* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA

+ WRIT PETITION No. 23639 of 2025

% 08.07.2026

Between:

Dunga Kumari

.....PETITIONER

AND

The State of Andhra Pradesh and others

....RESPONDENTS

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri D. Purnachandra Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri Kirthi Teja, GP attached to

Office of the Addl. Advocate General

< Gist :

> Head Note:

? Cases Referred:

1. 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 515

2. (2015) 16 SCC 253

3. 2020 SCC OnLine AP 565

4. WP.No.1803 of 2021, Decided on

27.04.2021 (APHC, Amaravati)

5. WP.No.7335 of 2023 & Batch,

Decided on 03.07.2023 (APHC, Amaravati)

6. WP.No.932 of 2025, Decided on

26.09.2025 (APHC, Amaravati)

7. (1991) 1 SCC 128

8. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 502

9. 1985 SCC OnLine SC 316

10. (1990) 2 SCC 629

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

2

Date of reserved for orders : 03.07.2026

Date of pronouncement : 08.07.2026

Date of uploading : 08.07.2026

APHC010460382025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

WRIT PETITION NO: 23639 of 2025

[3562]

Dunga Kumari ...Petitioner

Vs.

The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...Respondent(s)

**********

Advocate for Petitioner: D PURNACHANDRA REDDY

Advocate for Respondent: THE ADVOCATE GENERAL

CORAM : SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA

DATE : 8

th

July, 2026

JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)

Heard Sri D. Purnachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri Kirthi Teja, learned Government Pleader, attached to

the Office of the Additional Advocate General, appearing for the

respondents.

2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

has been filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by the petitioner for direction

to the respondents to release the petitioner’s husband, namely, Dunga

Manikyam (in short ‘the detenu’) pursuant to the Order of his detention.

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

3

3. The 2

nd

respondent – the Principal Secretary to Government

(FAC), Revenue (Excise-II) Department, State of Andhra Pradesh, vide

G.O.Rt.No.711, dated 09.07.2025 passed an Order of Detention under

Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (in short ‘PIT NDPS Act, 1988’) on

the ground that the detenu was involved in ‘illicit traffic’ within the

meaning of Section 2 (e) (iii) of the PIT NDPS Act, 1988 and his activities

were prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and to prevent him

from further indulging in such type of activities, it was necessary to pass

the Order of Detention. The case of the detenu was placed before the

Advisory Board which reviewed and submitted its reports/opinions dated

07.08.2025 stating that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the

detenu and accordingly, the State Government issued G.O.Rt.No.931,

dated 26.08.2025 under Section 3 (1) read with Section 11 of the PIT

NDPS Act, 1988, confirming the order of detention for a period of 12

months from the date of detention.

4. The Order of Detention was passed basing on six different

criminal cases, registered against the detenu. Those cases are as under:

Sl.No. Details of Case/Crime Property Seized

1. Cr.No.128/2017 of Nakkapalli

P.S. for the offences under

Sections 25, 8C, 20 (b) of PIT

NDPS Act

40 kgs Ganja and Auto

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

4

2. Cr.No.11/2018 of Rolugunta PS

for the offences under Sections

8C, 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT

NDPS Act

30 kgs Ganja and Car &

Auto

3. Cr.No.28/2018 of Rolugunta PS

for the offences under Sections

8C, 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT

NDPS Act

60 kgs Ganja, two Cars &

Pulsar Bike

4. Cr.No.66/2018 of Pithapuram PS

for the offences under Sections

8C and 20 (b) (ii) (c) of PIT NDPS

Act

29 kgs Ganja and Auto

5. Cr.No.344/2019 of

Payakaraopeta PS for th e

offences under Sections 8C, 20

(b) (i), 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT

NDPS Act

175 kgs of Ganja and Auto

6. Cr.No.42/2025 of Payakaraopeta

PS for the offences under

Sections 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 r/w.

8 (c) of PIT NDPS Act

600 kgs of Ganja and

Bolero vehicle

5. Challenging the aforesaid Orders, the present writ petition has

been filed.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the only submission

that the Order of Detention is unsustainable and erroneous in law. He

submitted that out of 6 cases, the detenu was granted bail in 5 cases. In

one other case, out of 6 cases, i.e., Cr.No.42 of 2025 (i.e., 6

th

case) supra

of Payakaraopeta Police Station, on the date of passing of the Order of

Detention i.e., 09.07.2025, the detenu was in judicial custody. The said

case was also taken into consideration, but the 2

nd

respondent did not

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

5

record its satisfaction about the necessity to pass the order of detention

once the detenu was already in judicial custody, or about the imminent

possibility of his release on bail in that case. He submitted that the Order

of Detention, cannot be sustained on that ground and so the order of

confirmation.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the following

cases in support of his contentions:

1. Syed Mohiyuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh

1

2. Champion R. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya

2

3. V. Adi Lakshmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh

3

4. Cheemparthi Parvin v. State of Andhra Pradesh

4

5. Lakshmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh

5

6. Cheemparthi Salma v. State of Andhra Pradesh

6

8. Sri Kirthi Teja, learned Government Pleader, for the respondents

submitted that the aforesaid Cr.No.42 of 2025, as referred to above, was

taken into consideration in the detention order. In the said case, the

detenu was in the judicial custody. In the order of detention any

satisfaction as regards the possibility or the likelihood of the detenu being

1

2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 515

2

(2015) 16 SCC 253

3

2020 SCC OnLine AP 565

4

WP.No.1803 of 2021, Decided on

27.04.2021 (APHC, Amaravati)

5

WP.No.7335 of 2023 & Batch,

Decided on 03.07.2023 (APHC, Amaravati)

6

WP.No.932 of 2025, Decided on

26.09.2025 (APHC, Amaravati)

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

6

released on bail was not recorded. However, he submitted further that

even if the contention of the petitioner’s counsel be correct on that

ground, the order of detention would still not be vitiated. The order of

detention can stand in view of the other grounds with respect to the other

criminal cases i.e., in Ground Nos.1 to 5.

9. Learned Government Pleader referred to the provisions of

Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act 1988 to contend that the Order of Detention

shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of the grounds, it

has been passed and shall not be invalid or inoperative merely because

on Ground No.6 the detention order would be invalid.

10. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned

counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

11. The Order of Detention has been passed by the Principal

Secretary to Government on Ground Nos.1 to 6. The challenge is with

respect to Ground No.6, i.e., Cr.No.42 of 2025. The detenu was in

judicial custody in that case and the Principal Secretary to Government

has not recorded its satisfaction that there was no need to pass the Order

of Detention or on the point that there was likelihood of the detenu being

released on bail.

12. In Champion R. Sangma (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has

held that even if the detenu is in jail in connection with some criminal

cases, there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. However,

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

7

there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining

authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived while passing

the detention order. Referring to the case in Kamarunnissa v. Union of

India

7

those three factors were re-stated; (1) If the authority passing the

order is aware of the fact that the detenu is actually in custody; (2) If he

has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him

(a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that

on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial

activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him from so doing. The

Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the authority passes an order after

recording his satisfaction on these aspects, such an order cannot be

struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to

oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to

question it before a higher Court.

13. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Champion R. Sangma (supra) are

reproduced as under:

“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may

point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal

case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this

aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this

Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are

certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and

satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention

order.

7

(1991) 1 SCC 128

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

8

10. There are three such factors which were restated

in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1

SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)

“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that

even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed

(1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in

custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed

before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and

(b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial

activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing.

If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf,

such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for

the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such

opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated

in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC

232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be

passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which

are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law.

It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the

facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of

preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed

above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our

attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it

difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was

no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention

because the detenus were in custody.”

11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as well. Some

of which are as under:

(i) T.V. Sravanan v. State [T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC 664 :

(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] ,

(ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N. [K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of

T.N., (2008) 9 SCC 89 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 679] ,

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

9

(iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [Huidrom Konungjao

Singh v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 956] .”

14. In Champion R. Sangma (supra), it was recorded that the

appellant therein (detenu) was under incarceration as he was implicated

in as many as 8 cases and he was in jail and he was not yet granted bail.

It was held that it was for the respondents therein (the detaining authority)

to satisfy the Court as to whether the triple requirements as postulated

stood satisfied. Those requirements were not satisfied. There, though

the detention order and even the grounds of detention recorded the

factum of the detenu being in custody, no satisfaction was recorded by

the detaining authority that there was reliable material before the authority

on the basis of which the detaining authority had reasons to believe that

there was real possibility of release on bail of the detenu. The detention

order was silent on that aspect of possibility of indulging in activity if the

detenu was granted bail. So, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the

detention order suffered from material illegality which vitiated the order of

detention.

15. The other cited judgments of Syed Mohiyuddin (supra),

Cheemparthi Parvin (supra) and V. Adi Lakshmi (supra) as in para-7

(supra) also hold the same relying upon the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment

in Champion R. Sangma (supra). But, the question is whether the Order

of Detention would be vitiated on the aforesaid submissions and grounds

and the detenu entitled to be set free.

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

10

16. The aforesaid law is by now well settled. When tested on the

triple tests as in Champion R. Sangma (supra) the Order of Detention

satisfied only the first test, i.e., the detaining authority was aware that the

detenu was in custody in Cr.No.42 of 2025 (Ground No.6). However, the

other two tests are not satisfied. While considering the Ground No.6, the

Principal Secretary to Government has not recorded its satisfaction; (1)

that the authority had reason to believe on the basis of reliable material

placed before him, (a) that there was a real possibility of the detenu being

released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all

probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (2) if it was felt essential to

prevent him from so doing, with respect to the aforesaid case. So, the

Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6.

17. Champion R. Sangma (supra) was on Meghalaya Preventive

Detention Act, 1995. The other judgments on which reliance was placed

are under Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of

Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic

Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986. Those are not under

Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 1988.

18. We are not saying that the detaining authority while passing the

Order of Detention under PIT NDPS Act has not to record its satisfaction

on the aspects as laid down in Champion R. Sangma (supra) if the

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

11

detenu is, in custody. But what we say is that the effect of non-

compliance with the above requirements with respect to one ground out

of six grounds (as is the present case) would not invalidate the order of

detention and the detenu would not be entitled to release. We say so

because of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act.

19. Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act provides as under:

“6. Grounds of detention severable.-Where a person has been detained in

pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has

been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to

have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly-

(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely

because one or some of the grounds is or are-

(i) vague,

(ii) non-existent,

(iii) not relevant,

(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or

(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore

possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have

been satisfied as provided in sub-section (I) of section 3 with reference to the

remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;

(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be

deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (I) after

being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining

ground or grounds.”

20. A bare perusal of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act shows that where

a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under

sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more

grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been passed

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

12

separately on each of such grounds, and accordingly, (a) such order shall

not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some

of the grounds is or are; (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv)

not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v)

invalid for any other reasons whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible

to hold that the Government or Officer making such order would have

been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference

to the remaining ground or grounds and make the order of detention.

Clause (b) makes it more clear that the Government or Officer making the

order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention

under the sub-section (1) of Section 3 after being satisfied as provided in

that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.

21. In Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland

8

the

Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act,

1988 provides that grounds of detention are severable and an order of

detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because

one or some of the grounds are either found to be vague, nonexistent,

irrelevant or not connected with such persons or is invalid for any other

reason. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that Section 6

specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to

an order of detention under Section 3 (1), which has been made on two or

more grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made

8

2025 SCC OnLine SC 502

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

13

separately on each ground. Paragraph -7 of Mortuza Hussain

Choudhary (supra) reads as under:

“7. It would be apposite at this stage to take note of the statutory regime of

the Act of 1988. Section 3(1) thereof empowers the authorized officers, either

of the Central Government or of a State Government, to detain any person with

a view to prevent him/her from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances. Section 3(2) requires a State Government that passes

such a detention order to forward a report of the same to the Central

Government within ten days. Section 3(3) mandates communication of the

grounds on which the detention order has been made to the detenu as soon as

may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days and in

exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later

than fifteen days from the date of detention. The sub-section records that this

requirement is for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which

mandates such communication as soon as may be. Section 6 of the Act of 1988

provides that the grounds of detention are severable and an order of detention

shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of

the grounds is either found to be vague, non- existent, irrelevant or not

connected with such persons or is invalid for any other reason. Section

6 specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to an

order of detention under Section 3(1), which has been made on two or more

grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made separately on each

ground. This indicates that the order of detention must be accompanied by the

„grounds of detention‟ made by the detaining authority itself. Section 11 of the

Act of 1988 speaks of the maximum period of detention and states that the same

may be extended up to 2 (two) years from the date of detention.”

22. In Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary.

Government of Kerala

9

where under consideration was Section 5-A of

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling

9

1985 SCC OnLine SC 316

RNT, J & SS, J

WP. No.23639 of 2025

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Activities Act (COFEPOSA Act) which is on the same lines as Section 6

of PIT NDPS Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 5-A stipulates

that when the detention order has been made on two or more grounds,

such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately

on each of such grounds and accordingly if one irrelevant or one

inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not

make the detention order bad.

23. Paragraphs 70 & 71 of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra) read

as under:

“70. Section 5-A of the said Act which was introduced by amendment in

1975 reads as follows:

“5-A. Grounds of detention severable.—Where a person has been detained

in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which

has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be

deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and

accordingly—

(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely

because one or some of the grounds is or are—

(i) vague,

(ii) non-existent,

(iii) not relevant,

(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or

(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,

and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer

making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of

Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order

of detention;

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WP. No.23639 of 2025

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(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be

deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after

being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining

ground or grounds.”

71. Section 5-A stipulates that when the detention order has been made on

two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been

made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly that if one irrelevant

or one inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not

make the detention order bad.”

24. In Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P

10

the same

principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the

specific provision even a single ground for detention if found to be

material may be the basis of the detention order. Paragraph-11 of

Vashisht Narain Karwaria (supra) reads as under:

“11. …………. What Section 5-A provides is that where there are two or

more grounds covering various activities of the detenu, each activity is a

separate ground by itself and if one of the ground is vague, non-existent, not

relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person or

invalid for any other reason whatsoever, then that will not vitiate the order of

detention.”

25. In view of the statutory provision of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act,

the Order of Detention passed under Section 3 (1) of PIT NDPS Act 1988

when passed on two or more grounds, such Order of Detention shall be

deemed to have been passed separately on each of such grounds. In the

present case, the impugned Order of Detention has been passed on six

10

(1990) 2 SCC 629

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WP. No.23639 of 2025

16

grounds i.e., two or more grounds. Such Order of Detention shall be

deemed to have been passed separately on each of such grounds from

Ground Nos.1 to 6. So, even if it be taken that the Order cannot be

sustained on Ground No.6, for non-consideration of three requirements

with respect to the detenu being in judicial custody, it cannot be held that

the detaining authority had not satisfied on the other grounds, only

because of no satisfaction recorded relating to Ground No.6. It shall be

deemed that the State Government or the detaining authority had made

the Order of Detention after being satisfied on the remaining grounds.

26. Order of Detention shall not be deemed to be invalid for the

remaining grounds and it shall be deemed that the Order of Detention has

been made under Section 3 (1) of PIT NDPS Act 1988 after being

satisfied with reference to the remaining 5 grounds. Simply because the

Order of Detention cannot be sustained on Ground No.6, it cannot be said

that the Order of Detention cannot be sustained on Ground Nos.1 to 5. It

cannot be that the Order of Detention has to go. Notwithstanding that the

Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6, it is still a valid Order

on Ground Nos.1 to 5. As already mentioned (supra), the only ground of

challenge raised before us was to the Ground No.6.

27. In the judgment cited, the Preventive Detention Act as involved

did not contain any provision like Section 6 of the PIT NDPS Act 1988.

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WP. No.23639 of 2025

17

28. The Order of Detention is sustained on the Ground Nos.1 to 5,

though not on Ground No.6. In view of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act 1988,

the Order of Detention would not be illegal and the detenu would not be

entitled for release.

29. The Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in

consequence.

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

______________________

SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J

Date: 08.07.2026

Dsr

Whether the order is :

Reasoned ‘Yes’

Reportable ‘Yes’