IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

RESERVED ON: 13.05.2026

DELIVERED ON: 19.05.2026

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH

WPA 10962 OF 2026

FLEMINGO DUTYFREE SHOP PRIVATE LIMITED

VERSUS

AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ANR.

Appearance:-

Mr. Amitesh Banerjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Krishnaraj Thaker, Sr. Adv.

Mrs. Nasrin Sultana, Adv.

Mr. R. Singh, Adv.

Mr. A. Bhat, Adv.

Mr. V. Nath, Adv.

Mr. N. Prasad. Adv.

…………….. for the Petitioner

Mr. Shashwat Nayak, Adv.

Mr. Dipankar Das, Adv.

Mr. M. Bhattacharyya, Adv.

. … for the Airport Authority of India.

Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Arindam Guha, Adv.

Mr. S. Sengupta, Adv.

Ms. S. Dey, Adv.

…………… for the Respondent No. 2

JUDGMENT

Gaurang Kanth, J.:-

1. The Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India challenging the tender evaluation process

undertaken by the Respondent Authorities in respect of the Request for

Proposal (hereinafter referred to as "RFP") dated 20.01.2026, issued by the

Respondent No. 1, Airports Authority of India, for the development,

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operation and maintenance of Duty-Free Outlets at Netaji Subhas

Chandra Bose International Airport, Kolkata.

2. The facts leading to the present case are as follows:

3. The Petitioner, Flemingo Duty Freeshop Pvt. Ltd., is a company engaged in

the business of managing and operating duty-free retail outlets at

international airports across India. The Petitioner has been operating duty-

free outlets at Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport, Kolkata,

having emerged as the successful bidder pursuant to a Request for

Proposal issued in September 2015. The Petitioner's Concession

Agreement, originally for a period of seven years, was extended by

Respondent No. 1, Airports Authority of India, owing to the unprecedented

disruption caused to international passenger operations and the travel

retail sector, and the extended term remained valid until 21.04.2026.

4. On 20.01.2026, Respondent No. 1 issued a fresh Request for Proposal for

the development, operation and maintenance of Duty-Free Outlets at

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport, Kolkata.

5. Prior to participating in the fresh tender process, the Petitioner had filed

Writ Petition No. WPA 3830/2026 titled Flemingo Duty Freeshop Pvt. Ltd. v.

AAI, challenging the legality and validity of Clause 2.2.1 of the RFP

pertaining to the eligibility criterion relating to "Outstanding Dues," as well

as Article 7.3.1 of the draft Concession Agreement, which provided for

unilateral set-off and adjustment of alleged dues. This Court, vide order

dated 05.03.2026, directed Respondent No. 1 to permit the Petitioner to

participate in the tender without imposing the condition prescribed under

Clause 2.2.2(d) thereof. Pursuant to the said order, the Petitioner

submitted its bid in response to the RFP.

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6. The terms and conditions of the RFP, read with the provisions of the AAI

Commercial Manual, 2025, stipulated that all communications, queries

and clarifications pertaining to the bid process were required to be routed

exclusively through the Central Public Procurement Portal ("CPP Portal"),

with the stated objective of ensuring transparency, uniformity and equal

treatment of all participating bidders.

7. During the course of evaluation of the bids received, the Respondent

Authorities, vide communication dated 20.04.2026, issued a query to

Respondent No. 2, Nuance Group (India) Private Limited, under the

heading "Shortfall of Documents," noting that Respondent No. 2 had not

duly signed and stamped certain specified pages of the Chartered

Accountant certified documents submitted along with the bid, and

directing Respondent No. 2 to resubmit duly signed and stamped

documents. Respondent No. 2 resubmitted the said documents on

23.04.2026, thereby rectifying the deficiencies noted. It is further stated

that Respondent No. 2 had affixed a digital signature in place of a manual

signature on the documents so submitted.

8. On the same date, i.e., 20.04.2026, the Respondent Authorities also sought

clarifications and additional documents from the Petitioner. However,

unlike the communications pertaining to Respondent No. 2, the said

communications to the Petitioner were transmitted through direct private

electronic mail, rather than through the CPP Portal as mandated under the

RFP and the Commercial Manual. The Petitioner duly responded to the

said communications on 23.04.2026.

9. The Petitioner thereafter addressed formal representations dated

24.04.2026 and 27.04.2026, and a further email dated 07.05.2026, to the

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Respondent Authorities, particularising the alleged irregularities in the

evaluation process and calling upon the Respondents to take corrective

action.

10. In response thereto, Respondent No. 1, vide reply letter dated 11.05.2026,

sought to justify its conduct by contending that: (i) the evaluation process

was being conducted strictly in accordance with Clause 3.3 of the RFP; (ii)

clarifications were sought as and when necessitated during the course of

evaluation; (iii) the second request for shortfall documents was transmitted

through electronic mail, instead of through the CPP Portal, solely on

account of a technical glitch in the Portal and only after obtaining requisite

sanction from the competent authority; and (iv) copies of such

communication were simultaneously marked to all other participating

bidders in the interest of transparency.

11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid tender evaluation process, the Petitioner

has preferred the present writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

12. It is also pertinent to note that during the pendency of the present

proceedings, the financial bids submitted pursuant to the RFP were

opened on 12.05.2026, whereafter Respondent No. 2, Nuance Group

(India) Private Limited, was declared as the successful bidder.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

13. Mr. Amitesh Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Petitioner urged, that the Respondent Authorities adopted different and

inconsistent standards while evaluating the bids submitted by the various

bidders, and impermissibly permitted Respondent No. 2 to rectify and

supplement alleged deficiencies in their bid after the deadline for

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submission, an indulgence which was not extended to the Petitioner in

comparable circumstances. It was pointed out that Respondent No. 2, vide

communication dated 20.04.2026, was allowed to resubmit pages of the

Chartered Accountant certified documents that were not duly signed and

stamped, and had further affixed digital signatures in place of mandatory

manual signatures, all of which discrepancies were condoned by the

Respondent Authorities. It was submitted that such selective leniency,

extended to one bidder while denied to another similarly situated bidder,

amounts to hostile discrimination and is violative of the right to equality

guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which mandates

that State action must be free from arbitrariness and that persons

similarly situated must be treated alike. It was additionally contended that

the bid of Respondent No. 2 suffers from material deficiencies in statutory

certifications, notarisation and mandatory disclosure requirements, which

ought to have rendered the said bid non-compliant and liable to outright

rejection at the threshold stage of evaluation under the RFP.

14. It was submitted that the Respondent Authorities acted contrary to the

express terms and conditions of the tender as well as the provisions of the

AAI Commercial Manual, 2025 governing the tender process, by soliciting

clarifications and additional documents from the Petitioner through private

electronic mail communications, rather than through the CPP Portal as

expressly mandated. It was further contended that such deviation from the

prescribed procedure adversely affects the transparency and equal

treatment that are the cornerstones of a fair procurement process, and

that the explanation of a technical glitch offered by Respondent No. 1 in its

reply dated 11.05.2026 is neither contemplated under the RFP as a

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permissible exception nor sufficient to cure the procedural impropriety

occasioned thereby.

15. It was further urged that certain communications transmitted during the

course of the tender evaluation process were routed through an

undisclosed third-party email domain not attributable to Respondent No. 1

or any of its authorized agencies, thereby raising serious and legitimate

concerns regarding the transparency, confidentiality and integrity of the

overall procurement process. It was submitted that the identity of the

persons operating the said third-party domain has not been disclosed and

that the Petitioner is unable to ascertain whether sensitive bid-related

information has been exposed to unauthorized parties or whether the

communications so transmitted have been tampered with, rendering the

entire evaluation process suspect.

16. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the Petitioner placed reliance upon

the decision of the Orissa High Court, Cuttack in WP(C) No. 3714/2016

in Maquet Medical India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Odisha State Medical

Corporation Ltd. & Anr., the judgment of the Kerala High Court in WA

No. 1342/2018 in ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Kerala

State Warehouse Corporation , and the decision of the Punjab and

Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in M/s Shyamji Transport Company

v. FCI, Civil Writ Petition No. 12046/2014, in support of the proposition

that deviation from prescribed tender procedures and differential

treatment of bidders by State authorities is impermissible and renders the

procurement process liable to be interfered with by a Constitutional Court

exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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17. Mr. Sanjoy Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Petitioner, supplementing the arguments advanced by Mr. Amitesh

Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel, urged that the conduct of Respondent

No. 1, viewed in its entirety and proper perspective, discloses a consistent

and discernible intention on the part of the Respondent Authorities to

exclude the Petitioner from participation in the tender process. It was

pointed out that the Petitioner was able to participate in the impugned

tender solely by virtue of the order dated 05.03.2026 passed by this Court

in WPA No. 3830/2026, and that, but for the said judicial intervention, the

Petitioner would have been unlawfully shut out from the procurement

process altogether. It was further contended that whereas the Respondent

Authorities condoned the affixation of digital signatures by Respondent No.

2 in place of mandatory manual signatures, the requirement of original

manual signatures on bid documents is a substantive condition going to

the root of the integrity of the process, inasmuch as it serves as a critical

safeguard against manipulation, interpolation and unauthorized alteration

of documents submitted in a competitive public procurement process, and

any dilution of the said requirement in favour of a particular bidder is

wholly impermissible.

18. Concluding their submissions, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner

urged that the cumulative effect of the aforesaid irregularities and acts of

commission and omission on the part of Respondent No. 1 unmistakably

demonstrates that the tender evaluation process was conducted in a

manifestly unfair and partisan manner, with a view to conferring undue

advantage upon Respondent No. 2. It was accordingly prayed that this

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Hon'ble Court be pleased to allow the writ petition and grant the reliefs as

prayed for therein.

Submissions on behalf of the RespondentNo.1

19. Mr. Shashwat Nayak, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent

No. 1 opposed the writ petition and submitted that the tender evaluation

process was conducted in strict conformity with the terms of the RFP and

the applicable procedural framework. It was submitted that Clause 7.8.5 of

Chapter 7 of the RFP document, dealing with Concession Procedure,

Design, Develop and Award, expressly contemplates that during the course

of scrutiny of bids, if it is observed that documents are deficient, that a

bidder has not submitted documents in terms of the NIT/Tender

Document, or that certain clarifications are required, the Respondent

Authorities are empowered, with the approval of the NIT Approving

Authority, to call for such shortfall documents or clarifications from the

concerned bidder. It was further clarified that the only circumstance in

which a bid may be rejected straightway, without affording any

opportunity to cure deficiencies, is where the EMD, Tender Fee or

Unconditional Acceptance Letter has not been submitted by the bidder. It

was submitted that in cases of e-tenders, such shortfall documents and

clarifications are ordinarily required to be sought through the e-tender

portal only, with a maximum of two opportunities being afforded to a

bidder for furnishing the same. It was accordingly contended that the RFP

itself expressly permits the Respondent Authorities to seek clarifications

and deficient documents from bidders, and that the same procedure was

uniformly adopted in respect of all participating bidders, including the

Petitioner, without any discrimination whatsoever.

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20. It was further submitted that the present tender is a project of considerable

magnitude and commercial significance, and that Respondent No. 1, as the

tendering authority, was consciously disinclined to reject any bid on

hyper-technical grounds, where the substantive merits of the bid could be

ascertained upon receipt of clarifications or shortfall documents. It was

contended that the said approach was applied uniformly and consistently

to all bidders, and that clarifications were sought from the Petitioner as

well on the same basis. As regards the deviation from the CPP Portal for

transmission of the communication to the Petitioner, it was submitted that

the same was occasioned solely by a technical failure of the Portal, and

that in view of such technical exigency, the communication was

transmitted through electronic mail after obtaining requisite sanction from

the competent authority, with copies being simultaneously marked to all

other participating bidders, thereby ensuring that no prejudice was caused

to any party and that the transparency of the process was duly

maintained.

21. On the question of the scope of judicial review in tender matters, learned

Counsel for Respondent No. 1 submitted that it is well-settled law that

though the power of judicial review of tender decisions is undoubted, it

must be exercised with circumspection and restraint, and that

Constitutional Courts do not sit as appellate authorities over tender

evaluation decisions taken by expert administrative bodies. It was

submitted that interference by a Court in contractual and procurement

matters is warranted only where the decision-making process is shown to

be vitiated by palpable arbitrariness, mala fides, or patent illegality

causing immediate and demonstrable prejudice to the aggrieved party, and

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that none of these ingredients are made out in the facts of the present

case. In support of the aforesaid propositions, Respondent No. 1 placed

reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Tata

Motors Ltd. v. The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport

Undertaking, reported as (2023) 19 SCC 1, as well as the decision in

N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain reported as 2022 (6) SCC 127 ,

urging that the impugned evaluation process discloses no infirmity

warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India, and that the writ petition is accordingly liable to be dismissed.

Submission on behalf of Respondent No. 2

22. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

Respondent No. 2 adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of

Respondent No. 1 and supplemented the same with the following

additional contentions. It was submitted that Clause 2.17.3 of the RFP

expressly provides that any alteration, modification or additional

information supplied by a bidder subsequent to the proposal due date,

unless specifically sought by the Authority, shall be disregarded. It was

contended that the said provision, properly construed, necessarily and

impliedly recognises the authority of Respondent No. 1 to call for

additional information, documents or clarifications from bidders during

the evaluation process, for it is only in the absence of such a requisition by

the Authority that unsolicited post-submission material is liable to be

disregarded. The converse position, namely, that information or

documents specifically sought by the Authority may legitimately be

furnished by a bidder after the proposal due date, is thus expressly

contemplated and sanctioned by the terms of the RFP itself.

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23. It was accordingly submitted that when Respondent No. 1, vide

communication dated 20.04.2026, pointed out the shortfall in the

documents submitted by Respondent No. 2, the said communication was

issued in due exercise of the authority's power expressly recognised under

the RFP, and Respondent No. 2, in furnishing the requisite documents in

response thereto, acted in strict conformity with the terms of the tender

and in accordance with law. It was urged that the conduct of both

Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 throughout the evaluation

process was entirely regular, transparent and in consonance with the

applicable contractual and procedural framework, and that the allegations

of arbitrariness, mala fides or hostile discrimination levelled against the

Respondents are wholly misconceived, unsupported by the materials on

record. It was accordingly prayed that the writ petition be dismissed with

costs, and that this Court decline to interfere with the impugned tender

evaluation process, which has been conducted fairly, transparently and in

strict conformity with the terms of the RFP and the applicable law.

Legal Analysis

24. This Court has heard the arguments advanced by the learned Senior

Counsels appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and the learned Counsels

appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and has carefully

examined the pleadings, documents and materials placed on record.

25. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope and limits of the power

of judicial review in matters pertaining to public procurement and tender

evaluation. It is well settled by a long and consistent line of decisions of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that though the power of judicial

review of administrative decisions in contractual matters is undoubted,

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Constitutional Courts do not function as appellate authorities over the

merits of tender evaluation decisions taken by expert administrative

bodies. Interference by a Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India is warranted only in exceptional circumstances,

where the decision making process is demonstrated to be vitiated by

palpable arbitrariness, mala fides, or patent illegality causing immediate

and demonstrable prejudice to the aggrieved party. In Tata Motors Ltd. v.

The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking

(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated with considerable emphasis

that in matters of tender evaluation, Courts must exercise restraint and

defer to the judgment of the tendering authority, which possesses the

requisite technical expertise and domain knowledge to assess the

suitability and compliance of bids. The said principle is equally affirmed in

N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain (supra), wherein it was held that

judicial intervention in procurement decisions is not warranted merely

because a party aggrieved by the outcome of the evaluation process urges

an alternative interpretation of the tender conditions. Tested on the anvil

of the aforesaid well-established principles, this Court finds that the

impugned evaluation process discloses no infirmity of a nature or degree

that would justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

26. The primary contention of the Petitioner that Respondent No. 2 was

extended differential and preferential treatment by being permitted to

resubmit deficient documents, is also found to be without substance upon

a careful examination of the record. Clause 7.8.5 of Chapter 7 of the RFP

expressly empowers the Respondent Authorities, with the approval of the

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NIT Approving Authority, to seek shortfall documents and clarifications

from bidders during the scrutiny process. The said provision forms an

integral and deliberate part of the contractual framework governing the

tender, and the exercise of such power by Respondent No. 1 cannot,

therefore, be characterised as an act contrary to the terms of the RFP or as

an act of undue favour extended to any particular bidder. It is evident from

the materials placed before this Court that the procedure of calling for

shortfall documents was uniformly adopted in respect of all participating

bidders, including the Petitioner, in exercise of the power expressly

conferred under Clause 7.8.5 of the RFP, which contemplates a maximum

of two opportunities being afforded to a bidder for furnishing shortfall

documents or clarifications. The allegation of selective leniency being

extended exclusively to Respondent No. 2 is thus found to be factually

unsustainable. The mere fact that the nature and extent of the deficiencies

noted in the respective bids of different bidders varied from bidder to

bidder does not, by itself, give rise to an inference of discriminatory

treatment. Equal treatment in the context of tender evaluation signifies the

application of the same standards and criteria to all participating bidders,

and this Court finds that the said standard has been scrupulously adhere

to in the present case.

27. As regards the contention that the bid of Respondent No. 2 is vitiated by

material deficiencies in statutory certifications, notarisation requirements

and mandatory disclosure obligations, this Court is of the view that the

evaluation of bid documents and the determination of their compliance

with the requirements of the RFP falls squarely within the domain of the

tendering authority, being best placed to assess the same. It is noted that

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the alleged deficiencies were identified and brought to the notice of

Respondent No. 2 by Respondent No. 1 itself, in the transparent exercise of

its power under Clause 7.8.5 of the RFP, and Respondent No. 2 duly

rectified the same in strict conformity with the prescribed procedure. The

question as to whether the bid of Respondent No. 2 was, upon such

rectification, compliant with the requirements of the RFP is essentially a

matter of technical evaluation falling within the exclusive province of the

tendering authority. In the absence of any material on record to establish

that the decision to accept the bid of Respondent No. 2 as compliant was

arbitrary, mala fide or patently illegal, this Court declines to substitute its

own assessment for that of the expert authority.

28. The second grievance of the Petitioner is that clarifications and shortfall

documents were sought from the Petitioner through private electronic mail

rather than through the CPP Portal as mandated under the RFP and the

Commercial Manual. This Court has carefully considered the said

contention and finds it difficult to sustain. It is noted that the deviation

from the CPP Portal was occasioned solely by a technical failure of the

Portal, and that the impugned communication was transmitted through

electronic mail only after obtaining requisite sanction from the competent

authority, with copies being simultaneously marked to all other

participating bidders so as to ensure transparency and equal access to

information. In the considered view of this Court, such a deviation,

occasioned by a technical exigency and accompanied by adequate

safeguards to maintain transparency, does not amount to a substantive or

material violation of the tender conditions so as to warrant judicial

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interference. Significantly, no demonstrable prejudice to the Petitioner

arising from the said deviation has been established on record.

29. The contention of the Petitioner regarding the use of an undisclosed third-

party email domain for transmission of certain communications during the

evaluation process is found to be vague, unsubstantiated and unsupported

by any cogent or specific material on record. The Petitioner has not placed

before this Court any concrete evidence to demonstrate that the use of the

said email domain resulted in any breach of confidentiality, exposure of

sensitive bid related information to unauthorised parties, or tampering

with any communication transmitted in the course of the evaluation

process. A mere apprehension or suspicion, howsoever earnestly

articulated, cannot constitute sufficient ground for this Court to interfere

with a public procurement process of this magnitude under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India.

30. This Court has carefully examined the three decisions placed on record by

the Petitioner in support of its contentions and is of the considered view

that not only are the said decisions clearly distinguishable on facts, but

that each of them, upon a proper reading, paradoxically lends support to

the case of the Respondents rather than the Petitioner.

31. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Maquet Medical India Pvt. Ltd.

& Anr. v. Odisha State Medical Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (supra), upon

a closer examination, actually advances the case of the Respondents. In

that case, the Court upheld the outright rejection of a bid where

Declaration Format T5, as uploaded on the portal, did not bear any

signature whatsoever, and further held that since the said document was

required to be notarised, the affixation of a digital signature in place of a

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manual signature was impermissible, as it demonstrated that the

executant had not personally appeared before the Notary Public. The facts

of the present case are materially and fundamentally different. The

deficiency noted by Respondent No. 1 in the bid of Respondent No. 2 was

confined merely to the absence of the bidder's counter-signature on merely

two pages out of a voluminous bulk of CA certified documents, a deficiency

which did not go to the root of the bid's authenticity or compliance. The

tendering authority, in the lawful exercise of its expert judgment,

considered the said deficiency to be of a minor and curable nature,

insufficient to warrant outright rejection, and accordingly invoked the

express power vested in it under Clause 7.8.5 of the RFP to afford

Respondent No. 2 an opportunity to resubmit the deficient pages. It is well

settled that the tendering authority is best placed to assess the materiality

of deficiencies in bid documents, and its decision to treat a deficiency as

curable rather than fatal is entitled to judicial deference in the absence of

any demonstrable arbitrariness or mala fides. This Court finds no infirmity

whatsoever in the said decision, and the reliance placed by the Petitioner

upon Maquet Medical India (supra) is accordingly wholly misconceived

and deserves to be rejected.

32. The judgment of the Kerala High Court in ATC Telecom Infrastructure

Pvt. Ltd. v. Kerala State Warehouse Corporation (supra) is equally

distinguishable and in fact operates against the Petitioner. In that case,

the Division Bench upheld the rejection of a bid where the Petitioner had

failed to sign the General Conditions of Contract, holding that such failure

carried the substantive implication of the bidder's non-acceptance of and

non-consent to the terms and conditions governing the contract, and

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affirmed that it is for the tendering authority, and not the Court, to

determine whether a particular deficiency is fatal or curable, and that such

determination is entitled to judicial deference. The present case stands on

an entirely different footing. The deficiency noted in the bid of Respondent

No. 2 was confined merely to the absence of counter signature on two

pages of a voluminous CA certified document, which, unlike the failure to

sign the General Conditions of Contract, carries no implication of non-

acceptance of or non-consent to the tender terms. The tendering authority,

in the lawful exercise of its expert judgment under Clause 7.8.5 of the RFP,

consciously and deliberately assessed the said deficiency as minor and

curable. The ratio of ATC Telecom (supra), rather than supporting the

Petitioner, in fact affirms that such an assessment by the tendering

authority is entitled to be respected, and this Court finds no reason to take

a different view in the present case.

33. The decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s Shyamji

Transport Company v. FCI (supra) is equally distinguishable and turns

against the Petitioner. In that case, the Court upheld the rejection of a bid

where the Petitioner had failed to sign a mandatory document, and the

tender conditions contained an express clause providing that non-

compliance with the said requirement shall entail outright rejection. The

present case stands on an entirely different footing. The deficiency noted in

the bid of Respondent No. 2 was confined to the absence of counter

signature on two pages of a voluminous CA certified document, and

crucially, unlike the tender conditions in Shyamji Transport (supra), the

RFP in the present case contains Clause 7.8.5 which expressly empowers

the tendering authority to call for shortfall documents and afford an

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opportunity of rectification, which power was duly and lawfully exercised

by Respondent No. 1. All three decisions relied upon by the Petitioner thus

uniformly affirm the overarching principle of judicial deference to the

decision making authority of the tendering body, and paradoxically lend

support to the Respondents rather than the Petitioner. The reliance placed

upon them is accordingly liable to be rejected.

34. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion

that the tender evaluation process undertaken by Respondent No. 1 in

respect of the RFP dated 20.01.2026 does not suffer from any infirmity of

arbitrariness, mala fides or patent illegality so as to warrant interference

by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner

has accordingly failed to establish any ground justifying judicial

intervention in the impugned procurement process.

35. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.

(GAURANG KANTH, J.)

SAKIL AMED (P.A)