to

carry out the purposes of the law made by it. Such

delegation could also be made to an executive authority

within certain limits.

Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 747 and Rajnarain

Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee,

Patna, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290, relied on.

Use of such expressions as " Parliament may by law provide "

or " Parliament may by law confer " by the Constitution did

not necessarily mean that delegation was wholly excluded.

It would be a matter for determination in each case whether

the intention was that the entire provisions were to be made

by law without recourse to any rules framed under the power

of delegation. The numerous and varied provisions

contemplated by Art. 312 made it impossible to hold that

they were all intended to be enacted as statute law and

nothing was to be delegated to the executive authorities.

It was not correct to suggest that the Article laid down a

mandate prohibiting Parliament from delegating authority to

the Central Government to frame rules for the recruitment

and conditions of All-India Services.

Nor was there any substance in the contention that S. 3 Of

the Act was vitiated by excessive delegation of power and

the Act did not lay down any policy. Section 4 of the Act

read with s. 3(2) Of the Act showed that there was no

delegation of power to the Central Government under s. 3(1)

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Of the Act in excess of what was justified by the special

circumstances of the case.

There was no basis for the contention that the Central

Government and not the Punjab Government could institute the

enquiry. Rule 5 Of the Rules showed that the enquiry was to

be initiated in all cases by the Government under which the

100

794

Officer concerned served, although the punishment as

required by Rule 4(1) might have to be ultimately imposed by

the Central Government.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTiON: Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated

July 30, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ

Application No. 732 of 1958.

N.C. Chatterjee, I. M. Lal and B. P. Maheshwari, for the

appellant.

S.M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State, of Punjab,

Mohinder Singh Pannum, Additional Advocate-General for the

State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.

B. Sen and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener.

1958. December 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered

by

WANCHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question

of the constitutionality of the All-India Services Act, (LXI

of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act). The appellant was

appointed to the Indian Police Service on October 1., 1949,

and posted to the State of Punjab. He held charge as

Superintendent of Police in various districts but was

reverted as Assistant Superintendent of Police in August

1957, and was eventually Posted to Dharamsala in March 1958.

In the same month he was informed that it was proposed to

take action against him under r. 5 of the All-India Services

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, (herein. after called

the Rules), framed under s. 3 of the Act. He was thereafter

-placed under suspension under r. 7 of the Rules pending

disciplinary proceedings against him, and Shri K. L.

Bhudiraja S. was appointed enquiry officer to hold the

departmental enquiry against him. Notice was issued to him

by the Enquiry Officer in July 1958. He thereupon

immediately made an application under Art. 226 of the

Constitution before the Punjab High Court challenging the

constitutionality of the Act and the legality of the enquiry

against him. The application was dismissed on July 30,

1958, and his application for a certificate to appeal

795

to this Court was dismissed next day. Thereupon he came to

this Court and was granted special leave.

Shri Chatterjee appearing for the appellant has raised the

following six points in support of the appeal :

(1), The amendment made by the President in Art. 312 of the

Constitution by virtue of his power under Art. 392 by the

Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II of 26th

January, 1950, was in excess of the power conferred on him

under Art. 392;

(2)It was not within the competence of the provisional

Parliament to enact the Act in 1951, as there was no

compliance with the condition precedent to such an Act being

passed under Art. 312;

(3)The Rules when promulgated in 1955 were bad as they

were repugnant to Art. 312 as the amendment made by the

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President by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties)

Order No. 11 had ceased to have force and Art. 312 stood in

1955 as originally enacted in the Constitution ;

(4)Art. 312 laid a mandate on Parliament to make a law

regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of all-

India services created under that Article and Parliament

could not delegate this function to the Central Government,

and, therefore, s. 3 of the Act was invalid;

(5)In any event, the delegation made by s. 3 of the Act

was excessive and, therefore, section 3 should be struck

down; and

(6)The Punjab Government has no authority to institute

these proceedings under the Rules. Re. 1, 2 & 3.

These three points may conveniently be taken together.

Article 392- provides that "the President may, for the

purpose of removing any difficulties, particularly in

relation to the transition from the provisions of the

Government of India Act, 1935, to the provisions of this

Constitution, by order direct that this Constitution shall,

during such period as may be specified in the order, have

effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way of

modification, addition or

796

omission, as he may deem to be necessary or expedient ;

provided that no such order shall be made after the first

meeting of Parliament duly constituted under Chapter 11 of

Part V ". The purpose of this provision is obvious from the

very words in which it was made. Further Art. 379 provided

that " until both Houses of Parliament have been duly

constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under

the provisions of this Constitution, the body functioning as

the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India

immediately before the commencement of this Constitution

shall be the provisional Parliament and shall exercise all

the powers and perform all the duties conferred by the

provisions of this Constitution on Parliament ". As there

was only one House during the transitional period, there

were bound to be difficulties in the application of the

Constitution, which envisaged a bicameral legislature.

Consequently, the President passed the Constitution (Removal

of Difficulties) Order No. II on January 26, 1950, by which

among other adaptations, he made an adaptation in Art. 312

also, to this effect:-

"In clause (1), omit 'if the Council of States has declared

by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the

members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient

in the national interest so to do".

This order was to come into force at once and was to

continue until both Houses of Parliament had been duly

constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under

the provisions of the Constitution. After removal of the

omitted words, Art. 312 read as follows:-

" (1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XI, Parliament may by

law provide for the creation of one or more all-India

services common to the Union and the States, and subject to

the other provisions of this Chapter, regulate the

recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons

appointed, to any such service.

(2)The services known at the commencement of this

Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service

797

and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services

created by Parliament under this article."

It is urged that though the President undoubtedly had power

to make adaptations, he exceeded that power inasmuch as he

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omitted the words mentioned above from Art. 312 altogether.

It is suggested that the adaptation would have been proper,

if in Art. 312, as it originally stood in the Constitution,

the words " Council of States " had been substituted by the

words " provisional Parliament ", so that instead of a

resolution of the Council of States a resolution of the

provisional Parliament would have been necessary for the

creation and regulation of recruitment and conditions of

service of an all-India service common to the Union and the

States. Reliance in this connection is placed on Sankari

Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar (1),

where dealing with an adaptation made in Art. 368, by the

same order, this Court observed that " the adaptation leaves

the requirement of a special majority untouched ". It is

urged that if the President had made the adaptation in the

way suggested by learned counsel that would have left the

requirement of a resolution supported by requisite majority

untouched and would have been within the power of the

President; but inasmuch as the entire portion was omitted

the President had exceeded his power. It is enough to say

that Sankari Prasad Singh's case (1) does not lay down that

if the adaptation in Art. 368 had been made in some other

manner it would have been invalid and unconstitutional.

Reference to the fact that adaptation left the requirement

of a special majority untouched was made obviously for the

purpose of emphasising that there was no real ground of

grievance and not for indicating that in the absence of the

retention of that provision the adaptation would have been

bad. Indeed, it was pointed out in that 'case that Art. 392

was widely expressed and an order could be made under that

Article for the purpose of removing any difficulties. The

nature of the adaptation to be made is also equally widely

expressed and it may be by way of

(1)[1952] S.C.R. 89.

798

modification, addition or omission. In the case of Art. 368

the President thought it necessary or expedient that the

adaptation should be by modification. In the case of Art.

312, however, he thought it necessary or expedient that the

adaptation should be by way of omission of certain words

from that Article. The power given to the President under

Art. 392 was very wide and it-cannot be said that he -could

make the adaptation in one way and not in another. It was

left to him to consider whether the adaptation should be by

way of modification, addition or omission; and if he thought

it necessary or expedient with respect to a particular

Article that adaptation should be by way of omission it

cannot be said that he had exceeded his power. We are,

therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be declared

unconstitutional on the ground that the President had

exceeded his power under Art. 392 and that if he had not

done so a resolution of the provisional Parliament would

have been necessary with the requisite majority before any

law could be undertaken to regulate the recruitment and the

conditions of service of an all-India service.

Once it is held that the adaptation made by the President in

Art. 312 was within his power, there is very little left in

the other two points raised by Mr. Chatterjee. It is said

that the provisional Parliament was not competent to pass

the Act in 1951, because the condition precedent for passing

such a law had not been, as required by Art. 312, complied

with. This means in other words that a resolution with the

requisite majority had Dot been passed by the provisional

Parliament; but this condition would not be there once those

words were validly removed by the order of the President

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under Art. 392, and the provisional Parliament would have

power to pass the Act without any resolution being passed

before the law was made.

The further argument that the Rules were promulgated in 1955

when the words omitted by the Constitution (Removal of

Difficulties) Order No. II had reappeared in Art. 312 and

were, therefore, repugnant to Art. 312 inasmuch as there was

no resolution of the

799

Council of States, as required by that Article, is, in our

opinion, completely baseless. The reappearance of these

words in Art. 312 has nothing to do with the vires of the

Rules. The rules were framed under the power given to the

Central Government by the Act, and if the Act was valid when

it was passed, the Central Government would have power to

frame rules under it, as it is a permanent measure. The

Rules framed in 1955, therefore, cannot be challenged on the

ground that the omitted words reappeared in Art. 312. The

Rules derive their force from the Act and the form in which

Art. 312 emerged, after the Constitution (Removal of

Difficulties) Order No. 11 came to an end in 1952, would not

have any effect on the Rules. There is no force, therefore,

in any of these three points, and we reject them.

Re. 4.

It is contended that Art. 312 lays down a mandate on

Parliament to make the law itself regulating the recruitment

and the conditions of service of all-India services, and

therefore, it was not open to Parliament to delegate any

part of the work relating to such regulation to the Central

Government by framing Rules for the purpose. Now, it is

well settled that it is competent for, the legislature to

delegate to other authorities the power to frame rules to

carry out the purposes of the law made by it was so held by

the majority of Judges in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1).

The Delhi Laws case was, further examined in Rajnarain Singh

v. The Chairman. Patna Administration Committee, Patna (2),

and the delegation was held to go to the extent of

authorising an executive authority to modify the law made

but not in any essential feature. It was also observed that

what constitutes essential feature cannot be enunciated in

general terms. It is, therefore, clear that delegation of

legislative functions can be made to executive authorities

within certain limits. In this case s. 3 of the Act lays

down that the Central Government may, after consultation

with the Governments of the States concerned, make rules for

the regulation of

(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.

(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290.

800

recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed

to an all-India service. It also lays down that all rules

made under this section shall be laid for not less than

fourteen days before Parliament as soon as possible after

they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications,

whether by way of repeal or amendment, as Parliament may

make on a motion made during the session in which they are

so said. Mr. Chatterjee contends that no delegation

whatsoever was possible under Art. 312 and that the

Constitution required that Parliament should itself frame

the entire law relating to the regulation of recruitment and

the conditions of service of all-India services. We have,

therefore, to see whether there is anything in the words of

Art. 312 which takes away the usual power of delegation,

which ordinarily resides in the legislature. Stress in this

connection has been laid on the words " Parliament may by

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law provide " appearing in Art. 312. It is urged that these

words should be read to mean that there is no scope for

delegation in a law made under Art. 312. Our attention in

this connection was drawn to words used in Art. 245, which

are " Parliament may make laws ". It is said that the words

used in Art. 312 are in a special form, which import that

Parliament must provide by law for regulation of recruitment

and the conditions of service and cannot delegate any part

of it to other authorities. Reference was also made to the

words used in Art. 138 (1), (namely, Parliament may by law

confer); Art. 138 (2), (namely, Parliament may by law

provide); Art. 139, (namely, Parliament may by law confer);

and Art. 148 (3), (namely, as may be determined by

Parliament by law). In contrast to these Articles, our

attention was drawn to the words of Art. 173 (c), (namely,

by or under any law made by Parliament), and Art. 293 (2),

(namely, by or under any law made by Parliament). It is

urged that when the Constitution uses the words " may by law

confer " or " may by law provide ", no delegation whatsoever

is possible. We are of opinion that these words do not

necessarily exclude delegation and it will have to be seen

in each case how far the intention of the Constitution was

that

801

the entire provision should be made by law without recourse

to any rules framed under the power of delegation. Let us,

therefore, examine Art. 312 from this angle, and see if the

intention of the Constitution was that regulation of

recruitment and conditions of service to an all-India

service should only be by law and there should be no

delegation of any power to frame rules. Regulation of

recruitment and conditions of service requires numerous and

varied rules, which may have to be changed from time to time

as the exigencies of public service require. This could not

be unknown to the Constitution makers and it is not possible

to hold that the intention of the Constitution was that

these numerous and varied rules should be framed by

Parliament itself and that any amendment of these rules

which may be required to meet the difficulties of day-to-day

administration should also be made by Parliament only with

all the attending delay which passing of legislation

entails. We are, therefore, of opinion that in the

circumstances of Art. 312 it could not have been the

intention of the Constitution that the numerous and varied

provisions that have to be made in order to regulate the

recruitment and the conditions of service of all-India

services should all be enacted as statute law and nothing

should be delegated to the executive authorities. In the

circumstances we are of opinion that the words used in Art.

312 in the context in which they have been used do not ex-

clude the delegation of power to frame rules for regulation

of recruitment and the conditions of service of -India

services. We cannot read Art. 312 as laying down a mandate

prohibiting Parliament from delegating authority to the

Central Government to frame rules for the recruitment and

the conditions of service of all-India services. We,

therefore, reject this contention.

Re. 5.

The argument in this connection is that even if delegation

is possible, there was excessive delegation in this case,

and, therefore, the Act should be struck down. The Act is a

short, Act of four sections. The

101

802

first section deals with the short title, the second section

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defines the expression " all-India Service ", and the third

section gives power to the Central Government to frame rules

for regulation of recruitment and ,the conditions of service

after consultation with the Governments of the States

concerned, and lays down that all rules so framed shall be

laid before Parliament and shall be subject to such

modifications as Parliament may make. Section 4 which is

important is in these terms-

" All rules in force immediately before the commencement of

this Act and applicable to an all-India service shall

continue to be in force and shall be deemed to be rules made

under this Act."

It is urged that this Act lays down no legislative policy or

standard at all and everything is left to the Central

Government. In this connection reference was made to the

following observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he was then), in

Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1)at p. 982

" The essential legislative function consists in the

determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of

formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of

conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the

policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as

it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the

legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work

out the details within the framework of that policy. I So

long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by

statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is

involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making

of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the

determination of facts to which the legislation is to

apply'."

It is said that in this case Parliament did not even

exercise the essential legislative function inasmuch as it

did not determine or choose the legislative policy and

formally enact that policy into a binding rule of conduct.

Apparently, if one looks at the Act, there seems to be some

force in this contention. But a close reading of s. 4 of

the Act and its scope, purpose and

(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.

803

effect will show that this is not a case where the legis-

lature has failed to lay down the legislative policy and

formally to enact that policy into a binding rule of con-

duct. What does s. 4 in fact provide ? Undoubtedly there

were rules in force immediately before the Commencement of

the Act which governed the two all India services covered by

it and the legislature adopted those rules and said in s. 4

that they shall continue to be in force. Thus though s. 4

appears on the face of it as one short section of four

lines, it is in effect a statutory provision adopting all

the rules which were in force at the commencement of the

Act, governing the recruitment and the conditions of service

of the two all-India services. The section certainly lays

down that the rules already in force shall be taken to be

rules under the Act; but that was necessary in order to

enable the Central Government under s. 3 to add to, alter,

vary and amend those rules. There is no doubt, however,

that s. 4 did lay down that the existing rules will govern

the two all-India services in the matter of regulation of

recruitment and conditions of service, and in so far as it

did so it determined the legislative policy and set up a

standard for the Central Government to follow and formally

enacted it into a binding rule of conduct. Further, by s. 3

the Central Government was given the power to frame rules in

future which may have the effect of adding to, altering,

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varying or amending the rules accepted under s. 4 as

binding. Seeing that the rules would govern the all-India

services common to the Central Government and the State

Government provision was made by s. 3 that rules should be

framed only after consulting the State Governments. At the

same time Parliament took care to see that these rules were

laid on the table of Parliament for fourteen days before

they were to come into force and they were subject to

modification, whether by way of repeal or amendment on a

motion made by Parliament during the session in which they

are so laid. This makes it perfectly clear that Parliament

has in no way abdicated its authority, but is keeping strict

vigilance and control over its delegate. Therefore, reading

s. 4 along with

804

s. 3(2) of the Act it cannot be said in the special cir-

cumstances of this case that there was excessive delegation

to the Central Government by s. 3(1). We are, therefore, of

opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of

excessive delegation.

Re. 6.

The last contention is that the Punjab Government has no

authority to institute these proceedings under the Rules.

It would be necessary in this connection to refer to the

Rules. Rule 3 provides for penalties, which are seven in

number. Rule 4 provides for the authorities, who can impose

the penalties, and three of the penalties, namely,

dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, can only be

imposed by the Central Government, while the other four

penalties can be imposed by the State Government. Rule 5

provides the procedure for imposing penalties. The argument

is that as in this case the charge against the appellant is

serious, he is likely to be dismissed or removed or

compulsorily retired, and therefore, the Central Government

should have instituted enquiry in this case. We are of

opinion that there is no force in this contention. In the

first place, it cannot be postulated at the very outset of

the enquiry whether there would be any punishment At all,

and even if there is going to be punishment, what particular

punishment out of the seven mentioned in r. 3 would be

imposed. Therefore, even on the assumption that the

Government which has to impose the punishment must also

institute the enquiry, it cannot be said at this stage that

the Punjab Government which can impose at least four out of

seven penalties is not the proper Government to institute

the enquiry. In the second place, a perusal of r. 5 shows

that the intention is that the enquiry would be instituted

by the Government under which the officer is serving even in

cases where the penalty is to be imposed by the Central

Government. Rule 4(2) shows that so far as the four

penalties which could be imposed by the State Government are

concerned, the institution of the enquiry is by the

Government under whom such officer was serving at the time

of commission of such act or omission which renders him

liable

805

to punishment. Rule 2(b) defines ,Government", and the

third clause thereof lays down that in the case of a member

of service serving in connection with the affairs of a

State, the Government would be the Government of that State.

The appellant was serving in connection with the affairs of

the State of Punjab, and in his case therefore the

Government for the purpose of r. 5 which provides procedure

for imposing penalties would be the Punjab Government. It

is the Punjab Government, therefore, which could take the

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steps provided in r. 5. Rules 5(1) to 5(8) provide the

procedure for such enquiries and the word " government "

used in these sub-rules means in the present case, the

Punjab Government, for the appellant was-serving in

connection with the affairs of the State of Punjab. Rule

5(9) provides for what is to happen after the enquiry is

over, and it lays down that after the enquiry has been

completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at a

provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be

imposed, if the penalty proposed is dismissal, removal,

compulsory retirement or reduction in rank, the member of

the service charged shall be supplied with a copy of the

report of enquiry and be given a further opportunity to show

cause why the proposed penalty should not be imposed on

him., The very fact that in this rule the word Government'

is not used and instead the words punishing authority ' are

used shows that the question Of punishment arises after the

enquiry is over and the relevant Government would then

consider that question; and if punishment is to be one of

the three provided in r. 4(1) the report of the enquiry

officer would have to be forwarded to the Central Government

so that it may determine the provisional punishment and

communicate it to the officer concerned along with the

report of the enquiry officer to comply with the provisions

of Art. 311(2). So far as the institution of the enquiry is

concerned, r. 5 contemplates that it will be instituted by

the Government of the State in connection with the affairs

of which the officer is serving. In this case the appellant

was serving in connection with the affairs of the State of

Punjab, and, therefore,

806

the Punjab Government would have authority to institute the

enquiry against him. The Central Government would only come

into the picture after the enquiry is concluded and if it is

decided to impose one of the three punishments mentioned in

r. 4(1). This contention must also be rejected.

We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the State of

Punjab.

Appeal dismissed.