IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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AT GWALIOR

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA

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ON THE 11

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th

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OF NOVEMBER, 2025

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MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 26644 of 2023

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GIRRAJ SHARMA

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Versus

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

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Appearance:

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Mr. Amit Lahoti - Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Purshottam Tanwar - Panel Lawyer for respondent/State.

Mr. Sanjay Kumar Sharma - Advocate for the respondent [COMP].

ORDER

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This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the

petitioner for quashment of FIR bearing Crime No.645/2021 registered at

Police Station Kotwali, District Shivpuri for offence punishable under

Sections 376, 506, 420 and 384 of IPC and Section 67 of Information

Technology (Amendment) Act, 2000.

2. As per the prosecution case, the complainant, along with her father,

submitted an application and supporting documents alleging that the

petitioner fraudulently misled the complainant with a promise of marriage

and, on one occasion, committed sexual intercourse against her consent and

wishes after administering an intoxicating substance while she was present at

his house. The application further stated that the petitioner captured obscene

photographs of her and used them to blackmail her, attempting to

1 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

dishonestly obtain the maintenance amount she received following her

separation from her husband. The prosecutrix, fearing humiliation and

scandal, initially did not disclose the incident. However, the petitioner

continued to criminally intimidate the complainant both inside and outside

her house. This subsequent series of incidents compelled her to approach the

police station, on the basis of which the aforesaid offence was registered

against the present petitioner.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the prosecutrix is a

major lady serving as an Assistant District Prosecution Officer (ADPO). She

lodged the FIR on 14.11.2021 against the petitioner, alleging that she was

posted as an ADPO at Chhatarpur Court at the relevant time, and is currently

working as an ADPO at Sheopur Court. While serving at Chhatarpur, she

came into contact with the petitioner. As per her own version, the prosecutrix

was a divorced lady at that time. It is alleged that the petitioner made a false

promise of marriage and, on that pretext, maintained physical relations with

her. It is further alleged that, prior to the physical relationship, the petitioner

administered an intoxicating substance to her, causing her to become

unconscious. Thereafter, without her will and consent, the petitioner

committed rape and also took certain obscene photographs of her.

Subsequently, the petitioner allegedly blackmailed the prosecutrix using

those photographs and continued to have physical relations with her on

several occasions.

4.

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It is further submitted that, as per the FIR, the prosecutrix had been

acquainted with the petitioner since 2018 and they were in a consensual

2 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

relationship for several years. No specific date, time, or incident has been

mentioned in the FIR to constitute the alleged offence of rape. The

prosecutrix continued to maintain an intimate relationship with the petitioner

over a long period, which clearly reflects that the relationship was consensual

and based on mutual affection.

5. It is further submitted that, even if all the allegations in the FIR and

the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. are taken

at face value, no offence as alleged is made out against the petitioner. It is a

matter of record that, as per her own version, the prosecutrix had been

acquainted with the petitioner since 2018 and they were in a consensual

relationship for several years. The FIR was lodged only in 2021, much after

the alleged relationship had begun. Even in her statement under Section 164

Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix admitted that the petitioner had promised to marry

her, but she later came to know that the petitioner was already married. In

these circumstances, and considering the factual background of the case, the

matter is squarely covered by various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, wherein consensual relationships under a promise of marriage do not

attract the ingredients of Section 376 IPC.

6. It is further submitted that the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix

in the FIR are false, concocted, and motivated. The alleged threats by the

petitioner are also unsubstantiated by any legal evidence. Hence, the entire

FIR stands vitiated and does not disclose the commission of any cognizable

offence.

7. It is further submitted that the relationship between the prosecutrix

3 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

and the petitioner was purely consensual, and both parties had spent

considerable time together of their own free will. Once such consensual

physical intimacy has occurred between two adults, it cannot subsequently be

termed as rape merely because the petitioner refused to marry the

prosecutrix. The consent of the prosecutrix was not induced by any deceitful

promise or false assurance. The petitioner and prosecutrix were known to

each other for a long time and were in a relationship. When the petitioner

declined to marry, the prosecutrix, in a revengeful manner and to misuse the

process of law, lodged the present false FIR against him.

8. It is further submitted that the F.I.R. was initially lodged under

Sections 376, 506, and 384 of the I.P.C., and during investigation, Section

420 of the I.P.C and Section 67 of IT Act were added. Thereafter, the

charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court. It is further submitted

that in the present facts and circumstances, Section 420 of the I.P.C. is not

attracted. Even if the petitioner had sexual relations with the prosecutrix

several times on the false pretext of marriage, this act does not fall under the

definition of the offence of cheating, therefore, Section 420 of the I.P.C. is

not made out against the present applicant.

9. It is further submitted that the prosecutrix had matrimonial

disputes with her husband and subsequently obtained a divorce. The

petitioner had no role in her matrimonial discord or divorce proceedings.

Thus, it is prayed that the impugned FIR be quashed. To bolster these

submissions, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court

rendered in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra

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4 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

and Anr.

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, reported in (2019) SCC Online SC 1073

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.

10. Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State and counsel for

the complainant, while opposing the prayer for quashing of the FIR, submit

that the allegations levelled in the FIR, when taken at their face value, clearly

disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 376, 506, and

384 of the IPC. The petitioner, under the guise of a promise to marry,

allegedly established repeated physical relations with the prosecutrix and

thereafter refused to solemnize the marriage. The contents of the FIR make

out a prima facie case, and hence, the FIR cannot be quashed at the threshold.

They submit that the question of whether the consent of the prosecutrix was

free and voluntary or was obtained on the false pretext of marriage is a

matter of trial and requires appreciation of evidence. Under these

circumstances, they prayed for dismissal of the present petition.

11. Counsel for the complainant has drawn the attention of this Court

to the statement of the prosecutrix, wherein, she specifically stated that on

January 2, 2018, while she was in Shivpuri and waiting for a bus to go to her

workplace, i.e., Chhatarpur, the accused/petitioner arrived in his white four-

wheeler and asked her where she was going. She told him that she was going

to Chhatarpur, and he said he was also going there. He asked her to come

with him. She got into the car with him. On the way, he said that he needed

to pick up some documents from home. The accused then stopped the car at

his home in Vijaypuram Colony and took her inside. There was no one

present. Thereafter, the petitioner-accused brought tea and biscuits laced

with some intoxicant. After consuming them, she fell unconscious and, while

5 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

still intoxicated, he committed rape upon the prosecutrix. He also took

several obscene photographs of her. By showing these photographs, the

accused raped the prosecutrix several times without her consent or wish and

threatened to make the photographs viral. The accused demanded money

several times, and she was forced to give him money.

12. At the stage of considering an application under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C., the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry or evaluate the

evidentiary value of the allegations. If the contents of the FIR disclose the

commission of any offence, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed

merely on the basis of disputed facts or the probable defence of the accused.

In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment passed by the

Delhi High Court in Crl. M.C. No. 4228/2023 (Divyansh Bajpai v. State

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(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr.)

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, wherein, the Court has held that Section

90 of the IPC provides that "consent is known to be given under fear or

misconception." Based on these submissions, counsel for the complainant

argues that the allegations are substantive and warrant a full-fledged trial.

The Complainant opposes the quashing of the FIR, asserting that preemptive

interference by this Court would deny her the opportunity to establish the

truth and seek justice through due process.

13. Heard counsel for the parties and peruse the record.

14. From the contents of the FIR and the statement of the prosecutrix

recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., it is palpably clear that the

petitioner and the prosecutrix were well acquainted with each other for a

long time. There existed a love affair between them, and they had developed

6 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

physical relations which continued for a considerable period. However,

before arriving at any conclusive finding on the basis of the material

available on record and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

parties, it is appropriate to first take note of the law laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court and the various High Courts on the issue.

15. The Supreme Court in case of [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi)]

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Delhi 2024 INSC 879

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dealing with similar circumstances has observed as

under:-

"17. In the present case, the issue that had to be addressed by the

High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the FIR

are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Sections

376 and 506 IPC were made out. A bare perusal of the FIR reveals

that the appellant and the complainant first came in contact in the

year 2017 and established a relationship thereafter. The parties met

multiple times at various places during the years 2017 and 2019,

including at parks and their respective houses. Although the

complainant stated that the appellant had a forceful sexual

relationship with her, neither did she stop meeting the appellant

thereafter, nor did she file a criminal complaint during the said

period.

18. It is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to

meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical

relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her

part. Moreover, it would have been improbable for the appellant to

ascertain the complainant's residential address, as mentioned in the

FIR unless such information had been voluntarily provided by the

complainant herself. It is also revealed that, at one point, both

parties had an intention to marry each other, though this plan

ultimately did not materialize. The appellant and the complainant

were in a consensual relationship. They are both educated adults.

The complainant, after filing the FIR against the appellant, got

married in the year 2020 to some other person. Similarly, the

appellant was also married in the year 2019. Possibly the marriage

of the appellant in the year 2019 has led the complainant to file the

FIR against him as they were in a consensual relationship till

then."

16. In case of Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh &

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Anr. reported in 2024 INSC 481

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, the Supreme Court considering the long

7 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

relationship between the parties has observed as under:-

"25. From the factual matrix of the case, the following relevant

features can be culled out:

(i) the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was

of a consensual nature;

(ii) the parties were in a relationship for a period of almost two

years; and

(iii) though there were talks between the parties and their family

members regarding marriage, the same did not fructify leading to

lodging of FIR.

26. That being the position and having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it would be in

the interest of justice if the proceedings are terminated at this stage

itself. Consequently, impugned order of the High Court dated

03.10.2019 and the order of the Sessions Judge dated 24.04.2019

are hereby set aside and quashed."

17. Further, in case of Mahesh Damu v. The State of Maharashtra &

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Anr. reported in 2024 INSC 897

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, the observation made by the Supreme

Court is as under:-

"22. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship

by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held

criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable

directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other

circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to

have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage

made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner

without insisting upon formal marital ties. Thus, in a situation

where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period

knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the

said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged

promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be

shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the

promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus MCRC-54176-

2023 with the physical relationship without being influenced by

any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation

of consent under misconception of fact.

x x x

31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged

physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious

consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to

such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an

allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in

the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There is always a

danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil

8 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

relationship of which the Court must also be mindful."

18. Further in case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of

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Maharashtra and another reported in AIR 2019 SC 327,

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considering the

existing facts and circumstances of the case, which are almost similar to the

case in hand, has observed as under:-

"20. With this factual background, the Court held that the girl had

taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the

events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a

case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false

promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie

accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus : (Deelip

Singh [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005

SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 106, para 35) "35. The remaining

question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is

reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent

intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false

promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out

the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for

the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12

was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we

find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond

reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to MCRC-

54176-2023 marry her at all from the inception and that the

promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances

emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the

other hand, the statement of PW 12 that "later on", the accused

became ready to marry her but his father and others took him

away from the village would indicate that the accused might have

been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not

materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders.

It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a

case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the

observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of

Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24

come to the aid of the appellant."

19. Likewise in a case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana) reported

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in (2013) 7 SCC 675,

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the Supreme Court has observed as under:-

"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,

obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,

accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,

the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between

9 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very

carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to

marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false

promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls

within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction

between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false

promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at

an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and

whether the consent involved was given after wholly

understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.

There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual

intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,

and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the

accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which

he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was

unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such

cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for

rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the

accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

x x x

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to

show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the

accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to

marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a

person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim

owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep

a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to

reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does

not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come

within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact

must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be

called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in

entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court

is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had

never really intended to marry her."

20. The Supreme Court in case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of

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Uttar Pradesh and Anr. [Criminal Appeal No.233 of 2021 (Arising out of

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SLP (Cri) No. 11218 of 2019],

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has observed as under:-

"10. Bearing in mind the tests which have been enunciated in the

above decision [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra,

(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , we are of the view

that even assuming that all the allegations in the FIR are correct

for the purposes of considering the application for quashing under

Section 482CrPC, no offence has been established. There is no

allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the

second respondent was false at the inception. On the contrary, it

10 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a

subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry MCRC-

54176-2023 the second respondent which gave rise to the

registration of the FIR. On these facts, we are of the view that the

High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under

Section 482CrPC on the basis that it was only the evidence at trial

which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was

established."

21. In case of Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand reported in

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(2020) 10 SCC 108,

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the observation made by the Supreme Court is as

follows:-

"13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix

consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of

fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was

her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage

which the appellant never intended to keep since the very

inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he

intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very

inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception

of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made

out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record

that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting

her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under

fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of

the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary

statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged

offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury."

22. Further, in case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of

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Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608

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, the Supreme Court has

considered the similar circumstances and observed as under:-

"12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect

to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the

circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An

individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating

various MCRC-54176-2023 alternative actions (or inaction) as

well as the various possible consequences flowing from such

action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar

[Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18

SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100] which was a case

involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this

Court observed :(SCC para 15) "15. ... An inference as to consent

11 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the

case. "Consent" is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with

deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit

the doing of the act complained of."

This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this

Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala [Kaini Rajan v. State of

Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 :(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] : (SCC p.

118, para 12) "

12. ... "Consent", for the purpose of Section 375, requires

voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence

based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of

the act but after having fully exercised the choice between

resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be

ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances."

x x x

14. In the present case, the "misconception of fact" alleged by the

complainant is the appellant's promise to marry her. Specifically in

the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that

there is a distinction between a false promise given on the

understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach

of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not

fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v.

State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC

509], this Court held : (SCC para 12)

"12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be

that if it is established and proved that from the inception the

accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not

have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent

for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he

would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent

obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in

such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and

such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as

defined under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the

offence under Section 376 IPC."

23. The Supreme Court in case of Uday v. State of Karnataka reported

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in (2003) 4 SCC 46,

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dealing with the factual circumstances existing in the

said case has observed as under:-

"21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is

in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to

sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love

on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be

said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is

not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to

agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket

formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix

12 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a

misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down

by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while

considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case,

consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances,

before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own

peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the MCRC-54176-

2023 question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given

under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence

keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to

prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent

being one of them.

x x x

23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in

such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on

record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl

studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant.

She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to

different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the

proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by

their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant

when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient

intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the

act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long

as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the

appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely

exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have

known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was

conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all

on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us

to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously

consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her

consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.

x x x

25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in

this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled

for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown

that the consent was given under a misconception of fact.

Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the

consent knew, or had reason to believe MCRC-54176-2023 that

the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We

have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the

prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the

appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her

marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste

considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff

opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a

distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the

marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the

appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the

appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had

13 MCRC-26644-2023NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:28659

consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a

consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get

married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this

fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support

the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the

consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love

for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love.

They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted

him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with

whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that

the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely

place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases,

when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to

each other several times that come what may, they will get

married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such

a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the

promise loses all significance, particularly when they are

overcome with emotions and passion and find themselves in

situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment,

succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is

what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the

prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with

the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he

promised to marry her, but because she also desired it. In these

circumstances it would be very difficult to impute to the appellant

knowledge that the MCRC-54176-2023 prosecutrix had consented

in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his

promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to

know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she

consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to

consent."

24. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana and others v.

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Bhajan Lal and others reported in of 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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, has laid down

the criteria/categories as to under what circumstances the Court should

exercise the power provided under Section 482 of CrPC or extraordinary

jurisdiction provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to

quash the proceedings. The categories of the cases in which interference is

permissible quoted by the Supreme Court, are as under:-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant

provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of

law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the

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exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have

extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories

of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently

channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to

give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such

power should be exercised:

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or

the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence

or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers

under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a

Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not

disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case

against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence,

no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order

of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance

of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the

Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala

fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a

view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

25. As per the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner, the

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present case falls within category Nos.1, 3 and 5 as laid down by the

Supreme Court in the said case.

26. In view of aforesaid, Sections 376, 506, 420 of IPC are not made

out against the present petitioner.

27. So far as the offence under Section 384 of the IPC and Section 67

of IT Act is concerned, the prosecutrix alleges that the petitioner attempted to

extort money by showing her obscene photographs. However, the record

indicates a conflicting fact: a cheque of HDFC Bank amounting to

₹3,00,000/- was issued by the petitioner to the prosecutrix. Given this

payment from the petitioner to the prosecutrix, the allegation of extortion

against the present petitioner is highly doubtful primafacie.

28. The facts of the present case reveal that both the prosecutrix and

the petitioner are major adults who were in a consensual relationship for

approximately 2-3 years. At the time they entered into the relationship, the

complainant/prosecutrix was admittedly married and, knowing well that the

petitioner could not have married her at that time, she entered into a

bigamous relationship. Thus, the very conduct of the complainant/prosecutrix

implies that their physical relationship was the result of mutual consent and

free will. Subsequently, due to personal reasons, the petitioner declined to

marry the prosecutrix, which led to the registration of the FIR. The

allegations, even if taken at their face value, therefore do not constitute the

offence under Section 376 IPC or any other cognizable offence. Therefore,

the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the complainant is

distinguishable from the present facts and circumstance of the case.

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(RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA )

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JUDGE

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Continuation of the criminal proceedings would, therefore, amount to an

abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, the prosecution initiated against

him deserves to be quashed in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal

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(supra)

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, while exercising the inherent powers

conferred under Section 482 of the CrPC.

29. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The FIR

registered against the petitioner vide Crime No.645/2021 registered at Police

Station Kotwali, District Shivpuri for offence punishable under Sections 376,

506, 420 and 384 of IPC and Section 67 of Information Technology

(Amendment) Act, 2000 is hereby quashed, along with all consequential

proceedings arising therefrom.

30. Accordingly, the petition stands allowed and disposed of. No order

as to costs.

(LJ*)

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