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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

2026:CGHC:10934-DB

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA(MAT) No. 59 of 2023

{Arising out of judgment and decree dated 18-1-2023 in HMA

No.105A/2022 of the Judge, Family Court, Balodabazar}

Judgment reserved on: 17-2-2026

Judgment delivered on: 3-3-2026

Judgment (Full) uploaded on: 3-3-2026

Dinesh Sahu, S/o Shri Radheshyam Sahu, aged about 34 years, R/o Village

Pawani, Police Station & Tahsil Bilaigarh, Civil District Balodabazar-

Bhatapara, Revenue Distt. Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh

(Plaintiff)

... Appellant

versus

Smt. Padma Sahu, W/o Shri Dinesh Sahu, aged about 34 years, R/o Village

Pawani, Police Station & Tahsil Bilaigarh, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara,

Chhattisgarh at Present R/o Village Raykona, Thana Sarsiwan, Tahsil

Bilaigarh, Revenue District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh

(Defendant)

... Respondent

For Appellant :Mr. Sunil Sahu, Advocate.

For Respondent :Mr. Aman Kesharwani, Advocate.

Amicus Curiae:Mr. Rahul Tamaskar and Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocates.

Division Bench: -

Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and

Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, JJ.

C.A.V. Judgment

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1.Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 19(1) of the

Family Courts Act, 1984, the appellant herein/plaintiff has preferred

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

this appeal challenging the judgment & decree dated 18-1-2023

passed by the Judge, Family Court, Balodabazar in HMA

No.105A/2022, by which his application for dissolution of marriage

on the grounds contained in Sections 13(1)(ia) & 13(1)(ib) of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the Act of 1955’), has been

rejected finding no merit.

2.The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual

backdrop: -

(For the sake of convenience, parties hereinafter will be

referred as per their status shown and ranking given in the civil suit

before the Family Court.)

2.1)The appellant herein/plaintiff filed application for dissolution

of marriage with the respondent herein/defendant stating inter alia

that their marriage was solemnized on 15-2-2015 at Village Raikona,

Police Station Sarsiwa, under Hindu rites and customs and

immediately after marriage, his wife i.e. the respondent herein

resided with him for 10-11 days and thereafter proceeded to her

maternal home, thus she lived with him only for 10-11 days and

thereafter, started pressurizing him to live separately from his ailing

and aged parents and in case of refusal, she threatened him to

implicate him in false case and from July, 2017, she started residing

separately without there being any reason. Thereafter, in the year

2018, the defendant/wife got registered FIR against the plaintiff/

husband and his family members for offence punishable under

Sections 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC & 5 of the

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005, which was

pending consideration before the jurisdictional criminal court and

which comes under the purview of mental cruelty. It has further

been pleaded that counselling was done by the Family Welfare

Committee, Balodabazar on 23-7-2018 in which his wife i.e. the

respondent herein has categorically and unequivocally stated that

she is not willing to reside in her matrimonial home by leaving her

father and mother. It has also been pleaded that the defendant/wife

is residing separately from the plaintiff/husband since more than 5-6

years which falls under the definition of cruelty under Section 13(1)

(ia) of the Act of 1955 and living separately since more than 5-6 years

which leads to the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the

Act of 1955. In para 12 of the plaint, it has also been clearly stated

that false case has been filed by the respondent/wife against the

plaintiff/ husband and his family members for offence punishable

under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC at Police Station

Sarsiwa, which constitutes the ground of mental cruelty. Thus, the

plaintiff/husband prayed for dissolution of marriage by a decree of

divorce.

2.2)The defendant/wife filed written statement controverting the

allegations made in the plaint stating inter alia that the plaintiff

started demanding dowry, four-wheeler, etc. and used to draw

amount of her salary by ATM card and also used to brand her ‘tonhi’

and did not take her along with him. In paragraph 5, she has

admitted the fact that case of dowry under Section 498A read with

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

Section 34 of the IPC and tonhi pratadna for offence under Sections 4

& 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005

were registered against the appellant herein and his family members

and pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhatgaon,

District Balodabazar-Bhatapara. As such, the plaintiff/husband is

not entitled for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce.

2.3)The Family Court after appreciating oral and documentary

evidence available on record, framed following four issues and

answered the issues as under: -

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vyx gjus dh ftí djrs gq, >wBs dsl esa Qalk nsus dh /kedh

nsdj Øwjrkiw.kZ O;ogkj fd;k x;k?

ugha

2.D;k izfrokfnuh }kjk oknh dks fcuk ;qfä;qDr dkj.k ds yxHkx

5&6 o”kksZa ls i`Fkd jgdj oknh dk vfHkR;tu dj fn;k gS?

ugha

3.D;k oknh] izfrokfnuh ds lkFk laiUu fookg fnukad

15&02&2015 dks fo?kfVr djkdj fookg&foPNsn dh vkKfIr

izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gS?

ugha

4.lgk;rk ,oa O;;? dafMdk 25 ds vuqlkj

fu.kZ; ?kksf”kr

2.4)In sum and substance, the Family Court has clearly recorded a

finding that the grounds of cruelty and desertion are not established

and as such, proceeded to dismiss the suit/application for dissolution

of marriage against which this appeal has been preferred.

3.Mr. Sunil Sahu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

herein/plaintiff/husband, would submit that the Family Court has

dismissed the application for dissolution of marriage on 18-1-2023

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

and the present appeal was filed on 22-2-2023, thereafter, on 16-6-

2025, the appellant herein, his brother Rajesh Kumar Sahu, his

father Radheshyam Sahu, his mother Phoolbai and his one more

brother Manoj Kumar – all five family members, have been acquitted

of the charges under Sections 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC

and 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005 by judgment

dated 16-6-2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Bhatgaon, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh in Criminal Case No.J-

374/2018. This would reinforce the cruelty meted out by the

respondent herein/wife by making false complaint. Mr. Sunil Sahu

would further submit that the appellant has filed application under

Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC along with copy of the judgment of

acquittal dated 16-6-2025 which may be taken on record. As such,

the ground of cruelty is very much established on account of the

subsequent event also which the appellant has filed in shape of Order

41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Mr. Sunil Sahu would rely upon the decisions

of the Supreme Court in the matters of Rani Narasimha Sastry v.

Rani Suneela Rani

1

and K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa

2

to

buttress his submissions. He would also submit that the ground of

desertion is also established.

4.Mr. Aman Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent herein/defendant/wife, would submit that though the

charges have not been established for offence under Sections 498A

read with Section 34 of the IPC & 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran

1(2020) 18 SCC 247

2AIR 2013 SC 2176

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

Adhiniyam, 2005, but further appeal is to be filed against the

judgment dated 16-6-2025 by which the appellant herein and four

other family members have been acquitted of the criminal charges

levelled against them and as such, the present first appeal as well as

the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC deserve to be

rejected. He would further submit that Order 41 of the CPC has not

been made expressly applicable by Section 10 of the Family Courts

Act, 1984 and therefore Order 41 of the CPC is not applicable to

appeals under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, as such,

the application under Order 41 Rule 27 and the present first appeal

both deserve to be dismissed.

5.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their

rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the

record with utmost circumspection.

6.True it is that the application for divorce on the ground of cruelty

under Section 13(1)(ia) and on the ground of desertion under Section

13(1)(ib) of the Act of 1955 was rejected by the jurisdictional Family

Court by the impugned judgment & decree dated 18-1-2023 against

which this first appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff/husband

and during the pendency of the instant first appeal, the appellant

herein and his four other family members namely, brother Rajesh

Kumar Sahu, father Radheshyam Sahu, mother Phoolbai and

another brother Manoj Kumar have been acquitted by the

jurisdictional criminal court from the criminal charges for offence

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

under Sections 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC & 5 of the Tonhi

Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005.

7.This Court on 20-1-2026 took cognizance of the application under

Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and issued notice to the other side and

further directed that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the

CPC shall be considered at the time of final hearing. It is the case of

the respondent herein/wife that Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC has not

been made applicable by virtue of Section 10 of the Family Courts

Act, 1984. At the outset, the applicability of Order 41 Rule 27 of the

CPC i.e. the application for taking additional evidence on record is

being considered now.

8.Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 prescribes the procedure to

be applied to suits and proceedings before the Family Court. It states

as under: -

“10. Procedure generally .—(1) Subject to the other

provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the

time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings

[other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)] before a Family Court

and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, a

Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have

all the powers of such court.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the

rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2

of 1974) or the rules made thereunder, shall apply to the

proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family

Court.

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall

prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure

with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-

matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts

alleged by the one party and denied by the other.”

9.A careful perusal of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 would

show that subject to the other provisions of the Act of 1984 and the

rules, the provisions of the CPC would apply to the suits and

proceedings before a Family Court, but Order 41 of the CPC has not

been expressly made applicable by virtue of Section 10 of the Family

Courts Act, 1984 in an appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family

Courts Act, 1984. Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is also

silent on the aspect of application of CPC or power to admit

additional evidence. Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 states

as under: -

“19. Appeal.—(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and

notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall

lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory

order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on

law.

(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by

the Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an

order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to

any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed

under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of

1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts

(Amendment) Act, 1991.

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred

within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or

order of a Family Court.

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise,

call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the

Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order

under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of

1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness,

legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory

order, and, as to the regularity of such proceeding.

(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to

any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family

Court.

(6) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be

heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges.”

10.As stated above, Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984

mandates that save as provided in sub-section (2) and

notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law,

an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an

interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts

and on law. Notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC, Order

41 of the CPC has not been expressly made applicable to the appeals

preferred under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The

general principle behind Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC is that the

appellate court should not travel outside the record of the trial court

and cannot take any evidence in appeal and an exception has been

carved out in shape of Order 41 Rule 27 which enables the appellate

court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances and

one of the circumstances in which the production of additional

evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC by the appellate court is

to be considered is, whether or not the appellate court requires the

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for

any other substantial cause of like nature.

11.The Supreme Court in the matter of Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State

of Jharkhand

3

has explained the general principles behind Order

41 Rule 27 of the CPC in following terms: -

“7.It is true that the general principle is that the appellate

court should not travel outside the record of the lower court

and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an

exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the appellate court to

take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. It may

also be true that the appellate court may permit additional

evidence if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to

exist and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the

admission of such evidence. However, at the same time, where

the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the

cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and

important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of

justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be

permitted on record, such application may be allowed. Even,

one of the circumstances in which the production of additional

evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the appellate court is

to be considered is, whether or not the appellate court requires

the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce

judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature.

8.As observed and held by this Court in A. Andisamy

Chettiar v. A. Subburaj Chettiar

4

, the admissibility of

additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the

issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an

opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or

not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate court

requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to

pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It is

further observed that the true test, therefore is, whether the

appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials

before it without taking into consideration the additional

evidence sought to be adduced.”

3(2022) 7 SCC 247

4(2015) 17 SCC 713 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 514

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

12.But the fact remains that Order 41 including Rule 27 of the CPC has

not been expressly made applicable in the appeals preferred before

this Court against the judgment & order of the Family Court under

Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and there is no express

provision in the Family Courts Act applying the CPC including Order

41 of the CPC, though Section 21 of the Act of 1955 provides for

application of all the proceedings. Despite, all the above, the Family

Courts Act, 1984 is silent on the point of applicability of the CPC,

specially Order 41 to appeals under Section 19 and thus power of

appellate court to admit additional evidence. In such circumstances,

the doctrine of ex debito justitiae is pressed into motion. According

to Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, ex debito justitiae means

‘from or as a debt of justice; in accordance with the requirement of

justice; of right; as a matter of right’.

13.It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of the

proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate

jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is

invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right

of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by

the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first

appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and

decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must

record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as

fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the

parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

conscious application of mind and record findings supported by

reasons on all issues and contentions. (See Malluru Mallappa

(Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Kuruvathappa

and others

5

.)

14.It is also well established principle of law that the right of appeal is a

substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and

are open to review by the appellate Court. It is a firmly established

rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by

necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to

make such grant effective and meaningful.

15.In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of

Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi

6

may be noticed herein in which it has been held that the appellate

court has all the ancillary and incidental power(s) to make the appeal

effective, which states as under: -

“6.… The right of appeal is a substantive right and the

questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by

the Appellate Tribunal. Indeed the Tribunal has been given

very wide powers under Section 254(1) for it may pass such

orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties

to the appeal. If the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate

Assistant Commissioner have made assessments or imposed

penalties raising very large demands and if the Appellate

Tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery the

entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the

orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. It is

difficult to conceive that the legislature should have left the

entire matter to the administrative authorities to make such

orders as they choose to pass in exercise of unfettered

discretion. The assessee, as has been pointed out before, has

no right to even move an application when an appeal is pending

5(2020) 4 SCC 313

61968 SCC OnLine SC 71

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 220(6) and it is

only at the earlier stage of appeal before the Appellate Assistant

Commissioner that the statute provides for such a matter being

dealt with by the Income Tax Officer. It is a firmly established

rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by

necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means

to make such grant effective ( Sutherland Statutory

Construction, 3

rd

Edn., Articles 5401 and 5402). The powers

which have been conferred by Section 254 on the Appellate

Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them

by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and

necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective.

In Domat's Civil Law Cushing's Edn., Vol. 1 at p. 88, it has

been stated:

“It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to

what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions,

but to all the cases where a just application of them may be

made, and which appear to be comprehended either within

the consequences that may be gathered from it.”

7.Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11

th

Edn.,

contains a statement at p. 350 that “where an Act confers a

jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such

acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to

its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoqe concessa esse

videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit”. An

instance is given based on Ex parte Martin [(1879) 4 QBD 212,

491] that “where an inferior court is empowered to grant an

injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by

commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the

power would be useless if it could not be enforced”.

16.Similarly, in the matter of Haryana Suraj Malting Limited v.

Phool Chand

7

, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid

down the doctrine of the implied grant and held that certain powers

are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are

inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but

because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly

7(2018) 16 SCC 567

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and

meaningfully exercised.

17.In the matter of Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner,

Cooperation, Punjab and others

8

, it has been held by the

Supreme Court that in absence of express provision for application of

CPC, in order to do complete justice, the provisions of CPC can be

applied, and their Lordships observed as under: -

“21.What matters for exercise of jurisdiction is the source of

power and not the failure to mention the correct provisions of

law. Even in the absence of any express provision having

regard to the principles of natural justice in such a proceeding,

the courts will have ample jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte

decree, subject of course to the statutory interdict.

18.In view of the above-stated discussion, it is held that even in absence

of express provision for application of the CPC and more particularly,

Order 41 of the CPC, in appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family

Courts Act, 1984, the appellate Court/this Court will have, by its

necessary implication, all the incidental and ancillary power to make

the adjudication of appeal effective and meaningful including power

to admit additional evidence in accordance with law subject to two

caveats that, case sought to be set up is pleaded so as to support the

additional evidence that is proposed to be brought on record and

secondly, the appellate court requires additional evidence so as to

enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of

like nature.

8(2008) 7 SCC 663

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

19.In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court may be noticed

herein profitably. The Supreme Court in the matter of Iqbal

Ahmed (Dead) by LRs. and another v. Abdul Shukoor

9

held

that if additional evidence is sought to be brought on record,

permissible pleading to that effect in either plaint or written

statement, would be necessary, and observed as under: -

“8.In our opinion, before undertaking the exercise of

considering whether a party is entitled to lead additional

evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code, it would be

first necessary to examine the pleadings of such party to gather

if the case sought to be set up is pleaded so as to support the

additional evidence that is proposed to be brought on record. In

absence of necessary pleadings in that regard, permitting a

party to lead additional evidence would result in an

unnecessary exercise and such evidence, if led, would be of no

consequence as it may not be permissible to take such evidence

into consideration. Useful reference in this regard can be made

to the decisions in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17

SCC 491 : AIR 2009 SC 1103 and Union of India v. Ibrahim

Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148. Thus, besides the requirements

prescribed by Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code being fulfilled,

it would also be necessary for the Appellate Court to consider

the pleadings of the party seeking to lead such additional

evidence. It is only thereafter on being satisfied that a case as

contemplated by the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the

Code has been made out that such permission can be granted.

In absence of such exercise being undertaken by the High Court

in the present case, we are of the view that it committed an

error in allowing the application moved by the defendant for

leading additional evidence.”

20.The scope of admitting additional evidence has already been held by

the Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Singh (supra). As such,

though Order 41 of the CPC has not been made expressly

inapplicable, but the High Court while hearing appeal under Section

19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has all the incidental or ancillary

92025 SCC OnLine SC 1787

Page 16 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

powers inherent in it to make its appellate jurisdiction effective and

meaningful including the power to take additional evidence. Since

the additional evidence is very much necessary and the Court

requires it for just and proper disposal of the appeal, the application

for taking additional documents on record is allowed and the

judgment of the criminal court is taken on record.

21.At this stage, this Court would have ordinarily stayed the judgment

and could have directed the other side to produce the document in

rebuttal, but since it is the judgment of the jurisdictional criminal

court, no useful purpose will be served by doing so, therefore, this

Court is proceeding to consider the appeal on merits.

22.Now, the question that needs consideration is, whether the Family

Court is justified in rejecting the application filed by the

appellant/plaintiff for grant of decree for dissolution of marriage on

the ground of cruelty and desertion?

Cruelty

23.In order to answer the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate

to notice the provision contained in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955, which states as under :-

“13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before

or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition

presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a

decree of divorce on the ground that the other party -

(i) xxxxxxxxx

(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the

petitioner with cruelty, or

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

(ib) xxxxxxxxx”

24.A careful perusal of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

would show that husband or wife would be entitled for decree of

dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty if after

solemnization of marriage, one spouse has treated the other spouse

with cruelty.

25.The word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act,

1955. However, the Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, defines

‘cruelty’ as the intentional and malicious infliction of mental or

physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human and defined

‘legal cruelty’, ‘mental cruelty’ and ‘physical cruelty’ as under:-

“legal cruelty. Cruelty that will justify granting a divorce to

the injured party, specif., conduct by one spouse that endangers

the life, person, or health of the other spouse, or creates a

reasonable apprehension of bodily or mental harm. [Cases:

Divorce →27. C.J.S. Divorce § 22.]

mental cruelty. As a ground for divorce, one spouse’s course

of conduct (not involving actual violence) that creates such

anguish that it endangers the life, physical health, or mental

health of the other spouse. See EMOTIONAL, DISTRESS.

[Cases: Divorce 27.

→

C.J.S. Divorce § 22.]

physical cruelty. As a ground for divorce, actual personal

violence committed by one spouse against the other. [Cases:

Divorce 27(3, 6).

→

C.J.S. Divorce §§ 24, 27, 29-31.]”

26.The word ‘cruelty’ has not been specifically defined in the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh

10

has laid down some situations or

instances of human behaviour that would constitute mental cruelty.

Paragraph 101 of the report states as under :-

10(2007) 4 SCC 511

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{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for

guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some

instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in

dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances

indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative

and not exhaustive:

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the

parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not

make possible for the parties to live with each other could

come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life

of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is

such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to

put up with such conduct and continue to live with other

party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to

cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner,

indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it

makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely

intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep

anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by

the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental

cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment

calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of

the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one

spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the

other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant

danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and

weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,

indifference or total departure from the normal standard of

conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving

sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.

(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,

selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and

dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for

grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty

Page 19 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of

the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be

adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few

isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to

cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy

period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent

that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the

wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the

other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of

sterilisation without medical reasons and without the consent

or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes

vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the

consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the

spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for

considerable period without there being any physical

incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after

marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to

cruelty.

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous

separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial

bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though

supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law

in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the

contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions

of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental

cruelty.”

27.It is doubtless that burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his

or her case for, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms

a fact, not on the party which denies it. This principle accords with

common sense as it is so much easier to prove a positive than a

negative. The petitioner must therefore, prove that the respondent

has treated him with cruelty within the meaning of Section 10(1)(b)

Page 20 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. [See : Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs.

S. Dastane

11

para 23.]

28.In the instant case, it is the case of the plaintiff/husband that the

defendant/wife has got registered a false complaint case giving rise

to cause of action, against him, his two brothers namely, Rajesh

Kumar Sahu & Manoj Kumar, his father namely, Radheshyam Sahu

and his mother namely, Phoolbai. First Information Report was

lodged by the defendant/wife on 13-5-2018, charge-sheet was filed

on 4-10-2018 and ultimately, after seven years they have been

acquitted on 16-6-2025 by recording following findings in Criminal

Case No.J-374/2018 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Bhatgaon, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh: -

16- blh izdkj izdj.k ds vU; lk{kh jked`".k lkgw v-lk- 07 ,oa fd’kksj lkgw

v-lk- 08 us ?kVuk dh tkudkjh lkekftd cSBd ds nkSjku gksuk crk;k gSA

izdj.k esa foospukdrkZ iquhjke VaMu v-lk- 09 us foospuk dk;Zokgh dk leFkZu

fd;k gSA v-lk- 09 ds }kjk tIrh dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gS rFkk tIrh dk;Zokgh dk

gh muds }kjk leFkZu fd;k x;k gSA vfHk;kstu ds mDr rF;ksa ds [kaMu esa cpko

i{k ds }kjk vkjksih fnus’k lkgw us Lo;a dk ijh{k.k djk;k gS rFkk nLrkost is’k

dj ;g LFkkfir djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS fd ?kVuk ds le; vkjksih jkts’k dqekj

lkgw] eukst dqekj lkgw vkSj muds firk jk/ks’;ke lkgw rFkk og Lo;a vius&vius

dk;Z ij mifLFkr Fks blfy, ?kVuk fnukad 29@03@2018 dks muds }kjk

dksbZ ?kVuk dkfjr ugha fd;k x;k gSA ;g Hkh LFkkfir djus dk iz;kl fd;k gS

fd lHkh vkjksihx.k vyx&vyx txg fuokl djrs gSaA izdj.k esa ;g nf’kZr gS

fd vkjksihx.k jkts’k lkgw ,oa eukst lkgw vyx&vyx txg fuokljr gSa rFkk

jk/ks’;ke lkgw vkSj QqyckbZ xzke iouh esa rFkk vkjksfi;k xqatk lkgw vius llqjky

esa fuokl djrs gSaA tcfd izkfFkZ;k dk fuokl LFky mldk ek;dk xzke jk;dksuk

gSA bl izdkj izdj.k esa izkfFkZ;k ds }kjk ngst esa pkj ifg;k okgu dh ekax fd;s

tkus dh ckr lR; izrhr ugha gksrk gSA izkfFkZ;k us mlds [kkrs esa vkjksih fnus’k

lkgw vkSj jkts’k lkgw ds }kjk 57000@& :i;s VªkalQj djus dk Hkh dFku fd;k

11AIR 1975 SC 1534

Page 21 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

gS ftl laca/k esa iklcqd is’k fd;k x;k gS ftlesa ,d lkFk mDr jkf’k dk

VªkalQj ugha gqvk gS] vyx&vyx fnukad dks jkf’k vkgj.k gqbZ gS tks Lo;a vFkok

,Vh,e ds ek/;e ls vkgj.k gqvk gSA blls Hkh ;g rF; izekf.kr ugha gks jgk gS

fd vkjksih fnus’k lkgw izkfFkZ;k ds osru dk vkgj.k dj ysrk FkkA

17- Vksugh izrkM+uk ds laca/k esa ;g rF; vk;k gS fd vkjksihx.k izkfFkZ;k dks

Vksugh dgrs Fks blfy, vkjksfi;k xqatk lkgw ds cPps gksus ij mls xksn ysus ugha

fn;s rFkk vkjksih jkts’k lkgw ds 'kknh esa ysdj ugha x;sA bl laca/k esa dksbZ Li"V

rF; ugha vk;k gS D;ksafd izkfFkZ;k vkSj vkjksih ds e/; ,d lkFk jgus dks ysdj

okn&fookn c<+rs tk jgk Fkk ftlds dkj.k gh muds e/; vyx jgus dh fLFkfr

mRiUu gqbZ rFkk izkfFkZ;k vkjksihx.k ds fo:) Vksugh izrkM+uk ds laca/k esa

c<+k&p<+kdj dFku dh gSA blfy, vkjksihx.k ds fo:) izkfFkZ;k dk fd;k x;k

dFku muds mij ncko Mkyus ds vk’k; ls fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj vkjksihx.k

ds fo:) vkjksfir vijk/k izkfFkZ;k ds dFku ls gh izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA

18- mijksDr fo’ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;kstu viuk ekeyk vkjksihx.k ds

fo:) ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs izekf.kr djus esa vlQy jgk gS fd mUgksaus ?kVuk

fnukad 29-03-2018 ls vc rd LFkku xzke izkFkhZ;k ds ek;ds jk;dksuk vUrxZr

Fkkuk ljlhok ftyk cykSnkcktkj orZeku ftyk lkjax<+ fcykbZx<+ esa izkFkhZ;k

inek lkgw ds lkFk Øqjrk djus dk lkekU; vk’k; vkjksihx.k fnus’k lkgw] jkts’k

lkgw] jk/ks’;ke lkgw QqyckbZ] eukst lkgw] xqatk lkgw ds lkFk fufeZr dj lkekU;

vk’k; ds vxz’kj.k esa izkFkhZ;k ds ifr ,oa ifr ds ukrsnkj gksrs gq, ngst ds :i

esa pkj ifg;k okgu dh ekax dj izkFkhZ;k dks 'kkjhfjd ,oa ekufld :i ls

izrkfM+r fd;kA izkFkhZ;k dks mDr fnukad] le; o LFkku ij Vksugh ds :i esa

igpku dj mls 'kkjhfjd ,oa ekufld :i ls izrkfM+r fd;kA bl izdkj

fopkj.kh; fcanq Øekad 1 ls 3 dk fu"d"kZ izekf.kr ugha esa fn;k tkrk gSA vr%

izdj.k ds vkjksihx.k dks /kkjk 498(A)@34 Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ,oa /kkjk 5

Vksugh izrkM+uk vf/kfu;e 2005 ds vijk/k esa nks"keqDr dj Lora= fd;k tkrk gSA

29.As such, the jurisdictional criminal court has clearly recorded a

finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that the

plaintiff/husband, his two brothers – Rajesh Kumar Sahu & Manoj

Kumar, his father – Radheshyam Sahu and his mother – Phoolbai

have treated the defendant/wife with cruelty and demanded dowry

and they were acquitted of the charges under Sections 498A read

Page 22 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

with Section 34 of the IPC and 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonhi Pratadna

Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005.

30.In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Rani

Narasimha Sastry (supra) deserves to be noticed herein profitably

in which their Lordships have clearly held that when a person

undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence

under Section 498A of the IPC, levelled by the wife against the

husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has been meted out on

the husband, and observed in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under: -

“13.In the present case, the prosecution is launched by the

respondent against the appellant under Section 498-A IPC

making serious allegations in which the appellant had to

undergo trial which ultimately resulted in his acquittal. In the

prosecution under Section 498-A IPC not only acquittal has

been recorded but observations have been made that

allegations of serious nature are levelled against each other.

The case set up by the appellant seeking decree of divorce on

the ground of cruelty has been established. With regard to

proceeding initiated by the respondent under Section 498-A

IPC, the High Court

12

made the following observation in para

15: (Rani Narsimha Sastry case

4

, SCC OnLine Hyd)

“15.… Merely because the respondent has sought

for maintenance or has filed a complaint against the

petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 498-A

IPC, they cannot be said to be valid grounds for holding

that such a recourse adopted by the respondent amounts

to cruelty.”

The above observation of the High Court cannot be approved. It

is true that it is open for anyone to file complaint or lodge

prosecution for redressal of his or her grievances and lodge a

first information report for an offence also and mere lodging of

complaint or FIR cannot ipso facto be treated as cruelty. But,

when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the

allegation of offence under Section 498-A IPC, levelled by the

wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty

12Narsimha Sastry v. Suneela Rani, 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 714

Page 23 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

has been meted out on the husband. As per the pleadings

before us, after parties having been married on 14-8-2005, they

lived together only 18 months and, thereafter, they are

separately living for more than a decade now.

14.In view of the forgoing discussion, we conclude that the

appellant has made a ground for grant of decree of dissolution

of marriage on the ground as mentioned in Section 13(1)(i-a) of

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”

31.Furthermore, the Supreme Court in K. Srinivas Rao (supra) has

held that the conduct of the respondent-wife in filing a complaint

making unfounded, indecent and defamatory allegation against her

mother-in-law, in filing revision seeking enhancement of the

sentence awarded to the appellant-husband, in filing appeal

questioning the acquittal of the appellant-husband and acquittal of

his parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that he

and his parents are put in jail and he is removed from his job. Their

Lordships further held that this conduct has caused mental cruelty to

the appellant-husband.

32.Coming to the facts of the case, it is quite evident that the defendant/

wife has reported the matter to the police for registration of offence

punishable under Sections 498A of the IPC and 5 of the Tonhi

Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005 on 13-5-2018 stating that she

was subjected to cruelty and harassment pertaining to demand of

dowry pursuant to which charge-sheet was filed on 4-10-2018 in

which the plaintiff/husband, his two brothers, his father and mother,

all five were acquitted on 16-6-2025. However, such allegations are

extremely serious affecting the character and the reputation of the

plaintiff/husband and he has also faced apprehension of arrest for

Page 24 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

the aforesaid offence and as such, he suffered great mental trauma of

getting arrested and he not only stood trial for seven years, but also

suffered prosecution for fairly long time which caused permanent

scar on his mind and has definitely adversely affected his status in

the society.

33.On the basis of aforesaid discussion, it is held that the plaintiff/

husband and his family including two brothers and parents were

subjected to the rigors of a criminal trial under Sections 498A of the

IPC and 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005, an

ordeal that spanned seven years only to culminate in an acquittal. It

is evident that the allegations of cruelty and demand of dowry, etc.,

levelled by the defendant/wife could not withstand judicial scrutiny;

they remained unsubstantiated, devoid of cogent evidence, and

ultimately collapsed under their own weight. Furthermore, an

acquittal in a criminal court does not merely signal the end of a trial;

it often highlights the beginning of a social scar. In our social fabric,

such public accusations tarnish reputation and erode the dignity of

the husband and the family members long before a verdict is even

reached and recorded. We find that the sustained distress of

defending one’s honour against unfounded claims constitutes a

potent form of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act of

1955. To compel a spouse/husband to endure the shadow of a

criminal prosecution that is eventually found to be baseless is to

inflict a wound that no reconciliation can easily heal. Parties have

remained entrenched in their respective solitudes, living separately

Page 25 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

for a period of seven years. As such, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the plaintiff/husband has successfully established the

ground for grant of decree of dissolution of marriage under Section

13(1)(ia) of the Act of 1955 that is mental cruelty.

Desertion

34.The ground of desertion has been enumerated in Section 13(1)(ib) of

the Act of 1955, which states as under :-

“13. Divorce. - (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before

or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition

presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a

decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—

(i) xxxxxxxxx

(ia) xxxxxxxxx

(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of

not less than two years immediately preceding the

presentation of the petition; or

(ii) to (vii) xxxxxxxxx

Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression

“desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the

other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and

without the consent or against the wish of such party, and

includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other

party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and

cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

35.The word “desertion” in the context of Sections 13(1)(ib) and 10 of

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has been considered by the Supreme

Court in the matter of Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma

Bhattar Sri Devi

13

and to establish “desertion”, their Lordships

have laid down two essential ingredients in order that it may furnish

13AIR 2002 SC 88

Page 26 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

a ground for relief, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the

intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus

deserendi). Their Lordships observed in paragraph 6 of the report as

under: -

“6.‘Desertion’ in the context of matrimonial law represents a

legal conception. It is difficult to give a comprehensive

definition of the term. The essential ingredients of this offence

in order that it may furnish a ground for relief are:

1. The factum of separation

2. The intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an

end — animus deserendi;

3. The element of permanence which is a prime condition

requires that both these essential ingredients should

continue during the entire statutory period;

The clause lays down the rule that desertion to amount to

a matrimonial offence must be for a continuous period of not

less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of

the petition. This clause has to be read with the Explanation.

The Explanation has widened the definition of desertion to

include ‘wilful neglect’ of the petitioning spouse by the

respondent. It states that to amount to a matrimonial offence

desertion must be without reasonable cause and without the

consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the

Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended

to give to the expression a wide import which includes wilful

neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.

Therefore, for the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting

spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there,

namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to

bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).

Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted

spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2)

absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse

leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention

aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of

proving those elements in the two spouses respectively and

their continuance throughout the statutory period.”

Page 27 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

36.Similarly, in the matter of Roi (Bari) Stree v. Rassinga Naik

and another

14

, relying upon the observations of GORELL BARNES,

J. in the matter of Sickert v. Sickert

15

, it has been held by the

Madras High Court that in order to constitute desertion there must

be a cessation of cohabitation and an intention on the part of the

accused party to desert the other, and it has been observed as under:-

“In order to constitute desertion there must be a cessation of

cohabitation and an intention on the part of the accused party

to desert the other. In most cases of desertion the guilty party

actually leaves the other, but it is not always or necessarily the

guilty party who leaves the matrimonial home. In my opinion,

the party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and

whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the

act of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the

case of a husband who intends to put an end to a state of

cohabitation, and does so by leaving his wife, and that of a

husband who with the like intent obliges his wife to separate

from him.”

37.However, in this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the

matter of Malathi Ravi, M.D. v. B.V. Ravi, M.D.

16

may be

noticed herein in which the essential elements of desertion have been

laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -

“20. In the said Savitri Pandey case

17

, reference was also made

to Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani case

18

wherein it has been

held that desertion in its essence means the intentional

permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the

other without that other's consent, and without reasonable

cause. For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting

spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1)

the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring

cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).

Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted

14AIR 1935 Mad 541

15(1899) P. 278, 282

16(2014) 7 SCC 640

17(2002) 2 SCC 73

18Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40

Page 28 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2)

absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse

leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention

aforesaid. For holding desertion as proved the inference may

be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be

capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts

have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those

acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior

and subsequent to the actual acts of separation.”

38.Coming to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that the appellant and

the respondent both are living separately for a period of seven years,

as the respondent has lodged FIR on 13-5-2018 and thereafter, they

started living separately and the respondent has refused to live with

the appellant in the counselling also. As such, the appellant/

husband has successfully established that there has been no

cohabitation between the parties for a continuous period of at least

two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.

The respondent/wife predicated her separation on allegations of

cruelty, specifically initiating proceedings under Section 498A of the

IPC against the husband and his family members and on the

allegations of cruelty and the Tonhi Pratadna, the jurisdictional

criminal court did not found any material against the petitioner and

other family members and they have been acquitted as mentioned in

the aforementioned paragraphs.

39.In that view of the matter, the wife’s justification for leaving the

matrimonial home stands eroded and it is established that she was

living separately without reasonable cause. As such, the allegation of

cruelty by husband and his family members remained

unsubstantiated, rendering the wife's withdrawal from the

Page 29 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

matrimonial home without any reasonable cause. The prolonged

period of 7 years, coupled with the lack of any effort towards

reconciliation, clearly demonstrates an intentional and permanent

abandonment of the matrimonial obligations. It is evident that the

abandonment was both intentional and without the consent of the

husband and thereby the respondent/wife has effectively repudiated

the matrimonial bond with the clear intention of bringing

cohabitation to a permanent end.

40.Consequently, this Court concludes that the appellant has

successfully discharged the burden of proving desertion. Therefore,

the ground for dissolution of marriage specified under Section 13(1)

(ib) of the Act of 1955 stands established and the appellant is entitled

for decree of dissolution of marriage under the ground of desertion

also.

41.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment &

decree dated 18-1-2023 passed by the Judge, Family Court,

Balodabazar in HMA No.105A/2022 are set aside. It is held that the

plaintiff/husband is entitled for decree of divorce, as such, it is

hereby granted in favour of the plaintiff/husband and against the

defendant/wife. Consequently, the marriage solemnized between the

plaintiff/husband and the defendant/wife on 15-2-2015 is hereby

dissolved by a decree of divorce.

42.The defendant/wife has not claimed any permanent alimony by

making application or in the written statement, therefore, liberty is

Page 30 of 30

{FA(MAT)No.59/2023}

reserved in her favour for claiming permanent alimony by making a

separate application under Section 25 of the Act of 1955.

43.Decree be drawn-up accordingly.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma)

JUDGE JUDGE

Soma