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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 3652 of 2002

Appeal (civil) 3653 of 2002

PETITIONER:

DHANNALAL

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

KALAWATIBAI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/07/2000

BENCH:

R.C. LAHOTI, B.N. AGRAWAL.

JUDGMENT:

R.C. Lahoti, J.

Leave granted.

The suit premises in these two appeals are two shops situated in

M.T. Cloth Market, Indore on the ground-floor of a building. The

property was owned by late Krishnadas. He inducted the two

appellants in the two shops as tenants for non-residential purpose.

Krishnadas died on 8.7.1995. His ownership and right of reversion as

landlord have devolved on his widow - Smt. Kalawatibai and two sons

- Govinda and Hemant. These three are the respondents in these

appeals. They initiated the proceedings for eviction of the two

appellants in December 1995. The case of the respondents is that the

shop in the occupation of appellant Dhannalal is required bona fide

for starting the business of Govinda, the respondent no.2, while the

shop in the occupation of the other appellant, M/s Tulsidas

Sureshchandra is required by the respondent Hemant for shifting and

continuing his readymade garments business which he is presently

running in a rented accommodation situated in Gorakund locality, at a

little distance from the building in question. It is alleged that the

respondents do not own or possess any other accommodation of their

own suitable to satisfy their alleged requirement. These proceedings

for eviction were initiated under Chapter III-A of M.P.

Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act, for short) by

filing applications before the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore

(RCA, for short). The two appellants contested the claim preferred by

the respondents. However, the R.C.A. found the claims for

eviction proved and directed the two appellants to be evicted. Both

the appellants preferred revision petitions under Section 23-E of the

Act before the High Court. The High Court, having dealt with each of

the contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioners, has

dismissed the revision petitions upholding the orders of the R.C.A.

Feeling aggrieved thereby these appeals have been filed by special

leave.

Two questions arise for decision in these appeals: firstly,

whether looking at the nature of requirement pleaded by the landlord-

respondents in their applications the forum of Rent Controlling

Authority was available to the respondents under Chapter III-A of the

Act or whether they were required to have recourse to the jurisdiction

of Civil Court by filing suits for eviction under Section 12 of the Act;

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and secondly, whether the landlords have succeeded in making out

case of bona fide requirement of the suit premises within the meaning

of clause (b) of Section 23-A of the Act.

M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is a legislation

providing for regulation and control of letting and rent of

accommodations and generally to regulate the control of eviction of

tenants from accommodations and for other matters connected

therewith or incidental thereto. It also provides for expeditious trial of

eviction cases on ground of bona fide requirement of certain

categories of landlords. Section 12 of the Act, which opens with a

non-obstante clause, provides for no suit against a tenant for his

eviction from any accommodation being filed in any Civil Court

except on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein. Thus the

rights, obligations and protection of the tenants in the matter of

eviction from accommodations are governed principally by Section 12

of the Act and suit against tenant seeking eviction can be filed only in

Civil Court. The procedure applicable and the remedy of appeal and

revision are those as enumerated in the Code of Civil Procedure. The

M.P. Amendment Act No. 27 of 1983 w.e.f. 16.8.1983 inserted in the

Act Chapter III-A entitled "Eviction of tenants on grounds of

'bonafide' requirement" making provision for a special and summary

procedure for dealing with claims for eviction of tenants founded on

the ground of bona fide requirement for all the landlords generally.

Corresponding amendment was made in Section 12 of the Act so as to

do away with jurisdiction of Civil Court so far as claim for eviction on

the ground of bona fide requirement, residential or non-residential, is

concerned. Within a short range of time the Legislature gave a second

thought and in its wisdom considered it appropriate to not to extend

the benefit of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A to all

landlords generally but to keep it confined to such specified categories

of landlords who on account of certain handicap, adversity or a

peculiar position in which they are placed need to be dealt with on a

different pedestal and given advantage of a summary, quick and

expeditious remedy of seeking eviction on the ground of personal

requirement. Chapter III-A was hence amended by M.P. Act No. 7 of

1985 w.e.f. 16.1.1985. We are concerned with the provisions of

Chapter III-A as amended. Chapter III-A, as it stands now (since

16.1.1985), makes provision for proceedings for eviction of tenants,

on the ground of bonafide requirement for residential or non-

residential purpose, being initiated in the forum of Rent Controlling

Authority only by specified categories of landlords (and not by any

landlord generally).

Section 12 of the Act, placed in Chapter III dealing with control

of eviction of tenants, provides (by relevant part thereof) as under :

Sec.12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. (1)

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall

be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his

eviction from any accommodation except on one

or more of the following grounds only namely:-

xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(e) that the accommodation let for residential

purposes is required bona-fide by the

landlord for occupation as a residence for

himself or for any member of his family, if

he is the owner thereof or for any person for

whose benefit the accommodation is held

and that the landlord or such person has no

other reasonably suitably residential

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accommodation of his own his occupation in

the city or town concerned;

(f) that the accommodation let for non-

residential purposes is required bona-fide by

the landlord for the purpose of continuing or

starting his business or that any of his major

sons or unmarried daughters if he is the

owner thereof or of any person for whose

benefit the accommodation is held and that

the landlord or such person has no other

reasonably suitably non-residential

accommodation of his own in his occupation

in the city or town concerned.

The abovesaid provision needs to be read in juxtaposition with

Section 23-A of the Act placed in Chapter III-A of the Act which

reads as under:

"23-A. Special provision for eviction of

tenant on ground of bona fide

requirement.___ Notwithstanding anything

contained in any other law for the time being in

force or contract to the contrary, a landlord

may submit an application, signed and verified

in a manner provided in rules 14 and 15 of

Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were

a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on

one or more of the following grounds for an

order directing the tenant to put the landlord in

possession of the accommodation, namely:-

(a) that the accommodation let for

residential purposes is required "bona

fide" by the landlord for occupation

as residence for himself or for any

member of his family, or for any

person for whose benefit, the

accommodation is held and that the

landlord or such person has no other

reasonably suitable residential

accommodation of his own in his

occupation in the city or town

concerned."

Explanation.For the purposes of this clause,

"accommodation let for residential purposes"

includes

(i) any accommodation which having been

let for use as a residence is without the

express consent of the landlord, used

wholly or partly for any non-residential

purpose;

(ii) any accommodation which has not been

let under an express provision of contract

for non-residential purpose;

(b) that the accommodation let for non-

residential purposes is required "bona

fide" by the landlord for the purpose of

continuing or starting his business or that

of any of his major sons or unmarried

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daughters, if he is the owner thereof or

for any person for whose benefit the

accommodation is held and that the

landlord or such person as no other

reasonably suitable non-residential

accommodation of his own in his

occupation in the city or town concerned:

The specified categories of landlords by whom proceedings can

be initiated under Chapter III-A are defined in Section 23-J which

reads as under:-

"Sec.23J. Definition of landlord for the

purposes of Chapter III-A.___For the purposes of

this Chapter "landlord" means a landlord who is ___

(i) a retired servant of any Government

including a retired member of

Defence Services; or

(ii) a retired servant of a company owned

or controlled wither by the Central or

State Government; or

(iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or

(iv) physically handicapped person; or

(v) a servant of any Government

including a member of defence

services who, according to his service

conditions, is not entitled to

Government accommodation on his

posting to a place where he owns a

house or is entitled to such

accommodation only on payment of a

penal rent on his posting to such

place."

Such a landlord seeking eviction of his or her tenant on the

ground of bona fide requirement of residential or non residential

accommodation, the ground as defined in Section 23-A of the Act,

must have recourse to Chapter III-A only. Section 11-A of the Act

provides that the provisions of Chapter III so far as they relate to

matter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the

landlord defined in Section 23-J. Section 45 of the Act also provides

that as to the matters which the Rent Controlling Authority is

empowered by or under the Act to decide are not entertainable by

Civil Court. The effect of these provisions is that a landlord as

defined in Section 23-J of the Act cannot have recourse to the forum

of Civil Court.

Broadly speaking, the main features of Chapter III-A are that it

provides a summary procedure for the hearing of applications on the

lines similar to those contained in Order 37 of the CPC. The tenant

cannot contest the prayer for eviction from accommodation unless

leave to defend is sought for by moving an application within the

prescribed period of time and allowed. Default in appearance or

refusal of leave results in the statement made by the landlord in the

application for eviction being deemed to have been admitted by the

tenant obliging the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of

eviction. Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the

application, the Rent Controlling Authority shall hold an enquiry

consistently with the practice and procedure of a Court of Small

Causes. The requirement of the landlord is presumed to be bona fide

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unless the contrary is proved, that is to say, the burden of proof is

placed on the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord contrary to the

ordinary procedure in a Civil Court where the burden of proof lies on

the landlord. As against an order of eviction passed by the RCA, a

revision lies to the High Court and the remedy of appeal is excluded.

The submission of Shri S.S. Ray, the learned senior counsel for

the appellants, has been that the procedure and remedy provided by

Chapter III-A are summary and onerous to the tenant. Mainly

speaking, the tenant is not entitled to defend himself as of right, the

burden of proof is shifted on him from the very inception and he does

not have a right of appeal.

At the very outset, we may point out that the issue as to the

constitutional validity of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A of

the Act is not before us. The proceedings have originated in the

jurisdiction of Rent Controlling Authority where the question of vires

could not have been raised and gone into. Before the High Court,

during the hearing of revision filed by the appellants, the plea was

faintly raised and urged but turned down. In the absence of proper

pleadings and the Advocate General of the State having been put on

notice, we do not deem it proper to enter into the question of

constitutional validity. However, it needs to be noted that the

controversy as to the constitutional validity of Chapter III-A on the

ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as

conferring benefit of special procedure for eviction of tenant on

certain classified landlords and the classification suffering from

invidious discrimination is a beaten track. All these questions have

been exhaustively gone into by a Division Bench of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh presided over by J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship

then was) in B. Johnson Vs. C.S. Naidu, AIR 1986 MP 72, and the

challenge was turned down. In Kewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti, (1980) 1

SCC 290, a similar challenge laid against similar provisions of the

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was rejected. Similarly in Ravi Dutt

Sharma Vs. Ratanlal Bhargava, (1984) 2 SCC 75, challenge to the

classification between landlords in order to provide benefit of the

special procedure only to some of them constituting a distinct class

was upheld as permissible and reasonable classification. Both these

decisions were relied on by the Division Bench of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh in B. Johnson's case (supra). To the same effect is

a later Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in

Kunjulal Yadu Vs. Parasram Sharma, 2000 (II) MPJR 123. So

much observation would suffice for the purpose of the present case as

in our opinion, the present one is not a fit case, on the basis of the

pleadings and material available, to examine the question of

constitutional validity of Chapter III-A of the Act.

The principal issue is that out of three co-landlords, the

respondents herein, one is a widow falling within the definition of

'landlord' as defined in Section 23-J of the Act and hence entitled to

have recourse to the provisions of Chapter III-A while other two co-

landlords do not fall within the definition of 'landlord' in Section 23-

J. Though the requirement pleaded is of all the landlords, i.e. the

widow as also the other two co-landlords, it is only the widow who

can take advantage of the special procedure for eviction but the others

two, who actually require the premises for their non-residential use,

should have gone to Civil Court and cannot, under the law, have

recourse to the forum of Rent Controlling Authority.

The submission of Shri S.S. Ray, the learned senior counsel for

the appellants, is that inasmuch as the requirement is of non-classified

landlords to whom the forum of Civil Court under Section 12 of the

Act is open, they could not have invoked Chapter III-A to their

advantage and to the prejudice of the tenant-appellants and should

have filed their suits for eviction before the Civil Court. It is further

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submitted that unless that view is taken the provisions of Chapter III-

A would be liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution and, therefore, the provisions of Chapter III-A should be

so read as to save them from constitutional invalidity. The submission

made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, though

attractive, is liable to be discarded on scrutiny of its merit.

We will first note how the issue has been dealt with by the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh. In Shivraj Jat Vs. Smt. Asha Lata Yadav

and Ors.- 1989 MPJR HC 336, a widow filed an application under

Section 23-A of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the leased

premises on the ground that the same was bona fide required for the

purpose of starting the business of her major son who was also

arrayed as a co-plaintiff. One of the pleas raised on behalf of the

tenant was that only one of the applicants being a widow a

'landlord' as defined by Section 23-J of the Act, while the other

applicant was not such a landlord, the special procedure provided by

Section 23-A of the Act was not available to them. It was held by the

Division Bench that the provisions of Section 23-A (b) were

unambiguous. The legislation enables a "landlord" to seek eviction if

the leased premises are bona fide required by the landlord for starting

the business of a major son or daughter of the landlord; there can be

no logic or justification for denying that relief to the landlord because

the major son or daughter of the landlord also happens to be co-owner

of the leased premises. The case was held to be covered by Section

23-A(b) of the Act. A similar issue arose for consideration by a Full

Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Harbans Singh Vs. Smt.

Margrat G. Bhingardive AIR 1990 MP 191. The question posed

before the Full Bench was : "Whether out of several landlords of an

accommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the

tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need

or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children,

would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under

Section 23-A(a) read with Section 23-J(iii) of the Act". The premises

in question were let out by the late husband of the landlady and after

his death the widow as well as her children succeeded to the tenanted

premises by inheritance and therefore the widow and her children all

became co-owners and joint landlords thereof. The application for

eviction was filed by the widow alone. It was urged that the widow

alone cannot maintain an application under Section 23-A of the Act

either for her own bona fide need or for the joint need of herself and

her married sons who are also joint landlords but do not belong to the

special class envisaged in Section 23-J of the Act and have not joined

the widow in making application for eviction. The Full Bench held

that application filed by the widow alone as one of the landlords was

competent. The Full Bench further held :-

"If we examine the language of

Section 23-A and clause (a) thereof it would

be clear from the plain and unambiguous

words and language used therein that they

are capable of only one construction that the

person who falls in the category of special

class of landlords is authorized to take

action for eviction of the tenant either for his

own bona fide need or for the bona fide need

of any member of his family who may not

belong to any of the special class of

landlords. If we accept the submissions

advanced by the learned counsel for the

tenant/applicant then in that event we would

be doing violence to the plain language and

words used in the provisions under

consideration by reading into the said

provisions the words that the member of the

family for whose bona fide need, the

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application has been filed by the special

class of landlord, should also belong to that

category. But law of Interpretation of Statute

does not permit such a course.

Consequently the result is that the

application made by the widow/non-

applicant under S.23-A(a) of the Act for

eviction of the tenant/applicant herein on the

ground of her bona fide need and that of her

married sons who are members of his family

is competent and maintainable before the

Rent Controlling Authority"(para 17).

".out of several landlords of an

accommodation including a widow, an

application for eviction of the tenant by the

widow alone, on the ground of her own bona

fide need or joint need of herself and that of

her married sons and their children, who are

members of his family would be competent

before the Rent Controlling Authority under

S.23-A(a) read with S.23-J of the Act" (para

18).

We find ourselves in agreement with the view of the law

taken by the High Court of M.P. in Shivraj Jat's case (supra) and

Harbans Singh's case (supra). An analysis of Section 23-A(b) of the

Act shows that an application seeking eviction of tenant thereunder is

maintainable if :- (i) the accommodation is let for non-residential

purpose; (ii) it is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of

continuing or starting (a) his business, or (b) business of any of his

major sons or unmarried daughters; (iii) the landlord is the owner of

such accommodation or is holding accommodation for benefit of any

person who requires the accommodation; and (iv) the landlord or such

person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential

accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town

concerned.

It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court,

namely, Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and Ors. (1976) 4 SCC

184, Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathan and Ors.- (1977) 2 SCC 814 and

Pal Singh Vs. Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. and Ors. (1989) 1 SCC

444 that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit

for ejectment of tenant and it is no defence open to tenant to question

the maintainability of the suit on the ground that other co-owners were

not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming subject

matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-

owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with

others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional

owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned.

He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of tenant without joining the

other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Shri Ram

Pasricha's case (supra) reliance was placed by the tenant on the

English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for

possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for

occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the

requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the

English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and

Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule

of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in

favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner

of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and

also satisfied the requirement of being "if he is the owner", the

expression as employed by Section 13(1)(f) of W.B. Premises

Tenancy Act, 1956.

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It follows that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the

premises can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under

Section 23-A(b), as analysed hereinbefore, without joining other co-

owners/co-landlords as party to the proceedings if they do not object

to the initiation of proceedings by such landlady, because she is the

owner of the property and requires the tenanted accommodation for

the purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major

sons. The major sons though co-owners/co-landlords may not have

been joined as party to the proceedings but it would not adversely

affect the maintainability of the proceedings. It would also not make

any difference if they are also joined as party to the proceedings.

Their presence in the proceedings is suggestive of their concurrence

with the widow landlady maintaining the proceedings in her own

right. The presence of such co-landlords, as co-plaintiffs or co-

applicants, as are not classified landlords as defined in Section 23-J of

the Act does not alter the nature of claim preferred by the widow

landlady and therefore does not take the proceedings out of the scope

of Section 23-A (b). Conversely, the major sons or any of them suing

alone without joining a widow co-landlord as party to the proceedings

may institute a suit before a Civil Court under Section 12 of the Act

pleading that the non-residential premises were required bona fide by

them or any of them for the purpose of continuing or starting their

own or his own business as they would be owners thereof and the

requirement will be theirs. It would not make any material difference

if the widow co-landlord was joined as party to the proceedings either

as plaintiff or as co-applicant because the case pleaded in the plaint

would squarely fall within the ambit of clause (f) sub-Section (1) of

Section 12 of the Act.

Here we may divert a little and refer to a decision of this Court

in Messrs. Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. Vs. Pheroze Framroze

Taraporewala and Ors. AIR 1953 SC 73. The local law (applicable

to Bombay) provided for a suit between landlord and tenant being

filed in the Small Causes Court. In the suit filed by the landlord

against the tenant, the sub-tenant was also impleaded as a party. The

defendant objected to the maintainability of the suit before the Small

Causes Court submitting that the suit being not one between landlord

and tenant alone it would not be within the competence of the Small

Causes Court to try the same. This Court held that a sub-tenant was a

proper party in a suit for ejectment between landlord and tenant. The

joinder of such a proper party cannot alter the character of the suit and

does not make the suit any the less a suit between the landlord and the

tenant; to hold otherwise will be to encourage multiplicity of the suits

which will result in no end of inconvenience and confusion. It is clear

from the ratio of this decision that presence of proper party does not

alter the basic character of the suit and availability of forum is to be

determined by examining the essential nature of the suit.

The submission of the learned senior counsel for the tenant-

appellants if accepted may create a diabolical situation. The

requirement pleaded is the requirement of a widow landlady for

continuing or starting the business of her major sons. In proceedings

for eviction of a tenant it is permissible for all the co-owner landlords

to join as plaintiffs. Rather, this is normally done. Now, if they all file

a claim before the Civil Court an objection may possibly be raised on

behalf of the tenant-defendant that the widow landlady being one of

the claimants for eviction she must go to the Rent Controlling

Authority under Chapter III-A. If they collectively join in initiating

the proceedings for eviction of the tenant before the Rent Controlling

Authority under Chapter III-A the tenant-defendant may object that

the requirement being that of the major sons who are themselves

landlord-applicants the claim should have been filed before the Civil

Court, as is the plea before us. How such dilemma can be resolved?

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Both the learned senior counsel for the parties stated that there

is no specific statutory provision nor a binding precedent available

providing resolution to the problem posed. Procedural law cannot

betray the substantive law by submitting to subordination of

complexity. Courts equipped with power to interpret law are often

posed with queries which may be ultimate. The judicial steps of judge

then do stir to solve novel problems by neat innovations. When the

statute does not provide the path and precedents abstain to lead, then

they are the sound logic, rational reasoning, common sense and urge

for public good which play as guides of those who decide. Wrong

must not be left unredeemed and right not left unenforced. Forum

ought to be revealed when it does not clearly exist or when it is

doubted where it exists. When the law procedural or substantive

does not debar any two seekers of justice from joining hands and

moving together, they must have a common path. Multiplicity of

proceedings should be avoided and same cause of action available to

two at a time must not be forced to split and tried in two different fora

as far as practicable and permissible.

Reference to, or deriving aid from, certain legal maxims will be

useful. Ubi jus ibi remedium there is no wrong without a remedy.

Where there is a right there is a forum for its enforcement. According

to Broom's Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition, pp.118-119), the maxim

has been considered so valuable that it led to the invention of the form

of action called an action on the case. Where no precedent of a writ

can be produced, the clerks in Chancery shall agree in forming a new

one. The principle adopted by courts of law accordingly is, that the

novelty of the particular complaint alleged in an action on the case is

no objection, provided that an injury cognizable by law be shown to

have been inflicted on the plaintiff, in which case, although there be

no precedent, the common law will judge according to the law of

nature and the public good. If a man has a right, he must, "have a

means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the

exercise and enjoyment of it, and, indeed, it is vain thing to imagine a

right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are

reciprocal".

As held in Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors.

(1974) 2 SCC 393 there is an inherent right in every person to bring a

suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may,

at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit,

howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to

sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is

enough that no statute bars the suit.

Plaintiff is dominus litis, that is, master of, or having dominion

over, the case. He is the person who has carriage and control of an

action. In case of conflict of jurisdiction the choice ought to lie with

the plaintiff to choose the forum best suited to him unless there be a

rule of law excluding access to a forum of plaintiff's choice or

permitting recourse to a forum will be opposed to public policy or will

be an abuse of the process of law.

Reference may also be had to Section 17 of CPC which

provides that where a suit is to obtain relief respecting immoveable

property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit

may be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose

jurisdiction any portion of the property is situated; provided that, in

respect of the value of the subject-matter of the suit, the entire claim is

congnisable by such Court. The provision confers right on plaintiff

suing on consolidate cause of action to choose one out of several fora

available to him and it is his convenience and sweet will which will

prevail. The provision is not an answer to the problem posed in the

present case; nevertheless the principle underlying thereunder can be

read out and pressed in service. In Nrisingha Charan Nandy

Choudhry Vs. Rajniti Prasad Singh and Ors. AIR 1936 PC 189,

their Lordships referred to Section 17 of the CPC and termed it as the

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ordinary rule for determining the Court which can take congnizance of

a suit for immoveable property situated within the local limits of two

or more tribunals. Where cause of action is one against several

defendants and they reside in different jurisdictions, the plaintiff may,

under Section 20 of CPC file the suit in a court within whose

jurisdiction any one of the defendants, at the time of the

commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides. Thus in

case of a cause of action being triable in more than one forum it may

be tried by any one forum subject to any other provision or rule of

law.

Reverting back to the issue before us, the cause of action is one

requirement of a major son, who himself is a co-owner. It is capable

of being construed in two ways, depending on from the point of view

of which of the landlords we look at. From the point of view of the

widow landlady and owner it is a case of the accommodation let for

non-residential purpose required bona fide by the landlady for the

purpose of continuing or staring the business of any of her major sons,

within the meaning of Section 23-A(b) of the Act. From the point of

view of the major son himself, who is also himself an owner, it is a

case of the accommodation let for non-residential purpose required

bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his

business as he is owner thereof, within the meaning of Section

12(1)(f) of the Act. In the former case the cause of action is triable by

way of an application before R.C.A. In the latter case the cause of

action is triable in a suit instituted in Civil Court. Any one of them

may singally commence the proceedings without impleading the other

or by impleading the other as a non-applicant or defendant in pro-

forma capacity in which case the choice of forum would present no

difficulty. The former shall go to R.C.A. The latter shall go to Civil

Court. However, the law does not prevent the co-owner landlords

from joining together to sue on the cause of action common to them

all. And if they do so the conflict of jurisdiction arises. The choice of

forum, in such a case, must of necessity be left open to the plaintiffs.

Otherwise they will be left without remedy. Keeping in view the

three relevant principles (i) that every wrong must have a remedy and

every right to relief must have a forum for enforcement, (ii) that

plaintiff is dominus litis, and (iii) that one co-owner/landlord can file a

suit for ejectment of tenant and it is not necessary that all co-

owner/landlords must jointly sue for ejectment though they are not

prevented from rather entitled to joining together and suing jointly

if they wish to do so, we proceed to state our conclusions as under :-

(i) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord, or a co-landlord,

belonging to any one of the five categories defined in Section 23-J of

the Act, as the sole applicant without objection by other co-landlords

who have not joined as co-applicants and the nature of claim for

eviction is covered by Section 23-A(b) of the Act, the proceedings

would lie only before the Rent Controlling Authority;

(ii) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord or by such a co-

landlord who does not belong to any of the categories defined by

Section 23-J and the other co-landlord/landlady falling in one of the

categories defined in Section 23-J is not joined as co-plaintiff the

claim shall have to be filed only by way of a suit instituted in a Civil

Court;

(iii) if the proceedings are initiated by such co-owner landlords, one or

more of whom belong to Section 23-J category while some others are

those not falling within the definition of 'landlord' under Section 23-J

and the requirement pleaded provides a cause of action collectively to

all the landlords arrayed as plaintiffs or applicants, the choice of

forum lies with the landlords. They may file an application before

R.C.A. under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a Civil Court

under Section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be

competent and maintainable.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the

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plea raised on behalf of the appellants that the three respondents, one

widow and her two major sons, could not have initiated proceedings

for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority. We have carefully

perused the two applications for eviction filed by the respondents. The

bonafide requirement pleaded is of the widow landlady, the

respondent no.1, who requires the suit premises for Govinda,

respondent no.2 for starting his business and that of another son

Hemant, the respondent no.3 for continuing the business which

presently he is carrying on in rented premises. Respondents 2 and 3

being major sons of the widow respondent no.1, such requirement

clearly falls also within the purview of Section 23-A (b) of the Act.

The proceedings initiated before R.C.A. do not suffer from want of

jurisdictional competence.

So far as the challenge to proof of requirement is concerned it

merits a summary dismissal. The Rent Controlling Authority

and the High Court, both, have on a meticulous evaluation of evidence

found the requirement proved. None of the landlords is possessed of

any other suitable alternative accommodation of his or her own to

satisfy the requirement found proved. A landlord cannot be

compelled to carry on business in rented premises and the proved

requirement cannot be defeated by the tenant submitting that the

landlord can start or comfortably continue to run his business in

rented premises. It has come in evidence that the landlords have

secured possession of some premises in Ahilyapura locality situated at

a short distance from the suit premises but the Ahilyapura

accommodation is again a tenanted accommodation and hence

irrelevant for defeating the claim of the landlords. To be an alternative

accommodation relevant within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) or

Section 23-A(b) it must be 'of his own', that is, the one 'owned' by

the landlord. Another alternative accommodation pointed out by the

tenant is the one situated on the first floor of the building. It has come

in the evidence that the second floor of the building is used for

residence of the landlords while the first floor is used partly as a

godown and partly for stitching the clothes which are sold as

readymade garments in the shop of respondent no.3. To amount to an

alternate non-residential accommodation so as to defeat the

requirement of the landlord for the suit premises, it should be

reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation. It should be

suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. In Shiv Sarup

Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court

has held that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the

claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in

comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is

seeking eviction. The availability of another accommodation, suitable

and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an

adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord if he

unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his

alleged need. The bona fides of the need of the landlord for the

premises or additional premises have to be determined by the Court

by applying objective standards and once the Court is satisfied of such

bona fides then in the matter of choosing out of more

accommodations than one available to the landlord, his subjective

choice shall be respected by the Court. For the business, which the

respondents no.2 and 3 propose to start or continue respectively, an

accommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to be an

alternative suitable accommodation in comparison with the shops

situated on the ground floor. A shop on the first floor cannot attract

the same number of customers and earn the same business as a shop

situated on the ground floor would do. Moreover, there is no evidence

adduced by the appellants to show that in M.T. Cloth market shops are

also situated on first floor of buildings and attract the same business as

the shops on ground floor do. The High Court and the R.C.A. have

held none of the premises pointed out by the tenant-appellants such

alternate accommodation as may defeat the respondents' claim. We

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find no reason to take a different view. Between the years 1987 and

1989 late Krishna Das, the then sole owner of the building, had sold

three shops but that was an event which had taken place in the life-

time of late Krishna Das and cannot have relevance for denying the

claim of the respondent-landlords filed in the year 1995.

For all the foregoing reasons we find the appeals devoid of any

merit and liable to be dismissed. They are dismissed with costs.

However, each of the appellants is allowed four months time for

vacating the suit premises subject to each of them clearing all arrears

of rent and filing usual undertaking, within a period of four weeks

from today.