Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 8989 OF 2010

Gian Singh …Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab & Another …Respondents

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 6138 OF 2006

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 5203 OF 2011

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 259 OF 2011

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 5921 OF 2009

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 7148 OF 2009

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 6324 OF 2009

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2107-2125 OF 2011

JUDGEMENT

R.M. LODHA, J .

When the special leave petition in Gian Singh v. State of

Punjab and another came up for hearing, a two-Judge Bench (Markandey

Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra, JJ.) doubted the correctness of the

decisions of this Court in B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and

1

Page 2 another

1

, Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another

2

and Manoj Sharma v. State and others

3

and referred the matter to a

larger Bench. The reference order reads as follows :

“Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

The petitioner has been convicted under

Section 420 and Section 120B, IPC by the learned

Magistrate. He filed an appeal challenging his

conviction before the learned Sessions Judge. While

his appeal was pending, he filed an application before

the learned Sessions Judge for compounding the

offence, which, according to the learned counsel, was

directed to be taken up along with the main appeal.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition under Section

482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR on the ground of

compounding the offence. That petition under Section

482 Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the High Court by

its impugned order. Hence, this petition has been filed

in this Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on

three decisions of this Court, all by two Judge

Benches. They are B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana

(2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant vs. Central

Bureau of Investigation and Another (2008) 9 SCC

677; and Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others (2008)

16 SCC 1. In these decisions, this Court has indirectly

permitted compounding of non-compoundable

offences. One of us, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey

Katju, was a member to the last two decisions.

Section 320, Cr.P.C. mentions certain offences

as compoundable, certain other offences as

compoundable with the permission of the Court, and

the other offences as non-compoundable vide Section

320(7).

Section 420, IPC, one of the counts on which

the petitioner has been convicted, no doubt, is a

compoundable offence with permission of the Court in

1

(2003) 4 SCC 675

2

(2008) 9 SCC 677

3

(2008) 16 SCC 1

2

Page 3 view of Section 320, Cr.P.C. but Section 120B IPC,

the other count on which the petitioner has been

convicted, is a non-compoundable offence. Section

120B (Criminal conspiracy) is a separate offence and

since it is a non-compoundable offence, we cannot

permit it to be compounded.

The Court cannot amend the statute and must

maintain judicial restraint in this connection. The

Courts should not try to take over the function of the

Parliament or executive. It is the legislature alone

which can amend Section 320 Cr.P.C.

We are of the opinion that the above three

decisions require to be re-considered as, in our

opinion, something which cannot be done directly

cannot be done indirectly. In our, prima facie, opinion,

non-compoundable offences cannot be permitted to

be compounded by the Court, whether directly or

indirectly. Hence, the above three decisions do not

appear to us to be correctly decided.

It is true that in the last two decisions, one of

us, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju, was a

member but a Judge should always be open to

correct his mistakes. We feel that these decisions

require re-consideration and hence we direct that this

matter be placed before a larger Bench to reconsider

the correctness of the aforesaid three decisions.

Let the papers of this case be placed before

Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger

Bench.”

2. This is how these matters have come up for consideration

before us.

3. Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for

short, ‘Code’) which are vital for consideration of the issue referred to the

larger Bench are Sections 320 and 482. Section 320 of the Code provides

3

Page 4 for compounding of certain offences punishable under the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). It reads as follows :

“S. 320. Compounding of offences.—(1) The

offences punishable under the sections of the Indian

Penal Code, (45 of 1860) specified in the first two

columns of the Table next following may be

compounded by the persons mentioned in the third

column of that Table :

TABLE

OffenceSection of

the Indian

Penal Code

applicable

Person by whom offence

may be compounded

1 2 3

(2)The offences punishable under the sections of

the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the

first two columns of the table next following may, with

the permission of the Court before which any

prosecution for such offence is pending, be

compounded by the persons mentioned in the third

column of that Table:--

TABLE

Offence

Section of

the Indian

Penal Code

applicable

Person by whom

offence may be

compounded

1 2 3

(3)When an offence is compoundable under this

section, the abatement of such offence or an attempt

to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself

an offence) or where the accused is liable under

section 34 or 149 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of

1860) may be compounded in like manner.

4

Page 5 (4) (a)When the person who would otherwise

be competent to compound an offence

under this section is under the age of

eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic,

any person competent to contract on his

behalf, may, with the permission of the

Court, compound such offence.

(b)When the person who would otherwise

be competent to compound an offence

under this section is dead, the legal

representative, as defined in the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 of such person

may, with the consent of the Court,

compound such offence.

(5)When the accused has been committed for trial

or when he has been convicted and an appeal is

pending, no composition for the offence shall be

allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is

committed, or, as the case may be, before which the

appeal is to be heard.

(6)A High Court or Court of Session acting in the

exercise of its powers of revision under section 401

may allow any person to compound any offence

which such person is competent to compound under

this section.

(7)No offence shall be compounded if the

accused is, by reason of a previous conviction, liable

either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of

a different kind for such offence.

(8)The composition of an offence under this

section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the

accused with whom the offence has been

compounded.

(9)No offence shall be compounded except as

provided by this section.”

5

Page 6 4. Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court and

it reads as follows :

“S. 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.—

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect

the inherent powers of the High Court to make such

orders as may be necessary to give effect to any

order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the

process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice.”

5. In B.S. Joshi

1

, the undisputed facts were these : the husband

was one of the appellants while the wife was respondent no. 2 in the

appeal before this Court. They were married on 21.7.1999 and were living

separately since 15.7.2000. An FIR was registered under Sections

498-A/323 and 406, IPC at the instance of the wife on 2.1.2002. When the

criminal case registered at the instance of the wife was pending, the

dispute between the husband and wife and their family members was

settled. It appears that the wife filed an affidavit that her disputes with the

husband and the other members of his family had been finally settled and

she and her husband had agreed for mutual divorce. Based on the said

affidavit, the matter was taken to the High Court by both the parties and

they jointly prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings launched

against the husband and his family members on the basis of the FIR

registered at the wife’s instance under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. The

High Court dismissed the petition for quashing the FIR as in its view the

offences under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC were non-compoundable

6

Page 7 and the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code could not be

invoked to by-pass Section 320 of the Code. It is from this order that the

matter reached this Court. This Court held that the High Court in exercise

of its inherent powers could quash criminal proceedings or FIR or

complaint and Section 320 of the Code did not limit or affect the powers

under Section 482 of the Code. The Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 (Pg.

682) of the Report held as under :

“14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing

Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian

Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her

husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-

A was added with a view to punishing a husband and

his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce

her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of

dowry. The hypertechnical view would be

counterproductive and would act against interests of

women and against the object for which this provision

was added. There is every likelihood that non-

exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings

to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from

settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A

of the Indian Penal Code.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the

High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can

quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and

Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the

powers under Section 482 of the Code.”

6. In Nikhil Merchant

2

, a company, M/s. Neemuch Emballage

Ltd., Mumbai was granted financial assistance by Andhra Bank under

various facilities. On account of default in repayment of loans, the bank

filed a suit for recovery of the amount payable by the borrower company.

The bank also filed a complaint against the company, its Managing

7

Page 8 Director and the officials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences, namely,

Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC read with

Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988. The suit for recovery filed by the bank against the company

and the Managing Director of the Company was compromised. The suit

was compromised upon the defendants agreeing to pay the amounts due

as per the schedule mentioned in the consent terms. Clause 11 of the

consent terms read, “agreed that save as aforesaid neither party has any

claim against the other and parties do hereby withdraw all the allegations

and counter-allegations made against each other”. Based on clause 11 of

the consent terms, the Managing Director of the Company, the appellant

who was accused no. 3 in charge sheet filed by CBI, made application for

discharge from the criminal complaint. The said application was rejected

by the Special Judge (CBI), Greater Bombay, which came to be

challenged before the Bombay High Court. The contention before the

High Court was that since the subject matter of the dispute had been

settled between the appellant and the bank, it would be unreasonable to

continue with the criminal proceedings. The High Court rejected the

application for discharge from the criminal cases. It is from this order that

the matter reached this Court by way of special leave. The Court having

regard to the facts of the case and the earlier decision of this Court in

8

Page 9 B.S. Joshi

1

, set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the

criminal proceedings by consideration of the matter thus:

“28. The basic intention of the accused in this case

appears to have been to misrepresent the financial

status of the Company, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd.,

Mumbai, in order to avail of the credit facilities to an

extent to which the Company was not entitled. In

other words, the main intention of the Company and

its officers was to cheat the Bank and induce it to part

with additional amounts of credit to which the

Company was not otherwise entitled.

29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of

an offence of cheating punishable under Section 420

IPC, the same has been made compoundable under

sub-section (2) of Section 320 CrPC with the leave of

the court. Of course, forgery has not been included as

one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such

cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi case

becomes relevant.

30. In the instant case, the disputes between the

Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the

basis of the compromise arrived at by them

whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared

and the Bank does not appear to have any further

claim against the Company. What, however, remains

is the fact that certain documents were alleged to

have been created by the appellant herein in order to

avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the

Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein

has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal

facets. The question which is required to be answered

in this case is whether the power which independently

lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings

pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all

be exercised?

31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated

hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this

Court in B.S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived

at between the Company and the Bank as also

Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by

9

Page 10 the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where

technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way

in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in

our view, the continuance of the same after the

compromise arrived at between the parties would be

a futile exercise.”

7. In Manoj Sharma

3

, the Court was concerned with the

question whether an F.I.R. under Sections 420/468/471/34/120-B IPC can

be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of

the Constitution when the accused and the complainant have

compromised and settled the matter between themselves. Altamas Kabir,

J., who delivered the lead judgment referred to B.S. Joshi

1

and the

submission made on behalf of the State that B.S. Joshi

1

required a

second look and held that the Court was not inclined to accept the

contention made on behalf of the State that the decision in B.S. Joshi

1

required reconsideration, at least not in the facts of the case. It was held

that what was decided in B.S. Joshi

1

was the power and authority of the

High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or under

Article 226 of the Constitution to quash offences which were not

compoundable. The law stated in B.S. Joshi

1

simply indicated the powers

of the High Court to quash any criminal proceeding or first information

report or complaint whether the offences were compoundable or not.

Altamas Kabir, J. further observed, “The ultimate exercise of discretion

under Section 482 CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with

10

Page 11 the court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each case.

It has been explained that the said power is in no way limited by the

provisions of Section 320 CrPC. We are unable to disagree with such

statement of law. In any event, in this case, we are only required to

consider whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction under

Section 482 CrPC legally and correctly.” Then in paragraphs 8 and 9

(pg. 5) of the Report, Altamas Kabir, J., inter alia, held as under :

“8. …..Once the complainant decided not to pursue

the matter further, the High Court could have taken a

more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not

suggest that while exercising its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have

refused to quash the first information report, but what

we do say is that the matter could have been

considered by the High Court with greater pragmatism

in the facts of the case.

9. ……In the facts of this case we are of the view

that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be

an exercise in futility………”

8. Markandey Katju, J. although concurred with the view of

Altamas Kabir, J. that criminal proceedings in that case deserved to be

quashed but observed that question may have to be decided in some

subsequent decision or decisions (preferably by a larger Bench) as to

which non-compoundable cases can be quashed under Section 482 of

the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution on the basis that the parties

11

Page 12 have entered into compromise. In paragraphs 27 and 28 (pg. 10) of the

report he held as under:

“27. There can be no doubt that a case under Section

302 IPC or other serious offences like those under

Sections 395, 307 or 304-B cannot be compounded

and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be

quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power

under Section 482 CrPC or in writ jurisdiction on the

basis of compromise. However, in some other cases

(like those akin to a civil nature), the proceedings can

be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come

to an amicable settlement even though the provisions

are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will

have to be decided in some later decisions of this

Court, preferably by a larger Bench (so as to make it

more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be

evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left

at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise

there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy.

A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some

objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the

whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion,

after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.

28. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B.

Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has rightly

expressed his concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi

case should not be understood to have meant that

Judges can quash any kind of criminal case merely

because there has been a compromise between the

parties. After all, a crime is an offence against society,

and not merely against a private individual.”

9. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner in SLP(Crl.) No. 6324 of 2009 submitted that the inherent power

of the High Court to quash a non-compoundable offence was not

circumscribed by any of the provisions of the Code, including Section 320.

Section 482 is a declaration of the inherent power pre-existing in the High

12

Page 13 Court and so long as the exercise of the inherent power falls within the

parameters of Section 482, it shall have an overriding effect over any of

the provisions of the Code. He, thus, submitted that in exercise of its

inherent powers under Section 482, the High Court may permit

compounding of a non-compoundable offence provided that in doing so it

satisfies the conditions mentioned therein. Learned senior counsel would

submit that the power to quash the criminal proceedings under Section

482 of the Code exists even in non-compoundable offence but its actual

exercise will depend on facts of a particular case. He submitted that some

or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether to quash or

not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given case; (a) the nature and

gravity of case; (b) does the dispute reflect overwhelming and pre-

dominantly civil flavour; (c) would the quashing involve settlement of

entire or almost the entire dispute; (d) the compromise/settlement

between parties and/or other facts and the circumstances render

possibility of conviction remote and bleak; (e) not to quash would cause

extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and (f) not to quash

would result in abuse of process of court.

10. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5921 of 2009 submitted that Section 482

of the Code is complete answer to the reference made to the larger

Bench. He analysed Section 482 and Section 320 of the Code and

13

Page 14 submitted that Section 320 did not limit or affect the inherent powers of

the High Court. Notwithstanding Section 320, High Court can exercise its

inherent power, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. To secure the ends of justice is a

wholesome and definite guideline. It requires formation of opinion by High

Court on the basis of material on record as to whether the ends of justice

would justify quashing of a particular criminal complaint, FIR or a

proceeding. When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section

482 in respect of offences which are not compoundable taking into

account the fact that the accused and the complainant have settled their

differences amicably, it cannot be viewed as permitting compounding of

offence which is not compoundable.

11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that in cases

of civil wrongs which also constitute criminal offences, the High Court may

pass order under Section 482 once both parties jointly pray for dropping

the criminal proceeding initiated by one of them to put an end to the

dispute and restore peace between the parties.

12. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel for the respondent

(accused) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6138 of 2006 submitted that

the real question that needs to be considered by this Court in the

reference is whether Section 320(9) of the Code creates a bar or limits or

affects the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the

14

Page 15 Code. It was submitted that Section 320(9) does not create a bar or limit

or affect the inherent powers of the High Court in the matter of quashing

any criminal proceedings. Relying upon various decisions of this Court, it

was submitted that it has been consistently held that the High Court has

unfettered powers under Section 482 of the Code to secure the ends of

justice and prevent abuse of the process of the Court. He also submitted

that on compromise between the parties, the High Court in exercise of

powers under Section 482 can quash the criminal proceedings, more so

the matters arising from matrimonial dispute, property dispute, dispute

between close relations, partners or business concerns which are

predominantly of civil, financial or commercial nature.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Leave Petition

(Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010 submitted that the court should have positive view

to quash the proceedings once the aggrieved party has compromised the

matter with the wrong doer. It was submitted that if the court did not allow

the quashing of FIR or complaint or criminal case where the parties

settled their dispute amicably, it would encourage the parties to speak lie

in the court and witnesses would become hostile and the criminal

proceeding would not end in conviction. Learned counsel submitted that

the court could also consider the two questions (1) can there be partial

quashing of the FIR qua accused with whom the complainant/aggrieved

party enters into compromise. (2) can the court quash the proceedings in

15

Page 16 the cases which have not arisen from the matrimonial or civil disputes but

the offences are personal in nature like grievous hurt (S.326), attempt to

murder (S.307), rape (S.376), trespassing (S.452) and kidnapping (S.364,

365) etc.

14. Mr. P. P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General

referred to the scheme of the Code. He submitted that in any criminal

case investigated by police on filing the report under Section 173 of the

Code, the Magistrate, after applying his mind to the chargesheet and the

documents accompanying the same, if takes cognizance of the offences

and summons the accused and/or frames charges and in certain grave

and serious offences, commits the accused to be tried by a court of

Sessions and the Sessions Court after satisfying itself and after hearing

the accused frames charges for the offences alleged to have been

committed by him, the Code provides a remedy to accused to challenge

the order taking cognizance or of framing charges. Similar situation may

follow in a complaint case. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted

that power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked in the non-

compoundable offences since Section 320(9) expressly prohibits the

compounding of such offences. Quashing of criminal proceedings of the

offences which are non-compoundable would negative the effect of the

order of framing charges or taking cognizance and therefore quashing

16

Page 17 would amount to taking away the order of cognizance passed by the

Magistrate.

15. Learned Additional Solicitor General would submit that when

the Court takes cognizance or frames charges, it is in accordance with the

procedure established by law. Once the court takes cognizance or

frames charges, the method to challenge such order is by way of

appropriate application to the superior court under the provisions of the

Code.

16. If power under Section 482 is exercised, in relation to non-

compoundable offences, it will amount to what is prohibited by law and

such cases cannot be brought within the parameters ‘to secure ends of

justice’. Any order in violation and breach of statutory provisions, learned

Additional Solicitor General would submit, would be a case against the

ends of justice. He heavily relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of

this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Keshub

Mahindra and others

4

wherein this Court held, ‘no decision by any court,

this Court not excluded, can be read in a manner as to nullify the express

provisions of an Act or the Code.’ With reference to B.S. Joshi

1

, learned

Additional Solicitor General submitted that that was a case where the

dispute was between the husband and wife and the court felt that if the

proceedings were not quashed, it would prevent the woman from settling

4

(2011) 6 SCC 216

17

Page 18 in life and the wife had already filed an affidavit that there were

temperamental differences and she was not supporting continuation of

criminal proceedings. As regards, Nikhil Merchant

2

, learned Additional

Solicitor General submitted that this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Rameshwar and others

5

held that the said decision was a decision under

Article 142 of the Constitution. With regard to Manoj Sharma

3

, learned

Additional Solicitor General referred to the observations made by

Markandey Katju, J. in paragraphs 24 and 28 of the Report.

17. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the High

Court has no power to quash criminal proceedings in regard to offences in

which a cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate merely because

there has been settlement between the victim and the offender because

the criminal offence is against the society.

18. More than 65 years back, in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir

Ahmed

6

, it was observed by the Privy Council that Section 561A

(corresponding to Section 482 of the Code) had not given increased

powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was

enacted. It was observed, `The section gives no new powers, it only

provides that those which the court already inherently possess shall be

preserved and is inserted lest, as their Lordships think, it should be

considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those

5

(2009) 11 SCC 424

6

(1945) 47 Bom. L.R. 245

18

Page 19 expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent

power had survived the passing of the Code’.

19. In Khushi Ram v. Hashim and others

7

, this Court held as

under :

“It is unnecessary to emphasise that the inherent

power of the High Court under Section 561A cannot be

invoked in regard to matters which are directly covered

by the specific provisions of the Code…”

20. The above view of Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed

6

and

another decision in Lala Jairam Das & Ors. v. Emperor

8

was expressly

accepted by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh. v. Mohammad Naim

9

.

The Court said :

“7. It is now well settled that the section confers no new

powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all

existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court

necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends

of justice. The section provides that those powers

which the court inherently possesses shall be

preserved lest it be considered that the only powers

possessed by the court are those expressly conferred

by the Code and that no inherent powers had survived

the passing of the Code………..”

21. In Pampathy v. State of Mysore

10

, a three-Judge Bench of

this Court stated as follows :

“ The inherent power of the High Court mentioned in

Section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code can be

exercised only for either of the three purposes

specifically mentioned in the section. The inherent

7

AIR 1959 SC 542

8

AIR 1945 PC 94

9

AIR 1964 SC 703

10

1966 (Suppl) SCR 477

19

Page 20 power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter

covered by the specific provisions of the Code. It

cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be

inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the

Code. It is only if the matter in question is not covered

by any specific provisions of the Code that s. 561A can

come into operation…….”

22. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others

11

, a three-

Judge Bench of this Court referred to Section 482 of the Code and in

paragraph 7 (pg. 703) of the Report held as under :

“7. …….. In the exercise of this wholesome power,

the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it

comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding

to continue would be an abuse of the process of the

Court or that the ends of justice require that the

proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the

High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and

criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary

public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought

not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of

harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the

veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very

nature of the material on which the structure of the

prosecution rests and the like would justify the High

Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of

justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends

of mere law though justice has got to be administered

according to laws made by the legislature. The

compelling necessity for making these observations is

that without a proper realisation of the object and

purpose of the provision which seeks to save the

inherent powers of the High Court to do justice

between the State and its subjects, it would be

impossible to appreciate the width and contours of

that salient jurisdiction.”

23. The Court then observed that the considerations justifying

the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally

11

(1977) 2 SCC 699

20

Page 21 vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one

conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the straitjacket

of a rigid formula.

24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. The

State of Maharashtra

12

, dealt with the invocation of inherent power under

Section 482 for quashing interlocutory order even though revision under

Section 397(2) of the Code was prohibited. The Court noticed the

principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High

Court as under :

“(1)That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a

specific provision in the Code for the redress of the

grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2)That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent

abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the

ends of justice;

(3)That it should not be exercised as against the express

bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

25. In Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others

13

, the Court

explained the width and amplitude of the inherent power of the High Court

under Section 482 vis-à-vis revisional power under Section 397 as

follows:

“10. …….The opening words of Section 482

contradict this contention because nothing of the

Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude

of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by

12

(1977) 4 SCC 551

13

(1980) 1 SCC 43

21

Page 22 the language of Section 482. Even so, a general

principle pervades this branch of law when a specific

provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not

right except under compelling circumstances. Not that

there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power

should not invade areas set apart for specific power

under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye’s case this

Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great

respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law

beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is

pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written

into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section

397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations

between the two provisions and a happy solution

“would be to say that the bar provided in sub-

section (2) of Section 397 operates only in

exercise of the revisional power of the High

Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will

have no power of revision in relation to any

interlocutory order. Then in accordance with

one or the other principles enunciated above,

the inherent power will come into play, there

being no other provision in the Code for the

redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.

But then, if the order assailed is purely of an

interlocutory character which could be

corrected in exercise of the revisional power of

the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High

Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power.

But in case the impugned order clearly brings

about a situation which is an abuse of the

process of the Court or for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice interference by the

High Court is absolutely necessary, then

nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or

affect the exercise of the inherent power by the

High Court. But such cases would be few and

far between. The High Court must exercise the

inherent power very sparingly. One such case

would be the desirability of the quashing of a

criminal proceeding initiated illegally,

vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction”.

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of

inherent power where abuse of the process of the

22

Page 23 court or other extraordinary situation excites the

court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint,

nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that

interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be

taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary

litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders

are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of

inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in

the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J.

has pointed out as for example, where it is more than

a purely interlocutory order and less than a final

disposal. The present case falls under that category

where the accused complain of harassment through

the court's process. Can we state that in this third

category the inherent power can be exercised? In the

words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para 10)

“The answer is obvious that the bar will not

operate to prevent the abuse of the process of

the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved

party is immaterial. The High Court can

examine the matter in an appropriate case

under its inherent powers. The present case

undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of

the High Court in accordance with Section 482

of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although

not accepting, that invoking the revisional

power of the High Court is impermissible.”

I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent

power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us.

Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our

allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical

insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order

under cessation need not take up this court's time.

Our conclusion concurs with the concession of

counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of

the order has not been produced, despite its presence

in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to

hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated

and the inherent power stultified.”

23

Page 24 26. In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and

another

14

, the Court considered the scope of Section 482 of the Code in a

case where on dismissal of petition under Section 482, a second petition

under Section 482 of the Code was made. The contention before this

Court was that the second petition under Section 482 of the Code was not

entertainable; the exercise of power under Section 482 on a second

petition by the same party on the same ground virtually amounts to

review of the earlier order and is contrary to the spirit of Section 362 of

the Code and the High Court was in error in having quashed the

proceedings by adopting that course. While accepting this argument, this

Court held as follows :

“3. ……The inherent power under Section 482 is

intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the

court and to secure ends of justice. Such power

cannot be exercised to do something which is

expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration

of the facts by way of review is not permissible under

the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the

court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the

matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had

been change in the circumstances of the case, it

would be in order for the High Court to exercise its

inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and

pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice

or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

Where there is no such changed circumstances and

the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that

existed as on the date of the earlier order, the

exercise of the power to reconsider the same

materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a

review, which is expressly barred under Section 362.

14

(1990) 2 SCC 437

24

Page 25 5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no

court when it has signed its judgment or final order

disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same

except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save

as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482

enables the High Court to make such order as may be

necessary to give effect to any order under the Code

or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent

powers, however, as much are controlled by principle

and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If

a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the

court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions

and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of

inherent jurisdiction.

7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot

be invoked to override bar of review under Section

362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal,

that the inherent power of the court cannot be

exercised for doing that which is specifically

prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that

the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that

which cannot be done on account of the bar under

other provisions of the Code. The court is not

empowered to review its own decision under the

purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the

impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing

the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same

materials. The High Court has grievously erred in

doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any

compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that

stage.”

27. In Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others

15

, this

Court observed as follows :

“……It is now well settled that the inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for

exercising powers which are expressly barred by the

Code…….”

15

1993 Crl. L.J. 1049

25

Page 26 28. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.

16

,

a two-Judge Bench of this Court held as under :

“….It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the

High Court has inherent powers to make such orders

as may be necessary to give effect to any order under

the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But

the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to

secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited

jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse

of the process of law or the ends of justice could only

be secured in accordance with law including

procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent

powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to

be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned

in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no

express provision empowering the High Court to

achieve the said object. It is well-neigh settled that

inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any

matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if

its exercise would infringe any specific provision of

the Code. In the present case, the High Court

overlooked the procedural law which empowered the

convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against

conviction of the offence. The High Court has

intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled

the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the

trial.”

29. In G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. and others

17

,

the Court was concerned with the order of the High Court whereby the

application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the criminal

proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC pending in the Court

of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad was dismissed. In paragraph 8

(pg. 643) of the Report, the Court held as under:

16

AIR 1999 SC 2554

17

(2000) 2 SCC 636

26

Page 27 “8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to

be exercised with great care. In exercise of its

jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the

matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which

is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak

of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a

short cut of other remedies available in law. Before

issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a

great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious

matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the

basis of which the High Court is to exercise its

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code.

Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

30. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.

Devendrappa and another

18

restated what has been stated in earlier

decisions that Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High

Court, it only saves the inherent power which the court possessed before

the commencement of the Code. The Court went on to explain the

exercise of inherent power by the High Court in paragraph 6 (Pg.94) of

the Report as under :

“6. ……… It envisages three circumstances under

which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,

namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to

otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither

possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule

which would govern the exercise of inherent

jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with

procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly

arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart

from express provisions of law which are necessary

for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed

upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds

expression in the section which merely recognizes

18

(2002) 3 SCC 89

27

Page 28 and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All

courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the

absence of any express provision, as inherent in their

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do

the right and to undo a wrong in course of

administration of justice on the principle quando lex

aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine

quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a

person anything it gives him that without which it

cannot exist). While exercising powers under the

section, the court does not function as a court of

appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the

section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully and with caution and only when such

exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down

in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito

justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the

administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of

the court exists for advancement of justice and if any

attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to

produce injustice, the court has power to prevent

abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to

allow any action which would result in injustice and

prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers

court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it

finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse

of the process of court or quashing of these

proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of

justice……..”

The Court in paragraph 9 (Pg. 96) further stated :

“9. ………the powers possessed by the High Court

under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the

very plenitude of the power requires great caution in

its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its

decision in exercise of this power is based on sound

principles. The inherent power should not be

exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High

Court being the highest court of a State should

normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a

case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,

more so when the evidence has not been collected

and produced before the Court and the issues

involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude

and cannot be seen in their true perspective without

sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule

28

Page 29 can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High

Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of

quashing the proceeding at any stage……”

31. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Ravishankar Prasad

and others

19

, the Court observed in paragraphs 17,19,20 and 39 (Pgs.

356, 357 and 363) of the Report as follows :

“17. Undoubtedly, the High Court possesses

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. These inherent powers of the

High Court are meant to act ex debito justitiae to do

real and substantial justice, for the administration of

which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the

process of the court.

19. This Court time and again has observed that the

extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should

be exercised sparingly and with great care and

caution. The Court would be justified in exercising

the power when it is imperative to exercise the

power in order to prevent injustice. In order to

understand the nature and scope of power under

Section 482 CrPC it has become necessary to

recapitulate the ratio of the decided cases.

20. Reference to the following cases would reveal

that the Courts have consistently taken the view that

they must use the court's extraordinary power only to

prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. We

have largely inherited the provisions of inherent

powers from the English jurisprudence, therefore the

principles decided by the English courts would be of

relevance for us. It is generally agreed that the

Crown Court has inherent power to protect its

process from abuse. The English courts have also

used inherent power to achieve the same objective.

39. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly

reveals that the exercise of inherent powers would

entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of

each case. The object of incorporating inherent

19

(2009) 6 SCC 351

29

Page 30 powers in the Code is to prevent abuse of the process

of the court or to secure ends of justice.”

32 In Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

another

20

, while dealing with the question whether a pure civil dispute can

be subject matter of a criminal proceeding under Sections 420, 467, 468

and 469 IPC, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the High

Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code if the allegations made in the First Information Report, even if given

face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any

offence.

33. In Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation and

another

21

, the Court considered the scope and ambit of the inherent

jurisdiction of the High Court and made the following observations in para

16 (pg. 715) of the Report:

“16. Section 482 CrPC itself envisages three

circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction

may be exercised by the High Court, namely, (i) to

give effect to an order under CrPC; (ii) to prevent an

abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise

secure the ends of justice. It is trite that although the

power possessed by the High Court under the said

provision is very wide but it is not unbridled. It has to

be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex

debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for

which alone the Court exists. Nevertheless, it is

neither feasible nor desirable to lay down any

inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of

inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Yet, in numerous

cases, this Court has laid down certain broad

20

(2009) 7 SCC 495

21

(2011) 5 SCC 708

30

Page 31 principles which may be borne in mind while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

Though it is emphasised that exercise of inherent

powers would depend on the facts and circumstances

of each case, but the common thread which runs

through all the decisions on the subject is that the

Court would be justified in invoking its inherent

jurisdiction where the allegations made in the

complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, taken

at their face value and accepted in their entirety do

not constitute the offence alleged.”

34. Besides B.S. Joshi

1

, Nikhil Merchant

2

and Manoj Sharma

3

,

there are other decisions of this Court where the scope of Section 320

vis-à-vis the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the

Code has come up for consideration.

35. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab

22

, in the appeal

before this Court which arose from an order of the High Court refusing to

quash the FIR against the appellant lodged under Sections 379, 406, 409,

418, 506/34, IPC on account of compromise entered into between the

complainant and the accused, in paragraphs 5 and 6 (pg. 584) of the

Report, the Court held as under :

“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the

application was filed in the High Court for quashing of

proceedings which has been dismissed by the

impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR

and the other documents on record that the dispute

was purely a personal one between two contesting

parties and that it arose out of extensive business

dealings between them and that there was absolutely

no public policy involved in the nature of the

allegations made against the accused. We are,

therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would

22

(2008) 4 SCC 582

31

Page 32 be served in continuing with the proceedings in the

light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact

that the complainant has on 11-1-2004 passed away

and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has

thus to be ruled out.

6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable

that in disputes where the question involved is of a

purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily

accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal

proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no

possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a

luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they

are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be

utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful

litigation. This is a common sense approach to the

matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the

technicalities of the law.”

36. In Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

23

, the Court was

concerned with a case where the accused – appellant was convicted and

sentenced by the Additional Sessions Judge for an offence punishable

under Section 307, IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal from the

judgment and conviction. In the appeal, by special leave, the injured –

complainant was ordered to be joined as party as it was stated by the

counsel for the appellant that mutual compromise has been arrived at

between the parties, i.e. accused on the one hand and the complainant –

victim on the other hand during the pendency of the proceedings before

this Court. It was prayed on behalf of the appellant that the appeal be

disposed of on the basis of compromise between the parties. In para 12

(pg. 670) of the Report, the Court observed as follows :

23

(2008) 15 SCC 667

32

Page 33 “12. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that an offence

punishable under Section 307 IPC is not a

compoundable offence. Section 320 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 expressly states that no

offence shall be compounded if it is not

compoundable under the Code. At the same time,

however, while dealing with such matters, this Court

may take into account a relevant and important

consideration about compromise between the parties

for the purpose of reduction of sentence.”

37. The Court also referred to the earlier decisions of this Court

in Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan

24

, Murugesan v. Ganapathy Velar

25

,

Ishwarlal v. State of M.P.

26

and Mahesh Chand & another v. State of

Rajasthan

27

and noted in paragraph 13 (pg. 670) of the Report as follows:

“13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan, Murugesan

v. Ganapathy Velar and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. this

Court, while taking into account the fact of

compromise between the parties, reduced sentence

imposed on the appellant-accused to already

undergone, though the offences were not

compoundable. But it was also stated that in Mahesh

Chand v. State of Rajasthan such offence was

ordered to be compounded.”

Then, in paragraphs 14 and 15 (pg. 670) the Court held as under :

“14. In our considered opinion, it would not be

appropriate to order compounding of an offence not

compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping

aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however,

limited submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant deserves consideration that while imposing

substantive sentence, the factum of compromise

between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance

which the Court may keep in mind.

24

(2006) 9 SCC 255

25

(2001) 10 SCC 504

26

(2008) 15 SCC 671

27

1990 (supp) SCC 681

33

Page 34 15. In the instant case, the incident took place before

more than fifteen years; the parties are residing in one

and the same village and they are also relatives. The

appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of

commission of crime. It was his first offence. After

conviction, the petitioner was taken into custody.

During the pendency of appeal before the High Court,

he was enlarged on bail but, after the decision of the

High Court, he again surrendered and is in jail at

present. Though he had applied for bail, the prayer

was not granted and he was not released on bail.

Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, in

our opinion, the ends of justice would be met if the

sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant

(Accused 1) is reduced to the period already

undergone.”

38. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and another

28

,

the Court was concerned with applicability of Section 320 of the Code

where the accused was being prosecuted for commission of offences

under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC along with the bank

officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused

had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in

the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The

accused prayed for her discharge on the grounds (i) having regard to

the settlement arrived at between her and the bank, no case for

proceeding against her has been made out; (ii) the amount having

already been paid and the title deeds having been returned, the

criminal proceedings should be dropped on the basis of the settlement

28

(2009) 6 SCC 364

34

Page 35 and (iii) the dispute between the parties were purely civil in nature and

that she had not fabricated any document or cheated the bank in any

way whatsoever and charges could not have been framed against her.

The CBI contested the application for discharge on the ground that

mere repayment to the bank could not exonerate the accused from the

criminal proceeding. The two-Judge Bench of this Court referred to

Section 320 of the Code and the earlier decisions of this Court in CBI

v. Duncans Agro Industries Limited

29

, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

30

,

State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma

31

, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary

32

and

Nikhil Merchant

2

which followed the decision in B.S. Joshi

1

and then

with reference to Article 142 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the

Code refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding as

under:

“24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of

the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of

such power would, however, depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The High Court, in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms

of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not

direct quashing of a case involving crime against the

society particularly when both the learned Special

Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima

facie case has been made out against the appellant

herein for framing the charge.”

29

(1996) 5 SCC 591

30

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

31

1992 Supp (1) SCC 222

32

(1992) 4 SCC 305

35

Page 36 39. In Shiji alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another

33

this Court considered the exercise of inherent power by the High Court

under Section 482 in a matter where the offence was not compoundable

as the accused was already involved in commission of the offences

punishable under Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The High Court rejected the

prayer by holding that the offences with which appellants were charged

are not ‘personal in nature’ to justify quashing the criminal proceedings on

the basis of a compromise arrived at between the complainant and the

appellants. This Court considered earlier decisions of this Court, the

provisions contained in Sections 320 and 394 of the Code and in

paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 (pgs. 712 and 713) of the Report held as

under:

“17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is

not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by

itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise

of its power under Section 482 CrPC. That power can

in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no

chance of recording a conviction against the accused

and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an

exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction

between compounding of offences by the parties

before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and

the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the

prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on the other.

While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal

against conviction, may not be competent to permit

compounding of an offence based on a settlement

arrived at between the parties in cases where the

offences are not compoundable under Section 320,

the High Court may quash the prosecution even in

cases where the offences with which the accused

33

(2011) 10 SCC 705

36

Page 37 stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent

powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are

not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 CrPC.

18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the

plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by

itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to

exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The

width and the nature of the power itself demands that

its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the

High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear

view that continuance of the prosecution would be

nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is

neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the

situations in which the exercise of power under

Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say

is that the exercise of power must be for securing the

ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to

exercise that power may result in the abuse of the

process of law. The High Court may be justified in

declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate

evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate

court while dealing with a petition under Section 482

of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above,

the High Court will have to consider the facts and

circumstances of each case to determine whether it is

a fit case in which the inherent powers may be

invoked.

19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view

that the incident in question had its genesis in a

dispute relating to the access to the two plots which

are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad

daylight robbery for gain. It was a case which has its

origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which

dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That

being so, continuance of the prosecution where the

complainant is not ready to support the allegations

which are now described by her as arising out of

some “misunderstanding and misconception” will be a

futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is

noteworthy that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who

are closely related to the complainant, are also no

longer supportive of the prosecution version. The

continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an

empty formality. Section 482 CrPC could, in such

circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High

37

Page 38 Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and

thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts

below”.

40. In Ashok Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India and

others

34

, the issue under consideration was whether an offence which

was not compoundable under the provisions of the Code could be

quashed. That was a case where a criminal case was registered

against the accused persons under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and

471 of IPC. The allegation was that accused secured the credit facilities

by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilized such

facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening Letters of

Credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing

any goods but inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of Credit in

favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash credit facility.

The Court considered the earlier decisions of this Court including B.S.

Joshi

1

, Nikhil Merchant

2

, Manoj Sharma

3

, Shiji alias Pappu

33

, Duncans

Agro Industries Limited

29

, Rumi Dhar (Smt.)

28

and Sushil Suri

21

and also

referred to the order of reference in one of the cases before us. In

paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Report it was held as under:-

“17. Having carefully considered the facts and

circumstances of the case, as also the law relating to

the continuance of criminal cases where the

complainant and the accused had settled their

differences and had arrived at an amicable

arrangement, we see no reason to differ with the

34

JT 2012 (3) SC 469

38

Page 39 views that had been taken in Nikhil Merchant's case

or Manoj Sharma's case (supra) or the several

decisions that have come thereafter. It is, however, no

coincidence that the golden thread which runs

through all the decisions cited, indicates that

continuance of a criminal proceeding after a

compromise has been arrived at between the

complainant and the accused, would amount to abuse

of the process of court and an exercise in futility,

since the trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may

conclude in a decision which may be of any

consequence to any of the other parties. Even in

Sushil Suri's case on which the learned Additional

Solicitor General had relied, the learned Judges who

decided the said case, took note of the decisions in

various other cases, where it had been reiterated that

the exercise of inherent powers would depend entirely

on the facts and circumstances of each case. In other

words, not that there is any restriction on the power or

authority vested in the Supreme Court in exercising

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, but that

in exercising such powers the Court has to be

circumspect, and has to exercise such power

sparingly in the facts of each case. Furthermore, the

issue, which has been referred to a larger Bench in

Gian Singh's case (supra) in relation to the decisions

of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case, Nikhil Merchant's

case, as also Manoj Sharma's case, deal with a

situation which is different from that of the present

case. While in the cases referred to hereinabove, the

main question was whether offences which were not

compoundable, under Section 320 Cr.P.C. could be

quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in Gian Singh's

case the Court was of the view that a non-

compoundable offence could not be compounded and

that the Courts should not try to take over the function

of the Parliament or executive. In fact, in none of the

cases referred to in Gian Singh's case, did this Court

permit compounding of non-compoundable offences.

On the other hand, upon taking various factors into

consideration, including the futility of continuing with

the criminal proceedings, this Court ultimately

quashed the same.

18. In addition to the above, even with regard to the

decision of this Court in Central Bureau of

39

Page 40 Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Ors. :

[(2009) 6 SCC 351], this Court observed that the High

Court can exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

to do real and substantial justice and to prevent abuse

of the process of Court when exceptional

circumstances warranted the exercise of such power.

Once the circumstances in a given case were held to

be such as to attract the provisions of Article 142 or

Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, it would be

open to the Supreme Court to exercise its

extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution to quash the proceedings, the

continuance whereof would only amount to abuse of

the process of Court. In the instant case the dispute

between the petitioners and the Banks having been

compromised, we have to examine whether the

continuance of the criminal proceeding could turn out

to be an exercise in futility without anything positive

being ultimately achieved.

19. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh's case

(supra), the pendency of a reference to a larger

Bench, does not mean that all other proceedings

involving the same issue would remain stayed till a

decision was rendered in the reference. The

reference made in Gian Singh's case (supra) need

not, therefore, detain us. Till such time as the

decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or altered

in any way, they continue to hold the field.

20. In the present case, the fact situation is different

from that in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). While in

Nikhil Merchant's case the accused had

misrepresented the financial status of the company in

question in order to avail of credit facilities to an

extent to which the company was not entitled, in the

instant case, the allegation is that as part of a larger

conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a person

who had no title to the leased properties, was offered

as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart from

the above, the actual owner of the property has filed a

criminal complaint against Shri Kersi V. Mehta who

had held himself out as the Attorney of the owner and

his family members. The ratio of the decisions in B.S.

Joshi's case and in Nikhil Merchant's case or for that

matter, even in Manoj Sharma's case, does not help

40

Page 41 the case of the writ petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant's

case, this Court had in the facts of the case observed

that the dispute involved had overtures of a civil

dispute with criminal facets. This is not so in the

instant case, where the emphasis is more on the

criminal intent of the Petitioners than on the civil

aspect involving the dues of the Bank in respect of

which a compromise was worked out.”

The Court distinguished B.S. Joshi

1

and Nikhil Merchant

2

by observing

that those cases dealt with different fact situation.

41. In Rajiv Saxena and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and

another

35

, this Court allowed the quashment of criminal case under

Sections 498-A and 496 read with Section 34 IPC by a brief order. It was

observed that since the parties had settled their disputes and the

complainant agreed that the criminal proceedings need not be continued,

the criminal proceedings could be quashed.

42. In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the month

of July, 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat and

another

36

, this Court was again concerned with the question of quashment

of an FIR alleging offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420

and 120-B IPC. The High Court refused to quash the criminal case under

Section 482 of the Code. The question for consideration was that

inasmuch as all those offences, except Section 420 IPC, were non-

compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code, whether it

35

(2012) 5 SCC 627

36

JT 2012 (6) SC 504

41

Page 42 would be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Section 482

of the Code or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The Bench elaborately considered the decision of this Court in Shiji alias

Pappu

33

and by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution quashed the

criminal proceedings. It was held as under:-

“10. In the light of the principles mentioned above,

inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 - the Complainant

has filed an affidavit highlighting the stand taken by

the Appellant (Accused No. 3) during the pendency of

the appeal before this Court and the terms of

settlement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying

the same analogy and in order to do complete justice

under Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept the

terms of settlement insofar as the Appellant herein

(Accused No. 3) is concerned.

11.In view of the same, we quash and set aside

the impugned FIR No. 45/2011 registered with

Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences

punishable Under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and

120-B of IPC insofar as the Appellant (Accused No.

3) is concerned. The appeal is allowed to the extent

mentioned above”.

43. In Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A. P.

37

decided on April 29,

1987, this Court allowed the compounding of an offence under Section

326 IPC even though such compounding was not permitted by Section

320 of the Code. However, in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K

38

, this

Court observed that Y. Suresh Babu

37

was per incuriam. It was held that

37

(2005) 1 SCC 347

38

(1999 2 SCC 213

42

Page 43 an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable cannot be

compounded at all even with the permission of the Court.

44. Having surveyed the decisions of this Court which throw light

on the question raised before us, two decisions, one given by the Punjab

and Haryana High Court and the other by Bombay High Court deserve

to be noticed.

45. A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another

39

was called

upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the

power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings

or allow the compounding of the offences in the cases which have been

specified as non-compoundable offences under the provisions of Section

320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions

of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye

12

, Bhajan Lal

30

, L.

Muniswamy

11

, Simrikhia

14,

B.S. Joshi

1

and Ram Lal

38

and framed the

following guidelines:

“a. Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if

other offences are introduced for aggravation of the

case.

b. Cases pertaining to property disputes between

close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature

and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of

criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal

39

(2007) 4 CTC 769

43

Page 44 liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and

harmony to larger number of people.

c. Cases of dispute between old partners or business

concerns with dealings over a long period which are

predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal

dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a

redressal of their financial or commercial claim.

d. Minor offences as under Section 279, IPC may be

permitted to be compounded on the basis of

legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another

offence which remains non- compoundable is Section

506 (II), IPC, which is punishable with 7 years

imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an

offence under Section 506 IPC in most cases is

based on the oral declaration with different shades of

intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be

liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148, IPC,

more particularly where other offences are

compoundable. It may be added here that the State of

Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act No. 17 of 1999

(Section 3) has made Sections 506(II) IPC, 147 IPC

and 148, IPC compoundable offences by amending

the schedule under Section 320, Cr.P.C.

e. The offences against human body other than

murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies

in the course of transaction would fall in the category

where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous

offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case

involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall

in the prohibited category. Offences committed by

Public Servants purporting to act in that capacity as

also offences against public servant while the victims

are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain

non-compoundable. Offences against the State

enshrined in Chapter-VII (relating to army, navy and

air force) must remain non-compoundable.

f. That as a broad guideline the offences against

human body other than murder and culpable homicide

may be permitted to be compounded when the court

is in the position to record a finding that the settlement

between the parties is voluntary and fair.

44

Page 45 While parting with this part, it appears necessary to

add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy

the conscience of the court. The settlement must be

just and fair besides being free from the undue

pressure, the court must examine the cases of

weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary

caution."

To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never

be any hard and fast category which can be

prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The only principle

that can be laid down is the one which has been

incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent

abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the

ends of justice".

It was further held as under :

“23. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of

the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle

down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

25. The only inevitable conclusion from the above

discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the

Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this

Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be

limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has

the wide power to quash the proceedings even in

non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar

under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent

the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be

exercised ex-debito Justitiae to prevent an abuse of

process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive

list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High

Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will

always depend upon the facts and circumstances of

each case. The power under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will

exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and

caution. The exercise of power has to be with

circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and

an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and

control social order. The Courts play role of

paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony

45

Page 46 and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of

a dispute by way of a compromise between two

warring groups, therefore, should attract the

immediate and prompt attention of a Court which

should endeavour to give full effect to the same

unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful

composition of the society or would promote

savagery.”

46. A three-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abasaheb

Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra

40

dealt with the inherent power

of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code vis-à-vis the express bar

for compounding of the non-compoundable offences in Section 320(9) of

the Code. The High Court referred to various decisions of this Court and

also the decisions of the various High Courts and then stated as follows :

“The power of compounding on one hand and

quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of

inherent powers on the other, are incapable of

being treated as synonymous or even inter-

changeable in law. The conditions precedent and

satisfaction of criteria in each of these cases are

distinct and different. May be, the only aspect

where they have any commonality is the result of

exercise of such power in favour of the accused,

as acquittal is the end result in both these cases.

Both these powers are to be exercised for valid

grounds and with some element of objectivity.

Particularly, the power of quashing the FIR or

criminal proceedings by the Court by taking

recourse to inherent powers is expected to be

used sparingly and that too without losing sight of

impact of such order on the criminal justice

delivery system. It may be obligatory upon the

Court to strike a balance between the nature of

the offence and the need to pass an order in

40

2008 (2) Mh.L.J.856

46

Page 47 exercise of inherent powers, as the object of

criminal law is protection of public by

maintenance of law and order.”

47. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with regard

to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the offences punishable

under IPC which may be compounded by the parties without permission

of the Court and the composition of certain offences with the permission

of the court. The offences punishable under the special statutes are not

covered by Section 320. When an offence is compoundable under

Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such

offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 of the IPC

can also be compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18

years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract

compounding of offence but the same can be done on his behalf with the

permission of the court. If a person is otherwise competent to compound

an offence is dead, his legal representatives may also compound the

offence with the permission of the court. Where the accused has been

committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal is pending,

composition can only be done with the leave of the court to which he has

been committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case may be.

The revisional court is also competent to allow any person to compound

any offence who is competent to compound. The consequence of the

47

Page 48 composition of an offence is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of

Section 320 mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as

provided by this Section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an

offence has to be in accord with Section 320 and in no other manner.

48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High

Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has

settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is

allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.

49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests,

saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it

being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, ‘nothing

in this Code’ which means that the provision is an overriding provision.

These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the

Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of

such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has

been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High

Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High

Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to

secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not

to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of

48

Page 49 the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly

and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted

in any other provision of the Code.

50. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised

in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by

the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on

either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.

51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation

of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or

to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded

on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id

sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever

anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to

be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something

else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done,

then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex

debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real,

complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed

by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but

requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

49

Page 50 52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the

High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a

straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under

Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.

53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of

settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as

compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.

Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court

under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal

proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In

compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by

the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and

squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the

High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or

criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the

ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate

consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

54. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having

regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been

settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its

opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility

50

Page 51 and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is

put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being

the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful

effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers

and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-

doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or

that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been

made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In

respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other

offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude

under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the

settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all.

However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear

civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,

partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of

matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where

the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all

disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such

offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within

the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or

criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such

51

Page 52 settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and

by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and

ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not

exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast

category can be prescribed.

55. B.S. Joshi

1

, Nikhil Merchant

2

, Manoj Sharma

3

and Shiji alias

Pappu

33

do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal

proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under

Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the

powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by

quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi

1

, Nikhil Merchant

2

, Manoj

Sharma

3

and Shiji alias Pappu

33

, this Court has compounded the non-

compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist

the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320

and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent

power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different

although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the

accused or dismissal of indictment.

56. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the

decisions of this Court in Simrikhia

14

, Dharampal

15

, Arun Shankar

Shukla

16

, Ishwar Singh

23

, Rumi Dhar (Smt.).

28

and Ashok Sadarangani

34

.

The principle propounded in Simrikhia

14

that the inherent jurisdiction of the

52

Page 53 High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is

by now well settled. In Dharampal

15

, the Court observed the same thing

that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized

for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar

statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla

16

. In Ishwar Singh

23

, the

accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under

Section 307, IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was

held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not

compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no

offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In

Rumi Dhar (Smt.)

28

although the accused had paid the entire due amount

as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the

Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for

commission of offences under Section 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC

along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section

13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court

refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the

Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when

a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing

the charge. Ashok Sadarangani

34

was again a case where the accused

persons were charged of having committed offences under Sections 120-

B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, IPC and the allegations were that the accused

53

Page 54 secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as

collaterals and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent

manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of

goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to

negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by

misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference

made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi

1

,

Nikhil Merchant

2

and Manoj Sharma

3

and it was held that B.S. Joshi

1

, and

Nikhil Merchant

2

dealt with different factual situation as the dispute

involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration

in Ashok Sadarangani

34

was more on the criminal intent than on a civil

aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani

34

supports the view that the

criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different

footing.

57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be

summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal

proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is

distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for

compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent

power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be

exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to

secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any

54

Page 55 Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint

or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their

dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and

no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,

the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the

crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the

victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such

offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to

the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or

the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity

etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings

involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly

and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the

purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,

financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the

offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family

disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and

the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases,

High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the

compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction

55

Page 56 is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused

to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused

to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete

settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court

must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of

justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the

criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite

settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and

whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is

put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative,

the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.

58. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi

1

, Nikhil

Merchant

2

and Manoj Sharma

3

were not correctly decided. We answer

the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the

concerned Bench(es).

…………………… .J.

(R.M. Lodha)

…………………… .J.

(Anil R. Dave)

…….............…………………… .J.

(Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

NEW DELHI.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2012.

56