Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1079 OF 2006

ECON ANTRI LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special Leave

Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, this Court passed the

following order:

“In our view, the judgment relied upon by the

counsel for the appellant in the case of Saketh

India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd.

(1999) 3 SCC 1 requires reconsideration. Orders

of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained

for placing this matter before a larger Bench.”

Page 2 Pursuant to the above order, this appeal is placed

before us.

2.Since the referral order states that the judgment of this

Court in Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities

Ltd.

1

(“Saketh”) requires reconsideration, we must first

refer to the said judgment. In that case, this Court identified

the question of law involved in the appeal before it as under:

“Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of

the NI Act is within or beyond time as it was

contended that it was not filed within one month

from the date on which the cause of action arose

under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of

the NI Act?”

The same question was reframed in simpler language

as under:

“Whether for calculating the period of one month

which is prescribed under Section 142( b), the

period has to be reckoned by excluding the date

on which the cause of action arose?”

1

(1999) 3 SCC 1

2

Page 3 3.It is pointed out to us that there is a variance between

the view expressed by this Court on the above question in

Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk

Exporters, Bangalore

2

. We will have to therefore re-

examine it for the purpose of answering the reference. The

basic provisions of law involved in this reference are proviso

(c) to Section 138 and Section 142(b) of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 (“the NI Act”).

4.Facts of Saketh need to be stated to understand how

the above question of law arose. But, before we turn to the

facts, we must quote Section 138 and Section 142 of the N.I.

Act. We must also quote Section 12(1) and (2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897, on which reliance is placed in Saketh.

Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under:

“138. Dishonour of cheque for

insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an

account maintained by him with a banker for

payment of any amount of money to another

2

(1999) 4 SCC 567

3

Page 4 person from out of that account for the discharge,

in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is

returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the

amount of money standing to the credit of that

account is insufficient to honour the cheque or

that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid

from that account by an agreement made with

that bank, such person shall be deemed to have

committed an offence and shall, without prejudice

to any other provision of this Act, be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may be extended

to two years, or with fine which may extend to

twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section

shall apply unless-

(a)the cheque has been presented to the bank

within a period of six months from the date on

which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,

whichever is earlier;

(b)the payee or the holder in due course of the

Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for

the payment of the said amount of money by

giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the

cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of

information by him from the bank regarding the

return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c)the drawer of such cheque fails to make the

payment of the said amount of money to the

payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due

course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the

receipt of the said notice.”

Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under:

4

Page 5 “142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ),-

(a)no court shall take cognizance of any offence

punishable under section 138 except upon a

complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the

case may be, the holder in due course of the

cheque;

(b)such complaint is made within one month of

the date on which the cause of action arises under

clause (c) of the proviso to section 138;

[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may

be taken by the Court after the prescribed period,

if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had

sufficient cause for not making a complaint within

such period.]

(c)no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan

Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class

shall try any offence punishable under section

138.”

Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads

as under:

“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.-

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any

suit, appeal or application, the day from which

such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for an

appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for

revision or for review of a judgment, the day on

5

Page 6 which the judgment complained of was

pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a

copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed

from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be

excluded.”

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as

under:

“9. Commencement and termination of

time.-

(1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after

the commencement of this Act, it shall be

sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in

a series of days or any other period of time, to use

the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including

the last in a series of days or any other period of

time, to use the word “to”.

(2)This section applies also to all [Central Acts]

made after the third day of January, 1868, and to

all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth

day of January, 1887.”

5.In Saketh cheques dated 15/3/1995 and 16/3/1995

issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for

encashment. Notices were served on the accused on

29/9/1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act,

the accused were required to make the payment of the said

6

Page 7 amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. on or

before 14/10/1995. The accused failed to pay the amount.

The cause of action, therefore, arose on 15/10/1995.

According to the complainant for calculating one month’s

period contemplated under Section 142(b), the date

‘15/10/1995’ has to be excluded. The complaint filed on

15/11/1995 was, therefore, within time. According to the

accused, however, the date on which the cause of action

arose i.e. ‘15/10/1995’ has to be included in the period of

limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. The

accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) for quashing

the process issued by the learned Magistrate. That petition

was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused

approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in

Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal.

3

wherein it

was held that the rule is well established that where a

particular time is given from a certain date within which an

act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded; the

3

(1972) 1 SCC 639

7

Page 8 effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day

within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day

and to include the last day. Referring to several English

decisions on the point, this Court observed that the principle

of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned

is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act,

1963. This Court observed that this principle is also

incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

This Court further observed that there is no reason for not

adopting the rule enunciated in Haru Das Gupta, which is

consistently followed and which is adopted in the General

Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. This Court went on to

observe that ordinarily in computing the time, the rule

observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last.

Following the said rule in the facts before it, this Court

excluded the date ‘15/10/1995’ on which the cause of action

had arisen for counting the period of one month. Saketh

has been followed by this Court in Jindal Steel and Power

Ltd. & Anr. v. Ashoka Alloy Steel Ltd. & Ors.

4

In

4

(2006) 9 SCC 340

8

Page 9 Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr.,

5

there is a reference to Jindal Steel & Power Ltd.

6.We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some

length. We have also carefully perused their written

submissions. Ms. Prerna Mehta, learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that Saketh lays down the correct law.

She submitted that as held by this Court in Saketh while

computing the period of one month as provided under

Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the first day on which the

cause of action has arisen has to be excluded. The same

principle is applicable in computing the period of 15 days

under Section 138(c) of the N.I. Act. Counsel submitted that

Saketh has been followed by this Court in Jindal Steel and

Power Ltd. and Subodh S. Salaskar . Counsel also relied

on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1961 which provides

that the first day on which cause of action arises is to be

excluded. In this connection counsel relied on State of

Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Himachal Techno

5

(2008)13 SCC 689

9

Page 10 Engineers & Anr.,

6

where it is held that Section 12 of the

Limitation Act is applicable to the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 (for short, “the Arbitration Act"), which is a

statute providing for its own period of limitation. Counsel

submitted that the N.I. Act is a special statute and it does

not expressly bar the applicability of the Limitation Act.

Counsel submitted that if this Court reaches a conclusion

that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to

the N.I. Act, it should hold that Section 9 of the General

Clauses Act, 1897 covers this case. Counsel submitted in

Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma

7

Section

12 of the Limitation Act is held to be in pari materia with

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. Counsel submitted

that in the same judgment this Court has held that use of

words ‘from’ and ‘within’ does not reflect any contrary

intention and the first day on which the cause of action

arises has to be excluded. Counsel submitted that in the

circumstances this Court should hold that Saketh lays down

correct proposition of law.

6

(2010) 12 SCC 210

7

(2000) 8 SCC 649

10

Page 11 7.Shri Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel for the

respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the

provisions of the N.I. Act provide for a criminal offence and

punishment and, therefore, must be strictly construed.

Counsel submitted that it is well settled that when two

different words are used in the same provision or statute,

they convey different meaning. [The Member, Board of

Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall

8

, The Labour

Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti

Mills Ltd. and others

9

, B.R. Enterprises etc. V. State of

U.P. & Ors. etc.

10

, Kailash Nath Agarwal and ors. v.

Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of

U.P. Ltd. and another

11

, DLF Qutab Enclave Complex

Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and

others

12

]. Counsel pointed out that Section 138(a) provides

a period of 6 months from the date on which the Cheque is

drawn, as the period within which the Cheque is to be

8

AIR 1956 SC 35

9

AIR 1964 SC 1687

10

(1999) 9 SCC 700

11

(2003) 4 SCC 305

12

(2003) 5 SCC 622

11

Page 12 presented to the bank. Section 138(b) provides that the

payee must make a demand of the amount due to him

within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank.

Section 138(c) uses the words ‘within 15 days of the receipt

of notice’. Using two different words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in the

same Section at different places clarifies the intention of the

legislature to convey different meanings by the said words.

According to counsel, seen in this light, the word ‘of’

occurring in Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) is to be

interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’ occurring

in Section 138(a). The word ‘from’ may be taken as implying

exclusion of the date in question and may well be governed

by the General Clauses Act, 1897. However, the word ‘of’ is

different and needs to be interpreted to include the starting

day of the commencement of the prescribed period. It is not

governed by Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Thus, for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes

that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on

which the cause of action arises, the starting date on which

the cause of action arises should be included for computing

12

Page 13 the period of 30 days. Counsel further submitted that

Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) prescribe the period

within which certain acts are required to be done. Section

12(1) of the Limitation Act cannot be resorted to so as to

extend that period even by one day. If the starting point is

excluded, that will render the word ‘within’ of Section 142(b)

of the N.I. Act otiose. Counsel submitted that the word

‘within’ has been held by this Court to mean ‘on or before’.

[Danial Latifi and Another v. U.O.I .

13

] Therefore, the

complaint under Section 142(b) should be filed on or before

or within, 30 days of the date on which the cause of action

under Section 138(c) arises. Counsel submitted that there is

no justification to exclude the 16

th

day of the 15 day period

under Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period

under Section 142(b) as has been wrongly decided in

Saketh . This would amount to exclusion of the starting date

of the period. Such exclusion has been held to be against

the law in SIL Import USA. Counsel further submitted that

the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the

13

(2001) 7 SCC 740

13

Page 14 N.I. Act as held by this Court in Subodh S. Salaskar .

Counsel pointed out that by Amending Act 55 of 2002, a

proviso was added to Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. It

bestows discretion upon the court to accept a complaint

after the period of 30 days and to condone the delay. This

amendment signifies that prior to this amendment the courts

had no discretion to condone the delay or exclude time by

resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The statement

of objects and reasons of the Amending Act 55 of 2002

confirms the legal position that the N.I. Act being a special

statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it. Counsel

submitted that the judgment of this Court on the Arbitration

Act is not applicable to this case because Section 43 of the

Arbitration Act specifically makes the Limitation Act

applicable to arbitrations. Counsel submitted that in view of

the above, it is evident that Saketh does not lay down the

correct law. It is SIL Import USA which correctly analyses

the provisions of law and lays down the law. Counsel urged

that the reference be answered in light of his submissions.

14

Page 15 8.It is necessary to first refer to SIL Import USA on

which heavy reliance is placed by the respondents as it

takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh. In

SIL Import USA, the complainant-Company’s case was

that the accused owed a sum of US $ 72,075 (equivalent to

more than 26 lakhs of rupees) to it towards the sale

consideration of certain materials. The accused gave some

post-dated Cheques in repayment thereof. Two of the said

Cheques when presented on 3/5/1996 for encashment were

dishonoured with the remark “no sufficient funds”. The

complainant sent a notice to the accused by fax on

11/6/1996. On the next day i.e. 12/6/1996 the complainant

also sent the same notice by registered post which was

served on the accused on 25/6/1996. On 8/8/1996 the

complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I.

Act. Cognizance of the offence was taken and process was

issued. Process was quashed by the Magistrate on the

grounds urged by the accused. The complainant moved the

High Court. The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order

and restored the complaint. That order was challenged in

15

Page 16 this Court. The only point which was urged before this Court

was that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of

the offence after the expiry of 30 days from the date of

cause of action. This contention was upheld by this Court.

This Court held that the notice envisaged in clause (b) of the

proviso to Section 138 transmitted by fax would be in

compliance with the legal requirement. There was no

dispute about the fact that notice sent by fax was received

by the complainant on the same date i.e. 11/6/1996. This

Court observed that as per clause (c) of Section 138, starting

point of period for making payment is the date of receipt of

the notice. Once it starts, the offence is completed on

failure to pay the amount within 15 days therefrom. Cause

of action would arise if the offence is committed. Thus, it

was held that since the fax was received on 11/6/1996, the

period of 15 days for making payment expired on 26/6/1996.

Since amount was not paid, offence was committed and,

therefore, cause of action arose from 26/6/1996 and the

period of limitation for filing complaint expired on 26/7/1996

i.e. the date on which period of one month expired as

16

Page 17 contemplated under Section 142(b). The complaint filed on

8/8/1996 was, therefore, beyond the period of limitation.

The relevant observations of this Court could be quoted

hereunder:

“19. The High Court’s view is that the sender of

the notice must know the date when it was

received by the sendee, for otherwise he would

not be in a position to count the period in order to

ascertain the date when cause of action has

arisen. The fallacy of the above reasoning is that it

erases the starting date of the period of 15 days

envisaged in clause (c). As per the said clause the

starting date is the date of “the receipt of the said

notice”. Once it starts, the offence is completed on

the failure to pay the amount within 15 days

therefrom. Cause of action would arise if the

offence is committed.

20. If a different interpretation is given the

absolute interdict incorporated in Section 142 of

the Act that no court shall take cognizance of any

offence unless the complaint is made within one

month of the date on which the cause of action

arises, would become otiose.”

9.Undoubtedly, the view taken in SIL Import USA runs

counter to the view taken in Saketh. What persuaded this

Court in Saketh to take the view that in computing time, the

17

Page 18 rule is to exclude the first day and include the last can be

understood if we have a look at the English cases which have

been referred to in the passage quoted therein from Haru

Das Gupta.

10.We must first refer to The Goldsmiths’ Company v.

The West Metropolitan Railway Company.

14

In that

case, under a special Act, a railway company was

empowered to take lands compulsorily for the purpose of its

undertaking, and the powers of the company for this purpose

were to cease after the expiration of three years from the

passing of the Act. The Act received the Royal assent on

9/8/1899. On 9/8/1902 the railway company gave notice to

the plaintiffs to treat for the purchase of lands belonging to

them which were scheduled in the special Act. The question

was whether the notice was served on the plaintiffs within

three years. It was held that the notice was served within

the prescribed time because the day of the passing of the

14

(1904) 1 K.B, at p. 1, 5

18

Page 19 Act i.e. 9/8/1899 had to be excluded. The relevant

observations of the Court may be quoted as under:

“The true principle that governs this case is

that indicated in the report of Lester v.

Garland

15

, where Sir William Grant broke

away from the line of cases supporting the

view that there was a general rule that in

cases where time is to run from the doing of

an act or the happening of an event the first

day is always to be included in the

computation of the time. The view

expressed by Sir William Grant was repeated

by Parke B. in Russell v. Ledsam

16

, and

by other judges in subsequent cases. The

rule is now well established that where a

particular time is given, from a certain date,

within which an act is to be done, the day of

the date is to be excluded.”

11. The second case referred to is Cartwright v.

MacCormack

17

. In that case, the plaintiffs met with an

accident at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959. He was run into by the

defendant driving a motor car. He issued his writ in this

action claiming damages for personal injuries. The

defendant initiated third party proceedings against the

respondent insurance company, alleging the company’s

liability to indemnify him under an instrument called a

15

15 Ves. 248; 10 R. R. 68

16

14 M. & W. 574

17

[1963] 1 All E.R. 11

19

Page 20 temporary cover note admittedly issued by the insurance

company on 2/12/1959. The insurance company inter alia

contended that the policy had expired before the accident

happened. The insurance company succeeded on this point.

On appeal the insurance company reiterated that the cover

note issued by the insurance company contained the

expression ‘fifteen days from the date of commencement of

policy’. On the same note date and time were noted as

2/12/1959 and 11.45 a.m. It was argued that the fifteen

days started at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the

same time on 17/12/1959. The accident occurred at 5.45

p.m. on 17/12/1959 and, therefore, it was not covered by the

insurance policy. The Court of Appeal treated the

expression ‘fifteen days from the commencement of the

policy’ as excluding the first date and the cover note was

held to commence at midnight of that date. It was observed

that the policy expired fifteen days from 2/12/1959 and

these words on the ordinary rules of construction exclude

the first date and begin at midnight on that day, therefore,

20

Page 21 the policy would cover the accident which had occurred at

5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959.

12.The third case referred to is Marren v. Dawson

Bentley & Co. Ltd.

18

. In that case on 8/11/1954 an accident

occurred whereby the plaintiff was injured in the course of

his employment with the defendants. On 8/11/1957, he

issued a writ claiming damages for the injuries which he

alleged were caused by the defendants’ negligence. The

defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s cause of

action, if any, accrued on 8/11/1954 and the proceedings

had not been commenced within the period of three years

thereof contrary to Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, 1939.

It was held that the day of the accident was to be excluded

from the computation of the period within which the action

should be brought and, therefore, the defendants’ plea must

fail. While coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on

passages from Halsbury’s laws of England

19

. It is

necessary to quote those passages:

18

(1961) 2Q.B. 135

19

2

nd

ed., vol. 32 p. 142

21

Page 22 “207. The general rule in cases in which a period

is fixed within which a person must act or take the

consequences is that the day of the act or event

from which the period runs should not be counted

against him. This rule is especially reasonable in

the case in which that person is not necessarily

cognisant of the act or event; and further in

support of it there is the consideration that in case

the period allowed was one day only, the

consequence of including that day would be to

reduce to a few hours or minutes the time within

which the person affected should take action.

208. In view of these considerations the general

rule is that, as well in cases where the limitation of

time is imposed by the act of a party as in those

where it is imposed by statute, the day from which

the time begins to run is excluded; thus, where a

period is fixed within which a criminal prosecution

or a civil action may be commenced, the day on

which the offence is committed or the cause of

action arises is excluded in the computation.”

Reliance was also placed in this judgment on Radcliffe

v. Bartholomew

20

. In that case on June 30 an information

was laid against the appellant therein in respect of an act of

cruelty alleged to have been committed by him on May 30.

An objection was taken on the ground that the complaint had

not been made within one calendar month after the cause of

the complaint had arisen. It was held that the day on which

20

(1892) 1 Q.B.161

22

Page 23 the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from

the computation of the calendar month within which the

complaint was to be made; that the complaint was,

therefore, made in time.

13.The fourth case referred to is Stewart v. Chapman

21

.

In that case, an information was preferred by a police

constable that Mr. Chapman had on 11/1/1951 driven a

motor car along a road without due care and attention

contrary to Section 12 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. At

hearing, a preliminary objection was taken that the notice of

intended prosecution had not been served on the defendant

within fourteen days of commission of offence in accordance

with Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, inasmuch as

although the alleged offence was committed at 7.15 a.m. on

11/1/1951, the prosecutor did not send the notice of

intended prosecution by registered post; until 1.00 p.m. on

11/1/1951 and it was not delivered to the defendant until

25/1/1951 at about 8.00 a.m. This submission was rejected

observing that in calculating the period of fourteen days

21

(1951) 2 KB 792

23

Page 24 within which the notice of an intended prosecution must be

served under Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the

date of commission of the offence is to be excluded.

14.In re. North. Ex parte Hasluck

22

, the execution

creditor obtained judgment on 19/5/1893. An order was

made authorizing sale of the bankrupt’s goods. The

purchase money thereunder was paid to the sheriff on July

18. The sheriff retained the money for fourteen days in

compliance with Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890. In

August, the solicitor of the execution creditor paid over the

said money to the execution creditor. Application was filed

by the trustee in bankruptcy for an order calling upon the

execution creditor and his solicitor to pay over to the

trustee, the proceeds of an execution against the bankruptcy

goods on the ground that at the time of the sale they had

notice of prior act of bankruptcy on the part of the bankrupt.

Under Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, a debtor

commits an act of bankruptcy if execution against him has

been levied by seizure of his goods, and the goods have

22

(1895) 2 Q.B. 264

24

Page 25 been held by the sheriff for twenty one days. The time limit

of twenty one days was an allowance of time to the debtor

within which to redeem if he can. It was under these

circumstances it became necessary to ascertain whether

there was, in fact, a holding by the sheriff for twenty one

days prior to the sale. If there was, then neither the

execution creditor, nor his solicitor could be heard to say

that they had no notice of such possession and the act of

bankruptcy thereby constituted. Vaughan Williams, J. held

that if the goods were seized on June 27 and sold on July 18,

if June 27 is excluded, there was no holding by the sheriff for

21 days and consequently there was no act of bankruptcy

and therefore execution creditor is not bound to hand over

the money on the ground that he received it with notice of

an act of bankruptcy. On appeal the same view was

reiterated. Rigby L.J referred to Lester v. Garland

23

where

Sir W. Grant expressed that if there were to be a general

rule, it ought to be one of exclusion, as being more

reasonable than one to the opposite effect.

23

15 Ves. 248

25

Page 26 15.We shall now turn to Haru Das Gupta , where this

Court has followed the law laid down in the above

judgments. In that case, the petitioner therein was arrested

and detained on 5/2/1971 by order of District Magistrate

passed on that day. The order of confirmation and

continuation, which has to be passed within three months

from the date of detention, was passed on 5/5/1971. The

question for decision was as to when the period of three

months can be said to have expired. It was contended by

the petitioner that the period of three months expired on the

midnight of 4/5/1971, and any confirmation and continuation

of detention thereafter would not be valid. This Court

referred to several English decisions on the point apart from

the above decisions and rejected this submission holding

that the day of commencement of detention namely

5/2/1971 has to be excluded. Relevant observations of this

could read as under:

“These decisions show that courts have

drawn a distinction between a term created

within which an act may be done and a time

26

Page 27 limited for the doing of an act. The rule is

well-established that where a particular

time is given from a certain date within

which an act is to be done, the day on that

date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths

Company v. the West Metropolitan Railway

Company). This rule was followed in

Cartwright v. Maccormack where the

expression “fifteen days from the date of

commencement of the policy” in a cover

note issued by an insurance company was

construed as excluding the first date and

the cover note to commence at midnight of

that day, and also in Marren v. Damson

Bentley & Co. Ltd. a case for compensation

for injuries received in the course of

employment, where for purposes of

computing the period of limitation the date

of the accident, being the date of the cause

of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart

v. Chadman and In re North, Ex parte

Wasluck). Thus, as a general rule the effect

of defining a period from such a day until

such a day within which an act is to be done

is to exclude the first day and to include the

last day. [See Halsbury’s Laws of England,

(3rd Edn.). Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.] There is

no reason why the aforesaid rule of

construction followed consistently and for

so long should not also be applied here.”

16.We have extensively referred to Saketh. The

reasoning of this Court in Saketh based on the above

English decisions and decision of this Court in Haru Das

27

Page 28 Gupta which aptly lay down and explain the principle that

where a particular time is given from a certain date within

which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be

excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning of

this Court in SIL Import USA where there is no reference to

the said decisions.

17.It was submitted that in Saketh this Court has

erroneously placed reliance on Section 12(1) and (2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12 (1) states that in computing

the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application,

the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be

excluded. In Section 12(2) the same principle is extended to

computing period of limitation for an application for leave to

appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment. Our

attention was drawn to Subodh S. Salaskar wherein this

Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable

to the N.I. Act. It is true that in Subodh S. Salaskar, this

Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable

to the N.I. Act. However even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is

28

Page 29 held not applicable to the N.I. Act, the conclusion reached in

Saketh could still be reached with the aid of Section 9 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 9 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897 states that in any Central Act or Regulation made

after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897,

it shall be sufficient to use the word ‘from’ for the purpose of

excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of

time and to use the word ‘to’ for the purpose of including the

last in a series of days or any other period of time. Sub-

Section (2) of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897

states that this Section applies to all Central Acts made after

the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made

on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. This Section

would, therefore, be applicable to the N.I. Act.

18.Counsel, however, submitted that using two different

words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in Section 138 at different places

clarifies the intention of the legislature to convey different

meanings by the said words. He submitted that the word ‘of’

occurring in Sections 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I. Act is to

29

Page 30 be interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’

occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.I. Act. The word ‘from’

may be taken as implying exclusion of the date in question

and that may well be governed by the General Clauses Act,

1897. However, the word ‘of’ is different and needs to be

interpreted to include the starting day of the

commencement of the prescribed period. It is not governed

by Section 9 of the General Clauses Act 1897. Thus,

according to learned counsel, for the purposes of Section

142(b), which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed

within 30 days of the date on which the cause of action

arises, the starting date on which the cause of action arises

should be included for computing the period of 30 days.

19.We are not impressed by his submission. In this

connection, we may refer to Tarun Prasad Chatterjee.

Though, this case relates to the provisions of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short ‘the RP

Act, 1951’), the principle laid down therein would have a

bearing on the present case. What is important to bear in

30

Page 31 mind is that the Limitation Act is not applicable to it. In that

case the short question involved was whether in computing

the period of limitation as provided in Section 81(1) of the RP

Act, 1951, the date of election of the returned candidate

should be excluded or not. The appellant was declared

elected on 28/11/1998. On 12/1/1999, the respondent filed

an election petition under Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951

challenging the election of the appellant. The appellant filed

an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC read with

Section 81 of the RP Act, 1951 praying that the election

petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as not

maintainable as the same had not been filed within 45 days

from the date of election of the returned candidate. While

dealing with this issue, this Court referred to Section 67-A of

the RP Act, 1951 which states that for the purpose of the RP

Act, 1951 the date on which a candidate is declared by the

returning officer under Section 53 or Section 66 to be

elected shall be the date of election of the candidate. As

stated earlier, the appellant was declared elected as per this

provision by the returning officer on 28/11/1998. Section 81

31

Page 32 of the RP Act, 1951 which relates to presentation of petition

reads thus:

“81. Presentation of petitions. — (1) An

election petition calling in question any election

may be presented on one or more of the grounds

specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and

Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at

such election or any elector within forty-five days

from, but not earlier than the date of election of

the returned candidate or if there are more than

one returned candidate at the election and dates

of their election are different, the later of those

two dates.

Explanation.—In this sub-section, ‘elector’ means

a person who was entitled to vote at the election

to which the election petition relates, whether he

has voted at such election or not.

* * *

(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied

by as many copies thereof as there are

respondents mentioned in the petition and every

such copy shall be attested by the petitioner

under his own signature to be a true copy of the

petition.”

Before analyzing this provision, this Court made it clear

that it was an accepted position that the Limitation Act had

no application to the RP Act, 1951. This Court then referred

32

Page 33 to sub-clause (1) of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act,

1897, which states that it shall be sufficient for the purpose

of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period

of time to use the words ‘from’ and for the purpose of

including last in a series of days or any other period of time

to use the word ‘to’. This Court observed that Section 9

gives statutory recognition to the well established principle

applicable to the construction of statute that ordinarily in

computing the period of time prescribed, the rule observed

is to exclude the first and include the last day. This Court

quoted the relevant provisions of Halsbury’s Laws of

England, 37

th

Edn., Vol.3, p. 92. We deem it appropriate to

quote the same.

“Days included or excluded — When a period of

time running from a given day or even to another

day or event is prescribed by law or fixed as

contract, and the question arises whether the

computation is to be made inclusively or

exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last-

mentioned day, regard must be had to the context

and to the purposes for which the computation

has to be made. Where there is room for doubt,

the enactment or instrument ought to be so

construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the

intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the

33

Page 34 case may be. Expressions such as ‘from such a

day’ or ‘until such a day’ are equivocal, since they

do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the

exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a

general rule, however, the effect of defining a

period in such a manner is to exclude the first day

and to include the last day.”

The further observations made by this Court are

pertinent and need to be quoted:

“12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or

regulation made after the commencement of the

General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for

the purpose of excluding the first in a series of

days or any other period of time, to use the word

“from”, and, for the purpose of including the last

in a series of days or any period of time, to use

the word “to”. The principle is that when a period

is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a

beginning and an end and the word “from” is used

indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be

excluded and if the last day is to be included the

word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the

first day of the period, the crucial thing to be

noted is whether the period of limitation is

delimited by a series of days or by any fixed

period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties

or inconvenience that may be caused to some

parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to

be good for one day from 1st January, it might be

valid only for a few hours after its execution and

the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy

would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless

1st January is excluded from the period of

computation.”

34

Page 35 It was argued in that case that the language used in

Section 81(1) that “within forty-five days from, but not

earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate”

expresses a different intention and Section 9 of the General

Clauses Act has no application. While rejecting this

submission, this Court observed that:

“We do not find any force in this contention. In

order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be

fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed

“from” a particular point. When the period is

marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem,

the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9

of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to

exclude the first day. The words “from” and

“within” used in Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951

do not express any contrary intention.”

This Court concluded that a conjoint reading of Section

81(1) of the RP Act, 1951 and Section 9 of the General

Clauses Act, 1897 leads to the conclusion that the first day

of the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the

convenience of the parties. This Court observed that if the

declaration of the result is done late in the night, the

35

Page 36 candidate or elector would hardly get any time for

presentation of election petition. Law comes to the rescue of

such parties to give full forty-five days period for filing the

election petition. In the facts before it since the date of

election of the returned candidate was 28/11/1998, the

election petition filed on 12/1/1999 on exclusion of the first

day from computing the period of limitation, was held to be

in time.

20.As the Limitation Act is held to be not applicable to N.I.

Act, drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee where

the Limitation Act was held not applicable, we are of the

opinion that with the aid of Section 9 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897 it can be safely concluded in the present case that

while calculating the period of one month which is prescribed

under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be

reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action

arose. It is not possible to agree with the counsel for the

respondents that the use of the two different words ‘from’

and ‘of’ in Section 138 at different places indicates the

36

Page 37 intention of the legislature to convey different meanings by

the said words.

21. In this connection we may also usefully refer to the

judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in

Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel & Ors. v. Union of India

& Ors.

24

which is approved by this Court in Gopaldas

Udhavdas Ahuja and another v. Union of India and

others

25

, though in different context. In that case the

premises of the appellants were searched by the officers of

the Enforcement Directorate. Several packets containing

diamonds were seized. The appellants made an application,

for return of the diamonds, to the learned Magistrate, which

was rejected. Similar prayer made to the Single Judge of the

Bombay High Court was also rejected. An appeal was

carried by the appellants to the Division Bench of the

Bombay High Court. It was pointed out that under Section

124 of the Customs Act, 1962, no order confiscating any

goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made

24

AIR 1967 Bombay 138

25

(2004) 7 SCC 33

37

Page 38 unless the owner of the goods or such person is given a

notice in writing with the prior approval of the officer of

customs not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of

Police, informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed

to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty. Under

Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 a proper officer,

who has reason to believe that any goods are liable to

confiscation may seize such goods. Under sub-Section(2) of

Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, where any goods are

seized under sub-Section (1) and no notice in respect thereof

is given under clause (a) of Section 124 within six months of

the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the

person from whose possession they were seized. Under

proviso to Section 110, sub-section (2), however, the

Collector could extend the period of six months on sufficient

cause being shown. It was argued that the Customs Officers

had seized the goods within the meaning of Section 110 of

the Customs Act, 1962 on 4/9/1964. The notice

contemplated under Section 124(a) was given after

3/3/1965, that is after the period of six months had expired.

38

Page 39 As per Section 110(2), notice contemplated under Section

124(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 had to be given within six

months of the seizure of the goods, and, therefore, notice

issued after the expiry of six months was bad in law and,

hence, the Collector of Customs was not competent to

extend the period of six months under the proviso to sub-

section (2) of Section 110 as he had done. Therefore, no

order confiscating the goods or imposing penalty could have

been made and the goods had to be returned to the

appellants. It was argued that Section 9 of the General

Clauses Act, 1897 has no application because the words

‘from’ and ‘to’ found in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act,

1897 are not used in sub-Section 2 of Section 110 of the

Customs Act, 1962. This submission was rejected and

Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was held

applicable. Speaking for the Bench Chainani, C.J. observed

as under:

“… … …The principle underlying section 9 has

been applied even in the cases of judicial orders

passed by Courts, even though in terms the

section is not applicable, See. Ramchandra Govind

39

Page 40 v. Laxman Savleram, AIR 1938 Bom 447,

Dharamraj v Addl. Deputy Commr., Akola, AIR

1957 Bom 154, Puranchand v. Mohd Din. AIR 1935

Lah 291, Marakanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda, AIR

1952 Orissa 279, and Liquidator Union Bank, Mal,

v. Padmanabha Menon, (1954) 2 Mad LJ 44.The

material words in sub-s. (2) of section 110 are

"within six months of the seizure of the goods". In

such provisions the word "of" has been held to be

equivalent to "from": see Willims v. Burgess and

Walcot, (1840) 12 Ad and El 635. In that case

section 1 of the relevant statute enacted that

warrants of attorney shall be filed "within twenty-

one days after the execution. Section 2 enacted

that unless they were "filed as aforesaid within the

said space of twenty-one days from the execution,

"they and the judgment thereon shall be void

subject to the conditions specified in the section.

The warrant of attorney was executed on 9th

December, 1839 and it was filed, and judgment

entered up on the 30th December. It was held that

in computing the period of 21 days the day of

execution must be excluded, Reliance was placed

on Ex parte Fallon, (1793) 5 Term Rep 283 in

which the word used was "of" and not "from". It

was observed that "of", "from" and "'after" really

meant the same thing and that no distinction

could be suggested from the nature of the two

provisions. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3,

1953 Edition in Note (5) under the word "of", it has

been observed that "of" is sometimes the

equivalent of "after" e.g., in the expression "within

21 days of the execution". The principle

underlying section 9 of the General Clauses Act

cannot therefore, be held to be inapplicable,

merely because the word used in sub-section (2)

of section 110 is "of" and not "from".

40

Page 41 Relevant extracts from Halsbury’s laws of England

26

were quoted. They read as under:

“The general rule in cases in which a period is

fixed within which a person must act or take the

consequences is that the day of the act or event

from which the period runs should not be counted

against him.

This general rule applies irrespective of whether

the limitation of time is imposed by the act of a

party or by statute; thus, where a period is fixed

within which a criminal prosecution or a civil action

may be commenced, the day on which the offence

is committed or the cause of action arises is

excluded in the computation.”

In the circumstances, it was held that the day on which

the goods were seized has to be excluded in computing the

period of limitation contemplated under sub-section (2) of

Section 110 and therefore the notice was issued within the

period of limitation. It is pertinent to note that under Section

110 (2) of the Customs Act, notice had to be given within six

months of the seizure of the goods. Similarly, under Section

142(b) of the N.I. Act, the complaint has to be made within

one month of the date of which cause of action arose. The

26

3

rd

Edn., vol. 37 p. 95

41

Page 42 view taken in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel meets with

our approval.

22.In view of the above, it is not possible to hold that the

word ‘of’ occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I.

Act is to be interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’

occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.I. Act; and that for the

purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that the

complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which

the cause of action arises, the starting day on which the

cause of action arises should be included for computing the

period of 30 days. As held in Ex parte Fallon

27

the words

‘of’, ‘from’ and ‘after’ may, in a given case, mean really the

same thing. As stated in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3

1953 Edition, Note (5), the word ‘of’ is sometimes equivalent

of ‘after’.

23.Reliance placed on Danial Latifi is totally misplaced.

In that case the Court was concerned with Section 3(1)(a) of

the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,

27

(1793) 5 Term Rep 283

42

Page 43 1986. Section 3(1)(a) provides that a divorced woman shall

be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and

maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat

period by her former husband. This provision is entirely

different from Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, which provides

that the complaint is to be made ‘within one month of the

date on which the cause of action arises’. (emphasis

supplied).

24.We may, at this stage, note that learned counsel for the

appellant relied on State of Himachal Pradesh where,

while considering the question of computation of three

months’ limitation period and further 30 days within which

the challenge to the award is to be filed, as provided in

Section 34(3) and proviso thereto of the Arbitration Act, this

Court held that having regard to Section 12(1) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897, day from which such period is to be reckoned is to

be excluded for calculating limitation. It was pointed out by

counsel for the respondents that Section 43 of the

43

Page 44 Arbitration Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to

the Arbitration Act whereas it is held to be not applicable to

the N.I. Act and, therefore, this judgment would not be

applicable to the present case. We have noted that in this

case reliance is not merely placed on Section 12(1) of the

Limitation Act. Reliance is also placed on Section 9 of the

General Clauses Act. However, since, in the instant case we

have reached a conclusion on the basis of Section 9 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 and on the basis of a long line of

English decisions that where a particular time is given, from

a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of

the date is to be excluded, it is not necessary to discuss

whether State of Himachal Pradesh is applicable to this

case or not because Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act is

relied upon therein.

25.Having considered the question of law involved in this

case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments,

we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct

44

Page 45 proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of

calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed

under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be

reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action

arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the

correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court

which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by

this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the

correct law on the question involved in this reference. The

reference is answered accordingly.

………………………………………… ..CJI

(P. SATHASIVAM)

…………………………………………… ..J.

(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

…………………………………………… ..J.

(RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI,

AUGUST 26, 2013

45