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PETITIONER:

G. PONNIAH THEVAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

NELLAYAM PERUMAL PILLAI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1976

BENCH:

BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

BENCH:

BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

RAY, A.N. (CJ)

SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:

1977 AIR 244 1977 SCR (2) 446

1977 SCC (1) 500

CITATOR INFO :

D 1989 SC1110 (18)

ACT:

Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, s, 2(e)

"Landlord", whether relates only to creator of

lease---Section 3(1) whether protects tenancy rights creat-

ed by life-estate holder extending beyond his

life-time--Provisions of Act, whether prospective.

HEADNOTE:

The plaintiffs-respondents who became owners of the land

in dispute, as remainder-men, sued to evict the appellant, a

cultivating tenant, on the ground that his tenancy rights

created by Annamalai Ammal, a life-estate holder had ceased

with her death. The appellant claimed protection under s.

3(1) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955.

The respondents contended that such protection was only

available against the creator of a lease, to persons who

were cultivating tenants in 1955 when the Act came into

force, and not to the appellant who became a cultivating

tenant in 1961.The eviction suit was decreed. by the Dis-

trict Court and the High Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court,

HELD: (1 ) The statutory definition of the term "land-

lord" relates not only to the person who created the lease

but contemplates and takes in every successive holder who

could be entitled to evict a tenant. That. person can only

one who has the right, at the time of filing the suit, to

realise rents or evict persons in wrongful occupation.

[449G-H]

(2) The terms of the statutory protection apply to all

tenancies governed by the Act irrespective of the nature of

rights of the person who leased the land so long as the

lessor was entitled to create a tenancy. [447E]

The Court observed--

The Madras High Court's view that a life estate holder

cannot create a. tenancy which could last beyond his life-

time, applied to statutory tenancies runs counter not only

to the principles underlying creation of statutory tenancy

rights in agricultural land, through out the country, but is

in conflict with the particular statutory protection con-

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ferred upon cultivating tenants in the State of Madras.

[447E-F]

(3) The provisions of the Act' are prospective except

for section 4(1) and even s. 4(1) shows that the protection

was not meant merely for those who were cultivating tenants

in 1955. The provisions became enforceable as soon as the

Act became operative and there is nothing in the Act to show

that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in

its operation only as a protection given to persons who

were cultivating tenants in 1955. [450B-C]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICION: Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1976.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order

dated 29-1-1976 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal

No..468/75).

K.S. Ramarmurthi and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan, for the appel-

lant.

T.S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Miss

Veena Devi Khanna, for respondents Nos. 2---4.

447

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG, J.--This appeal by special leave raises quite a simple

question interpretation of the provisions of the Madras

Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, (hereinafter

referred to as 'the act') which we think, have been ignored

entirely by the Madras high court in the judgment under

appeal.

The undisputed facts are: one Annamalai Pillai died

leaving behind two widows, namely, Annamalai Ammal and

Veerayee. The last mentioned lady instituted a suit No. 482

of 1927 in the Court of the District Munsif, Periyakulam,

for partitioning the properties of the deceased, impleading

the other widow and a nephew of the deceased Annammalai

Pillai as defendants. That suit ended in a compromise dated

6th July, 1935. Under the terms of the compromise decree,

some land was given to Annamalai Ammal for enjoyment during

her life time, and, thereafter, absolutely to the sons of

the second defendant of suit No. 482 of 1927. Annamalai

Ammal died on 26th July, 1968. She had, however, during her

life time, inducted a tenant, G. Ponniah Thevar, the appel-

lant before us, by means of a lease dated 27th March, 1961.

After the death of Annamalai Ammal, the plaintiffs-respond-

ents, as remainder-men, sued to evict the appellant, the

cultivating tenant, on the ground that his tenancy rights

did not enure beyond the life time of Annamalai Ammal.

The suit for eviction, decreed by the District Court and

the High Court, is now before us. It is not disputed that

the provisions of the Act conferring protection upon culti-

vating tenants govern the rights of the appellant. We are,

therefore, not concerned with any rights under any general

or personal law which may enable the remainder--men to evict

a tenant of a life estate holder. The terms of the statu-

tory protection apply clearly to all tenancies governed by

the Act irrespective of the nature of rights of the person

who leased the land so long as the lessor was entitled to

create a tenancy. It is not disputed before us that Annama-

lai Ammal was entitled to create a tenancy. The only

question, on which there is a dispute, is whether a tenancy

created by her could legally extend beyond her life. The

Madras High Court had, apparently, followed certain deci-

sions of that Court which had applied the principle that a

life estate holder cannot create a tenancy which could

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last beyond the life of a life-estate holder. The view taken

by the Madras High Court and applied to statutory tenancies

runs counter not only to the principles underlying creation

of statutory tenancy rights in agricultural land, throughout

the length and breadth of the country, but, it seems to us

to be obviously in conflict with the particular statutory

protection conferred upon cultivating tenants in the State

of Madras. These enactments are really meant for the pur-

poses proclaimed by them. The obvious effect of such statu-

tory provisions cannot be taken away or whittled down by

forensic sophistry. Courts should not allow themselves to

become tools for defeating clearly expressed statutory

intentions.

Section 2(aa) of the Act lays down:

"2(aa) 'cultivating tenant' in relation

to any land-

(1) means a person who carried on personal

cultivation on such land, under a tenancy

agreement, express or implied, and

448

(2) includes--

(i) any such person as is referred to in

sub-clause (1) who continues in possession of

the land after the determination of the tenan-

cy agreement,

(ii) in the district of Tiruchirappalli, a

Kaiaeruvaramdar or a muttuvaramdar who works

on the land under an engagement with the

landlord for remuneration by a share in the

crop in respect of which the work is done, and

(iii) the heirs of any such person as is

referred to in subclause (1) or sub-clause

(2) (i) and (ii): but does not include a mere

intermediary or his heirs.

Explanation.---A sub-tenant shall be

deemed to be a cultivating tenant of the

holding under the landlord if the lessor of

such sub-tenant has ceased to be the tenant of

such landlord;'

Section 3 (1 ) of the Act lays down:

"3 ( 1 ) Subject to the next succeeding

sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be

evicted from his holding or any part thereof,

by or at the instance of his landlord, whether

in execution of a decree or order of a Court

or otherwise".

Section 3(2) deals with the exceptional circumstances, such

as default in payment of rent, in which the statutory pro-

tection is lifted. Section 3(3) relates to other matters

with which also we are not concerned here. Section 3 (4)

lays down the procedure for the eviction of tenants in those

cases in which the statutory protection is removed. It runs

as follows:

"4(a) Every .landlord seeking to evict a

cultivating tenant falling under sub-section

(2) shall, whether or not there. is an order

or decree of a Court for the eviction of such

cultivating tenant, make an application to the

Revenue Divisional Officer and such applica-

tion shall bear a Court-fee stamp of one

rupee.

(b) On receipt of such application, the

Revenue Divisional Officer shall, after giving

a reasonable.opportunity to the landlord and

the cultivating tenant to make their represen-

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tations, hold a summary enquiry into the

matter and-pass an order either allowing the

application or dismissing it and in a case

falling under clause (a) or clause (aa) of

sub-section (2) in which the tenant had not

availed of the provisions contained in sub-

section (3), the Revenue Divisional Officer

may allow the cultivating tenant such time as

he considers just and reasonable having regard

to the relative circumstances of the landlord

and the cultivating tenant for depositing the

arrears of rent payable under this Act inclu-

sive of such costs as he may direct. If the

cultivating tenant deposits the sum as

directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the

rent under subsection (3) (b). If the culti-

vating tenant fails to deposit the

449

sum as directed the Revenue Divisional Officer

shall pass an

order for eviction".

Thus, we see that the statutory protection from evic-

tion, in this exhaustively comprehensive self contained

procedure may last even after the landlord has filed the

prescribed application for eviction an accrual of his cause

of action.

Section 2(e) defines the landlord as follows:

"2(e) 'landlord' in relation to a hold-

ing or part thereof means the person

entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from

such holding or part;"

The plaintiffs respondents, on their own showing, are

landlords as defined by the Act because they claimed, as the

learned Counsel for the contesting respondents admitted, to

be able to evict the appellant.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the appellant was the

lessee whose right to cultivate as a tenant had not been

determined by anything in the lease or under any statutory

provision. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out

that, even if there had been a determination of the tenancy

under a lease, the appellant would still be a cultivating

tenant as defined in the Act because of the provisions of

Section 2(aa) (2) (i) of the Act. Apparently, such a statu-

tory definition of a cultivating tenant and an exhaustive

procedure for his eviction in certain cases only and in no

other case, are there so as to carry out the purpose .stated

in the preamble as follows:

"Whereas it is necessary to protect

cultivating tenants in certain areas in the

State of Madras from unjust eviction".

The plaintiffs landlords could be entitled to resume

land only under section 4(A) of the Act added by the Madras

Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act of, 1956, for

purposes of personal cultivation in the manner laid down in

the Act itself. The tenant could also be evicted for arrears

of rent as provided in Section 3 (2) of the Act, be.cause,

in that case, the protection given by Section 3 (1) would

not apply. But, none of the conditions for eviction is

fulfilled in the case before us. Moreover, the procedure

for eviction is a special procedure provided by Section 3

(4) of the Act by proceedings in the Court of the Revenue

Divisional Officer.

Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent had tried to

advance two contentions in support of the view taken by the

High Court. Firstly, he submits that the protection given

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under Section 3(1) was for the landlord of the cultivating

tenant. In view of the statutory definition of the term

"landlord", we think that the suit itself would fail if the

plaintiffs were not landlords. The statutory definition of

the term landlord relates not only to the person who created

the lease but contemplates and takes in every successive

holder who could be entitled to evict a tenant. That person

can only be one who has the right, at the time of filing the

suit, to realise rents or evict persons in wrongful occupa-

tion. 'There is nothing in the Act itself to show that the

protection given to

450

the cultivating tenant, as defined in the Act, was given

only against his original lessor and did not extend to

subsequent holders of land occupying the capacity of the

landlord. Secondly, it was urged that the protection was

given only to those persons who were cultivating tenants in

1955 when the Act came into force. The argument has only

to be stated to be rejected. There is not a scintilla of

indication in the provisions of the Act to support such an

impossible interpretation. The provisions of the Act are

clearly prospective except for the provisions of Section 4(

1 ) of the Act, showing that even a person who was a culti-

vating tenant of any land on 1st December, 1953. but is "not

in possession thereof at the commencement of the Act" could

be treated if he was in possession of the land on 1st

December, 1953. Even Section 4(1) of the Act shows that

the protection was not meant merely for those who were

cultivating tenants in 1955. Provisions of the Act show

that they became enforceable as soon as the Act became

operative. There is nothing whatsoever in the. Act to show

that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in

its operation only as a protection given to persons who were

cultivating tenants in 1955. Hence, we are unable to see

any reason whatsoever for denying the appellant the clearly

intended protection conferred upon cultivating tenants, as

defined in the Act, by the provisions of the Act set out

above.

Our attention has been invited to some cases which

relate to the. applicability of Section 76(a) of the Trans-

fer of Property Act. It is. true that this provision has

been applied to tenancies created under various statutory

provisions regulating the rights of tenants to agricultural

lands in States all over India. But, we are not concerned

here, with a case in which the position of the alleged

lessee is struck by Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Proper-

ty Act. Such alleged lessees are not tenants at all at the

time when they are inducted on the land as tenants whatever

else they may be. We, therefore, need not even refer to the

cases cited before us which relate either to this provision

of law or to enactments of other States.

Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the

judgment and decree of the High Court. But, in the circum-

stances of the case the. parties will bear their own costs.

M.R. Appeal allowed.

451