No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
* * * *
CONTEMPT CASE No. 2360 of 2017
Between:
Dr. N. Venkata Srinivasa Rao
..... PETITIONER
AND
1. Prof. Ch. C. Satyanarayana
2. Prof. G. S. R. Krishna Murthy
.....RESPONDENTS
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 07.02.2023
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
+ CONTEMPT CASE No. 2360 of 2017
% 07.02.2023
# Dr. N. Venkata Srinivasa Rao
….Petitioner
Versus
$ 1. Prof. Ch. C. Satyanarayana
2. Prof. G. S. R. Krishna Murthy
....Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri A. Rajendra Babu
^ Counsel for respondent No.1: Sri M. Radha Krishna
^ Counsel for respondent No.21: Sri P. B. Vijay Kumar,
Senior Counsel,
Assisted by Sri P. Ponna Rao & P. Subash
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1. (1999) 8 SCC 106
2. 2017 SCC Online Hyd 276
3. 2016 (1) ALD 579
4. AIR 2016 SC 4403
5. CC Nos.673 & 686 of 2020 (decided on 19.04.2022, APHC)
6. (2006) 4 SCC 257
7. AIR 1994 SC 2252
8. AIR 1985 Calcutta 143
9. AIR 1991 SC 1171
10. (2019) 18 SCC 150
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
3
11. AIR 2021 SC 5360 = (2022) 1 SCC 101
12. 2011 (6) ALT 119 (S.B)
13. AIR 1999 SC 3215
14. 2000 (6) ALT 430 (D.B)
15. (1978) 3 SCC 339
16. AIR 2021 SC 721
17. (2012) 4 SCC 307
18. AIR 1969 SC 189
19. (2002) 5 SCC 352
20. (2000) 2 SCC 367
21. (1986) 2 ALT 131
22. (2013) 14 SCC 127
23. (1984) 3 SCC 405
24. (2007) 11 SCC 374
25. (2014) 7 SCC 280
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
4
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
CONTEMPT CASE No. 2360 of 2017
JUDGMENT:
Heard Sri A. Rajendra Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner/applicant,
Sri M. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent – Professor Ch. P.
Satyanarayana and Sri P. B. Vijay Kumar, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri
P. Ponna Rao, and Sri P. Subash, learned counsels, appearing for respondent
No.2 – Professor G. S. R. Krishna Murthy.
Factual Background:
2. The petitioner/applicant – Dr. N. Venkata Srinivasa Rao was appointed
as Guest/part-time Teacher on 21.11.2012 and continued till the academic year
2016-17 as such in the Department of Education of Rashtriya Sanskrit
Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, now known as “National Sanskrit University, Tirupati” (in
short „University‟) He filed W.P.No.31900 of 2017 to continue him as such for
the academic year 2017-18 and for the subsequent years with consequential
reliefs.
3. In W.P.No.31900 of 2017 this Court passed interim order dated
21.09.2017, which reads as under:
―Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
Issue notice to 2
nd
respondent.
Learned counsel for petitioner is permitted to take out personal notice on the
2
nd
respondent by RPAD and file proof of service thereof into Registry.
If there is any need, the respondents may consider the case of petitioner for
his continuation on same terms, in accordance with rules.
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
5
Post after eight weeks.‖
4. The order dated 21.09.2017 not having been complied, the petitioner
filed the present contempt case bearing CC.No.2360 of 2017 on 14.11.2017
against Professor Ch. P. Satyanarayana, the then Registrar incharge of the
University, present respondent No.1.
5. In the writ petition, the University filed I.A.No.1 of 2017 on
27.11.2017 to vacate the interim order dated 21.09.2017 along with the
counter affidavit, taking the stand that there was no work load as the students
strength was reduced, giving the details of such reduction, and thus, showing
that there was no need for the engagement of the petitioner as guest faculty
teacher.
6. I.A. No. 1 of 2017 was dismissed by this Court vide order dated
19.02.2018, rejecting the ground for vacation i.e., shortfall in the intake
capacity of the students being no more a valid ground.
7. In spite of the order dated 19.02.2018, the 1
st
respondent passed the
order dated 07.03.2018 that on consideration, the case of the petitioner was
rejected since “there is no need or requirement”.
8. The order dated 07.03.2018 reads as under:
―In compliance of the orders of Honourable High Court passed in
WP.31900 of 2017, it is hereby informed that Vidyapeetha has considered your
case and rejected to engage you as Guest Faculty on hourly basis in the
Department of Education, RSV, Tirupati for the academic session 2017-18
since there is no need or requirement.‖
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CC No.2360 of 2017
6
9. Challenging the order, dated 19.02.2018, the University filed
W.A.No.553 of 2018 which was dismissed on 18.07.2018 finding no ground to
interfere.
10. The order dated 07.03.2018 was passed after rejection of I.A.No.1 of
2017 in the writ petition, but before filing of the writ appeal.
11. After the dismissal of the writ appeal, no orders were passed to
comply with the interim order dated 21.09.2017.
12. In the contempt case, notice was issued to the present 1
st
respondent on 30.11.2017, who filed counter affidavit on 27.03.2018.
13. On 28.12.2018 this Court issued notice in Form – I to the present 1
st
respondent.
14. Pending the contempt case, Professor G. S. R. Krishna Murthy, was
appointed as Registrar incharge of the University. Writ Appeal was filed by the
University through him and he was impleaded as respondent No.2 in the
Contempt Case making the sole respondent, as respondent No.1.
15. On 18.02.2019 notice was issued to the present 2
nd
respondent. He
filed counter affidavit on 21.02.2019.
16. On 20.07.2022 charge was framed against the 1
st
respondent, as
also against the 2
nd
respondent in their presence as also in the presence of
their respective counsels.
17. Charges were read over and explained to both the respondents and
though the order dated 07.03.2018 passed by the 1
st
respondent and the
counter affidavit dated 27.03.2018 filed by the 1
st
respondent and the counter
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CC No.2360 of 2017
7
affidavit dated 21.02.2019 filed by the 2
nd
respondent are in English language,
on their request the charges were explained to both of them in Hindi language
as well.
18. The respondents denied the charges.
19. Time was granted as prayed to file response to the charges, as also
the evidence, if any, in support of their defence. Copy of the order containing
the charges was served on the respondents on 21.07.2022.
20. On 20.07.2022 Sri P. B. Vijay Kumar, learned senior counsel, assisted
by Sri P. Ponnarao, learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent and Sri M. Radha
Krishna, learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent, advanced submissions which
were recorded in the order, dated 20.07.2022, which shall be referred to and
considered in the later part of this judgment.
21. The 1
st
respondent filed an additional affidavit on 01.08.2022 and
another affidavit on 04.08.2022.
22. The 1
st
respondent in the additional affidavits dated 01.08.2022 and
04.08.2022 inter alia deposed that during his tenure as Registrar in charge, he
made certain correspondences to the then Vice-Chancellor to implement the
interim order, but the copy of those correspondences were not available with
him which would be in the records of the University and as such he was not
able to file or produce those correspondences in defence.
23. In view of the aforesaid, to comply with the principles of natural
justice and to afford full opportunity to the 1
st
respondent to defend, and also
to find out the correctness of the averment of the 1
st
respondent, that he made
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CC No.2360 of 2017
8
efforts to implement this Court‟s order, dated 21.09.2017; an order was passed
on 12.08.2022 directing the Vice-Chancellor of the University to file response to
the affidavits dated 01.08.2022 and 04.08.2022 of the 1
st
respondent, under
the affidavit of the present Registrar of the University.
24. The present Registrar of the University filed response/affidavit vide
USR No.54244/2022, dated 22.08.2022.
25. On 07.09.2022, as requested, the 1
st
respondent was granted time to
file reply to the affidavit of the Registrar, which reply was filed, after seeking
further time by the 1
st
respondent, finally on 02.11.2022.
26. The 2
nd
respondent filed additional affidavit on 01.08.2022.
Consideration of charge against 1
st
respondent:
27. The charge against the 1
st
respondent is as under:
“Prof. Ch.P.Satyanarayana, has deliberately and willfully did not comply
with the interim order dated 21.09.2017, inspite of the rejection of the
application for vacation of the interim order, by order dated 19.02.2018, and
has passed the order dated 07.03.2018 on the same ground, on which the
application for vacation was rejected and inspite of the dismissal of W.A.No.533
of 2018 on 18.07.2018, which was filed against the order dated 19.02.2018
amounting to contempt of this Court punishable under Section 12 of the
Contempt of the Courts Act.”
28. The Order dated 21.09.2017 in W.P.No.31900 of 2017 reads as
under:
―Heard learned counsel for petitioner.
Issue notice to 2
nd
respondent.
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
9
Learned counsel for petitioner is permitted to take out personal notice on the
2
nd
respondent by RPAD and file proof of service thereof into Registry.
If there is any need, the respondents may consider the case of petitioner for
his continuation on same terms, in accordance with rules.
Post after eight weeks.‖
29. In I.A.No.1 of 2017 for vacation of the order dated 21.09.2017 filed
by the University under the affidavit of the 1
st
respondent, the ground taken
for vacation, was that there was no requirement / need in view of reduction of
the work load due to reduction of intake capacity of students. This Court, on
19.02.2018 dismissed I.A.No.1/2017, clearly recording that there was only one
candidate short in the total intake capacity for the two years course of B.Ed.
Though there was short fall in the intake capacity in M.Ed course, the reason
assigned in support of the prayer to vacate the interim order was no more
valid. No other reasons were assigned in the counter affidavit and no case was
made out for vacating the interim order, was observed by this Court.
30. It is apt to reproduce the order dated 19.02.2018 in I.A.No.1 of 2017
as under:
―Petitioner claims to possess degree in Bachelor of Education (B.Ed) and
Master of Education (M.Ed). Pursuant to the recruitment notification issued in
the year 2012, petitioner was appointed as Part time/Guest lecturer. Initially it
was for period of one year and thereafter it was renewed from year to year. But
for the academic year 2017-2018, no such renewal was granted, compelling the
petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.
According to the petitioner there is sufficient requirement and not granting
renewal is not made in bonafide exercise of power and authority. According to
the petitioner the University is adopting National Council for Teacher
Education Rules, in Siksha Sastri (B.Ed) and Siksha Acharya (M.Ed) and from
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10
the academic year 2015-16 the above courses have now made into two years
course. Therefore, there is increase in the intake and thus, not renewing the
appointment of petitioner is illegal.
This Court by order dated 21.10.2017 directed that if there is need, the
respondents may consider the case of petitioner for his continuation on same
terms, in accordance with the Rules.
Praying to vacate the said interim order, the present application is filed.
The stand of the 2
nd
respondent is that there is reduction in the intake
capacity of students in B.Ed and M.Ed Courses and therefore, there is no
requirement of services of the petitioner. Therefore, his appointment was not
renewed for the academic year 2017-18.
In paragraph No.4 of the counter affidavit, the details of students‘ strength
from year to year and for the academic year 2016-17 onwards are mentioned. In
addition, the consolidated statement of student intake for B.Ed and M.Ed
courses is filed in the tabulated form annexed to the counter affidavit at
Page No. 108.
By placing reliance on the said statement learned Standing counsel
vehemently contended that as there is reduction in intake capacity of the
students, there is no requirement of services of the petitioner and therefore, not
granting renewal to the petitioner was validly made and that petitioner cannot
compel the University to renew his employment, even though there is no
requirement.
Learned counsel for the petitioner countered this contention
by stating that what is shown in Page No. 108 and what is mentioned in
Paragraph No.4 of the counter affidavit, applies for one year of B.Ed and
M.Ed courses only and does not reflect the total incapacity for two years of
the B.Ed and M.Ed courses and therefore there is clear suppression of true
and correct facts.
Learned Standing counsel, though initially sought to stick to his
earlier assertion, on receiving clear instructions from the Vice-Chancellor
he has accepted that wrong statement was made and sought time to file
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CC No.2360 of 2017
11
affidavit expressing apology for making a wrong statement and to place on
record the correct figures.
Having regard to the statement made in the counter affidavit and assertions
about the intake capacity, the Court expressed displeasure in the manner in
which the affidavit was drawn and directed the Registrar of the University to
appear in person as well as to file an affidavit.
Today, the Registrar of the respondent University is present. Affidavit is
filed deposed by the incumbent Registrar Prof.Ch.P.Satyanarayana. It is now
stated that what is stated in paragraph No.4 of the counter affidavit and the
statement enclosed at Page No.108 do not reflect the correct student intake
capacity for two years and what is shown there would only reflect one year
course. A detailed statement of intake for the year 2015-16 onwards is enclosed
in a tabulated form in Paragraph No.4 of the affidavit filed by the Registrar. He
has expressed unconditional apology.
A perusal of the statement would disclose that for the academic year 2017-
18 the strength of students for B.Ed is 199 i.e one short of total strength. The
plea to vacate the interim order is on the ground that there is reduction in the
student strength. Whereas, the figures now furnished would show that there is
only one candidate short of the total intake capacity for the two years course of
B.Ed. Though there is short fall in the intake capacity in M.Ed course, the
reason assigned in support of the prayer to vacate the interim order is no more
valid. No other reasons are assigned in the affidavit deposed by the Registrar
on 19.02.2018. No case is made out for vacating the interim order.
The affidavit deposed by the Registrar dated 19.02.2018 is taken on record
and the Registrar is warned to be careful in future while making averments
before the court.
This application (WVMP) is accordingly dismissed. Further appearance of
the Registrar is dispensed with.‖
31. In the order dated 19.02.2018, this Court expressed displeasure in
the manner in which the counter affidavit was filed in the writ petition and
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directed the Registrar of the University, the present respondent No.1, to appear
in person as well as to file affidavit, after the learned standing counsel
appearing in the writ petition received clear instructions from the then Vice-
Chancellor, contrary to what was stated in the counter affidavit by the
Registrar, the present 1
st
respondent, that the Vice Chancellor accepted that
wrong statement was made and sought time to file affidavit expressing apology
for making a wrong statement, to place on record the correct figures.
32. In the order dated 19.02.2018, this Court further recorded that the
Registrar, present 1
st
respondent, filed affidavit (subsequently) stating that
what was stated in para-4 of the counter affidavit and the statement enclosed
along with the counter affidavit in the writ petition for vacation of the interim
order, did not reflect the correct student intake capacity. He also expressed
unconditional apology.
33. On consideration of the correct statement, this Court rejected the
plea to vacate the interim order and the Registrar- 1
st
respondent was warned
to be careful in future while making averments before the Court, in the Order
dated 19.02.2018 itself.
34. From the aforesaid, it is on record that, for vacation of the interim
order dated 21.09.2017, the 1
st
respondent herein filed his affidavit making
wrong statement and placing incorrect figures. The correct figure was
furnished only by the then Vice Chancellor after acquiring the knowledge.
35. It is evident that in the affidavit of the 1
st
respondent in I.A.No.1 of
2017, the ground which was taken to vacate the order dated 21.09.2017 was
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CC No.2360 of 2017
13
rejected by this Court on 19.02.2018, but in spite thereof, on the same ground
that there was no need or requirement, the petitioner‟s case was rejected on
07.03.2018 by the following order:
―In compliance of the orders of Hon‘ble High Court passed in
W.P.No.31900 of 2017, it is hereby informed that Vidyapeetha has considered
your case and rejected to engage you as Guest Faculty on hourly basis in the
Department of Education, RSV, Tirupathi for the academic session 2017-18
since there is no need or requirement.”
36. W.A.No.553 of 2018, by the time the order dated 07.03.2018 was
passed, had also not been filed by the University. The writ appeal was filed
after the 2
nd
respondent was appointed as Registrar incharge.
37. In the writ appeal it was argued for the University that the post of
Guest Faculty / Part-time Teacher in the Department of Education was reserved
for Scheduled Caste and therefore, the writ petitioner could not be continued in
the said post.
38. The writ appeal was dismissed on 18.07.2018 observing that there was
no such argument or ground raised before the learned single Judge in I.A.No.1
of 2017.
39. The 1
st
respondent in the affidavit dated 01.08.2022 submitted and it
was also argued by his learned counsel that the 1
st
respondent took charge of
the Registrar on 01.11.2017 and resigned on 29.06.2018 as Registrar incharge
of the University. He also retired from service on 31.10.2019. Being the
Registrar incharge he requested the then Vice Chancellor to comply with the
interim order of this Court. He could only bring the order of this Court to the
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
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knowledge of the Vice Chancellor as the Registrar is merely a communication
channel and himself does not have power to take decision with respect to
appointment of faculty. As such, the Registrar alone cannot be held liable, as
he cannot take a decision without the concurrence of the Vice Chancellor.
40. Paras 10 and 11 of the affidavit dated 01.08.2022 upon which
emphasis has been placed by the learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent, read
as under:
―10. It is also respectfully brought to the notice of this Hon‘ble Court
that being Registrar (in charge), I have also requested the then Vice Chancellor
to comply with the interim order passed by this Hon‘ble Court in
W.P.No.31900 of 2017
11. I respectfully submit that I could only bring the orders of this
Hon‘ble Court to the knowledge of the Vice-Chancellor of the Vidyapeeth, for
further action. The Registrar is merely a communication channel between the
Vidyapeeth and outsiders, and the Registrar himself does not have power to
take any decision more particularly with respect to appointment of faculty. As
such, Registrar alone cannot be held liable. Since I am only an in-charge
registrar I can‘t take any decision without the concurrence of the Vice
Chancellor. Even for filing counter affidavit I use to place the letter written by
the standing counsel for his approval.‖
41. In paras-5 & 7 of the affidavit dated 04.08.2022, the 1
st
respondent
further stated as under:
―5. At the hearing of the above contempt case before this Hon‘ble Court
I have recollected my memory with regard to the above correspondence and on
advice, I have sent a email to the present registrar on 03/08/2022, requesting
him to furnish the copies of correspondence made by me with the then Vice
Chancellor during currency of my tenure as Registrar (in charge) for
implementation of order of this Hon‘ble Court in the writ petition so as to
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
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enable me to place it before this Hon‘ble Court to show my bona-fides. A copy
of the email letter sent to the registrar is annexed to this Affidavit and I crave
leave of this Hon‘ble Court to peruse the same for all purposes.
7. I humbly submit that I have requested the then Vice Chancellor
several times orally to take steps for implementation of order of this Hon‘ble
Court. Since there was no response from him I felt inconvenience and
submitted my resignation on 29.06.2018 as Registrar (in charge) duly
mentioning the reason that ―Due to some inconvenience, I would like to request
you to release me from the responsibilities of Registrar I/c, at earliest” A copy
of resignation letter is filed herewith and I crave leave of this Hon‘ble Court
peruse the same for all purposes.‖
42. In the response of the present Vice Chancellor through affidavit of
the present Registrar of the University, dated 22.08.2022 it has been stated as
follows in paras - 5(a), 5(b) & 5(c) as under:
―a) That the respondent no.1 communicated to the then Deputy
Registrar of NSU a letter dt.24.01.2018 written by the then learned Standing
Counsel of NSU about filing of the present contempt case received by the
respondent no.1 through e-mail on 24.01.2018 and the Deputy Registrar
submitted the same to the then Vice Chancellor for information.
b) The respondent no.1 communicated to the then Vice Chancellor on
24.02.2018 by email forwarding the copy of the order dt.19.02.2018 by this
Hon‘ble Court in I.A.No.1 of 2017 in W.P.No.3900 of 2017 received by the
respondent no.1 from the then Standing Counsel by email on 24.02.2018.
c) That except the above two communications there are no other
communications on record from the respondent no.1 to either the then Vice
Chancellor or to any other authority as stated by the respondent no.1 in
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the affidavit dt.01.08.2022 and in paragraphs 5 and 7
of the affidavit dt.04.08.2022.‖
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43. In para-5 (a) of the affidavit dated 22.08.2022 it has been stated
that the 1
st
respondent communicated to the then Deputy Registrar of the
National Sanskrit University a letter dated 24.01.2018 written by the then
learned standing counsel of the University about filing of the contempt case
received by the 1
st
respondent through e-mail dated 24.01.2018 which was
submitted by the Deputy Registrar to the then Vice Chancellor for information.
44. In para-5 (b) of the affidavit dated 22.08.2022 it is submitted that
the 1
st
respondent communicated to the then Vice Chancellor on 24.02.2018 by
e-mail forwarding the copy of the order dated 19.02.2018 in I.A.No.1 of 2017 in
W.P.No.31900 of 2017 received by the 1
st
respondent from the then learned
standing counsel by e-mail on 24.02.2018.
45. In para – 5 (c) of the affidavit dated 22.08.2022 it has been clearly
deposed that except the two communications (i.e., letter dated 24.01.2018 and
24.02.2018 with respect to the copy of the order dated 19.02.2018), there are
no other communications on record (of the University) from the 1
st
respondent
to either the then Vice Chancellor or to any other authority as stated by the 1
st
respondent in paragraphs-10 and 11 of the affidavit dated 01.08.2022 and
paragraphs-5 and 7 of the affidavit dated 04.08.2022.
46. In his reply dated 02.11.2022 to the response affidavit dated
22.08.2022 of the present Registrar, the 1
st
respondent has not denied
paragraph-5 (c) nor has filed any document with respect to the alleged
communication by him to the then Vice Chancellor requesting to comply with
the order dated 21.09.2017.
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CC No.2360 of 2017
17
47. The aforesaid two documents dated 24.01.2018 and 24.02.2018 are
annexed by the 1
st
respondent himself in his affidavit dated 04.08.2022 and are
being reproduced as under:
Communication dated 24.01.2018 :
―Subject: CC.No.2360 of 2017 in WP.No.31900 of 2017 – Counter reg.
From: prabhala rajasekha (prabhalarajasekhar@gmail.com)
To: registrar_rsvp@yahoo.co.in
Date: Wednesday, 24 January 2018 8:45 PM
Sir,
Please find the attachment.
Thanking you
P. RAJASEKHAR
ADVOCATE
Attachments
LETTER-RSVP.docx (15l.84KB)
DR: urgent pl (hand written)
Sd/-xx 25.1.18 Submitted to VC for kind information (hand written)
Sd/-25.1.18 Sd/-xx V.C.
Communication dated 24.02.2018:
―FW: Fwd: Order copy in wp.no.31900 of 2017
From: Registrar RSVP (registrar_rsvp@yahoo.co.in
To: vmsharma2015@gmail.com, ajey1999@gmail.com
Date: Saturday, 24 February 2018 at 01:52 pm IST
19-02-2018 (hand written)
Yours Sincerely,
Prof.Ch.P.Satyanarayana
REGISTRAR i/c
Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha
TIRUPATI – 517 507
On Saturday, 24 ebruary 2018 12:21 PM, prabhala rajasekhar
prabhalarajasekhar@gmail.com wrote.
Sir,
Please find the attachment copy of order dt.19-02-2018
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CC No.2360 of 2017
18
Thanking you,
P.RAJASEKHAR
ADVOCATE‖
New Doc 2018-02-24 pdf
13 MB
48. A perusal of the aforesaid documents, reproduced as above, shows
that the 1
st
respondent had submitted, to the Vice Chancellor, for information,
letter of the then learned standing counsel dated 24.01.2018, informing about
the adjournment of the contempt matter to enable him to file counter affidavit
and the letter dated 24.02.2018 along with which copy of the order dated
19.02.2018 was sent.
49. In those documents, as aforesaid, there is nothing to support the
stand/defence of the 1
st
respondent about his request to the Vice-Chancellor to
comply with the order of this Court as mentioned in para-10 of the affidavit
dated 01.08.2022 or for implementation of the orders of this Court passed in
the writ petition, to show his bona fides as is the stand taken by the 1
st
respondent in para-5 of the affidavit dated 04.08.2022 as well.
50. Thus, there is nothing on record in support of the submission that
the respondent No.1 made attempt, which he could only make, to comply with
the order dated 21.09.2017, and the documents upon which reliance is placed
do not support such defence of the 1
st
respondent.
51. Learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent has tried to submit that the
communications dated 24.01.2018 and 24.02.2018, as also deposed in paras-7
and 8 of the reply affidavit dated 02.11.2022, were the 1
st
respondent‟s attempt
made only to comply with the order, but the same is not acceptable, as perusal
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CC No.2360 of 2017
19
of the letters dated 24.01.2018 and 24.02.2018, makes it evident that they
were only the communications informing about the orders, by the 1
st
respondent and there is nothing to substantiate that the 1
st
respondent made
any request or any attempt for implementation of the order dated 21.09.2017.
52. Further, any such stand, as above, was not taken in the counter
affidavit of the 1
st
respondent dated 27.03.2018, the first counter affidavit in
the contempt petition. Such defences in the later affidavits are only after
thought and are also not substantiated from the evidence / documents filed in
support of such averments in the later affidavits.
53. Further, in the additional counter affidavit dated 01.08.2022, the 1
st
respondent deposed that being the Registrar incharge, he also requested the
then Vice Chancellor to comply with the interim order, but later on, the 1
st
respondent realizing that he might not succeed in proving what he stated in
para-10 of the additional counter affidavit dated 01.08.2022 from the record of
the University, filed another affidavit dated 04.08.2022 to improve upon his
defence by deposing in para-7 thereof that he requested the then Vice
Chancellor several times orally to take steps for implementation of the order.
Now, in the additional affidavit dated 04.08.2022 the word „orally‟ was
introduced to improve upon the defence knowing well that the then Vice
Chancellor, to whom the 1
st
respondent represents to have requested „orally‟ to
implement the order, had died on 13.01.2022 and consequently there would be
no one to rebut, what he now deposed in the affidavit dated 04.08.2022.
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54. With the affidavit dated 01.08.2022, the 1
st
respondent has annexed
the Rules of Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, (in short „the Rules‟), in
support of the submission that the Board of Management is the Principal Organ
of the Management and Principal Executive Body of the University and the
Registrar himself does not have the power to take any decision, more
particularly with respect to appointment of Faculty and as such he alone cannot
be held liable.
55. Learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent placed reliance on Rules 1 &
3 of the Rules, which provides as under:
―1. Management of the Institution:
The Board of Management constituted in accordance with the rules shall be the
principal organ of the Management and principal Executive Boady of the Vidyapeetha.‖
―3. Composition of the Board of Management:
i) Vice-Chancellor who shall be the Chair Person
ii) Pro-Vice-Chancellor wherever applicable
iii) Deans of Faculties of Vidyapeetha not exceeding two (by rotation based on
seniority) to be nominated by the Chancellor
iv) Three eminent academicians as nominated by the Chancellor
v) One eminent academician to be nominated by the Central Government in
consultation with UGC
vi) One Vice-Chancellor of a Sanskrit University in the country to be nominated by
the Chancellor.
vii) Two teachers (from Professors, Associate Professors) by rotation based on
seniority to be nominated by Chancellor.
viii) Maximum of two nominees of the sponsoring Society/Trust/Company.
ix) The Registrar, who shall be the Secretary
The term of membership of the Board of Management shall be as follows:
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CC No.2360 of 2017
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i) All the members of the Board of Management other than the ex-officio members
and the members of the teaching staff shall hold office for a term of three years
and shall be eligible for reappointment.
ii) Members of teaching staff in the Board of Management shall hold office for a
period of 2 years or till such time as they continue to be members of the teaching
staff, whichever is earlier.‖
56. A perusal of rules shows that the Board of Management of the
University, constituted in accordance with the rules, shall be the Principal Organ
of the Management and Principal Executive Body of the Vidyapeetha. The
composition of the Board of Management, as in Rule-3, consists of the Registrar
as well, who shall be the Secretary. The Registrar as such is one of the
members in the composition of the Board of Management.
57. So far as the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent is concerned, there is no plea taken in his affidavit that the decision
dated 07.03.2018 was taken by the Board which rejected, to engage the
petitioner as guest faculty for the academic session 2017-2018. Any such
decision of the board has also not been brought on record. The order dated
07.03.2018 passed by the 1
st
respondent also does not make mention of any
specific order of the Board of Vidyapeetha or of any other authority. The
defence plea based on Rule 3 is therefore not acceptable.
58. As mentioned above on 20.07.2022 Sri P. B. Vijay Kumar, assisted by
Sri P. Ponnarao, learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent, as also Sri P. Subash,
learned counsel, who later on appeared for the 2
nd
respondent, and Sri M.
Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent, argued that non-
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CC No.2360 of 2017
22
compliance of the interim order dated 21.09.2017 is neither deliberate nor
willful. They submitted that the interim order used the expression „may‟ and
consequently, it was not mandatory for the respondents to comply. Learned
senior counsel submitted that the word „may‟ is directory and not mandatory.
The word „shall‟ was not used in the interim order. They further submitted that
the interim order was subject to condition “if there is any need” and as there
was no need, there was no deliberate or willful disobedience of the order.
59. So far as the aforesaid submission is concerned, it is not the case of
the respondent No.1, that pursuant to the interim order, the case of the
petitioner was not considered because of the expression „may‟. The 1
st
respondent passed the order dated 07.03.2018, meaning thereby the case was
considered notwithstanding the use of „may‟ in the order dated 21.09.2017.
The only thing is that the rejection was on a ground that there is no need or
requirement” which ground had already been rejected in I.A.No.1 of 2017 as no
more valid.
60. In view of the aforesaid there is no scope for the submission that
„may‟ as used in the order of the Court is directory and not mandatory.
Besides, in R. Gandhi v. Union of India
1
the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held
that “It is a well settled principle that the words in the judgment of the Court
cannot be interpreted as the words in a statute.”
61. Learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent argued that the 1
st
respondent alone cannot be held responsible and guilty of the contempt.
1
(1999) 8 SCC 106
RNT, J
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23
62. Merely because in the submission of the learned counsel for 1
st
respondent the others may also be responsible and guilty of contempt, on that
ground, the 1
st
respondent cannot escape his liability and duty to comply with
the Court‟s order. If he voluntarily or deliberately disobeyed the Court‟s order, it
cannot be contended by him in defence that he alone cannot be held guilty.
63. Learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent has placed reliance in the
judgment of G. Naganna v. Dr. Manmohan Singh
2
and on the strength of
that judgment, he submitted that the interim order cannot be seen in isolation,
but is to be considered in the light of the prayer made in the writ petition. He
further submitted that if an interim order gives scope for two different views or
at least a scope for some degree of lack of clarity, it is not open to the Court to
invoke the contempt jurisdiction.
64. In G. Naganna (supra), the petitioner therein was transferred and
suspended by two different orders of the same date. He challenged the order
of suspension before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in which
interim stay of the order of suspension was granted. When the State filed an
application for vacating the interim order and the petitioner therein filed a
contempt application alleging willful disobedience of the order of interim stay,
the Tribunal thought fit to take up the original application itself for disposal and
disposed of the said application merely with a direction to the respondents
therein to review the suspension of the applicant and to pass appropriate
orders for his reinstatement. The petitioner challenged the said order in writ
2
2017 SCC Online Hyd 276
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CC No.2360 of 2017
24
petition and sought interim suspension of the order of the Tribunal as also the
order of suspension and further sought direction to reinstate him into service.
The High Court passed ex parte interim order providing “interim suspension, as
prayed for”. In the contempt petition, the two learned Judges constituting the
Division Bench not being in agreement with the conclusions reached by each
other, the matter was referred to the third Judge. In the judgment dated
01.09.2017, upon which reliance has been placed, passed by the learned third
Judge, it was held that the interim order cannot be seen in isolation and it was
necessary to see the prayer in the writ petition and the relief sought in the
miscellaneous petition and the interim order passed in the writ petition. It was
found that the interim order passed in the writ petition was only “interim
suspension, as prayed for” and there was no interim direction to reinstate. The
main prayer in the writ petition was to quash the order of the Tribunal and the
order of the Tribunal was the direction to review the suspension and pass
appropriate orders for reinstatement. There was also no main prayer for
reinstatement. Consequently, it was held that the respondent therein was not
guilty of the disobedience of the interim order dated 22.12.2015 by not
reinstating the petitioner therein.
65. In the present case the prayer in the writ petition is direction to
continue the petitioner in the academic year 2017-18 and also in the
subsequent academic years. The interim order dated 21.09.2017, as quoted
above, is to consider the petitioner‟s case for his continuation on same terms in
accordance with rules if there is any need. The stand of the 1
st
respondent that
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25
there was no need was already negatived by this Court rejecting the I.A.No.1 of
2017. The writ appeal was also dismissed. Consequently, the interim order,
even if, seen not in isolation, but in the light of the main prayer in the writ
petition, the judgment in the case of G. Naganna (supra) is neither applicable
nor of any help to the 1
st
respondent.
66. The further submission of Sri M. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for
the 1
st
respondent, based on the judgment in G. Naganna (supra), is that if an
interim order gives a scope for two different views or at least a scope for some
degree of lack of clarity, it is not open to the Court to invoke the contempt
jurisdiction.
67. The aforesaid submission deserves rejection. It could not be argued
by the learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent as to what two different views
were possible of the interim order dated 21.09.2017 or as to how the said order
lacked in clarity.
68. Further, any such stand/defence as to what two different views are
possible and how the order was not clear, in the understanding of the 1
st
respondent, has not been stated in any of the affidavits of the 1
st
respondent,
though so many affidavits have been filed.
69. It is the understanding of the order by the person charged of
contempt and that too in bona fides is of concern and not the understanding in
the legal submission of his counsel. Even the learned counsel could not point
out what two different views were possible of the plain and simple order dated
21.09.2017 and how the order was not clear.
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70. In K. Mallaiah v. Sandeep Kumar Sultania
3
the Division Bench
of this Court held that if a party who is fully in the know of the order of the
Court, or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the
Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that the
disobedience is wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention
behind the act or omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively,
and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed
to intend the probable consequence of his act. To establish contempt of court,
it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnor
knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is not necessary to
prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order.
71. In view of the aforesaid consideration of the matter, the Court is of
the definite view that the 1
st
respondent has committed willful disobedience of
the order dated 21.09.2017 passed in W.P.No.31900 of 2017.
72. The charge against the 1
st
respondent is held proved to this effect
that the 1
st
respondent deliberately and willfully did not comply with the order
dated 21.09.2017 in spite of rejection of the application for vacation of the
interim order by order dated 19.02.2018 and has passed the order dated
07.03.2018 on the same ground on which the application for vacation was
rejected amounting to contempt of this Court, punishable under Section 12 of
the Contempt of Court‟s Act.
3
2016 (1) ALD 579
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
27
Consideration of charge against 2
nd
respondent:
73. The charge against the 2
nd
respondent reads as under:
“Prof. G.S.R. Krishna Murthy, has deliberately and willfully did not
comply with the interim order dated 21.09.2017, inspite of the rejection
of the application for vacation of the interim order, by order dated
19.02.2018, against which W.A.No.533 of 2018 was also dismissed on
18.07.2018 amounting to contempt of this Court punishable under
Section 12 of the Contempt of the Courts Act.”
74. The 2
nd
respondent filed counter affidavit on 21.02.2019 and
additional affidavit on 01.08.2022.
75. Sri P. Subash, learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent submitted that
the 2
nd
respondent assumed charge as Registrar in charge on 29.06.2018. The
Department of Education did not make any request for the academic year 2017-
18, as there was no need of any guest/part time lecturer in the Department of
Education. He further submitted that the academic year 2017-18 came to end
in April 2018 and therefore the first relief in the writ petition ceased to survive
at the time the 2
nd
respondent joined as Registrar in charge on 29.06.2018, for
that academic year, and so far as utilization of services of the petitioner for the
future academic year is concerned, two sanctioned posts were vacant in the
University reserved for Schedule Caste Category only, against which the
petitioner could not be considered as guest/part time lecturer as he does not
belong to the Scheduled Caste category.
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
28
76. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent that the order dated 21.09.2017 could not be complied as the post
was earmarked for Scheduled Caste is concerned, the same plea was taken in
the writ appeal but was not accepted by the Division Bench and the writ appeal
was dismissed confirming the order dated 19.02.2018 by which the application
for vacation of the interim order dated 21.09.2017 was rejected.
77. Once the plea of the University that there was no need or
requirement was rejected and the plea of the sanctioned post being earmarked
for Scheduled Caste was also not accepted, taking the same plea in defence for
not complying with the order dated 21.09.2017 is not justified nor acceptable.
78. The plea taken by the University in I.A.No.1 of 2017 to vacate the
interim order dated 21.09.2017 and the additional plea taken in the writ appeal
also having been rejected, the same plea cannot form a valid defence in the
contempt matter. The order must have been complied by the 2
nd
respondent
as well , by considering the petitioner‟s case in terms of the order dated
21.09.2017 read with order dated 19.02.2018 and the order passed in
W.A.No.553 of 2018 dated 18.07.2018.
79. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further advanced the same
submissions as advanced by the learned counsel for the 1
st
respondent to the
effect that it is the Board of Management which is the principal organ and the
principal executive body of the University and the 2
nd
respondent being
Registrar had no role to play. It was further submitted by the learned counsel
for the 2
nd
respondent that under Rule 21 of the Rules of the Vidyapeeth, there
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
29
is Selection Committee for making recommendations to the Board of
Management for appointment to the post, inter alia, of Assistant Professors and
in that Selection Committee the Registrar is not there. He also pointed out to
Rule 28 of the Rules of Vidyapeeth to contend that amongst the duties of the
Registrar, it is not the duty of the 2
nd
respondent as the Registrar either to
make selection or the appointment.
80. Rule 28 of the Rules are referred as under:
―28. Registrar
i) The Registrar shall be a whole time salaried officer of the Vidyapeetha and
shall be appointed by the Board of Management on the recommendations
of the Selection Committee consisting of the following:
1) Vice-Chancellor – Chairperson
2) One nominee of the Chancellor
3) One nominee of the Board of management
4) One expert appointed by the Board of Management who is not an
employee of the Vidyapeetha.
ii) The emoluments and other terms and conditions of service of the Registrar
shall be as prescribed by Rules of the Vidyapeetha.
iii) When the office of the Registrar is vacant or when the Registrar is absent
by reason of illness or any other reason, the duties and functions of the
Registrar shall be performed by such other person as the Vice-Chancellor
may appoint for the purpose.
iv) The Registrar shall be ex-officio Secretary of the Board of Management,
Academic Council and the Planning and Monitoring Board, but shall not be
deemed to be a member of any of these authorities.
v) The Registrar shall be directly responsible to the Vice-Chancellor and shall
work under his direction.
vi) The following shall be the duties of the Registrar:
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
30
1) To be custodian of the records and the funds and such other property of
the Vidyapeetha as the Board of Management may commit to his/her
charge;
2) To conduct the official correspondence on behalf of the authorities of
the Vidyapeetha;
3) To issue notices convening meetings and the official correspondence of
the authorities of the Vidyapeetha and all Committees and Sub-
Committees appointed by any of these authorities;
4) To maintain the minutes of the meetings of all the authorities of the
Vidyapeetha and of all the Committees and Sub-Committees appointed
by any of these authorities;
5) To make arrangements for and supervise the examinations conducted
by the Vidyapeetha;
6) To represent the institution deemed to be university in suits or
proceedings by or against the Vidyapeetha, sign powers of attorney and
perform pleadings or depute his/her representatives for this purpose;
7) To enter into agreement, sign documents and authenticate records on
behalf of the Vidyapeetha;
8) To make arrangements to safeguard and maintain the buildings,
gardens, office, canteen, cars and other vehicles, laboratories, libraries,
reading rooms, equipment and other properties of the Vidyapeetha;
9) To perform such other duties as may be specified in the Rules or as
may be assigned by the Board of Management or the Vice-Chancellor
from time to time;
10) When the office of the Finance Officer is vacant or when the Finance
Officer is by reason of illness, absence or any other cause unable to
perform the duties of his office, if the Vice-Chancellor orders these
shall be performed by the Registrar or by such person as the Vice-
Chancellor may appoint for the purpose; and
11) To be the custodian of common seal and the movable and immovable
property of the Vidyapeetha.‖
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CC No.2360 of 2017
31
81. Rule 28 (i) clearly provides that the Registrar shall be a whole time
salaried officer of the Vidyapeetha. Rule 28 (vi), which also is one of the duties
of the Registrar, inter alia, provides “to issue notices convening meetings and
the official correspondence of the authorities of the Vidyapeetha and all
Committees and Sub-Committees appointed by any of those authorities”. The
Registrar has also to perform such other duties as may be specified in the rules
or as may be assigned by the Board of Management or the Vice Chancellor from
time to time, besides other duties.
82. There is nothing on record to show nor it is the case of the 2
nd
respondent that he issued any notice convening the meeting for implementing
the order of this Court in discharge of his duties as the Registrar, though the
Registrar is the Secretary of the Board of Management, as per composition of
the Board of Management, if for implementing the Court‟s order, the Board of
Management was to consider the case, as is the submission advanced.
83. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further submitted that the
Registrar is merely a communication channel between the University and the
outsiders and he himself does not have power to take any decision with respect
to appointment of faculty. As such, the Registrar alone cannot be held liable.
He further submitted that the 2
nd
respondent requested the Dean, Department
of Education to comply with the interim order passed by this Court.
84. Nothing has been brought on record to substantiate such above
defence taken in the affidavit dated 28.07.2022 and argued by the learned
counsel for the 2
nd
respondent that he requested the Dean, Department of
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CC No.2360 of 2017
32
Education to comply with the interim order. The document annexed with the
affidavit dated 28.07.2022 (at page-22) on the strength of which it is argued
that the 2
nd
respondent made request to the Dean Academic Affairs to comply
with the interim order is only dated 22.07.2022, i.e., submitted recently, during
the continuance of the present contempt proceedings, at a later stage, and
annexed with the affidavit dated 28.07.2022.
85. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further submitted that after
filing I.A.No.1 of 2018 in the contempt petition he came to know about the
contempt proceedings and the orders of this Court and previously the 2
nd
respondent was not put to the notice about the order of this Court.
86. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent is misconceived. Writ Appeal No.553 of 2018 was filed by the
University challenging the order dated 21.09.2017, through the 2
nd
respondent
being the Registrar in charge of the University, which is an undisputed fact. It
cannot be said that the 2
nd
respondent was not aware about the orders dated
21.09.2017, 19.02.2018 or the order passed in the writ appeal on 18.07.2018,
by which the writ appeal was dismissed. The 2
nd
respondent was the Registrar
in charge from 29.06.2018 and rendered service till 18.03.2020. Under these
circumstances, the submission advanced that the 2
nd
respondent became aware
about the order only after filing of I.A.No.1 of 2018 in the contempt petition is
misconceived and contrary to records.
87. Nothing has been brought on record to substantiate as to what steps
the 2
nd
respondent took towards ensuring the compliance of the Court‟s order
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
33
since after he joined as Registrar in charge and during his tenure as such, in
spite of the fact that the writ appeal filed by the University through 2
nd
respondent was dismissed on 18.07.2018.
88. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent placed reliance on the
following judgments:
i) Gyani Chand v. State of A.P.
4
ii) Boggarapu Naveen Kumar v. B. Rajsekhar
5
iii) ESI Corpn. v. All India ITDC Employees’ Union
6
iv) Mohamad Iqbal Khandy v. Abdul Majid Rather
7
v) M/s. Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India
8
vi) R.M.Ramaul v. The State of H.P.
9
vii) K. Arumugam v. V. Balakrishnan
10
viii) Dr.U.N.Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Association
11
ix) Sode Ramulu v. K.L.V.Prasad
12
x) Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar
13
xi) Prof.Pannalal v. Holy Bharathi
14
xii) In Re S. Mulgaokar
15
xiii) Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang
16
4
AIR 2016 SC 4403
5
CC.Nos.673 & 686 of 2020 (decided on 19.04.2022, APHC)
6
(2006) 4 SCC 257
7
AIR 1994 SC 2252
8
AIR 1985 Calcutta 143
9
AIR 1991 SC 1171
10
(2019) 18 SCC 150
11
AIR 2021 SC 5360 = (2022) 1 SCC 101
12
2011 (6) ALT 119 (S.B)
13
AIR 1999 SC 3215
14
2000 (6) ALT 430 (D.B)
15
(1978) 3 SCC 339
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
34
xiv) Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi
17
xv) Debabrata Bandopadhyay v. The State of W.B
18
xvi) Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly
19
xvii) Murray & Co. v. Ashok KR.Newatia
20
xviii) K. Mallaiah v. Sandeep Kumar Sultania (3 supra)
xix) V. G. Govindaswami Mudali v. B. Subba Reddy
21
89. The Court proceeds to consider the aforesaid judgments in the light
of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent.
89.1. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent has placed reliance in the
case of Gyani Chand v. State of A.P. (supra) to submit that it is impossible
for the 2
nd
respondent to comply with the order and in view of „impossible to
perform‟, he cannot be held guilty of disobedience.
89.1.1. In Gyani Chand (supra) the facts were that the appellant
therein, to whom the original documents of his mother were handed over under
the orders of the Court had given an undertaking that those documents would
be produced before the Court when required. He handed over those
documents to his mother who had right to retain the same, but she expired and
it was his further case that in cyclone his house was partly hit and submerged
in flood water and all the belongings were vanished. The documents were
neither with the appellant nor could be produced by him before the Court as
16
AIR 2021 SC 721
17
(2012) 4 SCC 307
18
AIR 1969 SC 189
19
(2002) 5 SCC 352
20
(2000) 2 SCC 367
21
(1986) 2 ALT 131
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
35
now it was impossible for him. It was in that context, it was held that there
was no willful breach of undertaking given by the appellant for which he cannot
be held guilty of Contempt of Court.
89.1.2. In the present case, it could not be argued by the learned
counsel for the 2
nd
respondent as to how it was impossible for the 2
nd
respondent to comply with the Court‟s order by dong what was on his part,
after dismissal of the writ appeal for convening meeting of the Board of
Management for consideration of the petitioner‟s case by issuing notices, if it
was for the Board of Management at all to consider.
89.2. In C.C.Nos.673 & 686 of 2020, decided on 19.04.2022, upon
which also reliance has been placed, the petitioner therein did not possess
requisite qualification being mandatory, this Court held that granting for
promotion would be violative of rules, and therefore the failure to comply could
not be said to be willful disobedience.
89.2.1. It is not the case of the 2
nd
respondent herein neither in the
counter affidavit nor in the additional affidavit that the present petitioner lacked
in requisite mandatory qualification and consequently considering him in terms
of the order dated 21.09.2017 would be violative of any specified rule. In fact
the petitioner was continuing as guest faculty teacher since 2014 and
consequently, the failure on the part of the 2
nd
respondent to comply, on such a
submission of qualification, cannot be defended on the strength of the
judgment cited.
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
36
89.3. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further placed reliance in
the case of ESI Corpn. v. All India ITDC Employees’ Union (supra) to
contend that in the order dated 21.09.2017 this Court directed to „consider‟ and
there was no positive direction.
89.3.1. In ESI Corpn. (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court, considering the
directions, given by the learned single Judge of the High Court, held that the
High Court did not really give a positive direction and left the matter to be
decided by the Corporation. The direction was to „consider‟ and in that sense
there was no positive direction. It was further held that when the Court directs
the authority to consider, it requires the authority to apply its mind to the facts
and circumstances and then take a decision thereon, in accordance with law.
The Hon‟ble Apex Court, further held that the High Court directs the authority
to consider in different category of cases. Where the authority vested with the
power to decide the matter fails to do so in spite of request, the person
aggrieved approaches the High Court which in exercise of the power of judicial
review directs the authority to consider and decide the matter. In such cases,
while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court directs
consideration without examining the facts or the legal question involved and
without recording any findings on the issues. It was further held that the High
Court may also direct the authority „to consider‟ afresh, where the authority had
decided the matter without considering the relevant facts and circumstances, or
by taking extraneous or irrelevant matters into consideration. In such cases
also the High Court may not examine the validity or tenability of the claim on
RNT, J
CC No.2360 of 2017
37
merits but require the authority to do so. The Hon‟ble Apex Court further held
that where the High Court finds the decision making process erroneous and
records its findings as to the manner in which the decision should be made and
then directs the authority to „consider‟ the matter, the authority will have to
consider and decide the matter in the light of the findings or observations of
the Court. But where the High Court without recording any findings, or without
expressing any view, merely directs the authority to „consider‟ the matter, the
authority will have to consider the matter in accordance with law, with
reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, its power not being
circumscribed by any observations or findings of the Court.
89.3.2. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent could not point out if in
ESI Corpn. (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court has also held that if the direction is
given to consider, the authority is not to consider the case or that if direction to
consider is preceded by the word „may‟ the authority is vested with the
discretion to choose to consider or not to consider at all.
89.3.3. In the present case, there was a positive direction to consider
the petitioner‟s case in case of need, in accordance with law. And, once the
plea taken in the counter affidavit for vacation of the interim order that there
was no need or requirement was rejected in I.A.No.1 of 2017 by this Court on
19.02.2018 firstly, the petitioner‟s case could not be rejected on the same
ground that there was no need or requirement and;
89.3.4. Secondly, after the order dated 19.02.2018 was confirmed in
W.A.No.553 of 2018 by order dated 18.07.2018, also rejecting the ground of
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the sanctioned post being for Scheduled Caste category, the 2
nd
respondent
was to ensure compliance of the order dated 21.09.2017, but he did not take
any step towards compliance and now the defence is being taken that because
of the use of the word „may‟ in the order dated 21.09.2017, it was not
mandatory for the 2
nd
respondent to consider.
89.3.5. The judgment in ESI Corpn. (supra) does not support the
contention of the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent and is of no help to
the 2
nd
respondent.
89.4. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent placed reliance in the case
of Mohamad Iqbal Khandy v. Abdul Majid Rather (supra) to contend that
when there are difficulties in implementing order or if the order is impossible for
compliance, the contempt jurisdiction should not be invoked.
89.4.1. In Mohamad Iqbal Khandy (supra) the High Court granted
interim order directing the State Government to grant ad hoc promotion to the
post of Associate Professor. That was the interim direction and was the main
prayer in the writ petition itself. In implementing the said order, there were
inseparable difficulties. Under the relevant rules the promotion was required to
be made by the Public Service Commission or by the Departmental Promotion
Committee and that person also did not possess requisite
qualifications/experience eligibility for promotion. The appellant therein could
not be given promotion since it was to be done by the Public Service
Commission or by the departmental promotion committee. Therefore, the
implementation was impossible at the end of the appellant therein. Considering
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the aforesaid inseparable difficulties in implementing the order and those
difficulties being genuine, it was held that the Court must always be zealous in
preserving its authority and dignity but at the same time it will be inadvisable to
require compliance of an order impossible of compliance at the instance of the
person proceeding against for contempt.
89.4.2. In Mohamad Iqbal Khandy (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court
clearly held that greater respect should have been shown to the Court and if
he, the appellant therein, was aggrieved by the order, he should have taken
prompt steps to invoke the appellate procedures. The appellant could not
ignore the order and plead the difficulties for implementation at the time
contempt proceedings are initiated.
89.4.3. In the present case, the University challenged the order by filing
the vacate stay application which having been rejected, also filed writ appeal
and the same also having been rejected, if it was still aggrieved, ought to have
challenged those orders further, but not having done so, in the contempt
proceedings cannot ignore the order and raise the same alleged difficulties, in
defence, in implementing the order as were raised in I.A.No.1 of 2017 and
W.A.No.553 of 2018, but were rejected by this Court, by orders dated
19.02.2018 and 18.07.2018 respectively. The judgment in Mohamad Iqbal
Khandy (supra) is of no help to the 2
nd
respondent.
89.5. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent placed reliance in the case
of M/s. Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India (supra) to
contend that when the order is incomplete and ambiguous the contempt is not
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made out. This judgment is not on the point. This is a case under Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, and on the point of territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
89.6. In R.M.Ramaul v. The State of H.P. (supra) upon which
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent, the
promotion was granted to the complainant therein from 28.05.1982 up to
03.09.1986 as a mere notional promotion without any monetary benefits, in
spite of the specific directions in the order of the Court for restoration of the
complainant‟s seniority in service over and above the two officers who were
juniors to him. In the contempt petition, the Hon‟ble Apex Court found that the
grievance of the complainant was legitimate one and though there was no
specific direction to consider the complainant‟s case for promotion with effect
from 28.05.1982 such a relief was implicit in the reasoning of the order and
withholding of the monetary benefits in respect of that period was inconsistent
with what was decided by the Court, to which the complainant was entitled to.
The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that since there was no specific direction in that
behalf in the order i.e., payment of monetary benefits, there may not be the
case for punishment for contempt.
89.6.1. The aforesaid judgment is of no help to the 2
nd
respondent, as
here there was specific direction to consider the petitioner‟s case and ground
for non-considering the case was found to be not a valid ground and
consequently the I.A.No.1 of 2017 was rejected and the W.A.No.553 of 2018
was also dismissed.
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89.7. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent placed reliance in the case
of K. Arumugam v. V. Balakrishnan (supra) to contend that the Courts
cannot traverse beyond four corners of the order under Contempt of Courts
Act.
89.7.1. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in this case held that in the contempt
jurisdiction the Court has to confine itself to the four corners of the order
alleged to have been disobeyed. The Court cannot travel beyond the four
corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted.
89.7.2. There is no dispute on the aforesaid proposition of law. In the
said case, the order of the Court directed the authority to ensure fair and
reasonable compensation to be sanctioned and paid at the earliest, which was
paid and thus, the order of the Court was complied with, however, in the
contempt petition, the learned single Judge issued positive direction to the
authorities to pay further compensation @Rs.600/- per square feet. It was held
that in the contempt jurisdiction the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by
issuing directions which could not be issued as the Court had to confine itself to
the four corners of the order alleged to have been disobeyed.
89.7.3. This Court would certainly not travel beyond the four corners of
the order, dated 21.09.2017.
89.8. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further placed reliance in
the case of Dr.U.N.Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Association (supra) to
contend that the contempt proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and the
standard of proof required is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would be
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hazardous to impose sentence for contempt in exercise of the contempt
jurisdiction on mere probabilities as also to contend that if two interpretations
are possible, and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding
would not be maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken
into consideration and the same must be read in its entirety.
89.8.1. There is no dispute on the aforesaid settled principle of law that
if two interpretations are possible and if the action is not contumacious, a
contempt proceeding would not be maintainable. The effect and purport of the
order is to be taken into consideration and read in its entirety.
89.8.2. However, the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent could not
submit as to what two interpretations of the order were possible and which of
the two such possible interpretations, the 2
nd
respondent considered which one
so as not to proceed to ensure compliance of the order dated 21.09.2017. Any
such plea has also not been taken in the responses filed by the 2
nd
respondent.
This Court clearly provided to consider the case of the petitioner in case of
need, in accordance with law. So there was a positive direction to consider and
any other view that the petitioner‟s case was not to be considered, in the
decision of this Court, neither flows from the order nor even is a possible
interpretation.
89.9. Sode Ramulu v. K.L.V.Prasad (supra) was cited to submit that
when there is an error in understanding the judgment, it is not willful
disobedience. He referred to paragaraphs-35, 39, 41 & 42 of the said
judgment, to contend that if from the circumstances of a particular case, the
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Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience, but the same is
the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the
contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish for contempt.
89.9.1. There may not be any dispute on the law as aforesaid, but what
was an error in understanding the order of this Court, in the understanding of
the 2
nd
respondent, is not explained neither in the counter affidavit dated
21.02.2019 nor in the additional affidavit dated 01.08.2022 filed by the 2
nd
respondent. No such plea has been taken by the 2
nd
respondent that there was
an error in his understanding of the order dated 21.09.2017. The same has
also not been explained by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent during
arguments. The judgment is therefore of no help nor the law laid down therein
is applicable in the present case.
89.10. The case of Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar (supra)
was cited to contend that for holding one having committed civil contempt it
has to be shown that there has been willful disobedience and when there is
clear violation of the Court‟s order.
89.10.1. There is no dispute on the proposition of law that it is only
when there is violation of the Court‟s order and it is willful that there would be
civil contempt.
89.11. Reliance has further been placed in Prof.Pannalal v. Holy
Bharathi (supra) by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent, to contend
that if an order is passed, then it has to be challenged by way of fresh
proceeding and to further contend that the Court cannot travel beyond the
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scope of the order and grant fresh order in the exercise of the contempt
jurisdiction, as also to contend that the order passed may or may not be true
but the same could not be gone into in the contempt proceedings.
89.11.1. In Prof. Pannalal (supra) by the order passed in the
contempt petition, the petitioner therein was granted relief of affiliation which
was not claimed in the writ petition and was outside the scope of the pleadings
as also was not granted by the writ Court. The said judgment is not applicable
nor is on the point. In the exercise of contempt jurisdiction, this Court is not
oblivious of its limitations and certainly would not be travelling beyond the
scope of the order passed by the writ Court.
89.11.2. No doubt, if an order is passed making compliance with the
final or interim order of the Writ court and the person is aggrieved from such
order, he may take recourse to file appropriate proceedings, but at the same
time, for the purposes of considering whether there is compliance with the
Court‟s order or not, and the non-compliance or the disobedience, if any, is
willful or not, the contempt jurisdiction of the Court cannot be said to be barred
only because the order has been passed, which apparently may be an eyewash
or/and in clear disobedience of the Court‟s order. An order may suffer from
both infirmities, i.e., it may be illegal on merits and it may also be
contemptuous for not complying with the Court‟s order and disobeying the
same willfully. With respect to such order, this Court is of the view that, the
person may approach in appropriate proceedings challenging such order and at
the same time may also invoke the contempt jurisdiction. The order being
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illegal and not sustainable, may be quashed and finding that the order is
contemptuous, the punishment can also be imposed in contempt jurisdiction.
89.11.3. In the present case the 2
nd
respondent has not passed any
order and consequently, the judgment in Prof. Pannalal (supra) does not help
the 2
nd
respondent for this additional reason. The 2
nd
respondent has not taken
any action for complying with this Court‟s order even after its knowledge and
dismissal of the writ appeal filed by the University through the 2
nd
respondent.
89.12. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further placed reliance in
the case of In Re S. Mulgaokar (supra) on the point of what constitutes
contempt and how the Court should deal in contempt matters, in particular
paragraph-27 of the judgment.
89.12.1. Paragraph-27 in In Re S. Mulgaokar (supra) is reproduced
as under:
―27. The first rule in this branch of contempt power is a wise economy of
use by the Court of this branch of its jurisdiction. The Court will act with
seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized by a gross and/or
unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or
destroy the judicial process. The Court is willing to ignore, by a majestic
liberalism, trifling and venial offences — the dogs may bark, the caravan will
pass. The Court will not be prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability.
Much rather, it shall take a notice look at the conspectus of features and be
guided by a constellation of constitutional and other considerations when it
chooses to use, or desist from using, its power of contempt.‖
89.12.2. The first rule, as laid down in the branch of contempt power is
a wise economy of use by the Court of its contempt jurisdiction. The Court will
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act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized. There is no
dispute on such settled proposition of law.
89.13. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further placed reliance in
the case of Rama Narang (supra) to contend that the contempt proceedings
are quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is in the same
manner as in other criminal cases. He has also referred the cases of Kanwar
Singh Saini (supra) and Debabrata Bandopadhyay (supra) in support of his
same contention that the contempt Court‟s proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature and the duty of the Court in dealing with the contempt matters, where
the Court is both the accuser as well as the Judge of the accusation, it,
behooves the Court to act with as great circumspection as possible, making all
allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate
practices in Courts and Tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious
conduct not explainable otherwise, arises, that the contemner must be
punished.
89.13.1. The proposition of law as in the aforesaid cited judgments is
well settled on which there is no dispute. The only thing is of its application.
89.14. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent has placed further
reliance in the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul (supra) to contend that the
power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be
used sparingly by the Courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of
contemptuous conduct upon which also there is no dispute on principles.
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89.15. Learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent further placed reliance in
the case of Murray & Co. v. Ashok KR.Newatia (supra) to contend that the
conduct of the party should substantially interfere with the cause of justice, and
that no generalized guidelines can be had nor can a set of general principles in
the matter of award of punishment be formulated. The Court must otherwise
come to the conclusion that on facts the act tantamount to obstruction of
justice which, if allowed, would even permeate into society. It is only then that
this power ought to be exercised.
89.15.1. In Murray & Co. (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court in clear
words also expressed its view that “this Court in our view, would be failing in its
duties, if the matter in question is not dealt with in a manner proper and
effective for maintenance of the majesty of courts as otherwise the law courts
would lose their efficacy to the litigant public. It is in this perspective that we do
feel it expedient to record that mere tendering of unconditional apology to this
Court would not exonerate the contemner in the contextual facts.”
89.15.2. In Murray & Co. (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that
Section 13 of the Act of 1971 postulates no punishment for contemptuous
conduct in certain cases and the language used therein seems to be with
utmost care and caution when it records that unless the Court is satisfied that
the contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially
interferes with the due course of justice, the question of any punishment would
not arise. It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of
Court but it must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise
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substantially interfere with the due course of justice which has been equated
with “due administration of justice”.
89.16. In K. Mallaiah v. Sandeep Kumar Sultania (supra) upon
which also reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent, in particular paragraph-36, the High Court of Judicature at
Hyderabad held that if a party who is fully in the know of the order of the
Court, or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the
Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that the
disobedience is willful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention
behind the act or omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively,
and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed
to intend the probable consequence of his act. To establish contempt of court,
it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnor
knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is not necessary to
prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order.
89.17. In V. G. Govindaswami Mudali v. B. Subba Reddy (supra)
upon which also reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the 2
nd
respondent the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that for the purposes of
judging „civil contempt‟ intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is
only whether the breach was on account of willful disobedience i.e., whether it
was not casual or accidental and unintentional.
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90. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that
even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience, particularly
when attention of the person is drawn to the Court‟s orders and its implication.
91. It is also apt to refer para-36 of the judgment in K. Malaiah (supra)
as under:
―36. If a party who is fully in the know of the order of the Court, or is
conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court's order,
ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that the disobedience is
wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention behind the act or
omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively, and it may
presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the
probable consequence of his act. (N.S. Kanwar). To establish contempt of court,
it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnor
knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is not necessary to
prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order. (St. Helens
Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers Union; Adam Phones Ltd. v. Goldschmidt
1999 4 ALLER 486). While the jurisdiction exercised in cases of contempt is
quasi-criminal in nature and the court must be satisfied, on the material before
it, that contempt of court was in fact committed, such satisfaction may be
derived from the circumstances of the case. (Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind
Shukla; Bank of India v. Vijay Transport 2000 8 SCC 512). For the purposes of
judging ‗civil contempt‘, intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is
only whether the breach was on account of willful disobedience i.e, whether it
was not casual or accidental and unintentional. (V.C. Govindaswami
Mudali v. B. Subba Reddy 1986 2 ALT 131).‖
92. From the aforesaid judgments, it is very much clear that even where
the Court‟s order is ignored a case of civil contempt is made out if the party
fully knew of the order of the court and was conscious thereof. Even
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negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience, particularly when
attention of the person is drawn to the Court‟s order. It is not necessary to
prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order.
93. It is not the case of the 2
nd
respondent that he did not know the
order or was not conscious and aware of the consequences. The fact is that
the 2
nd
respondent is aware of the order as the appeal was filed by the
University through the 2
nd
respondent and the order of dismissal of the writ
appeal was passed when the 2
nd
respondent was still in charge of the Registrar
of the University. He ignored the compliance of the order.
94. In the facts and circumstances of the case on record, it is held that
the ignorance of the compliance of the order and not complying and disobeying
the order by the 2
nd
respondent is nothing but willful and deliberate
disobedience.
95. This Court is satisfied with the material before it that there is willful
disobedience of the order dated 21.09.2017 in spite of rejection of the
application for vacation of the interim order and dismissal of the writ appeal.
The 2
nd
respondent is guilty of willful disobedience of the order dated
21.09.2017.
96. The charge against the 2
nd
respondent as framed is held proved.
Apology:
97. The respondents 1 and 2 have tendered apology.
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98. In Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P.
22
though it was a case of
criminal contempt against a lawyer, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that no one
has the authority to conduct in a manner which would demean and disgrace the
majesty of justice which is dispensed by a Court of law. The administration of
justice is the paramount role of the Court. It was further held that the apology
should be prompt and genuine. The concept of mercy and compassion is
ordinarily attracted keeping in view the infirmities of the man‟s nature and the
fragile conduct, but in a Court of law a counsel cannot always take the shelter
under the canopy of mercy for the law has to reign supreme.
99. In Arun Kumar Yadav (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to
the judgment of L.D.Jaikwal v. State of U.P
23
in which it was observed that
“We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology
we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished, otherwise,
all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest
imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later
on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such
an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would
in fact be virtually issuing a „licence‟ to scandalize Courts and commit contempt
of Court with impunity”.
100. In All Bengal Excise Licensees’ Assn. v. Raghabendra
Singh
24
the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it is settled law that a party to the
22
(2013) 14 SCC 127
23
(1984) 3 SCC 405
24
(2007) 11 SCC 374
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litigation cannot be allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach
of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof by pleading
misunderstanding. It was further observed that “under the constitutional
scheme of this countery orders of the High Court have to be obeyed implicitly
and the orders of this Court – for that matter any Court should not be trifled
with”. In that case it was found that the respondents therein acted deliberately
to subvert the orders of the High Court. The Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that
“it is equally necessary to erase an impression which appears to be gaining
ground that the mantra of unconditional apology is a complete answer to
violations and infractions of the orders of the High Court or of this Court.”
101. It is also apt to refer the case of Bal Kishan Giri v. State of
U.P.
25
in which the Hon‟ble Apex Court held, in paras-13 to 17, as under:
“13. In Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta [(1983) 4 SCC 125 : 1983 SCC
(Cri) 771] , while dealing with the issue, this Court observed as under : (SCC p.
127, para 3)
―3. … The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to
lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of
justice by vilification of Judges. It is not that Judges need be protected;
Judges may well take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the
public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected.‖
14. In Jennison v. Baker [(1972) 2 QB 52 : (1972) 2 WLR 429 : (1972) 1
All ER 997 (CA)] , All ER p. 1006d, it was observed : (QB p. 66 H)
―… ‗The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who
defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.‘‖
15. The appellant has tendered an absolute and unconditional apology
which has not been accepted by the High Court. The apology means a regretful
25
(2014) 7 SCC 280
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acknowledgment or an excuse for failure. An explanation offered to a person
affected by one's action that no offence was intended, coupled with the
expression of regret for any that may have been given. Apology should be
unquestionable in sincerity. It should be tempered with a sense of genuine
remorse and repentance, and not a calculated strategy to avoid punishment.
16. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act and the Explanation
attached thereto enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for
committing the contempt of court on an apology being made to the satisfaction
of the court. However, an apology should not be rejected merely on the ground
that it is qualified or tendered at a belated stage if the accused makes it bona
fide. A conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process of
the court is to be dealt with iron hands and no person can tinker with it to
prevent, prejudice, obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice. There
can be cases where the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns upon only at a
later stage. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or an
appropriate punishment for an act which tantamounts to contempt of court. An
apology can be accepted in case where the conduct for which the apology is
given is such that it can be ―ignored without compromising the dignity of the
court‖, or it is intended to be the evidence of real contrition. It should be
sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow; there is no remorse; no
regret; no repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law.
Such an apology can merely be termed as ―paper apology‖.
17. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [(1984) 3 SCC 405 : 1984 SCC (Cri)
421] , this Court noted that it cannot subscribe to the “slap-say sorry-and
forget” school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence.
Saying “sorry” does not make the slapper poorer. [See also T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot [(2006) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 2006
SC 2007] .] So an apology should not be ―paper apology‖ and expression of
sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it is one thing to
―say‖ sorry, it is another to ―feel‖ sorry.‖
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102. In Bal Kishan Giri (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that a
conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process of the Court
is to be dealt with iron hands and no person can tinker with it to prevent,
prejudice, obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice. An apology
tendered is not to be accepted as a matter of course by the Court.
103. The present is not a case of accidental or unintentional
disobedience. The 1
st
respondent and the 2
nd
respondent acted deliberately to
subvert the order of this Court. Their act is contumacious. The apology
tendered by the respondents in the facts of the case is considered not bona
fide. The apology tendered is rejected.
104. The compliance with the interim order, on 12.08.2022 after more
than 4 years, by the present authorities of the University, is no answer to the
willful disobedience of the order, by the respondents 1 and 2.
105. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul (supra) held
that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of
the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of
law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric
of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. It was further
held that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the
statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in
general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power
to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the Constitution
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in the Courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and
needs to be exercised with care and caution.
106. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex court held that
the disobedience of Court‟s order strikes at the very root of rule of law on which
our system of governance is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary
for the maintenance of effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent
perversion of the course of justice.
107. The Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to the famous passage of Lord
Diplock in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. {(1973) 3 ALL ER 54} in
which it was said that there is also an element of public policy in punishing civil
contempt, since administration of justice would be undermined if the order of
any Court of law could be disregarded with impunity. Jurisdiction to punish for
contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to
comply with the order of the Court or disregards the orders.
Conclusions:
108. The charges against the respondents 1 and 2 have been proved.
They have been held guilty of committing civil contempt of the Court. Their
apology has been rejected. Their acts substantially interfere with the due
course of justice or due administration of justice. By their acts the petitioner
was prevented from justice by not complying with the order dated 27.09.2017
in spite of rejection of petition for vacation of the order and the dismissal of the
writ appeal. The respondents are liable for imposition of punishment. Under
the facts and circumstances, mere imposition of fine will not meet the ends of
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CC No.2360 of 2017
56
justice. Sentence of imprisonment is necessary. However, considering the
present age of the respondents being 68 and 65 years respectively, the Court is
taking a lenient view in imposition of sentence of imprisonment.
Punishment:
109. Consequently, this Court imposes the following punishment on the
respondents 1 and 2 under Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971;
i. The 1
st
respondent shall undergo sentence of simple imprisonment
for 2 days and shall pay fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand
only);
ii. The 2
nd
respondent shall undergo sentence of simple imprisonment
for 2 days and shall pay fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand
only);
110. The respondents 1 and 2 shall be detained in a civil prison for the
period the sentence of simple imprisonment is imposed.
111. The execution of the punishment, however, shall remain suspended
for a period of 30 days from today.
112. It is further directed that subject to the orders in the appeal, if so
filed, on expiry of the aforesaid period, the respondents 1 and 2 shall surrender
before the Principal Senior Civil Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chittoor to
serve the sentence, and if they do not so surrender, the Principal Senior Civil
Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chittoor shall secure their custody and
send them to civil prison to serve out the sentence.
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CC No.2360 of 2017
57
113. If the fine is not deposited, the proceedings for recovery of fine
shall be taken as per the provisions of Section 421 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
114. Learned Registrar General of this Court shall ensure compliance and
place on record the report of compliance
115. Let copy of this order be sent to the Principal Senior Civil Judge-
cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chittoor along with the particulars of the
respondents 1 and 2.
116. Contempt case is allowed as aforesaid.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in
consequence.
_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
Date: 07.02.2023
Dsr
Note:
L.R.Copy to be marked
B/o
Dsr
Note:
Furnish copy today itself
B/o
Dsr
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