1059

FAKIRBHAI FUl.ABHAI SOLANKI

v.

PRESIDING OFFICER & ANR.

MAY 8, 1986

[E,S. VENKATARAMIAH AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ,]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 : s.33(3) -Subsistence

~allowance -Denial of -whether violates principles of natural

justice -Whether vitiates proceedings before the Tribunal •

._ Suspension from service -Whether puts an end to

relationship of master and servant -Right to subsistence

A

B

-t-allowance -Whether to be read into the Standing Orders. C

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1 Administrative Law.

Labour disputes: Dismissal -Non-payment of Subsistence

allowance for the period of suspension -Whether violation of

principles of natural justice/reasonable opportunity to

defend.

Sub-section (3) of s.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act,

,Al 1947 provides that no employer shall, during the pendency of

any proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take

action against any protected workman concerned (a) by

altering, to his prejudice the conditions of service appli­

cable to him i1111ediately before the colmlll!!ncement of such

proceedings, or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by

•· t dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the

express permission in writing of the authority before which

-~ the proceeding is pending.

The appellant, a protected workman, was found guilty

after a disciplinary enquiry of the act of misconduct alleged

to have been comf.tted by him. The management made an

application before the Industrial Tribunal under sub-s.(3) of

s. 33 of the Act for peraission to dismiss him. lie was,

-ti' however, suspended froa service with effect from August 13,

i 1979 pending disposal of the application but without any wages

or allowances. The appellant thereupon filed a complaint

before the Tribunal under s. 33A of the Act alleg~ng violation

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1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.

of s.33 by the management. In the standing orders governing

the appell1nt there was no provision for payment of any sub-

sistence allowance during the pendency of an application under

s.33(3), The Tribunal while disposing of both the applications

granted permission

to the management to dismiss the appellant

from service.

In these appeals by special leave it

was contended for

the appellant that the permission accorded to the management ~

was vitiated as· the non-payment of subsistence allowance had

resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant

to defend himself effectively before the Tribunal in the

proceedings under s.33(3) of the Act.

Allowing the appeal, the Court, i

HELD: l, The work.man against whom an application is made ,~

under s.33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 should be

paid reasonable amount by way of subsistence allowance to

enable him to maintain himself and the members of his family,

and also to meet the expenses of litigation before the

Tribunal.

If no

amount is paid during the pendency of such an

application, the work.man concerned can be said to have been

denied a reasonable opportunity

to defend himself in the

JI,

proceedings before the Tribunal. Such denial leads to viola­

tion of the principles of natural justice and consequently

vitiates the proceedings before the Tribunal and any decision

given

in those proceedings against the workman concerned. [1066 B-0]

i .

2, A workman does not cease to be a work.man until the

Tribunal grants permission under s.33(3) of the Act to dismiss L

him and the management does so pursuant to such permission. T

[1065 B-C]

An order of suspension by itself does not put an end to

the e!lployment. The work.man continues to be an employee during

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the period of suspension. Though such an order prevents the

employee from rendering his services bUt that dbes not put an ~

end to the relationship of master and servant between the 'r

management and the work.man. [1065 C-D]

)fmU!g •t of Hotel hperia1 v. Hotel Workers' Union,

[1960] 1 SCR 476 and lanipar Colliery v. lbusban Si.Dgh & On.,

1959 LLJ Vol.II 231 distinguished.

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FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER 1061

State of Maharashtra v. Oiandrabban Tale, (1983] 2 SCR

>f 387 and Iba Qiaad v. i.rl.on of India, (1963] Supp. 1 SCR 229

referred to.

3, If the order passed at the conclusion of a domestic

enquiry is only one of suspension (even though the management

has decided to dismiss him) where the workman has a chance of

being

reinstated with back wages on the permission being

refused under s.33(3) of the

Act, it cannot be said that the

•workman is not entitled to any monetary·relief at all. In such

a case the

right of the workman to receive some reasonable &S>Unt, which may be fixed either by the standing orders or in

the absence of any standing order by the authority before

which the application is pending by way of subsistence

-t-allowance during the pendency of the application under s.33(3)

of

the

Act, with effect from the date of suspension should be

-I implied as a term of the contract of employment. (1070 I>-F]

4. The case fall:tng under s.33(1) of the Act is not in

any way different from a case falling under sub-s.(3) of s.33

and in both these cases previous permission of the authority

concerned should

be obtained before any action is taken

against the

workman concerned. In a case where the proceedings

are c011pleted and the order of dismissal is successfully

~ challenged on the ground of non-paYJl!llt of subsistence

allowance

for the period of suspension during.the pendency of

the application under s.33(1) or s.33(3) of the

Act, it shall

be open to the management to ask for the permission of the

authority again under

s. 33(1) or s.33(3) of the Act after

t

paying or offering to pay to the workman concerned within a

~ reasonable time to be fixed by the authority the arrears of

subsistence allowance. (1071 A-D]

~ In the instant case, no material has been placed before

the Court

to show that the appellant had sufficient

means to

defend himelf before the Tribunal. He has not been paid even

the barest subsistence allowance during the pendency of the

application under s.33(3) of the Act.

Having regard to the circumstances of the case, grant of an opportunity to the

management to apply for pend.ssion again under s.33(3) of the

i Act is declined. The punishment of dismissal i111>osed on the

appellant appears

to be excessive.

The order/award of the

Tribunal

is set aside.

The application 118de by the management

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1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.

under s.33(3) of the Act is dismissed, and the complaint filed

by the appellant under s.33A of the Act accepted. The

management is directed to reinstate the appellant in service

with effect from the date of suspension and to pay him all the

wages and allowances, as if there was no break in the

continuity of his service. (1066 D-E; 1071 D-F]

CIVIL APPELIATE JURISDICTION : Civil

546(NL) of 1986,

Appeal Nos. 545-

From the Award dated 5.8.1985 of the Industrial Tribunal

at Gujarat in complaint No, (IT) 124 of 1979 and application

(IT) No. 88 of 1979 in reference (IT) No. 434 of 1978.

A.K. Goel for the Appellant. +

P.H. Parekh and Uday Lalit for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Vl!NKATARAMIAH, J. These two appeals by special leave are , ...

filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against

the Order/Award dated 5.8.1985 in Application (IT) No. 88 of

1979 and Complaint (IT) No. 124 of 1979 in Reference (IT) No.

434 of 1978 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat by~

the appellant Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki against the Manage-

ment of the Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd., Baroda.

During the pendency of a referen~e made under the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the i,

Act') to the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat the management

served a charge-sheet on the appellant who was one of the

workmen working in the factory belonging to the management of ~

the Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd., Baroda asking him to show

cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him

for an alleged Act of misconduct said to have been committed

by him on July 12, 1979. The act of misconduct attributed to

the appellant was that he was playing cards along with two

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other workmen during the working hours of the factory. It was '..

alleged that the appellant had given a letter addressed to 'r

Shrl R.A. Desai, Manager, Industrial Relations, Alembic Chemi-

cal Works Co. Ltd. admitting his guilt and tendering apology.

The disciplinary enquiry was held against all the three work-

FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER [VENKATARA.ll!IAH, J,) 1063

f men including the appellant. At the conclusion of the enquiry

the appellant

was found guilty of the act of misconduct

alleged to have been

conmitted by him by the Inquiry Officer

Shri J.N. Patel, Director (Manufacturing) of the Alembic

Chemical Works Co. Ltd. and it was decided by the management

to dismiss him but because the appellant was a protected work­

man as defined in the Explanation to sub-section (3) of sec­

tion 33 of the Act and the permission of the Tribunal had to

ibe obtained before dismissing lliin as required by sub-section

(3) of section 33 of the Act, the management made an applica­

tion (IT) No. 88 of 1979 before the Tribunal for such permis­

sion. The appellant was, however, suspended from service with

effect from 13. 8.1979 pending disposal of the application

+before the Tribunal after he had been found guilty at the

domestic enquiry but without

any wages or allowances. The -1appellant also filed an application before the Tribunal under

section 33A of the Act complaining violation of section 33 of

the Act by the management. The complaint of the appellant was

registered as Complaint (IT) NO. 124 of 1979 in Reference (IT)

No. 434 of 1978. Both, the application under section 33(3) of

the

Act and the complaint under section 33 A of the Act,

were

filed in the year 1979. The Tribunal was able to dispose of

them finally only on August 5, 1985. The Tribunal granted

..., permission to the management to dismiss the appe Hant and

rejected the complaint filed by him. Aggrieved by the said

decision of the Tribunal the appellant has filed these two

appeals.

In the Standing Orders governir.g the appellant there was

· ~no provision for payment of any subsistence allowance (either

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the whole of the allowance which the workman was entitled to F

jdraw or a part thereof) during the pendency of an application

)made by the management under section 33(3) of the Act for

permission to dismiss protected workman. Admittedly the

appellant was not paid any allowance from 13.8.1979 to August

5, 1985 on which date the Tribunal accorded its permission to

the management to dismiss him from service. G

,) In these appeals the learned counse 1 for the appellant

'(has confined his submission to the effect of non-payment of

any subsistence allowance on the decision of the Tribunal

under

section 33(3) of the Act. It is urged by the learned

counsel

for the appellant that since the appellant was denied

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1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.

the subsistence allowance it was not possible for him to ·t

defend himself effectively before the Tribunal in the

proceedings relating to the permission prayed for by the

management under section 33(3) of the Act and, therefore, the

permission accorded by the Tribunal was vitiated. In support

of his case he has relled upon the decision of this Court in

State of Maharashtra v. lllandrabhan Tale, [1983] 2 s.c.c.

387. In that case the respondent Chandrabhan Tale was a

Government

servant.

He was convicted and sentenced to~.

imprisonment by the Trial Court in a criminal case. He filed

an appeal against his conviction and sentence and remained on

bail throughout without undergoing the sentence of

imprisonment. He was, however, kept under suspension pending

trial of the criminal case and was paid normal subsistencef

allowance under the main rule 21 of the Bombay Civil Services

Rules, 1959 from the ·date of his suspension until the date on~

which he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the

Trial Court. But from the date of his conviction the

subsistence allowance was reduced to the nominal sum of Re.I

per month under the second proviso to rule 15(1) (ii )(b) of the

Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959. The order reducing his

subsistence allowance was questioned in this Court in the

above case. The Court held that the second proviso to rule

15(l)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 which._

directed the reduction of the subsistence allowance to Re. I

per month was unreasonable and void. The Court further held

that a. civil servant under suspension was entitled to the

normal subsistence allowance even after his conviction by the

Trial Court pending consid~ration of his appeal filed against

his conviction until the appeal was disposed of finally one-f •

way or the other, whether he was on bail or lodged in prison

on conviction by the Trial Court. Relying upon the above deci:~

sion the learned counsel for the appellant contended that(

there was denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to

defend himself before the Tribunal in the proceedings initiat­

ed by the application made under section 33(3) of the Act.

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Sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Act provides that

notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) thereof '-.

no employer shall during the pendency. of any such proceeding)'

in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against

any protected workman concerned in such dispute -(a) by

FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 1065

altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the

f conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the

co111Dencement of such proceedings; or (b) by discharging or

punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected

workman, save with the express permission in writing of the

authority before which the proeeeding is pending. It follows

from the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33 of the

Act that the workman does not cease to be a w~rkman until the

Tribunal

grants permission to dismiss the workman and the ,,. management dismisses the workman pursuant to such permission.

t

An order of suspension by itself does not put an end to the

employment. The workman continues to be an employee during the

period of suspension

and it is for this

raason ordinarily the

various standing orders

l.n force in several factories and

industrial establishments provide for payment of subsistence

allowance which is

normally less than the usual salary and

~ allowance that are paid to the workman concerned. An order of

suspension

no doubt prevents the employee from rendering his

service but it does not put an end to the relationship of

master and

servant between the management and the workman.

When an applicaton is made under section 33(3) of the

Act the

workman is entitled to defend himself before the Tribunal. In

those proceedings it is open to him to show that the domestic

enquiry held

against him was not in accordance with law and _.. principles of natural justice and the action proposed to be

taken against him by the management is unjust and should not

be permitted.

Sometimes it may be necessary to either of the

parties to lead evidence even before the Tribunal. The

proceedings before the Tribunal

very-often take a long time to

, i come to an end. In this very case the proceedings were pending

before the Tribunal

for nearly six years. Most of the workmen

are not in a position to maintain themselves and the members j_ of their families during the pendency of such proceedings. In

i addition to the cost of maintenance of his family the workman

has to find money to meet the expenses that he has to incur in

connection with the proceedings pending before the Tribunal.

In this case the appellant was in receipt of salary and

allowances till the end of the disciplinary enquiry. But from

.> 13.8.1979 he was not paid even the barest subsistence

allowance

till August 5, 1985 when the

Tribunal passed its

1 order/award on the application of the management and the

complaint of the

appellant. It is true that in the instant

case the Tribunal granted the application of the management

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1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 S.C.R.

and rejected the complaint of the appellant. It was also quite

possible that the Tribunal could have rejected the application _.

of the management and upheld the complaint of the appellant in

which case the appellant would have been entitled to continue

to be an employee under the management of the factory and the

disciplinary enquiry held aginst him would have had no effect

at all. Because it is difficult to anticipate the result of

the

application made before the Tribunal it is reasonable to

hold that the workman against whom the application ls made

should be paid some amount by way of subsistence allowance to

~

enable him to maintain hi!llself and the members of his family

and

also to meet the expenses of the litigation before the

Tribunal. And if no

al!k)unt is paid during the pendency of such

an

application it has to be held that the workman concerned

has been denied a reasonable opportunity

to defend himself in

·i­

the proceedings before the Tribunal. Such denial leads to

violation of principles of natural justice and consequently t

vitiates the proceedings before the Tribunal under sub-section

(3) of section 33 of the Act and any decision given in those

proceedings

against the

worklllan concerned. No material has

been placed bef or~ us in this case to show that the appellant

had sufficient means to defend himself before the Tribunal.

The learned counsel for the management however relied

upon the decision of this Court in the Management of Hotel "

Imperial, New Delhi & Ors. v. Hotel Workers' Union, [1960] 1

S.C.R. 476. In that case this Court was mainly concerned with

the right of the management to suspend a workman where the

management had taken a decision to dismiss him but could not

immediately give

effect to such decision owing to the restric­

tion imposed by section 33(1) of the Act which required the

f'

management to obtain the perlllission of the Tribunal when a

reference was pending adjudication before it. In that case I,.

this Court observed at pages 485, 488-489 thus: (

''We have, therefore, to see whether it would be

reasonable for an Industrial Tribunal where it is

dealing with a case to which section 33 of the Act

applies, to imply a term in the contract giving

power to the naster to suspend a servant when the

master has come to the conclusion after necessary

enquiry

that the servant has

conmdtted misconduct

and ought to be dismissed, but cannot do sq because

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FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER [VENKATARAMIAH, J,] 1067

of section 33. It is urged on behalf of the

f respondents that there is nothing in the language

of

section 33 to warrant the conclusion that when

an employer has to apply under it for permission he

can suspend the

workmen concerned. This argument,

however, begs

the question because i.f there were

any such provision in s. 33, it would be an express

provision

in the statute authorising such

suspension

and no further question of an implied

term

would arise. What we have to see is whether in

the absence of an express provision to that effect

in s. 33, it will be reasonable for an Industrial

Tribunal in these extraordinary circumstances

arising out of the effect of s. 33 to imply a term

in the contract giving power to the employer to

suspend the contract of employment, thus relieving

himself of the obligation to pay wages and

relieving the servant of the corresponding

obligation to render service. We are of opinion

that in the peculiar circumstances which have

arisen on account of the enactment of s. 33, it is

but just and fair that Industrial Tribunals should

imply such a term

in the contract of

employment

••••••••••••••••••

We are, therefore, of opinion that the

ordinary law of master and servant as to suspension

can be

and should be held to have been modified in

view of the fundamental change introduced by s. 33 in that law and a term should bE! implied for

Industrial Tribunals in the contract of employment

that if the master has held a proper enquiry and

come to the conclusion that the servant should be

dismissed and in consequence suspends him pending

the permission

required under s.

33 he has the

power to order such suspension, thus suspending the

contract of employment temporarily, so that there

is no obligation on him to pay wages and no

obligation on the servant to work. In dealing with

this point the basic and decisive consideration

introduced by s. 33 Olis t be borne in mind. The

undisputed COlllBOn law right of the master to

dismiss his servant for proper cause has been

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1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 S.C.R.

subjected by s. 33 to a ban; and that in fairness

llllSt mean that, pending the removal of the said-+

statutory ban, the master can after holding a

proper enquiry

temporarily terminate the relation­

ship of master and servant by suspending his

employee pending proceedings under s. 33. It

follows therefore that if the tribunal grants

permission, the suspended contract would come to an

end

and there will be no further obligation to pay

any

wages after the date of suspension. If, on

the"'

other hand, the permission is refused, the

suspension would be wrong and the workmen would be

entitled to all his wages from the date of

suspension."

i

In the above decision it was laid down that the manage-t

ment should be deemed to possess the power to suspend an

employee

in respect of whom a decision had been taken to

dismiss him but an application for permission had to be filed

until the application for permission was decided. The Court in

giving the above decision also relied on an earlier decision

~

of the Court in Ranipur Colliery v. l!huban Singh & Ors.,

[ 1959] L. L. J. Vol. II 231. In that case it was pointed out

that but for the ban on the employer by section 33(1) the

employer would have been entitled to dismiss the employee~

immediately after the completion of his enquiry on coming to

the conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct but

section 33 stepped in and stopped the employer from dismissing <II

the employees immediately on the conclusion of his enquiry and

compelled

him to seek permission of the Tribunal.. It

was,f,

therefore, held that it was reasonable that the employer

having done

all that he could do to bring the contract of

service to an end should not be expected

t..l continue payingJ

the employee thereafter. It was pointed out that in such a

case the employer would be justified in suspending the

employee without pay as the time taken by the Tribunal to

accord permission under section 33 of the Act was beyond the

control of the employer. Lastly, it was observed that this

would not cause any hardship to the employee for if the ~

Tribunal granted permission the employee would not get anyth-

ing from the date of his suspension without pay while if the Y

permission was refused he would be entitled to his back wages

from such date.

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FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 1069

f But in neither of the above two decisions the Court

considered the question from the angle from which we have

approached the problem.

In neither of them the Court had the

occasion to consider whether the

denial of payment of

subsistence allowance during the pendency of the proceedings

under

section 33(3) of the

Act would amount to violation of

principles of natural justice. They approached the question

from the angle of the common law right of a master to keep a

• workman under suspension either during the pendency of a

dom=stic enquiry into an act of misconduct alleged to have

been committed

by a workman or during the pendency of an

application under section 33 of the

Act. Those were perhaps

halcyon days when such applications were being disposed of

t

quickly. If the Court had rea Used that such applications

would take nearly six years as it has happened in this case

i thel.r view would have been different. An unscrupulous

management may by all possible means delay the proceedings so

that the workman may be driven to accept its terms instead of

defending himself

in the proceedings under section 33(3) of

the

Act. To expect an ordinary workman to wait for such a long

time

in these days is to expect something which is very

unusual

to happen. Denial of payment of atleast a small amount

by way of subsistence allowance would amount to gross

unfairness.

~

Apart from the violation of the principles of natural

justice, the very concept of the relationship of master and

servant has undergone a sea-change since the date on which

Hotel 1-perial's case (supra) was decided. We have pointed out

that in that case this Court recognised the power of suspen­

sion without pay vested in the management after it had decided

to dismiss an employee where it had to make an application for

permission under section 33(1) of the Act. The case falling

under sectior. 33(1) of the Act is not in any way different

from a case falling under sub-section (3) of section 33 and in

both these cases previous permission of the authority concern­

ed should be obtained before any action is taken against the

workman concerned unlike a case falling under section 33(2)(b)

of the

Act

where only its approval to an action already taken

is required to be sought. This Court further observed in the

above decision

that the management could relieve itself of the

obligation to pay wages during the period of such suspension.

Now

what is the effect of suspension? Does it put an end to

the relationship of master and servant altogether? It does

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1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.

not. This Court has in its subsequent decision in Kliem Clland

v. Union of India, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 229, at pages 236-237 ~

observed thus :

"An order of suspension of a government servant

does not put an end to his service under the

Government. He continues to be a member of the

service in spite of the order of suspension ••••

The real effect of the order of suspension is that +

though he continued to be a member of the

Government service he was not permitted to work,

and

further, during

che period of his suspension he

was paid only some allowance - generally called

"subsistence allowance" -which is normally less t

than his salary -instead of the pay and allowances

he would have been entitled to if he had not been ~

suspended. There is no doubt that the order of

suspension affects a government servant

injuriously. 'fllere is no basis for thinking however

that because of the order of suspension he ceases

to be a member of the service."

If the order passed at the conclusion of domestic enquiry

is only one of suspension (even though the management has

decided to dismiss him) where the workman has a chance of

being reinstated with back wages on the permission being

refused under section 33(3) of the Act, it cannot be said that

the workman is not entitled to any monetary relief at all. In

such a case the right of the workman to receive some

reasonable amount which may be fixed either by the Standing

Orders or in the absence of any Standing Order by the

authority before which the application is pending by way of

subsistence allowance during the pendency of the application f

under section 33(3) of the Act with effect from the date of

suspension should be implied as a term of the contract of

employment having regard to the observat tons made in Kbea

Chand's case (supra). In the two earlier decisions referred to

above this aspect of the matter has not been considered.

It is likely that in some cases filed under section 33(1) r

or section 33(3) of the Act (which are 'permission' clauses

and not 'approval' clauses) pending before any authority, the

management may not be payl.ng any subsistence allowance to the

workman concerned. We, therefore, clarify that in such cases

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FAKIRBHAI v. PRESIDING OFFICER [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 1071

it shall be open to the management to pay within a reasonable

t time to be fixed by the authority, the subsistence allowance

for the period during which the workman is kept under

suspension without wages and to continue the proceedings. Such

subsistence allowance shall be the amount flxed under the

Standing Orders, if any, which the management is H.able to pay

to the workman if he is kept under suspension during the

pendency of such application or in the absence of any such

Standing Order

by the authrity before which such application ~ls pending. In a case where the proceedings are completed and

the order of dismissal ts successfully challenged on the

ground of non-payment of subsistence allowance for the period

of suspension during the pendency of the application under

j_ section 33(1) or section 33(3) of the Act it shall be open to

r the management to ask for the permission of the authority

'+again under section 33(1) or section 33(3) of the Act after

paying or offering to pay to the workman concerned within a

reasonable time to be fixed by the authority concerned the

arrears of subsistence allowance at the rate stated above. But

in the instant case however having regard to the circumstances

of this case we do not wish to grant any such opportunity to

the management to apply for permission again under section

33(3) of the Act. On facts we are of the view that the punish­

ment of dismissal imposed in this case on the appellant

r appears to be excessive but our decision however is not based

on

this ground.

We, therefore, set aside the order/award of the Tribunal

and dismiss the application made by the management under , 1 section 33(3) of the Act. We accept the complaint filed by the

appellant under section 33A of the Act. The management is

directed to reinstate the appellant in its service and to pay

fhim all the wages and allowances due to him from August 13,

, 1979 as if there was no break in the continuity of his

service. The appeals are accordingly allowed •rlth costs.

P. S.S.

Appeals allowed.

A

B

c

D

E

F

G