DR. HANIRAJ L. CHULANI

v.

BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA AND GOA

APRIL 8, 1996

[AM. AHMADI, CJ, S.B. MAIMUDAR AND SU.TATA V.

MANOHAR, JJ.]

Advocates Act, 1961: Section 24(1)(e) read with Section

28(2)(d)-Rule 1 of Maharashtra & Goa State Bar Council Rules, jimned

thereunde1; baning other professionals from enrolment-Whether suffers from

vice

of excessive delegation of legislative power and hence void and inoperative

at

law-Held, no.

A

B

c

Constitution of

India, 1950 : Articles 14, 19(J)(g) & 21 : Rule 1 of

Maharashtra & Goa State Bar Council Rules baning other professionals from D

enro/Jnent-lVhether ultra vires-Held, no.

Section 24(1) (e) of the Advocates Act, 1961 requires persons seeking

admission as advocates

on a

State roll to fulfil such other conditions as

may be specified in the rules made

by the

State Bar Council. Section 24A

bars a person from being admitted as an advocate on a State roll if he is E

convicted of an offence involving m.oral turpitude etc. Section 28(2)(d)

empowers the State Bar Council to make rules as may provide for the

conditions subject to which a person may

be admitted as an advocate on

its rolls.

Section 49(1)(ag) requires the Bar Council of India to indicate

the class

or category of persons who may be enrolled as advocates. f

Rule 1 of the Rules framed by the

State Bar Council of Maharashtra

and Goa in exercise of its powers under section 28(2)(d) read with section

24(1)(e) ofthe Act bars a person, who is otherwise qualilied to be admitted

as an advocate but is either

in full or part time service or employment or

is engaged in any trade, business or profession, from being admitted as an

advocate.

G

The Enrolment Committee of the Respondent

State Bar Council

refused enrolment to :he appellant, qualified to be admitted as an advo­

cate, on his insistance on simultaneously carrying on his medical practice H

51

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. i S.C.R.

A as a surgeon. A Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed

his writ petition. Hence this appeal.

B

c

It was contended for the appellant that

rule 1 of the rules framed by

the respondent Bar Council suffers from the vice of excessive delegation

of legislative power

and hence is void and inoperative at law, that the said

rule

is violative of Article 19(1) (g) of the

Constitution and is not saved by

sub-article (6) thereof, and that the aforesaid rule is violative of Articles

14 and 21 of the Constitution, that in the guise of imposing conditions for t

enrolment the impugned rule has laid down a disqualification for enrol-

ment which

is beyond the scope of section 24A of the Act.

Dismissing the appeal, the

Court

HELD : 1.1. Rule 1 of the Maharashtra and Goa State Bar Council

Rules does not suffer from vice of any excessive delegation of legislative

D power. [72-C]

1.2. Rule 1 has been framed

by the respondent

State Bar Council in

exercise of its rule-making power under section 24(1)(e) read with section

28(2)(d) of the Advocates

Act, 1961. Sufficient guidelines are laid down by

the legislature itself while conferring the said power on the

State Bar

E Councils. These guidelines flow from the nature of the profession to which

admissions are to

be given, the selection of the chosen representatives of

the profession to

be the recipients of such power and the requirements of

the Statute

and the rules framed by the Bar

Couucil of India for the

guidance of all the State Bar Councils. [70-F-G]

F

1.3. Tite Act has been enacted with a view to regulate the right of

advocates to practise

law. It provides standards for identification and

meaSurement of professional deviance. It sets up disciplinary authorities

to chastise and

if necessary, punish members of the profession for n1iscon­

dnct. The punishment may include suspension from practice as well as

G removal of the name from the roll of advocates. Section 49(1) of the Act

confers power

on the Bar

Council of India to make rules, inter alia, for

discharging its functions under the Act. Section 49(1)(ag) r-ead with section

24 of the Act confers wide powers on the Bar Council of India to indicate

the class or category of persons

who may be enrolled as advocates, which

H power wonld include the power to refuse enrolment in certain circumstan-

•

H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA 53

ces. The rules framed by the Bar Council of India, especially relating to A

standards of professional conduct clearly aim at securing high standards

of competence in legal services. The

Act has also entrusted the Bar Council

of India the function to promote legal education

and to lay down standards

of such education in consolation with the

Universities in India and the

State Bar Councils. It is also entrusted with the function to recognize" B

Universities whose degrees in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as

an advocate. Further, the Act has entrusted the power

and the duty to the

elected representatives of the profession constituting the

State Bar Coun-

cils to lay

down the high standards of professional etiquette as expected

of the advocates enrolled

by it. [67-B; D-F; 68-B-C; 67-G-H]

1.4. The role of an advocate is essentially different from the role

of'­

any other profession. He is an officer of justice and friend of the Court.

His status as an officer of justice does not mean the he is subordinate to

c

the Judge. If' only means that he is an integral part of the administration

of-justice. The legal profession inheres certain high traditions which its

D

members are expected to upkeep and uphold. [69-E-F]

1.5. The rule-making power conferred on the

State Bar Councils by

sections 24(1)(e)

read with section 28(2)(d) of the Act is thus inherently

hedged in with the obligation to

frame only such rules regarding enrolment

which would fructify the purpose of having efficient members of the Bar

E

who can stand up to the expectation of the profession to which they are to

be given entry. Any rule which effectuates this purpose will be within the

permissible field. The rule makirig power therefore cannot

be said to be an

unfettered power or that it exhibits effacement of legislative power.

Con­

sequently, rule 1 cannot be said to be void and inoperative at law. [72-A-C] F

A.N. Parasurama11 & 01~. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] 4 SCC 683;

Ajoy Kumar Banerjee & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 3 SCC

127 and Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice & Ors. v. Bar Council of India

& Anr., [1995] 1 SCC 732 referred to.

G

2.1. It cannot be said that the respondent State Bar Council has, by

enacting rule 1 of its Rules, imposed any unreasonable restriction on the

fundamental right of the prospective practitioner who wants to enter the

legal profession. Rule 1 restricts entry of a professional

who is otherwise

qualified for being enrolled

as an advocate if he is already carrying on any H

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A other profession. Legal profession rei111ires full time attention and would

not countenance an advocate practising two prdf'essions or n1ore at a time.

He has to be a full time advocate or not at all. [72-G-H; 73-A-B)

2.2. An advocate faces examination every day. It is not as if he has

not

to

put in hurd work on his study table in his chamber with or without

8" the presence of his clients. To put forward his best performance as an

advocate

he is required to give whole-hearted

a.,d full time attention to his

profession.

Any llinching from such unstinted attention to his legal

profes·

sion would certainly have an impact on his professional ability and exper·

tise. [74; B-C]

c

D

E

2.3. In the instant case, the appellant insists that he will be a

practising doctor as

well as a practising advocate simultaneously. Such an

insistence

on his part itself would create an awkward situation not only

for him but for his

own clients as well as patients. As a practising advocate

if he gives attention to his clients in his chamber after court hours and if

he is also required to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it

will be very difficult for him to choose whether to leave his clients and go

to attend his patient in the operation theatre or to refuse to his patient. If

he selects to cater to his patient his clients would clamour, his preparation

as advocate would suffer and naturally it would reflect

on his performance

in the court next

day. If on the other hand he chooses to cater to the needs

of his clients and his legal work, his patients

may suffer and may in given

contingency

even stand to lose their lives without the aid of his expert hand

as a surgeon. [73-C,

F-H)

2.4. Litigants are also members of gen~ral public and if in their

F interest any rule imposes a restriction on the entry to the legal profession,

it cannot

be said to be unreasonable. Article 19(6) permits such a

restric·

ti on, in the interest of general public, on tht: exercise of the right conferred

by Article 19(l)(g). Rule 1 cannot therefore be said to be violative of

appellant's right under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution.

[72;

E·F)

G

3. Rule 1 of the respondent's Rules cannot be said to be arbitrary or

unreasonable. The rule carves out a well defined class of professionals

carrying

on other professions and denies to members of this well defined

class entry to the legal profession so long as they insist

on carrying on any

other profession simultaneously

with the legal profession. The said

clas·

H silication has a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved,

•

J•

ll.L. CHU LANI "· BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MA.TMUDAR • .T.J 55

namely, the efficiency of advocates and the better administration of justice A

for which the legal profession is a

partner with the judiciary. Rule

I cannot

therefore

be held to be violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution.

[75; G-H, 76; A]

4. Rule 1 framed by the respondent does not deny the appellant his

right to livelihood. He is already a professional carrying on the profession B

of medical practitioner. He wants simultaneously to be permitted to prac-

tise law "ith a view to earn additional or more livelihood. The rule requires

that unless he gives up that other practice and joins wholeheartedly the

legal profession he cannot be permitted to enter the legal profession. That

rule cannot be said to be laying down a procedure not established by law.

The procedure has been found

well sustained under Article 19(l)(g) read mth Article 19(6). Consequently, rule 1 cannot be said to be violative of

Article

21 the

Constitution. [76; B-E)

c

5. Once it is found that rule 1 falls mthin the parameters of rule

making power as entrusted

by the legislature to the State Bar

Councils as D

per section 24(1)(e) read mth section 28(2)(d), it cannot be said that the

State

Bar

Council has laid down a dfsqualification for enrolment which is

,.. beyond the scope of Section 24A of the Act. [76; G, F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6876 of

1996. E

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.92 of the Bombay High

Court in W.P. No. 2584 of 1992.

Ms. Indira jaising, V.K. Garg, Rajeev Kr. Singh and Sanjay Parikh,

for the Appellant. F

V.B. Joshi and Alok Singh for the Respondents .

Maninder Singh for Medical Council of India.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. MAJ.MUDAR, J. Leave granted.

A short but an interesting question falls for determination in the

present case. It runs as under :

G

"Whether the respondent-State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa H

A

B

c

56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

i

was justified in refusing enrolment of the appellant as an advocate

under the Advocates Act,

1961 as he is a medical practitioner who

does not want to

give up his medical practice but wants simul­

taneously to practice

law.

11

In order to appreciate the contours of controversy centering round this

question, a

few relevant facts leading to these proceedings arc required to

be noted at the outset.

The appellant

is a permanent resident of Bombay. He is a medical

practitioner (coloreetal surgeon) since

1970. During the continuance of his

said profession

as a medical practitioner, the appellant joined LL.B. De­

gree Course and obtained Degree of Bachelor of Law on 4th March

1991.

Thereafter the appellant applied to the respondent State Bar Council of

Maharashtra

& Goa for being enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates

Act,

1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). This application was moved

by the appellant on 26th July

1991. The appellant insisted that even though

D he is a medical practitioner he is entitled to

siml!ltaneously carry on the

profession

as an

advocate. The Enrolment Committee of the respondent­

State Bar Council rejected his request for being enrolled

as an advocate

simultaneously with his carrying on

his medical practice as a surgeon. The

appellant

was ultimately informed on 16th November 1992 that his applica-

E tion for enrolment as an advocate was rejected. He was also supplied a

copy of the reasons for 'refusal for grant of a sanad'. The appellant feeling

aggrieved by the said refusal filed

writ petition No. 2584 of 1992 in the High

Court of Bombay. After hearing the petitioner

' Division Bench of the

High Court summarily dismissed his writ petition on 14th December 1992.

It is thereafter that the appellant moved the present proceedings by way

F of special leave petition. By an order dated 30th November 1993 delay in

filing the special leave petition

was condoned and notice was ordered to

be issued to the Bar Council of Maharashtra

&

Gpa with a direction that

the notice

\viii state that the matter will be disposed of at the

notice stage

itself. Subsequently after hearing the learned senior counsel for the appel-

G !ant by an order dated 21st September 1995 notice was ordered to be issued

to Bar Council of India

as well as the Medical Council of India.

Rival Co11te11tio11s

We have heard the learned senior advocate for the appellant as well

H as the learned advocates for the respondents in support of their respective

..

•.

H.L.CHUlANI v. BARCOUNCILOFMAHARASHTRA[MAJMUDARJ.] 57

stands. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that Ruic (1) A

framed by the respondent-Bar Council of Maharashtra under Sections

28(2) and 24(1)(e) of the Act was ultra vires and illegal. In this connection

she submitted that

in so far as the said rule prohibits a person who is

otherwise qualified to be admitted as an advocate from being enrolled as

an advocate if he is carrying on any other profession like medical profes- B

sion in the present case, it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of

legislative power and even otherwise the said rule

is unconstitutional being

violative of Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and

is not saved by sub-ar­

ticle (

6) thereof as it imposes unreasonable restriction on the right of a

citizen to pursue

any profession of his choice and that the rule is equally

violative of Articles

14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as it seeks to C

deprive right of livelihood to the appellant in a most unreasonable manner.

It was contended that there was nothing obnoxious or illegal in a practising

doctor insisting on being enrolled

as an advocate and in carrying

en

practice both as a medical practitioner as well as an advocate. As the

medical profession cannot be said to be in any

way less dignified profession D

and once the appellant is found to be qualified to be enrolled as an

advocate as per the Act, the State Bar Council by framing such a rule could

not have restricted his entry to the profession of advocates especially when

the appellant

was ready to give an undertaking that during court hours he

would not carry on his medical profession. Learned counsel appearing for

the State Bar Council on the other hand supported the decision of the High

E

Court and contended that the rule framed by the State Bar Council does

not suffer from any vice nor was it violative of any of the fundamental rights

invoked by

t.he appellant for getting it voided on that score. It may be stated

ihat the Medical

Council of India to whom notice was issueed has referred

this matter to its Executive Committee which

was of the view that Medical F

Council of India has no objection to

llhy medical practitioner holding

registerable recognised medical certificate

who is also qualified in law,

practising medicine and law

simultaneously .

In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions the following points G

arise for our determination. ·

1. Whether impugned Rule (1) framed by the State Bar Council of

Maharashtra

& Goa suffers from the vice of excessive delegation

of legislative power and hence

is void and inoperative at law. H

58

A

SUPREME COURT REPORT~ 1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

2. Whether the said rule is violative of Article 19)(l)(g) and is not

saved by sub-article ( 6) thereof.

3. Whether the aforesaid rule is violative 9f Articles 14 and 21 of

the Constitution.

B We shall deal with the aforesaid points in the same sequence in which

they

are noted. However, before dealing with them it is necessary to have

a glance at the relevant statutory settings in the light of which the aforesaid

points will have to be considered.

C

Statutmy Provisions

The genesis of the advocates Act, 1961 is found in the felt need for

providing a uniform

and well-knit structure of

lega) profession which plays

pivotal role in strengthening the system of administrative justice

in the

country.

It

is axiomatic that a properly equipped and efficient Bar can play

D a pre-eminent role not only in the system of justice but also in the

constitutional government

and rule of law. Realising the importance of an

independent/integrated Bar, the India Bar Committee appointed by

Government of India

in 1951 recommended, inter alia, the constitution of

an All India Bar Council, State Bar Councils, a common roll of advocates

E

F

and complete autonomy to the Bar in matters relating to qualification,

administration, discipline, etc. of members of the profession. In 1958 the

Law Commission in its fourteenth

report on the Reform of Judicial Ad­

ministration endorsed the recommendation of the All India Bar Committee

and urged the Government to implement the sa;me. In 1959, the Legal

Practitioners

1

Bill incorporating the recommendations was introduced in

Parliament which was later adopted with the changed name of Indian

Advocates Act. 1961.

Though the demand for a unified All India

Bar initially emerged

mainly, if not wholly, as a protest against the monopoly of the British

Barristers on the 'Original

Side' of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts

G and the invidious distinctions between the barristers and non-barristers,

after independence it assumed

the status of a professional claim and a

national necessity in the search for

better delivery of justice to the people.

It was

as,,umed that a unified Bar for the whole country with monopoly in

legal practice and autonomy in matters of professional management would

H advance the cause of justice in society. The role of the profession in the

.,

..

H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMLIDAR, J.J 59

national movement for Independence and the professional standards dis- A

played by native lawyers including Vakils, Pleaders and Mukhtars, con­

vinced Parliament

to adopt the Advocates Act giving a unique status and

structure

to the Indian Bar.

The Advocates

Act amended and codified the law relating to legal

practitioners and provided

for the constitution of an All India Bar. The

complete control and jurisdiction regarding enrolment of advocates and

their discipline, which had

all along been with the High Courts, stood

transferred to the Bar Council of

India and State Bar Councils. The Bar

Councils have become complete autonomous bodies

with elected repre-

B

sentatives of advocates. C

Every

State Bar Council has (a) one or more Disciplinary Commit­

tees; (b) an Executive Committee consisting of live members; ( c) an

Enrolment Committee consisting of three members; and such other com-

mittees

as may be found necessary. D

The Act came into force with effect from 19.5.1961. The dictionary

of the Act

is to be found in Section 2, clause (a) whereof defines an

advocate

as a person entered in any roll under the provisions of the Act

as such and the term 'roll' according to clause (k) means a roll of advocates

prepared and maintained under the Act. Section 3 provides that there shall

be a Bar Council for each of the

States to be known as the Bar Council of

that State. Section 4

next provides for a Bar Council for the territories to

which the Act extends to be known as the Bar Council of India. The

functions of the Slate Bar Council and the Bar Council of India have been

E

set out in Sections 6 and 7 respectively. The functions of the State Bar F

Council include admission of persons

as advocates on its roll, preparation

and maintenance of such roll, safeguarding the rights, privileges and inter-

ests of advocates

on its roll and to do all things necessary for discharging

the above functions. The functions of the Bar Council of

India include the

laying down of standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advo-G

cates and for safeguarding their rights, privileges and interests. Chapter

Ill

which deals with

"Admission and Enrolment of Advocates" comprises of

Sections

16 to 28. Section 16 provides that there shall be two classes of

advocates, senior advocates and other advocates; Section 17 sets out how

every

State Bar Col'Ileil shall prepare and maintain a roll of advocates;

Section

18 deals with the transfer of name of an advocate from one

State H

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A to another; Section 19 enjoins upon every State Bar Council to send a copy

of the roll of advocates to the Bar Council of India; Section 20 makes

special provision

for enrolment of every

advo<;ate who was entitled to

practise

in the Supreme Court immediately before the appointed day and

whose name

is not entered in the roll of the State Bar Council; Section 21

B

c

D

E

F

relates to the fixation of seniority; Section 22, provides for issuance of

certificate of enrolment and Section

23 confers the right of pre-audience

on the Attorney General of India, the Solicitor General of India, the

Additional Solicitor General of India, etc. Section

24 to the extent it is

relevant for our purpose provides as under :

"24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State 'roll. -

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made

thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted

as an

advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions,

namely:

(a) he

is a citizen of India;

(b)

he has completed the age of twenty-one years; and

(c) he has obtained a degree in law -

(d) ...

( e) he fulfils such other conditions as may be specified in the rules

made by the State Bar Council under this Chapter;

(f) ...

Section 24-A provides that no person shall be admitted as an advocate on

G a State roll, for the period indicated in the proviso, if he is convicted of an

offence involving moral turpitude, or if he

is convicted of an offence under

the provisions of Untouchability (Offences) Act,

1955 or if he is dismissed

or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge

involving moral turpitude; Section

25 indicates the authority to whom

applications for enor!ment

may be made; Section 26 provides for the

H disposal of such applications; Section 26-A confers power on the State

Bar

r

..

'

>•

11.L. CHU LANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJ MUD AR, J.) 61

Council to remove any name from its roll; Section 27 provides that where A

a State Bar Council has refused application of any person for admission as

an advocate, no other State Bar Council shall entertain his/her application

for admission

on roll except with the previous consent of the former and

of the Bar Council of India. Section

28 confers power on a

State Bar

Council lo make rules to carry out

the purposes of the Chapter which may

in particular, inter

<;1lia, provide fort.he conditions subject to which a person

may be admitted as an advocate on its roll. Chapter IV deals with the

"Right to Practise". Section 29 says that subject to the provisions of the Act

and

any rule made thereunder there shall, as from the appointed day, be

only one

class of persons entitled to practise the profession of law, namely,

advocates. According to Section 30 every advocate whose name is entered

in the Stale roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the

territories to which the Act extends

in all courts including the Supreme

Court of India, before any Tribunal or person legally authorised lo take

evidence and before any authority or person before whom such advocate

is, by or under any law for the time being in force, entitled to practise.

Section

33 further provides that no person shall, on or after the appointed

day, be entitled to practise in any court or before any authority or person

unless he is enrolled as an advocate under the Act. Chapter V deals with

11

Conduct of

Advocates

11

• Under Section 35 where on receipt of a complaint

or otherwise a Stale Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate

B

c

D

on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer E

the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Section 37 provides for

an appeal to the Bar Council of India against an order made by the

disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council. Section 36 provides that

where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, the Bar Council of India has

reason to believe that any advocate whose name

is not entered on any

State F

roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct,

it shall refer the

case to the disciplinary committee. Any person aggrieved by an order made ..- by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under Section 36

or 37 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Section

38 of the Act. The powers of the disciplinary committee have been

enumerated in Section

42. Chapter VI deals with 'Miscellaneous' matters. G

Having noted the relevant provisions of the Act it will be apposite to

consider the scheme underlying the Act. This Court has an occasion to

consider this very scheme

in the case of Indian Council of Legal Aid &

Advice &

Ors v. Bar Council of India & Anr., [1995] 1 SCC 732. A three H

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A member Bench of this Court presided over by one of us A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.

had ·to consider whether Rule (9) framed by the Bar Council of India

barring enrolment to persons

who had completed 45 years of age was

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India being discriminatory,

unreasonable and arbitrary. While considering the said question the

fol-

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

lowing pertinent observations were made on

ti\e scheme of the Act in para

6 of the Report :

"We have briefly noticed the relevant provision of the Act in the

earlier part of this judgment.

We may now briefly indicate the

scheme. Before

we do so it may not be out of place to mention

that the profession of law

is one of the oldest professions and was

practised in one form or the other

in the hoary past. After the

advent of the British in India, certain rules in regard to the practise

of

law were introduced. Before independence there were Mukhtars

and Vakils

who were permitted to practise law in moffusil courts

even though not all of them were Law graduates. However, slowly

and gradually they were allowed to .wither

away and their place

was taken by pleaders who were, after securing a degree in Law,

permitted

to practise at the district level. Those who were enrolled

as advocates could practise in any court subordinate to the High

Court including the High Court. The difference between a Pleader

and an Advocate was merely on account of the fee charged for

enrolment. After independence, came the Act which was enacted

"to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners

and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an all-India

Bar". The Act creates an all-India Bar with only one class of legal

practitioners, namely, advocates, who of course arc classified as

senior advocates and other advoca\es (Section 16). The general

superintendence of ethics and etiquette of the profession

is the

responsibility of the Bar Councils created under the Act and they

have been charged

with the duty to punish their members for

misconduct. The Act envisages the existence of a Bar Council for

every State. The function of admission of persons

as advocates is

entrusted to every State Bar Council which is required to prepare

and maintain a roll for that purpose. While disciplinary jurisdiction

is conferred on the State Bar Councils to punish its members for

misconduct, it

is at the same time charged with the duty to

safeguard their rights, privileges and interests. They must perform

...

H.L. CHULA I "· BAR COU CIL OF MAHARASHTRA (MA.TMUDAR J.] 63

all the functions conferred on them by or under the Act and do A

everything that is necessary to discharge the functions set out in

Section 6. So far as the Bar Council of India is concerned, its

functions arc of a more general nature, e.g., to lay c.lo\vn standards

of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, to safeguard

their rights, privileges and interests, to supervise and control the

working of the State Bar Council, to promote legal education, to

recognise universities, to organise legal aid to the poor and to

perform all other functions conferred by or under the Act and do

everything that may be necessary to discharge the functions

enumerated in Section

7. Besides the above it too is required to

exercise discipline and control over the members of the profession.

Thus the functions are divided between the State Bar

CounCils and

the Bar Council of India, although

for obvious reasons overlaps

are unavoidable. The rule-making power has been conferred

on

the State Bar Councils under Sections 15 and 28 and on the Bar

Council of India under Section

49 of the

Act."

While considering the relevant roles of the State Bar Councils and the Bar

Council of India

as envisaged by the Act following pertinent observations

were made

in paragraph 11 of the Report :

11

lt seems Parliament while enacting the Act created agencies at

the State level as well as at the Central level in the form of State

B

c

D

E

Bar Councils and Bar Council of India and invested them with

rule-making powers on diverse matters touching the legal profes­

sion, presumably because it must have realised that matters per­

taining to the profession are best left to informed bodies F

comprising of members of the said profession. However,

while

doing so it provided for basic substantive matters, e.g., eligibility

for entry into the .profession (Section

24), disqualification for

enrolment (Section 24-A), authority entitled

to grant admission

(Sections

25 and 26), the authority which can remove any name G

from the roll (Section 26-A), etc., and placed them within the

domain of a State Bar Council. Thus it

is the

State Bar Council

which alone must decide the question of enrolment of an applicant

on its roll.

Under Section 24 a person who is citizen of India and

p-Ossesses a degree in Law becomes qualified to be admitted as an

advocate if he has completed twenty-one years of age, subject of H

A

B

64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. l S.C.R.

course to the other provisions of the Act. No doubt he must fulfil

the other conditions specified in the ru

1

1es made by the State Bar

Council [Section 24(l)(e)]. Every person whose name

is entered

in the list of advocates has a right to practise in all courts including

the Supreme Court, before any

tribunal or other authority. It is,

therefore, within the exclusive domain of the State Bar Councils

lo admit persons

as advocates on

thei,r rolls or to remove their

names from the rolls.

11

In the light of the aforesaid statutory settings i\, therefore, becomes clear

that it

is for the concerned

State Bar Councils by promulgating appropriate

C rules to regulate the entry of persons seeking to join legal profession. The

respondent-Stale Bar Council of Maharashtra

& Goa in exercise of its

powers under

Section 28(2)(d) read with Section 24(1)(e) of the Act has

framed rules

in this connection. Rule (1) with which we are concerned

reads as under :

D

E

F

G

H

''1. A person \Vho is otherwise qualified to be admitted as an

Advocate but is either in full or part time service or employment

or is engaged in any trade, business or profession shall not be

admitted as an Advocate.

Provided however that this rule ~hall not apply lo :

(i) Any person who

is a Law

Officer of the Central Gover­

ment or the Government of a State or of any Public corpora­

tion or body constituted by Statute.

For the purpose of this clause a "Law officer" shall mean a person

who

is so designated by the terms of his appointment and who by

the said terms is required to act and/or plead in Court on behalf

of

his employer.

(ii) Any person who

is an Articled

Clerk of an Attorney;

(iii) Any person who

is an assistant to an Advocate or to an

Attorney who

is an Advocate;

(iv) Any person who is in part-time

service as a Professor, Lecturer

or Teacher-in-law;

••

1

>

H.L. CHULAN! "· BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 65

(v) Any person who by virtue of being a member of a Joint Hindu A

Family has an interest

in a joint Hindu Family business, provided

he does not take part

in the management

thei;cof; and

(vi) Any person who is not personally engaged in any business

but

is a sleeping partner in a firm doing business, provided

that

in the opinion of the Bar Council of Maharashtra the

nature of the business

is not inconsistent with the dignity of

the profession.

(vii) Any person who

is a Director or Chairman of the Board

of Directors of a company with or without

any ordinary sitting

fees,

provided none of his duties are of an executive character

and he

is not a Managing Director or a Secretary of the said

company, or of

any other company.

B

c

(viii) Any person who has inherited or succeeded by survivor­

ship to a family business but who

is not personally participat- D

ing in the management thereof.

(ix) Any person who either prior to or after his application

for enrolment under Section

24 holds or continues to hold a

share with others in

any business which descended to him by

survivorship or inheritance or by Will provided he does not E

personally participate in the management thereof.

(x) Any person who reviews Parliamentary Bills for a

remuneration, edits legal text-books at a salary, does !!press

vetting

11

for ne\vs-papers, sets and examines question papers

F

or is a part-time teacher or lecturer or and assistant to an

editor of a La\v journal provided his hours or \Vork and/or

engagement <lo not conflict with the hours of court, and

subject to the rules ag<iinst advertising and full-time employ­

ment to which an Advocate after enrolment is subject to, is

engaged in broadcasting, journalism, lecturing and teaching G

subjects, both legal and non-legal.

(xi) Any other person or class of persons as the Bar Council

may from time to time exempt.

11

The said rule which is impugned in the present proceedings clearly bars H

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A an otherwise qualified person from being enrolle\! as an advocate if he is

engaged in any other profession. It is based qn the premise that an

advocate must devote

his full time and attention to the legal profession. It is because of the aforesaid provision in the rule that appellant's entry to

the legal profession is denied by the respondent-State Bar Council as the

B

c

appellant is already an active medical practitioner carrying on his profes­

sion as a surgeon and which professional activity he insists on continuing

simultaneously with being an advocate though

as submitted by his learned

senior counsel the appellant

is willing to stagger the time during which he

would carry

on either of the two professions in the course of the day. At

this stage also it

is necessary to note that the Bar Council of India has also

framed rules called Bar Council of India Rules in exercise of its powers

under

Section 49 of the Act. In Chapter III of Pa~t VI of the Rules dealing

with the 'Conditions for right to practice', are found rules framed under

Section 49(l)(ah) of the Act which deals with 'the conditions subject to

which an advocate shall have the right to practise and the circumstances

D under which a person shall be deemed to practice

as an advocate in a

court'. The relevant rule

is Rule 2 which states that an Advocate shall not

enter into a partnership or any other arrangement for sharing remuneration

with any person or legal practitioner who is not an Advocate.

Our attention

was also invited to Rule 47 found in Section VII of Chapter II part VI of

the said Rules dealing with 'Standards of Professional Conduct and

E Etiquette' which contains rules framed by the

B~r Council of India under

Section 49(1)(c) of the Act read with the provi~o thereto. The aforesaid

rule-making power pertains to Standards of professional conduct and

etiquette to be observed

by the advocates. This rule states that an advocate

shall not personally engage

in any business;

but he may be a sleeping

F partner in a

firm doing business provided

that, in the opinion of the

appropriate State Bar Council, the nature of the business is not inconsistent

with the dignity of the profession. This rule framed by the Bar Council of

India

was sought to be contrasted with the impugned rule framed by the

respondent-State Bar Council.

It was submitted that as per Rule 47 framed

by the Bar Council of India an advocate is not all,,wed to personally engage

G in any business. The said rule does not prohibit

him from carrying on any

other profession while the impugned rule bars the entry of even a

profes­

sional carrying on any other profession which is equally dignified from

being enrolled

as an advocate.

H

It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions and the

~-

H.L CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 67

relevant rules that we now proceed to deal with the points for determina-A

tion that have fallen for our consideration.

Point No. 1

So far as the question of excessive delegation of legislative power is

B

concerned we must note at the outset that the Act has been enacted, as

seen earlier, with a view to regulate the right of advocates to practise law.

The rules framed by the Bar Council of India especially relating to stand-

ards of professional conduct and etiquette clearly aim at securing high

standards of competence in legal services and seek to strengthen profes-

c

sional relationship among its members and promote the welfare of the

society

as a whole. Specific norms have been laid down in respect of

conduct of the persons practising the profession vis-a-vis

the public, the

court, the client, the opposite lawyer and professional

brethren. Lawyer's

duty to train juniors and impart free legal aid to poor

is part of the ethics.

The code thus provides standards for identification and measurement of

D

professional deviance. As noted earlier the Act besides highlighting the

essential functions of Bar Council of India provides for enforcement of the

..

same and sets up disciplinary authorities to chastise and, if necessary,

punish members of the profession

for misconduct. The punishment may

include suspension from practice

as well as removal of the name from the

E

roll of advocates. Section 49(1) confers power on the Bar Council of India

to make rules, inter alia, for discharging its functions under the Act.

Section

49(1)(ag) when read with section 24 of the Act confers wide powers on the

Bar Council of India to indicate the class or category of person

who may

be enrolled

as advocates which power would include the power to refuse

enrolment in certain circumstances. The obligation to maintain the dignity

F

and purity of the profession and to punish erring members carries with it

the power to regulate into the profession with a

view to ensuring that only

profession-oriented and service-oriented people join the Bar and those not

so oriented are

kept· out. The role of an advocate is essentially different

from the role of any other profession.

An advocate is said to belong to a

G

noble profession. That Act itself envisages the

State Bar Councils who are

the elected peers of advocates themselves to

lay down the standards for

the professional conduct and etiquette. That would naturally bring in its

wake the power to regulate entry to such a noble profession.

It is said that

law

is a jealous mistress that calls for undivided loyalty and unflinching

attention from her devotees. Dry drudgery of desks' dead wood

is the H

)

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A essential requirement of an advocate aspiring to Win laurels in the profes­

sion. The attack on the impugned rule

on the ground of excessive delega­

tion of legislative power

will have to be examined

1n the light of scheme of

the Act which has entrusted the power and th<; duty to elected repre­

sentatives of the profession constituting the State Bar Councils to lay down

B

c

the high standards of professional etiquette as expected of the advocates

enrolled by it.

It is pertinent to note that the Act has entrusted to the Bar

Council of India, amongst others, the functions

to1 promote legal education

and to lay down standards of such education in consultation with the

Universities in India imparting such education and the State Bar Councils.

The Bar Council of India

is entrusted with the function to

reCO!,'llise

Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolments as

an advocate and for that purpose to visit and inspect Universities or cause

the State Bar Councils to visit and inspect Universities with such directions

as it may give in this behalf. It conducts seminars and organise talks on

legal topics by eminent jurists and publishes journals and papers of legal

D interest. In this

connection, it also exercises general supervision and control

over the State Bar Councils. It is also entrusted with the task of promoting

and supporting law reform. All these provisions

,as laid down by

Section 7

of the Act leave no room

for doubt that even prior to the enrolment as

advocate the teaching of law and laying down

pf the curriculum for law

courses are also the tasks entrusted to the Bar Council of India, which

is

E the apex body of professionals monitoring these rµatters in conjunction with

the

State Bar Councils. Thus even at pre-entry stage of an advocate to the

profession

his equipments as a student of law and the requirement of basic

legal education with which he should be armed before he can aspire to be

enrolled

as an advocate are also looked after by the Bar Council of India

F and the concerned

State Bar Council which works under the general

supervision and control of the apex body, namely, the Bar Council of India.

Thus the Bar Council of India

is cast with the duty to take all such steps

as it considers necessary to filter students at the entry stage to the law

course e.g. by providing an entrance test, as well as al the entry point to

the profession, e.g. by providing an examination

'Of a training course before

G enrolment as an advocate. The Act also deals with the topic of regulation

of professional conduct of advocates from the entry point itself.

The concerned State Bar Councils have to monitor the role of

advocates

so long as they continue to practise law after initial entry. As the

H enrolment by the

State Bar Council entitles an advocate after entry to the

•

H.L. CHULM1 v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 69

profession; to practise the noble profession of law and who becomes, by A

such enrolment, an officer of the court, the said entrant can be validly

subjected

by the concerned Bar Council to the strict requirements of the

profession for enabling such an aspirant

to effectively cater to the needs of

the legal profession. The power and the duty entrusted

to the

State Bar

Councils to monitor such entry,

in the light of the nature of the

profession

to which such entry is given would themselves supply the necessary

yardstick and guidelines for the exercise of such power

by the elected body

of advocates constituting the concerned Bar Councils. The scheme of the

Act thus

lay down a complete code for regulating the

l,egal education and

professional equipments of

an aspirant seeking entry to legal profession

from the grassroot

level where he is student of law till he equips himself

with essential legal knowledge and seeks enrolment and even thereafter till

B

c

he practices law and completes his professional career as advocate. Thus,

from the pre-entry point

to legal profession till the exit point from the legal

profession, the Bar Council of India and the

State Bar Council monitor the

career of the legal practioner.

It is the entire scheme of the Act when D

considered in the light

of the nature of the legal profession to which such

entry

is given which has to be kept in view while considering the submission

of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the power

given to the

State

Bar Counci1' to regulate such entries by framing. rules is a piece of

excessive delegation of legislative power.

It cannot be gainsaid that law is

universally

deseribed as an honourable profession. An advocate is an

officer of justice and friend of the court. A conduct, therefore, which

is

unworthy of him as an officer of justice cannot be justified by stating that

he did it

as the agent of his client. His status as an officer of justice does

not mean that he

is subordinate to the judge. It only means that he is an

integral part for the admini,tration of justice. Legal profession

is monop­

olistic in character and this monopoly itself inheres certain high traditions

which its members are expected to upkeep and uphold. Members of the

profession claimed that they are the leaders of thought and society. The

central function

that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than

the administration of justice.

The aforesaid

well established connotations and contours of the

requirements of legal profession themselves supply the necessary guideline

E

F

G

for the concerned Bar Councils to frame rules for regulating the entries of

persons to the profession. As noted earlier, the impugned rule has been

framed

by the Maharashtra

State Bar Council in the exercise of its rule- H

·r

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS, [1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A

making power under Section 24(1)(e) read with Section 28(2) of the Act

Section 24 deals with 'Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State

roll'. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of this

Act,

and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be

admitted as

an advocate on a

State roll, if he fulfils the conditions laid

B

down in the Section. Amongst other conditions are found conditions which

~

the entrant has to fulfil as may be specified by the Rules made by the State

Bar Council under Chapter III dealing with 'Admission and Enrolment of

Advocates'. Section

28 sub-section (2) similarly gives power to the

State I

Bar Council to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in

•

particular such rules may provide the conditions subject to which a person

c

may be admitted as an advocate. Such rule-making power flows from

Section 28(2)( d). Even though the aforesaid rule making power is couched

in wide terms the said power entrusted to the Stat~ Bar Council cannot be

said to be unfettered or unhedged. The said rule-making power draws its

sustinence from the guidelines laid down by the

Act itself which entrusts

the duty to the concerned

State Bar Council to rcgu.late entry to the legal

D profession which has the aforesaid well established connotations and at-

tributes.

The concerned Bar Councils are entrusted by the legislature itself

with the aforesaid rule-making power enabling them to determine the

requirements

of the concerned

State Courts where the new entrants have

to practise and to lay down appropriate conditions regulating such entries.

E

As the power to make rules is entrusted by legislature to the chosen

representatives of legal practitioners

themselves who would be alive to the

requirements

of the concerned

State where the Council functions and the

needs

of the litigating public residing in the

State in the J;ght of the set-up

courts

in the

State concerned, it cannot be said that the the power is in any

way unfettered or uncanalised so

as to amount' to total effagement of

F

legislative control. Sufficient guidelines are laid down by the legislature

itself while conferring such powers on the

State Bar Councils. The

guidelines flow from the nature of the profession to which admissions are

to

be given, the selection of the chosen representatives of the profession

lo be the recipients of such power and the requirements of the

Statute itself

laying down the conditions for regulating the professional conduct

of

G advocates as discernible from various provisions of the Act and the rules

framed by a Central Bar Council itself for the guidance

of all the

State Bar

Councils functioning in the country which are entrusted with the task of

regulating the conduct of legal-profei;sion throughout the country under

the supervision and guidance

of Central Bar Council. The entire edifice of

H

the Act in this connection has to.be kept in view for finding out the relevant

j

' .

H.L CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MATMUDAR. J.J 71

guidelines for enlightening the path of State Bar Councils entrusted with A

the task of framing rules regulating entries of new aspirants who are to be

permitted to enter the fold legal profession.

In this connection the learned senior counsel for the appellant invited

our attention to the decision of this Court in A .N. Parasuran1an & Ors. v.

State of Tamil Nadu, [ 1989] 4 SCC 683 and Ajay Kumar Baiwjee & 01:<.

Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & 01:<., [1984] 3 SCC 127 for buttressing her

submission that legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions to

its delegate. There cannot be any dispute about the settled legal position

B

on this aspect. However, as discussed by us earlier, in the set-up of the

entire scheme of the Act and the rules framed

by the Central Bar Council C

and in the light of the nature of

the power entrusted to the elected body

of advocates themeselves

it cannot be said that while regulating the entry

to the legal profession the Bar Councils would find themselves without

any

yardstick or guideline and would be trading an unchartered sea and

consequently the rules of enrolment framed

by them would fall foul on the D

alter of permissible delegation of legislative power. It is, therefore, not

possible to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel

for the

appellant that the impugned rule suffers from the vice of excessive delega-

tion of legislative power or by providing rule-making power to the

State

Bar Councils for regulating entries of new advocates seeking to join the

profession the legislature

has effaced itself. The power conferred on the State Bar Councils to lay down further conditions for controlling the entries

to the legal profession cannot be said to be an unguided power conferred

E

F

on them. The conditions which the

State Bar Councils can lay down by

rules

rimst be conditions which would be germane to the high and exacting

standards of advocacy expected of the new entrants to the fold of the

profession. Implicit in the conferment of such rule-making power

is the

guideline

laid down by the legislature itself that the conditions must be

commensurate with the fructification of the very purpose of the Act of

putting the profession of advocates on a sound footing

so that the

con­

cerned new entrant can well justify his role as an officer of the Court

admitted to the fold of the noble ptofession to which he seeks his admis- G

sion. Any conditions laid down by the State Bar Councils for fructifying

· this laudable object of legislature would remain germane to the exercise of

this power and can

well be

said to be logically flowing from it. It cannot,

therefore, be said that any unguided and unchartered power

is handed over

on a platter by the legislature to the concerned Bar Councils for regulating

H

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS! [1996] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A entry to the legal profession. Rule-making power conferred on the State

Bar Councils

is inherently hedged in with the obligation to frame only such

rules regarding enrolment which would fructify

the purpose of having

efficient members of the Bar who can stand up to the expection of the

noble and learned profession to which they are to Ile given entry. Any rule

B

c

D

E

F

which effectuates this purpose will be within ti1e

p~rmissihle field and will

not fall foul on the altar of Article 14 and Article 19(l)(g) read with Article

19(6). Any rule framed for enrolment which does not meet this yardstick

will be a taboo. Hence it cannot be said that the rule making power

entrusted to the

State Bar Councils suffers from absence of any guidelines

or exhibits effacement of legislative power. The fits! point for determina­

tion, therefore,

is answered in the negative by holding that the impugned

rule docs not suffer from

vice of any excessive delegation of legislative

power. That takes

us to the consideration of

Point No. 2.

Point No. 2

It is no doubt true that under Article 19; sub-Article (l)(g) all

citizens have a right to practise any profession, or to carry on the occupa­

tion, trade or business and any profession may include even plurality of

professions. However, this

is not an absolute right. It is subject to sub-Ar-

ticle (

6) of Article 19 which lays down that nothing in sub-clause (g) of the

said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law

in so far as it

imposes, or prevent the

State from making any law imposing, in the

interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise

of

the right conferred by the said-clause. It cannot

lle gainsaid that litigants

are also members of general public and if

in their interest any rule imposes

a restriction on the entry to the legal profession

~nd if such restriction is

found to be reasonable Article 19(1)(g) would not get stultified. It is true

that the appellant as a

citi?.cn of India having obtained the qualification

required for being enrolled as an advocate can legitimately aspire to be

enrolled as an advocate but his aforesaid right

is fettered by the impugned

rule framed by the State Bar Council. We have to consider whether the

G said restriction imposed by the rule is in any way unreasonable. We have

to keep

in view the fact that the impugned rule restricts entry of a person

who

is otherwise qualified for being enrolled as an advocate if he is already

carrying

on any other profession. Question is whether such a person

carrying on other profession can be validly told off the gates by the State

H Bar Council by resorting to the impugned rule. In our view looking to the

•

1

H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA (MAJMLJDAR. J.] 73

nature of the legal profession to which we have made detailed reference A

earlier the State Bar Council would be justified in framing such a rule

prohibiting the entry

of a professional who insists on carrying on other

profession simultaneously

with the legal profession. As we have seen earlier

legal profession requires

full time attention and would not countenance an

advocate riding

two horses or more at a time. He has to be full time B

advocate or not at all. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted

that

even though the appellant is a practising surgeon he undertakes, if

given entry to the legal profession, not to practise medicine during the

court hours. This

is neither here nor there. It is obvious that even though

medical profession also

may be a dignified profession a person cannot

insist that he

will be a practising doctor as well as a practising advocate

simultaneously. Such an insistence

on his part itself would create an

awkward situation not

only for him but for his own clients as well as

patients. It is easy to visualise that a practicing surgeon like appellant may

be required to attend emergency operation even beyond court

h•.;urs either

c

in the morning or in the evening. On the other hand the dictates of his legal D

profession may require him to study the cases for being argued the next

day in the court. Under these circumstances his attention would be divided.

He would naturally be in a dilemma as to whether to attend to his patient

on the operation table in the evening or to attend to

his legal profession

and work for preparing cases for the next

day and to take instructions from

his clients for efficient conduct of the cases next day in the court. If he is

an original side advocate he may be required to spend his evenings and

even late nights for making witnesses ready for examination in the court

next

day. Under these circumstances as a practising advocate if he gives

attention to his clients in his chamber after court hours and if he is also

required

to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it would be

very difficult for

him to choose whether to leave his clients and go to attend

his patient in the operation theatre or

to refuse to attend to his patients.

If he selects the first alternative his clients would clamour, his preparation

E

F

as advocate would suffer and naturally it would

reflect upon his perfor­

mance in the court next

day. If on the other hand he chooses to cater to G

the needs of his clients and his legal work, his patients may suffer and may

in given contingency even stand

to lose their lives without the aid of his

expert hand as a surgeon. Thus he would be torn between two

conflicting

loyalties, loyalty to his clients on the one hand and loyalty to his patients

on the other. In a way he will instead of having the best of both the worlds, H

74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A have worst of both the worlds. Such a person aspiring to have simultaneous

enrolment both

as a lawyer and as a medical practioner will thus be like

'trishanku' of yore

who will neither be in heaven nor on earth. It is

axiomatic that an advocate has lo burn midnight pi! for preparing his cases

for being argued

in the court next day. Advocate face examination every

day when they appear

in courts. It is not as

~f that after court hours

advocate has not to put in hard work

on his

stud~ table in his chamber with

or without the presence of his clients

who may be .available for consultation.

To put forward his best performance

as an advocate he is required to give

whole-hearted and full time attention to his profession. Any flinching from

B

c

such unstinted attention lo his legal profession would certainly have an

impact on

his professional ability and expertise. If he is permitted to

simultaneously practise

as a doctor then the requirement of his full time

attention to the legal profession

is bound to be adversely affected. Conse­

quently however equally dignified

may be the profession of a doctor he

cannot simultaneously be permitted to practise law which

is a full time

D occupation.

It is for ensuring the full time attention of legal practitioners

towards their profession and

with a view to bringing out their best so that

they can fulfil their role

as an officer of the court and can give their best

in the administration of justice, that the impugned rule has been enacted

E

F

by the

State legislature. It, therefore, cannot be said that it is in any way

arbitrary or that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the new entrant

to the profession who

is told not to practise simultaneously any other

profession and

if he does so to deny to him entry to the legal profession.

It

is true as submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the

rule of Central Bar Council does not countenance an advocate simul-

taneously carrying on any business and it does not expressly frawn upon

any simultaneous profession. But these are general rules of professional

conduct.

So far as regulating enrolment to the profession is concerned it

is the task entrusted solely to the State Bar Councils by the Legislature as

seen earlier while considering the schen1c of the Act. While carrying on

that task if the entry to the profession is restricted by the State Bar council

G by enacting the impugned rule for not allowing any other professional to

enter the Bar when he does not want to

give up the other profession bnt

wants to carry on the same simultaneously with legal practice, it cannot be

said that the Bar Council has

by enacting such a rule imposed any un­

reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the prospective prac-

H titioner who wants to enter the legal profession.

•

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H.L. CHULANI v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJMUDAR, J.] 75

Learned senior advocate for the appellant vehemently contended A

that such a rule is not found to have been framed by other State Bar

Councils. In our

view that would not make any difference. We are called

upon to decide the question whether the impugned rule framed

by the

respondent-State Bar Council stands the test of Article 19(1)(g) or not.

While deciding that question whether other State Bar Councils permit

by

their rules entry of other professional to the legal profession, would be an

aspect which would not be strictly relevant.

In our view the impugned rule

does not impose

any unreasonable restriction on the right of the profes­

sional

carrying on any other avocation and insisting on continuing to carry

B

on such profession, while it prohibits entry of such a person to the legal

profession.

If the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant C

is countenanced and any person professing any other profession

is permitted

to join the legal profession having obtained the Degree of

law and having

fulfilled the other requirements of Section

24, then even chartered account­

ants, engineers and architects would also legitimately

say that during court

hours they will practise

law and they will simultaneously carry on their other D

profession beyond court

hours. If such simultaneous practices of profes­

sionals who want to carry on more than one profession at a time are

permitted, the unflinching devotion expected by the legal profession from

its members

is bound to be adversely affected. If the peers being chosen

representatives of the legal profession constituting the State Bar Council, in

their wisdom, had thought

it fit not to permit such entries of

dual prac-E

titioners to the legal profession it cannot be said that they have done

anything unreasonable or have framed an arbitrary or unreasonable rule.

Point No. 3

So far as the challenge to the impugned rule on the touchstone of

Article

14 is concerned it cannot be said that the rule is unreasonable,

arbitrary or capricious

from any angle. On the same ground on which the

F

rule is found not to have fallen foul on the anvil of Article 19(1)(g) as the

impugned rule has to be treated

as imposing a reasonable restriction on G

the said fundamental right

is also, therefore, has to be held not to be

arbitrary or unreasonable from any viewpoint. The rule carves out a well

defined class of professionals carrying on other professions and denies to

members of this well

defined class entry to the legal profession so long as

they insist on carrying on any other profession simultaneously with the legal

profession. The said classification has a reasonable nexus to the object H

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A sought to be achieved, namely, the efficiency of advocates belonging to the

legal profession and the better administration of justice for which the legal

profession

is a partner with the judiciary. The challenge mounted on the

rule in the light of Article

14, therefore, has to fail.

B

c

That leaves out the challenge to the rule in the light of Article 21. It

is difficult to appreciate this challenge. It is no doubt true that right to live

includes right to livelihood. However the appellant is not denied his right

to livelihood.

He is already a professional carrying on the profession of a

medical practitioner.

He wants to have a second string to his bow. He wants

simultaneously to be permitted to practise law with a

view to earn addi­

tional or more livelihood.

So far as his aforesaid demand is concerned the

impugned rule requires that unless he gives up that other practice and joins

wholeheartedly the legal profession

he cannot be permitted to enter the

legal profession. That rule cannot be said to be laying down a procedure

not established

by law. On the contrary that procedure has been found to

D be

well sustained under Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6). Once that

conclusion

is reached the absolute requirement of Artcle 21 would be out

of the

way. Appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to

livelihood

by pursuing two professions, contrary to any established proce­

dure of

law. Consequently the impugned rule cannot be faulted on the

touchstone of Article

21. The third point for determination also, therefore,

E is decided against the appellant.

Before parting we may mention one submission highlighted

by

learned senior counsel for the appellant.

She submitted that under rule­

making power of the State Bar Council conditions of enrolment can be

F imposed. But

in the guise of imposing such conditions, the impugned rule

has travelled further and has laid down a disqualification

for enrolment

which

is beyond the scope of

Section 24-A. It is true as submitted by

learned senior counsel for the appellant that in a

way the enactment of this

rule imposes a disqualification for

enrolment, However once it is found

that the rule falls within the parameters of rule•making power as entrusted

G by the legislature to the State Bar Councils as per Section 24(1)(e) read

with Section 28(2)( d) it cannot be said that such disqualification could not

be legitimately imposed by the State Bar Council. She next submitted that

the Medical Council of India has no objection to the appellant's simul­

taneously practising

law along with his practising as a surgeon.

She also

H submitted that in foreign countries in some of the States such simultaneous

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l

H.L. CH ULAN! v. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA [MAJ MUD AR. J.] 77

practice is permitted. In our view all this is besides the point. Whether the A

Medical Council of India has no objection to their members' practising law

or whe.thcr in foreign countries under certain circu1nstances other profes­

sionals are permitted to simultaneously practise law would not be strictly

relevant

in deciding the short question with which we are concerned,

namely, whether ihe State Bar Council had undertaken an impermissible

exercise in enacting the impugned ru1e restricting entries of other profes­

sionals to the legal profession while they are not prepared to give up their

other professions and

on the contrary insist on simultaneously practising

more than one professions. While deciding this question the wider question

whether there can be a better rule than one framed

by the State Bar

Council would be besides the point and cannot

be of any assistance. Such

a contention, therefore, cannot be of any avail to the learned senior councel

for the appellant.

The aforesaid were the only contentions canvassed on behalf of the

appellant and

as they fail the appeal also fails and will stand dismissed. In

the facts and circumstances of the case there

will be no order as to costs.

P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

B

c

D