IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

I. RSA-1908-1993 (O&M)

Smt. Parba$ (since deceased)

Through

LRs and Another . . . . Appellants

Vs.

Satbir Singh and Another . . . . Respondent s

II. RSA-1909-1993 (O&M)

Dhupli @ Dhupali (since deceased)

Through

LRs and Another . . . . Appellants

Vs.

Satbir Singh and Another . . . . Respondent s

Reserved on: 17.11.2025

Pronounced on: 27.11.2025

Uploaded on: 27.11.2025

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Argued by:- Mr. Rajinder Goyal, Advocate

for the appellants.

Mr. Adarsh Jain, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Johan Kumar, Advocate for

the respondent.

****

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

Both these appeals arise out of a common judgment dated

16.01.1985 delivered by the learned Trial Court of Sub Judge, 1

st

Class Panipat,

whereby two civil suits—one ins/tuted by Smt. Parba/ and another (appellants

herein), and the other by Satbir Singh and another (respondents herein), were

decided together. The appeals preferred by respondents – Satbir Singh and an-

other were therea1er disposed of by the learned First Appellate Court of Addi-

/onal District Judge, Panipat on 21.08.1993.

2. Background Facts: The dispute concerns agricultural land measur-

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ing 70 Kanal 19 Marla situated in the revenue estate of village Lahori, Tehsil Pa-

nipat. It is not in dispute that the said land belonged to Bhara son of Shadi.

3. Appellants’ case: Smt. Parba/ and Smt. Dhupli, asser/ng

themselves to be the daughters of Bhara, filed Civil Suit No. 670 of 1980 seeking

a declara/on that they were the righ<ul owners of the suit land. Their claim was

based both on natural succession as well as on a registered Will dated

18.05.1979, purportedly executed by Bhara in their favour. Alongside this claim,

they challenged a prior judgment and decree dated 25.10.1978 passed in Civil

Suit No. 483 of 1978 by the Court of the then Sub-Judge 1

st

Class, Panipat,

whereby Bhara was purported to have suffered a decree in favour of defendants

Satbir & Shamsher. According to Parba/ and Dhupli, this earlier decree had been

procured by fraud, misrepresenta/on, and undue influence, and was in any case

void for want of registra/on. Alleging that they were already in possession of

the land and that the defendants were aCemp/ng to interfere, they sought a

declara/on of ownership, and consequen/al decree of permanent injunc/on.

4. Respondents’ stand : On the other hand, respondents - Satbir &

Shamsher filed Civil Suit No. 637 of 1980 against Parba/ and Dhupli, asser/ng

that they were the owners in possession of the same parcel of land. They too

complained of interference at the hands of the opposite party and prayed for a

decree of permanent injunc/on for protec/ng their possession.

5. In their wriCen statement to the suit filed by Parba/ and Dhupli,

Satbir and Shamsher took a categorical stand that the plain/ffs were not the

daughters of Bhara and that Bhara had died issueless. They defended the decree

dated 25.10.1978 as lawful and valid, asser/ng that it reflected a family

seClement arrived at in June 1977, pursuant to which muta/on No. 1006 dated

28.11.1978 had been sanc/oned in their favour. Their stand was that once

Bhara had transferred his rights through the decree and muta/on, he was le1

with no /tle in the land, and therefore, he could not have executed the Will

dated 18.05.1979 in favour of Parba/ and Dhupli.

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6. Parba/ and Dhupli contested the suit of Satbir and Shamsher taking

similar stand, as in the plaint of their suit.

7. With consent of counsel on both sides, the Trial Court consolidated

the two suits. Consolidated issues were framed, and common evidence was

recorded in the suit filed by Parba/ and Dhupli.

8.1 Trial Court Findings: Upon a detailed appraisal of the evidence, oral

and documentary, the learned Trial Court held unequivocally that Parba/ and

Dhupli were in fact the daughters of Bhara. The Court further found that the

registered Will dated 18.05.1979 (Ex. PW1/A) had been duly proved in

accordance with law. It also held that Parba/ and Dhupli were in possession of

the suit land.

On the crucial ques/on concerning the earlier decree dated

25.10.1978, the Trial Court recorded that although allega/ons of fraud,

misrepresenta/on, and undue influence had not ul/mately been pressed by

counsel for the plain/ffs, the decree nevertheless suffered from a fundamental

legal defect, as it was compulsorily registrable under the law, and since it had

not been registered, it was invalid and non-binding upon the rights of Parba/

and Dhupli. The Court also observed that Satbir and Shamsher were strangers to

Bhara; whereas they had projected themselves as his grandsons without any

proof merely to obtain the decree on the strength of an alleged family

seClement.

8.2 In view of these findings, the Trial Court, vide a common judgment

dated 16.01.1985, decreed Civil Suit No. 670 of 1980 filed by Parba/ and Dhupli,

declaring them to be owners in possession of the suit land, and holding the

judgment and decree dated 25.10.1978 in Civil Suit No. 483 of 1978 to be null,

void, and inopera/ve against their rights. A decree of permanent injunc/on was

also granted in their favour restraining Satbir and Shamsher from interfering in

their possession. Consequently, Civil Suit No. 637 of 1980 filed by Satbir and

Shamsher was dismissed.

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9.1 Appellate Court Findings: Aggrieved by the above judgment of the

Trial Court, Satbir and another, who were the defendants in Civil Suit No. 670 of

1980, and plain/ffs in Civil Suit No. 637 of 1980, filed two separate appeals

before the First Appellate Court. Both the appeal were disposed of vide

judgment dated 21.08.1993 by the first appellate court.

9.2 While re-appraising the evidence, the First Appellate Court affirmed

the Trial Court’s finding that Parba/ and Dhupli were indeed the daughters of

Bhara. It therea1er examined the pleadings of Civil Suit No. 483 of 1978. In that

earlier suit, Satbir and Shamsher had asserted that Bhara was their grandfather,

and the learned First Appellate Court observed that since Bhara had not

disputed this asser/on in the earlier proceedings, the correctness of that

rela/onship could not be reopened in the subsequent li/ga/on. Significantly,

the First Appellate Court did not return any independent or categorical finding

as to whether Satbir and Shamsher were in fact the grandsons of Bhara.

Instead, relying solely on the pleadings of the earlier suit, it invoked the

principle laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Gurudev Kaur and

another v. Mehar Singh and others, 1989 (2) RLR 338, as well as the judgment

in Harpal and others v. Ram Pyari and others, 1981 PLJ 492, to hold that a

Court trying a later suit cannot go behind an earlier decree and re-examine

whether that earlier decree had been passed on correct or incorrect facts.

Proceeding on this premise, the First Appellate Court treated the decree dated

25.10.1978 as binding, without adjudica/ng the founda/onal ques/on of

rela/onship between the par/es.

9.3 The Appellate Court further held that since the decree dated

25.10.1978 in the previous suit, was based upon a family seClement, therefore,

it did not require compulsory registra/on, as per Sec/on 17 of the Registra/on

Act. The Appellate Court also no/ced that before the trial Court, the counsel for

plain/ffs - Parva/ and Dhupli had not pressed the allega/ons of fraud,

misrepresenta/on or undue influence. Therefore, it was held that Parva/ and

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Dhupli were bound by the consent decree suffered by their father in favour of

Shamsher and Satbir.

9.4 Consequent to these findings, the First Appellate Court reversed

the judgments passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by Parva/ &

Dhupli; whereas the suit filed by Satbir & Shamsher, was decreed.

10. The above-said judgment dated 21.08.1993 of lear ned Addl.

District Judge, Panipat has given rise to these two appeals, both filed by Parva/

& Dhupli, i.e. plain/ffs of one suit, and the defendants of the other suit.

11.1 Conten/ons of Appellants: Assailing the judgment of first appellate

court, Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the rela/onship of

Parba/ & Dhupli with Bhara is beyond dispute, inasmuch as both Courts below

have concurrently held them to be the daughters and thus, the only natural

heirs of Bhara. Referring to the evidence on record, Ld. counsel argues that

Satbir & Shamsher are not even remotely related to Bhara. On the contrary, it

has come in evidence that one Pyara Singh, the father of one respondent, and

grandfather of the other, was engaged in li/ga/on with Bhara. In such

circumstances, Ld. counsel contends, it is inconceivable that Bhara would enter

into any seClement with the son & grandson of Pyara Singh. When members of

that family are strangers to Bhara, the very founda/on of the alleged family

seClement collapses, and no rights could possibly flow from such a claim.

11.2 It is argued further that even assuming for the sake of argument

that Bhara had, out of his free will, suffered the decree dated 25.10.1978 in fa-

vour of Satbir & Shamsher, such decree did not bind the rights of the appel-

lants. The decree, according to him, created rights in immovable property for

the first /me in favour of Satbir and Shamsher, and therefore required compuls-

ory registra/on. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the judg-

ment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, 1995

(3) RRR 541, wherein it was held that if a compromise decree is not a bona fide

seClement of pre-exis/ng rights but is instead a device to avoid payment of

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stamp duty or to circumvent the law of registra/on, such a decree must neces-

sarily be registered to have legal effect.

11.3 Learned counsel further argues that the First Appellate Court erred

in placing reliance on the Division Bench judgment in Gurudev Kaur v. Mehar

Singh, 1989 (2) RLR 338, which, according to him, is wholly inapplicable to the

present facts. It is submiCed that the earlier decree could not have been

treated as conclusive or binding, when the very existence of any family rela/on-

ship, the founda/on of the earlier decree, stood disproved on the record.

11.4 On these premises, prayer is made for seOng aside the judgment

and decree of the First Appellate Court and restoring the well-reasoned findings

of the Trial Court.

12.1 Conten/ons of Respondents : Per contra, learned senior counsel

for the respondents–Satbir & Shamsher submits that the findings of the First

Appellate Court call for no interference. According to him, the decree dated

25.10.1978 has been found not to be the result of fraud, misrepresenta/on or

undue influence, and once that is so, the Court in the subsequent proceedings

cannot go behind the earlier decree, or the admissions made therein. He argues

that in the earlier suit, Bhara had admiCed Satbir and Shamsher to be his grand-

sons, and such admission, once acted upon by the Court, cannot be re-ex-

amined in a later suit.

12.2 However, when queried specifically by this Court, learned senior

counsel for the respondents candidly conceded that, in fact, no family

rela/onship existed between Bhara on the one hand and Satbir & Shamsher on

the other as per evidence on record, and that they were complete strangers to

him. Nonetheless, his conten/on is that because the decree was based on

consent and was not vi/ated on grounds of fraud or coercion, the correctness

of the admissions made by Bhara therein cannot be ques/oned in a later suit.

On this basis, he supports the conclusion of the First Appellate Court that

registra/on of the decree was not necessary, and that the dismissal of the suit

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filed by Parba/ & Dhupli, as well as the decree of injunc/on in favour of Satbir

and Shamsher, was jus/fied. To support this conten/on, learned senior counsel

for the respondents, has referred to Khushi Ram and others vs Nawal Singh

and others 2021 AIR (SC) 1117;

 Gurcharan Singh and others v Angrez Kaur and

another (2020) AIR (SC) 2912; Mohammade Yusuf and others vs Rajkumar and

others (2020) AIR (SC) 796;

 Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) thr LR Smt. Sadhna Rai v

Rajinder Singh and others 2006 (5) SCC 566; and Sakina Sultanali Sunesara

(momin) v. Shia Imani Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj and others (2025) INSC 570.

12.3 Learned senior counsel for the respondents further argues that the

suit filed by Parba/ & Dhupli was itself not maintainable. According to him, the

decree dated 25.10.1978 being a compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3

CPC, could only be challenged by way of an applica/on in the same suit, in

terms of Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC, and therefore, an independent suit would be

barred.

12.4 With the above submissions, learned counsel prayed for dismissal

of the present appeals.

13. In reply to above conten/on, learned counsel for the appellants

submits that the decree of 1978 was not a compromise decree under Order

XXIII Rule 3 CPC at all, but rather a consent decree / decree based on admission,

passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Consequently, the bar under Order XXIII

Rule 3-A CPC would not apply, and the appellants were fully en/tled to bring an

independent suit challenging the legal efficacy and binding nature of that de-

cree

.

Court’s Analysis and Findings:

14. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the record,

this Court proceeds to determine the substan/ve legal issues arising in the

maCer.

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15. Before proceeding further, some admiCed facts may be noted.

SSuit property was owned by Bhara.

SBhara had two sons, but both of them had pre-deceased him. When

Bhara expired, he le1 behind only two natural legal heirs - his daughters,

i.e., appellants Parba/ and Dhupli. Though, the respondents herein had

denied the rela/onship of Parba/ & Dhupli with Bhara to be his

daughters, but there is concurrent finding of fact in this regard by both

the Courts below that they are the daughters of Bhara. This finding has

not been refuted by Ld. Senior advocate for the respondents even before

this Court.

SThe First appellate Court has not held the finding of fact of the trial court

to the effect that Satbir and Shamsher are not related to Bhara as his

grandsons, as wrong. In fact, First Appellate Court did not return any

independent or categorical finding as to whether Satbir and Shamsher

were in fact the grandsons of Bhara. Instead, relying solely on the

pleadings of the earlier suit, it held that a Court trying a later suit cannot

go behind an earlier decree and re-examine whether that earlier decree

had been passed on correct or incorrect facts.

SAs a maCer of fact, the evidence on file clearly establish that Bhara was

not related even remotely to Shamsher and Satbir; and as has been noted

earlier, Ld. Senior advocate for the respondents candidly admiCed this

fact on specific query by this Court

SMost importantly, the judgment and decree dated 25.10.1978 passed in

civil suit No.483 of 1978 as suffered by Bhara in favour of Satbir and

Shamsher, has been found to be not based upon fraud, misrepresenta/on

or undue influence and rather, it has been found that it was suffered with

the consent of Bhara.

16. Having no/ced the undisputed factual posi/on on record, it

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becomes evident that the controversy ul/mately narrows down to a single

determina/ve ques/on as to - Whether the decree dated 25.10.1978 required

compulsory registra/on under law. If the said decree is found to be one, which

mandatorily required registra/on, then its non-registra/on would render it

ineffec/ve to convey or create any right, /tle, or interest in favour of Satbir &

Shamsher. In that event, the /tle to the property would unques/onably devolve

upon Parba/ and Dhupli, the admiCed natural heirs and daughters of Bhara,

who alone would succeed to his estate.

17. In order to consider the effect of non-registra/on of a consent

decree, Sec/ons 17(1) and 17(2)(vi) of the Registra/on Act are relevant which

are as follows:-

“17. Documents of which registra/on is compulsory.—(l) The following docu-

ments shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a dis-

trict in which, and if they have been executed on or a1er the date on which,

Act No. XVI of 1864, or the

Indian Registra/on Act, 1866, or the Indian Registra-

/on Act, 1871, or the Indian Registra/on Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes

into force, namely:—

(a) instruments of gi1 of immovable property;

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to

create, declare, assign, limit or ex/nguish, whether in present or in fu-

ture, any right, /tle or interest, whether vested or con/ngent, of the

value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;

(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or

payment of any considera/on on account of the crea/on, declara/on,

assignment, limita/on or ex/nc/on of any such right, /tle or interest;

and

(d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term ex-

ceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;

(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree

or order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award

purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or ex/nguish,

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whether in present or in future, any right, /tle or interest, whether ves-

ted or con/ngent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to

or in immovable property:

Provided that the State Government may, by order published in the Offi-

cial GazeCe, exempt from the opera/on of this sub-sec/on any lease executed

in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed

five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fi1y rupees.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub- sec/on (1) applies to—

(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be

made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that

which is the subject-maCer of the suit or proceeding; or

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”

18. The above provisions came to be considered by Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major (supra), and it was held as under:

16. We have to view the reach of clause (vi), which is an excep/on to sub-

sec/on (1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind. We would think that the excep/on

engra1ed is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree

or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-

exis/ng right and does not by itself create new right, /tle or interest in

thabnbry in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards. Any other

view would find the mischief of avoidance of registra/on, which requires

payment of stamp duty, embedded in the decree or order.

17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to examine in each case

whether the par/es have pre-exis/ng right to the immovable property, or

whether under the order or decree of the court one party having right, /tle or

interest therein agreed or suffered to ex/nguish the same and created right,

/tle or interest in preasen/ in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or

upwards in favour of other party for the first /me, either by compromise or

presented consent. If laCer be the posi/on, the document is compulsorily

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registerable.

18. The legal posi/on qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the aforesaid

discussion, be summarised as below :

(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a

device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law rela/ng to

registra/on, would not require registra/on. In a converse situa/on, it would

require registra/on.

(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first /me right, /tle or

interest in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards in favour of

any party to the suit, the decree or order would require registra/on.

(3) If the decree were not to aCract any of the clauses of sub-sec/on (1) of

sec/on 17, as was the posi/on in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's

cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registra/on.

(4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the

posi/on in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be

derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in

ques/on.

(5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the "subject maCer of the

suit or proceeding", clause (vi) of sub-sec/on (2) would not operate, because of

the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the

aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause

would have been aCracted, even if it were to encompass property not

li/gated.“

19. In

Mohammade Yusuf and others Vs. Rajkumar and others

(supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court again had the occasion to interpret Sec/on 17,

wherein Bhoop Singh’s case was also referred. It was held as under:

“6. A compromise decree passed by a Court would ordinarily be covered

by

Sec/on 17(1)(b) but sub-sec/on (2) of Sec/on 17 provides for an excep/on

for any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be

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made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that

which is the subject-maCer of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by virtue of sub-

sec/on (2)(vi) of

Sec/on 17 any decree or order of a court does not require re-

gistra/on. In sub-clause (vi) of sub-sec/on (2), one category is excepted from

sub-clause (vi), i.e., a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise

and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-mat-

ter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by conjointly reading Sec/on 17(1) (b)

and Sec/on 17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise decree comprising immov-

able property other than which is the subject-maCer of the suit or proceeding

requires registra/on, although any decree or order of a court is exempted from

registra/on by virtue of Sec/on 17(2) (vi)……….”

20. Similar views have been expressed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Khushi Ram vs Nawal Singh (supra); and Gurbachan Singh’s case (supra).

21. A careful reading of Sec/ons 17(1) and 17(2)(vi) of the Registra/on

Act makes it apparent that, as a general rule, every non-testamentary instru-

ment which purports to create, declare, assign, limit, or ex/nguish a right or in-

terest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees or above re-

quires compulsory registra/on. At the same /me, the statute carves out a lim-

ited excep/on by providing that a decree or order of a Court ordinarily does not

require registra/on, unless it is a decree made on a compromise and comprises

immovable property, which was not the subject-maCer of the suit. This is the

statutory backdrop against which the Supreme Court has repeatedly examined

the effect of compromise and consent decrees.

22. In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, the Supreme Court undertook

a detailed analysis of this excep/on and held that the exemp/on from registra-

/on is not absolute. The Court explained that the excep/on contained in Sec-

/on 17(2)(vi) is intended to apply only to those decrees which merely recognise

or record a pre-exis/ng right. If, however, the so-called compromise or consent

decree were to create, for the first /me, a new right, /tle, or interest in immov-

able property in favour of a party who previously had no such right, the docu-

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ment would fall squarely within Sec/on 17(1)(b) and must be compulsorily re-

gistered. The Supreme Court warned that any contrary view would encourage

par/es to use compromise decrees as a device to avoid payment of stamp duty

and defeat the law of registra/on. The Court thus held that it is the duty of

every court to examine in each case whether the decree merely records an ex-

is/ng right, in which case registra/on is not required, or whether it ex/nguishes

one party’s right and creates a new right in another, in which case registra/on

becomes mandatory.

23. This principle was further elaborated in Mohammad Yusuf v. Ra-

jkumar, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed Bhoop Singh and clarified the

scope of the statutory excep/on. The Court held that, generally, decrees,

whether on compromise or otherwise, do not require registra/on provided they

relate to the subject-maCer of the suit. However, if a compromise decree deals

with immovable property that is not the subject of the suit, or if the decree cre-

ates new substan/ve rights in property for the first /me, then the protec/on of

Sec/on 17(2)(vi) is not available, and such a decree must be registered. The Su-

preme Court reiterated that the exemp/on under Sec/on 17(2)(vi) cannot be

interpreted so broadly as to permit the crea/on of /tle through an unregistered

decree where the statute mandates registra/on.

24. Thus, the pivotal inquiry is whether the decree acknowledges an

exis/ng right or creates a fresh right. Where it is the laCer, registra/on is indis-

pensable; and a decree that ought to have been registered but is not, is legally

ineffectual to transfer or create /tle. In short, a compromise or consent decree

can avoid registra/on only when it reflects a genuine adjustment of pre-exis/ng

rights between the par/es. Where the decree cons/tutes a fresh grant of /tle

or is used to circumvent the statutory requirements of stamp duty and registra-

/on, the law insists upon compulsory registra/on, failing which the decree con-

fers no enforceable rights.

25. Applying the above legal posi/on to facts of present case, it is

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undisputed that decree dated 25.10.1978 is with regard to same immovable

property, which is the subject maCer of suit; and not any other property, as

referred to in Sec/on 17 (2) (vi) of the Registra/on Act.

 However, in the factual

matrix of the present case, this Court is of the firm view that the decree dated

25.10.1978, on which the en/re claim of Satbir & Shamsher rests, was

compulsorily registrable. It is for the reason that no pre-exis/ng right in their

favour existed, as they were uCer strangers to Bhara and so, there could be no

ques/on of any family seClement between them. The decree did not merely

record a seClement of antecedent rights and rather, it was a clear device to

create rights in immovable property for the first /me by avoiding stamp duty

and registra/on, in favour of persons having no lawful claim prior thereto. In

such circumstances, the ra/o of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, 1995 (3) RRR

541 squarely applies, rendering the unregistered decree incompetent to divest

Bhara of his ownership.

26. The law is well-seCled that where a compromise or consent decree

creates rights in immovable property in favour of a person, who did not

previously possess them, such decree must be compulsorily registered. The

authorita/ve pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh v.

Ram Singh Major, supra reiterates that where the compromise decree is not

merely declaratory of pre-exis/ng rights but travels beyond and creates fresh

rights for the first /me, it aCracts Sec/on 17 of the Registra/on Act. The

Supreme Court further cau/oned that Courts must look beyond the label of

“compromise decree” to ensure that decrees are not used as a device to avoid

stamp duty and registra/on.

27. This Court has carefully considered the judgments relied upon by

learned senior counsel for the respondents, namely Khushi Ram v. Nawal

Singh; Gurcharan Singh v. Angrej Kaur; Mohammad Yusuf v. Rajkumar;

Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh; and Sakina Sultan Ali Sunesara v. Shia

Imani Ismaili Memmi Jamat Samaj. However, all of them are dis/ngishable

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from the facts of present case.

28.1 In Khushi Ram (supra), Smt. Jagno, the widow of Sher Singh was

the owner of ½ share in the property dispute. She suffered a consent decree in

favour of her nephews, i.e. brother's sons in 1991. That decree was challenged

by the nephews of her husband to be null, illegal and void on the ground that no

family seClement could take place and further, the decree required registra/on

and in the absence of registra/on, the decree did not create any right in favour

of nephews of Smt. Jagno. The trial Court, the First Appellate Court as well as

the High Court dismissed the suit. Hon’ble Supreme Court also dismissed the

appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court dealt with a genuine family seClement among

members of a joint family concerning pre-exis/ng rights in ancestral property.

The decree passed on the basis of such a seClement merely recorded

recogni/on of exis/ng claims and did not create new rights in strangers.

28.2 On the issue of rela/onship, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that heirs

of father of female are included as person, who can possibly succeed, and

therefore, it cannot be said that they were strangers and not members of the

family qua the female. As such, nephews of Smt. Jagno were held to be not the

strangers to the family and as such, it was held that decree did not require

registra/on. For holding so, Hon’ble Supreme Court also referred to Ram

Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi and others, 1965(3) SCR 841, besides Kale and

ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolida/on and ors. (1976) 3 SCC 119.

28.3 However, in the present case, Satbir & Shamsher are admiCedly

strangers to Bhara. There was no pre-exis/ng right, no family rela/onship, and

so, there could be no family seClement of any kind. The decree of 1978 did not

acknowledge antecedent rights but purported to create /tle in favour of non-

family members for the first /me, thereby aCrac/ng compulsory registra/on

under Bhoop Singh. Thus, Khushi Ram has no applica/on.

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29. Similarly, the issue in Gurcharan Singh (supra) concerned the effect

of a valid family arrangement recorded through a compromise decree. The

Supreme Court emphasized the sanc/ty and binding effect of genuine family

seClements amongst related members designed to maintain peace and

harmony. However, here in the present case, there is no family arrangement at

all. The very asser/on of family rela/onship between Bhara and the

respondents stands disproved and even conceded as false before this Court. A

decree based on a fic//ous family rela/onship cannot be placed on the same

pedestal as a bona fide compromise among family members. Therefore, the

ra/o of Gurcharan Singh is wholly inapplicable.

30. In Mohammade Yusuf’s case, the Supreme Court dealt with the

circumstances under which a consent decree can be challenged and the limited

scope of a collateral aCack on such decrees, par/cularly where the compromise

is lawful and the consent is unequivocal. However, in present case, decree of

1978 is not a mere consent decree but one that creates new rights in

immovable property in favour of strangers. Such a decree aCracts mandatory

registra/on under Sec/on 17 of the Registra/on Act. A decree that is void for

want of registra/on is a nullity, and its invalidity can be declared even

collaterally. The bar on collateral aCack does not apply to void decrees. Hence,

Mohammad Yusuf offers no assistance.

31. In Sakina Sultan’s case, the Supreme Court examined the doctrine

that a consent decree is binding where the consent is free and the decree does

not violate any statutory provision. The case reaffirmed that courts must respect

compromise arrangements that reflect lawful seClements. However, the present

decree violates Sec/on 17 of the Registra/on Act, which mandates registra/on

of instruments crea/ng rights in immovable property. The decree also proceeds

on the false premise that the respondents were grandsons of Bhara. A decree

obtained on the basis of false founda/onal facts and crea/ng fresh rights in

strangers cannot be equated with a lawful compromise upheld in Sakina Sultan.

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Moreover, a decree contrary to mandatory statutory requirements is a nullity,

and consent cannot breathe life into it.

32. The First Appellate Court placed strong reliance upon the Division

Bench judgment in Gurudev Kaur and another v. Mehar Singh and others, 1989

(2) RLR 338, to hold that a subsequent Court cannot look behind an earlier

decree to determine whether it was passed on right or wrong facts. This

reliance, however, was wholly misplaced. In Gurudev Kaur’s case, the par/es

were closely related, and the earlier decree was a bona fide arrangement

recognising pre-exis/ng family rights. The principle that a later Court cannot go

behind an earlier consent decree assumes that the founda/onal facts in the

earlier decree are true, lawful, and not suspect. However, in the present case,

Satbir and Shamsher are strangers to Bhara, a fact now unequivocally admiCed;

there could be no family seClement amongst strangers; the decree conferred

ownership for the first /me; and the decree itself was void for want of

registra/on.

33. Once the very founda/on of the earlier decree is shown to be false,

the later Court is not bound to treat it as sacrosanct. The First Appellate Court,

therefore, erred in invoking Gurudev Kaur (supra) and in reversing the well-

reasoned findings of the Trial Court.

34. A plea has been raised by the respondents that the suit filed by

Parba/ & Dhupli was barred by Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC, which prohibits a

separate suit to set aside a compromise decree. This submission fails on a

fundamental premise.

35. The decree of 1978 was not a compromise decree under Order

XXIII Rule 3 CPC. It was passed on the basis of admission by Bhara in his wriCen

statement, and the decree itself was drawn under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which

provides for a judgment on admissions. A consent decree based on admissions

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is dis/nct from a compromise decree founded on a lawful agreement between

par/es.

36. The case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (supra) is the

leading authority on the effect of Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC, holding that a

compromise decree cannot be challenged through a separate suit and that the

proper remedy is to approach the same court which recorded the compromise.

37. The said decision in Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh (supra) was

rendered on an en/rely different factual matrix. In that case, the landlord had

ins/tuted a suit for evic/on of the tenant. During the proceedings, the par/es

arrived at a compromise, whereby the tenant agreed to vacate the premises by

a specified date. The compromise was not reduced into a wriCen instrument;

instead, the statements of counsel for both par/es were recorded on oath, and

on the basis of those statements, a consent decree came to be passed. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such a decree cons/tuted a valid compromise

decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, and the mere fact that the compromise

was not embodied in a formal wriCen instrument did not detract from its valid-

ity. The Court further held that, in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A of Or-

der XXIII, no independent suit would lie to set aside such a compromise decree

on the ground that the compromise was unlawful. A consent decree, the Su-

preme Court observed, operates as an estoppel and remains binding on the

par/es unless and un/l it is set aside by the very Court that passed it, upon an

applica/on filed under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. Thus, the only

remedy available to a party seeking to avoid a consent decree is to approach

the Court which recorded the compromise and to establish before that Court

that no lawful compromise had, in fact, been arrived at. It is that Court alone,

which is competent to examine and decide whether the compromise was validly

entered into or not.

38. The facts of present case are compeletly dis/nguishable. Here, the

decree dated 25.10.1978 in the present case was not a compromise decree

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under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. It was passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC based on

admissions. Consequently, the bar of Order XXIII Rule 3-A does not apply.

Further, the decree is void for want of registra/on; and a void decree can always

be ques/oned in an independent suit. Therefore, Pushpa Devi Bhagat is of no

help to advance the plea of respondents Satbir & Shamsher.

39. Once the nature of the decree is correctly iden/fied, the bar under

Order XXIII Rule 3-A has no applica/on. A decree passed on admissions may be

challenged in an independent suit, par/cularly where it is a nullity for want of

registra/on, as in the present case. The maintainability of the suit filed by the

appellants thus stands affirmed.

40. Applying the principle of Bhoop Singh to the facts before this Court

leaves no manner of doubt that the 1978 decree was compulsorily registrable. It

was not the recogni/on of an antecedent right but a conferral of ownership

upon complete strangers to the family. Not being registered, it could not legally

divest Bhara of his /tle, nor could it prevent him from execu/ng the subsequent

Will in favour of Parba/ and Dhupli. The Trial Court was, therefore, en/rely

correct in holding that the decree dated 25.10.1978 was null and void for want

of registra/on.

41. Once the decree of 1978 is held to be a nullity for want of registra-

/on, it necessarily follows that Bhara con/nued to remain the owner of the suit

land /ll his death. The registered Will dated 18.05.1979, duly proved on record,

validly conferred the property upon his daughters Parba/ and Dhupli. The Trial

Court rightly upheld their rights and found them to be owners in possession.

42. Despite repe//on, it may be noted that in the present case, it is in-

deed correct that the decree dated 25.10.1978 could not be proved to have

been obtained through fraud, misrepresenta/on, or undue influence. On the

contrary, the evidence demonstrates that Bhara voluntarily suffered the decree

in favour of Satbir and Shamsher. However, what stands equally established

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and has been fairly conceded by learned senior counsel for the respondents is

that Satbir and Shamsher bore no rela/onship whatsoever with Bhara. They

were not his heirs, not his descendants, nor even remotely connected to his

family. In such circumstances, the very founda/on of any alleged seClement

between Bhara on the one hand, and Satbir & Shamsher on the other simply

does not exist.

43. Once it is accepted that there was no familial rela/onship between

the par/es, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the decree dated

25.10.1978 was not a bona fide family arrangement, but a device employed to

confer fresh rights in immovable property upon strangers without adhering to

the mandatory requirements of the Registra/on Act. As held by the Hon’ble Su-

preme Court in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, a decree which, under the

guise of a compromise, creates new rights in immovable property in favour of

persons having no antecedent /tle or lawful claim, must be compulsorily re-

gistered. Its non-registra/on renders it legally ineffec/ve.

44. Support for this principle is also found in the celebrated judgment

of the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kale & Ors. v.

Deputy Director of Consolida/on & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 119, wherein the Court

emphasised that a family seClement must be a bona fide arrangement intended

to resolve genuine family disputes among members who possess some ante-

cedent /tle, claim, or even a possible claim to the property. Only then can such

arrangements be upheld. In the present case, since Satbir and Shamsher had no

antecedent claim, no /tle, and no rela/onship with Bhara, the very concept of a

family seClement is wholly alien. No bona fide family arrangement, even no-

/onally, could come into existence.

45. Conclusion: In view of these circumstances, this Court has no hesit-

a/on in holding that the First Appellate Court commiCed a grave error in con-

cluding that the decree dated 25.10.1978 did not require registra/on. The Trial

Court, on the other hand, correctly appreciated the legal posi/on and rightly

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held that the said decree required compulsory registra/on and, in its absence,

could not confer any right upon Satbir and Shamsher.

46. Consequently, the findings and decree of the First Appellate Court

cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside. The judgment and decree

passed by the Trial Court are hereby restored. As a result, both the appeals

stand allowed. The civil suit ins/tuted by appellants Parba/ and Dhupli is de-

creed, while the suit for permanent injunc/on filed by Satbir and Shamsher is

dismissed. Both the appeals are disposed of in these terms.

Photocopy of this order be placed on the connected case file.

(DEEPAK GUPTA)

JUDGE

27.11.2025

:bby-aRMj bGa

Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes

Whether reportable? Yes

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