In the High Court at Calcutta

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arjun Ray Mukherjee

MAT No.1917 of 2026

+

CAN 1 of 2026

Dipu Das

Vs.

The State of West Bengal and Others

For the appellant : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Samim Ahammed ,

Ms. Ambiya Khatun,

Mr. Asif Ikbal Baidya,

Ms. Huma Shakil

For the State : Mr. D.N. Roy, Ld. Govt. Pleader,

Ms. Aparna Banerjee, Ld. Addl. Govt. Pleader,

Mr. Anindya Basu, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Bikash Kumar Sriwastav,

Mr. Vinayak Chaubey

For the KMC : Mr. S.N. Mitra, Ld. Advocate General,

Mr. Debanjan Mukherjee

For the

State Election

Commission, W.B. : Ms. Sonal Sinha,

Mr. Sandipan Das

For the respondent no.8 : Mr. Zohaib Rauf,

Mr. Ajitesh Pandey,

Mr. Andalan Sarkar

For the respondent no.9 : Mr. Biswaroop Bhattacharyya,

Mr. Arka Kr. Nag,

Mr. Neil Basu,

Ms. Shrobana Sengupta,

Mr. Kaushik Bandyapadhyay

2

For the

Respondent nos.10 & 11: Mr. Kallol Basu,

Mr. Tapas Maity

Heard on : 04.11.2026

Reserved on : 04.11.2026

Judgment on : 06.11.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appeal arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellant

against a Notification dated September 11, 2026, whereby Schedule II

of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (for short, “the KMC

Act”) was substituted to give effect to an exercise of delimitation of the

different wards/constituencies of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as “the KMC”). By the impugned order, the

learned Single Judge directed affidavits to be exchanged but refused to

grant any interim protection to the writ petitioner/appellant. Being

aggrieved by such refusal, the instant appeal has been preferred.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argues that in the

garb of delimitation, the respondents have resorted to gerrymandering

in order to secure partisan advantage to the ruling political party in the

State of West Bengal on the premise of previous electoral results,

without considering relevant circumstances such as geographical

contiguity, compactness and administrative convenience, involving

huge expenses from the public exchequer. The basis of such exercise, it

is alleged, is the electoral rolls rather than the actual population,

3

thereby excluding a large number of residents from the zone of

consideration.

3. Learned senior counsel argues that the power to amend the Schedules

to the KMC Act, including Schedule II which, read with Section 5(2) of

the said Act, delineates the different wards of the KMC (each of which

constitutes a constituency for the purpose of the KMC elections), flows

from Section 601 of the KMC Act. As per Section 601, the State

Government may, of its own, or shall, on the recommendation of the

KMC, add to, amend, or alter any Schedule except Schedule I. By

relying on several documents annexed to the writ petition, which are

also a part of the stay application filed in the present appeal, it is

contended that in the present case, the exercise was undertaken by the

State Government not suo motu but at the behest of the Administrator

appointed by the State upon dissolving the Corporation.

4. However, it is submitted that an Administrator is appointed upo n

dissolution of the Corporation under Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act

only to discharge temporarily the administrative functions of the

different office-bearers of the Corporation till the next election is held.

Such powers of the Administrator do not include the authority to make

a recommendation under Section 601 of the said Act, which is a quasi-

legislative function to be discharged by the “Corporation” as a whole,

acting as a Corporation, and not individually by its office-bearers.

5. To bolster such argument, learned senior counsel for the appellant

refers to Section 5 of the KMC Act, which provides that the Corporation

4

shall consist of all its elected Councillors and the nominated members

of the State Government.

6. The appellant contends that vide Order dated June 8, 2026, the then

Corporation was prematurely dissolved, appointing the Municipal

Commissioner of the KMC as the Administrator under Section 118(1)(b)

of the KMC Act. Section 14(1)(a) mentions the Municipal Commissioner

as an officer of the Corporation who, as per Section 15(1) of the said

Act, is paid salary and allowances out of the Municipal Fund as

determined from time to time by the State Government. A mere officer

of the Corporation, it is argued, cannot act as the “Corporation” itself

for the purpose of making a recommendation under Section 601.

7. Moreover, since the State Government itself appoints the Administrator,

it would be absurd that such appointee would herself/himself make a

recommendation in the capacity of “Corporation” which then would be

binding on the State Government under Section 601 of the KMC Act,

which would translate into the State making a mandatory

recommendation to itself for the purpose of altering Schedule II of the

Act. Also, under the first proviso to Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act, it

is the State Government which allocates the powers and duties to be

exercised/performed by the Administrator, which would accentuate

such absurdity.

8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits that the draft

Schedule II was made available for public inspection from August 5 to

August 13, 2026. However, a notification was issued within only 2 days

5

thereafter, on August 7, 2026 regarding the KMC Amendment Bill to

give effect to such draft.

9. On August 21, 2026, the Special Secretary sent an e mail to the State

Election Commissioner regarding the proposed delimitation, followed by

the Administrator’s letter dated August 22, 2026 to the Additional Chief

Secretary intimating the number of old and new wards. On the self -

same date, that is August 22, 2026, the draft Schedule II was made

available for public inspection from the said date to September 3, 2026.

10. However, even prior thereto, on August 20, 2026, the KMC

(Amendment) Act, 2026 was notified in the Official Gazette, thereby

implementing the increase in number of Councillors as per the draft

amendment to Schedule II.

11. Ultimately on September 11, 2026, the amendment to Schedule II of

the KMC Act was notified.

12. The appellant contends that the entire chronology of the

aforementioned events clearly exhibits malice in law, where the

Executive acted hand-in-glove with the State Legislature, colluding with

the Administrator appointed by the State, to achieve the objective of

gerrymandering.

13. Learned senior counsel for the appellant cites State of Madhya Pradesh

& Ors. -vs- Devilal, reported at (1986) 1 SCC 657, where the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that if the State Government were to issue a

notification under the concerned Act for redistribution of the

constituencies in a block after the process of election has started, it

6

would necessarily change the whole pattern of voting in the election,

which would plainly be a typical case of gerrymandering, meaning to

arrange election districts so as to give an unfair advantage to the party

in power by means of a redistribution act or to manipulate

constituencies generally.

14. Learned senior counsel next relies on Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

(DMK) -vs- Secretary, Governor’s Secretariat & Ors., reported at (2020) 6

SCC 548, for the proposition that the express constitutional embargos

of Articles 243-O and 243-ZG do not apply if the proceedings are only

to further the expeditious completion of pre-requisites of a fair election.

15. Again, the appellant places reliance on Kishorchandra Chhanganlal

Rathod -vs- Union of India & Ors., reported at (2024) 13 SCC 237, in

support of the proposition that nothing precludes constitutional courts

from checking the validity of orders passed by the Delimitation

Commission on the touchstone of the Constitution if an order is found

to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to constitutional values.

16. Lastly, the appellant relies on Debabrata Bera & Ors. -vs- The State of

West Bengal & Ors., reported at 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 4861 , to

strengthen the argument that the Board of Ad ministrators of the

Corporation can discharge only the executive functions, as opposed to

the legislative functions, of the Corporation.

17. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 10 and 11 cites State of

Goa & Anr. -vs- Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh & Anr., reported at (2021) 8 SCC

401, to contend that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under

7

Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 136

of the Constitution is not affected as the non obstante clause in Article

243-ZG operates only during the process of election.

18. Learned counsel for respondent no. 9 adds that the mode and manner

of the exercise of delimitation undertaken by the State Government

tantamounts to fraud on power.

19. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 10 and 11, respondent

no. 9 and respondent no. 8 otherwise adopt the arguments of the

appellant in unison.

20. Learned Advocate General, appearing for the KMC, raises a preliminary

objection as to maintainability of the writ petition from which the

present appeal arises, on the ground of bar under Article 243-ZG of the

Constitution of India. By citing State of U.P. & Ors. -vs- Pradhan Sangh

Kshettra Samiti & Ors., reported at 1995 Supp(2) SCC 305 , it is

contended that it is for the Government to decide, and not for the Court

to dictate, the manner in which the panchayat areas and the

constituencies in each panchayat area will be delimited. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court held in the said report that the approach of the High

Court was objectionable insofar as it went into the question of the

validity of the delimitation of constituencies and also the allotment of

seats to them despite the bar under Article 243-O(a).

21. In Devilal’s Case, it is pointed out, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was

considering a situation where the exercise of delimi tation was

8

undertaken after the electoral process had begun, as opposed to the

instant case.

22. The other judgments cited by the appellant are sought to be

distinguished by learned Advocate General on facts.

23. Next relying on the language of Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act,

learned Advocate General argues for the KMC that there is no

restriction in the said provision as to who can be appointed as an

Administrator. Thus, it is submitted, the appellant’s arguments based

on the Administrator being necessarily an Officer of the Corporation are

not tenable in the eye of law.

24. Moreover, it is submitted, the objections raised before this Court were

not urged before the writ court, nor did the appellant raise any

objection before the appropriate authorities despite seve ral

opportunities being given the public in general at every stage of the

delimitation process.

25. Learned Advocate General further contends that under Section 601 of

the KMC Act, the State Government itself has ample power to add,

alter, or modify the Schedules of the KMC Act other than Schedule I,

irrespective of whether any recommendation is made by the

Corporation or not. Thus, the appellant’s contentions in that regard are

irrelevant.

26. Learned Government Pleader, representing the State, adopts the last-

aforementioned argument of the KMC and adds that the delimitation

has already been enacted as law by the State Legislature by way of the

9

KMC (Amendment) Act, 2026. In the absence of any challenge thereto

in the writ petition, the arguments advanced on the ame ndment to

Schedule II of the KMC Act acquire a mere academic character.

27. Having heard learned counsel for the contesting parties, the Court

comes to the following conclusions:

28. The limited conspectus of the present appeal is whether the learned

Single Judge erred in law in refusing to grant any interim protection to

the writ petitioner/appellant. Since the main writ petition is still

pending, we desist from deciding conclusively the merits of the same

and make it clear that the scope of examination in the present appeal is

limited to the prima facie case made out in the writ petition and

whether the writ petitioner/appellant was entitled to any interim order.

29. The first salient feature of the present lis is that the impugned

notification substituting/amending Schedule II has been issued by

virtue of the powers vested in the State Government under Section 601

of the KMC Act. The said Section has two facets.

30. First, the State Government may, by notification, add to, amend, or

alter any Schedule (except Schedule I) of the KMC Act of its own, in

which case the power is discretionary and there is no mandate on it to

do so.

31. Secondly, the State Government shall so add, amend or alter on the

recommendation of the Corporation (KMC), in which case, once a

recommendation is so made, it is mandatory for the State Government

to implement the same.

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32. This distinction between the two scenarios is borne out by the contrast

in language embodied in the Section itself, which uses the expression

“may” for a suo motu addition/amendment/alteration by the State

whereas employs the term “shall” in case such

amendment/addition/alteration is made on the recommendation of the

Corporation.

33. From the chronology of events, as evidenced by the materials on record,

there cannot be any manner of doubt that the impugned amendment

was made by the State Government not suo motu, but on the

recommendation of the Administrator appointed upon dissolution of the

Corporation.

34. By Order No.1188/MA-15011(22)/22/2026-LS-MA SEC dated June 8,

2026, issued by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of

West Bengal on behalf of the Government of West Bengal, Department

of Municipal Affairs, the Corporation was dissolved with immediate

effect under Section 117(1) of the KMC Act.

35. Vide Order No.1189/MA-15011(22)/22/2026-LS-MA SEC of June 8,

2026, immediately thereafter, the erstwhile office-bearers of the

Corporation were directed to vacate office and the then Municipal

Commissioner of the Corporation was designated by the State

Government as the Administrator under Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC

Act to exercise all the powers and duties which may be exercised or

performed by the members or the Mayor-in-Council or any Committee

or the Mayor or the Chairman of the Corporation.

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36. On August 5, 2026, a Notice was issued by the Joint Secretary to the

State Government, publishing the initial draft of the amended Schedule

II of the KMC Act, purportedly making it available for public inspection

with effect from August 5 to August 13, 2026. Conspicuously, in the

said notice itself, it was categorically mentioned that the said draft

describing the boundaries of the projected wards of the KMC was being

published as per recommendation received from the Kolkata Municipal

Corporation.

37. The next link in the chain of events came on August 22, 2026, when

the Administrator of the KMC sent to the Additional Chief Secretary,

Urban Development and Municipal Affairs Department, Government of

West Bengal a list of the old wards of the KMC, together with the new

ward numbers, electoral part nos. and assembly constituency nos.

pertaining to the KMC.

38. On the self-same date, the Additional Chief Secretary passed an order

publishing the draft amendment to Schedule II of the KMC Act for

“information of persons likely to be affected thereby”, granting public

inspection from that date till September 3, 2026.

39. Thereafter, by the impugned Gazette Notification dated September 11,

2026, the amendment to Schedule II was finally notified.

40. Thus, it is crystal-clear that the said amendment to Schedule II was

made under the powers conferred by the second limb of Section 601 of

the KMC Act, on the purported recommendation of the Corporation.

12

41. The next question which inevitably crops up is whether the

Administrator, appointed by the State Government upon dissolution of

the Corporation, could act as the “Corporation” and issue such

recommendation.

42. The entire scheme of the KMC Act militates against such proposition

and indicates the answer to be in the negative.

43. Section 5 of the KMC Act, in no uncertain terms, define s the

Corporation to consist of all its elected Councillors and the State

Government-nominated members. Conspicuously, the language used in

Section 118(1)(b) is not that the Administrator appointed by the State

Government upon dissolution of the Corporatio n shall act as the

“Corporation”, but that such person shall exercise or perform the

powers and duties of the members or the named office-bearers of the

Corporation. None of the members or office-bearers of the Corporation

can claim to represent the Corporation by themselves. By necessary

implication, the Administrator can also discharge only the executive

functions of the individual members of the Corporation as delegated by

the State Government and not exercise the legislative functions of the

Corporation as such.

44. The limited ambit of powers of the Administrator is further highlighted

by Section 117(5) of the KMC Act, which mandates that an election to

constitute “the Corporation” shall be completed before the expiry of six

months from the date of its dissolution.

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45. The consequences of dissolution are enumerated in Section 118, the

different sub-sections of which complement each other. Whereas

Clause (a) of sub-section (1) provides that on dissolution, all the

members of the Corporation, the Mayor-in-Council, Committees, Mayor

and Chairman shall vacate their offices, Clause (b) stipulates that the

State Government shall appoint one or several persons to discharge the

powers and duties of the aforementioned functionaries in the

interregnum. Such appointment, as evident from a conjoint reading of

Sections 117(5) and 118(1), is a stop-gap interim arrangement to

ensure continuity of discharge of the essential functions and duties of

the Corporation functionaries till a new Corporation is elected within

the mandatory period of six months from such dissolution.

46. Although Section 118(1)(b) does not restrict the appointment of

Administrator to the Officers of the Corporation, fact remains that the

ambit of functioning of the Administrator/Administrators is limited to

regular administrative functions and the Administrator cannot

substitute a validly elected Corporation for the purpose of making a

recommendation under Section 601 of the KMC Act. The Administrator

cannot arrogate to herself/himself the legislative / quasi-legislative

function of the Corporation itself to recommend any

addition/alteration/amendment of the Schedules of the KMC Act.

47. Moreover, fact remains that in the present case the Municipal

Commissioner is an Officer of the KMC as per Section 14(1)(a) of the

KMC Act and is paid salary and allowances from the Municipal funds

14

as determined by the State Government. Such Officer cannot be

elevated to act as a duly elected Corporation in the capacity of a

“Corporation” as contemplated in Section 5 of the Act.

48. Another absurdity which would arise if the Administrator exercises

recommendatory power under Section 601 is that whereas the State

Government, acting on its own, has the discretion of amending or not

amending the Schedules of the KMC Act (except Schedule I, of course)

under Section 601, no such discretion is available to it once the

Corporation recommends such amendment or alteration. Taking such

logical thread further, it is the State Government which allocates the

specific powers and duties of the Administrator under the first proviso

to Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act. Thus, theoretically the State

Government itself could then empower the Administrator of its own

choice to make a tailor-made recommendation to it under Section 601

of the KMC Act, in which ca se the mandatory element of such

recommendation would be rendered farcical and meaningless. It would

then be the State Government which would virtually recommend an

amendment to the Schedules to itself and then choose to be bound by

it, denuding the mandatory nature of the recommendation of any

credibility and autonomy whatsoever.

49. Such puppetry cannot be compatible with the scheme of the KMC Act.

The key feature of Section 601 of the KMC Act is the institutional

autonomy vested in the Corporation in making a binding

recommendation to the State Government, which confers authority on

15

the Corporation, an autonomous institution, to decide the delimitation

of its own wards, in other words, its electoral constituencies.

50. In the present case, in view of the Corporation having been dissolved

and the Administrator appointed long back on June 8, 2026, there

could not have been a valid recommendation from the ‘Corporation’

within the contemplation of Section 601 on August 5, 2026, when such

recommendation was cited as the basis of the draft amendment to

Schedule II of the KMC Act. Rather, it was a recommendation by the

Administrator appointed by the State itself, who did not have the

authority in law to arrogate to herself the powers of the Corporation,

acting as the ‘Corporation’.

51. Hence, the very premise and genesis of the draft notification was bad in

law, being violative of Section 601 of the KMC Act. In view of such

genetic defect, the subsequent final publication and consequential

alteration to Schedule II is vitiated by law.

52. The next issue which arises is, whether Article 243-ZG creates an

embargo to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the instant case. The

answer has to be in the negative because of the following reasons:

53. First, the bar under Clause (1) of Article 243-ZG is confined to any law

relating to the delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats to

such constituencies “made or purporting to be made under Article 243-

ZA”.

54. However, in the instant case, the alteration to Schedule II was not

made by any law made by the State Legislature but by the State

16

Government, which is the Executive, under Section 601 of the KMC

Act, which is a statute subservient to the Constitution. That apart,

Article 243-ZA does not specifically cover delimitation prior to the

electoral process but relates to superintendence, direction and control

of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, elections

and laws made in connection therewith.

55. Thus, the bar under Article 243-ZG is not attracted at all in the present

case.

56. In State of U.P. -vs- Pradhan Sangh (supra)

1

, cited by the KMC, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that so long as the panchayat areas

and the constituencies are delimited in conformity with the

constitutional provisions or without committing a breach thereof, the

courts cannot interfere with the same. Thus, even as per the said

judgment, where there was a breach of the relevant provisions, the

courts could interfere. The bar being considered there was

constitutional, being stipulated in Article 243-O(a), and operated in

respect of delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to them

under Article 243-K. However, in the instant case, the amendment to

Schedule II was made under a statutory provision, that is, Section 601

of the KMC Act, which is definitely subject to judicial review under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

1

State of U.P. & Ors. -vs- Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti & Ors. , reported at 1995

Supp(2) SCC 305

17

57. In fact, in State of Goa (supra)

2

, even in case of the constitutional bar

under Article 243-ZG, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that such

bar operates only during the process of election. In the case at hand,

the exercise of delimitation was admittedly not undertaken during any

electoral process or in connection with an election, although it might

have an effect on future elections of the KMC.

58. The Hon’ble Supreme Co urt, in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod

(supra)

3

, after taking into consideration the law holding the field and

several earlier judgments, disapproved the view that the order of

delimitation of constituencies, issued in exercise of statutory powers

under the Delimitation Act, is entirely insusceptible to the powers of

judicial review exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution.

59. In the instant case, the delimitation exercise was undertaken under

Section 601 of the KMC Act, which is a statutory provision subservient

to the Constitution of India and not a Constitutional power. Thus, an

illegal or arbitrary exercise under Section 601 is all the more amenable

to the power of judicial review exercised by the High Court under

Articles 226 and 227, which flows from the Constitution, the Grund

norm of the Indian legal framework, and has been held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

60. In the present case, the manner in which the Corporation was dissolved

mid-term and an Administrator was appointed and the hasty

2

State of Goa & Anr. -vs- Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh & An r., reported at (2021) 8 SCC

401

3

Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod -vs- Union of India & Ors., reported at (2024)

13 SCC 237

18

chronology of events thereafter lends some substance to the appellant’s

arguments that there might have been a method in the madness.

61. Admittedly, on August 5, 2026, when the draft Schedule II was made

available for public inspection, it was done on the recommendation of

the “Corporation”, despite the Corporation being non-existent, since the

earlier Corporation already stood dissolved mid-term and the next

election mandated under Section 117(5) of the KMC Act had not yet

taken place. Strangely, although public inspection was allowed by the

said notice till August 13, 2026, only two days after, that is, on August

7, 2026, the KMC (Amendment) Bill was tabled and made into an

enactment on August 20, 2026.

62. On the very next day, that is, August 21, 2026, the Special Secretary

wrote to the State Election Commissioner. The Administrator, on the

succeeding date, wrote to the Additional Chief Secretary who, on the

very same day, published the draft Schedule II for public inspection.

63. This apparent complicity between the KMC, which has been conferred a

degree of autonomy by dint of its recommendatory power under Section

601 of the KMC Act, with the State, cannot thus be ruled out

altogether, creating an apprehension of arbitrariness and violation of

the spirit of the law, although it would be premature at this stage to

decide whether there was malice in law or any attempt at

gerrymandering.

64. Yet, in view of the above considerations, the writ petition is prima facie

maintainable.

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65. The question of locus standi of the petitioner/appellant is not dented

merely because she did not file any objection to the impugned

notification when public objections were invited. A foundational flaw

hitting at the genesis of an action of the State Government in discharge

of its public functions can very well be assailed by any member of the

electorate by seeking invocation of the power of judicial review of

constitutional courts.

66. The concept of locus standi has undergone much expansion in recent

years and has evolved out of its original restricted conspectus. The

erroneous and unlawful actions of the State and/or failure of the State

to discharge its duties and functions having public ramifications can

always be assailed by a citizen, in the present case an elector and an

ex-Councillor of the very Corporation, the wards of which have been

sought to be subjected to delimitation.

67. The State argues that the statutory amendment brought about to the

KMC Act has not been assailed. However, such amendment i s much

more limited than the alteration to Schedule II which has been assailed

in the present writ petition, and absence of challenge to the

Amendment Act per se does not preclude a challenge to the delimitation

exercise.

68. In any event, the writ petition is still pending and it is always open to

the writ petitioner/appellant to challenge the Amending Act as well by

amending the prayers and pleadings of the writ petition. Such statutory

amendment, if construed to give effect to the delimitation process

20

arising out of the alteration in Schedule II, would automatically also be

vitiated if such alteration itself is set aside.

69. In such view of the matter, in the least, it has to be held that the writ

petitioner/appellant has made out a sufficiently strong prima facie case

in the writ petition to be favoured with interim protection in order to

save the writ petition from being rendered infructuous.

70. However, the learned Single Judge presumably overlooked the legal and

factual implications as discussed above in refusing to grant ad interim

protection to the writ petitioner/appellant.

71. Accordingly, MAT No.1917 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby

modifying the impugned Order dated October 29, 2026 passed in WPA

No.31433 of 2026 by restraining the respondent no. 6, that is, the West

Bengal State Election Commission, from issuing any notification calling

an election to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation on the basis of the

amended Schedule II of the KMC Act as notified in the Official Gazette

vide Notification No.1728/UDM A-15011(22)/57/2026-LS-MA SEC

dated September 11, 2026 till disposal of WPA No.31433 of 2026. The

rest of the said impugned order is not interfered with.

72. It is made clear that the aforesaid observations are tentative in nature

insofar as the final disposal of the writ petition is concerned.

73. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026, filed in the present appeal, stands

disposed of as well.

74. No order as to costs.

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75. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be

furnished to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)