REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. ………….. OF 2022

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1132-1155 of 2022)

DAXABEN ….Appellant

Versus

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. ….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Indira Banerjee, J.

Leave granted.

2. These Appeals are against the impugned final judgment and

order dated 20

th

October 2020 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad allowing the Criminal Revisional Applications under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C), being

R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 5026 of 2020, 5600 of 2020, 5107 of

2020, 5004 of 2020, 5108 of 2020, 5165 of 2020, 5159 of 2020, 5161

of 2020, 5524 of 2020, 5166 of 2020, 5162 of 2020, 5739 of 2020 and

quashing the FIR being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1

st

March

1

2020 registered with Himmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, District

Sabarkantha, and also the order dated 29

th

July 2021 passed by the

High Court dismissing the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by

the Appellant, registered as R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 10845

of 2021, 10846 of 2021, 10847 of 2021, 10848 of 2021, 10849 of

2021, 10850 of 2021, 10851 of 2021, 10852 of 2021, 10853 of 2021,

10855 of 2021, 10856 of 2021, 10858 of 2021 for recalling the said

common final order dated 20

th

October 2020.

3. The Appellant is the wife of late Shaileshkumar Chimanbhai

Patel, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, who is stated to have

committed suicide on 1

st

March 2020 by consuming poison in his

office.

4. One Pinakin Kantibhai Patel, claiming to be a cousin of the

deceased, as also an Accountant working for the deceased, lodged an

FIR being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1

st

March 2020 with

Himmatnagar Police Station, District Sabarkantha, naming 12 accused

persons, being the applicants in the Criminal Miscellaneous

Applications in the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC,

referred to above, alleging that they had committed offence under

Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) of abetting the

commission of suicide by the deceased.

5. As per the FIR, the deceased left a hand-written note, the

contents whereof are as hereunder:-

2

“With due respect, I am to state that I, Shaileshkumar Chimanlal

Patel, Proprietor of Jigar Transport, state that I have been cheated.

The names and statement are as under

1. As per the instructions of Anil Mathur, I have paid amounts as

under: Anil Mathur, RTO, Jodhpur, Service Ratanpur RTO Check

Post, Anil Mathur, Rs.600000/-, Pramod Dadhichi Rs.10,00,000/-,

Sunil Mathur, Rs.300000/-, Niharika Mathur Rs.800000/-, Malvika

Mathur Rs.300000/-, Niru Mathur Rs.700000/-, Dolly Mathur

Rs.300000/-. The accounts of above amounts are not cleared and

they have not returned the amounts.

2. Karni Bhavarsha serving in RTO, Mandar Border, and Rajkuar G.

serving in RTO had launched company and amount is given in

their RP Powertech company and total amount comes to

Rs.3723200/-.

3. Vijaysinh Bhati who has committed most cheating and fraud

with me. I am in credit of Rs.14700000 (Rupees one crore forty

seven lakhs only). From this person. I am also in credit of

Rs.1,50,000/- from Chandravirsinh Bhati and in credit of

Rs.10,00,000 from Padam Bhati. They have taken my CRETA car

bearing RT No.6797 and they are not giving my car back. It is

requested to do needful.”

6. The FIR records :-

“There is signature in English. The name Patel Shaileshkumar

Chimanlal is written in gujarati under the signature. The names of

Padam Bhati, Chandravirsinh Bhati, Dolly Mathur, Niru Mathur,

Malvika Mathur, Niharika Mathur, Sunil Mathur, Pramod Dadhichi,

Anil Mathur, PK Powertech, Kamalpal Mineral Pvt. Ltd., Leena

Computerized Ledger Statements are affixed with staple pin.

These words are written in the handwriting of Shaileshkumar. I

know the handwriting. I had given this chit to Apurvabhai in the

office. He had read over the said chit. He told me that this is

suicide note of Shaileshkumar.

The name Pramod Dhidhasi is written in the suicide note but the

real name is Pramod Dadhichi. That money was given to all

persons through Bank except Vijaysinh. Kamalpal Minerals Pvt.

Limited of Vijaysinh was given Rs.18,52,000/.”

7. In the FIR, it was alleged that the deceased had been making

phone calls to the accused persons calling upon them to return his

money, but they did not do so. The accused had cheated the

3

deceased of Rs.2,35,73,200/-. The deceased was in acute financial

crunch and, therefore, constrained to take his own life.

8. Section 306 of the IPC reads:

“306. Abetment of suicide. -If any person commits suicide,

whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished

with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

9. As argued by Ms. Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the Respondents, what is required to constitute alleged

abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC is that there must

be an allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the

commission of the offence of suicide.

10.Ms. Shenoy cited M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its

Inspector of Police

1

, where this Court held:-

"7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC

are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or

instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the

accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive

language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide.

There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused

intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.

Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide

are satisfied the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306

IPC."

11.Ms. Shenoy also cited Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of

Haryana

2

, where this Court held:

16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof

of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of

suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a

suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of

suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex

1 (2019) 3 SCC 315

2 (2019) 17 SCC 301

4

attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the

case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be

looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement

to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere

allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person

would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the

accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such

an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of

occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of

suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts

and circumstances of each case.

16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted

commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if

the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide.

As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above-

referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite

or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide

had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise

not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced

person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused

guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the

accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct

creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other

option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four

corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in

tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which

eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may

be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea

on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with

reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the

acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused

intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a

particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of

suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the

deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was

provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide.

Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour,

each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while

taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the

actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased."

12.Ms. Shenoy referred to Ramesh Kumar v. State of

Chhatisgarh

3

, where this Court defined ‘instigate’ as under:-

“Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage

to do an act.”

3 (2001) 9 SCC 618

5

13.In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another.

4

,

cited on behalf of the Respondent, this Court observed:-

"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person

or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a

positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in

committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention

of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court

is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC

there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also

requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to

commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been

intended to push the deceased into such a position that he

committed suicide."

14.The proposition of law enunciated and/or re-enunciated in the

judgments cited above are well settled. Whether the acts alleged

would constitute an offence, would depend upon the facts and

circumstances of the case. Each case has to be judged on its own

merits.

15.In this case, however, it appears that the High Court did not

even address to itself, the question of whether the allegations in the

FIR constituted an offence under Section 306 IPC or not. The FIR was

quashed in view of a settlement between the accused named in the

FIR and the complainant.

16.It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question of

whether there was any direct or indirect act of incitement to the

offence of abetment of suicide, since the High Court has not gone into

that question. Suffice it to mention that even an indirect act of

incitement to the commission of suicide would constitute the offence

of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC.

4 (2010) 12 SCC 190

6

17.In Court, it was submitted that the parties had amicably

resolved their disputes. In support of such submission, affidavits of

Settlement of Disputes, signed by the complainant and other family

members of the deceased were placed on record.

18.The High Court held:

“9. Since now, the dispute with reference to the impugned FIR is

settled and resolved by and between parties which is confirmed

by the original complainant through their learned advocate, the

trial would be futile and any further continuation of proceedings

would amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, the

impugned FIR is required to be quashed and set aside.

10. Resultantly, the applications are allowed. The impugned FIR

being No. C.R.No. I-11209016200112 of 2020 registered with

Himmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, District Sabarkantha and

all other consequential proceedings arising out of said FIR are

hereby quashed and set aside qua the applicants.”

19.By the common order dated 29

th

July 2021, also impugned in

these appeals, the prayer of the Appellant for recalling the order

dated 20

th

October 2020 was declined. The High Court held:-

“22. …However, as discussed herein above, this Court has passed

an order dated 20.10.2020 after considering the settlement

arrived at between the original first informant, who is cousin

brother of the deceased and was working as an Accountant of the

firm of the deceased. Further, investigating agency has verified

about the genuineness of the settlement arrived at between the

parties. It is not in dispute that the present applicant is a third

party – as stated in Paragraph No.1 of the application and, hence,

so far as the FIR in question is concerned, she is merely a witness

in the FIR. Therefore, when this Court has passed an order after

giving an opportunity of hearing, the original first informant –

cousin brother of the deceased, the order dated 20.10.2020

passed by this Court is not required to be recalled while exercising

power under Section 482 of the Code.

23. At this stage, it is once again required to be noted that the

applicant has stated in the memo of application at Page No.9 that

the respondent No.3 – original first informant has pocketed hefty

amount from an individual original accused and is totally out of

picture post allowing of the quashing petition and is not in contact

7

with the present applicant. Thus, it appears that after settling the

dispute by the respondent No.3 – original first informant with the

original accused, he has not given/paid the said amount to the

applicant, however, for the reasons, it is always open for the

applicant to file appropriate proceeding against the respondent

No.3 – original first informant. Therefore, the present application,

which is filed for recalling the order, is not maintainable, and in

the facts of the present case, this Court is not inclined to exercise

the powers under Section 482 of the Code for recalling of the

order dated 20.10.2020.

24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, all these applications are

dismissed.”

20.In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court referred to an order

dated 6

th

December 2019 passed by a three Judge Bench of this Court

in Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.

Krishna Kumar Pandey

5

) where this Court held that in a revision

arising out of conviction, the High Court could not have sealed the

right of the employer to take disciplinary action against the accused

for misconduct in accordance with the Service Rules.

21.In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this Court referred with

approval, to the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v.

Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.

6

where this Court held that

the High Court was not denuded of inherent power to recall a

judgment and/or order which was without jurisdiction, or in violation

of principles of natural justice, or passed without giving an

opportunity of hearing to a party affected by the order or where an

order was obtained by abusing the process of Court which would

5 2019 SCC Online 1786

6 (2011) 14 SCC 770

8

really amount to its being without jurisdiction. Inherent powers can

be exercised to recall such orders.

22.The High Court rightly found, in effect, that it had the inherent

power to recall a judgment and/or order which was without

jurisdiction or a judgment and/or order passed without hearing a

person prejudicially affected by the judgment and/or order. The High

Court, however, fell in error in not recalling the order dated 20

th

October 2020. The High Court did not address to itself, the question

of whether it had jurisdiction to quash a criminal complaint under

Section 306 of the IPC, which is a grave non-compoundable offence,

entailing imprisonment of ten years, on the basis of a settlement

between the parties.

23.The High Court erred in declining the prayer of the Appellant for

recalling its order dated 20

th

October 2020, passed without hearing

the wife of the deceased only because the original

informant/complainant, a cousin brother and an employee of the

deceased had been heard. Hearing a cousin-cum-employee of the

deceased cannot and does not dispense with the requirement to give

the wife of the deceased a hearing. The wife of the deceased would

have greater interest than cousins and employees in prosecuting

accused persons charged with the offence of abetting the suicide of

her husband.

9

24.Be that as it may, since the initial order dated 20

th

October

2020 is also under challenge in these appeals, it is really not

necessary for this Court to delve deeper into the question of whether

a final order passed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quashing an FIR

could have, at all, been recalled by the High Court, in the absence of

any specific provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall and/or review of such

order. The High Court has, in effect, held that in exceptional

circumstances, such orders can be recalled, in exercise of the

inherent power of the High Court, to prevent injustice.

25.The only question in this appeal is whether the Criminal

Miscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of

the IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment of

imprisonment of ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of

a settlement between the complainant and the accused named in the

FIR. The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the

negative.

26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides :—

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this

Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the

High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give

effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the

process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is

10

wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in

exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to

be exercised for the asking.

28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P.

7

, this Court held that

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such

exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section

itself.

29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of the

Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under

Section 482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would

only be justified when the complaint did not disclose any offence, or

was patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court

in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar

8

.

30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi

and Others.

9

, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held:

“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the

ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This provision

confers a separate and independent power on the High Court

alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and

substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the

court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a revisional

power meant to be exercised against the orders passed by

subordinate courts. It was under this section that in the old Code,

the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or expunge

uncalled for remarks against witnesses or other persons or

subordinate courts. Thus, the scope, ambit and range of Section

561-A (which is now Section 482) is quite different from the

powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of

7 (2008) 8 SCC 781

8 AIR 1990 SC 494 : 1990 Supp SCC 686

9 (1983) 1 SCC 1

11

Section 397. It may be that in some cases there may be

overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is

well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the

present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is

available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is

provided by the statute. Further, the power being an

extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If these

considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency

between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.

7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly defined

by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC

(Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows : [SCC para 10,

p. 47 : SCC (Cri) p. 76]

“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law

when a specific provision is made : easy resort to inherent

power is not right except under compelling circumstances.

Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent

power should not invade areas set apart for specific power

under the same Code.”

8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is

as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section

482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of

criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into in

greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa

Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976 Supp SCR

123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the scope of Sections 202 and 204

of the present Code was considered and while laying down the

guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings could be

quashed this Court observed as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 :

SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12]

“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an

order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused

can be quashed or set aside:

(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the

statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same

taken at their face value make out absolutely no case

against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the

essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against

the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently

absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person

can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground

for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in

issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been

based either on no evidence or on materials which are

wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

12

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal

defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint

by legally competent authority and the like.

The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and

provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where

the High Court can quash proceedings.”

9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court in Sharda

Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505 : 1977 SCC (Cri)

132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146] where Bhagwati, J.

speaking for the Court observed as follows : [SCC para 2, p. 506 :

SCC (Cri) p. 133]

“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in

the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any

offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the

Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.

10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an

accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of

the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence

is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the

allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or

subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High

Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of

its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra

Pradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh

10

, the High Court, while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not

ordinarily embark upon an enquiry into whether the evidence is

reliable or not or whether there is reasonable possibility that the

accusation would not be sustained.

32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand

11

, this Court

held:—

“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used

sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the

10 (2010) 11 SCC 226

11 (2013) 11 SCC 673

13

process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.

Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends

upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential

ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged

by the High Court. …”

33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao

Chandrojirao Angre

12

, a three-Judge Bench of this Court

summarized the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:—

“7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at

the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by

the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made

prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take

into consideration any special features which appear in a

particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the

interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so

on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique

purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an

ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is

likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,

the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of

a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a

preliminary stage.”

34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal

13

, this

Court observed:—

“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used

as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or

with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of

the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither

possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would

govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction

of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and

in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position,

the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”

12 (1988) 1 SCC 692

13 (2007) 12 SCC 1

14

35.It is a well settled proposition of law that criminal prosecution, if

otherwise justified, is not vitiated on account of malafides or

vendetta. As said by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial

Singh

14

“if the use of the power for the fulfilment of a legitimate

object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”

36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others

15

, this

Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve

the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted

to degenerate into weapons of harassment.

37.Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commit

suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the

inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is

wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings

relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice

or to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Where the victim and

offender have compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in

nature, the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of

the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to

quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon

compromise can be exercised, would depend on the facts and

circumstances of the case.

14 (1980) 2 SCC 471

15 (2021) 5 SCC 524

15

38.However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal

proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be

circumspect and have due regard to the nature and gravity of the

offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not private in nature

and have a serious impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis

of a compromise between the offender and the complainant and/or

the victim. Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even

abetment to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature.

Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can

prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is serious

and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against society.

39.Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave and

serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant,

would set a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodged

for oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused.

Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot free, even in

cases of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride-

burning, etc. by buying off informants/complainants and settling with

them. This would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498-

A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific

social purpose.

40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant is

only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is

16

lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a

matter between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to

ensure that law and order is maintained in society. It is for the state

to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and serious non-

compoundable offences which impact society, the informant and/or

complainant only has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring

that justice is done by conviction and punishment of the offender. An

informant has no right in law to withdraw the complaint of a non-

compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature,

which impacts society.

41.In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab

16

, this Court discussed the

circumstances in which the High Court quashes criminal proceedings

in case of a non-compoundable offence, when there is a settlement

between the parties and enunciated the following principles:-

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having

regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the

victim has been settled although the offences are not

compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of

criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in

the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to

an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being

the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have

harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that

seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society

and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the

victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has

been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made

compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court.

In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or

other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral

turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption

Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in

that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim

can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which

overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having

16 (2012) 10 SCC 303

17

arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership

or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,

particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where

the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the

victim have settled all disputes between them amicably,

irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made

compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its

inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal

complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such

settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being

convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice

shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above

list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its

own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed”.

42.In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab

17

, this Court held that

in case of heinous and serious offences, which are generally to be

treated as crime against society, it is the duty of the State to punish

the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the

offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society

that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing

a similar crime.

43.In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi

18

, this

Court held:-

“26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the

manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits

fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi

as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the

compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social

wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted

principle of handling of finance that whenever there is

manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these

kinds of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having

overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate

victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest

of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the

economic spine of the nation. ...”

17 (2014) 9 SCC 466

18 (2014) 15 SC 29

18

44.In CBI v. Maninder Singh

19

, this Court held:-

“17. … In economic offences the Court must not only keep in view

that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded

but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a

theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are

concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate

design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence

to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the

ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank

would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the

economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire

community is aggrieved.”

45.In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi Stanley

20

, this Court

held:-

“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be

considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission

assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An

offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not

depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are

certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a

different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting

involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot

claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is

neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The

offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this

score.

15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for

that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent

in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on

the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when

the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the

load on the system. …”

46.In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai Bhimsinhbhai

Karmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another

21

, a three-

Judge Bench of this Court quoted Narinder Singh (supra), Vikram

19 (2016) 1 SCC 389

20 (2016) 1 SCC 376

21(2017) 9 SCC 641

19

Anantrai Doshi (supra), CBI v. Maninder Singh (supra), R.

Vasanthi Stanley (supra) and held:-

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on

the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High

Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to

secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new

powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere

in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to

quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the

ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the

offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of

jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While

compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by

the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is

attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or

complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the

ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide

ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the

ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any

court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first

information report should be quashed on the ground that the

offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves

ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no

exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while

dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High

Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the

offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental

depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot

appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the

victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly

speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon

society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is

founded on the overriding element of public interest in

punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be

criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant

20

element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing

insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is

concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar

transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate

situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the

dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal

proceeding if in view of the compromise between the

disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the

continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression

and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in

propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences

involving the financial and economic well-being of the State

have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere

dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be

justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in

an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or

misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of

upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the

balance.”

47.In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors.

22

, a

three-Judge Bench discussed the earlier judgments of this Court and

laid down the following principles:-

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of

this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and

held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to

quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable

offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having

overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising

out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the

parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions

which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity

or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not

private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

22 (2019) 5 SCC 688

21

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences

under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or

the offences committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of

compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc.

would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and

therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not

against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal

proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the

Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot

be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,

on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute

amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its

decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in

the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be

open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of

Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it

would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury

sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate

parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an

exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the

evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is

filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not

permissible when the matter is still under investigation.

Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the

decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014)

3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a

whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code

to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-

compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not

have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the

High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;

the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed

with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”

48.In Arun Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Through its Secretary and Another

23

, this Court held:-

“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v. State of

Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] it has been

observed that in respect of offence against the society it is the

23 (2020) 3 SCC 736

22

duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is a

settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not

prevail since it is in interests of the society that offender should

be punished which acts as deterrent for others from committing

similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in

the category where the correctional objective of criminal law

would have to be given more weightage than the theory of

deterrent punishment. In such cases, the court may be of the

opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to

better relations between them and would resolve a festering

private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482

CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as

the case may be.

15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid

down, we are of the view that offences for which the appellants

have been charged are in fact offences against society and not

private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society

and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the

overriding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such

serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar

transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on

a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at

between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot

constitute a valid ground to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.

16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in

refusing to quash the charge-sheet on the ground of compromise

between the parties.”

49.In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court

does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint

except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the

allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

50.In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding cannot be

nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Cr. P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary

settlement, between the accused and the complainant and other

relatives of the deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the

deceased. As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi

23

Narayan & Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category

of heinous and serious offences and are to be treated as crime

against society and not against the individual alone. On a parity of

reasoning, offence under section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same

category. An FIR under Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be

quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant,

surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone

else. It is clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine

the question whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence under

Section 306 of the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its power

under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole ground

that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been

compromised.

51.The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders of the High

Court are set aside. The observations made in this judgment are not

to be construed as any observation on the merits of the contentions

of the respective parties.

...…………………………………,J.

[INDIRA BANERJEE]

...…………………………………,J

[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 29, 2022.

24