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2026:CGHC:81

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Reserved on : 27.10.2025 & 31.10.2025

Delivered on : 02.01.2026

WPS No. 11842 of 2025

1 - Dr. Madhurima Pandey W/o Shri Piyushkant Pandey Aged About 60 Years

R/o Quarter No. 4-B, Street No. 20, Sector 8, Bhilainagar, District Durg (C.G.)

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Technical Education

Department, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)

2 - Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University Through The

Registrar P.O. Newai, District- Durg (C.G.)

3 - Bhilai Institute Of Technology Through The Registrar Bhilai House,

District- Durg (C.G.)

4 - Incharge Principal Bhilai Institute Of Technology Bhilai House, District

Durg (C.G.)

... Respondent(s)

WPS No. 11867 of 2025

1 - Dr. Banita Sinha W/o Shri Rajkumar Sinha Aged About 57 Years R/o

Street 1, Ashish Nagar East Risali, Civil Centre Bhilai, Bhilai, District Durg

Chhattisgarh

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - Kalyan Post Graduate College, Bhilai Nagar, Through Its Chairman, Bhilai

Nagar, District Durg Chhattisgarh

2 - Hemchand Yadav University Through Its Registrar, Durg, District Durg

Chhattisgarh

3 - Dr. Ishwar Singh Bargah Assistant Professor Working At Kalyan Post

Graduate College, Bhilai Nagar, District Durg Chhattisgarh

... Respondent(s)

and

WPS No. 6150 of 2014

1 - M.P. Yadav S/o Lt. Shri K.R. Yadav Aged About 64 Years Former Principal

R/o 62/10, Motilal Nehru Nagar East Bhilai, Distt. Durg. C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - Bhilai Steel Plant Through Chief Executive Officer Ispat Bhawan Bhilai

Steel Plant Bhilai Distt. Durg C.G., Chhattisgarh 490001

2 - Steel Education Society Through Secretary Steel Education Society Ispat

Bhawan Bhilai Steel Plant Bhilai Distt. Durg C.G. 490001

3 - Pro - Vice Chairman Smc Delhi Public School Bhilai And Executive

Director Works Sanyantra Bhawan Bhilai Steel Plant Bhilai Distt. Durg. C.G.

490001

4 - Chairman SMC DPS Bhilai The Delhi Public School Society F - Block East

Of Kailash New Delhi 110065.

5 - Chairman The Delhi Public School Society F - Block East Of Kailash New

Delhi- 110065

6 - Principal Delhi Public School Risali Sector Bhilai Distt. Durg. C.G.

4900006

--- Respondents

For petitioner in WPS No.

11842/2025

:Mr. Prateek Sharma, Advocate.

For petitioner in WPS No.

11867/2025

:Mr. Ghanshyam Kashyap, Advocate.

For petitioner in WPS No.

6150/2014

:Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Sr. Advocate along

with Mr. Harsh Dave, Advocate.

For State :Mr. Santosh Bharat, Panel Lawyer.

For Resp. No. 3 to 6 in

WPS No. 6150/2014

:Mr. Dr. Sourabh Kumar Pande, Advocate.

Hon'ble Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas, J.

CAV ORDER

1.Since an identical issue regarding maintainability of the writ petition

against private educational institution is involved in all the writ petitions,

therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order.

2.From perusal of the records of the case, it is quite vivid that the

petitioners are either teachers of the private or aided educational

institutions, therefore, the point emerged for determination is:-

“Whether the writ petition against private/ aided institution is

maintainable or not?

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3.To ascertain, the Point for determination, this Court has taken note of

the brief facts of each of the case.

4.WPS No. 11842/2025 has been filed by the petitioner assailing the

order dated 29.09.2025 passed by the Principal Incharge of Bhilai

Institute of Technology, Durg by which services of the petitioner have

been terminated with immediate effect on the following facts:-

(A) The petitioner was appointed on 09.02.1994 on the post of

Assistant Professor in respondent/Bhilai Institute of Technology, Durg

and was promoted on the post of Associate Professor vide order dated

15.02.2003 and on the post of Professor vide order dated 24.06.2008.

It is the case of the petitioner that as per clause 3 of the promotion

order dated 24.06.2008, the services of the petitioner can be

terminated by respondent No. 3 by paying three months salary in lieu

of notice and clause 4 prescribes that the teaching staff of the

respondent No. 3 shall be governed by the general terms and

conditions of service as per college code applicable under C.G. Vishva

Vidyalaya Adhiniyam and such other conditions laid down by the

Institution/affiliating University/AICTE from time to time but ignoring

these provisions of the University, college code and the rules framed by

AICTE, respondent No. 3 issued termination order dated 29.09.2025

with immediate effect.

5.WPS No. 11867 of 2025 has been filed by the petitioner assailing the

order dated 24.09.2025 issued by the Principal, Kalyan Post Graduate

College, Bhilai Nagar, District- Durg by which charge of departmental

work has been given to respondent No. 3 who is junior according to the

petitioner on the following facts:-

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(A) The petitioner vide order dated 08.09.2004 was appointed on the

post of Assistant Professor and joined on 13.09.2004 on the said post

in Kalyan Post Graduate College, Bhilai Nagar, District Durg which is a

government-aided institution affiliated to Hemchand Yadav University,

Durg. Respondent No. 3 was also appointed on the same date and

joined on 13.09.2004 and he was subsequently transferred in 2004 to

another institution as Principal, where his salary and allowances were

paid by the said management. The case of the petitioner is that on

superannuation of one Dr. (Smt.) Pushpalata Sharma on 31.08.2023,

the Principal, the charge of Head of Department (Faculty of Education)

was given to the petitioner and vide impugned order dated 24.09.2025,

the respondent Principal withdrew the departmental charge from the

petitioner and handed over it to respondent No. 3, who is junior to the

petitioner.

6.WPS No. 6150 of 2014 has been filed by the petitioner assailing the

order dated 10.03.2014 by which petitioner’s salary was re-fixed by the

Steel Education Society directing the School Management Committee,

Delhi Public School to pay the dues of the petitioner on the following

facts :-

(A) The petitioner was appointed on the post of Principal, Delhi Public

School, Bhilai on 04.03.1996 and served continuously from 15.05.1996

to 18.04.2013. The School Managing Committee approved extension of

service up to 31.03.2015 vide order dated 28.03.2013, but due to

internal management disputes, the extension was neither

communicated nor implemented and the petitioner was abruptly retired

on 18.04.2013 but the petitioner’s retiral dues for Rs. 30,76,690/- have

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not been released and only partial payments (gratuity Rs. 10,00,000/-

and Rs. 11,39,130/-) were made. It is also case of the petitioner that

after retirement, the respondents issued the impugned order dated

10.03.2014, retrospectively revising the petitioner’s salary, excluding

approved increments, MACPS and stagnation benefits and thereby

reducing retiral dues which have been challenged in this writ petition.

7.Learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No. 11842/2025 Mr. Prateek

Sharma would submit that the petition is maintainable as Bhilai Institute

of technology Durg is an institution duly affiliated with respondent

Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University, therefore, all the

rules, regularisation, ordinance, statute and laws of respondent

University are binding upon its affiliated colleges/Institutions, including

respondent BIT Durg. He would further submit that as per applicable

service Rules of respondent No. 3 age of superannuation of Professor

is 62 years and the service Rules of respondent No. 3 clearly

prescribes that respondent No. 3 is governed by the rules and

regulations of the affiliating University. Service conditions as

enumerated in Ordinance No. 19 (College Code) of CSVTU, Bhilai and

C.G.Vishva Vidyalaya Adhiniyam 1973 are applicable to the employees

of BIT Durg, as such the writ petition is very much maintainable. He

would further submit that one of the professors has filed the petition

bearing WPS No. 5149 of 2022 wherein the Institute has settled their

dispute and the writ petition has been taken cognizance by this Court,

and the Institute without complying with the Statute No. 19 of the

respondent University has issued termination order, therefore, the writ

petition is very much maintainable. To substantiate his submission, he

would refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in

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case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Shrivastava & others

[(2020) 14 SCC 449] & Gajanand Sharma Vs. Adarsh Siksha

Parisad Samiti & others [(2023) 18 SCC 581].

8.Learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No. 11867/2025 Mr.

Ghanshyam Kashyap would adopt the submissions made by the

learned counsel for the petitioner in WPS No. 11842/2025 and in

addition to it he would submit that since without opportunity of hearing,

the impugned order has been passed, as such the writ petition is very

much maintainable before this Court.

9.Learned senior counsel for the petitioner in WPS No. 6140/2014 Mr.

Kishore Bhaduri assisted by Mr. Harsh Dave, Advocate would submit

that Delhi Public School, Bhilai is amenable to writ jurisdiction as they

are financially, functionally and administratively controlled by Bhilai

Steel Plant. He would further submit that the salary and retiral benefits

cannot be revised to the detriment of an employee after retirement,

especially when pay fixation was duly approved and audited. He would

further submit that the impugned order dated 10.03.2014 was passed

without affording opportunity of hearing, as such there is flagrant

violation of principle of natural justice and the impugned order

withholding of retiral dues is unconstitutional as there is no statutory

authority permitting such withholding, therefore, the writ petition is

maintainable and would pray for setting aside the impugned order. To

substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered

by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Pradeep Kuamr Biswas Vs.

Indian Institute of Chemical Biology [(2002) 5 SCC 111], Andi

Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti

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Mahotsav Smarak Trust Vs. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691], Zee

Telefilms Limited Vs. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 649], D.A.V.

College Trust & Management Society Vs. Director of Public

Instructions [(2019) 9 SCC 185], M/s Utkal Highways Engineers &

Contractors Vs. Chief General Manager & others [SLP (C) Nos.

14350/2022 & 15596/2022], D.K. Pandey & others Vs. Union of

India [(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1192], Army Welfare Education

Society Vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683].

10.On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ Mr. Sourabh

Pande in WPS No. 6150/2014 opposing the submission made by

learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that this petition is not

maintainable against them as they are purely private institutions neither

established under any statute nor owned, controlled, or substantially

financed by the Government, therefore, does not fall within the

definition of “State” or “other authority” under Article 12 of the

Constitution of India. He would further submit that respondent No. 3 &

4 are office bearers of school management committee which is being

run, managed and controlled by a society registered under the

Chhattisgarh Societies Registration Act, 1973 in the name and style of

Steel Education Society and a registration certificate is also filed by the

respondents. It has also been contended that the Society is financial

independent and no external grant or aid is received from any authority

for running the school. He would further submit that the respondent is

not discharging any public or statutory function, and no material has

been placed on record by the petitioners to demonstrate that the

respondents are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. He would further submit that the dispute raised by

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the petitioners is essentially private and contractual in nature, for which

an alternative and efficacious remedy is available under the

appropriate forum. Hence, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this

Court cannot be invoked and the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed

at the threshold as not maintainable.

11.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction.

Finding & discussion in WPS No. 6150/2014

12.The submission made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that

respondents No. 2 & 3 are giving grant-in-aid to the institution to run

their school, as such the petitioner is an employee of Bhilai Steel Plant

being subsidiary company of Steel Authority of India, is State within the

Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as such, the writ petition is

maintainable, is being considered by this Court.

13.From the record annexed with the writ petition, it is quite vivid that no

material was placed on record that the Bhilai Steel Plant is giving

grant-in-aid to the school namely Delhi Public School, Bhilai whereas

from the documents filed by the petitioner itself, it is quite vivid that the

appointing authority of the petitioner is Delhi Public School and the

petitioner has annexed the Education Joint Venture with the Steel

Education Society Bhilai which is registered under the Societies

Registration Act, 1973 dated 17.05.2007. Clause 6 (b) & (c) of the

Education Joint Venture provides that the Principal and teacher of the

said school will be selected by selection committee duly constituted by

the Delhi Public School Society as per CBSE norms to which atleast

one representative of Steel Education Society (in short “SES”) will be

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invited. Clause 7 of the Education Joint Venture provides that the SES

will provide land and building for school, class room, suitable

accommodation and furniture, science demonstration laboratory,

suitable facilities and equipment for development of school and games

and other co-curricular activities. Clause 7(k) of the Education Joint

Venture provides that in case of net deficit i.e. the balance of revenue

budged expenditure, less collection of fee, if any, the school budge will

be made by SES.

14.From perusal of clause of the Education Joint Venture, it is quite vivid

that the entire management of the school, financial, functional and

administrative control lies with the Delhi Public School and even the

Steel Education Society which is a society registered under the

Societies Registration Act, 1973, has no pivotal role to play, as such it

cannot be presumed that the Bhilai Steel Plant has any vital role to

play and it cannot be held that the petitioner is employed by the Bhilai

Steel Plant Bhilai, as such service dispute between the Delhi Public

School, Steel Education Society and the petitioner is not amenable

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Court.

15.This issue has come up for consideration before Hon’ble the Supreme

Court in case of National Aluminium Company Limited & others Vs.

Ananta Kishore Rout & others [(2014) 6 SCC 756] wherein it has

been held in paragraphs 22, 23, 27 & 30 as under:-

“22. In order to determine the existence of employer - employee

relationship, the correct approach would be to consider as to

whether there is complete control and supervision of the NALCO.

It was so held by this Court in Chemical Works Limited (supra)

way back in the year 1957. The court emphasised that the

relationship of master and servant is a question of fact and that

depends upon the existence of power in the employer, not only

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to direct what work the servant is to do but also the manner in

which the work is to be done. This was so explained by

formulating the following principle:-

“14. The principle which emerges from these authorities is that

the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship

between master and servant is the existence of the right in the

master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not

only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do but

also the manner in which he shall do his work, or to borrow the

words of Lord Uthwatt at Page 23 in Mersey Docks and Harbour

Board v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd., and Another, “The

proper test is whether or not the hirer had authority to control the

manner of execution of the act in question.”

23. It has been established from the documents on record that

both the schools have their own independent Managing

Committees. These Managing Committees are registered under

the Societies Registration Act. It is these Managing Committees

who not only recruit teaching and other staff and appoint them,

but all other decisions in respect of their service conditions are

also taken by the Managing Committees. These range from pay

fixation, seniority, grant of leave, promotion, disciplinary action,

retirement, termination etc. In fact, even Service Rules, 1995

have been framed which contain the provisions; delineating all

necessary service conditions. Various documents are produced

to show that appointment letters are issued by the Managing

Committees, disciplinary action is taken by the Managing

Committees, pay fixation and promotion orders are passed by

the Managing Committees and even orders of superannuation

and termination of the staff are issued by the Managing

Committees. It, thus, becomes clear that day to day control over

the staff is that of the Managing Committees. These Managing

Committees are having statutory status as they are registered

under the Societies Registration Act. Therefore, Mr. Venugopal is

not right in his submission that Managing Committees do not

have their own independent legal entities.

27. In Workmen of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Societies Ltd.

(Supra) the entire law was re-visited. The Court emphasised that

no hard and fast rule can be laid down nor it is possible to do so.

Likewise no single test – be it control test, be it organisational or

any other test – has been held to be the determinative factor for

determining the jural relationship of employer and employee. The

Court enumerated the relevant factors, which are to be examined

in such cases, in Paras 37 and 38 which reads as under:-

“37. The control test and the organisation test, therefore, are not

the only factors which can be said to be decisive. With a view to

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elicit the answer, the court is required to consider several factors

which would have a bearing on the result: (a) who is the

appointing authority; (b) who is the paymaster; (c) who can

dismiss (d) how long alternative service lasts; (e) the extent of

control and supervision; (f) the nature of the job e.g. whether it is

professional or skilled work; (g) nature of establishment; (h) the

right to reject.

38. With a view to find out reasonable solution in a problematic

case of this nature, what is needed is an integrated approach

meaning thereby integration of the relevant tests wherefor it may

be necessary to examine as to whether the workman concerned

was fully integrated into the employer's concern meaning thereby

independent of the concern although attached therewith to some

extent.”

In the facts of that case, where the court found that the portress

and gridders who were claiming themselves to be the employees

of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Society, were not its employees

as the said society was neither maintaining any attendance

register or wage register or fixing working hours or had issued

appointment letters to them.”

30. No doubt, there may be some element of control of NALCO

because of the reason that its officials are nominated to the

Managing Committees of the schools. Such provisions are made

to ensure that schools runs smoothly and properly by the society.

It also becomes necessary to ensure that the money is

appropriately spent. However, this kind of 'remote control' would

not make NALCO as the employer of these workers. This only

shows that since NALCO is shouldering and meeting the

financial deficits, it wants to ensure that money is spent for

rightful purposes. ”

16.The seven judges Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court

in case of Pradeep Kuamr Biswas (supra) has also considered the

issue and has held in paragraphs 98 & 99 as under:-

“98. We sum up our conclusions as under:-

(1) Simply by holding a legal entity to be an instrumentality or

agency of the State it does not necessarily become an authority

within the meaning of 'other authorities' in Article 12. To be an

authority, the entity should have been created by a statute or

under a statute and functioning with liability and obligations to

public. Further, the statute creating the entity should have vested

that entity with power to make law or issue binding directions

amounting to law within the meaning of Article 13(2) governing its

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relationship with other people or the affairs of other people __

their rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations. If created

under a statute, then there must exist some other statute

conferring on the entity such powers. In either case, it should

have been entrusted with such functions as are governmental or

closely associated therewith by being of public importance or

being fundamental to the life of the people and hence

governmental. Such authority would be the State, for, one who

enjoys the powers or privileges of the State must also be

subjected to limitations and obligations of the State. It is this

strong statutory flavour and clear indicia of power __

constitutional or statutory, and its potential or capability to act to

the detriment of fundamental rights of the people, which makes it

an authority; though in a given case, depending on the facts and

circumstances, an authority may also be found to be an

instrumentality or agency of the State and to that extent they may

overlap. Tests 1, 2 and 4 in Ajay Hasia enable determination of

Governmental ownership or control. Tests 3, 5 and 6 are

'functional' tests. The propounder of the tests himself has used

the words suggesting relevancy of those tests for finding out if an

entity was instrumentality or agency of the State. Unfortunately

thereafter the tests were considered relevant for testing if an

authority is the State and this fallacy has occurred because of

difference between 'instrumentality and agency' of the State and

an 'authority' having been lost sight of sub-silentio, unconsciously

and un-deliberated. In our opinion, and keeping in view the

meaning which 'authority' carries, the question whether an entity

is an 'authority' cannot be answered by applying Ajay Hasia tests.

(2) The tests laid down in Ajay Hasia's case are relevant for the

purpose of determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or

agency of the State. Neither all the tests are required to be

answered in positive nor a positive answer to one or two tests

would suffice. It will depend upon a combination of one or more

of the relevant factors depending upon the essentiality and

overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source

of governing power, if need be by removing the mask or piercing

the veil disguising the entity concerned. When an entity has an

independent legal existence, before it is held to be the State, the

person alleging it to be so must satisfy the Court of brooding

presence of government or deep and pervasive control of the

government so as to hold it to be an instrumentality or agency of

the State.

CSIR, if 'the State'?

99. Applying the tests formulated hereinabove, we are clearly of

the opinion that CSIR is not an 'authority' so as to fall within the

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meaning of expression 'other authorities' under Article 12. It has

no statutory flavour __ neither it owes its birth to a statute nor is

there any other statute conferring it with such powers as would

enable it being branded an authority. The indicia of power is

absent. It does not discharge such functions as are governmental

or closely associated therewith or being fundamental to the life of

the people.”

17.The judgments cited by learned senior counsel for the petitioner in

case of D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society (supra) are

distinguishable on the law itself as in that case, the issue was required

for determination of the Supreme Court whether non-government

institution substantially financed falls within the ambit of public authority

under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, has answered

that they fall within the public authority. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in

respect of 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 has given its

finding and it has not dealt with the issue whether it is a State within

the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India for amenable in the

writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

18.Taking into consideration the facts as projected by the parties in WPS

No. 6150/2014 and the law on the subject, it is quite vivid that the

petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the Steel Education Society

and Delhi Public School Bhilai fall within the ambit of State as defined

under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable.

However, the petitioner is granted liberty to avail the remedies

available to him under the relevant provisions of law governing the

field. It is made clear that the time spent before this Court on account

of pendency of this writ petition will be excluded for computing the

limitation and the adjudicating authorities will not insist for delay and

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will decide the case on its own merits. Thus, the Point determined by

this Court is answered against the petitioner.

Finding & discussion in WPS No. 11842/2025 & WPS No.

11867/2025

19.Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against

private educational institution as the respondents are discharging

public function i.e. providing education to children in their institutions

and to substantiate this submission, they have referred to the judgment

of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya

(supra) wherein it has been held in paragraph 14 & 21 as under:-

“14. This Court has laid down in Raj Kumar v. Director of

Education & Ors. (supra) that the intent of the legislature while

enacting the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (in short, ‘the

DSE’) was to provide security of tenure to the employees of the

school and to regulate the terms and conditions of their

employment. While the functioning of both aided and unaided

educational institutions must be free from unnecessary

Governmental interference, the same needs to the reconciled

with the conditions of employment of the employees of these

institutions and provision of adequate precautions to safeguard

their interests. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is one such

precautionary safeguard which needs to be followed to ensure

that employees of educational institutions do not suffer unfair

treatment at the hands of the management.

21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation to

hold that the Writ Application is maintainable as rightly held by

the Division Bench of the High Court.”

20.Whereas in the subsequent judgment Hon’ble the Supreme Court in

case of St. Mary’s Education Society & others Vs. Rajendra Prasad

Bhargava & others [(2023) 4 SCC 498] has examined the issue of

maintainability of writ petition against private person or body and has

held in paragraphs 75 as under:-

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“75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:

75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is

maintainable against a person or a body discharging public

duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either

statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the

person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the

public involving the public law element. Similarly, for

ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be

established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve

the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it

and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.

75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is

imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct

nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public

law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke

the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a

prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts

without having any public element as its integral part cannot be

rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever

Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under

Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the

statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State”

within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found

that the action complained of has public law element.

75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be

discharging a public function or performing a public duty and

thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a

Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to

invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in

respect of matter relating to service where they are not

governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An

educational institution may perform myriad functions touching

various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While

such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a

"public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to

challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the

actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an

ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or

backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge

under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the

service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory

provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary

contract of service.

75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private

unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded

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expression of the term, an employee of a nonteaching staff

engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or

internal management is only an agency created by it. It is

immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to

discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of

contract between a school and nonteaching staff cannot and

should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the

obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to

the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a

particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee

of nonteaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions,

its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be

interfered by the court. But such interference will be on the

ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in

discharge of public duty.

75.5. From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is

apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or

otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has

no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as

the action was essentially of a private character.”

21.Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Army Welfare Education

Society New Delhi Vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma & others [2024 SCC

OnLine SC 1683] has held in paragraphs 42 & 43 as under:-

“42. In the penultimate paragraph, this Court ruled as under:-

(Binny case, SCC p. 674, para 32)

“32. Applying these principles, it can very well be said that a writ

of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not

“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and

such body is amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution can exercise judicial review of the action challenged

by a party. But there must be a public law element and it cannot

be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into

between the parties.” (Emphasis supplied)

43. In the background of the above legal position, it can be

safely concluded that power of judicial review under Article 226

of the Constitution of India can be exercised by the High Court

even if the body against which an action is sought is not State or

an authority or an instrumentality of the State but there must be

a public element in the action complained of.”

22.From perusal of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and

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coming to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that in WPS No.

11842/2025, the petitioner has challenged his termination order passed

by respondent No. 3 which is purely a private contract and the same

does not touch any public law element and the Bhilai Institute of

Technology cannot be said to be discharging any public duties in

connection with the employment of the petitioner. Even the service

conditions of the petitioner are not regulated by the statutory provisions

or the employer had the status of ‘State’ within the expansive definition

under Article 12 of the Constitution of India or it has found that the

action complained of his public law element.

23.The petitioner to fall his case amenable to writ jurisdiction has

contended that the statute of University has been violated by the

respondent institution, as such the writ petition is maintainable. This

submission is misconceived and deserves to be rejected as non-

compliance of provisions may not entitle the petitioner to fall his case

amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court but it may be a ground to

nullify the action of private respondent before appropriate forum.

24.Similarly in WPS No. 11867/2025, the petitioner has complained about

giving charge to private respondent No. 3 who according to the

petitioner, is junior to her. The complaint does not involve any public

duty as it does not touch any public law element and respondent No. 1

cannot be said to be discharging any public duties in connection with

the employment of the petitioner though the respondent institution is an

aided institution getting grant-in-aid from the State Government. Thus,

both the writ petitions are not maintainable.

25.Considering the afore-stated factual and legal position, I am of the view

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that the writ petitions are not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.

However, the petitioners are at liberty to take recourse to the remedy

available to them under the rules, provisions governing the field. It is

made clear that the time spent before this Court will be excluded for

computing the period of limitation as the petitioners are bonafidely

agitating before this Court. Thus, the Point determined by this Court is

answered against the petitioners.

26.It is made clear that this Court has not touched the merits of the case

and has only referred the facts of each case to determine the Point. In

the eventuality of taking recourse under the law by the petitioners, the

adjudicating authority/ Court will not influence from dismissal of the writ

petitions and they will decide the case of the petitioners on its own

merits.

27.Resultantly, all the writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable.

Sd/-

(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

Judge

Arun