No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
Andreza
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 100 OF 2023
Fabrica Da Igreja De Vasco, Thr. Its Attorney
Mr. Romald Colaco, 55 years of age, r/o.
H.No. 269, Nr. Laxmi Niwas, Belabai, Vasco,
Mormugao, Having office at St. Andrew's
Church Complex, Vasco-da-Gama, Goa
403802.
… Petitioner
V e r s u s
1. M/s. Paul Dias & Sons, A Partnership firm
Thr. Its Managing Partner William Dias with
office at 10, Khalap Mansion, Vasco da Gama,
Goa. Legal heirs of Deceased Petitioner
1(a) Mrs. Glendora Rebecca Dias (widow)
1(b) Ms. Tatum Arabella Dias (Daughter)
1(c) Mr. Dulan Vincent Dias (Son),
All residing at 6, Colaco Building, Mangor
Hill, Vasco da Gama, Goa 403 802.
2. Fabrica de Igreja de St. John Baptista da
Paroqula of Benaulim, through its President,
Fr. Francis X. Pereira, Benaulim, Salcete,
Goa, 403 716.
3. Mr. Xec Ashfaq, M/s. Foto Mohammed
Studio, Flat No.28, First Floor, St. Pelegia
Building, Fr. Jose Vaz Road, Vasco-da-Gama,
Goa.
…Respondents
Mr. A. D. Bhobe, Advocate with Mr. Shailesh Henriques and
Ms. Shaizeen Shaikh, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Ms. Flavia Mesquita, Advocate for the Respondent No. 1.
_______________________
CORAM: M. S. KARNIK, J
DATED: 21
st
MARCH 2023
_______________________
JUDGMENT
Page 1 of 22
21
st
March 2023 2023:BHC-GOA:704
::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
1. Heard Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Ms.
Mesquita, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1
2. The challenge in this Petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, is to an Order dated 24.01.2023 passed on the
application dated 09.01.2023 at Exhibit D-185.
3.The Petitioner is the original Defendant No.3. The Respondent
No.1- Original Plaintiff instituted a suit on 14.01.2008 against the
Respondent No. 2/Original Defendant No.1 and the Respondent
No.3/Original Defendant No. 2 seeking declaration that the
Respondent No.1 has a right to obtain on lease the suit premises
consisting of flat no.2-B located on the first floor of St. Pelegia
Building, Vasco da Gama from Respondent No. 2/original Defendant
No.2; that the lease deed dated 24.03.1999 in respect of the suit
premises executed by Respondent No.2/Original Defendant No.1 in
favour of Respondent No.3/original Defendant No.2 be declared null
and void and the Respondent No.2 be commanded to execute lease
deed in favour of Respondent No.1 by delivering possession of the
suit premises to the Respondent No.1 and further for injunction. The
Defendant No.1 is the landlord. The Plaintiff is a lessee in respect of
FlatNo.2-A. The Plaintiff's case is that instead of leasing Flat No.2-B
in his favour, the Defendant No.1 in violation of the lease agreement,
Page 2 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
leased Flat No.2-B in favour of Defendant No.2. Hence, the suit that
the lease Flat No.2- in favour of Defendant No.2 is null and void.
4.The Defendant No.1 filed written statement dated 12.03.2008
opposing the suit. The Defendant No.1 also filed a counter claim
seeking a decree that the Defendant No.1 is entitled to recover
possession of flat no.2A and that the Plaintiff having failed and
neglected to quit and vacate the flat no.2A, be ordered to deliver the
vacant possession of the same to the Defendant No.1.
5.The Defendant No.2 filed his written statement on 03.04.2008
as also to the counter claim filed by the Defendant No.1 praying that
the Suit of the Plaintiff be dismissed and the counter claim of the
Defendant No.1 in terms of prayer clause (d) be granted.
6.In the meantime and during the pendency of the suit, the
Defendant sold the suit property by registered Sale Deed dated
22.04.2021 to the Petitioner-Defendant No.3. On 09.06.2022, the
Respondent No.1 filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of
CPC seeking impleadment/addition of party and for striking out the
Defendant no.1 from the array of Defendants, which application was
marked as Exhibit D-150. By the application Exhibit D-150, the
Plaintiff, inter alia stated that pursuant to the Sale Deed in favour of
the Defendant No.3, the Defendant No.3 ceased to have any right or
Page 3 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
interest in the suit property/suit flat as the ownership vests in the
Defendant No.3 and hence, the relief and the claim of the Plaintiff
would lie against the Defendant No.3. It is averred that the
Petitioner-Defendant No.3 was a necessary party to the proceedings
as in his absence the suit would be incompetent. On the basis of the
said plea, the Plaintiff sought for deletion of the Defendant No.1 and
for substitution of the Defendant No.3.
7.By an Order dated 04.07.2022, the learned trial Judge allowed
the application dated 09.06.2022 at Exhibit D-150 filed by the
Plaintiff to the extent of joinder of the Petitioner herein as Defendant
No.3. The learned Judge observed that the Defendant No.1 cannot be
deleted in view of the counter claim of the Defendant No.1 wherein
the Plaintiff was a party Defendant. The Petitioner was thus arrayed
as Defendant No. 3 in the suit. The Petitioner-Defendant No.3 filed
the written statement on 15.09.2022.
8.On 09.01.2023, the Plaintiff filed an application captioned as
'Application for disallowing the Defendant No.3 from leading
evidence' which was marked as Exhibit D-185. The Plaintiff
contended that the Defendant No.1 had closed his evidence on
30.09.2022 by making an endorsement to that effect; that the
Petitioner-Defendant No.3 who was the transferee pendent lite was
seeking to lead evidence; that when the Defendant No.1, who was the
Page 4 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
original owner of the suit flat, had given up the right to lead evidence,
the Petitioner-Defendant No.3 who is the transferee pendent lite does
not get any right to lead evidence as he steps into the shoes of the
Defendant No.1. On the basis of the said contention, the Plaintiff
prayed that the affidavit in evidence filed by the Defendant No.3 be
discarded.
9.A reply came to be filed by the Petitioner-Defendant No.3
opposing the said application inter alia on the ground that the
Petitioner-Defendant No.3 had filed an independent written
statement; that the Defendant No.2 was cross examined at length by
the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1 and thereafter by the Defendant
No.3. The Trial Court by the impugned Order allowed the application
at Exhibit D-185 thereby disallowing the Defendant No.3 from
leading evidence. The Trial Court while relying upon the decision of
the Apex Court in the case of Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur
1
,
observed thus :
“......Apart from doctrine of lis pendens, under Section 52
of the Transfer of Property Act, the subsequent purchaser
does not get any right to lead any evidence, as he stepped
into the shoes of the first defendant.”
10.Shri Bhobe, learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the
decision in Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra) will have
1 (1997) 5 SCC 476
Page 5 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
no application in the facts of the present case. It is submitted that it
was at the instance of the Plaintiff that the Defendant No.3 was
impleaded as a necessary party. It is submitted that it is not as if the
Petitioner-Defendant No.3 had made an application for impleadment
being a transferee pendent lite. It is further submitted that the
Defendant No.1 was examined pursuant to the impleadment of the
Defendant No.3 and Defendant No.3 was allowed to file the written
statement. Learned Counsel submitted that the Defendant No.2 was
permitted to be cross examined at length by the Plaintiff, the
Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.3. It is further submitted that the
Defendant No.1 having lost interest in the property, did not choose to
lead any evidence. It is submitted that though Defendant No.3 has
stepped into the shoes of the Defendant No.1, but from the frame of
the application Exhibit D-150 made by the Plaintiff and the tenor of
the Order passed thereon by the Trial Court, it is obvious that the
Defendant No.3 is impleaded as a party Defendant No. 3 in an
independent capacity and, therefore, in such circumstances, the
Defendants' right to lead evidence cannot be curtailed. Learned
Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr. vs Farida Khatoon & Anr .
2
and
that of the High Court of Madras in the case of V. Damodaran &
2 (2005) 11 SCC 403
Page 6 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
Ors. vs. Thulasirama Reddy & Ors.
3
in support of his
submissions.
11.Ms. Mesquita, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, on the
other hand, argued in support of the impugned Order. It is
submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhanna Singh
vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the
present case. It is submitted that as rightly observed by the Trial
Court, the Defendant No.3 having stepped into the shoes of
Defendant No.1 as transferee pendent lite, the Defendant No. 3
cannot claim a better right than that of the predecessor in title. It is
submitted that if the Defendant No.1 has given up his right to lead
evidence, it is then not open for the Defendant No.3 to adduce
evidence, the position being well settled by the Supreme Court. It is
submitted that in terms of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,
the subsequent purchaser i.e. Defendant No.3 does not get any right
to lead evidence. It is moreover submitted that in the written
statement filed by the Defendant No.3, no fresh plea has been raised
by the Defendant No.3 and, therefore, there are hardly any facts in
the written statement which would justify the need for leading
evidence by the Defendant No.3. The learned Counsel, apart from
relying on the decision in Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur
(supra), relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
3 2011(3) MWN (Civil) 214
Page 7 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
Guruswamy Nadar vs. P. Lakshmi Ammal (D) through LR's
& Ors.
4
in support of her submission that as a public policy once a
suit has been filed pertaining to any subject matter of the property,
in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis
pendens is evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate
without intervention of a third party. It is submitted that if the
request of the Petitioner to lead evidence is to be accepted, then there
would be no end to litigation as in a given case, pursuant to the
transfer made during the pendency of the proceedings. According to
her, every subsequent purchaser will claim a right to adduce
evidence. It is submitted that knowing fully well that the suit
property is under litigation, the Defendant No.3 took the risk of
entering into a sale transaction with the Defendant No.1 and,
therefore, it hardly will make any difference if the Defendant No.3
has been impleaded at the instance of the Plaintiff or at his instance
in view of the settled proposition of law. Reliance is also placed on
the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of
Sukhdev Singh & Ors. vs. Mohan Singh & Ors.
5
, in support of
the submissions advanced on behalf of Respondent No.1. Learned
Counsel then placed reliance on the decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh & Ors. vs.
4 2008 (5) SCC 796
5 2011 DGLS (P&H) 3105
Page 8 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
Sohan Singh & Ors.
6
, to submit that the subsequent transferee
even though he obtained transfer without notice of original contract,
cannot set up any right against the Plaintiff. A reference is also made
to the decision of this Court in Manoihar Yadaoraoji Belge &
Ors. vs. KamlabaiManohar Rat & Ors.
7
12. Heard learned Counsel at length.
13.Admittedly, the Defendant No.3 purchased the suit property
from the Defendant No.1 during the pendency of the suit. The law so
far as the rights of the transferee pendent lite to lead evidence being
the representative in interest is well settled. The transferee steps into
the shoes of the transferor. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, which has a direct bearing on the issue involved, reads thus :
“Section 52 - Transfer of property pending suit relating
thereto.—During the [pendency] in any Court having
authority within the limits of India excluding the State of
Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits]
by the Central Government] [* * *] of [any] suit or
proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right
to immoveable property is directly and specifically in
question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise
dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to
affect the rights of any other party thereto under any
decree or order which may be made therein, except under
6 2004 DGLS (P&H) 166
7 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 312
Page 9 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may
impose.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the
pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to
commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint
or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent
jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding
has been disposed of by a final decree or order and
complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order
has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason
of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for
the execution thereof by any law for the time being in
force.”
14.Learned Counsel for the Respondent placed emphasis on the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhanna Singh vs.
Baljinder Kaur (supra). To appreciate the controversy, it would be
profitable to reproduce the decision which reads thus :
“1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, made
on May 22, 1996 in C.R. No.4333/1995.
3. The undisputed facts are that the respondents filed a
suit for permanent injunction with the following prayer:
"It is, therefore, prayed that a decree for
permanent injunction restraining the defendants
from raising any construction over any specific
portion of the property detailed in the heading of
the plaint, and also restraining the defendants
from filling any part of the property by sand and
also retraining the defendants from alienating any
specific portion of the property and also
restraining the defendants from transferring the
possession of the property without the same being
Page 10 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
partitioned between the parties to the suit may
kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiffs against
the defendants with costs and any other relief
which the Hon'ble Court may deem fit be also
granted."
4. Pending the suit, though several opportunities were
given, no evidence was adduced by the defendant. The
court passed an order on September 22, 1995 foreclosing
the evidence of the defendant on the statement of the
counsel that the first defendant was not willing to lead any
evidence. An application for impleadment was filed earlier
by the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser from the
first defendant. After impleadment, he filed application
for adduction of evidence which was rejected. Thus this
appeal.
5. The undisputed fact is that in the plaint the plaintiff-
respondent had already sought for a relief of injunction of
alienation, yet the alienation came to be made. Apart from
the doctrine of lis Pendense under Section 52 of the T.P.
Act, the subsequent purchaser does not get any right to
lead to any evidence, as he stepped into the shoes of the
first defendant, who had given up the right to lead
evidence. In view of these circumstances, he does not get
any right to lead any evidence.
6. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.”
15.Their Lordships thus held that the subsequent purchaser does
not get any right to lead any evidence, as he stepped into the shoes of
the first Defendant, who had given up the right to lead evidence. In
the context of Section 52, Their Lordships in the case of
Guruswamy Nadar vs. P. Lakshmi Ammal (supra) observed
thus :
Page 11 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
“Normally, as a public policy once a suit has been filed
pertaining to any subject matter of the property, in order to
put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis
pendens has been evolved so that the litigation may finally
terminate without intervention of a third party. This is
because of public policy otherwise no litigation will come to
an end. Therefore, in order to discourage that same subject
matter of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a
third person, this kind of transaction is to be checked.
Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end.”
16.The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jaswinder Singh &
Ors. vs. Sohan Singh & Ors. (supra) and this Court in Manoihar
Yadaoraoji Belge & Ors. vs. Kamlabai Manohar Rat & Or s
(supra) cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1, relied
on the decision in Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra).
17.In the context of the present controversy, it would also be
profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr vs Farida Khatoon & Anr . (supra).
Their Lordships in paragraphs 15 and 16 while considering the
question of application of doctrine of lis pendens observed thus :
“15. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is an
expression of the principle "pending a litigation nothing
new should be introduced". It provides that pendente lite,
neither party to the litigation, in which any right to
immovable property is in question, can alienate or
otherwise deal with such property so as to affect his
appointment. This Section is based on equity and good
conscience and is intended to protect the parties to
litigation against alienations by their opponent during the
Page 12 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
pendency of the suit. In order to constitute a lis pendens,
the following elements must be present:
1. There must be a suit or proceeding
pending in a Court of competent
jurisdiction.
2. The suit or proceeding must not be
collusive.
3. The litigation must be one in which
right to immovable property is directly and
specifically in question.
4. There must be a transfer of or otherwise
dealing with the property in dispute by any
party to the litigation.
5. Such transfer must affect the rights of
the other party that may ultimately accrue
under the terms of the decree or order.
16. The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis
is pending before a Court. Further pending the suit, the
transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to
the suit, though the Court has a discretion to make him a
party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a
proper party if his interest in the subject matter of the suit
is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee
pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from
the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, whether
the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the
latter having no more interest in the property may not
properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff.
Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make
a lis pendens transferee a party; under Order XXII Rule 10
an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already
noticed, the Court has discretion in the matter which must
be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be
joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The
Court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest
in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of
the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is
entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings
where the transferee pendente lite is made a party to the
Page 13 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the
merits of the case. (emphasis mine)
18.The High Court of Madras had an occasion to deal with an
issue somewhat similar to the one that arises for consideration in the
present Petition in the case of V. Damodaran & Ors. vs.
Thulasirama Reddy & Ors.(supra). Paragraph 13 to 20, which are
relevant reads thus :
13. A mere poring over and perusal of those judgments
would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and
spotlight the fact that no doubt a learned single Judge of
this Court at one point of time felt that there are two lines
of judgments, one to the effect that a pendente lite
purchaser is having a right to get impleaded in the suit and
contest the matter on merits and another to the effect that
a pendente lite purchaser is alien to the proceedings and he
is bound by the decision. This case in view of its peculiar
factual scenario has not got itself caught in the cross fire of
such conflicting views.
14. Here it is quite obvious and axiomatic that the
purchasers never filed any application to get themselves
impleaded as parties to the proceedings; whereas,
admittedly the plaintiffs took steps to implead them; Of
course, according to them even though the
appellants/defendants had no legs to stand in the legal
proceedings in the suit, yet the plaintiffs wanted to avoid
future unnecessary litigation and with that motive such
impleadment resulted. However, there is nothing on
record to indicate and exemplify that the Court while
allowing the I.A. for impleadment passed any order to the
effect that the appellants/defendants here, were added in
the suit only for the limited purpose of naming them as
Page 14 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
formal parties so as to avoid future litigation. The plaintiffs
wrongly assumed as though the course adopted by them,
was the line of least resistance, forgetting for the moment
that they cannot approbate and reprobate.
15. Adding fuel to the fire, the trial Court with the
connivance of the plaintiffs' so to say without any objection
from the plaintiffs, allowed the written statement to be
filed by the appellants/defendants and issues and
additional issues were framed by it and the matter was
posted for trial. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of
the following maxim: Consensus Tollit Errorem The
acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an
error obviates its effect and the relevant portion from
Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition is extracted
hereunder for ready reference:
"When applied to the proceedings in an action,
waiver may be defined to be the doing
something after an irregularity committed, and
with a knowledge of such irregularity, where the
irregularity might have been corrected before
the act was done; and it is essential to
distinguish a proceeding which is merely
irregular from one which is completely defective
and void. In that latter case the proceeding is a
nullity, which cannot be waived by any laches or
subsequent proceedings of the opposite
property.
Where, however, an irregularity has been
committed, and where the opposite party knows
of the irregularity, it is a fixed rule observed by
all the Courts in this country, that he should
come in the first instance to avail himself of it,
and not allow the other party to proceed to incur
expense. "It is not reasonable afterwards to
allow the party to complain of that irregularity,
of which, if he had availed himself in the first
instance, all that expense would have been
rendered unnecessary" (e); and therefore, if a
party, after any such irregularity has taken place,
consents to a proceeding which, by insisting on
the irregularity, he might have prevented, he
waives all exceptions to the irregularity (f). This
is a doctrine long established and well known,
and extends so far, that a person may be
materially affected in a subsequent criminal
prosecution by proceedings to the irregularity of
which he has, by his silence, waived objection
(g).
It may appear in some measure superfluous to
Page 15 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
add, that the consent which cures error in legal
proceedings, may be implied as well as
expressed: for instance-- where, at the trial of a
cause, a proposal was made by the judge in the
presence of the counsel on both sides, who made
no objection, that the jury should assess the
damages contingently, with leave to the plaintiff
to move enter a verdict for the amount found by
the jury, it was held that both parties were
bound by the proposal, and that the plaintiff's
counsel was not therefore at liberty to move for a
new trial on the ground of misdirection (h), for
qui tacet consentire videtur (i), the silence of
counsel implied their assent to the course
adopted by the judge, and "a man who does not
speak when he ought shall not be heard when he
desires to speak"(k)"
Only at the stage of cross examining P.W.1 the plaintiff got
awakened and filed the I.A. so as to prevent the defendants
from cross examining P.W.1 and for adducing rebuttal
evidence by the newly added parties. No doubt there is no
estoppel against law. Not to put too fine a point on it, here
the method and manner in which the proceedings went on
before the trial Court would pellucidly and palpably make
the point clear that the appellants/defendants were added
in the suit only for the purpose of giving opportunity to
them to litigate on merits.
16. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs by
narrating the relevant facts would submit that absolutely
there is no merit in the contentions of the
appellants/defendants and that they had no personal
knowledge about the benami transaction which emerged
between Jayarama Reddy and his brother-in-law
Chinnamma Reddy. He would also hasten to add that as of
now the appellants/defendants are also having no locus
standi to proceed with the matter, because they in turn
parted with the entire suit property in favour of various
other persons; as such they are having no legal or moral
stand to proceed with the matter; if the matter is
remanded, then that would amount to prolongation of the
litigation. He would also submit that in the long longevity
of this litigation, the first respondent/plaintiff has actually
Page 16 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
become an octogenarian and he has been litigating for
three generations without reaping any fruits and as such
he would oppose the move for remanding the matter back
to the trial Court for giving opportunity to the appellants.
17. I would also like to hark back to the decision of the
Madurai Bench of this Court rendered by me on
14.12.2006 in S.A.No.518 of 1996; certain excerpts from it
would run thus:
"27. At this juncture, I may proceed to lay down
as a general rule that whenever a party after
effecting transfer pendente lite simply agrees to
the claim of the other side without taking the
transferee pendente lite into confidence or
making adequate provisions to safeguard the
interest of such transferee pendente lite, such
act should be termed as only a collusive act.
28. The question may arise as to how the other
party to the litigation who was not a party to the
transfer pendente lite could be imputed with
knowledge and ultimately with collusive state of
mind. Normal course of occurrences alone is the
sole test. The transferor pendente lite invariably
does make the transfer with some specific
purposes and more specifically as against the
opposite side in the litigation and if such a
person all of a sudden turns turtle by having a
volte fact and submits to the claim of his enemy
in the litigative battle that is the opposite party,
naturally the role of the opposite party could
rightly be inferred in it and ultimately, bringing
about a non-adjudicatory judgment."
18. Even though the facts and circumstances of that case
are different from the factual scenario of this case, yet I
had the opportunity of referring to the doctrine of lis
pendens and also the duty of the seller of the property
pendente lite.
19. The factual circumstances in this case would display
and demonstrate that the original defendants did not file
any written statement and they did not contest the matter;
so to say, after initially contesting the injunction
application, they left the matter holus bolus. They did not
choose to safeguard the interest of the purchasers
pendente lite, namely the appellants herein. It is not a case
where the vendor's pendente lite, contested the matter and
Page 17 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
that the subsequent purchasers pendente lite are trying to
improve upon the case of their vendors by filing additional
written statement or by adducing more evidence etc. But
this is a singularly singular case in which the plaintiffs
themselves added the purchasers pendente lite and
allowed them to file written statement and whereupon the
issues were framed by the trial Court and only thereafter
the plaintiffs did choose to file the said I.A. for preventing
the appellants/defendants, so to say the purchasers
pendente lite from cross-examining P.W.1 and adducing
rebuttal evidence.
20. The decisions of the Hon'be Apex Court reported in
Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal & others, 2004 (1) CTC
549 and Amit Kumar Shaw & anr. vs. Farida
Khatoon & anr. 2005 (4) CTC 47 (SC): AIR 2005 SC
2209, supra would, in my considered view, come to the
rescue of the appellants herein. The said decisions would
unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight
that such purchasers pendente lite are having a right to
contest the matter on merits even after getting the ex parte
decree and judgment set aside as against their vendor. In
fact here the plaintiffs themselves paved the way for the
purchasers pendente lite to contest the matter on merits
and in such a case I am of the considered view that the
decision cited on the side of the plaintiffs would not in any
way prevent the appellants/defendants from contesting the
matter on merits. The trial Court went off on a tangent and
decided the lis, without referring to all the relevant
precedents and the factual circumstances; and it simply
prevented the defendants from contesting the matter on
merits. There is no quick fix and also there are no two ways
about it, in disposing the matter without adhering to the
maxim "audi alteram partem No man shall be
condemned unheard." No doubt, I am fully aware of the
fact that this is a long pending matter and in such a case if
the matter is remitted back to the trial Court, it would take
further time for the litigation to get concluded. The first
Page 18 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
appellate Court being the last Court of facts, on
considering the facts and circumstances of the case could
have given opportunity to cross examine the plaintiffs'
witness and also could have given opportunity to the
defendants concerned to adduce evidence, but it failed to
do so. Hence, remanding the matter to the first appellate
Court which happened to be the last Court of facts would
to some extent curtail further time of the litigation and
with that intention I would like remand the matter back to
the first appellate Court with the following direction:
The first appellate Court shall give due opportunity
to the appellants/defendants to cross examine P.W.1
and also give further opportunity to the plaintiffs to
adduce additional evidence both oral and
documentary, if any. The defendants also shall be
given opportunity to adduce oral and documentary
evidence. Endeavour shall be taken by the appellate
Court to see that the entire process is completed on
day to day basis and judgment delivered on merits
within a period of two months from the date of
receipt of the records.”
19.The law as regards the right of subsequent purchaser to adduce
evidence has been crystalised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra). The decision
in Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr. vs Farida Khatoon & Anr .
(supra) and that of the High Court of Madras come close to the facts
of the present case. In my considered opinion, the decision in
Dhanna Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra) can be distinguished
on facts.
20.In the present case, it is the Plaintiff who had filed an
application for impleadment of the Petitioner as a necessary party to
the suit and deletion of Defendant No.1. Even before the evidence of
Page 19 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
Defendant No.1 was adduced, the Plaintiff filed the application for
impleadment of Petitioner/Defendant No.3. The Plaintiff contended
that as the interest in the property of Defendant No.1 has been
purchased by the Petitioner, the Petitioner be substituted in place of
Defendant No.1. The Trial Court was however of the opinion that the
Petitioner be added as Defendant No.3 as there was counter claim of
the Defendant No.1 seeking a relief that the Lease Deed executed
between the Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff be declared as null and
void and, therefore, the name of the Defendant No.1 cannot be struck
off. Thus, the Defendant No. 1 continued to be party-Defendant and
Defendant No.3 came to be added as a necessary party, all this at the
instance of the Plaintiff.
21.It is pertinent to note that present is a case where the
Defendant No.1 has filed a counter claim against the Plaintiff for
recovery of the possession on determination of the lease. As
indicated earlier, Plaintiff filed a suit against the Defendant No.1 and
Defendant No.2 for the relief that the lease executed by the
Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No.2 in respect of Shop No. 2-
A is illegal. Not only was the Defendant No.3 impleaded at the
instance of the Plaintiff, but there was no objection from the Plaintiff
to the Defendant No.3 filing an independent written statement. The
evidence of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was yet to be adduced. It was at
Page 20 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
this stage that the Defendant No.3 was impleaded and permitted to
file a Written statement.
22.The Defendant No.1 refused to lead evidence in the matter and
closed his evidence on 30.09.2022 by making an endorsement to that
effect on the Court file. Thereafter, the Defendant No.2 was
examined by the Plaintiff. The Defendant No.2 was also examined by
the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.3. It is then that the
Defendant No. 3 sought to lead evidence in the matter. It is at this
stage, an application was made by the Plaintiff to the effect that as the
Defendant No.1 and the original Plaintiff had given up the right to
lead evidence, the Defendant No.3 who is a transferee pendent lite
does not get any right to lead evidence as he stepped into the shoes of
the Defendant No.1. This application is allowed by the impugned
Order.
23.The Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr vs Farida
Khatoon & Anr. (supra) observed that a transferee pendent lite to
the extent he has acquired interest from the Defendant is vitally
interested in the litigation, whether the transfer is of the entire
interest of the Defendant; the latter having no more interest in the
property may not properly defend the suit. It is to be borne in mind
that it was at the instance of the Plaintiff that the Petitioner is joined
as a necessary party at a stage when the evidence of Defendant No.1
Page 21 of 22
21
st
March 2023 ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
24-WP-100-2023.DOC
was yet to be adduced. It is after the impleadment of the Defendant
No.3 that the Defendant No.1 chose not to lead evidence. The
Defendant No.3 was allowed to file written statement and examine
Defendant No.2. In such facts, there is no justification to curtail the
right of Defendant No.3 to lead evidence. A party who has been
permitted to file written statement and examine witnesses, at the
stage of leading his evidence, cannot be precluded from doing so on
the plea that he has stepped into the shoes of Defendant No.1 who
has given up the right to lead evidence. It is also pertinent to note
that Defendant No.1 has filed a counter claim. Filing of the counter
claim was the reason why the trial Court did not permit deletion of
Defendant No.1 though such deletion was specifically prayed for by
the Plaintiff. It is therefore, in these facts, I am of the considered
opinion that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanna
Singh vs. Baljinder Kaur (supra), is distinguishable. In my
opinion, the Trial Court committed an error in allowing the
application Exhibit D-185.
24.The Petition is allowed. The impugned Order of the Trial Court
is set aside. Application Exhibit-185 stands rejected. No order as to
costs.
M. S. KARNIK, J
Page 22 of 22
21
st
March 2023
ANDREZA PEREIRA
Digitally signed by ANDREZA
PEREIRA
Date: 2023.04.06 12:54:13 +05'30' ::: Uploaded on - 06/04/2023 ::: Downloaded on - 30/08/2025 22:07:26 :::
Legal Notes
Add a Note....