RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 1 of 44

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

RVWPET No.399 of 2023

CNR No.ODHC010 828962023

Ferro Alloys Corporation

Limited, Bhadrak

..... Petitioner

-versus-

The Presiding Officer, Labour

Court, Bhubaneswar and others

.....

Opposite Parties

Advocates appeared in this case:

For Petitioner :Mr. Lalitendu Mishra, Advocate

Mr. Saswat Kumar Acharya, Advocate

For Opp. Parties : Ms. Biswabara Dash,

Additional Standing Counsel

(for O.P. No.1)

CORAM:

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO

J U D G M E N T

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of hearing :13.10.2026: Date of Judgment: 05.11.2026

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PER MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO , J.

1. The application has been filed seeking review of the

judgment dated 29.08.2023 passed by Division Bench in

W.P.(C) No.21154 of 2023.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 2 of 44

Since one of us M.S. Sahoo, J. was member of the

Division Bench that had considered the writ petition,

W.P.(C) No.21154 of 2023 and rendered the judgment dated

29.08.2023 dismissing the writ application, the review

application is listed before a Bench of which M.S. Sahoo, J.

is a member, the other Hon’ble Judge who was part of the

Bench that had delivered the judgment dated 29.08.2023 is

not available.

2. The review application has been filed under Order

XLVII Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 114 of C.P.C. The

petitioner in the writ petition is also the petitioner in the

review petition.

3. In the review application the notices were issued by

order dated 16.05.2024. The learned ASC/AGA appears on

behalf of the opposite party no.1. The notice on the

opposite party no.2 has been held to be sufficient by order

dated 03.07.2024 passed by another Division Bench of

which M.S. Sahoo, J. was a member. Paragraph -3 of the

said order dated 03.07.2024 observing the notice on the

opposite party no.2 to be sufficient is reproduced herein:

“3. Petitioner has liberty to effect service through

learned advocate, who had represented opposite

party no.2 in the Labour Court. This is in addition

to the service already attempted, which is good

service per decisions of the Supreme Court,

reported in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty

Muhammed , reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555 ,

paragraph 14, State of M.P. v. Hiralal, reported in

(1996) 7 SCC 523, paragraph 1 and M/s. Madan

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 3 of 44

and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand , reported in AIR

1989 SC 630, paragraph 6.”

4. By order dated 03.09.2024 in I.A. No.277 of 2024

substitution of opposite party no.2 was allowed as the said

opposite party had unfortunately passed away.

Paragraphs-3 and 4 of the order dated 03.09.2024 are

reproduced herein:

“3. Application is allowed. Hema Devi (widow),

Deepak Kumar (son), Raj Nandini Kumari (daughter)

and Nikita Kumari (daughter) are substituted as

opposite party no.2 series. Amended cause title be

filed and circulated. The application is disposed of.

4. Mr. Sahoo submits he has already filed power

on behalf of substituted legal representatives. His

name be accordingly reflected.”

Thereafter, on each date of listing i.e. 08.12.2025,

13.02.2026, 20.03.2026 and lastly on 13.10.2026 when the

matter was finally heard and judgment was reserved, none

had/has appeared on behalf of opposite party no.2.

Learned counsel for the review petitioner, Mr. Mishra

and Mr. Acharya have been heard at length. The note of

submissions filed in the review application along with the

date chart has also been considered.

5. Now, the issue for consideration and determination in

the review is whether the review petitioner has made out a

case for review of the judgment dated 29.08.2023 in W.P.(C)

No.21154 of 2023, as per the parameters of Order XLVII

Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 114 of the C.P.C.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 4 of 44

6. The applicable provisions of C.P.C. which have bearing

in deciding the review application are reproduced herein:

“ORDER XLVII

REVIEW

1. Application for review of judgment.—(1)

Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal

is allowed, but from which no appeal has been

preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal

is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of

Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of

new and important matter or evidence which,

after the exercise of due diligence was not

within his knowledge or could not be produced

by him at the time when the decree was

passed or order made, or on account of some

mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record or for any other sufficient reason,

desires to obtain a review of the decree passed

or order made against him, may apply for a

review of judgment to the Court which passed

the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or

order may apply for a review of judgment

notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by

some other party except where the ground of such

appeal is common to the applicant and the

appellant, or when, being respondent, he can

present to the Appellate Court the case on which

he applied for the review.

[Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a

question of law on which the judgment of the

Court is based has been reversed or modified by

the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any

other case, shall not be a ground for the review of

such judgment.]

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 5 of 44

2. To whom applications for review may be

made.—[Rep. by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1956 (66 of 1956) s. 14.]

“114. Review.—Subject as aforesaid, any person

considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or

order from which an appeal is allowed by this

Code, but from which no appeal has been

preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no

appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision

on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may

apply for a review of judgment to the Court which

passed the decree or made the order, and the

Court may make such order thereon as it thinks

fit.”

Judgment in the writ application:

7. In the writ application petitioner-employer challenged

the award dated 16.03.2023 passed by the Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in Industrial Dispute

Misc. Case No.63 of 2021.The industrial adjudication

involved issue raised under Section 33 -C(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was for recovery of

money due from the employer determined by the Labour

Court in the award dated 17.02.1999 passed in I.D. Case

No.60 of 1990 and confirmed by Division Bench in the writ

petition. The direction contained in the award of the Labour

Court in I.D. Case No.60 of 1990 at paragraphs-7 and 8 of

the award are reproduced herein:

“7.Issue No. (i) :-The termination of the workman

was done by virtue of the domestic enquiry report

and orders of the management dated 21.10.86.

Since the domestic enquiry report as well as the

orders of the management dated 21.10.86 are held

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 6 of 44

to be not legal and proper, the actions of the

management in terminating the workman with

effect from 24.10.86 is also not legal and justified.

The issue no.(i) is answered accordingly.

8. Issue No. (iv):-In view of my findings on the

foregoing issues, the workmen is entitled to be

reinstated in service, but considering the peculiar

nature and circumstances of this case, I feel that

the award of back wages at the rate of 50 per cent

would meet the ends of justice. The issue No. (iv) is

answered accordingly.”

8. The management-employer is aggrieved by the direction

as it was held by the Labour Court that termination of

service of the opposite party no.2-employee (since deceased)

with effect from 24.10.1986 is not legal and justified. The

said workman is entitled to be reinstated in service with

continuity of service. His entitlement towards back wages

was held to be 50% of the amount.

9. The management challenged the award by filing writ

petition, OJC No.7286 of 1999. The Division Bench of this

Court by order dated 11.12.2019 upheld the award,

confirmed the observations at paragraphs-6, 7 and 8 of the

award. Thereafter, the management -present review

petitioner have stated to have filed a review petition

RVWPET No.2 of 2020 on 08.01.2020, the said review

application remains without any further steps being taken

by the review petitioner. The order passed by the Division

Bench has attained finality.

10. The Division Bench in the writ petition has noted the

subsequent developments till filing of the W.P. (C) No.21154

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 7 of 44

of 2023 that was dismissed by judgment dated 29.08.2023

of which review is sought for. The relevant paragraph from

the judgment dated 29.08.2023 is reproduced herein:

“7. The Petitioner for the bad financial condition was

meanwhile admitted into Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process (CIRP) under IBC vide order dated

06.07.2017 passed by the NCLT annexed as

Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition, the order of NCLT

remains as follows:-

"The petition filed by the Financial Creditor under section

7 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is hereby

admitted for initiating the Corporate Resolution Process

and declare a moratorium and public announcement as

stated in section 13 of IBC 2016. The relevant sections 13

and 14 are reproduced below for the purpose of

convenience.

13. Declaration of moratorium and public announcement

(1) The Adjudicating Authority, after admission of the

application under section 7or section 9 or section 10,

shall, by an order-

(a) to in section 14; declare a moratorium for the purposes

referred

(b) cause a public announcement of the initiation of

corporate insolvency resolution process and call for the

submission of claims under section 15; and

(c) appoint an interim resolution professional in the

manner as laid down in section 16.

(2) The public announcement referred to in clause(b) of

sub-section(1) shall be made immediately after the

appointment of the interim resolution professional.

14. Moratorium

(1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the

insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating

Authority shall by order declare moratorim for prohibiting

all of the following namely:-

(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits

or proceedings against the corporate debtor including

executing of any judgment, decree or order in any court of

law, tribunal arbitration panel or other authority;

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 8 of 44

(b) transforming, encumbering, alienating or disposing of

by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal

right of beneficial interest therein;

(c) Any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security

interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its

property including any action under the Securitisation

and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement

of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);

(d) The recovery of any property by an owner or lessor

where such property is occupied by or in the possession

of the corporate debtor.

(2) The supply of essential goods or services to the

corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be

terminated or suspended or interrupted during

moratorium period.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to

such transactions as may be notified by the Central

Government in consultation with any financial sector

regulator.

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the

date of such order till the completion of the corporate

insolvency resolution process.

Provided that where at any time during the corporate

insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating

Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section

(1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of

corporate debtor under Section 33, the moratorium shall

cease to have effect from the date of such approval or

liquidation order, as the case may be."

Necessary public announcement as per section 15 of the

IBC, 2016 may be made by the Company.

Financial Creditor has also resolved to appoint Mr.

K.G.Somani, having registration no. IBBI/I?PA-001/IP-

address (1) P00300/2017 -18/10544 [e -mail

kgsomani@kgsomani.com to be appointed as interim

Resolution Professional for ascertaining the particulars of

creditors and convening a Committee of Creditors for

appointment of Resolution Professional and for evolving a

resolution plan.

Shri K.G.Somani has submitted his consent in Form -2

under Rule 9 of the insolvency and Bankruptcy

(Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016.

The applicant/petitioner has also certified the fact that

Mr. K.G.Somani is fully qualified and permitted to act as

an Insolvency Professional in accordance with Code and

the Associated Rules and Regulations. Therefore, Mr.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 9 of 44

K.G.Somani is appointed as Interim Resolution

Professional.

The Interim Resolution Professional should convene a

meeting of the Committee of Creditors and submit the

resolution passed by the Committee of Creditors.

Let the copy of the order be sent to the

Applicant/Financial Creditor as well as Corporate Debtor

and I.R.P.

List the matter on 22

nd

July, 2017.”

8. In the meantime as per procedure laid down under

IBC, a Committee of creditors was formed and

Resolution professional being appointed it took over

the Management. As final outcome, one Sterlite Power

Transmission Limited (SPTL) was declared as the

Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) and the above

resolution was approved by the NCLT Cuttack Bench

vide its order dated 30.01.2020 at Annexure-3 and 4

respectively. An Appeal being preferred by erstwhile

establishment, the NCLAT confirmed the order of the

NCLT and this order again got confirmed by the

Hon’ble apex Court in its order dated 27.09.2021 vide

Annexure-5 herein.

9. It is in the meanwhile for the Management not

working out the direction of Industrial Tribunal in I.D.

Case No.60 of 1990, the workman-Opposite Party No.2

got constrained to initiate a proceeding under Section

33-C(2) of the I.D. Act to compute the back wages @

50% arrear wages after the back wages period till

Opposite Party No.2 attended the age of

superannuation, bonus and leave salary during his

service period and this matter got registered as I.D.

Misc. Case No.63 of 2021. The Opposite Party No.2 led

its claim as an outcome of the award dated

17.02.1999 in I.D. Case No.60 of 1990 and final

award being confirmed vide O.J.C. No.7286 of 1999.”

11. The submissions and reliance upon the judgment of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra and

Sons Private Limited vrs. Edelweiss Asset

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 10 of 44

Reconstruction Company Limited: 2021 SCC Online SC

313 has been noted in the judgment at paragraph-10. The

contentions on behalf of the petitioner by the learned

counsel Mr. Mishra and Mr. Acharya have been noted at

paragraphs-12 and 13. The said paragraphs are

reproduced herein:

“10. In limiting the challenge to the order in I.D. Misc.

Case No.63 of 2021, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for

the Petitioner submitted that for there is liquidation of

the Petitioner and there is approval of transfer plan,

there is no possibility of admission of further claim.

The Management-Petitioner also attempted to

take help of the judgment in Ghanashyam Mishra

and Sons Private Limited vrs. Edelweiss Asset

Reconstruction Company Limited: 2021 SCC

Online SC 313.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

12. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the

Management-Petitioner raised the following

contentions:-

4. That it is a settled position of law that as soon as a

Resolution Plan is approved by the Hon'ble NCLT u/s.

31(1) of IBC, all the dues of the Corporate Debtor cease to

exist especially dues pertaining to period prior to the CIRP

of the Corporate Debtor. In the Petitioner's case also, the

Petitioner was admitted to CIRP and eventually when the

resolution plans were invited for taking over the Petitioner

Company, SPTL was declared as the SRA and as soon as

the Hon'ble NCLT Cuttack Bench approved the Resolution

Plan on 30.01.2020, all the prior dues of the Petitioner

company ceased to exist including the dues payable to

OP No. 2. Moreover, the order of the Hon'ble NCLT

Cuttack Bench clearly specifies that the order will be

binding on the Corporate Debtor (i.e. the Petitioner) and

its employees, members, all creditors including Central &

State Government and local authorities, guarantors and

other stakeholders. The said paragraph has been

reproduced below:

"19. The Resolution Plan submitted by Ms Sterlite Power

Transmission Limited (SPTL) i.e. Resolution Applicant,

approved by 95.15% of voting share in 31 Committee of

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 11 of 44

Creditors Meeting dated 13.11.2019 is APPROVED, as

per Section 31 (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code, 2016. Accordingly, the same shall be binding on

the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members, all

creditors including Central and State Government and

local authorities, guarantors and other stakeholders."

In fact, even the Hon'ble Supreme Court stamped with

finality the Resolution Plan of the Petitioner on

27.09.2021. 5. That Section 31 of the IBC clearly states

that the Resolution Plan once approved will be binding on

the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members,

creditors, guarantors and other stakeholder involved in

the Resolution Plan. The creditors whose claims are

accepted by the Resolution Professional and are

acknowledged in the Resolution Plan get paid

accordingly. Therefore, any claim relating to period prior

to the CIRP automatically extinguishes as soon as the

Resolution Plan is approved. The relevant extract of

section 31 is reproduced below: "31 (1) If the Adjudicating

Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved

by the committee of creditors under sub-section (4) of

section 30 meets the requirements as referred to in sub-

section (2) of section 30, it shall by order approve the

resolution plan which shall be binding on the corporate

debtor and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors

and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan."

6. That it is further submitted that the approved

Resolution Plan also bars anyone to claim any amount

which does not form the part of the Resolution Plan as on

the Plan Effective Date (i.e., date on which Resolution

Plan was approved). Moreover, the Resolution Plan also

clearly states that apart from admitted workmen dues,

any dues be it demand for any losses, damages, interest,

back wages, compensation, penal interest liquidated

damages already accrued /accruing or in connection with

any claims) any present or past, direct or indirect,

permanent or temporary employee and/or workmen of

the company whether admitted or not, due or contingent,

asserted or unasserted, crystalized or un-crystallized,

known or un- known, secured or unsecured, disputed or

undisputed, present or future, whether or not set out in

the IM will cease to exist. The Sub-clause (iii) of Para 3(b)

at internal Pg. 20 of the Resolution Plan reads as follows:

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 12 of 44

"Other than the Admitted Workmen and Employees Dues

and Potential Workmen Dues, any and all claims or

demands made by, or liabilities or obligations owed or

payable to (including any demand for any losses or

damages, or interest, back wages, compensation, penal

interest, liquidated damages already accrued/accruing or

in connection with any claims) any present or past direct

or indirect, permanent or temporary employee and lor

workmen of the company whether admitted or not, due or

contingent, asserted or unasserted, crystalized or un-

crystallized, known or un-known, secured or unsecured,

disputed or undisputed. present or future, whether or not

set out in the IM, the balance sheets of the Company or

the list of creditors, in relation to any period prior to the

Plan Effective Date or arising on account of the

acquisition of control by the Applicant over the Company

pursuant to this Resolution Plan, will be written off in full

and shall be deemed to be permanently extinguished by

virtue of the order of the NCLT approving this Resolution

Plan and the Company or the Applicant shall at no point

of time be directly or indirectly, held responsible or liable

in relation there to."

7. That it is also profitable to contend that the binding

nature of the Resolution Plan is to such an extent that the

IBC under Section 74(3) also provides that if the

Corporate Debtor, any of its officers, creditors or any

person upon whom the Resolution Plan is binding,

contravenes the Resolution Plan then such person shall

be punishable with imprisonment of not less than one

year, but may extend to five year or with fine which shall

not be less than one lakh rupees, but may extend to one

crore rupees, or with both. The Resolution Plan is binding

upon the OP No. 2 and the OP No. 2 has clearly

proceeded in violating Section 74(3) of IBC which is a

punishable offence. The relevant extract of the section is

reproduced below:

"74. Punishment for contravention moratorium or the

resolution plan

(1)...

(2)....

(3) Where the corporate debtor, any of its officers or

creditors or any person on whom the approved resolution

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 13 of 44

plan is binding under section 31 knowingly and wilfully

contravenes any of the terms of such resolution plan or

abets such contravention, such corporate debtor, officer,

creditor or person shall be punishable with imprisonment

of not less than one year, but may extend to five years, or

with fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees,

but may extend to one crore rupees, or with both.

8. That further it is pertinent to note that IBC has been

given overriding powers under Section 238 which clearly

specifies that the IBC will prevail over any other law. The

section states as below:

"238. Provisions of this Code to override other laws - The

provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding

anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other

law for the time being in force or any instrument having

effect by virtue of any such law"

9. That the claim of the OP No. 2 is not maintainable as it

relates prior to CIRP period and hence extinguished after

the approval of the Resolution Plan. This Hon'ble Court in

the Petitioner's own matter where the Department of

Mines, State of Odisha had raised claims of Rs. 215.92

Crores, has quashed the said demand on the ground that

the claim is extinguished as it relates to a period prior to

the approval of the Resolution Plan. The said judgment.is

reported as Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. vs. State of

Odisha, AIR 2022 Orissa 17.

10. The binding nature of the approved Resolution Plan

and the overriding powers of the Code have been

stamped with approval by several judgments which are

binding. on the Opposite Parties. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the landmark judgment of Committee of

Creditors of Essar Steel vs. Satish Kumar Gupta (2020) 8

SCC 531 has held as follows: "105. Section 31(1) of the

Code makes it clear that once a resolution plan is

approved by the Committee of Creditors it shall be

binding on all stakeholders, including guarantors. This is

for the reason that this provision ensures that the

successful resolution Applicant starts running the

business of the corporate debtor on a fresh slate as it

were.

107.. A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly

be faced with "undecided" claims after the resolution plan

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 14 of 44

submitted by him has been accepted as this would

amount to a hydra head popping up which would throw

into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective

resolution applicant who successfully take over the

business of the corporate debtor. All claims must be

submitted to and decided by the resolution professional

so that a prospective resolution applicant knows exactly

what has to be paid in order that it may then take over

and run the business of the corporate debtor. This the

successful resolution applicant does on a fresh slate, as

has been pointed out by us hereinabove."

11. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of

Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Pvt. Ltd. vs. Edelweiss

Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd, (2021) SCC ONLINE

SC 313, has clearly held that claims which are not part of

the resolution plan shall stand extinguished upon

approval of resolution plan and the same has been

quoted below for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court:

"95. In the result, we answer the questions framed by us

as under:

(i) That once a resolution plan is duly approved by the

Adjudication Authority under subsection (1) of Section 31,

the claims as provided in the resolution plan shall stand

frozen and will be binding on the Corporate Debtor and

its employees, members, creditors, including the Central

Government, any State Government or any local

authority, guarantors and other stakeholders. On the

date of approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating

Authority, all such claims, which are not a part of

resolution plan, shall stand extinguished and no person

will be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in

respect to a claim, which is not part of the resolution plan;

(ii) 2019 amendment to Section 31 of the I & B Code is

clarificatory and declaratory in nature and therefore will

be effective from the date on which I&B Code has come

into effect;

(iii) Consequently all the dues including the statutory

dues owed to the Central Government, any State

Government or any local authority, if not part of the

resolution plan, shall stand extinguished and no

proceedings in respect of such dues for the period prior to

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 15 of 44

the date on which the Adjudicating Authority grants its

approval under Section 31 could be continued."

13. It is in the above grounds and taking cue from the

judgment in Ghanashyam Mishra (supra) and a

further direction of this Court in O.J.C. No.7286 of

1999, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the Petitioner

claimed declaring the direction in I.D. Misc. Case

No.63 of 2021 as bad in law and setting aside the

same.”

12. The discussions on the factual issues raised as well as

the law has been discussed threadbare at length by the

Division Bench in its judgment at paragraphs-15, 16, 17

and 18, which are reproduced herein:

“15. This Court here finds undisputed facts here

remain to be Petitioner herein became insolvent on

06.07.2017. In between 2017 -2020 Resolution

Professional (R.P) was in-charge as per IBC appointed

by NCLT Calcutta Bench and the R.P. invited claims

from 2017 till 2020. The C.P.(I.B) No.251/KB/2017 got

concluded in order of NCLT dated 22.07.2017. There is

drawing of Resolution Plan and the Resolution Plan

got approved by NCLT Cuttack on 30.01.2020. Copy of

Resolution plan is available here as Annexure-3 and

copy of approval order by NCLT appears at Annexure-

4. In the meantime promotors appealed before NCLAT

also failed. The matter went to the level of Hon9ble

apex Court and Hon9ble apex Court not only upheld

the decision of NCLT as well as NCLAT but it also

stamped the Resolution Plan by its order dated

27.09.2021 vide Annexure-5. Resolution Plan dated

13.11.2019 at Annexure -3 vide clause-10 under

heading the Resolution Plan and Implementation

Schedule at sub-para (a) and (b) reads as follows:-

"a) The term of the Resolution Plan shall commence on the

date of submission of the Resolution Plan to the

Resolution Professional and shall remain valid till the

Plan is fully implemented. Notwithstanding anything

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 16 of 44

contained in this Resolution Plan (except to the extent set

out in Section 7(b) of this Resolution Plan). no part of this

Resolution Plan shall become effective or enforceable until

either (i) the Resolution Plan is approved by the NCLT in

the manner previously proposes by the Applicant and

approved by the CoC; or (ii) if approved by the NCLT with

any variance which does not result in any change in the

Total Consideration proposed under the plan or does not

impact the overail Financial Proposal of the Applicant, in

the manner approved by the NCLT; (iii) if approved by the

NCLT with any variance other than (iv) above, then in the

form and substance acceptable to the COC and the

Applicant Upon approval of the Resolution Plan by the

NCLT, this Resolution Plan shall ispo facto form part of

the NCLT order approving the Resolution Plan.

b) The implementation schedule for the Resolution Plan is

set out in Section 7(b) of this Plan."

Similarly Resolution Plan at clause-3(b) under

heading proposed for workman-Employees sub-clause

(iii), at page-61 of the brief reads as follows:

"(iii) Other than the Admitted Workman and Employees

Dues and Potential Workmen Dues, any and all claims or

demands made by or liabilities or obligations owed or

payable to, (including any demand for any losses or

damages, or interest, back wages, compensation, penal

interest, liquidated damages already accrued/accruing or

in connection with any claims) any present or past, direct

or indirect, permanent or temporary employee and/or

workman of the Company whether admitted or not, due

or contingent, asserted or unasserted, crystalized or

uncrystallised known or unknown, secured or unsecured,

disputed or undisputed, present or future, whether or not

set out in the IM, the balance sheets of the Company or

the profit and loss account statements of the Company or

the list of creditors, in relation to any period prior to the

Plan Effective Dare or arising on account of the

acquisition of control by Applicant over the Company

pursuant to this Resolution Plan, will be written off in full

and shall be deemed to be permanently extinguished by

virtue of the order of the NCLT approving this Resolution

Plan and the Company or Applicant shall at no point of

time be, directly or indirectly, held responsible or liable in

relation thereto."

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 17 of 44

16. This condition appears to make it clear that the

resolution placed covers all other dues except the

admitted workman and employees9 dues. It be made

here that here the admitted dues of the workman

involved case by way of an industrial adjudication in

I.D. Case No.60 of 1990 decided on 17.02.1999 and

decided much prior to Company -Petitioner herein

became insolvent on 06.07.2017. The benefit to the

workman came by way of award dated 17.02.1999 in

disposal of I.D. Case No.60 of 1990. It is thus the

outcome in I.D. Misc. Case No.63 of 2021 remain

immaterial as it is only in giving into effect the outcome

in I.D. Case No.60 of 1990 that too being confirmed in

O.J.C. No.7286 of 1999. Pendency of the Review

Petition without even admitted has no consequence for

there is loss of decade in the meantime. The Petitioner

claims here undoubtedly remain outside, the

Resolution Plan and Petitioners attempt if entertained

will frustrate the effect of award being confirmed by

this Court and the Management here is expecting

undue advantage of the Resolution Plan and an

outcome of its approval by Supreme Court vide Civil

Appeal No.5991-92 of 2021 and 5129 of 2021 decided

on 27.07.2021 particularly when for there is

undertaking of industrial adjudication since 1990,

there was no scope for inclusion of such claim in

undertaking of exercise in calling for the claims in

2017.

17. This Court here considering the effect of the

judgment in Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private

Limited Vrs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company

Limited , 2021 SCC Online SC 313 finds, the short

question decided to be determined there as taken

down in paragraph-2 reads as follows:-

“2. The short but important questions, that arise for

consideration in this batch of matters, are as under:-

(i) As to whether any creditor including the Central

Government, State Government or any local authority is

bound by the Resolution Plan once it is approved by an

adjudicating authority under sub-section (1) of Section 31

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 18 of 44

of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter

referred to as 'I& B Code')?

(ii) As to whether the amendment to Section 31 by Section

7 of Act 26 of 2019 is clarificatory/ declaratory or

substantive in nature?

(iii) As to whether after approval of resolution plan by the

Adjudicating Authority a creditor including the Central

Government, State Government or any local authority is

entitled to initiate any proceedings for recovery of any of

the dues from the Corporate Debtor, which are not a part

of the Resolution Plan approved by the adjudicating

authority?"

18. Attention in taking help of the above decision was

drawn through question (iii) particularly plain reading

of the aforesaid question, this Court here observes, the

question (iii) does not fit to the issue involved herein as

there should not be any doubt that the dispute here

involved a determination on claim prior to 1990 and

the final outcome in the dispute even involving benefit

through as a corollary but all as an outcome of the

result in I.D. Case No.60 of 1990 being confirmed by

way of disposal in O.J.C. No.7286 of 1999 but

disposed of on 11.12.2019 and claims here placed to

be confident in terms of Resolution Plan involved

herein. It be stated here that even though liquidation

process involving the Petitioner commenced in 2017 till

disposal of the Writ Petition in 2019, the Management-

Petitioner consciously let this issue from being

considered in the previous round of litigation.”

13. The Division Bench further formulated its conclusion

with the reasons after discussing the law at paragraph-19

to 24, which are reproduced herein:

“19. Undisputedly in the case at hand not only not a

part of the Resolution plan nor even there is any claim

put here after approval of the Resolution. The claim

here arises by way of Industrial Adjudication in an

award, vide I.D. Case No. 60 of 1990 passed on

17.02.1999. Such Award even got confirmed by this

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 19 of 44

Court in disposal of OJC No. 7286 of 1999. It be stated

here that here the Resolution plan was submitted for

the first time on 30.01.2020 and was approved by

NCLT also on 30.01.2020 and ultimately confirmed by

Hon9ble apex Court, vide judgment reported in (2022)

10 SCC 493 being decided on 27.09.2021. For the

benefit here through award passed on 17.02.1999 in

a litigation initiated in 1990 and litigation going on,

there was no deliberate inclusion of this aspect in the

Resolution plan.

20. This Court here further also observes, the legal

position on above is well settled that an approved

Resolution Plan can deal with related party claim and

extinguish the same, which shall ensure that the

successful Resolution applicant can take over the

Corporate Debtor on hassle-free and clean state. This

Court here also finds, once the Corporate Debtor was

with clear knowledge of such an outstanding coming

on its head, nothing prevents to the Corporate Debtor

also putting such claim in the Resolution Plan. On the

other hand attempt of the Petitioner here appears to

circumvent the yield through the Industrial

Adjudication settled through disposal of the Writ

Petition in the guise of Resolution plan and trying to

avoid its responsibility.

21. On the Petitioner here attempting to take

advantage of Ghanashyam Mishra (supra) in the first

step, this Court finds, there is, however, involve the

issue involved therein and on the other hand even

deciding the issue No. (iii) taken note herein the

Hon9ble apex Court though taken its view in

Paragraph-95 therein also does not come in the aid of

the Petitioner.

22. It be stated here that the Petitioner even though

has some other grounds but the impugned order was

challenged only on the premises that the proceeding

therein in I.D. Misc. No. 63 of 2021 does not stand to

test for its Resolution Plan confirmed involving the

company and did not include such claim further also

hit by judgment of Hon9ble apex Court in

Ghanashyam Mishra (supra).

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 20 of 44

23. Based on the above discussion we are of the

considered opinion that there are no reason for

interference in the order dated 16.03.2023 passed by

the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Misc. Case No.

63 of 2021 involving a proceeding under Section 33-

C(2) of the I.D. Act and the Writ Petition thus declined

to be entertained for having no merit. For there is

inordinate delay in providing the legitimate dues to the

Workman involved herein and he is pursuing his

litigation remedy nearly three and half decade and the

Workman is sufficiently aged in the meanwhile, the

benefit by virtue of the impugned order unless paid

within thirty days hereafter, the Petitioner shall be

entitled to the same along with interest @ 8% per

annum all through.

24. The Writ Petition stands dismissed, however, with

the above direction. No Cost.”

Submissions on behalf of the petitioner

14. Supporting the prayer seeking review of the judgment

of the Division Bench extensive submissions ha ve been

made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Mishra

and Mr. Acharya. The summary of the submissions are

indicated herein below:

(i) The opposite party no.2-workman since deceased never

lodged a claim under I BC before the Resolution

Professional.

(ii) Clause -3(f)(i) of the Resolution Plan provides that all

mandatory liabilities arising out of the litigations relating to

the period prior to the effective date indicated shall be

settled as ‘NIL’.

(iii) The Division Bench has determined ‘apparently

mistaken findings’.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 21 of 44

(iv) At paragraph-33 of the review application, paragraph-A

to Paragraph-E specific points have been raised by the

review petitioner suggesting that the Division Bench has

returned finding of fact, which are contrary on the face of

the record.

15. The learned counsel Mr. Mishra and Mr. Acharya have

relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Board of Control for Cricket in India and another v.

Netaji Cricket Club and others: (2005) 4 SCC 741 , to

support the submissions that a case for review has been

made out. Relied upon paragraphs-88, 90 and 93 are

reproduced herein:

“88. We are, furthermore, of the opinion that the

jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a review

application cannot be said to be ex facie bad in law.

Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its

order if the conditions precedent laid down therein are

satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not

prescribe any limitation on the power of the court

except those which are expressly provided in Section

114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to

make such order as it thinks fit.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which

would include a mistake in the nature of the

undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An

application for review would also be maintainable if

there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would

constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts

and circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient

reason” in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide

enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 22 of 44

court or even an advocate. An application for review

may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine

“actus curiae neminem gravabit”.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

93. It is also not correct to contend that the Court

while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation

whatsoever cannot take into consideration a

subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the

Court accepts its own mistake in understanding the

nature and purport of the undertaking given by the

learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in

the AGM of the Board held on 29 -9-2004, the

subsequent event may be taken into consideration by

the Court for the purpose of rectifying its own

mistake.”

16. Seeking the review, the learned counsel for the

petitioner have also relied on the decisions of Ferro Alloys

Corporation Ltd. v. State of Odisha and others: AIR

2022 Ori 17 and Green View Tea and Industries v.

Collector, Golaghat, Assam and others: (2004) 4 SCC

122. We have gone through the said decisions and

considered whether they would be of any help to the

petitioner.

Discussions, Reasoning and Conclusions of the Court in

the review application

17. In The State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs.

Confederation of State Government Employees, West

Bengal & Ors.: R.V.W. 159 of 2022 In WPST 102 of 2020

With C.A.N. 1 of 2022 dated 22

nd September, 2022, the

Division Bench of Calcutta High Court considered the

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 23 of 44

review application; speaking for the Bench regarding

interpretation of Order XLVII Rules- 1 and 2 of the C.P.C.,

one of us Harish Tandon,J. (as His Lordship then was)

observed thus:

“Upon the meaningful reading of the above quoted

provisions the review is permissible provided the

condition enshrined therein are fulfilled. Although

the High Court enjoins the plenary powers of

review while dealing under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India yet the condition put forth

therein needs to be looked into and the power is to

be exercised within the circumference thereof. The

review is permissible provided the order/decree

contained an error apparent on the face of the

record or on a discovery of new and important

matters or evidence which despite the exercise of

due diligence was not within the knowledge of the

aggrieved person, at the time of passing of the said

order or decree or for any other substantial

reasons. The explanation appended thereto creates

a further fetter on the part of the Court exercising

review jurisdiction in not entertaining if aimed at

the subsequent decision of the superior Court in

any other case.”

[Underlined to supply emphasis]

18. It would be apt and appropriate to quote the judgments

relied upon and discussions made thereon by the Division

Bench of the Calcutta High Court in State of West

Bengal(supra).

“The Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in

case of M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in

AIR 1964 SC 1372 discussed the incidents which

can be engulfed within the expression “error

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 24 of 44

apparent on the face of the record”. It is held that

there is a distinction between an erroneous decision

and a decision vitiated by a patent error. It is

highlighted that the review jurisdiction should not be

invoked and/or exercised converting itself as a court

of appeal but founded upon the well sanctified

parameters and at the time of exercising such

jurisdiction the Court must be cautious and careful

in bearing in mind the aforesaid distinction. The

error can be said to be apparent on the face of the

record provided the law expounded therein does not

invite two possible conclusions/opinions. It is an

ardent duty of the Court not to find out the error

after an elaborate argument…... …”

In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors.

reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Apex Court in

fact, propelled the exposition of law laid down in the

case of Thungabhadra(Supra) and held that the

error apparent on the face of the record must be self-

evident and does not require to be ascertained by a

process of reasoning. It is further held that the said

jurisdiction can never be invoked for the purpose of

mere correction of the order and upon rehearing of the

entire matter, in the following:

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment

may be open to review inter alia if there is a

mistake or an error apparent on the face of

the record. An error which is not self-evident

and has to be detected by a process of

reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error

apparent on the face of the record justifying

the court to exercise its power of review under

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the

jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is

not permissible for an erroneous decision to

be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition,

it must be remembered has a limited purpose

and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in

disguise”.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 25 of 44

[Emphasis in original]

In Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik & Ors.

reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78, the Apex Court held

that the error or mistake appearing in Order 47 Rule

1 of the Code must not be such which is to be

established by a long drawn process of reasoning

upon lengthy arguments but should be self-evident in

the following:

“A Constitution Bench of this Court in the

case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v.

Maruti Hari Jadhav MANU/SC/0033/1965:

[1966]1SCR102 has held that the issue

concerning res judicata is an issue of law

and, therefore, there is no impediment in

treating and deciding such an issue as a

preliminary issue. Relying on the

aforementioned judgment of the

Constitution Bench, this Court has taken the

view in the case of Meharban v. Punjab

Wakf Board (supra) and Harinder Kumar

(supra) that such like issues can be treated

and decided as issues of law under Order

XIV, Rule 2(2) of the Code. Similarly, the

other issues concerning limitation,

maintainability and Court fee could always

be treated as preliminary issues as no

detail evidence is required to be led.

Evidence of a formal nature even with

regard to preliminary issue has to be led

because these issues would either create a

bar in accordance with law in force or they

are jurisdictional issues.”

[Emphasis in original]

In a recent judgment rendered by the Three Judge

Bench of the Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan

Reddy (Supra), it is held that the power of review

should not be equated with the power of an appeal. It

is further held that the Court can exercise such

powers for correction of a mistake but not to

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 26 of 44

substitute its view taken earlier solely on the ground

that there is a possibility of two views. It would be

profitable to quote the observations contained in

Paragraph 26 thereof which runs thus:

“26. As can be seen from the above

exposition of law, it has been consistently

held by this Court in several judicial

pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction

of review, is not the same as that of an

appeal. A judgment can be open to review if

there is a mistake or an error apparent on

the face of the record, but an error that has

to be detected by a process of reasoning,

cannot be described as an error apparent

on the face of the record for the Court to

exercise its powers of review under Order

XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising

powers of review, the Court can correct a

mistake but not substitute the view taken

earlier merely because there is a possibility

of taking two views in a matter. A judgment

may also be open to review when any new

or important matter of evidence has

emerged after passing of the judgment,

subject to the condition that such evidence

was not within the knowledge of the party

seeking review or could not be produced by

it when the order was made despite

undertaking an exercise of due diligence.

There is a clear distinction between an

erroneous decision as against an error

apparent on the face of the record. An

erroneous decision can be corrected by the

Superior Court, however an error apparent

on the face of the record can only be

corrected by exercising review jurisdiction.

Yet another circumstance referred to in

Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment

has been described as “for any other

sufficient reason”. The said phrase has

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 27 of 44

been explained to mean “a reason sufficient

on grounds, at least analogous to those

specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram V.

Neki Ram 17 and Moran Mar Basselios

Catholicos and Anr. V. Most Rev. Mar

Poulose Athanasius and Others 18).”

[Emphasis in original]

19. The further observations of the Division Bench of

Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal (supra) are

quoted and applied in considering the present review

application:

“The law that emanates from the aforesaid decision

leaves no ambiguity that the power of the review is

to be exercised within the limited compass. Though

the substantive provision in the Code of Civil

Procedure in the form of Section 114 confers power

upon the Court to review its judgment, order or

decree yet it does not prescribe any conditions

and/or the grounds of such review. In other words

Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure neither

prescribes any condition for exercising the power of

review nor creates any brindle or prohibition on the

Court from exercising such powers. Logically what

follows therefrom is that though the substantive

provision of review is provided in the Code yet the

power is to be exercised by the Court on the grounds

enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code.

Although the High Court enjoins a plenary power of

correcting its mistakes or the errors in a writ

jurisdiction yet by virtue of the introduction of Order

47 Rule 1 of the Code it is required to be exercised

bearing in mind the condition enshrined therein. The

expression ‘mistake’ or ‘error’ apparent on the face

of the record leaves no ambiguity on the legislative

intent that such error which are self-evident and

does not require a detailed examination, the detailed

scrutiny, roving enquiry and/or the elucidation of

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 28 of 44

the facts or the legal position, are kept outside the

purview of the aforesaid expression. The said

expression connotes that the mistake or error

apparent on the face of record must be such which

does not require a long debate or the elaborate

reasoning but on a bare look of the record and the

consequence to follow therefrom. Every error cannot

be construed as error apparent if it does not result

into an accepted decision already taken. The fringe

mistake or error which is ministerial having no

impact on the ultimate decision taken on a well

defined reasonings, cannot be perceived an error

apparent on the face of the record. There is a real

and apparent distinction between an erroneous

decision and the decision containing an error

apparent on the face of the record. In former case

the remedy available to an aggrieved person is to

move higher up and the review jurisdiction cannot

be invoked; on the other hand, in later case if the

Court finds that the judgment under review

contained patent error striking at the root of the

decision the review can be the proper remedy.

Though the Justice is a virtue and transcends all

barriers unbrindled with the rules of procedure or

technicalities but there is a difference in the nature

of a mistake and scope of the review as it largely

depends upon the facts of the each case . The

plenary powers of the Writ Court is based on equity

and the fairness and the mistake of a Court should

not cause prejudice to the litigants. The moment the

mistake or the error is qualified with the word

“apparent on the face of the record”, the power is to

be exercised in keeping the legislative intent and the

conferment of the jurisdictions by the statutory

provisions. The review jurisdiction is never equated

with the appellate jurisdiction nor can be considered

as an appeal in disguise. In case of an error, there is

a possibility of two views and the one has been

adopted it cannot come within the purview of the

review jurisdiction even the Court feels the other

possible views should have been taken. In such

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 29 of 44

cases, it should be regarded as an erroneous

decision capable of being corrected by a higherer

forum and does not come within the ambit of the

review jurisdiction. The normal principle perceived in

this regard is that the Court should avoid the

departure from the judgment taken as it becomes

final except when it is justified by the circumstances

of substantial and compelling character.

[Underlined to supply emphasis]

20. In judgment dated 25.04.2022 in RVWPET No.20

of 2022 rendered by coordinate Bench of this Court, of

which one of us M.S.Sahoo, J. was Member, decision of

the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kamlesh Verma v.

Mayawati

1was relied upon. Kamlesh Verma (supra)has

also been relied upon by the Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal (supra).

21. In Kamlesh Verma (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has laid down scope of exercise of power by the

High Court for reviewing its own judgment and the

limitations on exercise of such power. The paragraphs

which are relied upon and applied for adjudication of the

present review are reproduced herein; at paragraphs-12

to 20 of SCC the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as

follows:-

“12.This Court has repeatedly held in various

judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review

is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained

only if there is an error apparent on the face of the

record. A mere repetition through different counsel,

1

(2013) 8 SCC 320

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 30 of 44

of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over

ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of

inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.

This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib

[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC

(L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] held as under :

(SCC p. 675, para 1)

(underlined to supply emphasis)

“1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the

petitioners, has argued at length all the points

which were urged at the earlier stage when we

refused special leave thus making out that a review

proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May

be, we were not right in refusing special leave in

the first round; but, once an order has been passed

by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to

the rules of the game and cannot be lightly

entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious

step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where

a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave

error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A

mere repetition, through different counsel, of old

and overruled arguments, a second trip over

ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of

inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.

The very strict need for compliance with these

factors is the rationale behind the insistence of

counsel's certificate which should not be a routine

affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the

court which decided nor awareness of the precious

public time lost what with a huge backlog of

dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for

counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment

of review and fight over again the same battle

which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the

Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the

conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We

regret to say that this case is typical of the

unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat

performance with the review label as passport.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 31 of 44

Nothing which we did not hear then has been

heard now, except a couple of rulings on points

earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges

and then pressed, our order refusing special leave

was capable of a different course. The present

stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier

order which has the normal feature of finality.”

(emphasis in original)

13.In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible

on the ground of an error apparent on the face of

the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated

with the original hearing of the case. In Northern

India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi

[(1980) 2 SCC 167 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 222] , this

Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under : (SCC pp.

171-72)

“8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to

seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court

merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh

decision of the case. The normal principle is that a

judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and

departure from that principle is justified only when

circumstances of a substantial and compelling

character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh

v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845]. For

instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn

to a material statutory provision during the original

hearing, the Court will review its judgment:

Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC

189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279]. The Court may also

reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been

done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full

and effective justice : O.N. Mohindroo v. District

Judge, Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5]. Power to review its

judgments has been conferred on the Supreme

Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that

power is subject to the provisions of any law made

by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145.

In a civil proceeding, an application for review is

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 32 of 44

entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order

47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a

criminal proceeding on the ground of an error

apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1

of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever

the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute

that a review proceeding cannot be equated with

the original hearing of the case, and the finality of

the judgment delivered by the Court will not be

reconsidered except ‘where a glaring omission or

patent mistake or like grave error has crept in

earlier by judicial fallibility’ : Sow Chandra Kante

v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri)

305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200].

(underlined to supply emphasis)

9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal

material so assiduously collected and placed before

us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who

has now been entrusted to appear for the

respondent, was never brought to our attention

when the appeals were heard, we may also

examine whether the judgment suffers from an

error apparent on the face of the record. Such an

error exists if of two or more views canvassed on

the point it is possible to hold that the controversy

can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view

adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a

possible view having regard to what the record

states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error

apparent on the face of the record.”

(underlined to supply emphasis)

14.Review of the earlier order cannot be done

unless the court is satisfied that material error,

manifest on the face of the order, undermines its

soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This

Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India

[1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held

as under : (SCC p. 566, para 12)

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 33 of 44

“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we

resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any

feeling that the party has been hurt without being

heard. But we cannot review our earlier order

unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the

face of the order, undermines its soundness or

results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra

Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC

(Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax)

200] this Court observed : (SCC p. 675, para 1)

‘1. … A review of a judgment is a serious step and

reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring

omission or patent mistake or like grave error has

crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. … The present

stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier

order which has the normal feature of finality.’ ”

15.An error which is not self-evident and has to be

detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be

said to be an error apparent on the face of the

record justifying the Court to exercise its power of

review. A review is by no means an appeal in

disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard

and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This

Court in Parsion Devi v. SumitriDevi [(1997) 8 SCC

715] held as under : (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)

(underlined to supply emphasis)

“7. It is well settled that review proceedings

have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope

of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra

Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372]

this Court opined : (AIR p. 1377, para 11)

‘11. What, however, we are now concerned with

is whether the statement in the order of September

1959 that the case did not involve any substantial

question of law is an “error apparent on the face of

the record”. The fact that on the earlier occasion the

court held on an identical state of facts that a

substantial question of law arose would not per se

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 34 of 44

be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be

erroneous.Similarly, even if the statement was

wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error

apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a

distinction which is real, though it might not

always be capable of exposition, between a mere

erroneous decision and a decision which could be

characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A

review is by no means an appeal in disguise

whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and

corrected, but lies only for patent error.’

(underlined to supply emphasis)

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari

Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with

approval a passage from AribamTuleshwar

Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC

389] this Court once again held that review

proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have

to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may

be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or

an error apparent on the face of the record. An error

which is not self-evident and has to be detected by

a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an

error apparent on the face of the record justifying

the court to exercise its power of review under

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction

under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for

an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and

corrected’. A review petition, it must be

remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be

allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.”

(emphasis in original)

16.Error contemplated under the Rule must be

such which is apparent on the face of the record

and not an error which has to be fished out and

searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 35 of 44

power of review can be exercised for correction of a

mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere

possibility of two views on the subject is not a

ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v.

Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri)

1056] held as under : (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54,

56 & 58)

(underlined to supply emphasis)

xxx xxx xxx xxx

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review

can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not

to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised

within the limits of the statute dealing with the

exercise of power. The review cannot be treated

like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of

two views on the subject is not a ground for review.

Once a review petition is dismissed no further

petition of review can be entertained. The rule of

law of following the practice of the binding nature

of the larger Benches and not taking different

views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of

equal strength has to be followed and practised.

However, this Court in exercise of its powers under

Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and

upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have

resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a

citizen or rights created under any other statute,

can take a different view notwithstanding the

earlier judgment.

***

17.In a review petition, it is not open to the

Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a

different conclusion, even if that is possible.

Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence

cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is

shown that there is an error apparent on the face of

the record or for some reason akin thereto. This

Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics&

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 36 of 44

Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under

: (SCC p. 656, para 10)

“10. … In a review petition it is not open to this

Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a

different conclusion, even if that is possible. The

learned counsel for the Board at best sought to

impress us that the correspondence exchanged

between the parties did not support the conclusion

reached by this Court. We are afraid such a

submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in

a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on

record is fully within the domain of the appellate

court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced,

the court records a finding of fact and reaches a

conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a

review petition unless it is shown that there is an

error apparent on the face of the record or for some

reason akin thereto. It has not been contended

before us that there is any error apparent on the

face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to

argue on a question of appreciation of evidence

would amount to converting a review petition into

an appeal in disguise.”

(underlined to supply emphasis)

18.Review is not rehearing of an original matter.

The power of review cannot be confused with

appellate power which enables a superior court to

correct all errors committed by a subordinate court.

A repetition of old and overruled argument is not

enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This

Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public

Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501] , held as under : (SCC

pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)

(underlined to supply emphasis)

19.Review proceedings are not by way of an

appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope

and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review

jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 37 of 44

judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the

same. As long as the point is already dealt with

and answered, the parties are not entitled to

challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that

an alternative view is possible under the review

jurisdiction.

20.Thus, in view of the above, the following

grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated

by the statute:

20.1.When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or

evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,

was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could

not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” have been

interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA

144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and

approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios

Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius

[AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a

reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to

those specified in the rule”. The same principles

have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur

Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT

(2013) 8 SC 275]

20.2.When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not

enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the

original hearing of the case.

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 38 of 44

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material

error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines

its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise

whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and

corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject

cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record

should not be an error which has to be fished out

and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully

within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot

be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same

relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter

had been negatived.”

(underlined to supply emphasis)

22. The principles laid down in Kamlesh Verma (supra),

have been subsequently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in several judgments. To refer to a few, we take note of

Sunil Vasudeva & others vrs. Sundar Gupta & others

2,

Yashwant Sinha & others vrs. Central Bureau of

Investigation through its Director and another

3.

23. Keeping in view the principles which have been laid

down in Kamlesh (supra) at paragraphs 20.1 and 20.2, the

contentions raised in the review petition are to be

considered: whether a case has been made out for reviewing

judgment dated 10.01.2025. Accordingly , each of the

2

(2019) 17 SCC 385

3

(2020) 2 SCC 338

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 39 of 44

grounds raised by the petitioner are discussed and answered

herein :

23.1 Submissions on behalf of the review petitioner inter alia

suggest that the judgment passed by the Division Bench is

erroneous. Assuming for the sake of argument that the

submission is correct, review will not be maintainable as

held in Kamlesh (supra); para-20.2(ii)(v): that a review by no

means is an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous

decision is reheard and corrected. The argument s were

considered and overruled by the Division Bench, therefore

and such plea raised again is not enough to reopen the

concluded adjudication.

23.2 The contentions raised regarding interpretation of

Ghanashyam Mishra (supra) were considered in the

judgment rendered by the Division Bench. The Division

Bench has interpreted Ghanashyam, determined the

implications which has not favoured the review petitioner-

opposite party. Reiteration of the argument in review cannot

be countenanced as the argument has been overrulled.

Consideration of the review petition cannot be equated with

rehearing of the matter.

23.3 Further, assuming for the sake of argument that the

interpretation of Ghanashyam (supra) suggested by the

review petitioner would be a possible view, applying the

principles laid down in Kamlesh 20.2(vi): mere possibility of

two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. In

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 40 of 44

the present case the Division Bench has considered and

taken a view following Ghanashyam (supra).

23.4 The grounds as contended in the review application

deal with legal and factual aspects. The said factual aspects

have been considered by the Division Bench in challenge to

the award of the learned Tribunal and have been

discussed/decided. Therefore, the grounds would not come

to the aid of the review petitioner as it would amount to

reappreciation of evidence/material on record which would

not be available to be done by the Court even in an appeal,

much less in exercising review jurisdiction.

23.5 The legal issues raised in grounds of review are

reiteration of contentions those were raised in writ petition

and rejected, such contentions cannot be reheard and

reconsidered again in review.

23.6 Further, the relief as sought at the time of arguing the

writ application which have been negatived cannot be

reconsidered.

24. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, we

have also gone through the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra). We

take note of the paragraphs-91, 95, 108 and 109 which are

reproduced herein:

91. It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v.

Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [(1955) 1 SCR 520 :

AIR 1954 SC 526] this Court made observations as

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 41 of 44

regards limitations in the application of review of its

order stating: (SCR p. 529)

“Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to

bear in mind the scope of the application for review

which has given rise to the present appeal. It is

needless to emphasise that the scope of an application

for review is much more restricted than that of an

appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of

Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47

Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of

review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by

the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.

It may allow a review on three specified grounds,

namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or

evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was

not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be

produced by him at the time when the decree was

passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has

been held by the Judicial Committee that the words

‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason

sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those

specified in the rule’.”

but the said rule is not universal.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

95. Furthermore, the impugned order is interlocutory in

nature. The order is not wholly without jurisdiction so

as to warrant interference of this Court at this stage.

The Division Bench of the High Court had jurisdiction to

admit the review application and examine the

contention as to whether it can have a relook over the

matter. This Court, it is trite, ordinarily would not

interfere with an interlocutory order admitting a review

petition. The contentions raised before us as regards

the justification or otherwise of the Division Bench

exercising its power of review can be raised before it.

Furthermore, the Court having regard to clause (ii) of its

order dated 29-9-2004 may have to consider as to

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 42 of 44

whether the election was held in accordance with the

constitution of the Board and the Rules and Bye-laws

framed by it.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

108. However, keeping in view the fact that the elected

office-bearers are yet to take over charge, with a view

to do complete justice to the parties, we would in

exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution direct that the adjourned meeting should

immediately be convened. As regards the election of the

office-bearers of the Board, it would further be open to

an aggrieved party to question the legality or validity of

the said meeting dated 29-9-2004. Netaji also may, if it

is otherwise permissible in law, subject to an

appropriate order that may be passed by the Madras

High Court, file an application for amendment of the

plaint or take such other step or steps as it may be

advised.

109. Keeping in view the fact that on 8-10-2004 when

the impugned order was passed the new Board had not

taken over as also having regard to the prayer made in

the interim application filed by Netaji for grant of

interim injunction restraining the newly elected Board

from functioning in the interim, we make our interim

order dated 11-10-2004 staying the operation of the

part of the order whereby Mr. Justice S. Mohan was

appointed as an interim administrator absolute, leaving

the parties to file such interim applications as may be

necessary in the changed situation.”

25. The judicial pronouncements relied upon on behalf of

the petitioner and dealt in the preceding paragraphs, would

be of no avail for it’s cause as the fact matrix of those cases

are at miles apart from the facts of the present petition. A

decision is only an authority for the proposition laid down in

a given fact matrix, and not for all that, would logically

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 43 of 44

follow from what has been so laid down or every observation

made, said the Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor more

than a century ago in Quinn v. Leathem

4

and we quote:

“Before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, [1898] AC

1 and what was decided therein, there are two

observations of a general character which I wish to

make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said

before-that every judgment must be read as applicable

to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved,

since the generality of the expressions which may be

found there are not intended to be expositions of the

whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular

facts of the case in which such expressions are to be

found. The other is that a case is only an authority for

what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be

quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow legically

from it. Such a mode for reasoning assumes that the law

is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must

acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. I

think that the application of these two propositions

renders the decision of this case perfectly plain,

notwithstanding the decision in Allen v. Flood(1).”

[Underlined to supply emphasis]

26. Further, it has to be and is held that the suggested

grounds seeking review are not errors manifest on the

judgment and that they do not undermine soundness of the

judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the writ

application.

26.1 We do not find any material error, manifest on the face

of the judgment in the writ application nor can we ‘revisit’

the judgment when the matter is being ‘reargued’ in review.

4

[1901] UKHL 2:3[1901] AC 495:[1900-3] All E.R. Rep.1 (Page-7, placitum H & I of All E.R.)

RVWPET NO.399 of 2023 Page 44 of 44

27. In view of the discussions made above, the review

application being devoid of any merit has to be and is

dismissed.

No costs.

I agree.

(HARISH TANDON) (MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

The 5

th

day of November, 2026/Jyostna/Radha

Prasant