IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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AT INDORE

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI

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SECOND APPEAL No. 1582 of 2025

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DHARMANAND @ DHANNALAL AND OTHERS

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Versus

YASHWANT AND OTHERS

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Appearance:

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Shri Ashish Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant.

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Reserved on : 28.11.2025

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Pronounced on : 19.01.2026

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JUDGMENT

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Heard on the question of admission.

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The appellants have preferred present appeal under Section 100 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC") being

aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 06.05.2025 passed by learned

Additional District Judge, Dr. Ambedkar Nagar, District Indore in RCA No.

10/2025 whereby judgment and decree dated 23.12.2024 passed by learned

Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dr. Ambedkar Nagar, District Indore in RCS A

No. 478-A/2018 partially dismissed the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiff,

has been affirmed and appeal filed by the appellants has been dismissed.

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Necessary facts for disposal of this appeal, in brief are that

the appellants/plaintiffs had purchased the land bearing Survey No. 84/1 area

2.223 hectare situated at Village Jafarabad, Tehsil Dr. Ambedkar Nagar,

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District Indore from the previous owner of the land namely Bheru Singh @

Bherulal S/o Moti Singh through a registered sale deed dated 04.07.1998.

The name of the appellants have also been recorded in the revenue records as

the landowner of the disputed land. To the West side of the land of Survey

No. 84/1, land of Survey No. 84/2 owned by respondent No. 1/defendant No.

1 Yashwant S/o Ratan Singh Yadav, is situated. On 01.08.2016, respondent

Nos. 1 & 2/defendant Nos. 1 & 2 submitted an application under Section 32

of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for brevity "MPLRC") before the

Court of Naib Tehsildar, Tappa Manpur, Tehsil Mhow, District Indore. In

this application, it was stated that Ratan Singh, father of respondent Nos. 1

and 2, had submitted an application under Section 131 of the MPLRC in

respect of the said land, which was registered as case No. 06-A/2013/1994-

95 and was considered a road upon Survey No. 84/1 vide order dated

15.03.1995. The said application was decided against the appellants in

absence of the appellants.

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Further, appellants preferred an appeal before SDO, Mhow, the

same was also dismissed vide order dated 13.04.2017. Against which, a

second appeal was filed before the Additional Commissioner, again, it was

dismissed vide order dated 02.01.2018. Thereafter, on presentation of

Revision Petition No. 1417/2018 by the appellants before Revenue Board,

Gwalior, the Revision Petition was also dismissed by the Revenue Board

vide order dated 03.04.2018.

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It was further pleaded that the Revenue Authorities passed the

order illegally without providing any opportunity to cross-examine the

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respondents and without investigating the existence of the alleged road.

Upon receiving a certified copy of the order dated 15.03.1995, passed in

Case No. 06/2013/1994-95, the appellants came to know that Bhairulal,

previous owner of the disputed land, had not signed any of the proceedings,

resulting in the proceedings being conducted in the absence of appellants. No

road exists on the south side of the disputed land, and a deep drain runs from

north to south at the said location. The respondents have been using the route

available from the Manpur-Jafrabad road through the land of another farmer,

Dhan Singh, to access the land, Survey No. 84/2. The respondents intended

to construct a new road in Survey No. 84/1. On 17.05.2018, respondent Nos.

1 & 2 threatened to seize possession of the disputed land. No road existed on

Survey No. 84/1. Therefore, this suit was filed by the appellants seeking a

declaration and permanent injunction that no road ever existed from Survey

No. 84/1, an area of 2.223 hectares, to survey No. 84/2.

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The respondents, have categorically denied the averments of the

plaint and have stated that the fathers of the appellants and respondents are

real brothers and members of the same family. Survey No. 84/1 and 84/2

were the land of the original Survey No. 84 and after the division of Survey

No. 84 between the fathers of the appellants and respondents, the land of

Survey No. 84/1 was received by the appellants and the land of Survey No.

84/2 was received by the respondents. There was a traditional customary path

from Survey number 84/1, which was stopped by the appellants' father

Bhairulal in the year 1994-95. After Bhairulal blocked the road, the

respondents' father Ratan Singh submitted an application under Section 131

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of MPLRC.

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The learned Trial Court, by judgment dated 23.12.2024,

dismissed the suit in favour of the respondent/defendants. Aggrieved thereby,

the appellants/plaintiffs preferred a first appeal, Civil Regular Appeal No.

10/2025. The First Appellate Court, by judgment dated 06.05.2025,

dismissed the appeal, held that the respondents have not interfere in the

path/road owned by the appellants and affirmed the findings of the Trial

Court.

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Being aggrieved by the concurrent findings and judgments passed

by the Courts below, the appellants/plaintiffs have preferred the present

Second Appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings of the

learned Courts below were incorrect in the eyes of law and facts. He also

submitted that the Trial Court and Appellate Court has not property

considered the fact that no path of any kind ever existed on the land in

question. Learned Court below has committed a serious error in dismissing

the suit of the appellants by going against the said document in Ex. P/3 and

P/4, which was related to the dispute regarding the path in the same disputed

land. It was proved that the respondents No. 1 and 2 were trying to forcibly

make a new road illegally on the agricultural land situated at Survey No.

84/1 in village Jafarabad Tehsil, Mhow, in the evidence filed by the

appellants and the as well as Appellate Court also serious error in passing the

judgment and decree against the appellants. There is a public road from north

to south of the land of Survey No. 84/1 measuring 2.223 hectares and that a

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culvert has been constructed on the said road at the corner of the south and

west side of the disputed land, in which the water of the road flows towards

west from under the culvert and a drain has been constructed under the said

proceedings, hence, proceedings were conducted in absence of appellants.

He further submitted that learned trial Court has committed a serious error in

passing the impugned order by arbitrarily interpreting the evidence presented

by the appellant and not believing the evidence filed by the appellants. On

the aforementioned grounds, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed

by setting aside the impugned order.

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Having heard the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

appellant, I have perused the record.

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The Second Appeal is filed under the provisions of Section 100 of CPC

which provides that Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court if it is satisfied

that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 101 of CPC provides that

no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100 of CPC.

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At the outset the question of entertaining the second appeal is required to

be considered. On this aspect the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal

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Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB

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, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 216

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has held as

under:-

“16.

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Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation

of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the

order of the court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance,

acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by

the legislature and conferring a court or authority with jurisdiction, is a

legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be

regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance

with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore,

the court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in

the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on

equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is

something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The Court cannot

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entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved,

as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of

fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a

substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the

second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained.

The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the

exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the

obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not

to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam

Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v. Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai

Ammal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal; P.

Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh; V.

Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran and Bhag Singh v. Jaskirat Singh.)

17.

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In

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Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

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v.

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Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 798,

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this Court observed :

“ 12. … it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised

in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could

be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in subsection (5) of

Section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be ‘satisfied’ that

the case involves a ‘substantial question of law’ and not a mere ‘question

of law’. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be

raised, should be ‘recorded’ by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on

compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or

proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be

alleged at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of

law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be

recorded.” [ Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5

SCC 438, pp. 445- 46, para 10].

18.

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In Madamanchi Ramappa

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v.

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Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC

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1633,

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this Court observed:-

“ 12. … Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a

second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual

manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed

by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give

effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court

dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it

regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the

findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is

necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice

according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however

important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the

law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court

contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably

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introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability

which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which

judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.”

19.

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In Jai Singh

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v.

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Shakuntala, AIR 2002

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SC 1428,

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this Court held as

under:

“ 6. … it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that

the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible — it is a

rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded

that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can

only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper

circumspection.”

Further Hon'ble Apex Court endorsing its another judgment pen down as

under:

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In

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Kulwant Kaur

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v.

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Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs & Ors., AIR

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2001 SC 1273,

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this Court observed as under:-

“ 34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the

exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is

concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite

objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we

are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a

second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be

disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong

test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there

is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view

will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only

in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and

the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-

vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is

a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a

categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity.

… The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it

will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity

will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed

above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question

of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that

effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that

Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.”

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In view of the aforesaid principle settled by Hon'ble Apex Court, every

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question of law could not be permitted to be raised in Second Appeal, there ought to

be substantial question of law for entertaining such appeal and such appeal is

entertainable in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity. It is a rarity rather

then regularity but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and

on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of

perversity involved therein, then Second Appeal should be entertained. In other

words, perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication. Here in this

appeal, it is to be seen as to whether any perversity was committed by the Courts

below and as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this Second

Appeal?

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So far as the 'perversity' is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of

Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi and others

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reported in (2016) SCC 78

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has held as under

:-

"8. ‘Perversity’ has been the subject matter of umpteen number of

decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this

Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil

Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are

based on evidence or are perverse.

9. In Krishnan v. Backiam and another

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[2207 INSC 908]

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, it has been held

at paragraph-11 that:

“11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section

96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal

under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded

by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings

of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on

the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse,

but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by

the High Court to that effect. …”

10. In Gurvachan Kaur vs. Salikram (Dead) through Lrs. [

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2010 (15) SCC

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530]

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this principle has been reiterated:

"It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact

recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless

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the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held

that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact

recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-

tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and default

committed by the latter in payment of rent."

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Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai Vs. Seethamma

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Hengsu Dead by L.R.s

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and others

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reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521

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has again held as

under :

" 2...But the High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 CPC

cannot interfere with the erroneous finding of fact howsoever the gross

error seems to be...."

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Further in this context, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Gurdev

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Kaur vs. Kaki

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reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546

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,

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has held as under :.

" 46. In Bholaram v. Amirchand (1981) 2 SCC 414

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a three- Judge Bench

of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however,

seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the

ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were

given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record

particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main

reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the

findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but

that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of

a clear error of law.

47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [(1997) 5 SCC

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438]

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, a three judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court

should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and

not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised

should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial

questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and

proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty

cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved

in the case even at the initial stage.

48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba

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Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2 SCC 471

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. The

Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section

100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to

be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second

appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of the such duly

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framed substantial questions of law.

49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can

exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of

substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of

admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and

decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law.

The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by

the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court,

some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar

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Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand

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(1998) 6

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SCC 683

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that the judgment rendered by the High Court under Section

100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained.

On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed.

50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly

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(1999) 6 SCC 35

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the Court has

observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law

while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set

aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC

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713 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari

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(2001) 3 SCC 179

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the

Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to

hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of

law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj

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and Anr. v. Muthamma

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(2001) 6 SCC 279

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. A statement of law has been

reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second

appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs.

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(2001) 3 SCC 179

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, another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly

delineated the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. The Court observed that an

obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of

appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which

the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it

was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a

substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has

then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word

substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance,

essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be

understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no

substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that

the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question

of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done

in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article

133(1) (a) of the Constitution.

52. In Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram

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(2001) 5 SCC 311

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the

Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first

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appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no

substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding.

53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil

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[(2004) 5 SCC 762],

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this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section

100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The

Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was

not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear

intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same.

This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the

lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second

appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence

merely on the ground that another view was possible.

54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave

petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with

findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court. This Court observed that to

say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the

obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the

legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further

observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own

findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another

view was possible.

55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commissioner, Hindu

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Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama

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[(2005) 9 SCC

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232]

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that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere

with the finding of facts.

56. Again, this Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [(2005)

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10 SCC 139

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] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not

justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court

observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope

of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

57. Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai [(2005) 10 SCC

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553],

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this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in

interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it

is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in

recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High

Court to upset the same.

58. Again, in the case of Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh [(2005) 12 SCC

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270],

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this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no

jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first

appellate court. In this case, the findings of the Trial Court and the lower

Appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part

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of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction

under Section 100 C.P.C.. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of

the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in

interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts

below.

59. In the case of H. P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa

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[(2006) 2 SCC 496]

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delivered

on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High

Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of

jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the

Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with

the judgments of the Courts below is confined to hearing of substantial

questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is

not warranted if it invokes reappreciation of evidence. This Court found

that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed

to be set aside.

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With regard to fact findings of trial Court as well as the appellate Court

in order to frame substantial question law in second appeal, the following view of the

Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai

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Sopan Gujar; (1999) 3 SCC 722

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, is condign to quote here under:-

"5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds

on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the

first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not

ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of

credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the

trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it

is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing

so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are

possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High

Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible.

The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first

appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower

appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions

of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements

made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or

arrived at without evidence.

6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already

decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy

Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely

wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a

substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or

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is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual

format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a

substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the

facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents

of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law.

But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction

which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal,

treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court

is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be

termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in

second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind

Morey [AIR 1976 SC 830]held that whether the trial court should not have

exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying

interference"

13.

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In this regard, in the case of

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Laxmidevamma v. Ranganath; (2015) 4 SCC

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264

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, again the Apex court has held as under:-

"16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have

recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established

their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of

fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was

no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High

Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A

schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right

and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs'

right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC,

concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the

findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the

High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by

the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the

judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained."

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So also the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others Vs.

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Bhimappa & Others; (2017) 9 SCC 586

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has held as under:-

"17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire

evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their

case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts

recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law

much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court.

18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor

against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are

13 SA-1582-2025

also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded

by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though

concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial

conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court."

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In the present case, learned trial Court has found that no access road

has ever existed from the land owned by the appellants/plaintiffs bearing

Survey No. 84/1, admeasuring 2.223 hectares, situated at Village Jafrabad,

Tehsil Mhow, District Indore to Survey No. 84/2. Whereas, the appellants

paid sufficient Court fees. That apart, it is also found that the cause of action

arose after filing of an application under Section 32 of MPLRC by the

respondents against the appellants before Naib Tehsildar on 01.08.2016 and

on the said application, order was passed against the appellants. Against

which, an appeal was also preferred, the same has also been dismissed.

Thereafter, a suit was filed before Trial Court seeking relief of an injunction.

Therefore, the appellants'/plaintiffs' attempt to use and enjoy the path

through the appellants'/plaintiffs' land appears to have given them cause of

action to file the present suit. The findings of facts arrived by the Trial Court on

the relevant issues, have been confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The learned

Trial Court as well as the learned Appellate Court have discussed the oral and

documentary evidence in proper perspective of law and thereafter as per the

concurrent findings, it is conclusively established that the appellants'/plaintiffs'

attempt to use and enjoy the path through the land in question appears to

have given them cause of action to file the present suit.

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In upshot of the aforesaid proposition of law, having examined

the facts and circumstances of the case in this second appeal, it stands that no

access road ever existed from Survey No. 84/1 to Survey No. 84/2. The

14 SA-1582-2025

(ALOK AWASTHI)

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JUDGE

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cause of action arose only after the respondents initiated proceedings under

Section 32 of MPLRC and obtained an order against the appellants, which

was upheld in appeal. Consequently, suit for injunction was founded solely

on the appellants’ attempt to use a non-existent pathway/road through the

disputed land. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that no perverse

finding was rendered by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.

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Accordingly, this Court is of the view that concurrent findings of

trial Court as well as appellate Court do not warrant any interference and in

the result thereof, this Second Appeal is hereby dismissed

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Vindesh

15 SA-1582-2025