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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 1968 of 1996

PETITIONER:

Goa Plast (P) Ltd.

RESPONDENT:

Chico Ursula D'Souza

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/11/2003

BENCH:

B.P. Singh & Dr. AR. Lakshmanan

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.

This appeal is preferred by the appellant/complainant against the order of the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Panaji Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 37/1995

whereby the High Court confirmed the order of acquittal dated 25.08.1995 passed by

the Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Pvt. N.C. Case No. 149/93/8 for offence

punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are as follows:

The respondent issued 10 post-dated cheques of Rs.40,000/- each in favour of

the appellant totalling Rs.4 lakhs for payment towards the liability of the amount

misappropriated from the funds of the appellant-Company. The respondent wrote a

letter to the appellant denying liability to pay the aforesaid sum for the reasons given in

the letter dated 12.02.1993(Annexure P-1). The appellant deposited the first cheque for

encashment. The said cheque was dishonoured by the Bank on the ground that the

respondent had issued instructions to stop payment. The appellant sent a legal notice

to the respondent regarding the dishonour of the cheque demanding payment of

Rs.40,000/- within 15 days. As the respondent did not comply with the aforesaid notice,

a complaint was filed against the respondent under Section 142 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for offence punishable under

Section 138 of the Act. According to the appellant, the respondent/accused was

working as Managing Director of the appellant-Company. The services of the

respondent were discontinued from the month of July, 1992. The appellant examined

its General Manager on their behalf to prove the complaint. The respondent in defence

did not examine any witness. The respondent also did not step in the witness box so as

to subject himself to the cross-examination. He only brought on record the letter dated

12.02.1993 written by him to the Company. True copy of the advice from the Bank

dated 12.04.1993, true copy of the complaint dated 06.03.1996 and true copy of the

deposition have been marked as Annexures P-2, P-3 and P-4.

The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class vide order dated 25.08.1995

acquitted the respondent holding that the petitioner failed to prove the liability and also

holding that the respondent had rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139

of the Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.

37 of 1995 to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which also dismissed the appeal

holding that the appellant had failed to prove the liability on the part of the respondent t

o

pay the sum in question. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 12.01.1996 of the

High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 37/1995, the present appeal was

preferred by the appellant.

We heard Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and

Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that

the presumption has to be rebutted by leading evidence and not by mere explanation or

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statement and that mere issuance of a cheque in favour of the appellant-Company is

sufficient to show that the respondent/accused owes liabilities of the appellant-

Company. While construing the provisions of Section 138 of the Act, besides the fact

that the cheque issued by the respondent was dishonoured, nothing further is required

to be proved by the complainant and it is for the accused to rebut the presumption

under Section 139 of the Act. He would further submit that merely by sending a letter or

a communication to the appellant-Company is not sufficient unless and until the

presumption is rebutted by leading evidence and that the presumption cannot be said to

be rebutted. Shri Dhruv Mehta would further urge that it was incumbent on the

respondent/accused to examine Rajan Kinnerkar as the respondent stated in his letter

dated 12.02.1993 that Rajan Kinnerkar was responsible for the financial transactions of

the Company and, therefore, he is responsible for the unexplained expenditure of the

Company's Accounts. It was further contended that as soon as the

respondent/accused presented or delivered the cheques to the appellant-Company, he

admitted the liability and the cheque on presentation to the Bank being dishonoured,

the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are satisfied and the accused committed an

offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.

Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused,

submitted that the appellant/complainant scrupulously avoided in the complaint and in

the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 to state the relationship with the respondent/accused

and there is also no whisper in the complaint as well as in the evidence led on behalf of

the appellant regarding the receipt of the letter dated 12.02.1993. It was further

submitted that the appellant has not placed before the trial Court any details or

statement as to how the respondent is liable for any dues alleged to be against the

respondent. Shri A.K. Sanghi would further submit that mere presentation or delivery of

the cheque, in the instant case, to the appellant by the respondent will not amount to

acceptance of the debt or liability and on the contrary, the respondent has given the

entire history in his letter dated 12.02.1993 before presentation of the cheque in the

month of April, 1993 to the Bank. It was further stated that the very letter was drafted

by Rajan Kinnerkar and it was prepared, as directed by the appellant, as per the draft

and, therefore, the respondent has rightly and specifically disowned the liability of Rs. 4

lakhs much less Rs.40,000/- involved in the instant appeal.

Before we advert to the respective contentions of the learned counsel appearing

on either side, it is beneficial to quote Section 138 and Section 139 of the Act as it stood

at the relevant time. Sections 138 and 139 of the Act read as under:

"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the

account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained

by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person

from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or

other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of

money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the

cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account

by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have

committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of

this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one

year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with

both:

Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless \026

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six

months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its

validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may

be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by

giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen

days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the

return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said

amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder

in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the

said notice."

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"139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the

contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the

nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any

debt or other liability."

We have perused the pleadings, annexures, the order passed by the learned

Judicial Magistrate and the judgment rendered by the High Court. In our view, the High

Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate failed to give effect to Section 139 of the Act

which creates a presumption unless the contrary is proved that the holder of cheque

received the cheque for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. We

have perused the contents of the letter dated 12.02.1993. Neither the said letter is

proved nor its contents nor is the document produced in the proceedings of the Court.

It is pertinent to note that in the said letter, the respondent/complainant did not,

however, deny the liability as such but merely shifted it on third person. The veracity of

the contents of the letter could only be verified if the contents of the letter were proved.

The High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate have ignored the admission of the

liability by the respondent who said that the liability did exist but he was not responsible

for it. While considering this, the High Court and the learned Magistrate treated the

proof adduced by the respondent, namely, the letter, denying the liability and that some

other person is liable as sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the

Act. As already noticed, the appellant examined its General Manager on his side. The

respondent did not examine any witness and also did not step in the witness box so as

to step himself for the cross-examination. The respondent has brought on record the

letter dated 12.02.1993 written by him to the Company.

In our view, the High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate have clearly

misunderstood the object behind Section 138 of the Act. Sections 138 and 139 of the

Act were enacted in view of the fact that cheques were issued for payment of admitted

liability but the drawer used to dishonour the said liability by issuing instructions to the

Bank for stop payment. To avoid the aforesaid and to create an element of credibility

and dependability, the aforesaid Sections were enacted which provide a criminal

remedy of penalty if the ingredients of the Sections are satisfied. The High Court, in our

view, gave an interpretation which would defeat the very purpose for which the

provisions were enacted. The impugned judgment wrongly interpreted Section 139 of

the Act which is a presumption in favour of the holder. Reading the judgment with

Section 139 of the Act, it would appear that the High Court has read in to Section 139 of

the Act what is not contained in the Section. Many passages of the judgments of the

High Court and of the learned Judicial Magistrate are direct off shoot of the wrong

interpretation placed upon Section 139 of the Act and the High Court and the learned

Judicial Magistrate dwelt on extraneous factors and principles in order to bring the

present case out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act.

The High Court while discussing the object of the Chapter dealing with offences

relating with dishonour of the cheque and extensively quoting commentary by Author

Dr. P.W. Rege, however, has failed to consider the important aspect which is discussed

at paragraph 16 which reads as under:

"It is true that Negotiable Instruments Act has not failed to provide a remedy

for the aggrieved party; but the foregoing provisions of the Act lay down a

procedure which is in the first place very elaborate and since the remedy

would be merely of a civil nature, the process to seek civil justice, in the

second place becomes notoriously dilatory. To ensure promptitude in remedy

against defaulters, therefore, was the only way in which the element of

credibility and dependability could be re-introduced in the practice of issuing

negotiable instruments in the form of cheques. The best way to do this was to

provide a criminal remedy of penalty, which is just the thing that is sought to

be done by the Amending Act."

To fulfil the objective, the Legislature while amending the Act has made the

following procedure:

"(i) Under Section 138 a deeming offence is created.

(ii) In Section 139, a presumption is ingrained that the holder of the

cheque received it in discharge of liability.

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(iii) Disallowing a defence in Section 140 that drawer has no reason to

believe that cheque would be dishonoured.

(iv) An explanation is provided to Section 138 to define the words "debt

or other liability" to mean a legally enforceable debt or other liability."

If the aforesaid are borne in mind then the findings of the High Court are legally

perverse, namely, that Section 138 of the Act has application only in the case of

transactions involving Mercantile relationship and the second being that the appellant

has failed to prove the liability. Paragraph 18 of the judgment of the High Court

contains both the findings which reads as under:

"In this case no evidence or history being traced to show the relationship

between the complainant and respondent accused. From the cross-

examination it transpired that the respondent accused was working as the

Manager of the Factory. Thus, relation were Master and Servant or employee

or employer there being no business or commercial or mercantile relation

between the parties."

The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to appreciate that on the facts of the

instant case, the liability was a legally enforceable debt or liability as per the explanati

on

to Section 138 of the Act, therefore, the relationship between the appellant and the

respondent was not at all a factor germane to the proceedings for an offence under

Section 138 of the Act. The liability was legally enforceable debt is clear from the

finding of the High Court at paragraph 19 which is quoted below:

"The Appellant-Company has attempted to short circuit the suit by compelling

the accused respondent to pay the amount."

Both the Courts, in our view, failed to consider the important aspect as to the

stop payment instructions issued by the respondent. Ordinarily, the stop payment

instructions are issued to the Bank by the account holder when there is no sufficient

amount in the account. In the present case, the reason for stopping the payment,

however, can be manifold. It is essential that to issue stop payment instructions, there

must be funds in the accounts in the first place. On this aspect, the Courts below have

failed to see whether as on the date of signing of the cheque dated 20.07.1992, the

date of presentation of the cheque dated 10.01.1993, the date of writing of letter dated

12.02.1993 and the date on which stop payment instructions were issued to the Bank,

the respondent has sufficient funds in the account. Both the Courts below have held

that after issuing the letter, the respondent has stopped the payment, therefore, no

mala fide can be attributed. It is pertinent to notice that the appellant made an

application to the Bank Manager to ascertain whether or not there was sufficient

amount in the account for the payment dated 02.06.1995. The learned Judicial

Magistrate disallowed the said application without hearing the complainant holding that

there is no dispute about the dishonour of the cheque by the accused, therefore, no

purpose will be served by the Bank Manager as the dishonour is not in issue. Had the

Bank Manager been examined it would have been clear whether the account had

sufficient amount to pay the amount of the cheque or not. It would have enabled also to

know on what date stop payment order was sent by the drawer to the Bank. The

learned Magistrate committed a serious mistake in not allowing the application and the

proceedings passed thereon have suffered from serious infirmity going to the root of the

matter. The High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate have also not noticed that

the respondent was otherwise admitting the liability when the cheques were being

issued. This was sufficient evidence to prove that there was a liability and as per the

presumption under Section 139 of the Act, the cheques issued, therefore, were towards

the liability even as per the version of the respondent. The relevant Section which is

Section 138 of the Act giving the ingredients of the offence. In the opening words of the

Section it is stated:

"Where any cheques drawn by a person on an account maintained by him

with a bank for payment of any amount of money to any person from out of

that account for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other

liability\005\005."

Both the Courts below have ignored the admission of the liability by the

respondent who stated that the liability did exist but he was not responsible for it. While

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considering this, the Courts below treated the proof adduced by the respondent,

namely, letter denying liability and that some other person is liable for it, as sufficient

to

rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The Courts below have also not

considered that the accused had admitted that he was the Managing Director of the

appellant-Company when the liability arose.

Another reason given by the Courts below to reject the complaint was that the

appellant has suppressed the fact about the letter dated 12.02.1993. In our view, there

is no obligation on the part of the appellant to reply to such letter as per the scheme of

Section 138 of the Act.

Certain comments were made by the High Court in regard to the relationship of

the parties. For the cases filed under Section 142 of the Act for offence committed

under the Act the relationship between the drawer and the drawee is not material

because the liability admitted is one which can be legally enforced by way of suit.

We have perused the complaint also. On the point of pleadings in the complaint,

the complainant narrated all the necessary facts required to constitute offence under

Section 138 of the Act, therefore, there was no question of suppression of facts in the

case as held by the learned Judicial Magistrate and the findings endorsed by the High

Court. The complainant narrated that the respondent owed the appellant a sum of

Rs.40,000/-. The appellant has received post-dated cheque for the said amount. The

cheque was presented to the Bank and was returned with the remark `stop payment'.

The statutory notice was issued and was received by the respondent. The respondent

not having complied with the demand made, complaint was filed.

We shall now advert to the rulings cited at the time of hearing. Learned counsel

relied upon paragraphs 13 to 16 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi

Cements Ltd. Versus Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (1998) 3 SCC 249 (three-Judge Bench),

which read as under:

"It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that the decision in

Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. does not support

the appellant as far as the facts that emerged in the present cases inasmuch

as the drawer had intimated to the bank on 8-8-1984 to stop the payment

whereas the cheques were presented for encashment on 9-8-1994 although

the same were drawn on 23-2-1994, 26-2-1994 and 28-2-1994. The learned

counsel for the respondent strongly relied upon the following observations in

Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corpn. Ltd.: (SCC p. 742,

para 6)

"Suppose after the cheque is issued to the payee or to the holder in

due course and before it is presented for encashment, notice is issued to him

not to present the same for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due

course presents the cheque to the bank for payment and when it is returned

on instructions, Section 138 does not get attracted."

(emphasis supplied)

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the attention of

the Court was drawn to the provisions of Section 139 of the Act which

according to him, had an important bearing on the point in issue, the Court

would certainly not have made the above observations. The said section

reads as under:

"139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless

the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the

nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any

debt or other liability."

According to the learned counsel if the observations of this Court in

Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. to the effect, (SCC

p. 742, para 6)

"[s]uppose after the cheque is issued to the payee or to the holder in

due course and before it is presented for encashment, notice is issued to him

not to present the same for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due

course presents the cheque to the bank for payment and when it is returned

on instructions, Section 138 does not get attracted"

is accepted as good law, the very object of introducing Section 138 in the Act

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would be defeated.

We see great force in the above submission because once the cheque

is issued by the drawer a presumption under Section 139 must follow and

merely because the drawer issues a notice to the drawee or to the bank for

stoppage of the payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of

the Act by the drawee or the holder of a cheque in due course. The object of

Chapter XVII, which is intituled as "OF PENALTIES IN CASE OF

DISHONOUR OF CERTAIN CHEQUES FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS

IN THE ACCOUNTS" and contains Sections 138 to 142, is to promote the

efficacy of banking operations and to ensure credibility in transacting business

through cheques. It is for this reason we are of the considered view that the

observations of this Court in Electronics Trade & Technology Development

Corpn. Ltd. in para 6 to the effect "Suppose after the cheque is issued to the

payee or to the holder in due course and before it is presented for

encashment, notice is issued to him not to present the same for encashment

and yet the payee or holder in due course presents the cheque to the bank for

payment and when it is returned on instructions, Section 138 does not get

attracted", does not fit in with the object and purpose for which the above

chapter has been brought on the statute-book."

Learned counsel relied on paragraph 38 of the judgment of this Court in the case

of Hiten P. Dalal versus Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 which reads as

under:

"The burden was on the appellant to disapprove (sic disprove) the

presumptions under Sections 138 and 139, a burden which he failed to

discharge at all. The averment in the written statement of the appellant was

not enough. Incidentally, the defence in the written statement that the four

cheques were given for intended transactions was not the answer given by

the appellant to the notice under Section 138. Then he had said that the

cheques were given to assist the Bank for restructuring (Ext.H). It was

necessary for the appellant at least to show on the basis of acceptable

evidence either that his explanation in the written statement was so probable

that a prudent man ought to accept it or to establish that the effect of the

material brought on record, in its totality, rendered the existence of the fact

presumed, improbable. (Vide Trilok Chand Jain vs. State of Delhi, (1975) 4

SCC 761). The appellant has done neither. In the absence of any such proof

the presumption under Sections 138 and 139 must prevail."

Learned counsel also relied on paragraph 7 of the judgment of this Court in the

case of K.N. Beena Versus Muniyappan & Another (2001) 8 SCC 458 which reads

as under :

"In this case admittedly the Ist respondent has led no evidence except some

formal evidence. The High Court appears to have proceeded on the basis

that the denials/averments in his reply dated 21.5.1993 were sufficient to shift

the burden of proof on to the appellant complainant to prove that the cheque

was issued for a debt or liability. This is an entirely erroneous approach. The

Ist respondent had to prove in the trial, by leading cogent evidence, that there

was no debt or liability. The Ist respondent not having led any evidence could

not be said to have discharged the burden of proving that the cheque was not

issued for a debt or liability, the conviction as awarded by the Magistrate was

correct. The High Court erroneously set aside that conviction."

Learned counsel placed reliance on paragraph 6 of the judgment of this Court in

the case of Goaplast (P) Ltd. Versus Chico Ursula D'Souza & Another, (2003) 3

SCC 232 which reads as under:

"In the present case the issue is very different. The issue is regarding

payment of a post-dated cheque being countermanded before the date

mentioned on the fact of the cheque. For the purpose of considering the

issue, it is relevant to see Section 139 of the Act which creates a presumption

in favour of the holder of a cheque. The said section provides that:

"139. It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the

holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section

138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability."

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Thus it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt

or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and

the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption.

This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act which is

to promote the efficacy of banking operation and to ensure credibility in

business transactions through banks persuades us to take a view that by

countermanding payment of post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed

to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary

view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to

persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them

through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking

advantage of one's own wrong. If we hold otherwise, by giving instructions to

banks to stop payment of a cheque after issuing the same against a debt or

liability, a drawer will easily avoid penal consequences under Section 138.

Once a cheque is issued by a drawer, a presumption under Section 139 must

follow and merely because the drawer issued notice to the drawee or to the

bank for stoppage of payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138

of the Act by the drawee or the holder of the cheque in due course. This was

the view taken by this Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi,

(1998) 3 SCC 249. On same facts is the decision of this Court in Ashok

Yeshwant Badave vs. Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar, (2001) 3 SCC 726.

The decision in Modi case overruled an earlier decision of this Court in

Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian

Technologists & Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 739 which

had taken a contrary view. We are in respectful agreement with the view

taken in Modi case. The said view is in consonance with the object of the

legislation. On the faith of payment by way of a post-dated cheque, the payee

alters his position by accepting the cheque. If stoppage of payment before

the due date of the cheque is allowed to take the transaction out of the

purview of Section 138 of the Act, it will shake the confidence which a cheque

is otherwise intended to inspire regarding payment being available on the due

date."

Reliance was also placed on paragraph 17 of the judgment of this Court in the

case of M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another Versus Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd.

and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234 which reads as under:

"There is therefore no requirement that the complainant must specifically

allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of

proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents.

Thus they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of

averments in the petitions filed by them the High Court could not have

concluded that there was no existing debt or liability."

We are unable to agree with the reasonings adopted by the Courts below. The

judgments of the High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate are set aside. We hold

that Section 138 of the Act will be attracted in the facts of the case and a case for

punishment under the provisions is made out.

In the instant case, the cheque issued by the respondent has been stopped for

payment on his instructions and the cheque was returned to the appellant unpaid. In

view of our discussion in the foregoing paragraphs and on the consideration of the facts

and circumstances of the case and the law on the subject, we hold that the respondent

shall be deemed to have committed an offence. When the matter was taken up for

further hearing on 17.11.2003, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this

Court may consider the case of the respondent and the reason for his inability to pay

the amount and may consider imposing lesser sentence by taking a lenient view. We

are unable to countenance the said submission for the various reasons stated supra.

We have no doubt that the respondent has committed an offence punishable under the

provisions of Section 138 of the Act and is liable to be punished. The transaction in

question took place between the parties in the year 1993, therefore, Section 138, as it

stood at the relevant time, would be applicable to the present case. Section 138

provides imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may

extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. Section 138 has now been

amended and the penalty of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year has

been substituted to two years as provided by the Amending Act of 2002 and the fine

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which may extend to twice of the amount of the cheque. This has been prescribed as

the punishment for the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

The object and the ingredients under the provisions, in particular, Sections 138

& 139 of the Act cannot be ignored. Proper and smooth functioning of all business

transactions, particularly, of cheques as instruments, primarily depends upon the

integrity and honesty of the parties. In our country, in a large number of commercial

transactions, it was noted that the cheques were issued even merely as a device not

only to stall but even to defraud the creditors. The sanctity and credibility of issuance o

f

cheques in commercial transactions was eroded to a large extent. Undoubtedly,

dishonour of a cheque by the Bank causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience

to the payee and the entire credibility of the business transactions within and outside

the country suffers a serious set back. The Parliament, in order to restore the credibility

of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment enacted the aforesaid

provisions. The remedy available in a Civil Court is a long drawn matter and an

unscrupulous drawer normally takes various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the

payee.

We, therefore, grant one month's time from this date to the respondent herein to

pay a sum of Rs.80,000/- (twice the amount of the cheque) by way of Demand Draft

drawn in favour of the appellant and payable at Goa (in the address given in the paper

book). In default thereof, the respondent shall suffer simple imprisonment for six

months.

In the result, the appeal stands disposed of.