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FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD.

v.

THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

GREATER MUMBAI & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos.9064-9065 of 2018)

SEPTEMBER 27, 2018

[KURIAN JOSEPH AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]

Right to Information Act, 2005 – ss. 6(1), 8(1)(d), 8(1)(j)

and 9 – Information regarding the plans submitted to public

authorities by a developer of a project – Disclosure of – A

development agreement was executed between respondent no.3 and

appellant for carrying out development on a property – Dispute

arose between the parties – Respondent no.3 filed application u/

s.6(1) of the Act before the Public Information Officer (PIO) and

sought information regarding development plans submitted by the

appellant – Information was declined by PIO – First Appellate

Authority partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent no.3,

by disclosing information regarding one question only out of five

questions – However, respondent no.3 succeeded in second appeal

– Aggrieved, writ petition was filed by the appellant and same was

dismissed – On appeal, held: There was no ‘personal information’

of which disclosure was sought – It cannot be said that information

sought had no relation to public activity or interest, or that it was

unwarranted, or there was an invasion of privacy – The provisions

of sub-section (3) of s.11 of RERA, mandatorily required the

developer to display sanction plan/layout plans along with

specifications, approved by the competent authority at the site or

such other places, as may be specified by the Regulations made by

the Authority – That respondent no.3 was the administrator of the

property in question and that did not reduce his rights as opposed

to anyone, including a flat buyer – Costs of Rs.2.50 lakhs imposed

on appellant – Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

– s.11(3) – Copyright Act, 1957 – ss.52(1)(f) and 22 – Evidence

Act, 1872 – s.74.

 [2018] 12 S.C.R. 244

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Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 11 of the Real Estate (Regulation and

Development) Act, 2016, provides the functions and duties of

promoters. The duties are more elaborate, as under Section 11(1)

of the RERA the promoter has to create his web page on the

website of the Authority and enter all details of the proposed

project as provided under sub-section (2) of section 4, in all the

fields as provided, for public viewing. The promoter, in terms of

sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the RERA is required to make

available to the allottee information about sanctioned plans,

layout plans along with specifications, approved by the

competent authority, by display at the site or such other place as

may be specified by the Regulations made by the Authority. The

object is clearly to bring greater transparency. [Para 22]

[258-C-E]

2. The fate of purchase of land development and

investments is a matter of public knowledge and debate. Any

judicial pronouncement must squarely weigh in favour of the

fullest disclosure, in this behalf. In fact, the Division Bench of

the Madras High Court in Dr. V.I. Mathan & Ors. vs. Corporation

of Chennai & Ors. opined that though the Chennai Metropolitan

Development Authority mandated plans to be displayed at the

site and also be made available on the website, the same

principle should apply to the Corporation for all other sanctioned

plans and, thus, issued directions for display of the plans on the

website of the Corporation, and at the site, with clear

visibility. This was just prior to the RERA coming into force.

[Para 23] [258-E-G]

3. In the aforesaid circumstances, even by a test of public

interest, it can hardly be said that the same would not apply in

matters of full disclosure of information of development plans to

all and everyone. If one turns to the provisions of Section 8 of

the said Act and the clauses under which the exception is sought,

clause (d) deals with information relating to commercial

confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, which has the

potentiality to harm the competitive position of a third party.

Firstly, the definition of a third party under Section 2(n) of the

said Act means a person other than a citizen requesting for

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information to a public authority. Under Section 11 of the said

Act, the third party has a right to be heard and to object to the

disclosure of information. The disclosure of plans, which are

required to be in public domain, whether under the repealed Act

or RERA, can hardly be said to be matters of commercial

confidence or trade secrets. In fact, ex facie, these terms would

not apply to the matter at hand. Similarly, insofar as the

intellectual property is concerned, the preparation of the plan

and its designs may give rise to the copyright in favour of a

particular person, but the disclosure of that work would not

amount to an infringement and, in fact, Section 52(1)(f) of the

Copyright Act, 1957 specifically provides that there would be no

such infringement if there is reproduction of any work in a

certified copy made or supplied in accordance with any law for

the time being in force. This is what is exactly sought for by

respondent No.3 – certified copies of the approved plans and its

modifications, from the public authority, being the Corporation.

Also, section 22 of the said Act provides for an overriding effect

with a notwithstanding clause qua any inconsistency with any other

Act. The aforesaid provision would not imply that a disclosure

permissible under the Copyright Act, 1957 is taken away under

the provisions of the said Act, but rather, if a disclosure is

prescribed under any other Act, the provisions of the said Act

would have an overriding effect. [Paras 24, 25][258-G-H;

259-A-E]

4. Similarly, clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the

said Act ex facie would have no relevance. There is no ‘personal

information’ of which disclosure is sought. Further it cannot be

said that it has no relation to public activity or interest, or that it

is unwarranted, or there is an invasion of privacy. These are

documents filed before public authorities, required to be put in

public domain, by the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership

Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale,

Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 and the RERA, and involves

a public element of making builders accountable to one and all.

That respondent No.3, in fact, happens to be the administrator of

the property in question, which will certainly not reduce his rights

as opposed to anyone else, including a flat buyer. [Para 26]

[259-G-H; 260-A-B]

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5. Keeping in mind the provisions of RERA and their

objective, the developer should mandatorily display at the site

the sanction plan. The provision of sub-section (3) of Section 11

of the RERA require the sanction plan/layout plans along with

specifications, approved by the competent authority, to be

displayed at the site or such other places, as may be specified by

the Regulations made by the Authority. Keeping in mind the

ground reality of rampant violations and the consequences

thereof, it is advisable to issue directions for display of such

sanction plan/layout plans at the site, apart from any other

manner provided by the Regulations made by the Authority. This

aspect should be given appropriate publicity as part of

enforcement of RERA. [Para 34] [261-E-F]

Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ferani Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors.

(Decision dated 08.04.2015 in CA No.3396/2015 of

Bombay High Court) ; Thalappalam Service

Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.

(2013) 16 SCC 82 : [2013] 14 SCR 475 ; Dr. V.I. Mathan

& Ors. v. Corporation of Chennai & Ors.

(Decision dated 22.03.2016 in WP No.4057/2016 of

Madras High Court) ; Reliance Industries Ltd. v.

Gujarat State Information Commission & Ors.

AIR 2007 Gujarat 203 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2013] 14 SCR 475 referred to Para 13

AIR 2007 Gujarat 203 referred to Para 28

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 9064-

9065 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.2015 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (L) No.1806 of 2015 and Writ

Petition No.789 of 2015 respectively.

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Gopal  Jain, Sr. Advs., Abhimanyu Bhandari,

Vivek Vashi, Ms. Roohina Dua, Ms. Aliya Khan, Naveen Kumar, Advs.

for the Appellant.

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

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Gourab Banerji, Sr. Adv., Rohan Kelkar, Ms. Nandini Gore,

Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Ms. Natasha S., Ms. Khushboo Bari, Arjun

Sharma, Mandeep  Kalra, Jasvir Singh, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala

(for M/s Karanjawala & Co.), Mrs.Suchitra Atul Chitale, Gurjyot Sethi,

Advs. for the Respondents.

 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 1. The present appeal raises the

issue of disclosure under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘said Act’), seeking information regarding the plans

submitted to public authorities by a developer of a project.

2.  Late Shri E.F. Dinshaw was the owner of three plots in Malad

(West), Mumbai and Mr. Nusli Neville Wadia/respondent No.3 is the

sole administrator of the estate and effects of late Shri E.F. Dinshaw.  It

may be noted that there is litigation pending qua the functioning of

respondent No.3 as an administrator, but it is not in doubt that at present,

there is no interdict against him in performing his role as the sole

administrator.  A Development Agreement dated 2.1.1995 was executed

inter se respondent No.3 and Ferani Hotels Private Limited /appellant

for carrying out the development on the said three plots.This

Agreement was coupled with an irrevocable Power of Attorney

executed by respondent No.3 in favour of the appellant. However,

disputes are stated to have arisen between the parties some time in the

year 2008.

3. As a consequence of the disputes having arisen, respondent

No.3 is stated to have terminated the Power of Attorney and the

Development Agreement on 12.5.2008 and, on the very next day, Suit

No.1628/2008 was filed by respondent No.3 for inter alia declaration

that the said Power of Attorney and the Development Agreement had

been validly terminated.  Interim relief, pending consideration of the suit,

qua further construction and demolition was also sought.

4. The question of grant of interim relief has also had a chequered

history.  The interim relief was originally granted by learned Single Judge

of the Bombay High Court vide order dated 19.7.2010, limited to the

extent of restraining the appellant from putting any party in possession

of any constructed premises, except with the approval of respondent

No.3, during the pendency of the suit.  This order was assailed before

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the Division Bench, which initially stayed the interim order on 26.7.2010,

and finally vacated it on 19.7.2012, calling upon the learned Single Judge

to first consider the issue as to whether the suit was within time.  The

order of the Division Bench was assailed before this Court, in Nusli

Neville Wadia vs. Ferani Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors.,

1

 where the legal

issue raised related to the local amendment in Maharashtra, to the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Code’),

whereby Section 9A was inserted.  Section 9 of the said Code mandates

trial of suits of civil nature excepting suits in which their cognizance is

either expressly or impliedly barred.  In terms of Section 9A,

notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, or any other law

for the time being in force, in case of an objection being raised as to the

jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit, the Court is mandated to

proceed to determine the same as a preliminary issue, before

proceeding with the question of granting or setting aside of an interim

order.  It is the interpretation of this provision, which received the

attention of the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed in this

Court, against the order of the Division Bench.  In terms of the order

dated 8.4.2015, it was held that Section 9A, introduced as the

Maharashtra Amendment, was mandatory in nature.

5. The aforesaid proceedings are relevant for the present case

only for limited purposes, since we are only concerned, herein, with an

application under the provisions of the said Act.  In the application for

interim relief filed before the learned Single Judge, one of the prayers

made was for disclosure of a set of documents, as sought for by the

counsel for respondent No.3 vide letter dated 29.3.2012, which the

counsel for the appellant had refused to disclose.  However, neither in

the adjudication before the learned Single Judge, nor before the Division

Bench, nor before this Court, was this aspect discussed at all, even

though this relief had been claimed throughout.  The adjudication,

instead, rested on the issue of the provisions of Section 9A, inserted by

way of a Maharashtra Amendment in the said Code, coupled with the

plea of limitation.  We may add here, that as per learned counsel for

respondent No.3, these set of documents are not identical to what forms

the subject matter of information sought, now, under the said Act.

6. We may now turn to the direct controversy in question, which

emanates from an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section

1

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FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

COMMR. GREATER MUMBAI  [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

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6(1) of the said Act before the Public Information Officer (for short

‘PIO’), Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.  Vide application

dated 10.12.2012, the following information in respect of the plots in

question was sought:

“(a) Certified copies of all PR cards submitted.

(b) Certified copies of all plans and amendments therein from

time to time submitted by the Ferani Hotels Ltd. and/or by its any

divisions and/or its Architect.

(c) Certified copies of all Layouts, Sub-Division Plans and

amendments therein form(sic.)

2

 time to time submitted by the Ferani

Hotels Ltd. and/or by its any divisions and/or its Architect.

(d) Certified copies of all development plans and any amendments

therein from time to time submitted by the Ferani Hotels Ltd. and/

or its any divisions and/or its Architect.

(e) Certified copies of all Reports submitted to the Municipal

Commissioner and his approvals to the same.”

7.The Advocates for the appellant, however, objected to the

disclosure of the information on the grounds, as per Section 11(1)

of the said Act:

(a) That it did not serve any social or public interest but was for

the private interest of respondent No.3 in the suit filed before the

Bombay High Court.

(b) That the information sought in the suit proceedings had not

been granted by the High Court of Bombay, and an appeal against

the said findings were pending before this Court, thereby making

the information sought, sub-judice.

(c) That respondent No.3 was a competitor in business and, thus,

disclosure would cause harm and injury to the appellant’s

competitive position, as well as to their valuable intellectual

property rights.  The information sought for was stated to involve

commercial and trade secrets, disclosure of which would be

detrimental to the interest of the appellant.

(d) That the architect of the appellant informed that all rights in

respect of the plans, clarifications, designs, drawings, etc. and the

2

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work comprised therein, including intellectual property rights and

in particular copyright, were reserved and vested exclusively in

the appellant.

The PIO, vide its letter dated 8.1.2013, declined to give

information in view of the objections filed by the counsel for the

appellant.  This communication stated that the information could not be

given as per Sections 8(1)(d), 8(1)(g), 8(1)(j) as well as Sections 9 and

11(1) of the said Act, since there was no public interest, as also on

account of the claim of copyright.

8. Respondent No.3 filed an appeal under Section 19(1) of the

said Act on 12.2.2013, which was disposed of by the First Appellate

Authority, vide order dated 1.4.2013, permitting the information sought

under the first head to be given, while declining the information under

heads 2 to 4 for the same reasons as set out by the PIO. The

5

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 information sought was stated to be too detailed and hence was not

possible to be given out.  This resulted in a second appeal before the

State Chief Information Commissioner (for short ‘SCIC’) under Section

19(3) of the said Act on 28.6.2013.  Respondent No.3 succeeded in the

second appeal in terms of order dated 31.1.2015, the order being

predicated on the reasoning that the development of the property has

connection with public interest, as flats erected thereon would be

purchased by the citizens at large.

9. It was now the turn of the appellant to assail this order, before

the High Court, by filing a writ petition, being Writ Petition (L)

No.1806/2015, which was dismissed vide impugned order dated

30.10.2015.  The reasoning was based on the very object of the said Act

being incorporated, which was to secure access to information, under

the control of public authorities, to citizens, in order to promote

transparency and accountability.  The documents sought, being for the

development of land and being copies of plans, layouts, sub-division plans,

etc., which had in turn received the attention and approval of the

Commissioner of the Corporation (a public authority), and were under

his control, the same were to be supplied to anyone seeking the same.

The Division Bench then proceeded to refer to the exceptions carved

out under Sections 8 & 9 of the said Act to ultimately hold that the

information sought for was part of public record and had to be revealed

in public interest, and could not be said to be in the nature of trade

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

COMMR. GREATER MUMBAI  [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

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secrets or of commercial confidence, or of a nature which would harm

the competitive position of the appellant.  It also dealt with the objection

of the appellant qua the endeavour of respondent No.3 to seek the

information in the suit proceedings to hold that the said Act was a

legislation which confers independent legal right de hors inter se rights

between the parties.

10. The aforesaid order has, thus, given rise to the present appeal

filed by the appellant.  We heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior

counsel for the appellant and Mr. Gourab Banerji, learned senior

counsel for respondent No.3, both seeking to forcefully put forth their

stand.  We may note that the private disputes inter se the appellant and

respondent No.3 have given rise to this contentious proceeding, where

the issue in question was, in our opinion, really innocuous.  We have

considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel.

11. We may note, at the inception itself, that Mr. Gourab Banerji,

learned senior counsel for respondent No.3 did not even press the last

set of documents sought, which was earlier held to be rather expansive

in nature.  The first set of information sought is stated to have already

been disclosed.  The controversy, thus, related to the 2

nd

 to 4

th

 set of

information sought, which consists of the plans with amendments, layouts,

sub-division plans with amendments and all other development plans

with amendments.  At the inception of the hearing, we had, in fact, put to

learned senior counsel for the appellant, as to what serious objection

could they have to the disclosure of these documents, which were really

public documents, having been submitted to the concerned authority and

forming part of the sanction process.  The persistence over this issue, as

noticed above, is clearly the result of the private dispute, rather than any

objective consideration qua the issue of disclosure of information.

12. The first objection raised by learned senior counsel for the

appellant flowed from the endeavour of respondent No.3 to seek

information in the suit proceedings, which endeavour had not been

successful.  Learned senior counsel contended that no leave had been

taken qua that aspect of the matter and, thus, applying any of the

principles whether of issue estoppel, constructive res judicata, or

election of remedy, respondent No.3 could not be permitted to agitate

the issue twice over.  Learned counsel sought to refer to the result of the

endeavour to obtain interim reliefs in general by respondent No.3, but

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that, to our mind, would be completely irrelevant.  In this behalf, the

information sought for, arising from the letter of the counsel for

respondent No.3, dated 29.3.2012, has to be examined.  We have

perused that letter.  In substance what has been sought is

communications inter se the appellant and public authorities, approvals

granted by the Corporation, compliances, occupation certificate,

application submitted to authorities, revenue records, documents

pertaining to stamp duty, agreement with prospective flat buyers, etc.  If

we compare this information sought with what has been sought under

the said Act, there is little doubt that the information sought under the

said Act is different and specific, i.e., dealing with the approved plans

and their modifications, which is part of the record of the public authority’s

sanction.  Not only that, even if we look at the aspect of the relief prayed

for, arising from the letter; that has not really formed the subject matter

of adjudication, before any of the three judicial forums; what received

the attention of the Court was quite different, and related to preliminary

determination arising from the provision introduced in the Maharashtra

Amendment by way of inserting Section 9A in the said Code.  This is

apart from the aspect, which we will discuss a little later, of the scope

and operation of the said Act, in respect of information being sought by

any person, even a third party.  We have, thus, no hesitation in rejecting

this objection that the plea for disclosure of information arose in

previous civil proceeding, inter se the parties, and had been denied.

13. The second defence against public disclosure of this

information, raised by learned senior counsel for the appellant, is that

respondent No.3 has failed to disclose any ‘larger public interest’, as

mandated under the said Act, and that the third respondent has no locus

standi to seek such information especially when the information falls

under Sections 8(1)(d) & 8(1)(j) of the said Act.  To buttress the plea, a

reference has been made to the judgment of this Court in Thalappalam

Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.

3

opining that if the information falls under clause (j) of sub-section (1) of

Section 8 of the said Act, in the absence of bona fide public interest,

such information is not to be disclosed. It may be noted, at this stage,

that even clause (d) of sub-section 1 of Section 8 of the said Act allows

for disclosure of exempted information in larger public interest, and hence

a similar test would apply.

3 

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FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

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14. To appreciate this submission, one would have to turn to the

very Statement of Objects & Reasons of the said Act, which has also

been discussed in the impugned order.  The said Act was a milestone in

the endeavour to make government authorities more accountable to public

at large by facilitating greater and more effective access to information.

The Preamble, thus, itself states that “the practical regime of right to

information for citizens to secure access to information under the

control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and

accountability in the working of every public authority” was being

established.  Section 2(f) of the said Act defines ‘Information’ and reads

as under:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, -

xxxx xxxx  xxxx xxxx

(f) “information” means any material in any form, including records,

documents, memos, e mails, opinions, advices, press releases,

circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples,

models, data material held in any electronic form and information

relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public

authority under any other law for the time being in force;”

The ‘Right to Information’ is defined under Section 2(j) of the

said Act, which reads as under:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, -

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(j) “right to information” means the right to information

accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of

any public authority and includes the right to—

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii) taking notes, extracts, or certified copies of documents or

records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

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(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes,

video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through

printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any

other device;”

We may note that there is no dispute that the Corporation is a

public authority within the definition of Section 2(h) of the said Act.

We may also note the definition of a ‘third party’ in Section 2(n)

of the said Act, which provides as follows:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, -

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(n) “third party” means a person other than the citizen making a

request for information and includes a public authority.”

15. The purport of the said Act is apparent from Section 6 of the

said Act, which provides for the manner of making a request for

obtaining information.  In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the

said Act, there is no mandate on an applicant to give any reason for

requesting the information, i.e., anybody should be able to obtain the

information as long as it is part of the public record of a public authority.

Thus, even private documents submitted to public authorities may, under

certain situations, form part of public record.  In this behalf, we may

usefully refer to Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, defining

‘public documents’ as under:

“74. Public documents. — The following documents are public

documents:—

(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts—

(i) of the sovereign authority,

(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and

(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of any

part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign country;

(2) Public records kept [in any State] of private documents.”

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

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16. The only exemption from disclosure of information, of

whatever nature, with the public authority is as per Sections 8 & 9 of the

said Act. Thus, unless the information sought for falls under these

provisions, it would be mandatory for the public authorities to disclose

the information to an applicant.

17. The endeavour of the appellant is to bring the information

sought for by respondent No.3, under the exemption of Section 8, more

specifically clauses (d) and (j) of sub-section (1), as also Section 9 of the

said Act.  The provisions read as under:

“8. Exemption from disclosure of information.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be

no obligation to give any citizen,

xxxx    xxxx xxxx xxxx

(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or

intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the

competitive position of a third party, unless the competent

authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the

disclosure of such  information;

xxxx   xxxx xxxx xxxx

(j) information which relates to personal information the

disclosure of which has not relationship to any public activity or

interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the

privacy of the  individual unless the Central Public Information

Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate

authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public

interest justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that

the information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a

State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”

…. …. …. ….

“9. Grounds for rejection to access in certain cases.—

Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, a Central Public

Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the

case may be may reject a request for information where such a

request for providing access would involve an infringement of

copyright subsisting in a person other than the State.”

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18. The issue of the test of larger public interest would, thus, arise

if it falls within those exceptions.

19. Now turning to the information sought for, as enunciated above,

they are really, plans relating to the property in question.  These plans

are required to be submitted by the person proposing to construct on the

property, to the Commissioner of the Corporation.  The appellant has

submitted these plans to the Corporation, in pursuance of the

Development Agreement and the Power of Attorney executed by

respondent No.3.  As to how these plans are processed, is referred to in

the order of the State Information Commissioner dated 31.1.2015, in

para 7, which reads as under:

“(7) On inquiry, the Public Information Officer in the Building

Proposal Department of the Municipal Corporation of Greater

Mumbai, clarified that there is prevailing procedure under Right

to Information Act, for giving copy of map and proposal received

from developer.  The proposals received from developer, are

being sent to the Tax Assessment Department, Water Engineer

Department, as well as to the office of concerned Administrative

Ward.  Besides, also to the Rain Water Drainage Department,

Road Department & Fire Brigade etc., of which department no

objection or specific approval is required.  Besides this, if it is

necessary as per local circumstance the reference is also made

to Railway Department, Airport Authority and to other

Committees.  In the Building Proposals received, it includes the

particulars of plot, the information related to F.S.I. of open space,

sectional plan and drawing.”

The aforesaid, thus, shows that considerable processing is

required before the plans reach the stage of sanction level.

20. The Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the

Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Maharashtra Act’) in Section 3 provides

for the General Liabilities of Promoters.  In terms of sub-section (2) of

Section 3, a promoter, who constructs or intends to construct a block or

building of flats was required to comply with many disclosure

requirements, inter alia clause (l), which reads as under:

“(l) display or keep all the documents, plans or specifications (or

copies thereof) referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c), at the site

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

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258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

and permit inspection thereof to persons intending to take or

taking one or more flats;”

21. The object of the aforesaid was that the purchaser should be

able to get full information of the sanction plan.  It can hardly be said

that while a purchaser can get the information, the person who

administers the land as owner and grants the authority through a Power

of Attorney to develop the land, would not have such a right.

22. We may note that this Act was, however, repealed

specifically by Section 92 of the Real Estate (Regulation and

Development) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RERA’), which

now, under Section 11 of the RERA, provides the functions and duties of

promoters.  The duties are more elaborate, as under Section 11(1) of the

RERA the promoter has to create his web page on the website of the

Authority and enter all details of the proposed project as provided under

sub-section (2) of section 4, in all the fields as provided, for public

viewing.  The promoter, in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the

RERA is required to make available to the allottee information about

sanctioned plans, layout plans along with specifications, approved by the

competent authority, by display at the site or such other place as may be

specified by the Regulations made by the Authority.  The object is clearly

to bring greater transparency.

23. The fate of purchase of land development and investments is

a matter of public knowledge and debate.  Any judicial pronouncement

must squarely weigh in favour of the fullest disclosure, in this behalf.  In

fact, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Dr. V. I. Mathan

& Ors. vs. Corporation of Chennai & Ors.

4

(to which one of us, Sanjay

Kishan Kaul, J. was a party) opined that though the Chennai

Metropolitan Development Authority mandated plans to be displayed at

the site and also be made available on the website, the same principle

should apply to the Corporation for all other sanctioned plans and, thus,

issued directions for display of the plans on the website of the

Corporation, and at the site, with clear visibility.  This was just prior to

the RERA coming into force.

24. In the aforesaid circumstances, even by a test of public

interest, it can hardly be said that the same would not apply in matters of

full disclosure of information of development plans to all and everyone.

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If we turn to the provisions of Section 8 of the said Act and the clauses

under which the exception is sought, clause (d) deals with information

relating to commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property,

which has the potentiality to harm the competitive position of a third

party.  Firstly, as observed aforesaid, the definition of a third party under

Section 2(n) of the said Act means a person other than a citizen

requesting for information to a public authority.  Under Section 11 of the

said Act, the third party has a right to be heard and to object to the

disclosure of information.  The disclosure of plans, which are required to

be in public domain, whether under the repealed Act or RERA, can

hardly be said to be matters of commercial confidence or trade secrets.

In fact, ex facie, these terms would not apply to the matter at hand.

Similarly, insofar as the intellectual property is concerned, the

preparation of the plan and its designs may give rise to the copyright in

favour of a  particular person, but the disclosure of that work would not

amount to an infringement and, in fact, Section 52(1)(f) of the Copyright

Act, 1957 specifically provides that there would be no such infringement

if there is reproduction of any work in a certified copy made or supplied

in  accordance with any law for the time being in force.  This is what is

exactly sought for by respondent No.3 – certified copies of the approved

plans and its modifications, from the public authority, being the

Corporation.  We may also note that Section 22 of the said Act provides

for an overriding effect with a notwithstanding clause qua any

inconsistency with any other Act, which reads as under:

“22. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this

Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent

therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923),

and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument

having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”

25. The aforesaid provision would not imply that a disclosure

permissible under the Copyright Act, 1957 is taken away under the

provisions of the said Act, but rather, if a disclosure is prescribed under

any other Act, the provisions of the said Act would have an overriding

effect.

26.  Similarly, clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said

Act ex facie would have no relevance.  There is no ‘personal

information’ of which disclosure is sought.  Further it cannot be said that

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

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it has no relation to public activity or interest, or that it is unwarranted, or

there is an invasion of privacy.  These are documents filed before public

authorities, required to be put in public domain, by the provisions of the

Maharashtra Act and the RERA, and involves a public element of

making builders accountable to one and all.  That respondent No.3, in

fact, happens to be the administrator of the property in question, which

will certainly not reduce his rights as opposed to anyone else, including a

flat buyer.

27. We, thus, reject the submission based on clauses of

sub-section (1) of Section 8 read with Section 9 of the said Act.

28. We also fail to appreciate the submissions of the learned

senior counsel for the appellant of “vendetta”.  What is the vendetta

involved in seeking disclosure of plans approved by a builder?  To say

the least, this is really carrying things too far, just for the sake of creating

an obstruction in disclosure.  Thus, the reference to the judgment in

Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat State Information Commission

& Ors.,

5

 would be of no avail.

29. Another limb of the submission of learned senior counsel for

the appellant was that the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the said Act

have been rendered nugatory.  The underlying documents of the

development plans, drawings, etc. ought not to have been directed to be

disclosed and only the grant of permission and approval by the

Corporation, i.e., commencement certificate and occupation certificate

could have been so directed at best.

30. Section 10 of the said Act refers to severability, i.e.,

information, which ought to be disclosed and not to be disclosed can be

severed.  This in turn would require a pre-requisite that the information

sought contains some element which has been protected under Section

8 of the said Act.  Having held that Section 8 of the said Act has no

application, this plea is only stated to be rejected.

31. Insofar as Section 11 of the said Act is concerned, dealing

with third party information, and the right to make submissions regarding

disclosure of information, that provision has been complied with by

permitting the appellant and even the architect to raise objections, and

has been dealt with by the PIO, and even by the State Information

Commission, on appeal.

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32. Lastly, the irony of the situation.  The Development

Agreement and the Power of Attorney is sought to be relied upon, by

the appellant, to contend that it was the responsibility and authority of

the attorney holder to obtain necessary permissions, sanctions and

approvals, and that respondent No.3 is not entitled to deal with, nor liable

to any authority in respect of the same, but is entitled to only 12 per cent

of the monetary shares from sale proceeds of the constructed premises.

Thus, no information should be disclosed under the said Act!

33. If we put this in the correct perspective, it means that the

owner of the property, who has given authority to a developer under an

agreement to develop the property and obtain sanctions, is precluded

from obtaining any information about the sanctions, because ultimately

he would be entitled to only a percentage of the monetary share of sale

proceeds of what is constructed on the premises.  Such a proposition is

only stated to be rejected, and in a sense seeks to put the developer and

holder of the Power of Attorney on a pedestal.  This is, of course, de

hors any private lis pending between the parties.

34. In the end, we would like to say that keeping in mind the

provisions of RERA and their objective, the developer should mandatorily

display at the site the sanction plan.  The provision of sub-section (3) of

Section 11 of the RERA require the sanction plan/layout plans along

with specifications, approved by the competent authority, to be displayed

at the site or such other places, as may be specified by the Regulations

made by the Authority.  In our view, keeping in mind the ground reality

of rampant violations and the consequences thereof, it is advisable to

issue directions for display of such sanction plan/layout plans at the site,

apart from any other manner provided by the Regulations made by the

Authority.  This aspect should be given appropriate publicity as part of

enforcement of RERA.

35. The result of the aforesaid is that we find no merit in the

appeal and consider it a legal misadventure. The dispute, though in

respect of information to be obtained, derives its colour from a private

commercial dispute.  We note this because, if judicial time is taken, and

legal expenses incurred by one side on account of such a misadventure,

appropriate costs should be the remedy.

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. STATE INFORMATION

COMMR. GREATER MUMBAI  [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

36.We, thus, dismiss the appeals with costs quantified at Rs.2.50

lakhs (Rupees two lakhs & fifty thousand), payable by the appellant to

respondent No.3 (though hardly the actual expenses!).

Ankit Gyan               Appeals dismissed.