HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

* * * *

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2 425 of 2025

Between:

G. Chaya Padmini

..... PETITIONER

AND

Mutta Lakshmi Narasamma and 3 others

....RESPONDENTS

DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED : 07.03.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 10.04.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED : 10.04.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

_______________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

2

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2425 of 2025

% 10.04.2026

# G. Chaya Padmini

….Petitioner

Versus

$ Mutta Lakshmi Narasamma and 3 others

....Respondents

! Counsel for the Petitioner : M. S. V. S. Sudha Rani

^ Counsel for respondents : None appeared

< Gist :

> Head Note:

? Cases Referred:

1. AIR 1939 Bom 188

2. AIR 1950 Kutch 96

3. AIR 1969 Guj 150

4. 2007 SCC OnLine AP 621

5. 1934 SCC OnLine All 37 (FB)

6. 1981 SCC OnLine All 332

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

3

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 2425 of 2025

JUDGMENT:

Heard Ms. M.S.V.S.Sudha Rani, learned counsel for the petitioner. None

appears for the respondents in spite of service.

2. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

has been filed by the defendant in the suit, challenging the Order dated

15.07.2025, by which, the petitioner‟s application I. A. No. 565 of 2022 in O. S.

No. 1225 of 2017, under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) read with Section 151 of

Code of Civil Procedure (in short „CPC‟) has been rejected by the learned VI

Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Visakhapatnam.

I. Facts:

3. O.S.No.1225 of 2017 was filed for a decree of payment of money with

interest based on the mortgage deed in Document No.445/2004 , dated

26.02.2004 and in case of default, to pass a final decree for sale of the plaint

schedule property i.e., the mortgage property with some further reliefs.

4. The petitioner/defendant filed written statement and the suit is

pending before the Court of VI Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Visakhapatnam. I.A.No.565 of 2022 was filed by the petitioner for rejection of

the plaint under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order VI Rule 11 CPC. The plea was

taken that the suit is barred by limitation. The husband of the 1

st

respondent

(1

st

plaintiff) and the father of the respondents 2, 3 and 4 (plaintiffs 2 to 4) the

minors by name Mutta Pydiraju, represented by the 1

st

plaintiff, died on

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

4

04.01.2014, and in his favour the mortgage deed was executed. The plaintiffs

did not obtain succession certificate before filing of the suit as per Section 214

of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The plea taken was that the suit was filed

without obtaining succession certificate and so was not maintainable under law.

Further, that it was barred by limitation having been filed on 11.10.2017, after

more than 12 years from the date of the mortgage deed, dated 26.02.2004.

5. The plaintiffs/respondents filed objections/counter in the application.

The execution of the mortgage deed dated 26.02.2004 was admitted which was

not cancelled at any point of time. The petitioner/defendant did not deny that

the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the deceased Pydiraju. It was pleaded that

the succession certificate was not required and on the plea of limitation, it was

pleaded that though the mortgage deed was executed on 26.02.2004 and the

suit was filed on 11.10.2017, but as per para-4 of the mortgage deed, the

principal and interest amount was payable within two years from the date of

execution of the mortgage deed. So, the period of limitation started after two

years from the date of execution i.e., with effect from 25.02.2006 and so the

suit was filed within 12 years period. The application was filed to drag on the

proceedings of the suit and deserved rejection.

II. Impugned Order of the Trial Court:

6. The learned trial Court framed the following point for consideration:

“Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief of rejection of plaint

filed by respondents in O.S,No.1225 of 2017, as prayed for?”

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

5

7. The learned VI Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Visakhapatnam

held that as per Article 62 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation, to

enforce payment of money secured by a Mortgage Deed, of 12 years,

commences from the date when the money sued for becomes due. As per the

recitals of the registered mortgage deed, two years from the date of execution

of the mortgage deed was clearly provided for making payment which was

completed on 25.02.2006, and therefore, the suit filed on 11.10.2017 was

within the period of limitation of 12 years.

8. On the point of requirement of succession certificate to file the suit by

the plaintiffs on the death of Pydiraju, the learned trial Court held that the

plaintiffs are the Class-I legal heirs and the suit was filed in that capacity for

recovery of money due under the registered mortgage deed. On such point of

necessity of succession certificate for the plaintiffs to institute the suit, the

learned trial Court held that on a plain reading of Section 214 of the Indian

Succession Act, the same does not provide any bar for institution of the suit. It

further held that the defendant herself admitted in the written statement that

the plaintiffs/respondents are legal heirs of the deceased Pydiraju. So, in view

of such an admission, any formal direction to the plaintiffs, the legal heirs of the

deceased Pydiraju for filing succession certificate was not required.

9. The learned trial Court further observed that after filing of the suit,

the defendant/petitioner filed written statement and after framing of issues the

matter was taken up for trial. At the stage of cross-examination of PW 1, the

petitioner came up with the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC along with

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

6

another petition under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC to frame preliminary issue but that

petition under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC was not pressed on 27.06.2025 in view of

filing of the petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

10. Thus, considered, the learned trial Court dismissed the application.

III. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the succession

certificate was required for the plaintiffs to institute the suit for recovery of

money based on mortgage deed executed in favour of the late husband of the

1

st

plaintiff and father of the plaintiffs 2 to 4.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the suit was

barred on the face of the plaint as the mortgage deed was executed on

26.02.2004 and the suit was filed in the year 2017 after more than 12 years.

IV. Points for Determination:

13. Two points arise for consideration and determination:

A. Whether the suit for recovery of debt by the plaintiffs (claiming on

succession from the deceased to be entitled to such debt amount)

without production of Succession Certificate, against the debtor

(defendant) is barred by law under Section 214 of the Indian Succession

Act, 1925?

B. Whether the suit is barred by Law of Limitation, Article 62 of the

Limitation Act, having been filed beyond 12 years from the date of

execution of the Mortgage Deed? In other words, what is the starting

point of limitation of 12 years under Article 62 of the Limitation Act?

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

7

V. Consideration:

14. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the

material on record.

15. Before this Court also, it has not been disputed that the plaintiff No.1

is the widow and plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the daughters and son respectively of late

Pydiraju.

Point ‘A’:

16. Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act provides as under:

“214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery

through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons.—

(1)No Court shall—

(a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his

debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effect of the

deceased person or to any part thereof, or

(b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to

execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt,

except on the production, by the person so claiming of—

(i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of

administration to the estate of the deceased, or

(ii) a certificate granted under section 31 or section 32 of the

Administrator- General‟s Act, 1913 (3 of 1913), and having the debt

mentioned therein, or

(iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt

sepcified therein, or

(iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 18891 (7 of

1889), or

(iv) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827,

and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889 having the debt

specified therein.

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

8

(2) The word "debt" in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent,

revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes.

17. A perusal of Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act shows, that no

Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of a decreased person for payment

of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effect of the

deceased person or to any part thereof, under clause (a), except on the

production by the person so claiming of, inter alia, succession certification

granted under either of the clauses (i) to (v) of subsection (1) of Section 214.

18. A bare reading of Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act shows

that the bar thereunder is not for institution of the suit, but (a) for passing of a

decree and (b) for execution of decree. Section 214 therefore does not bar

filing or institution of a suit by the legal heirs or representatives of the deceased

against the debtor. So, filing of the suit is not barred without succession

certificate by Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act.

19. Production of a succession certificate is not a condition precedent to

the maintenance of the suit nor its trial. It only prohibits the Court from

passing a decree or execution of a decree without the person claiming the same

producing the succession certificate, if required at all before passing a decree

inasmuch as in case of admission of the defendant about the plaintiffs being the

legal heirs, there may not be a necessity to prove that, by filing Succession

Certificate.

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

9

20. In Virbhadrappa Shilvant Shop at Barsi v. Shekabai Kom

Harun Sayad Ahmed Arab

1

the Bombay High Court held as under:

“The question is, whether having regard to the defect in procedure, the

claim of the estate to recover the debt should be defeated. There is no doubt that

the provisions of s. 214 of the Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925) govern the

procedure in such cases. Those provisions as interpreted by several decisions

merely emphasize that the Court cannot pass a final decree in the absence

of a certificate. Merely because a suit is instituted without a certificate, it does

not debar the plaintiffs from producing the certificate before the decree is

passed. There have been instances where a Court has deferred passing a decree

pending the production of a proper certificate. It has been argued for the

appellants that as there was a defect in the institution of the suit by reason of the

omission to produce a certificate along with the plaint the suit could not be

regarded as having been properly filed when it was originally registered, and

that for the purpose of limitation, the suit could be regarded as properly

instituted only when the certificate is produced. No authority has been cited in

support of that view. In Kammathi v. Mangappa [(1892) 16 Mad. 454.] it was

held that where the Court considered that a certificate was necessary, it

was enough to produce the certificate before the decree—(see also Raichand

Dhanji v. Jivraj Bhavanji [(1930) 56 Bom. 65.] , and Chandra Kishore

Roy v. Prasanna Kumari [(1910) L.R. 38 I.A. 7, S.C. 38 Cal. 327.] .

In Gulshan Ali v. Zakir Ali [(1920) 42 All. 549.] the Court observed that

there was no provision of law which required that a certificate must be

filed along with the plaint, and that an opportunity should be given to the

plaintiffs for obtaining and producing one. With respect we agree with that

view.

21. In Murji Asu v. Shamji Mavji

2

it was held that Section 214

prohibits the passing of a decree not trial of a suit. Section 214 of the Indian

1

AIR 1939 Bom 188

2

AIR 1950 Kutch 96

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

10

Succession Act only requires production of Succession certificate at any time

before the decree is passed.

22. In Bai Sarda v. Patel

3

the Gujarat High Court held that Section 214

of the Succession Act prohibits the Court from passing a decree unless a

succession certificate is produced in the case. In that case, the issue was as to

whether the plaintiff therein could institute a suit without obtaining a succession

certificate and it was ordered by the learned trial Court that the plaintiff should

file the certificate within two months and in failing to do so it was ordered that

the suit be dismissed. It was held by the Gujarat High Court that the order was

obviously erroneous and contrary to the express provisions of Section 214 of

the Indian Succession Act which only required the production of succession

certificate at any time before the decree was passed.

23. In Sreemanthula Kesavachari v. Yayyavuru Vallamma

4

on the

necessity of succession certificate under Section 214 of the Indian Succession

Act, this Court held as under:

“In Basappa v. Siddamma, AIR 1966 Mysore 198, the Mysore High Court

held that:

“The Executing Court could not proceed with the execution unless and until the

execution petitioner produces a Succession Certificate as required by Section

214 of the Indian Succession Act.”

In Jinnki Ballav v. Hafiz Mohamed, 13 Cal 47, the Court held that:

“In a suit to recover the debt, the plaintiff is bound to produce a succession

certificate under the Indian Succession Act before he can obtain a decree

already obtained by the deceased though he may institute his suit or apply

3

AIR 1969 Guj 150

4

2007 SCC OnLine AP 621

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

11

for execution without such a certificate, provided it is filed before decree or

execution.”

In Venkatalakshmi v. The Central Bank, (1956) 2 Mad LJ 114, the Madras

High Court held that:

“The object of taking out a succession certificate under Section 214 of the

Indian Succession Act is to give security to the debtors paying the debts

due to the deceased and thus facilitate the collection of debts on succession.

The purpose of the Act is not to enable litigant parties to have an opportunity of

litigating contested questions of title to property. When a Bank is satisfied that

the applicant is entitled to collect the debts it should not prescribe onerous

conditions which are in no way necessary for its safety.”

In Shrimati Sankar v. Pila Debi, 26 CWN 400, the Calcutta High Court

held that:

“Section 214(1)(a) of the Indian Succession Act is only a bar to the

institution of execution proceeding by a person claiming on succession.

There is no bar to the continuance of execution proceedings which have already

been initiated by the deceased Decree Holder.”

In Tejraj v. Mt. Rampyari, AIR 1938 Nag 528, the Bombay High Court

Nagpur Bench held that:

“Where a decree-holder dies during the pendency of his application and his heir

or legal representative applies for substitution of his name for that of the

deceased decree-holder, the Court cannot on that application proceed with the

execution unless succession certificate is produced which falls within the scope

of Section 214(1)(b) of the Indian Succession Act.”

In Mathura Prasad Jamuna Prasad v. Ghasi Ram alias Rajen, 1997 MPLJ

187, the M.P. High Court held that:

“Where the execution sought by the legal heirs of the decree-holder after his

death, Section 214(1)(b) is applicable and succession certificate is necessary.”

In Bhaiyaji v. Jogeshwar Dayal Bajpai, AIR 1978 All 268, the Allahabad

High Court held that:

“The non-production of the documents mentioned in Section 214(a) is no

bar to a suit, but clause (b) is a bar for passing of a decree.”

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

12

In Jadao Bai v. Puranmal, AIR 1944 Nag 243, the Nagpur High Court held

that:

“Where money decree has been obtained by the decree holder, succession

certificate has to be obtained by the widow to execute the decree.”

In Abdul v. Shamseali, AIR 1940 Bom 285, the Bombay High Court held

that:

“The necessity for obtaining a succession certificate cannot be waived by the

parties. The obligation is not merely one in favour of the debtor; it benefits also

those interested in the deceased's estate by requiring that money forming part of

the estate shall only be paid to a person who has been considered suitable for

the grant of a succession certificate.”

In S. Rajyalakshmi v. S. Sitamahalakshmi, AIR 1976 AP 361, the A.P. High

Court held that:

“If the representative of the decree holder is not a person on whom the interest

has developed by survivorship, it will be necessary for him to obtain a

Succession Certificate to recover a debt in execution proceedings under Section

214(1)(b), if the execution petition itself is filed by him. Therefore, in a case

where an execution application is filed by the legal representative of the

deceased, Succession Certificate would be necessary when a „debt‟ is sought to

be recovered. But when the execution is only for recovery of costs, no

succession certificate is essential.”

In LIC of India v. T. Tirupathayya, AIR 1963 AP 353, a Division Bench of

this High Court, while considering the scope of Section 214 of the Succession

Act, 1925, held as follows:

“Under the Hindu Law, there is a distinction between succession and devolution

of property by survivorship. The Succession Act, as is indicated in the

preamble, covers cases of succession only and cases of survivorship are not

within the ambit of that Act. Where a family is a joint Mitakshara family and

the amount sought to be recovered is an asset of the joint family, the plaintiff,

who claims by survivorship, cannot be compelled to take out a succession

certificate to enable him to recover the amount.”

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

13

But, in the present case, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that the amount

sought to be recovered is an asset of the joint family, therefore, Section 214 is

squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

In S.D. Thapa v. M.P. Regmi, AIR 1958 Assam 81, the Gauhati High Court

held that:

“Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act only prohibits recovery of a debt

against the debtor in the absence of a Probate or Succession Certificate. Where

the suit is not against a debtor the provisions of the Section are not attracted,

nor does the Section speak of any certificate in cases where a Probate has been

granted.”

24. The suit is not barred by Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act so

as to be covered under clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

25. So, for want of the succession certificate, under Order VII Rule 11

CPC, the plaint cannot be rejected.

26. On the face of the legal provisions and the legal authorities this Court

is in agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court that the suit is

not barred by Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act.

27. Further, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs are the legal heirs of

Muttu Pydiraju, the mortgagee. On such admitted facts, no proof was required

in the form of succession certificate. So, on this count also the plaint did not

deserve to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

Point ‘B’:

28. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that

the suit was barred by limitation under Article 62 of the Limitation Act.

29. Article 62 of the Limitation Act reads as under:

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

14

“62. To enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise

charged upon immovable property - Twelve years. - When the money sued for

becomes due”.

30. As per the aforesaid Article 62, the period of limitation is 12 years

and the time begins to run from the date when the money sued becomes due.

31. The mortgage deed was executed on 26.02.2004, but it is not the

date of execution of the mortgage deed, but the date on which the money due

thereunder became payable.

32. There is no dispute that the mortgage deed itself provided a period

of two years from the date of execution on completion of which the money

would become due. The relevant part of the mortgage deed reads as under:

“………Accordingly, I will fully discharge all the liabilities of this property,

the amount due, my own liabilities, and the liabilities of other properties

belonging to me for a period of two years from this date…..”

33. It is also apt to reproduce relevant part of para-III (b) of the plaint

as under:

“(b) …………….The defendant also agreed to pay the entire amount

within two years from the date of execution of the mortgage deed…..”

34. That period of two years came to an end on 25.02.2006. The period

of limitation of 12 years then started to run from that date. The suit was filed

on 11.10.2017 which is within the period of limitation which was available up till

25.02.2018. So, on the face of the plaint averments, the suit is not barred by

the Law of Limitation as well.

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

15

35. In Mohammad Hussai v. Sanwal Das

5

, the Full Bench of

Allahabad High Court on reference made on the question “whether in the

circumstances mentioned above, limitation for a decree under Order XXXIV,

Rule 6 commenced to run after the expiry of one year within which the

mortgagor made continued default for payment of interest, or whether it

commenced to run after the expiry of 8 years term stipulated in the

deed?”, answered that the limitation began to run after the expiry of the

stipulated period. It was held that the question whether the mortgagor has a

right to redeem before the expiry of the stipulated period is immaterial. Time

does not begin to run against the mortgagee before the expiry of that period

unless he avails himself of the option inserted exclusively for his benefit. The

option given was that the mortgagor may default the payment, mortgagee shall

have an option to enforce the security at once or to stand by their investment

for the full term. In the present case though that is not the question involved

with respect to the committing default of the mortgagor before the expiry of

the period upto which that debt could be repaid. But Muhammad Husain

(supra) the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court is relevant on the point of the

expression “the money did not become due within the meaning of Article 132”,

i.e., “until the expiry, of the stipulated period”. At that time, Article 132 of the

Limitation Act provided as under the present Article 62, that the limitation

begins „when the money becomes due‟. The answer to the reference by the Full

Bench is as under:

5

1934 SCC OnLine All 37 (FB)

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

16

“By the Court:- the answer to the question referred to us is that the

limitation began to run after the expiry of the stipulated

period.”

36. In Prem Chand v. Mohammad Sayeed

6

Article 132 of the old

Limitation Act was for consideration, same as the present Article 62. The

contention of the learned counsel for the appellant as raised in that case, that

the limitation commenced to run from the date of the mortgage deed was

rejected by the Allahabad High Court observing and holding that in view of the

clear terms of Article 132 there was no basis for that contention. Para-13 in

Prem Chand (supra) reads as under:

“13. The principal premise of the counsel for the appellant was that the period

to limitation for such a suit commences to run from the date of the mortgage

deed. In view of the clear terms of Article 132 there is no basis for this

contention.”

37. No other argument was raised.

VI. Conclusions:

38. For the consideration made above on the points for determination, I

hold and my conclusions are as under:

i) On point (A) it is held that Section 214 of Indian Succession Act does

not bar institution or/and trial of a suit for recovery of debt by the

persons (plaintiffs) claiming on succession from the deceased to be

entitled to such debt amount without production of succession

certification against the debtor (defendant).

6

1981 SCC OnLine All 332

RNT, J

CRP No.2425 of 2025

17

ii) Consequently, on the said ground for want of succession certificate the

suit would not be barred under law on the face of plaint averments and

the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

iii) On point (B) it is held that the limitation of 12 years under Article 62 of

the Limitation Act starts when the “money becomes due” and not from

the date of execution of the mortgage deed. In the present case in

terms of the mortgage deed the money became due on expiry of two

years from the date of execution of the mortgage deed. The suit was

filed within the period of limitation of 12 years.

iv) Consequently on the averments in the plaint, the suit was not barred

neither by Section 214 of Indian Succession Act nor by Article 62 of the

Limitation Act, so as to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.

v) I do not find any illegality in the Order under Challenge.

VII. Result:

39. The civil revision petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed. No

order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in

consequence.

_______________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

Date: 10.04.2026

Dsr/Ag

Note:

LR copy to be marked

B/o

Dsr