2026 INSC 483 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 1276 OF 2026

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 536 OF 2026

FAKIR MAMAD SULEMAN SAMEJA AND ORS.

…APPLICANT(S)

VERSUS

ADANI PORTS AND SPECIAL

ECONOMIC ZONES LTD. AND ORS.

…RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.

1. The instant miscellaneous application has been filed by the

Respondent No. 7 to 10 and 12 to 17 in a disposed of civil appeal.

It has been captioned as an ‘application seeking clarification in

respect of the order dictated on dated 27.01.2026 in open Court

and the one uploaded on 12.02.2026 and for necessary correction’.

The prayer made in the application is as follows:

“In the above circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed

that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to:

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a) Allow the present application clarifying that the Order as

it was dictated in the open Court on 27.01.2026 is final and

binding and the one uploaded on 12.02.2026, does not have

any force of law and cannot be acted upon and an order be

corrected accordingly;

b) Pass such order or further order (s) as this Hon’ble Court

may deem fit in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case in favour of the Petitioner.’

2. The Civil Appeal No. 536 of 2026 arose out of Special Leave

Petition (Civil) No. 14440 of 2024 challenging the interim order

dated 05.07.2024 in WPPIL No. 17/2011 passed by the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”).

By the said interim order, the High Court had directed the State to

carry out the process of resumption of land from the Respondents

as per the State of Gujarat’s resolution dated 04.07.2024. The said

resolution was passed by the State without hearing the

Respondent, based on the oral instructions of the Court. While

issuing notice on 10.07.2024, this Court had stayed the impugned

interim order dated 05.07.2024 and noted as follows:

“1. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner makes a categorical statement that the order

passed by the authority was without giving an opportunity

to the petitioner.

2. He further states that though the learned counsel for the

petitioner was present before the High Court and attempted

to make submission, he was not heard by the High Court.

3

3. In that view of the matter, issue notice, returnable within

four weeks.

4. Dasti, in addition, is permitted.

5. In the meantime, the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court shall remain stayed.”

3. The Civil Appeal was disposed of vide an order dated

27.01.2026, setting aside the interim order dated 05.07.2024 of

the High Court and the resolution dated 04.07.2024, granting

liberty to the State Government to pass a fresh order after hearing

all parties. It was also directed that the writ petition before the

High Court shall be treated to be disposed of and after passing of

the fresh order, the parties shall have the liberty to take recourse

as permissible under the law, keeping all contentions open to be

raised before the State or before the Court.

4. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the

Applicants claims that there was variance between the dictation

given to the Court-master by the Court on 27.01.2026 when the

matter was heard (hereinafter referred to as “dictation”) and the

order dated 27.01.2026 which was finally signed and uploaded on

12.02.2026 (hereinafter referred to as “signed order”). The

Applicants seek a clarification to the effect that the dictation given

to the Court-master on 27.01.2026 therefore is what is final and

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binding and the signed order dated 27.01.2026 uploaded on

12.02.2026 has no force of law.

5. In order to show such variance, the Applicants have filed

various media reports of the proceedings in the disposed of special

leave petition on 27.01.2026 and the letter dated 28.01.2026 sent

by the Respondent company to the Bombay Stock Exchange and

the National Stock Exchange in compliance of Regulation 30(11) of

the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements)

Regulations, 2015. The Applicants have also filed a pen drive

containing a video recording of the proceedings dated 27.01.2026

which was purportedly uploaded on YouTube (along with a web-

link), they have prepared a transcript of the order dictated in Court

in the said proceedings and they assert that the said transcript of

the dictation is correct and final in the matter.

6. The Applicants would contend that the dictation given in

Court on 27.01.2026 is the final pronouncement in the matter and

even prior to correction and signing, the transcript of the words

uttered during dictation as transcribed by the Applicants from a

video of the proceedings uploaded on YouTube shall form the

binding order in the matter.

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7. The Applicants have made a reference to Article 145(4) of the

Constitution of India which provides as follows:

“Article 145

…

(4) No judgement shall be delivered by the Supreme Court

save in open Court, and no report shall be made under

article 143 save in accordance with an opinion also

delivered in open Court.”

8. Article 145(4) of the Constitution of India is incorporated in

Order XII of the Supreme Court Rules, Rule 1 and 3 whereof has

been relied upon by the Applicants. They are also relevant, and are

therefore reproduced:

“1. The Court, after the case has been heard, shall

pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some

future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties

or their advocates on record, and the decree or order shall

be drawn up in accordance herewith.

…

3. Subject to the provisions contained in Order XLVII of these

rules, a judgment pronounced by the Court or by a majority

of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open Court shall not

afterwards be altered or added to, save for the purpose of

correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error

arising from any accidental slip or omission.”

9. In reference to the aforesaid rules, it is submitted by the

Applicants that once the order had been dictated in open Court,

there was no occasion for the Court to alter or modify the order on

material aspects. It is submitted that the material changes which

have crept into the signed order as opposed to the dictation in

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Court were broadly twofold – that the Court in the dictation had

directed status quo over the subject land in question and that the

Court in the dictation had directed that the High Court shall

proceed independently with the writ petition in accordance with

law. However, the signed order dated 27.01.2026 does not provide

for any status quo with respect to the land in question and also

directs that the writ petition, being WP (PIL) No. 17 of 2011 shall

be treated to be disposed of.

10. To buttress the arguments made by the Applicants, they have

placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar

Singh v. Banaras Hindu University,

1 where this Court held that

as soon as a judgment is pronounced in open Court, it becomes

the final operative pronouncement of the Court and the judgment

becoming operative does not need to await signing thereof by the

Court. In case the Court finds, after pronouncement of the

judgment in open Court that there is something in the case which

was noticed by the Court at the time of pronouncement, the matter

ought to be placed for re-hearing. Relevant portion of the said

judgement is quoted herein for reference:

“…

1

(1988) 1 SCC 80.

7

7. But, while the court has undoubted power to alter or

modify a judgment, delivered but not signed, such power

should be exercised judicially, sparingly and for adequate

reasons. When a judgment is pronounced in open court,

parties act on the basis that it is the judgment of the court

and that the signing is a formality to follow.

8. We have extensively extracted from what Bose, J. spoke

in this judgment to impress upon everyone that

pronouncement of a judgment in court whether immediately

after the hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered

later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of the

court with reference to the case. Bose, J. emphasised the

feature that as soon as the judgment is delivered that

becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. That

would mean that the judgment to be operative does not

await signing thereof by the court. There may be exceptions

to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgment is dictated

in open court, a feature which had not been placed for

consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel

of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts

from the record. In such a case the court may give direction

that the judgment which has just been delivered would not

be effective and the case shall be further heard. There may

also be cases — though their number would be few and far

between — where when the Judgment is placed for

signature the court notices a feature which should have

been taken into account. In such a situation the matter may

be placed for further consideration upon notice to the

parties. If the judgment delivered is intended not to be

operative, good reasons should be given.

9. Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is

complete by listening to submissions of counsel and perusal

of records and a definite view is reached by the court in

regard to the conclusion. Once that stage is reached and the

court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be

reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or

a review is asked for and is granted. When the judgment is

pronounced, parties present in the court know the

conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such

pronouncement, they proceed to conduct their affairs. If

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what is pronounced in court is not acted upon, certainly

litigants would be prejudiced. Confidence of the litigants in

the judicial process would be shaken. A judgment

pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there

be some exceptional feature and if there be any such, the

same should appear from the record of the case. In the

instant matter, we find that there is no material at all to

show as to what led the Division Bench which had

pronounced the judgment in open court not to authenticate

the same by signing it. In such a situation the judgment

delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition

should not have been placed for fresh hearing. The

subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not

available to be made once it is held that the writ petition

stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on

28-7-1986.

…”

11. The Applicants have also placed reliance on the unreported

judgment of this Court in U.P. Housing & Development Board &

Ors. v. M/s Fast Builders, Lucknow and Anr.

2. This Court held

that a judgment dictated in Court can be modified or altered until

it is signed by the Judge concerned, but if material changes are to

be made in the order dictated in open Court, the Court should get

the matter listed once again and the Court should tell the parties

the reasons for which the matter is required to be reconsidered.

Relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted herein for

reference:

2

Judgment dated 10.12.2012 in Civil Appeal No. 9127 of 2012.

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“It is indeed true that an order dictated in Court can be

modified or altered until it is signed by the Judge concerned.

But, such an occasion should arise very rarely and if the

Judge wishes to make any material changes in the order

dictated in open court, then the least that is expected is that

he should get the matter once again listed in Court and

clearly tell the parties the reasons for which he wishes to

reconsider the matter, to hear the parties in the case again

and then pass the final order that may be at variance with

the earlier order dictated in Court.

In case an order dictated in open court is later changed

behind the back of the parties, it is bound to give rise to

unhealthy suspicion and doubts in the mind of the litigant

adversely affected by the changes introduced in the order

and this would create very wrong impression in regard to

the functioning of the Court. This should never happen.”

12. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi appearing for the

Respondent has placed reliance of the judgment of three judges of

this Court in Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat ,

3

where it was held in the context of Section 362 of the Criminal

Procedure Code, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) that until

the judgment of the Court is signed and sealed after it has been

delivered in Court, it is not a judgment and it can be changed or

altered at any time prior to such signature. Relevant portion of the

said judgment is quoted as under:

“7. We do not find any forcible submission advanced on

behalf of the petitioners that once the order had been

dictated in open court, the order to review or recall is not

permissible in view of the provisions of Section 362 CrPC for

3

(2014) 9 SCC 124.

10

the simple reason that Section 362 CrPC puts an embargo

to call, recall or review any judgment or order passed in

criminal case once it has been pronounced and signed. In

the instant case, admittedly, the order was dictated in the

court, but had not been signed.

…

11. This Court has also dealt with the issue in Surendra

Singh v. State of U.P. [Surendra Singh v. State of U.P.,

(1953) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1954 SC 194 : 1954 Cri LJ 475] ,

observing as under : (AIR pp. 196-97, para 12)

“12. Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered

Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a

sort of ‘locus paenitentiae’ and indeed last minute

alterations often do occur. Therefore, however much a

draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is

nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment

of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full-

fledged judgment and become operative. It follows that

the Judge who ‘delivers’ the judgment, or causes it to be

delivered by a Brother Judge, must be in existence as a

member of the Court at the moment of delivery so that he

can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has

changed his mind. There is no need for him to be

physically present in court but he must be in existence as

a member of the Court and be in a position to stop

delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last

minute change of mind on his part. If he hands in a draft

and signs it and indicates that he intends that to be the

final expository of his views it can be assumed that those

are still his views at the moment of delivery if he is alive

and in a position to change his mind but takes no steps

to arrest delivery.

But one cannot assume that he would not have changed

his mind if he is no longer in a position to do so. A Judge's

responsibility is heavy and when a man's life and liberty

hang upon his decision nothing can be left to chance or

doubt or conjecture; also, a question of public policy is

involved. As we have indicated, it is frequently the

practice to send a draft, sometimes a signed draft, to a

Brother Judge who also heard the case. This may be

merely for his information, or for consideration and

criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not

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necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be

against public policy to leave the door open for an

investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was

intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion or

was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with an

unwritten understanding that he is free to change his

mind should fresh light dawn upon him before the

delivery of judgment.”

12. Thus, from the above, it is evident that a Judge's

responsibility is very heavy, particularly, in a case where a

man's life and liberty hang upon his decision nothing can be

left to chance or doubt or conjecture. Therefore, one cannot

assume, that the Judge would not have changed his mind

before the judgment became final.

13. In Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of

Maharashtra [(1975) 3 SCC 140 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 764 : AIR

1974 SC 1880] , the judgment in Surendra Singh [Surendra

Singh v. State of U.P., (1953) 2 SCC 468 : AIR 1954 SC 194

: 1954 Cri LJ 475] referred to hereinabove was considered

in this case. In that case, criminal appeal was heard by the

Division Bench of the High Court, the judgment was signed

by both of them but it was delivered in court by one of them

after the death of the other. It was held that there was no

valid judgment and the case should be reheard. This Court

took the view that the judgment is the final decision of the

court intimated to the parties and the world at large.”

13. Further, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent has

submitted that the instant miscellaneous application warrants

dismissal at the threshold, since it is not at all maintainable. He

has filed a compilation of judgments and orders: Supertech Ltd.

v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Assn. ,

4

Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset

4

(2023) 10 SCC 817.

12

Reconstruction Co. Ltd.,

5 Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. &

Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. and Anr. ,

6 Ajay Kumar

Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.,

7

to submit that this Court

has on multiple occasions deprecated the practice of filing

miscellaneous application in disposed of matters unless there is

an clerical or arithmetic error in the order, or unless the nature of

the order itself is executory and it has become impossible to

implement due to subsequent events or developments.

14. He has further argued that the aforementioned

pronouncements of this Court have resulted in the issuance of the

Circular F. No. 01/Judl./2025 dated 03.01.2025 by the Registrar

(Judl. Admn.) and Registrar (Judl. Listing) (hereinafter referred to

as “Circular dated 03.01.2025”) where it was directed that any

party filing a miscellaneous application in a disposed of matter

may be required to specifically aver on oath that the filing of the

miscellaneous application has been necessitated as the order

passed in the main proceeding being executory in nature and have

become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent

5

2022 SCC OnLine SC 2241.

6

2024 SCC OnLine SC 313.

7

M.A. Diary No. 39665 of 2024 in M.A. Diary No. 14381/2024 in M.A. No. 714 of 2022 in

W.P.(C) 429 of 2020.

13

events or developments and to make such a declaration on solemn

affirmation.

ANALYSIS

15. We have heard learned senior counsel for the parties and

perused the record. It goes without saying that in these

proceedings, the Court is not called upon to justify its order,

neither is the order itself under challenge. This Court is not sitting

in review over its order and it will suffice to say that the digitally

signed order dated 27.01.2026 which was uploaded on 12.02.2026

remains the only final order passed by the Court in this case. As

such, in these proceedings, the Court is not going to examine the

validity of the signed order dated 27.01.2026.

16. At the outset, the present miscellaneous application is not

maintainable in law. It is in the nature of a review petition, seeking

to rewrite the order of the Court. The prayer made in the

miscellaneous application is to declare the dictation given in Court

to the Court-master to be final and binding and the signed order

to be declared as not having any force of law. Such a prayer in the

first place is thoroughly misconceived. This Court, recently in Ajay

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Kumar Jain (Supra) has relied upon a similar observation in

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (Supra) and held as follows:

“17. Thus, this Court made it abundantly clear that a

miscellaneous application filed in a disposed of proceedings

would be maintainable only for the purpose of correcting

any clerical or arithmetical error. The Court further clarified

that a post disposal application for modification or

clarification of the order would lie only in rare cases where

the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and

the directions of the Court may have become impossible to

be implemented because of subsequent events or

developments.

18. The Registry shall not circulate any miscellaneous

application filed in a disposed of proceedings unless and

until there is a specific averment on oath that the filing of

the miscellaneous application has been necessitated as the

order passed in the main proceeding being executory in

nature and have become impossible to be implemented

because of subsequent events or developments.

19. The Registry shall insist from every applicant who

intends to file any miscellaneous application in a disposed

of proceedings for such a declaration as above on solemn

affirmation.”

17. Pursuant to the judgment in Ajay Kumar Jain (Supra), the

Registry of this Court has issued Circular F. No. 01/Judl./2025

dated 03.01.2025 which requires that in case a miscellaneous

application is filed in a disposed of proceedings, there must be a

specific averment on oath that the filing of the miscellaneous

application is necessary since the order is executory in nature and

it has become impossible to implement due to subsequent events.

15

Even otherwise, such an application can be filed by a party to point

out to the Court any arithmetic or clerical mistake which may have

crept into the order.

18. On perusal of the original file of the miscellaneous application

filed before this Court, it appears that the Applicants have not filed

an affidavit to meet the requirement as laid down in Ajay Kumar

Jain (Supra) and the Circular dated 03.01.2025. In any case, we

do not see how such an affidavit could have been filed in the first

place, since the prayer made in this miscellaneous application is

not for correction of a clerical or arithmetic error, nor does it

appear that the directions pursuant to the order have become

impossible due to subsequent events. In ideal circumstances, the

Registry of this Court should have raised a defect about non-

compliance of the Circular dated 03.01.2025. The Registrar

concerned shall submit an explanation in chambers in this regard

within one week from the date of this order, as to how the instant

miscellaneous application was permitted to be listed without

compliance of the above.

19. The Applicants herein are not merely seeking correction of

any clerical error or arithmetical correction in the signed order, but

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rather, they claim that the signed order ‘does not have any force of

law’. Such a prayer is prima facie erroneous and after the closing

of proceedings in the matter, making such a prayer by filing of a

miscellaneous application is completely misplaced, it is a gross

abuse of process of law and cannot be permitted. Further, it has

been pleaded in the miscellaneous application at paragraph 11

that the ‘error appears to have crept due to inadvertence, as the law

does not permit the order to be changed on material aspect, after it

has been dictated / pronounced in open Court’. A distinction must

be made between an error which may have crept into an order by

inadvertence and an error in application of the law itself, making

the order have no ‘force of law’. Here, the Applicants appear to be

contending the latter, in the garb of the former. The pleadings in

the miscellaneous application, in our view, are nothing but a

misconceived attempt to undermine the dignity of the Court and

browbeat its authority. Therefore, even though the application

itself is not maintainable in law, it is pertinent to make some

observations about the arguments which have been advanced.

20. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court

in Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra), relevant paragraph whereof has

been quoted in paragraph 9 of the present judgment. The factual

17

situation in that case was such that the Appellant in that case had

filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court seeking

admission in the Banaras Hindu University applying some

additional weightage. The matter which was heard by a division

bench of the said Court on 28.07.1986, and upon conclusion of

hearing, the judgment was pronounced in open Court allowing the

writ petition and directing the University to admit the petitioner in

the said course. The judgment, however, was not signed by the

learned judges and the petition was again listed in the hearing list

from September 1986 till 05.02.1987 when the same division

bench which had earlier disposed of the matter had directed the

matter to be taken up by another division bench. Upon subsequent

hearing, the writ petition was dismissed by the other division

bench on 23.03.1987. It was in those facts and circumstances that

this Court found that the judgment dictated in open Court on

28.07.1986 was the judgment of the Court and it did not need to

await its signing by the learned judges for it to become a judgment

in the eyes of law. As such, the subsequent judgment of a different

division bench dismissing the petition on 23.03.1987 could not be

a judgment in the matter once the judgment dated 28.07.1986 had

been dictated in open Court.

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21. Further, reliance has been placed on the judgment in U.P.

Housing (Supra) where the factual situation was such that the writ

petition filed by the Respondent in that case had been disposed of

by the division bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench

on 06.10.2010. The same order was uploaded online on the

website and a certified copy thereof was obtained by the Appellant

in that case. Thereafter, on 24.02.2011, the Respondent in that

case submitted a modified copy of the order dated 06.10.2010 to

the Appellant’s office. Upon seeking a report from the Registrar

General of the High Court, it was clarified that the order submitted

by the Respondent (which was modified) was actually the order of

the Court on record. It was in that context that this Court

acknowledged that a judgment dictated in open Court can be

modified or altered until it is signed by the Judge, but such

occasion should arise very rarely and if material changes are to be

made in the order, the parties to the case must be heard again

prior to passing the order which is materially changed. Further,

this Court observed in that judgment that if an order dictated in

open Court is changed behind the back of the parties, it may give

rise to unhealthy suspicion and doubts in the mind of the litigant

who is adversely affected by the changes introduced in the order

19

and it would create a wrong impression about the functioning of

the Court.

22. On facts, the judgment of Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra) does

not apply to the instant case. The instant disposed of appeal has

not been listed for re-hearing after the signed order was uploaded,

nor is any other bench seized of the matter which has been

disposed of and also, this is not a situation where there are two

orders of the Court in the matter. For the same reason, the

situation which arose in UP Housing (Supra) was also quite

different, where also, two orders were signed and uploaded and the

first order was obtained by one of the parties. Certainly, once a

Court has taken a view about the outcome of the case listed before

it on merits, it cannot be materially changed without hearing the

parties. This proposition of law which can be derived from the two

above-mentioned judgments, cannot be put to question.

23. In the present application, the Applicants would urge that

closing the Writ Petition before the High Court amounts to a

material change from the dictation given in Court. Even from the

YouTube video and the transcript thereof containing the dictation

given by the Court, the High Court was given liberty to proceed in

20

the matter in accordance with law ‘after passing the order by the

State Government’. Such a direction was included in terms of the

suggestion made by the counsel for the Respondent in the main

appeal (Applicants herein) after the dictation of the order was

concluded. After correction, the signed order reflects that the Writ

Petition (PIL) No. 17 of 2011 was to be treated as disposed of and

after passing the order afresh by the State Government, parties

were given the liberty to take recourse as permissible under the

law, keeping all contentions open for the parties to raise before the

State Government or the Court in appropriate proceedings. This,

in our opinion, is not a material change, it is a correction and

refinement of the dictation. Although we are not called upon to

explain the intent behind our order, but there is no material

change which has crept into the signed order which would warrant

a re-hearing in terms of the judgments cited by the Applicants,

which in the first place are distinguishable on facts. The writ

petition before the High Court had been pending for long and it

had culminated in the resolution dated 04.07.2024 which was

passed without hearing the Respondent, on the oral directions of

the Court. Upon passing of a fresh order by the State Government,

it was envisaged by this Court that fresh proceedings may be

21

drawn reserving all rights and contentions of the parties. In any

case, all contentions of the parties have been kept open and all

requisite liberty has been granted to the parties to take recourse

as permissible under the law.

24. Further, it is vehemently urged by the learned counsel

appearing for the Applicants that the Court in its dictation had

directed that status quo as it exists today shall be maintained but

no such direction to maintain status quo is reflected in the signed

order. In this regard, at the very outset, prior to dictation being

given to the Court-master on 27.01.2026, on a request being made

by the counsel appearing for the Respondents (Applicants herein)

for status quo, it was clarified by the Court that whatever order has

been passed by this Court, shall continue. Even during dictation,

the Court first dictated ‘stay of the impugned order’, since that was

the stay order passed by this Court while issuing notice on

10.07.2024, but later it was uttered ‘status quo as it exists today

shall be maintained’. Grant of status quo or non-grant thereof is

an ancillary direction and it cannot be said to be a material change

in the draft order which could not have been made prior to signing

of the order without re-hearing. In the main appeal, what was

under challenge was an interim order to implement a resolution

22

for resumption of land which was passed without hearing the

Respondent. The fact that the resolution was passed without giving

due hearing to the Respondent, merely on the oral directions of the

High Court was admitted by the State before this Court. In such

circumstances, the decision of the State to resume the said land

was bad in law from its very inception and therefore, it was directed

that a fresh decision be taken by the State in the matter.

25. The civil appeal which was disposed of by the signed order,

did not arise out of a civil suit or arbitration proceedings where

parties are in dispute with respect to title over a piece of land and

where preservation of the subject matter of dispute is material.

Although several prayers have been made in the writ petition, the

subject matter of the writ petition before the High Court, as

reflected from the High Court’s order dated 24.09.2014 originally

disposing of the writ petition, and the order dated 19.04.2024 post-

restoration, was in a narrow compass for replenishing ‘gauchar

land’ in the village Navinal in terms of prayer clause (b) of the Writ

Petition. Under the said prayer, replenishment of gauchar land was

prayed to be done out of the land allocated to the Respondent in

2005 or by providing sufficient alternative land. As such, the

manner of replenishment of gauchar land was never decided and

23

even in the prayer, it is mentioned that such replenishment can be

done by resumption of the land allocated or by providing sufficient

alternative land. In such circumstances, there was no occasion for

this Court to grant an order of status quo over the land resumed

by the State without hearing the Respondent. Although the learned

counsel for the Applicants have not shown us any order of

maintaining status quo passed by the High Court, we have gone

through the orders of the High Court in the writ petition. It appears

that at no point of time, during the proceedings before the High

Court or before this Court, any direction of maintaining status quo

has been passed. When the order directing resumption of the land

in question was found to be illegal due to want of hearing, on the

admission of the State, there was no occasion for this Court to

direct maintenance of status quo over the land since it would be

an unreasonable restraint over the rights of the Respondent in

respect of the land which was resumed. Whether the

replenishment of gauchar land has to be done out of the land

allocated to the Respondent or by providing alternative land is a

matter for the State to decide. Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme

Court Rules quoted in paragraph 8 above permits correction of

errors arising from accidental slip or omission. Even if it is

24

assumed that the dictation of the draft order to the Court-master

is sufficient for the purpose of ‘pronouncement’ of the judgment,

grant of status quo over the land in question would be an error in

law and correction of the dictation by the Court in chambers, prior

to signing, cannot be said to be a material change which required

further hearing.

26. In view of the aforesaid, there is no material change which

has crept into the signed order. Differences between the dictation

and the signed order are a result of correction and enhancement

of the dictated draft order. The Respondent has placed reliance on

the judgment of this Court in Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit

(Supra) which although in the context of Section 362 of the CrPC,

does recognize that a judge may change their mind prior to signing

of the dictated order.

27. Another aspect of the matter is the question of practice and

practicality of making corrections in the draft prior to signing,

without making any material changes. The dictation given to the

Court-master on 27.01.2026 was a rough draft at best, since there

were multiple interruptions and corrections made in the dictation

itself. It was subject to correction and further enhancement in

25

chambers. The Applicants have placed reliance on a YouTube

video, which itself does not appear to be complete and it cuts out

while the Court is giving further directions to the Court-master in

respect of the dictation given. There is a distinction which must

necessarily be drawn between dictation of a draft order to the

Court-master and pronouncement of judgment in the matter.

Dictation given to the Court-master must be subject to correction

and enhancement by the Court in chambers. The intent behind

dictating a draft to the Court-master is to put the facts on record

and lay down the skeletal framework for the order, which may help

the judge recall the matter when the corrections and enhancement

in the order is made at a later stage. For all practical purposes, the

practice of dictating a skeletal draft order and enhancing it in

chambers with corrections and reasoning, prior to signing, which

is quite prevalent in this Court, has its own benefit in saving the

time of the Court, especially when the Court has a heavy docket of

71 matters listed on a miscellaneous day, which was the situation

on 27.01.2026. The practicalities of being a judge in India, with

docket explosion were noticed by a coordinate bench of this Court

in its recent judgment of Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors.

26

v. State of Gujarat and Ors.

8 where the judgment of Vinod

Kumar Singh (Supra) was distinguished.

“19. The situation presents us with an opportunity where

we feel it expedient to share our thoughts only for the

purpose of future guidance to overcome adversity. Having

regard to the demands of changing times, one of the

significant aspects of judging that has been at the forefront

of discussion in many a conference/conclave or legal circle

is the need for prompt ‘pronouncement of judgments’. Order

XX of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ordains that a

judgment can be pronounced, in an open court, either at

once or as soon thereafter as may be practicable on a future

day. Guided by the principles enshrined in Order XX,

number of learned Judges scrupulously follow the same.

Learned Judges do come across cases requiring short

orders which, in their assessment, may not consume

more than 15/20 minutes. These orders are generally

dictated in open court immediately after a hearing is

over. On the other hand, if in any given case the judgment

could justifiably be reserved after hearing of extensive

arguments, it would not be proper to criticize a learned

Judge if he dictates the judgment in open court

notwithstanding the length of time to be taken therefor. As

per the ordainment of Order XX, the learned Judge would

be perfectly justified in doing so. In such cases, it could

roughly take any time between 20 minutes to a couple

of/few hours or even more spilling over to the next day (in

rare cases) to accomplish the task. This approach could

result in the board (if it is heavy) getting choked and the

remaining cases on the board having slim chances of being

considered. As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of

invention. The necessity to strike a balance, in turn,

has led to an innovative approach (many a times

followed even by this Court) which, though not strictly

in tune with Order XX, has transitioned into a regular

practice by passage of time. This contemplates a rough

assessment made by a learned Judge of the time to be

taken for dictating a judgment after hearing in a matter is

8

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985.

27

concluded and if, in such assessment, it is likely to take

more than 20/25 minutes, the learned Judge proceeds to

pronounce the operative part together with the outcome

while expressing “reasons to/would follow” and then

concludes the exercise of pronouncing the final judgment by

providing the reasons as soon as possible thereafter.

Having regard to the exploding docket of a majority

of the high courts, learned Judges consider it wise

and prudent to make optimum use of judicial time by

not dictating lengthy judgments in court. This

practice, no doubt, seeks to serve a salutary purpose.

People unversed with the functioning of the judicial

system are perhaps unaware as to how development

of this practice has contributed to saving of precious

judicial time, which the learned Judges invariably

devote and utilize for hearing more cases that are on

board in the anxiety to consider and decide as many

cases as are possible during the scheduled working

orders. Burdened though with immense pressure of

work and brushing aside fatigue, which is quite likely

to develop, the learned Judges after retiring for the

day dictate the judgment in their court chambers or

in their residential offices either on the same day or

within a few days thereafter. The hearing having

concluded not too long back, the arguments remain

fresh in the mind of the learned Judges and it

becomes all the more easy to dictate the judgment.

While this approach without a doubt has its own benefits,

recent happenings leave us to lament that reasons for the

conclusion reached are being placed in the public domain

much too late, as in the case of Balaji Baliram

Mupade (supra) as well as this case. In an attempt to save

time to attend to as many cases as possible, certain learned

Judges unwittingly are contributing to justice being delayed

in given cases which, concomitantly, have been giving rise

to criticism of unpleasant flavours. Critics of such practice

(to pronounce the operative part with the outcome and to

provide the reasons later in detailed final judgments) could

and do legitimately argue in favour of reserving judgments

as required by the procedural laws if the particular case so

demands but as Judges, we know, reserving too many

judgments has its own pitfalls. Once the files pile up, it

becomes increasingly difficult to remember the minute

28

details of the case and the arguments advanced by the

parties in support of their respective cases which leads to a

shift to rely on the written notes of arguments. However, if

only written notes were enough, there would be no need of

oral hearing in court. Additionally, drawing from our

experience on the bench, we can safely say that inclination

of learned Judges to reserve judgments is invariably the

course adopted where cases involving complex and intricate

points of law do call upon learned Judges to craft well-

researched and well-reasoned judgments. That apart, there

are cases arising from recent enactments involving

questions of law not having arisen hitherto and

consequently such questions have never been answered.

Such categories of cases demand the high courts to lay

down the law in clear terms for comprehension of all

concerned. Obviously, this process is time consuming and

the time limit for delivering judgments by the high courts as

laid down in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, at times, is breached.

We have full trust and confidence in the learned Judges of

the high courts since they are well-equipped to tackle any

kind of pressure situation. However, while it would be

prudent to leave it to the learned Judges to pick any

one of the three options [(i) dictation of the judgment

in open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and

pronouncing it on a future day, or (iii) pronouncing

the operative part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed”

or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously

expressing that reasons would follow in a detailed

final judgment supporting such outcome], it would be

in the interest of justice if any learned Judge, who

prefers the third option (supra), makes the reasons

available in the public domain, preferably within 2

(two) days thereof but, in any case, not beyond 5 (five)

days to eliminate any kind of suspicion in the mind

of the party losing the legal battle. If the pressure of

work is such that in the assessment of the learned Judge

the reasons in support of the final judgment cannot be made

available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would be a better

option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate order

would have the effect of changing the status of the parties

or the subject matter of the lis, it would always be advisable

to stick to the course envisaged in Order XX. Since, the

fraternity of learned Judges of all the courts are interested

29

to preserve the dignity of the respective judicial institutions

with which they are associated, all learned Judges must be

mindful of the impact of their actions on the society at large.

Dealing with lakhs of litigation is no mean task, but at the

same time we must realize that instances do emerge leaving

absolutely no margin for error. It is our duty as Judges to

stand tall and rise to the challenge.”

28. The Court in the aforementioned judgment recognized that in

cases which require short orders to be passed, orders are dictated

after hearing, in Court itself. If a detailed order is to be passed, it

might have the effect of clogging the day’s court docket and in such

cases normally the orders are reserved or operative portion of the

order is dictated while observing that detailed reasons are to follow.

We are of the view that the draft order dictated in Court has to be

subject to corrections and enhancement, removal of any accidental

inclusions or exclusions due to inadvertence, prior to signing, if

not anything else, but out of practical requirements. Subject, of

course, to further hearing, in case material changes are being

made in the draft order. Such an interpretation is also borne out

from Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules discussed

above, even if it is assumed that such dictation were to be

tantamount to ‘pronouncement’. The distinction between a draft

and the judgment of the Court was clarified by Vivian Bose, J in

30

the judgment of Surendra Singh v. State of U.P.,

9 which in fact

was the basis of this Court’s judgment in Vinod Kumar Singh

(Supra). He observed as follows:

“10. In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these

sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the

parties and to the world at large by formal

“pronouncement” or “delivery” in open court . It is a

judicial act which must be performed in a judicial

way. Small irregularities in the manner of

pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter

but the substance of the thing must be there : that can

neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture

nor can it be vague. All the rest—the manner in which it

is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated,

the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure

certainty about its content and matter—can be cured; but

not the hard core, namely, the formal intimation of the

decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way

in open court. The exact way in which this is done does not

matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or

read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced,

in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to

the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given

number of days for inspection.

11. An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the

decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a

declaration of the mind of the court as it is at the time of

pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of

delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it

must be done in a judicial way in open court. But however

it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the

court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is

the first judicial act touching the judgment which the court

performs after the hearing. Everything else uptil then is

done out of court and is not intended to be the operative act

9

(1953) 2 SCC 468.

31

which sets all the consequences which follow on the

judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss

the matter among themselves and reach a tentative

conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may

write and exchange drafts. Those are not the

judgments either, however heavily and often they may

have been signed. The final operative act is that

which is formally declared in open court with the

intention of making it the operative decision of the

court. That is what constitutes the “judgment”.

12. Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered,

the Judges have the right to change their mind. There

is a sort of locus poenitentiae, and indeed last minute

alterations often do occur. Therefore, however, much a draft

judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing

but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the

court. Only then does it crystallise into a full-fledged

judgment and become operative. It follows that the Judge

who “delivers” the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by

a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the

court at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary,

stop the delivery and say that he has changed his mind.

There is no need for him to be physically present in the court

but he must be in existence as a member of the court and

be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration

should there be any last minute change of mind on his part.

If he hands in a draft and signs it and indicates that he

intends that to be the final expository of his views it can be

assumed that those are still his views at the moment of

delivery if he is alive and in a position to change his mind

but takes no steps to arrest delivery. But one cannot assume

that he would not have changed his mind if he is no longer

in a position to do so. A Judge's responsibility is heavy and

when a man's life and liberty hang upon his decision

nothing can be left to chance or doubt or conjecture; also, a

question of public policy is involved. As we have indicated,

it is frequently the practice to send a draft, sometimes a

signed draft, to a brother Judge who also heard the case.

This may be merely for his information, or for consideration

and criticism. The mere signing of the draft does not

necessarily indicate a closed mind. We feel it would be

against public policy to leave the door open for an

32

investigation whether a draft sent by a Judge was

intended to embody his final and unalterable opinion

or was only intended to be a tentative draft sent with

an unwritten understanding that he is free to change

his mind should fresh light dawn upon him before the

delivery of judgment.”

29. The intent of the judge while making the dictation, therefore,

becomes material. The Court might dictate a draft to keep the facts

fresh in the mind and the draft so dictated then becomes final only

after signing, subject to corrections and alterations which do not

amount to a material change in the order. The signed order is what

embodies the final unalterable opinion of the Court, it is the only

version of the Court’s order which is reached after multiple rounds

of correction after dictation in Court. This practice, born out of

necessity, is not only in line with Order XII of the Supreme Court

Rules, but also acknowledged in the judgment of UP Housing

(Supra) where this Court had observed that an order dictated in

open Court can be altered and changed so long as no material

changes are being made in the order, at which stage re-hearing

would be required.

30. In such view of the matter, this miscellaneous application

deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable and also on merits.

33

31. In light of the frivolity of the application, the nature of

pleadings made and the attempt to undermine the authority of this

Court, symbolic and exemplary cost of ₹2000 each is imposed on

the Applicants, payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services

Committee, to be deposited within four weeks from the date of this

order.

….…..………………………….J.

(J.K. MAHESHWARI)

….…..………………………….J.

(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 12, 2026.