--

GANPAT RAM SHARMA & ORS.

A

I.

SMT. GAYATRI DEVI

JLL Y !7. 1987

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. NATARAJAN, JJ.] B

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14(l)(h)-'Has built'­

Has acquired'-'Has been al/otted'-lnterpretation of-Eviction of

tenant-When arises-Facts necessary to be pleaded and proved by

landlord-Whether tenant entitled

to protection once condition in clause (h) fulfilled.

Limitation Act,

1963: Article 66-Possession of immovable

property-Cause

of action-When arises or accrues.

Words and Phrases:

'Has built'-'Has acquired'-'Has been allotted'-meaning of.

The respondent purchased the suit premises in AJ>ril, 1973 and in

September, 197 3

applied to the Competent Authority under the Slum

. .ea (Improvement and Clearance! Act, 1956 for permission to evict

the appellants who were inducted into the premises by the erstwhile

landlord. The permission was granted

in December, 1974 and three

eviction suits were tiled in April,

1975 on the grounds contained in

Section 14(l)(al, (h) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the

Additional Rent Controller held that the ground under Section

1411)1h1

was made out against all the three appellants. The Rent Control

Tribunal confirmed the decree.

c

D

E

F

Before the High Court in revision, it was submitted that when the

landlady purchased the property she and her vendor had also been G

aware that the tenants owned a house and that on account of this • Y knowledge the respondent had waived her rights under clause ( h) of

Section 14(1)

o( the Act, that if a tenant built a house or has been

allotted a residential accommodation, he must acquire/obtain vacant

possession before he was evicted under clause (h), and that the area

where the allotted

quarter was situated was not governed by the Act H

539 --

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A and, therefore, the ground covered by clause (h) was not available to

the landlady.

The High Court construed Section 14(1)(h) of the

Act to mean that

a building constructed

by the tenant which is outside the purview of the

Delhi Rent Control

Act on the date of application for ejectment, was yet

B within Section 14(1J(h), and held that the word

'or' showed the

diffe­

rent circumstances in which a tenant was liable to be evicted, that it was

not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the tenant had built a

house and acquired vacant possession of the building or that

he had

been allotted and taken possession of the allotted premises, and that

there was

no substance in the argument advanced by the tenants that on

C account of the knowledge of the landlady that the tenants owned a

house, she had waived her rights under clause (h) of Section

14(1 l of the

Act, and dismissed the Revision

Petitions.

In the appeals, it was submitted that there must be a suitable

residence, one which

is a good and a reasonable substitute for the

D appellants or the landlord before eviction could

be ordered under

Sec­

tion 14(l)(h) of the Act.

Dismissing the appeals

by special leave, this Court,

HELD:

I. The Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation to both

E the landlord and the tenant.

It protects the tenant against unreasonable

eviction and exorbitant rent.

It also ensures certain limited rights to

/'-.

the landlord to recover possession in stated contingencies. [5508-C] (

2.1 The words 'has built' or 'has acquired' or 'has

been allotted'

1y

in clause (h) of Section 14(1) clearly mean that the tenant has already

F built, acquired

or been allotted the residence to which he can move and

that on the date of the application for his eviction, his right to reside

therein exists. Therefore, the High Court

was right in holding that the

words as they stood associated with each other

in clause (h) lead to the

only conclusion that as on the date of application the tenant must

be

possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the te-

G nancy premises as a matter of

his own rightful choice either because he

~ •

may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or

the same may have been allotted to him. The words 'built' and 'allotted'

did not mean that after building a residence

or after allotment of a

residence the tenant must also acquire its possession. [5480-FJ

H 2.2 The landlord, in order to be entitled to evict the tenant, must

.,4.

GANPAT v. GAYATRI 541

establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant A

has built,

or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a

resi­

dence. It is essential that the three ingredients must be pleaded by the

landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated

that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession

or has been allot-

ted a residence, whether it

is suitable or not and whether the same can

~ be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within B

the special knowledge of the tenant and he must pro.-e and establish

those facts. [549F-H]

...__

2.3 The landlord must be quick in taking his action after the

accrual of the cause of action, and if

by his inaction, the tenant allows

the premises to

go out of his hands

then it is the landlord who is to be C

blamed and not the tenant. [SSOA-B]

2.4 The High Court was right in holding that once the condition

stipulated in clause

(h) was fulfilled by the tenant, he was disentitled to protection. He cannot, therefore, claim that he should be protected. [547B-C]

D

...f 3.1 Article 66 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulated that for pos-

session of immovable property the cause of action arises or accrues

when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession

by reason of any

forfeiture

or breach of condition.

[SSOC-D I

3.2 On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply

in this case because

no determination is necessary, as determination by

notice under

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer

necessary. [SSOD-E]

In the instant case, the landlady purchased the property on April,

E

9, 1973. She filed an application for permission after about six months F

from the date of purchase, and filed eviction application after about

four months from the date of the grant of the permission

by the

Slum Authority. Time begins to run from the date of the knowledge.

Knowledge in this case

is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any

point of

view. There is, therefore, no question of limitation in this

• )Case. [SSOH; SSlA] G

Ved Prakash v. Chunilal, [1971] Delhi Law Times Vol. 7, 59; Smt

Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [1970] Rent Control Reporter Vol. II, 71;

Naidar Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain and another, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 509;

Siri Chand v, Jot Ram, Punjab Law Reporter Vol. I.XIII, 1961, 915;

Govindji Khera v. Padma Bhatia Attorney, [1972] Rent Control Repor-H

---------,:

"'S -r----...---------

~-...,---_:

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A

ter Vol. 4, 195; Harbans Singh and another v. Custodian of Evacuee

Property

·r Block and others, A.1.R. 1970 Delhi 82; Ujagar Singh v.

Likha Singh and another, A.1.R. 1941 Allahabad 28, 30; Somdass

(deceased)

v. Rikhu Dev Che/a Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab

Law Reporter Vol. 85, 184 and

K.

V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v.

M.R. Ry. Manavikrama Zamorin Rajah and others, A.1.R. 1930

B Madras 430, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2150-

52 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28. 8. 1980 of the Delhi High

C Court in S.A.O. No. 138 of 1979.

D

R.F. Nariman, P.H. Parekh and Suhail Dutt for the Appellants.

Ashok

Grover for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by special leave

are from the judgment and order dated 28th of August, 1980 of the

High

Court of Delhi. Three appellants, Jai Bhagwan,

Pearey Lal and

Ganpat Ram, were inducted into premises No. 3240, Kucha Tara

E

Chand, Daryaganj, Delhi by the then landlord, Shri Dina Nath. The

families

of the appellants consisted of about 7 or 8 members per family

living in

one room each on the ground floor of the said premises. Shri

Pearey Lal, one of the appellants, had one side store room alongwith

the room and Shri Jai Bhagwan had one small tin shed on the first

floor.

The appellants were also sharing the terrace.

F

G

In 1952 the land and building situated at No. A-6 25, at Krishna

Nagar, Delhi was purchased by one Nathu Ram, father of the

appel­

lant Ganpat Ram and Pearey Lal together with the appellant Jai

Bhagwan, his son-in-law.

The building consisted of two room. two

kitchens

and a Barsati.

Three applications were made by the appellants under

Order 4 l--1 •

Rule 2 of C.P.C. on or about 4th of August, 1980. The High Court

pronounced its judgment without disposing of these applications on or

about 27th of August. 1980 and proceeded to hold against the appel­

lants on the basis of an adverse inference that the three appellants had

H built

the house in Krishna Nagar, whereas a copy of the sale deed

GANPAT v. GAYATRI {MUKHARJI. J.J 543

would show that the said house was bought and not built that by Nathu

Ram and Jai Bhagwan. and were not.

by the two of the three

A

appellants.

In

1958 Ganpat Ram was allotted a D.D.A. Quarter No. 3 7 ,at

Village Seelampur, Shahdara. By a notification dated 28th of May,

~

1966, Village Seelampur, Shahdara was declared to be an urban area. B

By Notification dated 27th March, 1979 issued under section 1(2) of

the Delhi Rent Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') this village

was sub--...

jected to the provisions of the said Act. During 1967-68 one Mrs.

Sushila Devi was inducted into the quarter at Seelampur, consisting of

-

a room, a kitchen and a bath room. This lady had applied for the

allotment of the said quarter

in her name sometime in 1974.

On 20th of

c

July, 1980, the authorities, in fact, allotted the said quarter to her. In

1965-70 Ms. Dev Karan and Kul Bhushan being the sons of Pearey

Lal had been occupying the portion of the house at Krishna Nagar

together with their family members and grand-father, Nathu Ram.

Nathu Ram died

in 1969. The other pqrtion was occupied by one Kalu

Ram and

his family members being brother of Jai Bhagwan. There are D

~ 18 people residing at the relevant time in the said house. The present

landlord, the respondent herein, purchased the suit premises from the

erstwhile landlord, Dina Nath on or about 9th April,

1973.

On or

about 28th of September,

1973, the present landlord applied to the

competent authority under the

Slum Act for permission to evict the

appellants from the said premises. On 12th of December, 1974 the E

-

competent authority under the Slum Act granted permission to the

landlord to proceed

in eviction against the three appellants.

On or

about the

16th of April, 1975, the respondent herein filed three evic-

-.(

tion suits against the appellants on the grounds contained in section

14(l)(a).(h)

& (j) of the Act.

On 31st of January, 1977, it was held by

the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi that the ground under section F

14(1)(h) was made out against all the three appellants. The ground

under section 14(l)(a) was also upheld but the appellants were asked

to deposit arrears of rent within a month from the date of the order so

as to avail the benefit of section 15(1) of the Rent Act which the

appellants availed of.

On or about 24th April, 1979, the Rent Control

"

,.. Tribunal confirmed the decree in ejectment on appeal under section G

14(1)(h) of the Act against the three appellants. On further appeal the

High Court construed section

14{ l)(h) of the Act to mean that a Build-

ing constructed

by

th~ tenant which is outside the purview of the Delhi

Rent Act on the date of the application for ejectment, was yet within

section

14( l)(h) and the tenant was liable to be ejected.

H

-----------~-- ---~----,_,,...

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

~

A

In appeal before us, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants

that in none

of the three judgments, there was any finding as to the

suitability

of the residence that is built, allotted or of which the tenant

was acquired vacant possession of. None of the courts

has re-examined

the size

of the space, the distance and inconvenience that might be

caused, the number of persons in the tenants' families or the state of

B residence built

or allotted by or to the tenants. Aggrieved by the

~

aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 28th August, 1980, the

tenants have come up

in appeal. -

In this case the learned Addi. Rent Controller had passed an

order of eviction under clause (h) of section 14(1) of the said Act -

c

against all the three appellants as mentioned before. The said decision

was upheld

by the Tribunal. It has been held by the courts below that

the three tenants have built and acquired vacant possession of the

residential house at A-6/25 Krishna Nagar, Lal Quarter, Delhi.

It was

held that Gan pat Ram, one of the tenants-appellants has been allotted

residential quarter at 317, Seelampur III, Shahdara, Delhi. Before the

D High Court the judgments of the Rent Controller as well as the Tri-

).-

bunal were challenged on the grounds, inter a/ia, that none of the three

tenants had built

or acquired vacant possession of the residential house

No. A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal Quarter, Delhi.

It was further

submitted that

in any case the respondent-landlady was not entitled to

claim eviction under clause (h) on the grounds of waiver and !aches.

E Counsel submitted before the High Court that Ganpat Ram had not

been allotted the quarter at Seelampur and that

in any case he was not

41

in possession of the same. He further submitted that the Act was not

applicable to the quarter alleged to have been allotted to Ganpat Ram,

tenant and

as such grounds covered by clause (h) were not available to

).

the landlady. Lastly it was submitted that all the three ingredients

F mentioned in clause (h) of section 14 of the Act were applicable to the

landlord. Section 14 of the Act is in Chapter-III and controls eviction

of the tenants. The said section stipulates that notwithstanding any-

thing

to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order

or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made

by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against the tenant.

G Clause (h) deals with the situation where the tenant has, whether

~ •

before or after the commencement of the Act, built or acquired vacant

possession of or has been allotted a residence.

The High Court noted the apparent purpose of providing clause

H

( h)

of sub-section (!)of section 14. The High Court was of the opinion

that on account of rapid growth of population of Delhi, landlords were

GANPAT v. GAYATR! (MUKHARJI. J.J 545

.,4.

tempted to terminate the tenancies of the existing tenants and ask for

their eviction in order to let out the premises to the pew tenants at high

A

rents. Rent Control Legislation for Delhi and New Delhi was passed

for the first time during the second world war and since then there has

been Rent Control Legislation applicable to various urban areas

in the

Union Territory of Delhi. The Rent Control Act was enacted to pro-

)-

vide for the control of rents and evictions. The object of clause (h), as B

is apparent, is not to allow the tenant more than one residence in

Delhi. Therefore, it provided that in case' that tenant builds a resi-

-

dence, the landlord could get his house vacated. It also provided that if

the tenant acquires vacant possession of

any other residence, he is not

-

protected. Lastly, it also stipulated that if a residential premises has

been allotted to a tenant, he is not entitled to retain the premises taken

c

on rent by him. In the instant case, on the three causes on which the

>-

landlord can claim eviction were present against the tenant, the High

Court he.id that these causes are not joint. These need not be con-

jointly proved or established. These were

in the alternative. There-

fore, if the landlord

is successful in proving any one of the causes, he is

entitled to an order of eviction against the tenant. Counsel for the D

-..( appellants sought to urge before the High Court that if a tenant built a

house, he must acquire its vacant possession before he.can be evicted

under clause (h). Similarly, it was submitted that if residential accom-

modation was allotted to a tenant then

he must obtain vacant posses-

sion of the same. The word 'or' showed, according to the High Court,

that these were different circumstances in which tenant was liable to be E

-'''l·

evicted. These were (i) if the tenant had built a new residence, or (ii) if

he had acquired vacant possession of it or (iii) if he had been allotted a

residence.

-(

The words 'built' and 'allotted' do not mean that after building

residence

or after allotment of a residence, the tenant must also F

acquire its possession. If a tenant builds a house and does not occupy

it, he

is liable to eviction, according to the High Court. Similarly, if a

residence

is allotted to a tenant, but he does not occupy it and allows

others to occupy the same, he

is not protected, according to the High

Court. The Act provides that building of a house

by tenant or allot-

• )'"

men! of residence to him is a ground of eviction available to the land- G

lord against his tenant. The learned Judge of the High Court was of the

view that it

is not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the

tenant has built and acquired vacant possession of the building or that

he has been allotted and taken possession of the allotted premises.

The landlady

in the eviction application alleged that the tenants H

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1987] 3.S.C.R.

A had built and acquired vacant possession of a residential house at

A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal Quarter. Delhi.

It was denied by all

the tenants but the Controller and the Tribunal on the basis of the

evidence on record concluded that the three tenants have built and

have also acquired vacant possession of the said residential premises.

It was further held that the relatives of the three tenants were in actual

B physical possession of the said house at Krishna Nagar.

It transpired

from the record that Dev Karan,

Kul Bhushan and Kalu Ram were

admittedly related to the three tenants and were in occupation of

house at Krishna Nagar as licensee of the three appellants-tenants.

This

is a finding of fact and could not have been challenged in second

appeal before the High Court. Learned counsel for the tenants then

C submitted before the High Court that the landlady was a purchaser of

the property from one Dina Nath and she and her vendor had also

been aware that the tenants were owners of the house in Krishna

Nagar.

On account of this knowledge it was argued that the landlady­

respondent had waived her rights under clause (h) of section

14(1) of

the Act. The High Court found that there was no substance in the

D argument. There was no plea that the landlady ever waived or was

guilty

of )aches. No evidence was led by the parties. The facts were

that the respondent-landlady purchased this property from Dina

Nath on 9th of April, 1973. There was nothing on record to show that

Dina Nath was ever aware of the fact about building or acquiring a

house at Krishna Nagar

by the three tenants. The landlady on the 28th

E September,

1973 filed applications against the three tenants under

section

19 of the

Slum Arca (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956

seeking permission to institute eviction proceedings. The required

permission was granted

by the competent authority on 12th of

December,

1974 and the present eviction application out of which this

appeal arises was filed on 16th of April,

1975. Therefore, there was no

F question

of !aches on the part of the landlady.

She filed an application

for permission after about

six months from the date of purchase and

she filed an eviction application after about four months from the date

of the grant of permission by the

Slum authority.

The landlady claimed eviction< of Ganpat Ram, appellant-tenant,

' _ _.._,

G on another ground also, namely, that he has been allotted residential ~ •

quarter at 317, Seelampur III. Shahdara. Delhi. This fact was denied

by the tenant. A.W. I Naresh Chand, an official of the D.D.A.

brought the official record relating to the allotment of this quarter.

It

was proved that the said quarter was allotted to him in 1958 and that

possession was delivered to him. It was deposed that

it was residential

H in nature.

On behalf of the tenants, it was submitted before the High

-

'

""

~

""'

)._

~

GANPAT v. GAYATRI (MUKHARJI. J.J 547

Court that the same was in possession of Sushila Devi. Sushila Devi

had appeared

as a witness. She admitted that the said quarter was

allotted to the tenant, Ganpat Ram, the appellant. After allottment

Ganpat Ram was entitled to occupy the allotted accommodation and

possession was delivered to him. According to the said witness, he

was

not now in possession and somebody else was in possession. Evidence

was adduced on behalf of the tenant that he was not

in possession and

somebody else was

in possession. According to the High Court, if once

the condition stipulated in clause (h) was fulfilled, by the tenant, he

. was disentitled to protection under the Act He cannot thereafter claim

that he should be protected. We are of the opinion that the High Court

was right.

It was further alleged that Seelampur area known as Seelampur

where the allotted quarter

was situated, was not governed by the Act

and therefore ground covered

by clause (h) was not available to the

landlady. There

is no plea and the High Court found taking into con-

sideration all the relevant materials that there

was no evidence to show

that it was situated within the area which

was not governed by the Act.

We are in agreement with the learned Judge of the High Court.

Before

us in appeal, however, several points were sought to be

urged.

It was urged that on a proper construction, there must be a

suitable residence, that

is to say, a good substitute for the petitioners

A

B

c

D

or the landlord and a reasonable substitute. E

Reliance was placed

on the decision of this Court in Goppu/a/ v.

Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji and another, [ 1969) 3 SCR 989. There

,/ the Court was concerned with the sub-letting before the coming into

'f force of the Act and was concerned with section 13(1)(e) of the rele­

vant Act which used the expression "has sublet". The present perfect F

tense contemplated a completed event connected in some

way with the

present time. The words took within their sweep

any sub-letting which

was made in

the past and had continued up to the present time. There­

fore, this Court held that it did not matter that the sub-letting

was

either before or after the Act came into force.

.

...

G

The Delhi High Court in the case of Ved Prakash v. Chunilal,

[1971] Delhi Law 'iimes Vol. 7, 59, where the expression 'has' in the

Delhi Rent Control Act,

1958 in section 14(1)(h) came up for consi­

deration.

It was held that the word 'has in clause (h) carries in itself the

force

of the present tense. It has therefore to be interpreted in terms of

the. words employed in the opening part of the proviso which are to the H

--------......-- -~ ....... --------

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3.S.C.R.

A effect that the Controller

may on an application made to him in the

)c

prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of the premises and

those words meant that on the date of the application the tenant must

be having a residence either because he might have built the same or

might have acquired vacant possession thereof or it might have been

allotted to him. Either of the three situations must be there on the date

B

of the application. If that is not so, then clause (h) of the proviso to

i

sub-section (I) of section 14 of the Act would have no application. """"

According to the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court, _...,

the word 'has' applied with the same force and velocity to the words

'built', 'acquired vacant possession of' and 'been allotted'. The last

C words

'a residence' again relate to all the three contingencies. The

word 'has' contains in itself the meaning of presently possessing some­

thing. The ordinary English dictionaries while giving the meaning of

...4,

word 'has' refer to the word 'have', which in turn means 'to hold',

'possess'.

D The words 'has built'

or 'has acquired' or 'has been allotted'

clearly mean that the tenant has already built, acquired or been allot-

~

ted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the

application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists.

It was

therefore held that the words

as they stood associated with each other

in clause (h) lead to the only conclusion that

as on the date of the

E application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside

in

some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own

rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or

acquired vacant possession thereof or the same

may have been allotted

to him.

F

In

Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [ 1970) Rent Control Reporter

Vol. II,

71 Deshpande, J. of the Delhi High Court had occasion to

construe section 14(1)(h) of the Act. The landlord there applied for

eviction

of his tenant on the ground that the tenant had acquired

vacant possession

of another residence within the meaning of section

14(1)(h) of the Act. The tenant defended that he had not acquired any

G residence and that the alleged residence had in fact

bee<. acquired b~ .,

his wife and his sister-in-Jaw jointly. The Rent Control Tribunal held

that the view that under section 14(J)(h) the tenant was liable to be

evicted only if he himself had acquired the vacant possession of

another residence and not by any other member of his family including

the wife. The question which came up before the Court for decision

H was whether the acquisition of a separate residence

by the wife of the

-

~~.,,,.,_, ___ _

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!987] 3.S.C.R.

A

of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be

quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if

by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to

go out of his hands

then it

is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the

light

of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant

B

c

D

case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite apart from the suit

being barred

by lapse of time, this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial

to both the landlord and the tenant.

It protects the tenant against

unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain

limited rights to the landlord to

recover· possession on stated con tin-

gencies.

The next aspect of the matter

is which article of the Limitation

Act would be applicable. Reference

was made to Article 66 and Article

67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Limitation Act)

which stipulates that for possession of immovable property the cause

of action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to

possession by reason of any forfeiture

or breach of condition. Article

67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined.

Article

113 deals with suit for which no period of limitation is provided

elsewhere in this

Schedule. On the facts of this case it is clear that

Article

66 would apply because no determination in this case is neces­

sary and that

is well-settled

no"'. Determination by notice under sec­

tion 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary.

It is well-settled that time begins to run from the date of the ~

knowledge. See in this connection the decision of Harbans Singh and

another

v. Custodian of Evacuee Property 'P' Block

and others, A.LR.

1970 Delhi 82 though that was a case under a different statute and ...

dealt with a different article. See also Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and

F another, A.LR. 1941Allahabad28 at page 30. The Division Bench of

the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdass (deceased). v Rikhu

Dev Che/a Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab Law Reporter Vol.

85., 184 held that in a suit for possession under Article 113 of the

Limitation Act, material date

is one on which the right to sue for

possession arises.

G

In K.

V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v. M.R. Ry. Mana­

vikrama Zamorin Rajah and others,

A.LR.

1930 Madras 430, it was

held that where a claim is based upon a forfeiture of a lease by reason

of alienation of the demised land and nothing else, the article appli­

cable for the purpose of limitation

was clearly Article 143 and the

H limitation commences

to run from the date of the alienation. Here

GANPAT v. GAYATRI [MUKHARJI, J.[ 551

accrual of the right of the landlord is not challenged. The knowledge is A

indisputably in

1973 looked at from any point of view. There is no

question

of limitation in this case.

In the premises, we are of the view that the High Court was right

.,._ and the appeals must fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs. B

N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.

r

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