No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
12A.BA.2350.2024+.doc
HARSHADA H. SAWANT
(P.A.)
ININ THETHE HIGHHIGH COURTCOURT OFOF JUDICATUREJUDICATURE ATAT BOMBAYBOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION NO.2350 OF 2024
Dheeraj Wadhawan ..Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. ..Respondents
WITH
BAIL APPLICATION NO.2347 OF 2024
Kapil Wadhawan ..Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. ..Respondents
....................
Mr. Amit Desai, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Gopalkrishna Shenoy,
Mr. Kushal Mor, Ms. Pooja Kothari, Ms. Janaki Garde and Mr.
Raghav Dharmadhikari, Advocate i/by M/s. Rashmikant and
Partners for Applicant in both Bail Applications.
Mr. H.S. Venegavkar a/w Mr. Aayush Kedia and Ms. Diksha
Ramnani, Advocates for Respondent No.1 – ED.
Mr. H. J. Dedhia, APP for Respondent No.2 – State.
...................
CORAM:MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE:FEBRUARY 12, 2025
JUDGEMENT :
1. Heard Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate for Applicants;
Mr. Venegavkar, learned Advocate for Respondent – ED and Mr.
Dedhia, learned Advocate for Respondent – State.
2. The twin Bail Applications have been filed under Section
436-A read with Sections 439 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) seeking Bail in connection with ECIR/MBZO-
I/03/2020 dated 07.03.2020 registered with Central Bureau of
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Investigation (‘CBI’), EO-I, New Delhi for offences punishable under
Sections 120-B read with 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
‘IPC’) and Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
(for short ‘PMLA’). There are in all 36 accused in the matter and
Applicants before me are arraigned as Accused Nos.9 and 10 in the
crime incarcerated since 14.05.2020 i.e. almost 4 years 9 months.
Since facts are common as also charges qua both accused arising out of
the same ECIR, both Applications are disposed of by this common
order.
3. Briefly stated on 07.03.2020 CBI filed FIR bearing No. RC
219 of 2020 E0004 for offences under Sections 120-B read with 420 of
the IPC and on the basis of that FIR, on the same date i.e. 07.03.2020
Directorate of Enforcement (‘ED’) registered ECIR/MBZO- I/03/2020
under Section 3 of the PMLA. On 14.05.2020, Applicants were
arrested by the ED in connection with ECIR/MBZO- I/03/2020.
3.1. On 13.07.2020 Applicants filed Applications for default bail
under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. before the Special Court
established under the PMLA (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA Court’)
and on the same date ED filed 1
st
supplementary prosecution complaint
before the PMLA Court,
inter alia, against present Applicants before
stating that investigation was completed with respect to the properties
mentioned in the principal complaint and investigation with respect to
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other properties / transactions / persons / entities was underway.
3.2. By order dated 14.07.2020 the PMLA Court rejected
Applicants’ Application for default bail which was assailed by the
Applicants before this Court and this Court by order dated 20.08.2020
granted default bail to the Applicants. The Order dated 20.08.2020
was challenged by the ED before the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court stayed the operation of order dated 20.08.2020 pending the
Appeals.
3.3. On 14.03.2022 ED filed 2
nd
supplementary prosecution
complaint citing pendency of investigation in respect of other
properties / transaction / persons/ entities and the 3
rd
supplementary
prosecution complaint was filed by ED on 05.08.2022 keeping open
further investigation in respect of other properties / transaction /
persons/ entities. In this complaint, ED has relied upon the evidence of
total 51 witnesses.
3.4. By order dated 10.05.2023 passed by the Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal Nos.701-702 of 2020 Applicants were granted interim
bail for a period of 3 months initially and the same has been extended
from time to time.
3.5. On 20.07.2023 ED filed draft charges before the PMLA
Court.
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3.6. On 13.11.2023 Applicants filed Bail Application under
Section 436-A of the CrPC before the PMLA Court which was rejected
by the PMLA Court by its order dated 10.05.2024. Hence the
Applicants are before this Court seeking Bail under Section 436-A of
the CrPC.
4. Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate for the Applicants has
streamlined his submissions under three main grounds. Firstly, Mr.
Desai has argued that the maximum punishment which can be
imposed on Applicants upon conviction is 7 years however Applicants
have already undergone pre-trial incarceration of almost a period of 4
years and 9 months. He would submit that it is a settled position of
law that Section 436-A of the CrPC
1
recognising the constitutional right
to speedy trial of the accused – undertrial emanating from Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. He would submit that the same is equally
applicable to offences under the PMLA as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs. Union of India
2
.
4.1. Next Mr. Desai would submit that the PMLA Court has
completely ignored the intent behind the incorporation of Section 436-
A of CrPC and applied the proviso to the said Section to deny the
statutory relief to present Applicants when the trial has not
commenced. He would submit that the PMLA Court ought to have
1 Inserted in the Code by CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005)
2 2022 SCC OnLine 929
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considered the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) and this Court in the case of Sarang
Wadhawan @ Rakesh Kumar Wadhawan
3
in its true essence and
granted bail to the present Applicants.
4.2. Lastly on the count of delay on part of present Applicants, he
would submit that admittedly as per the 3
rd
supplementary prosecution
complaint dated 05.08.2022 filed by ED investigation is still pending
and till date there is no statement or intimation made by ED that
investigation is completed. He would therefore submit it is the
responsibility of the investigating agency and the state machinery to
ensure that the trial commences expeditiously. He would submit that
the PMLA Court in order dated 26.03.2024 passed below Exhibit 586
in the present case has observed that the trial in the matter is yet to
begin and there is no likelihood of the trial to commence in future in
view of Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA. He has also drawn my attention
to the order dated 06.02.2025 passed by the PMLA Court below
Exhibit 688 wherein in paragraph No.3 thereof the Court has observed
that it would take time for the trial to commence. He would therefore
submit that the delay in commencement of the trial cannot and should
not be attributed to the Applicants as the same is completely contrary
to the well-settled principles of law and natural justice.
3 Bail Application Nos.3377/2023 and 3867/2023
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4.3. He would submit that all accused except the present
Applicants are on bail and hence considering the pre-trial incarceration
of the Applicants of more than one-half of the maximum imprisonment
specified for the offence coupled with the slow progress of the trial,
this Court should enlarge the Applicants on bail considering the
provisions of Section 436-A of CrPC.
5. Mr. Venegavkar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
Respondent No.1 – Directorate of Enforcement would forcefully refute
the contention of Mr. Desai. He would submit that the Application is
liable to be rejected since considerable period of the delay would be
attributable to Applicants’ conduct itself. He would elaborate on his
contention by submitting that Applicants strategically kept their bail
applications pending before the PMLA Court for a period of more than
one year. He would draw my attention to the Affidavit-in-reply dated
25.07.2024 on behalf of Respondent No.1 - ED and more particularly
in paragraph Nos. 2.7 to 2.17 containing details of various Applications
filed by the Applicants seeking various interim reliefs during their
period of custody thus delaying the trial. He would submit that the
progress of trial before the PMLA Court is significantly impacted due to
these very pending applications as highlighted before the higher
courts. He would therefore submit that the time spent in prosecuting
these applications should not be included while computing the
‘one-
half of maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence”
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provided under Section 436-A of CrPC in the facts of the present case.
In support of his submissions, he would refer to the
orbiter dicta of the
Supreme Court in the case of
In Re 122 Prisoners
4 which reads thus:-
“9. It is also provided under Section 436-A of the Code that no
person shall in any case be detained during the period of
investigation inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period
of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law. In
computing the period of detention under this section for
granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in
proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded. Yet, as per
the first proviso to section 436-A, the court may order continued
detention of a person for a period longer than one-half of the
said period or release him on bail, instead of the personal bond
with or without sureties, after hearing the Public Prosecutor,
and for reason to be recorded by the court in writing.”
5.1. He would submit that the provision of Section 436-A do not
provide an absolute right of bail like default bail under Section 167 of
CrPC and the Court adjudicating Bail Application based on the ground
of Section 436-A reserves the authority to deny the relief if trial is
being delayed at the instance of Applicant himself. In support of this
submissions he would refer to and rely on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). He would
submit that although the maximum period of punishment prescribed
under the law for the relevant offence is 7 years out of which
Applicants have been incarcerated for a period of about 5 years
(thereby making it a case for consideration under 436-A) but the
peculiar facts of the case and more particularly Applicants themselves
having filed several Interim Applications before various forums should
4 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 691
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be considered a ground for delay while deciding the present
Applications. He would submit that when the said period is accounted
for and reconciled, the period of incarceration of Applicants falls below
the threshold of 3 and half years and therefore provisions of Section
436-A would be squarely inapplicable. He would submit that filing of
interim Applications is a strategy based on the belief of ‘Judicial
Gamble’ where the accused, especially ones hailing from financially
strong backgrounds make attempts to exhaust all chances available at
their disposal with an endeavor to secure their liberty. He would
submit that although there cannot be any legislation to restrict
individuals from availing their legal remedies, Courts have adopted the
approach of imposing costs on such vexatious proceedings when
determined. He would argue that when liberty is at stake and in such
grave economic offences as the present one where pockets are filled
with embezzled funds, costs are not a deterrent to such accused
persons. He would submit that hence economic offences should be
dealt with on a different footing than other offences while granting
bail. In support of his submissions he would draw my attention to
paragraph Nos.34 and 35 in decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI
5
which read thus:-
“
34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be
visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The
economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and
involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously
5(2013) 7 SCC 439
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and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the
country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the
financial health of the country.
35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof,
the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the
character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to
the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public/State and other similar considerations.”
5.2. Next, he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of
State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji
Porwal
6
wherein the Supreme Court while considering the long term
ramifications of economic offences laid down basis for distinct
treatment of such offender. Paragraph No.5 therein reads thus:-
“
5. ….. The entire community is aggrieved if the economic
offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to
book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon
passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with
cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal
profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A
disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested
only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the
community in the system to administer justice in an even-
handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters
which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful
of the damage done to the national economy and national
interest……”
5.3. He has next drawn my attention to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of
Nimmagadda Prasad Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation
7
wherein in paragraph Nos.24 and 25 the Supreme
Court has observed as under:-
6 (1987) 2 SCC 364
7 AIR 2013 SC 2821
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“24. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will
entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of
the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be
kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the
legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to
whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that
the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in
support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have
the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be
visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The
economic offence having deep-rooted conspiracies and
involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously
and considered as a grave offence affecting the economy of the
country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the
financial health of the country.”
5.4. In view of the above, he would submit that in that view of
the foregoing submissions, courts should not be liberal in calculating
the period of incarceration since such a practice would open floodgates
for litigation across forums of the country and practically cut the
sentence of each offence in half. He would thus pray for both the
Applications to be rejected.
6. Mr. Dedhia, learned APP appearing for the Respondent No.2
– State has adopted and supported the submissions made by Mr.
Venegavkar and urged the Court to reject both Applications.
7. The relevant applicable statutory provision in the present
case i.e. Section 436-A of CrPC reads thus:-
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“436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can
be detained -
Where a person has, during the period of investigation,
inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not
being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone
detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum
period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that
law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with
or without sureties;
Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public
Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order
the continued detention of such person for a period longer than
one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the
personal bond with or without sureties;
Provided further that no such person shall in any case be
detained during the period of investigation inquiry or trial for
more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for
the said offence under that law.”
8. As the offence invoked in the present case is under Section 3
of the PMLA, it will be appropriate to refer to provisions of Section 45
of PMLA which read thus:-
“
45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. -
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an
offence under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless -
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who is under the age of sixteen
years or is a woman or is sick or infirm or is accused either on
his own or along with other co-accused of money-laundering a
sum of less than one crore rupees may be released on bail, if
the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take
cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except
upon a complaint in writing made by-
(i) the Director; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government or State
Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central
Government by a general or a special order made in this behalf
by that Government.
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(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of
this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under
this Act unless specifically authorised, by the Central
Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed.
(2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in [***] of sub-
section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the
time being in force on granting of bail.”
9. Considering the above twin provisions, it will be fruitful to
refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary (supra) wherein in paragraph Nos. 316 to 322
the Supreme Court has observed that Section 436-A having come into
force on 23.06.2006 which is subsequent to the enactment of PMLA
will prevail and apply despite rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA.
Paragraphs Nos. 316 to 322 read thus:-
“
316. As a result, we have no hesitation in observing that in
whatever form the relief is couched including the nature of
proceedings, be it under Section 438 of the 1973 Code or for
that matter, by invoking the jurisdiction of the constitutional
court, the underlying principles and rigours of Section 45 of the
2002 Act must come into play and without exception ought to
be reckoned to uphold the objectives of the 2002 Act, which is a
special legislation providing for stringent regulatory measures
for combating the menace of money laundering.
317. There is, however, an exception carved out to the
strict compliance of the twin conditions in the form of Section
436-A of the 1973 Code, which has come into being on 23-6-
2006 vide Act 25 of 2005. This, being the subsequent law
enacted by Parliament, must prevail. Section 436-A of the 1973
Code reads as under:
“
[Inserted by Act 25 of 2005, Section 36 (w.e.f. 23-6-
2006).] [
436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial
prisoner can be detained.—Where a person has, during the
period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of
an offence under any law (not being an offence for which
the punishment of death has been specified as one of the
punishments under that law) undergone detention for a
period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of
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imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he
shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or
without sureties:
Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public
Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing,
order the continued detention of such person for a period
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on
bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:
Provided further that no such person shall in any case be
detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial
for more than the maximum period of imprisonment
provided for the said offence under that law.
Explanation.—In computing the period of detention under
this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed
due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be
excluded.]”
318. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was
stated thus:
“There had been instances, where undertrial prisoners
were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum
period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. As
remedial measure Section 436-A has been inserted to
provide that where an undertrial prisoner other than the
one accused of an offence for which death has been
prescribed as one of the punishments, has been under
detention for a period extending to one-half of the
maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged
offence, he should be released on his personal bond, with
or without sureties. It has also been provided that in no
case will an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the
maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be
convicted for the alleged offence.”
319. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar [Hussainara
Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri)
40], this Court stated that the right to speedy trial is one of the
facets of Article 21 and recognised the right to speedy trial as a
fundamental right. This dictum has been consistently followed
by this Court in several cases. Parliament in its wisdom
inserted Section 436-A under the 1973 Code recognising the
deteriorating state of undertrial prisoners so as to provide them
with a remedy in case of unjustified detention.
320. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing
Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India [Supreme Court Legal
Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39], the Court,
relying on Hussainara Khatoon [Hussainara Khatoon v. State of
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Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40], directed the
release of prisoners charged under the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act after completion of one-half of the
maximum term prescribed under the Act. The Court issued
such direction after taking into account the non obstante
provision of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposed the
rigours of twin conditions for release on bail. It was observed :
(Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial
Prisoners case [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India, (1994) 6
SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , SCC pp. 747-48, para 15)
“15. … We are conscious of the statutory provision finding
place in Section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions
which have to be satisfied before a person accused of an
offence under the Act can be released. Indeed we have
adverted to this section in the earlier part of the judgment.
We have also kept in mind the interpretation placed on a
similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by the
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab
[Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994
SCC (Cri) 899]. Despite this provision, we have directed as
above mainly at the call of Article 21 as the right to speedy
trial may even require in some cases quashing of a criminal
proceeding altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93], release on bail, which can be taken to be
embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases
be the demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to
accept the extreme submission of quashing the proceedings
and setting free the accused whose trials have been delayed
beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded to, we
have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without
ensuring speedy trial would also not be in consonance with
the right guaranteed by Article 21. Of course, some amount
of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in such
cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial
becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21
would receive a jolt. It is because of this that we have felt
that after the accused persons have suffered imprisonment
which is half of the maximum punishment provided for the
offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would
be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article
21, which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by
Article 14 which also promises justness, fairness and
reasonableness in procedural matters.”
321. The Union of India also recognised the right to
speedy trial and access to justice as fundamental right in their
written submissions and, thus, submitted that in a limited
situation right of bail can be granted in case of violation of
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Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it is to be noted that
Section 436-A of the 1973 Code was inserted after the
enactment of the 2002 Act. Thus, it would not be appropriate
to deny the relief of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code which is a
wholesome provision beneficial to a person accused under the
2002 Act. However, Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, does not
provide for an absolute right of bail as in the case of default
bail under Section 167 of the 1973 Code. For, in the fact
situation of a case, the court may still deny the relief owing to
ground, such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of
the accused himself.
322. Be that as it may, in our opinion, this provision is
comparable with the statutory bail provision or, so to say, the
default bail, to be granted in terms of Section 167 of the 1973
Code consequent to failure of the investigating agency to file
the charge-sheet within the statutory period and, in the context
of the 2002 Act, complaint within the specified period after
arrest of the person concerned. In the case of Section 167 of
the 1973 Code, an indefeasible right is triggered in favour of
the accused the moment the investigating agency commits
default in filing the charge-sheet/complaint within the
statutory period. The provision in the form of Section 436-A of
the 1973 Code, as has now come into being is in recognition of
the constitutional right of the accused regarding speedy trial
under Article 21 of the Constitution. For, it is a sanguine hope
of every accused, who is in custody in particular, that he/she
should be tried expeditiously — so as to uphold the tenets of
speedy justice. If the trial cannot proceed even after the
accused has undergone one-half of the maximum period of
imprisonment provided by law, there is no reason to deny him
this lesser relief of considering his prayer for release on bail or
bond, as the case may be, with appropriate conditions,
including to secure his/her presence during the trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. The right to bail has been effectively summarised as far back
as in the year 1923 in the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the
case of
In Re: Nagendra Nath Chakravarti
8
by stating that the principal
object of bail is to secure the attendance of the Accused at the trial.
11. It is settled law by a plethora of cases passed by the Supreme
Court that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in
81923 SCC OnLine Cal 318
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mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the
Accused is likely to appear before the Court for trial. Though there
would be consideration for the other broad parameters like gravity of
offence, likelihood of Accused repeating the offence while on bail,
whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the
evidence which will have to be considered. However juxtaposed that
with the fact that almost 4 years 9 months of incarceration and trial
having not commenced is required to be seen especially when trial has
indeed not commenced.
12. Argued before me is the case of the Applicants concerning
their right to speedy justice and liberty who are undertrial - accused
having been incarcerated almost 4 years 9 months, a situation
impacting their right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of
India to speedy justice as also personal liberty further extended by the
provisions of Section 436-A. In so far as the power of High Court to
grant bail is concerned, the Allahabad High Court as far back as in the
year 1931 in the famous Meerut Conspiracy case of Emperor Vs. H. L.
Hutchinson
9
laid down that when the case involves a question of
personal liberty of an under-trial who is incarcerated for a very long
period, the powers of the Court are wide and unfettered by the
conditions and the principle rule being that bail is the rule and refusal
is the exception should be applied. In that said case, it held that
9AIR 1931 ALL 356.
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legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session
discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls
all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must
be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that
accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to
defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is
the Rule and refusal is an exception. Justice Mukerji writing the
judgment for himself and on behalf of Justice Boys in paragraph No.9
of the aforesaid decision observed thus:-
“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the
High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason
for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek.
The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it
goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of
justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the
defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an
attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes.”
13. The above judgment is approved by the Supreme Court in
the case of
Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
10
and in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court has considered the
prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail,
principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well
recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail
jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of
10(2022) 10 SCC 51
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India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the said judgement read as under:-
“Prevailing situation
6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The
statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd
of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of
this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to
be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being
charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They
are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women.
Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of
them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the
mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the
investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a
draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus
to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an
impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually
opposite to each other.
Definition of trial
7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the
Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the
purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of
investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would
obviously be different between these two stages. In the former
stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted
for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters
substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a
trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence
to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards
enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among
other factors.
8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as
a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on
suspension of sentence.
Definition of bail
9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though
is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a
personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an
accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police
or by the investigating agency.
10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect
while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it
is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the
suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and
the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 9
th
Edn., p. 160 as:
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“A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required
by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in
court at a future time.”
11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14
th
Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:
“to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on
security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a
place certain, which security is called bail, because the
party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of
those who bind themselves or become bail for his due
appearance when required, in order that he may be safely
protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his
escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.”
Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
has been well recognised through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh
Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.
Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] ,
held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)
“19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab
[Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is
set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88,
paras 27-30)
‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that
right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right
to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that
as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In
re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC
OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-
80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance
of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question whether bail
should be granted or refused is whether it is
probable that the party will appear to take his trial
and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,
significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases”
observations are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N.
Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor,
1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was
observed, while dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code,
that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the
High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
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not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding
Section 497 which corresponds to the present
Section 437. It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle
governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be
exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson
[Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All
14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that
it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which will bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the court unfettered. According
to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases
and to say that in particular classes a bail may be
granted but not in other classes. It was observed that
the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. As a
presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his
own case. A presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
“1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty,
justice, public safety and burden of the public
treasury, all of which insist that a developed
jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially
sensitised judicial process. … After all, personal
liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of
“procedure established by law”. The last four
words of Article 21 are the life of that human
right.”
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
129, para 29)
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“29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula
in the matter of granting bail. The facts and
circumstances of each case will govern the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail.”
30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8,
p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
“Where the granting of bail lies within the
discretion of the court, the granting or denial
is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Since
the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the accused is to secure his appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction and the
judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is
whether a recognizance or bond would effect
that end.”
It is thus clear that the question whether to
grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a
variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated
as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’
* * *
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the
rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India
and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental
Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be
suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a
vast number of substantive and procedural rights post
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .”
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay
Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras
21-23)
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
the appearance of the accused person at his trial by
reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
that an accused person will stand his trial when called
upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
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principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that
every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and
duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that
detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a
cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity
demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in
custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial
but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this
country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of
personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon
which, he has not been convicted or that in any
circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon
only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left
at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the
object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be improper for any court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
Presumption of innocence
14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed
through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to
prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to
satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and
enlargement on bail is to be denied.
15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged
throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge
the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law,
until the individual is proven guilty.”
14. The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the
case of
Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High
Court of Andhra Pradesh
11
observed as under:-
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must revolve.
111978 (1) SCC 240
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When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to
incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are
concerned with the penultimate stage and the principal rule to
guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the
applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve
sentence in the event of the court punishing him with
imprisonment. In this perspective…” (emphasis supplied)
15. Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements
have discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and
that such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is
reasonable and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in
trial it would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial. Some of
the important decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the High
Courts are discussed herein under:-
15.1. In the landmark judgement of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of
India
12
, the Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but
includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the
procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it
cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.
15.2. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of
Bihar
13
the Supreme Court held as under:-
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
person of liberty cannot “reasonable, fair or just” unless that
procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt
of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
121978 (1) SCC 248
13(1980) 1 SCC 81
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reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or
just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be
no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what would
be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21.”
15.3.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shaheen Welfare
Association Vs. Union Of India
14
dealing with a Public Interest
Litigation seeking relief for under-trial prisoners charged under the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 due to gross
delay in disposal of cases qua Article 21 of the Constitution of India
held as under:-
“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to
protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in
Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such
stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the
crime, as was held in Kartar Singh’s case (supra), on the
presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without
undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases
when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible
situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.”
15.4.
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A.
Najeeb
15
while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of
trial and extended incarceration held as under:-
“18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact
that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a
serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the
respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the
14 1996 SCC (2) 616
15 Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2021
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period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial
being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have
been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right
to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond
any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights
guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well
protected.”
16. Applicants in present case are in custody since 4 years 9
months. There is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near
future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period
further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from
Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I deem it appropriate to
list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on
concerns underlying the “Right to speedy trial” from the point of view
of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of
Abdul
Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.
16
the Supreme Court
held as under:-
“86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that
these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all
situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.
These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of
the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The
fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves
the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right
of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible
in the circumstances.
(2) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses
all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has
161992 (1) SCC 225
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understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted
view.
(3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the
point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be
as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be
subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to
his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation
and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation,
inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of
the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
(4) – (11) -------x-------” (emphasis supplied)
17. The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgements
and orders that in situations where the under-trial-prisoner / accused
persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for a
considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being
completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can
exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the
rule and jail is the exception.
18. In the case of
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
(Representing undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India
17
, the Supreme
Court has held that:-
“17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug
trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent
punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities
do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot
be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be
languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of
acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided for
under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is
17(1995) 4 SCC 695
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bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore,
have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of
Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by
Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on
bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and
B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial improvement in
the pendency is shown since new cases continue to pour in, and,
therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to place
the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State
Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial
Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two
other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been
in jail for long including those released under this order and to
recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve
withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public
Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This
will not only. help reduce the pendency but will also increase
the credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to
this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases
of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on
account of their inability to furnish bail.”
19. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Anr.
18
, the Supreme Court while granting bail to
accused incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as
under:-
“16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when
dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is
committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the
offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and
economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental
neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted
with indigence or other privations.
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or
any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article
18(2024) 9 SCC 813
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21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.”
20. In the case of
Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.
19
,
in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court
granted bail to the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing
unlikelihood of completion of trial in the near future as also on parity
with the co-accused.
21. In this regard, support is also drawn from the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation
20
wherein the Supreme Court has held that in economic
offences while considering an application for bail, the nature of charge
may be relevant but at the same the punishment to which the party
may be liable, if convicted is also a significant aspect and therefore
both, the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment
should be taken into consideration for arriving at decision of grant of
bail. It further observed that deprivation of liberty must be considered
a punishment unless it is absolutely necessary in the interest of justice
and that object of bail is merely to secure appearance of accused at the
trial.
22. In the present case it is seen that Applicants have been
indicted in the predicate offence under Section 120-B read with 420 of
the IPC for which the maximum sentence which can be imposed is
19SLP (Crl.) No.8523 of 2024
20 (2012) 1 SCC 40
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imprisonment which may extend to 7 years alongwith fine. Even
otherwise as the scheduled offence against Applicants falls under
paragraph 1 of part A of the schedule to the PMLA, the maximum
period for which the Applicants can be punished with imprisonment of
7 years. Applicants have been in custody in connection with the
present offence since 14.05.2020 i.e. for almost 4 years and 9 months
which is beyond the one-half of maximum period of imprisonment
which can be imposed upon conviction.
23. In so far as the delay in conducting the trial is concerned,
Applicants have placed before me the roznama of the trial in the PMLA
Court which clarifies that Applicants have sought adjournments on
only few occasions and hence the delay in trial cannot be solely
attributed to them when admittedly ED has filed draft charges before
the PMLA Court only on 10.05.2023 despite which charges have not
been framed till date. There are in all 36 accused involved in the
matter and as per the 3
rd
supplementary prosecution complaint there
are total 51 witnesses in the case.
24. It is seen that statutory provisions of Section 436-A of CrPC if
seen contain the word “shall” which clearly indicates that gravity of the
offence is not relevant for considering bail neither it distinguishes that
rigours of Section 45 of PMLA would be applicable. It is plain and
simple on interpretation meaning that once the undertrial – accused
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crosses one-half of the maximum sentence, the rigours of the twin
conditions contemplated under Section 45(1) of PMLA would not
apply and applicant will be entitled to be released on bail. It is a
statutory provision which has to be read as it is without any fetter and
must be applied based on applicable facts. Only if the Court feels that
further incarceration of the undertrial – accused is required beyond the
said period, the Court will have to give appropriate reasons. In the
facts of this case in my opinion due to the observations made herein
above, further incarceration of Applicants is not required and they are
entitled to bail under Section 436-A of Cr.P.C. without entering into
the merits of the case at this stage.
25. Considering the present status of the trial and no possibility
of it being concluded in the foreseeable future coupled with the pre-
trial incarceration of the Applicants beyond one-half of the maximum
period of imprisonment which can be imposed on them upon
conviction, Applicants are entitled to bail.
26. In view of my above observations and findings and facet of
pre-trial incarceration of Applicants beyond one-half of the maximum
period of imprisonment which may be imposed on them upon
conviction as delineated above and no probability of trial being
completed in the foreseeable future, invoking the right to speedy
justice and personal liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the
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Constitution of India, the Bail Applications stand allowed subject to
following conditions:-
(i) Both Applicants are directed to be released on bail on
furnishing P.R. Bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each
with one or two sureties in the like amount;
(ii) Applicants shall report to the Investigating Officer of ED
once every month on the third Saturday of every month
between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon for the first six
months after release and thereafter as and when called;
(iii) Applicants shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and
attend the Trial Court on all dates unless specifically
exempted and will not take any unnecessary
adjournments, if they do so, it will entitle the
prosecution to apply for cancellation of this order;
(iv) Both Applicants shall surrender their passport before
the Trial Court within one week from their release;
(v) If the Applicants are required to leave the State of
Maharashtra for any reason, they shall inform the
Investigating Officer the details of their travel,
destination and reason for travelling outside the State
of Maharashtra including their date of return, until the
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completion of trial. It is clarified that if they have to
travel in any exigency then details of travel shall be
informed to the Investigating Officer even after the date
of their travel within a reasonable period with all other
relevant details;
(vi) Applicants shall not influence any of the witnesses or
tamper with the evidence in any manner;
(vii) Applicants shall keep the Investigating Officer informed
of their current address and mobile contact number and
/ or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from
time to time;
(viii)Any infraction of the above conditions shall entail
cancellation of this order.
27. The aforesaid observations are
prima facie on the basis of
record of the case which have been argued before me and is an
expression of opinion by this Court only for the purpose of
enlargement of Applicant on bail and shall not influence the trial in the
present case.
28. Bail Applications stand allowed and disposed.
H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
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HARSHADA
HANUMANT
SAWANT
Digitally signed
by HARSHADA
HANUMANT
SAWANT
Date:
2025.02.21
19:23:21
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