Reserved on 17.06.2026

Pronounced on 25.06.2026

Uploaded on 25.06.2026

APHC010002332001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3397]

THURSDAY, THE 25

th

DAY OF JUNE 2026

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA

RAO

APPEAL SUIT NO: 1776/2001

Between:

Davuluri Venkateswara Rao ...APPELLANT

AND

Davuluri Veeraiah Died and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Appellant:

1. GHANTA SRIDHAR

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1. SREEKANTH REDDY AMBATI

2. PAVAN KUMAR SHARMA

3. N SRIRAM MURTHY

The Court made the following:

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

APPEAL SUIT No.1776 OF 2001

Between:

Davuluri Venkateswara Rao,

S/o Veeraiah, Hindu, aged about 47 years,

Security Guard, Bommidala Guest House,

R/o. D.No.5-78-90, 6

th

Lane, Pandaripuram,

Guntur, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. …

Appellant

AND

Davuluri Veeraiah (Died) and others …

Respondents

Date of Judgment Pronounced : 25-06-2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL :

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of judgment may

be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wishes to see the

fair copy of the judgment? Yes/No

_________________________

V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.

*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

+APPEAL SUIT No.1776 OF 2001

%Dated: 25-06-2026

# Davuluri Venkateswara Rao,

S/o Veeraiah, Hindu, aged about 47 years,

Security Guard, Bommidala Guest House,

R/o. D.No.5-78-90, 6th Lane, Pandaripuram,

Guntur, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. … Appellant

VERSUS

$ Davuluri Veeraiah (Died) and others … Respondents

!Counsel for the appellant : Sri GHANTA SRIDHAR

^Counsel for respondents : Sri N SRIRAM MURTHY

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred:

1. 2025 (5) ALD 73 (SC)

2. 2025 (5) ALD 73 (SC)

3. AIR 1969 Ker. 21

4. AIR 2004 SC 1257

5. AIR 2007 AP 57 (F.B)

6. 2012 (1) ALD 90 (SC)

7. (2022) 7 SCC 1

4

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

APPEAL SUIT No.1776 of 2001

JUDGMENT:

This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short

‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellant/Plaintiff challenging the Decree and

Judgment, dated 24.04.2001, in O.S.No.733 of 1989 passed by the learned

Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur [for short ‘the trial Court’].

2. The appellant herein is the plaintiff, and the respondents herein are the

defendants. During the pendency of the Appeal Suit, this Court vide its order

dated 08.02.2011, dismissed the appeal suit against the respondent Nos.3, 5,

6 & 7 for default.

3. Originally, the appellant/plaintiff herein filed the suit in O.S.No.733 of

1989 against the defendants, seeking for partition of the plaint 'A' & ‘B’

schedule properties into two equal shares for allotment and for separate

possession of one such share to the plaintiff and for costs.

4. Both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they were arrayed

before the trial Court.

5. The case of the Appellant/Plaintiff as per the plaint averments in

O.S.No.733 of 1989, in brief, is as follows:

I. The plaintiff pleaded that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 were husband and

wife and the plaintiff is their son and defendant Nos.3 to 6 are their

daughters. The marriages of defendant Nos.3 to 6 were performed by

defendant Nos.1 and 2 prior to the year 1985 and the defendant Nos.5

5

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

II. and 6 are residing in the United States of America. The plaintiff further

pleaded that during the pendency of the proceedings, defendant Nos.1

and 2 died and the plaint ‘A’ schedule property consists of a house and

house site, whereas the plaint ‘B’ schedule property consists of

agricultural lands described in different survey numbers. The plaintiff

further pleaded that defendant Nos.1 and 2 had purchased an extent of

Ac.1.96 cents in D.No.170 and the plaintiff got married in the year 1979

and has three minor sons. The case of the plaintiff, as set out in the

plaint, is that the plaintiff and the defendants constituted a Hindu

coparcenary joint family and he along with defendant Nos.1 and 2 lived

jointly until about 3½ years prior to the filing of the suit, when the

defendant No.2 went to reside in the house of the 4

th

defendant.

III. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant No.1 had partitioned the

ancestral joint family properties among himself and his brothers about

eight years prior and out of the income derived from the ancestral

properties, defendant No.1 improved and acquired the joint family

properties of himself and the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that

the plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are coparcenary joint family

properties belonging to the plaintiff and defendant No.1, and both of

them had been jointly and commonly enjoying the same. The plaintiff

further pleaded that he, along with his wife and children, had been

residing jointly with his parents in the plaint ‘A’ schedule house and that

some portions thereof had been let out to tenants, with defendant No.1

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AS_1776_2001

collecting the rents. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant No.2,

taking advantage of the old age of defendant No.1, had been teasing,

harassing, and coercing him and, in collusion with defendant Nos.3 and

4, appears to have obtained several documents from defendant No.1

behind the back of the plaintiff with an intention to grab the entire

coparcenary properties to the detriment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff

further pleaded that the defendant No.1 had not alienated any of the suit

properties nor executed any valid documents in respect thereof. The

plaintiff further pleaded that even assuming any such documents were

executed by defendant No.1, the same are void ab initio and are not

binding on him as he had not consented to such transactions.

IV. The plaintiff further pleaded that he came to know that defendant No.1

had executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant No.3 in respect of

a portion of the plaint ‘A’ schedule house property. The plaintiff further

pleaded that the defendant No.3, who had lost her husband, has been

residing in a portion of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property. The plaintiff

further pleaded that the defendant No.2, leaving behind her husband,

namely defendant No.1, in the plaint ‘A’ schedule property, went to the

house of the defendant No.4 at Repalle and had been residing there for

the last 1½ years. The plaintiff further pleaded that he along with his

wife and children has been residing in the plaint ‘A’ schedule house and

taking care of defendant No.1. Since the defendants failed to effect

partition of the joint family properties, the plaintiff was constrained to file

7

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

the suit seeking partition of the joint family properties into two equal

shares and allotment of one such share to him

6. The defendant No.1 filed the written statement and the case of the

defendant No.1 as per the written statement is as follows:

I. The defendant No.1 pleaded that his father Ramaswamy inherited both

the house property and agricultural lands from his father and enjoyed

the same till his death. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that after

the death of Ramaswamy, the defendant No.1 and his brothers, namely

Subbaiah, Nagaiah, and Venkaiah, effected a partition among

themselves, wherein each of them obtained Ac.1.25 cents of land along

with a portion of the house property. In the said partition, the defendant

No.1 was allotted with Ac.1.25 cents of land in D.No.170 and

subsequently, through his hard labour and with the income derived from

the said extent of Ac.1.25 cents, he purchased the shares of his

brothers Venkaiah and Nagaiah in D.No.170 and thereby came into

possession of Ac.3.75 cents covered under item No.3 of the plaint ‘B’

schedule property. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that he also

purchased item Nos.1, 2, and 4 of the plaint schedule properties from

out of the income derived from the aforesaid lands and the entire plaint

schedule properties constitute joint coparcenary properties belonging to

himself and his only son i.e. the plaintiff.

II. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that a portion of the house property

admeasuring 100 square yards was sold under a registered sale deed

8

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

dated 28.05.1985 for a consideration of Rs.17,000/- and the remaining

portion of the house and the tiled house situated therein continued to

remain joint family property. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that at

the time of the marriage of the defendant No.4, he intended to provide

some land to her towards pasupu kumkuma and, after obtaining the

consent of the plaintiff, he executed a gift deed in favour of the

defendant No.4 in respect of Ac.5.00 cents of land in one item of the

plaint ‘B’ schedule property and Ac.1.25 cents in another item of the

plaint schedule property. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that

though the gift deed was executed, possession of the gifted lands was

never delivered to the defendant No.4 and that he himself along with the

plaintiff continued to cultivate the lands and pay amounts to the

defendant No.4. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that there were

petty quarrels between the defendant No.2 and the wife of the plaintiff.

The defendant No.1 further pleaded that defendant No.2 taking

advantage of his old age and weak condition, started pressurizing him

to confer authority upon her in respect of the plaint ‘A’ schedule house

property.

III. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that taking advantage of the

absence of the plaintiff and his wife, the defendant No.2 manipulated

several documents as though they had been voluntarily and knowingly

executed by the defendant No.1 and took him to the Sub-Registrar’s

Office and obtained his thumb impressions on various papers by playing

9

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

fraud. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that he did not execute either

will or any registered or un-registered documents in favour of the

defendant Nos.2 to 4 at any time either voluntarily or willingly. The

defendant No.1 further pleaded that he later came to know that the

defendant No.2 had fraudulently and secretly obtained settlement deeds

dated 29.04.1988 and 30.04.1988 from him and he executed two

revocation deeds dated 26.07.1989 and 27.07.1989 to be on safe side.

The defendant No.1 further pleaded that he is ready and willing to

partition the plaint ‘A’ schedule property and the remaining plaint ‘B’

schedule properties, excluding Ac.1.25 cents, into two equal shares

between himself and the plaintiff and requested for dismissal of the suit

with costs.

7. The defendant Nos.3, 5 and 6 remained ex-parte before the trial Court.

The defendant No.4 filed a written statement and the case of the defendant

No.4 as per the written statement is as follows:

I. The defendant No.4 pleaded that the plaintiff has no manner of right,

title, or interest in the plaint ‘A’ schedule property, as the same is the

self-acquired property of the defendant No.1. The defendant No.4

further pleaded that the defendant No.1 and one Boyapati Lakshmaiah,

who is the younger brother of the defendant No.2 and the brother-in-law

of the defendant No.1, jointly purchased the plaint ‘A’ schedule property

under a registered sale deed dated 10.08.1967. Subsequently, the said

Boyapati Lakshmaiah relinquished his half share in favour of the

10

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

defendant No.1 under a registered relinquishment deed dated

02.03.1971. The defendant No.4 further pleaded that a portion of the

plaint ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by the defendant No.1

under a registered sale deed dated 14.03.1972 and the defendant No.1

became the absolute owner of the entire plaint ‘A’ schedule property

and the same constitutes his self-acquired property. The defendant

No.4 further pleaded that out of love and affection towards his wife i.e.

the defendant No.2, the defendant No.1 executed gift deeds dated

19.04.1988 and 30.04.1988 in respect of portions of the plaint ‘A’

schedule property in favour of the defendant No.2 and the said gifts

were accepted by her. The defendant No.4 further pleaded that since

then the defendant No.2 has been in absolute possession a nd

enjoyment of the said property and her name was also mutated in the

municipal records.

II. The defendant No.4 further pleaded that the defendant No.2 was not

getting sufficient income from the plaint ‘A’ schedule property, she sold

the same to the defendant No.4 for a valid consideration of

Rs.1,50,000/- under a registered sale deed dated 15.12.1989. The

defendant No.4 further pleaded that ever since the said purchase, the

defendant No.4 has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint ‘A’

schedule property as its absolute owner to the knowledge of all

concerned, including the plaintiff. The defendant No.4 further pleaded

that the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 are the joint owners of the

11

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

plaint ‘A’ schedule property and they are in possession of the same.

The defendant No.4 further pleaded that plaint ‘B’ schedule properties

are also the self-acquired properties of the defendant No.1 and the

defendant No.1 gifted item No.3 of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property and

Ac.1.25 cents out of item No.2 to the defendant No.4 under a gift deed

dated 16.04.1979 towards Pasupu Kumkuma at the time of her

marriage, and possession of the said properties was also delivered to

her. Therefore, the defendant No.4 requested for dismissal of the suit

with costs.

8. The defendant No.7 filed a written statement and the case of the

defendant No.7 as per the written statement is as follows:

I. The defendant No.7 pleaded that he purchased an extent of Ac.1.95

cents out of the total extent of Ac.16.83 cents situated in D.No.173 from

one Gorantia Venkateswarlu under a registered sale deed dated

25.04.1992. The defendant No.7 further pleaded that ever since the

date of purchase, he has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of

the said property with absolute rights. The defendant No.7 further

pleaded that the vendor by name Gorantia Venkateswarlu, had been in

peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property since the year

1988, prior to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and

that requested for dismissal of the suit with costs.

9. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following

issues:

12

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

1) Whether the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties of

the plaintiff and his father D-1?

2) Whether the Gift deeds dated 29.04.1998 and 30.04.1988 are void?

3) Whether the sale of „A‟ Schedule property by D-2 in favour of D-4 is

binding upon the plaintiff?

4) Whether the gift deed dated 16.04.1979 in favour of D-4 by D-1 is valid

and binding on the plaintiff?

5) To what relief?

10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff,

P.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-14 were marked. On behalf

of the defendant No.4, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Ex.B-1 to

Ex.B-20 were marked.

11. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides,

the trial Court dismissed the suit vide its judgment, dated 24.04.2001, against

which the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/plaintiff in the suit.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would contend that the trial

Court failed to observe that the suit schedule properties were purchased by

the defendant No.1 from out of the funds of the joint family and that he does

not have any other source of income and that he is living only by doing

cultivation. He would further contend that the trial Court miserably failed to

give credence to Ex.A-10 and Ex.A-11 revocation deeds, though they are duly

registered, and the trial Court came to a wrong conclusion that the revocation

deeds are not valid under law. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff

13

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

further contended that the trial Court went wrong in determining that the

revocation of any gift must be with the leave of the Court. He would further

contend that the trial Court came to a wrong conclusion and, without

appreciating the evidence on record in a proper manner, dismissed the suit

filed by the plaintiff and that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the

judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.

13. Per contra, Sri N.Sriram Murthy, learned counsel for the

respondents/defendants, would contend that, on appreciation of the entire

evidence on record in a proper manner, the learned trial Judge rightly

dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the findings arrived at

by the learned trial Judge, and he would further contend that the first appeal

filed by the appellant/plaintiff may be dismissed.

14. Heard Sri Ghanta Sridhar, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and

Sri N.Sriram Murthy, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants.

15. Now, in deciding the present appeal, the points that arise for

determination are as follows:

1) Whether the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties

of the plaintiff and the defendant No.1?

2) Whether Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 gift deeds are not valid as pleaded

by the plaintiff and the defendant No.1?

3) Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit for

partition filed by the plaintiff?

16. Point No.1:

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AS_1776_2001

Whether the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral properties

of the plaintiff and the defendant No.1?

The plaintiff pleaded in the plaint that the defendant No.2 is the wife of

the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff is the only son of his parents, i.e. the

defendant Nos.1 and 2, and the defendant No.3 is the elder sister and

defendant No.4 is the younger sister of the plaintiff. The relationship between

both the parties to the suit is undisputed. It was pleaded by the plaintiff in the

plaint that the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 are the members of a Hindu

coparcenary joint family and the defendant No.1 partitioned the ancestral joint

family properties with his brothers at about eighty (80) years ago. The suit was

filed by the plaintiff in the year 1989. As per the own case of the plaintiff, the

defendant No.1 was aged about 75 years as on the date of filing of the suit.

Therefore, the alleged contention of the plaintiff that the defendant No.1

partitioned the ancestral joint family properties with his brothers about eighty

(80) years ago is prima facie false. The plaintiff further pleaded in the plaint

itself that the plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are the coparcenary

properties of the plaintiff and defendant No.1.

17. As noted supra, the plaintiff pleaded in the plaint itself that plaint ‘A’ and

‘B’ schedule properties are coparcenary properties of the plaintiff and

defendant No.1 and that the entire plaint schedule properties have been in

joint possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff and defendant No.1. The

plaintiff admitted in his evidence in cross-examination itself that his father

purchased Ac.4.04 cents of land, which is shown as Item No.2 of the

15

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

Schedule Property, and out of the extent, Ac.1.25 cents was given to the

defendant No.4 towards Pusupu Kumkuma and Item No.1 of plaint ‘B’

schedule was purchased by his father with his earnings. He further admitted

that Ac.0.50 cents of wet land shown as Item No.4 of plaint ‘B’ schedule

property was purchased by his father with his own earnings and that all the

items shown in the plaint ‘B’ schedule were purchased by his father as his

separate property. He further admitted that his father executed a settlement

deed in favour of the defendant No.4 giving Ac.3.75 cents of land situated in

Kondramunta Village in 1979, at the time of her marriage, which is Item No.3

of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property and the defendant No.4 sold away the same

to Davuluri Madhaya and G.Venkateswara Rao about 10 years ago. Therefore,

it is evident that some of the plaint schedule property is in the possession of

third parties, but not in the joint possession of the plaintiff and the defendant

No.1.

18. P.W.2, who is one of the own witnesses of the plaintiff and who is

interrelated to both the parties, made a categorical admission in his evidence

in cross-examination itself that the plaint schedule properties are self-acquired

properties of defendant No.1. Another witness of the plaintiff, i.e. P.W.3,

admits that the defendant No.1 purchased the land and house from out of his

own earnings. P.W.4, who is another witness of the plaintiff, admitted in his

evidence that the defendant No.2 is his own elder sister and that he had not

attended the obsequies of his sister. It clearly goes to show that there was

16

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AS_1776_2001

enmity between P.W.4 and the defendant No.2 and that it is not safe to rely on

the evidence of P.W.4.

19. As stated supra, as per the own admission of the plaintiff/P.W.1, the

plaint ‘B’ schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of defendant

No.1. As per the registered gift settlement deed executed by defendant No.1

in favour of his wife/defendant No.2, plaint ‘A’ schedule properties are his self-

acquired properties. The defendant No.4 pleaded in the written statement that

the plaint ‘A’ schedule property is the self-acquired property of the defendant

No.1 and the defendant No.1 and one Boyapati Lakshmayya, who is the

younger brother of defendant No.2, jointly purchased the plaint ‘A’ schedule

property under a registered sale deed dated 10.08.1967. The defendant No.4

further pleaded in the written statement itself that the said Boyapati

Lakshmayya relinquished his half share in favour of defendant No.1 under a

registered relinquishment deed dated 02.03.1971 and that a portion of the

plaint ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by the defendant No.1 under a

registered sale deed dated 14.03.1972 and thus, the defendant No.1 became

the absolute owner of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property. The same is evidenced

by the registered documents produced before the trial Court by the parties to

the suit. In the registered gift deeds executed in favour of defendant No.2 by

the defendant No.1, it was averred that plaint ‘A’ schedule property is the self-

acquired property of defendant No.1.

20. In the case at hand, the plaintiff approached the Court with a specific

plea that the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral joint family properties

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AS_1776_2001

of the plaintiff and defendant No.1. But as per the own admission of the

plaintiff, as stated supra, and the oral and documentary evidence on record go

to show that the plaint schedule properties are self-acquired properties of the

defendant No.1. The legal position in this regard is no more res integra and

the same was well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Angadi Chandranna

Vs. Shankar and others

1

, wherein it was held as follows:

“13. It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property

being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family.

The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property.

If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which

the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption

of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims

it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his

own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available. That apart,

while considering the term „nucleus‟ it should always be borne in mind that

such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of

such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.”

21. It is well established principle of law that “where a party claims that

any particular item of property is joint family property, the burden of

proving that it is so rests on the party asserting it”. In the case at hand,

the plaintiff pleaded in the plaintiff that the plaint schedule property is ancestral

property of the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. But, the plaintiff failed to prove

the same.

1

2025 (5) ALD 73 (SC)

18

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AS_1776_2001

22. In a case of R.Deivanai Ammal (deceased by LR) and another Vs.

G.Meenakshi Ammal and others

2

, wherein a Division Bench of the High

Court of Madras held as follows:

“16. In a Hindu joint family, if one member sues for partition on the foot that

the properties claimed by him are joint family properties then three

circumstances ordinarily arise. The first is an admitted case when there is no

dispute about the existence of the joint family properties at all. The second is

a case where certain properties are admitted to the joint family properties and

the other properties in which a share is claimed are alleged to be the

accretions or acquisitions from the income available from joint family

properties or in the alternative have been acquired by a sale or conversion of

such available properties. The third head is that the properties standing in the

names of female members of the family are benami and that such a state of

affairs has been deliberately created by the manager or the head of the family

and that really the properties or the amounts standing in the names of female

members are properties of the joint family. While considering the term

'nucleus' it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be

established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot

normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities. The extent of the property,

the income from the property, the normal liability with which such income

would be charged and the net available surplus of such joint family property

do all enter into computation for the purpose of assessing the content of the

reservoir of such a nucleus from which alone it could, with reasonable

certainty, be said that the other joint family properties have been purchased

unless a strong link or nexus is established between the available surplus

income and the alleged joint family properties. The person who comes to

Court with such bare allegations without any substantial proof to back it up

should fail.”

23. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the plaintiff, who approached the Court

for seeking relief of partition of the plaint schedule property, admitted that the

plaint ‘B’ schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the defendant

2

2025 (5) ALD 73 (SC)

19

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

No.1. The recitals in Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 executed by defendant No.1 in

favour of defendant No.2 go to show that the plaint ‘A’ schedule property is the

self-acquired property of defendant No.1. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court

is of the considered view that the plaint schedule properties are self-acquired

properties of defendant No.1. By giving cogent reasons, the trial Court rightly

held that the plaint schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of

defendant No.1.

Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the appellant.

28. Point No.2:

Whether Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 gift deeds are not valid as pleaded

by the plaintiff and the defendant No.1?

It was pleaded by the plaintiff and defendant No.1 that the defendant

No.1 cancelled the gift deeds said to have been executed by him in favour of

his wife/defendant No.2 by executing registered revocation deeds. As seen

from the recitals of the registered revocation deeds, it was admitted by the

defendant No.1 in Ex.A-10 and Ex.A-11 registered revocation deeds about the

execution of the gift deeds under Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 in favour of the

defendant No.2. It is the specific case of the defendant No.4 that the

defendant No.1, out of his love and affection towards the defendant No.2,

gifted a property to an extent of 131 square yards to the defendant No.2 and

executed a registered gift deed dated 29.04.1988 under Ex.B-13 and

delivered the possession of the same to the defendant No.2. He further

pleaded that similarly, on 30.04.1988, the remaining portion in an extent of 98

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VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

square yards of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property was gifted by the defendant

No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 and that he delivered possession of the

same to the defendant No.2. He further pleaded that the defendant No.2

accepted the said gift deeds in respect of plaint ‘A’ schedule property covered

under the said gift deeds under Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 and the plaint ‘A’

schedule property was mutated in the name of the defendant No.2 in the

Municipal Records and the same is evidenced by Ex.B-16. The defendant

No.4 further pleaded that since the defendant No.2 was not getting any proper

income from the plaint ‘A’ schedule property, she sold away the said property

to the defendant No.4 for a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- and executed a registered

sale deed dated 15.12.1989 in favour of the defendant No.4 under Ex.B-16.

29. It was contended by the plaintiff that Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 were

cancelled by the defendant No.1 by executing the registered revocation deeds

dated 26.07.1989 under Ex.A-10 and Ex.A-11 and therefore, in view of the

revocation deeds executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2,

the gift deeds are void documents.

30. In a case of Kesava Kurup Raghava Kurup vs. Thomas Idicula and

another

3

, the High Court of Kerala held as follows:

“A gift to be valid must have been accepted by the donee “during the life time

of the donor and while he is still capable of giving”. Under Mithakshara the

acceptance of a gift, particularly if it concerned immovable property, should

be express.”

3

AIR 1969 Ker. 21

21

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31. In a case of K.Bala Krishnan vs. K.Kamalam

4

, the Apex Court held

that the gift having been duly accepted in law and thus being complete, it was

irrevocable under Section 126 of Transfer of Property Act. Section 126

prohibits revocation of validly executed gift except in the circumstances

mentioned therein. It was not competent for the donor to have cancelled the

gift and executed a will in relation to the gifted property.

32. In a case of Yanala Malleshwari vs. Smt Ananthula Sayamma

5

,

wherein it was held as follows:

“In this regard, it needs to be noticed that a gift deed, on the one hand, and a

sale deed, on the other, stand on different footing. Under Section 126 of the

Transfer of Property Act, it is competent for a Donor, to suspend or revoke a

gift deed, executed by him, whereas similar facility is not available, in case of

a sale deed. Gift is a transfer, without any monetary consideration, whereas

under a sale transaction, mutual rights and obligations exist, as between a

vendor and vendee. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act prescribes the

manner, in which a document can be cancelled. What is required to be done

through the decree of a Court, cannot be permitted to be undertaken by a

party by himself”. And finally observed- “This Court is of the view that, if sale

deeds, under which valuable properties are conveyed, are permitted to be

cancelled unilaterally, it would not only result in several complications,

unnecessary litigations, and hardship to the affected parties, but also bring

about situations, having far-reaching implications and unrest in the society.

These aspects do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the

Division Bench, which disposed of W.A. No.972 of 2004. It is felt that the

matter needs to be examined either by another Division Bench, or, if

necessary, by a Full Bench”.

33. The above Full Bench judgment of this Court is challenged before the

Apex Court, the Apex Court overruled the above judgment. The Apex Court in

4

AIR 2004 SC 1257

5

AIR 2007 AP 57 (F.B)

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VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi and another vs. Government of Andhra

Pradesh and others

6

held as follows:

In this connection, we may also refer to Rule 26(i)(k) relating to Andhra

Pradesh under Section 69 of the Registration Act, which states:

“The registering officer shall ensure at the time of preparation for registration

of cancellation deeds of previously registered deed of conveyances on sale

before him that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the executant

and claimant parties to the previously registered conveyance on sale and that

such cancellation deed is accompanied by a declaration showing natural

consent or orders of a competent Civil or High Court or State or Central

Government annulling the transaction contained in the previously registered

deed of conveyance on sale:

Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with the execution of

cancellation deed by executant and claimant parties to the previously

registered deeds of conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation deed

is executed by a Civil Judge or a Government Officer competent to execute

Government orders declaring the properties contained in the previously

registered conveyance on sale to be Government or Assigned or Endowment

lands or properties not registerable by any provision of law”.

A reading of the above rule also supports the observations we have made

above. It is only when a sale deed is cancelled by a competent Court that the

cancellation deed can be registered and that too after notice to the concerned

parties. In this case, neither is there any declaration by a competent court nor

was there any notice to the parties. Hence, this Rule also makes it clear that

both the cancellation deed as well as registration thereof were wholly void

and non est and meaningless transactions.

34. The ratio laid down in the above decision of Apex Court is squarely

applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the law is very clear that

when the donor executed a gift settlement deed duly registered before Sub-

Register, the same is accepted by the donee, if the donor wants to cancel the

6

2012 (1) ALD 90 (SC)

23

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

said gift settlement deed, he has to approach the civil Court for cancellation,

questioning the alleged fraud played by the defendant No.2 but not by way of

execution of revocation deeds before the Sub-Registrar. In the case on hand

no notice was issued to the defendant No.2 i.e., donee before execution of

revocation deeds before the sub registrar and the donor unilaterally cancelled

the above gift settlement deed after a lapse 1 year from the date of registered

gift settlement deed. Therefore, Ex.A-10 and Ex.A-11 revocation deeds are

void and non-est.

35. The Full Bench of the Apex Court in a case of Veena Singh

(deceased) through L.Rs vs. District Registrar and another

7

held as

follows:

A document, once it is registered, can be cancelled or set aside only by a civil

court of competent jurisdiction. Upon the registration of the sale deed on 16

April 2012, the registration authorities are rendered infructuous and would

have no power to cancel registration even on the ground of fraud or other

irregularities;

The Apex Court further held as follows:

…. this Court also observed that the role of the Sub-Registrar stood

discharged once the document had been registered, since there is no

express provision in the Registration Act which empowers him to recall the

registration. This Court held:

"34. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the

document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan [State of

UP. v. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, AIR 1961 SC 787])...There is no

express provision in the 1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall

such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for

7

(2022) 7 SCC 1

24

VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The

power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any

express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-

Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the

documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is

limited to do superintendence of Registration Offices and make rules in that

behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of

any document which has already been registered."

This Court observed that Section 35 of the Registration Act does not confer a

quasi-judicial power on the registering officer, who is not expected to evaluate

title or irregularity in the document. As such, the validity of the registered

deed of extinguishment could be placed in issue only before a court of

competent jurisdiction. On the above facts, this Court upheld the dismissal of

the writ petition by the High Court, with an opportunity being granted to the

appellant to pursue a remedy in accordance with law. Therefore, the decision

in Satya Pal Anand (supra) has held that once a deed of extinguishment had

been registered by the registering officer, the registering officer had no power

to recall it nor was it amenable to the supervisory control of the Inspector

General of Registration under Section 69 of the Registration Act.

The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws is squarely applicable to

the present facts of the case. The law is very clear that the Sub-Registrar has

no authority to entertain the revocation deeds for cancelling the registered gift

settlement deed. Therefore, the registered revocation deeds said to have

been executed by donor to cancel the earlier registered gift settlement deeds

Ex.A-13 and Ex.A-14 are null and void and registration authority has no power

to cancel the earlier registered gift settlement deeds.

36. It is also well settled that the gift once completed cannot be

cancelled/revoked, subject to Section 126 of Transfer of Property Act,

which provides for the circumstances under which it can be cancelled.

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VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

The donor and donee must have agreed that it shall be revocable only or in

part on the happening of any subsequent event. It cannot be revoked,

unilaterally at the will of the donor. In the case on hand, admittedly no notice

was issued to the donee by the donor before execution of the said revocation

deeds that too after 1 year of execution of registered gift settlement deeds, the

donor executed a revocation deeds before the Sub-Registrar. The donor has

not approached the competent Civil Court to challenge the said gift settlement

deeds by saying that the donee obtained the said document by playing fraud.

The Sub-Registrar entertained the said document without any authority and

cancelled the said gift settlement deeds. Therefore, both the revocation deeds

as well as the registration thereof was wholly void and non-est and

meaningless transactions. The transfer of possession of immovable property

in a registered gift deed is not sine qua non for making a valid gift, even prior

to Rule 26 (i) (k) of A.P. Registration Rules 1960, the registered gift deed

could not be revoked or cancelled contrary to Section 126 of Transfer of

Property Act. Instead of approaching the Civil Court, the donor simply

approached the Sub-Registrar that too after 1 year of execution of gift

settlement deeds for revocation of registered gift settlement deeds without

giving any notice to the donee i.e., plaintiff. Therefore, the said revocation

deeds are nothing but a void and non-est and meaningless transactions.

37. For the aforesaid reasons, Ex.B-13 and Ex.B-14 gift deeds are valid

documents and Ex.A-10 and Ex.A-11 revocation deeds said to have been

executed by defendant No.1 are not valid and non-est in the eye of law.

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VGKR, J.

AS_1776_2001

Accordingly, point number 2 is answered by against the appellant.

38. Point No.3:

Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit for

partition filed by the plaintiff?

In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 and 2, the trial Court is justified in

dismissing the suit. The learned trial Judge, by appreciating the evidence on

record in a proper manner, rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to

interfere with the findings arrived at by the trial Court in its judgment.

39. In the result, the appeal suit is dismissed. Considering the facts and

circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the appeal.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall

stand closed

__________________________

V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.

Date: 25.06.2026

SRT

Whether the order is:

Speaking _ Reasoned Yes

Reportable Yes Non-reportable _