1
Reserved
Court No. - 40
AFR
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 651 of 2021
Appellant :- District Basic Education And Another
Respondent :- Shivkali And 4 Others
Counsel for Appellant :- Awadhesh Kumar
Counsel for Respondent :- Kamal Kumar Kesherwani
Hon'ble Manoj Misra,J.
Hon'ble Jayant Banerji,J.
(Delivered by Manoj Misra, J.)
1.This intra-court appeal arises from a judgment and order of a
Single Judge dated 02.02.2021 in Writ-A No.11578 of 2020 whereby,
the writ petition of the first respondent was allowed with a direction
upon the District Basic Education Officer, Basti (first appellant) and
the Finance and Account Officer (Basic Education), Basti (second
appellant) to compute the amount payable to the petitioner towards
gratuity in terms of the scheme formulated by the Government Order
dated September 16, 2009 and release the same along with interest at
the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing the application for
gratuity till the amount is actually disbursed.
2.In brief, the facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows:-
2 (i).The husband of the first respondent was appointed as
Assistant Teacher on 11.03.1974 in a basic school under the Basic
Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh. Later, he was promoted on the post
of Headmaster. Initially, the age of superannuation was 58 years
which was enhanced to 60 years and, later, to 62 years. Before
enhancement of the age of superannuation to 62 years, by
Government Order No.6369/15-5-93-55/89, dated 23.11.1994, the
benefit of gratuity was introduced to teaching and non teaching staff
of basic education institutions for those who opt to retire on attaining
the age of 58 years. Such option, as per Clause 2 of the Government
2
Order, dated 23.11.1994, was to be exercised within 90 days from the
issuance of the Government Order. This period, however, was
extended by Government Order No.5491/15-5-2002-212/2001, dated
10.06.2002, extracted below:-
“f'k{kk vuqHkkx&5 la[;k& 5491@15 & 5&2002&
212@2001] fnukad 10 twu] 2002
isz"kd]
fnus'k pUnz dukSft;k]
fo'ks"k lfpo]
mRrj izns'k 'kklu]
bykgkcknA
lsok esa]
f'k{kk funs'kd] ¼csfld½ ,oa v/;{k]
mRrj izns'k csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn~]
bykgkcknA
fo"k;%mRrj izns'k csfld f'k{kk ifj"knh; f'k{kd@f'k{k.ksRrj
deZpkfj;ksa ds lsokfuo`frd ykHkkas esa ifjorZu gsrq fodYi
dh lqfo/kk fn;s tkus ds laca/k esa uhfr fu/kkZj.kA
egksn;]
mi;qZDr fo"k;d 'kklukns'k la[;k&
6369@15&5&93&55@89] fnukad 23-11-1994 ds vuqdze esa
eq>s ;g dgus dk funs'k gqvk gS fd mDr 'kklukns'k }kjk iznRr
fodYi dks lqfo/kk ds ykHk ls oafpr jg x;s csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn
f'k{kd@f'k{k.ksRrj deZpkfj;ksa ds laca/k esa fodYi ifjorZu dh
lqfo/kk iznku fd;s tkus dh ekax ij lE;d~ fopkjksijkUr Jh
jkT;iky ;g vkns'k iznku djrs gSa fd m0 iz0 csfld f'k{kk
ifj"knh; f'k{kdks@f'k{k.ksRrj deZpkfj;ksa }kjk lsokfuo`fRr ds ,d
o"kZ vFkkZr~ ftl 'kSf{kd l= eas mudh lsokfuo`fRr gksxh] mldks
igyh tqykbZ rd fodYi ifjorZu dj ldrs gSaA fdUrq ,sls
deZpkjh tks 58 o"kZ dh vk;q ij lsokfuo`fRr dk fodYi nsrs gSa]
dks lsokfuo`fRr ds iwoZ rd fodYi ifjorZu dh lqfo/kk vuqeU;
gksxhA ;g O;oLFkk bl 'kklukns'k ds tkjh gksus dh frfFk ls ykxw
3
gksxhA
2- ;g vkns'k foRr foHkkx ds v'kkldh;
la[;k&bZ&11@753 nl&2002] fnukad 4-6-2002 esa izkIr mudh
lgefr ls tkjh fd;s tk jgs gSaA
Hkonh;
¼fnus'k pUnz dukSft;k½
fo'ks"k lfpoA
2 (ii).Thereafter, on February 4, 2004, Government Order
No.289/79-6-04-28(5)/2004 was issued enhancing the age of
superannuation from 60 years to 62 years and, further, clarifying that
the retiral dues that were to be available on attaining the age of 58
years would now be available at the age of 60 years; and those retiral
dues that were to be available at the age of 60 years would now be
available at the age of 62 years. The said Government Order is
extracted below:-
“csfld ,oa lgk;rk izkIr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa ds f'k{kdksa dh
lsok fuo`fRr
vk;q 60@62 o"kZ
la[;k 289@79&6&04&28¼5½@2004
isz"kd] lsok esa]
Jh gfjjkt fd'kksj f'k{kk funs'kd ¼csfld½
lfpo] mRrj izns'k y[kuÅ
mRrj izns'k 'kkluA
f'k{kk vuqHkkx&6y[kuÅ% fnukad % 4 Qjojh] 2004
fo"k; % ifj"knh; izkFkfed fo|ky;] ifj"knh; mPp
izkFkfed fo|ky; rFkk mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa ds v/;kidksa dh
vf/ko"kZrk vk;q orZeku 60 o"kZ ls 62 o"kZ fd;s tkus ds lEcU/k
esaA
4
egksn;]
'kklu }kjk lE;d fopkjksijkUr ;g fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gS
fd ifj"knh; izkFkfed fo|ky;] ifj"knh; mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;
rFkk lgk;rk izkIr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa esa 'kklu }kjk l`ftr
inksa ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zjr v/;kidksa dh orZeku vf/ko"kZrk vk;q
esa o`f) dj nh tk;sA
vr% Jh jkT;iky egksn; rkRdkfyd izHkko ls ifj"knh;
izkFkfed fo|ky;] ifj"knh; mPp izkFkfed fo|ky; rFkk
lgk;rk izkIr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa esa 'kklu }kjk l`ftr inksa
ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zjr v/;kidksa dh orZeku vf/ko"kZrk vk;q dks
60 o"kZ ls c<kdj 62 o"kZZ fd;s tkus dh lg"kZ Lohd`fr iznku
djrs gSaA QyLo#i 58 o"kZ dh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q ij feyus okys
lsok uSo`fRrd ykHk vc 60 Ok"kZ dh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q ij rFkk 60
o"kZ dh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q ij feyus okys lsok uSo`fRrd ykHk 62 o"kZ
dh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q ij vuqeU; gksxsaA
Jh jkT;iky egksn; ;g Hkh vkns'k iznku djrs gSa fd tks
f'k{kd tqykbZ] 2003 ds i'pkr~ vf/ko"kZrk vk;q iw.kZ dj l=kUr
ykHk ij py jgs gSa mUgsa Hkh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q o`f) lEcU/kh ykHk
iznku fd;k tk;sxkA
bl lEcU/k esa iwoZ esa fuxZr leLr 'kklukns'k mDr lhek
rd la'kksf/kr le>s tk;saxs rFkk mudh 'ks"k 'krsZa ;Fkkor~ jgsxhA
mRrj izns'k csfld f'k{kk ¼v/;kid½ lsok fu;ekoyh] 1981
ds laxr fu;eksa esa vko';d la'kks/ku dh dk;Zokgh 'kklukns'k
tkjh gksus ds rhl fnu ds vUnj lqfuf'pr dj yh tk;sxhA
;g vkns'k foRr fOkHkkx ds v'kkldh; i= la[;k ;w0 vks0
bZ0&11&207@2004 fnukad 04-2-2004 esa izkIr lgefr ds
vUrxZr fuxZr fd;s tk jgs gSaA
Hkonh;]
g0@& gfjjkt fd'kksj]
lfpoA
2 (iii). After the age of superannuation was enhanced from 60
to 62 years, the State Government issued yet another Government
Order No.1754/79-5-09-02/2009, dated 16.09.2009, inter alia,
providing Death-Cum-Retirement Gratuity up to a maximum of Rs.10
lacs to those who opted to retire at the age of 60 years. Clause 5 of the
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said Government Order is relevant and is extracted below:-
“5- lsokfuo`fRrd xszP;qVh
60 o"kZ dh vk;q dk fodYi fn;s tkus ij lsokfuo`fRrd
xszP;qVh@e`R;q xszP;qVh dh vf/kdre /kujkf'k #0 10-00 yk[k
¼#i;s nl yk[k ek=½ rd lhfer gksxhA
2 (iv). The first respondent’s husband, whose date of birth was
01.07.1951, died in harness on 30.06.2010, that is even before he
could attain the age of 60 years. Before his death, first respondent’s
husband had not exercised his option to retire at the age of 60 years.
Consequently, the claim of the first respondent for release of death
gratuity was not acknowledged. As a result, the first respondent filed
Writ-A No.11578 of 2020 for a direction upon the respondents to
release the amount of death-cum retirement gratuity otherwise payable
under Government Order dated 16.09.2009 with interest at the rate of
18% per annum.
2 (v). The appellants contested the claim of the first respondent
on the ground that under the Government Order dated 23.11.1994
gratuity was payable upon exercise of option to retire at the age of 58
years, that too, within three months from the date of issuance of
Government Order. Later, the period to exercise the option was
extended, vide Government Order dated 10.06.2002 (supra), up to the
first day of July of the year at the end of which the incumbent would
have attained the age of superannuation, which means that the option
could be exercised up to the first day of July of the year in which the
incumbent would have attained the age of 58 years and not later.
According to the appellants, the first respondent’s husband had
crossed the age of 58 years without exercising the option therefore, it
would be deemed that he had not opted for the benefit of death cum
retirement gratuity and as such the same was not payable to the first
respondent.
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2 (vi).The case of the first respondent had been that the purpose
of the Government Order dated 23.11.1994 was to provide the benefit
of gratuity to those who opted to retire at the age of 58 years i.e. two
years before attaining the age of superannuation. This age of
superannuation was enhanced by Government Order dated February
4, 2004 from 60 years to 62 years. Thereafter, by Government Order
dated September 16, 2009 the benefit of death-cum-retirement
gratuity up to a maximum of Rs.10 lacs was available to those who
opted to retire at the age of 60 years. The time period to exercise the
option, under the Government Order dated 23.11.1994, was upto three
months from the date of issuance of the said Government Order but
this period was extended by the Government Order dated June 10,
2002 up to the first day of July of the year in which the incumbent
would have attained the age of superannuation. Since the age of
superannuation was increased from 60 years to 62 years and the
retirement benefits that were to be available on completion of 58 years
and 60 years, respectively, were to be made available on completion
of 60 years and 62 years, respectively, vide Government Order dated
04.02.2004 (supra), by necessary implication, this option became
exercisable up to the first day of July of the year in which the
incumbent would have completed the age of 60 years. And since in
terms of clause 5 of the Government Order dated September 16, 2009
the benefit of death-cum-retirement gratuity was available either on
death before completion of 60 years or on retirement at the age of 60
years, the first respondent was entitled to it. Thus, the case of the first
respondent is that as her husband could have exercised his option to
retire at the age of 60 years till the first day of July 2010 and, because
of his death a day before, he could not exercise the option, the claim
for death gratuity could not be denied.
2 (vii). The learned Single Judge accepted the contentions made
on behalf of the writ petitioner (i.e. first respondent herein) and by
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placing reliance on certain decisions, which we shall refer to later,
allowed the writ petition by issuing a direction upon the appellants to
compute the gratuity payable to the writ petitioner in terms of the
scheme formulated by Government Order dated September 16, 2009
with interest etc.
3.We have heard Sri K. Sahi along with Sri Awadhesh Kumar for
the appellants; Sri Kamal Krishna Kesharwani for the contesting
respondent no.1; and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents
2 to 5.
4.Sri K. Sahi, who led the arguments for the appellants, submitted
that the decisions on which the learned Single Judge has placed
reliance have not taken into consideration that the benefit of option to
retire at the age of 58 years, which was later enhanced to 60 years, for
availing the benefit of gratuity had to be exercised, under the
Government Order dated 23.11.1994, within 90 days of the issuance
of that Government Order, and, under Government Order dated June
10, 2002, up to first day of July of the year in which the incumbent
would have completed the age of 58 years. But as this option was
never exercised by the husband of the first respondent up to the first
day of July, 2008, the first respondent was not entitled to the benefit
of death gratuity. It has been contended that the learned Single Judge
has failed to consider the true import of the Government Order dated
June 10, 2002.
5.Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents
submitted that the Government Order dated June 10, 2002 has to be
read not in isolation but with the subsequent Government Orders
dated February 4, 2004 and September 16, 2009. By Government
Order dated February 4, 2004, the age of superannuation was
enhanced from 60 years to 62 years and it was clearly specified that
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those benefits that were available on completion of the age of 58 years
would now be available on completion of the age of 60 years.
Following that, clause 5 of the Government Order dated September
16, 2009 clearly provided that the death - cum -retirement gratuity
would be available to those who opt to retire at the age of 60 years. It
was urged that a combined reading of the three Government Orders
would suggest that the last day to exercise the option for the benefit of
retirement at the age of 60 years on enhancement of the age of
retirement from 60 years to 62 years got extended up to the first day
of July in which the incumbent would attain the age of 60 years.
Consequently, as the date of birth of the husband of the first
respondent was 01.07.1951, he would have completed 60 years on
June 30, 2011 and, therefore, the last date for exercise of option by her
husband would be deemed to be the first day of July, 2010. But since
he died on June 30, 2010 i.e. a day before, he could not exercise his
option to retire at the age of 60 years hence the benefit of death
gratuity as payable under the Government Order dated 16.09.2009
could not be denied. It was thus submitted that the view taken by the
learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity.
6.We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the
record carefully.
7.Before we deal with the rival submissions it would be apposite
to notice a few decisions that have been consistently followed in
connection with grant of relief to such claimants as the first
respondent. The earliest decision on the issue was a Division Bench
decision in the case of Smt. Ranjana Kakkar Vs. State of U.P. and
others: 2008 (10) ADJ 63. The controversy involved in that case was
that the Government had taken a decision to raise the retirement age
of the employees from 58 years to 60 years. Those who did not want
to continue up to the age of 60 years, were given an option to retire at
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the age of 58 years with the benefits of Death-cum-Retirement
Gratuity, pension, family pension and general provident fund. The
employees who did not opt to retire at the age of 58 years and wanted
to avail two years of additional service upto the age of 60 years, were
not to be provided with the benefit of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity.
The other benefits namely pension, family pension and general
provident fund were to be made available to both categories of
employees. In that case, the employee concerned had opted to retire at
the age of 60 years but as providence would have it he died in an
accident at the age of 45 years. The widow of that employee made a
representation to the employer stating that though her husband had
opted to continue in service upto the age of 60 years thereby foregoing
the benefit of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity but as he died much
before attaining that age, he could not be deprived of the benefit of
Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity which would have, otherwise, been
available to him if he had not given an option to retire at the age of 60
years. The claim of the widow was rejected by the employer. The
widow invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. After considering
the true import of the beneficial provisions of the various Government
Orders, the Division Bench of this Court, in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and
13 of the judgment, observed as follows:-
“10. The scheme of the Government Orders dated 24.12.1983 and
21.08.1990 was to give the benefit of the extended age of retirement
from 58 years to 60 years subject to the conditions that those
teachers, who will retire at the age of 58 years, will not be given
benefit of D.C.R.G and those, who want to take benefit of two years
additional service, will get the calculation of pension only upto age of
58 years. These benefits, as it is stated in the opening paragraph of
the Government Order dated 24.12.1983, were given for the purposes
of providing social security to the teachers. These benefits were
available to only those who could live up to the date of their
superannuation to avail these benefits. For those, who unfortunately
10
could not reach the age of 58 years, could not be taken to be covered
by the scheme.
11. The providence to survive upto the age of 58 years could not be
known to the teachers exercising options. The God has not yet
bestowed the man with the powers to foresee or to predict death. The
man arranges his affairs in accordance with the wisdom given to him
by God. The Almighty has reserved the powers of sustaining and
guiding human destiny. No one, who was required to give an option
under the scheme, could have predicted, whether he would survive to
claim the benefits.
12. Where an event cannot be foreseen and a person is invited to give
options with the understanding to arrange his affairs according to his
own wisdom, his choice should not be allowed to work to his
disadvantage after his death. He should be provided with the
maximum of the benefits and social security after his death. Late
Prof. Amarnath Kakkar did not live beyond the age of 45 years. He
may have planned for his affairs upto the age of 60 years, both for
himself and and his family. The God however willed otherwise. His
untimely death made his option unworkable. In order to give him
maximum benefits of the social security, which was the intention of
the Government Order dated 24.12.1983, he could not be denied the
D.C.R.G payable to him and calculated upto his death, for the
completed years of service rendered by him to the University. His life
was cut short and thus his option became unworkable and futile, on
his death at the age of 45 years. He could not be pinned down to his
option by the University, to deprive his family of the gratuity earned
by him and payable to his family.
13. The ‘gratuity’ is defined in Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary
as something given voluntarily, or beyond obligation usually in
return for, or in anticipation of some service. The Black’s Law
Dictionary defined gratuity as a recompense or reward of service or
benefits given voluntarily without solicitation or promise. Late
Amarnath Kakkar could have given up gratuity voluntarily on his
option, if he had the occasion to avail the benefit of two years
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additional service. When he could not avail the benefit and was not in
a position to change his option, he cannot be denied the reward by
way of gratuity payable to him on completing 58 years of service. The
event provided in his option i.e. the extended service up to the age of
60 years, became an impossibility to be performed by him and thus
his option would be deemed to be revoked in law, on principles of
frustration of contract.”
8.In the case of Noor Jahan Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others
(Writ-A No.40568 of 2016, decided on 04.01.2018), the writ
petitioner's husband died at the age of 57 years and before his death,
he could not exercise the option to retire at the age of 60 years and
therefore the benefit of death gratuity available otherwise under the
Government Order dated September 16, 2009 was denied. Aggrieved
by such denial, the widow of the incumbent filed writ petition. A
Single Judge Bench of this Court held as under:-
“Government Order dated 16th September, 2009 provides for
revision of pension and other retiral benefits to the retired employees
of the department of basic education. This Government Order grants
higher benefits w.e.f. 1.1.2006. Clause 4(1) of the Government Order
provides that pension would not be payable to those employees, who
have not completed 10 years of qualifying service, but the employees
who retire upon attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years
would be entitled to gratuity and other service benefits. The
Government Order does not restrict payment of gratuity to an
employee, who is otherwise covered under the scheme just because he
has not attained the age of 60 years. Reference to age of 60 years is
due to fact that age of superannuation under the rule is otherwise 60
years. Position has otherwise been clarified by Clause 5 of the
Government Order, which provides that gratuity would be payable at
the age of 60 years or upon death. The respondents, therefore, were
not justified in rejecting petitioner's claim for payment of gratuity, in
terms of Government Order dated 16.9.2009. The impugned action,
therefore, cannot be sustained. Order dated 8.7.2016 is, accordingly,
quashed.
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A direction is issued to the respondents to compute the amount
payable to petitioner's husband towards gratuity in terms of the
scheme and release the same, within a period of three months from
the date of production of certified copy of this order. The petitioner
shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 8% per annum, from the
date of filing of the application till the amount is actually disbursed.
Writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.”
9.Following the above decision as well as other decisions, in
Writ-A No.17399 of 2019 (Usha Rani Vs. State of U.P. and others),
decided on 07.11.2019, it was held as follows:-
“Following the decision rendered in the judgment of Noor Jahan
(Supra) as well as Smt. Omwati (Supra), matter of Smt. Brijesh
(Supra) for payment of gratuity was allowed by this Court by
quashing the impugned orders by which gratuity was denied.
Similar controversy was also decided by Lucknow Bench of this
Court vide order dated 5.8.2019 passed in the matter of Smt. Mala
Tripathi (Supra) in which Court has taken a similar view and held
that if husband of petitioner died before attaining the age of 60 years
and has not given option for retirement at the age of 60 years,
gratuity cannot be denied only on this ground. Relevant paragraph of
the said judgment is quoted below:-
"Heard learned counsel for the contesting parties and perused the
records.
From perusal of the records, it clearly comes out that the petitioner's
husband died in harness on 26.08.2012 while working as Assistant
Teacher in an aided and recognized institution. It is also admitted
that the family pension has been paid to the petitioner. The only
dispute revolves around the payment of gratuity to the petitioner. The
ground taken by the respondents of the petitioner's husband not
having opted for retiring at the age of 60 years which thus entails
non-payment of gratuity to her at the very out set does not stand to
legal scrutiny inasmuch as it is an admitted case by the respondents
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also that the petitioner's husband died in harness on 26.08.2012
despite his actual date of superannuation being November 2019.
Thus, an employee is only expected to submit an option prior to his
retirement and not decades prior to his retirement. However, this
aspect of the matter has not been considered by the respondents and
even the letter of the Institution dated 19.03.2014, a copy of which
has been filed as Annexure-3 to the petition, does not address the
aforesaid issue.
Accordingly, keeping in view the aforesaid discussions, the order
dated 19.03.2014 (Annexure-3 to the petition) cannot be said to be
valid in the eyes of law. As such, the writ petition deserves to be
partly allowed and is hereby partly allowed. A writ of certiorari is
issued quashing the order dated 19.03.2014. A writ of mandamus is
issued directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner
for payment of gratuity in accordance with law and relevant rules
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified
copy of this order."
Facts of the case and dispute involved in the present case is squarely
covered by the pronouncements made by this Court which are
referred herein above, therefore, under such facts and circumstances,
impugned order dated 30.7.2019 passed by respondent No. 7- Block
Education Officer Block Kadarchauk, Distruict Badaun is hereby
quashed.
Respondents are directed to compute the amount payable to the
petitioner's husband towards gratuity in terms of the scheme and
release the same, maximum within a period of three months from the
date of production of certified copy of this order.............”
10.Following the above decisions, similar orders have been passed
in Writ-A No.11474 of 2020 (Savitri Vs. State of U.P. and others),
decided on 28.07.2021, and several other matters.
11.The issue that arises for our consideration is whether an
employee who, by a certain a date, could exercise an option to retire
14
early to avail the benefit of gratuity, dies before that date, and prior to
his death had not exercised that option, should his heirs be denied the
benefit of death gratuity which, otherwise, would have been available
to them had that employee died at that age after exercising the option.
12.To have an answer to the issue we would have to examine as to-
(a) what had been the purpose of conferment of such benefit on
exercise of the option; and (b) whether the Government Orders that
conferred the benefit had fixed a time period by which that option was
to be exercised, if so, whether the incumbent i.e. first respondent’s
husband had crossed the time limit by which he could have exercised
that option. In so far as the purpose of conferring such benefit is
concerned the same is obvious, which is to provide social security to
those who forego two years of additional service. There could be a
latent purpose as well, which is to encourage people to seek early
retirement may be to streamline the organization. Be that as it may, it
is a beneficial provision to accord social security to the employee and
his or her dependents therefore, an interpretation that promotes and
serves the purpose for which it is crafted must be preferred. Under the
circumstances, whatever the purpose might be, the same is subserved
where the nature exercises the option on behalf of the incumbent by
letting him not survive even upto the last day by which he could have
exercised the option. Therefore, denying the heirs/dependents of such
an incumbent the benefit of social security that, otherwise, would have
been available to them had the incumbent exercised his option would
defeat the very purpose for which the policy was made. Thus, to
ensure that the policy serves its purpose fully, in our view, where a
last date for exercise of the option is yet to arrive and before that date
the incumbent dies, without exercising his option, his dependents
should not be deprived of the benefit which they would have been
otherwise entitled to had the incumbent exercised his option.
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13.In so far as the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants that by Government Order dated June 10, 2002 the option
could have been exercised only upto first day of July in which the
incumbent was to attain the age of 58 years is concerned, the same is
not acceptable. Because a plain reading of the Government Order
dated June 10, 2002 would reflect that it is in two parts. The first part
is in respect of fixing the last date for exercise of option to retire early
to avail the benefits of early retirement whereas the second relates to
the last date for change of the option submitted earlier. In the first
part, the age of retirement is not mentioned. What is stated in the first
part is that those who could not exercise their option to avail the
benefits under the earlier Government Order dated 23.11.1994 may
exercise their option by the first day of July of the year in which they
attain the age of superannuation. The second part gives option to
those, who had already opted to retire at the age of 58 years, to change
their option before they retire. Meaning thereby that if suppose a
person has given an option to retire at the age of 58 years, before he
attains the age of 58 years, he can change the option. Thus, as by
Government Order dated February 4, 2004 the age of superannuation
was enhanced from 60 years to 62 years by specifically providing that
the benefits that were available on retirement at the age of 58 years
would now be available upon completion of the age of 60 years and
those that were to be available at the age of 60 years, would now be
available on completion of the age of 62 years, by necessary
implication, the option that could earlier be exercised upto the first
day of July in which the incumbent was to attain the age of 58 years
became exercisable upto the first day of July in which the incumbent
would attain the age of 60 years.
14.In the instant case, since the date of birth of the first
respondent’s husband was 01.07.1951, he would have completed 60
years on June 30, 2011. Thus, the last day by which he could have
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opted to retire at the age of 60 years would be the first day of July,
2010, which never came in the life time of the first respondent’s
husband. Thus, for all the reasons given above, the benefit of death
gratuity that would have been available to the incumbent's
dependents/ heirs on incumbent's death, before attaining the age of 60
years, under the Government Order dated September 10, 2009, would
be available to his heirs/dependents.
15.For all the reasons above, we find ourselves in agreement with
the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the appeal
fails and is dismissed.
Order Date :- 6.10.2021
AKShukla/-
Legal Notes
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