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PETITIONER:

GOA SAMPLING EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

GENERAL SUPERINTENDANCE CO. OF INDIA PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1984

BENCH:

DESAI, D.A.

BENCH:

DESAI, D.A.

SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:

1985 AIR 357 1985 SCR (2) 373

1985 SCC (1) 206 1984 SCALE (2)978

ACT:

Industrial Disputes Act 1947, Sections 2 (a) (i) and 10

(1) (d).

Industrial dispute in a Union Territory-Central

Government whether 'appropriate Government' to refer dispute

to the Industrial Tribunal.

Constitution of India 1950, Article 239.

'Administration of Union Territory'-Administrator-

Central Government whether 'appropriate Government' to refer

industrial dispute in a Union Territory to the industrial

Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.

General Clauses Act 1897 Sections 3 (8), 3 (60),

3,(62A).

'Central Government'-'State Government'-Union

Territory'-'Administration of Union Territory'-'Distinction

between.

Word & Phrases-Meaning of:

'appropriate Government'-Section 2 (a) (i) Industrial

Dispute Act 1947

in relation to the administration of Union` Territory'-

Section 3 (8) (b) (iii) and 3 (60) (c) General Clauses Act.

1897.

HEADNOTE:

The Central Government as an 'appropriate Government'

referred the Industrial dispute between the Appellant-

employees' Association and the first Respondent-employer in

each of the Appeals under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 to the Central Government Industrial

Tribunal.

A preliminary objection was raised that the CENTRAL

Government was not the 'appropriate Government' in relation

to the said industrial disputes and consequently the Central

Government had no power under Sec. 10 (l) (d) of the Act to

make the five references and that the Tribunal would have no

jurisdiction to entertain the same- The Appellant-

Association repelled this objection by contending that the

workmen were 'dock workers' within the meaning of the

expression in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment)

Act. 1948 and as they were working at Mormugao Port, a major

port in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman Diu, the Central

Government would be the 'appropriate Government' in relation

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to the industrial dispute and consequently the references

were valid and competent.

374

The Tribunal held that the workmen covered by the

reference who were iron-Ore samplers were 'dock workers' as

defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act,

1948 and as they were working in a major port, in a Union

Territory, the Central Government would be the 'appropriate

Government' for referring the industrial dispute. The

Tribunal over-ruled the preliminary objection and set down

the references for final hearing.

The first respondent-employers filed applications

under Article 227 in the High Court which held that the

workmen, who were iron ore samplers, were neither

comprehended in the expression 'dock workers' as defined in

the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948. nor

involved in any work connected with or related to a major

port. and were not involved in an industrial dispute

concerning a major port and therefore the Central Government

was not the appropriate Government' for referring the

industrial dispute. It further held that the Central

Government is not the State Government for the Union

Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu under Section 2 (a) (i) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but it is the

Administrator appointed under Article 239 and therefore the

Central Government was not the 'appropriate Government' and

had no jurisdiction to make the references. The rule was

made absolute and the references quashed.

Allowing the Appeals to this Court,

^

HELD: 1. The Central,Government as the 'appropriate

Government had made the references The High Court was

clearly in error in quashing the references. The judgment of

the High Court is quashed and set aside and the award of the

Tribunal on the preliminary point about the competence of

the Central Government to make the reference under Section

10(1) of Industrial Disputes, Act 1947 is confirmed. The

tribunal will be at liberty to examine the contention

whether iron ore samples are involved in any work connected

with or related to a major part or are dock workers and come

to its own decision uninfluenced by the view taken by the

High Court. As the dispute is an old one, the Tribunal is to

give top priority and dispose of the matter within a period

of six months. [386G; 387D-E, C]

2 (i) Indisputable the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

is a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 and the relevant definitions

having been recast to meet the constitutional and statutory

requirements the expressions 'Central Government, 'State

Government',and 'Union Territory' must receive the meaning

assigned to each in the General Clauses Act, 1897 unless

there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in

which it is used. No. such repugnancy was brought to the

notice of the Court. [384B-C]

(ii) On a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the

Constitution and the Union Territories Act 1963, it

clearly transpires that the concept of State Government is

foreign to the administration of Union Territory and Article

239 provides that every Union Territory is to be

administered by the President. The President may act through

an Administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus the

delegate of the President. His position is wholly different

from that

375

Of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ with his

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Minister and he must then obtain the orders of the President

meaning thereby of the Central A Government. The

Administrator of Union Territory does not therefore qualify

for the description of a State Government. The Central

Government is therefore the 'appropriate Government' [384F-

G]

(iii) The High Court fell into an error in

interpreting clause (c) of Section 3 (60) of the General

Clauses Act 1897 which upon its true construction would show

that in the Union Territory there is no concept of State

Government but wherever the expression 'State Government' is

used in relation to the Union Territory, the Central

Government would be the State Government. The very concept

of State Government in relation to Union Territory is

obliterated by the definition. [383D-H]

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors., [1955] SCR 549

and the State of Madhya Pradesh v, Shri Moula Bux & Ors.

[1962] 2 SCR 794, held inapplicable.

3. (i) The definition of three expression 'Central

Government' (Section 3 (8), 'State Government' (Section 3

(60)), and Union Territory' (Section 3 (62A)) in the General

Clauses Act, 1897 Would unmistakably show that the framers

of the Constitution as also the Parliament in enacting these

definitions have clearly retained the distinction between

State Government and Administration of Union Territory as

provided by the Constitution. It is especially made clear in

the definition of expression 'Central Government' that in

relation to the Administration of a Union Territory the

Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the

authority given to him under Article 239 of the

Constitution. would be comprehended in the expression

'Central Government. When this inclusionary part is put in

juxtaposition with exclusionary part in the definition of

the expression State Government' which provides that as

respects anything done or to be done after the commencement

of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall

mean, in a State, the Governors and in a Union Territory,

the Central Government, the difference conceptually speaking

between the expression' State Government' and the

'Administration of a Union Territory' clearly emerges There

is no room for doubt that the expression Administration of a

Union Territory', Administrator however having been

described, would not be comprehended in the expression State

Government as used in any enactment These definitions have

been modified to bring them to their present form at by the

Adaptation of Laws (No.1) Order, 1956. [386E-G]

(ii) The High Court clearly fell into an error when it

observed that the inclusive definition of the expression

'State Government, does not necessarily enlarge the scope of

the expression but may occasionally point to the contrary;

[386C]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4904-

4908 of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.83 of the

Bombay

376

High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 97B/80, 98B/80,

100B/80, 99B/80 and 67B/80.

VA Bobde, K.J. John and Ms. N. Srivastava for the

appellant.

F.S. Nariman, Miss A. Subhashini M.S. Usgaocar, S.K.

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Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J. Special leave granted.

Again the rigmarole of an utterly unsustainable

preliminary objection, and valuable time of a decade is

wasted in this bizarre exercise frustrating the search for

socio-economic justice, making it a distant dream, if not an

optical illusion.

The Central Government as an appropriate Government

referred the Industrial dispute between the appellant-Goa

Sampling Employees' Association ('Association' for short)

and the first respondent ('employer' for short) in each

petition under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 ('Act' for short) to the Central Government

Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Bombay by different orders made

in the year 1974 and 1975. Five separate references were

made because even though the Association representing

employees is common in all references, employer is different

but each raising a common question. When the references came

up before the Tribunal for hearing, it appears that the

employer in each case raised a preliminary objection but

what was the earliest preliminary objection eluded us. The

Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection whereupon the

employer filed some appeal to an authority which is not

made clear in the record. It appears the matters were

remitted to the Tribunal and thereafter all the five

references stood transferred to the Central Government

Industrial Tribunal No. 1 ('Tribunal' for short).

When the references again came up before the Tribunal

for hearing, the history repeated. A preliminary objection

was raised that the Central Government was not the

appropriate Government in relation to the industrial dispute

between the Association and the employer and therefore, the

Central Government had no power under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the

Act to make the reference

377

and accordingly the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to

entertain A the same. The Association attempted to repell

this contention by urging that the workmen were dock workers

within the meaning of the expression in Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and as they are working

in a major port, the Central Government will be the

appropriate Government in relation to the industrial dispute

between the Association and the workmen and therefore, the

reference is valid and the Tribunal should deal with the

same on merits according to law. As a second string to the

bow, it was contended that in relation to a union territory

Central Government is the appropriate Government.

It appears that evidence was led before the Tribunal

by both the sides. The Tribunal after exhaustively examining

the evidence held that the workmen covered by the reference

would be comprehended in the definition of expression 'Dock

Workers' as defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of

Employment) Act and as they were working at Mormugao Port

which is a major port, in respect of the industrial dispute

raised by them the Central Government would be the

appropriate Government. The Tribunal then proceeded to

examine whether the reference would be competent on the

assumption that the employees are not covered by the

expression 'Dock Workers' and held that the work performed

by the employees is in a major port and the dispute arise

out of the duty performed and work rendered in the major

port and therefore, the Central Government would be the

appropriate Government to make the necessary reference. The

Tribunal then proceeded to consider the alternative

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submission whether the reference would be competent even if

the State Government is the appropriate Government in view

of the fact that Goa, Damen and Diu constitute Union

Territory as set out in the First Schedule to the

Constitution and its administration is carried on by the

Administrator appointed by the President under Art. 239 of

the Constitution. Therefore, also the Central Government is

the appropriate Government. After discussing the rival

contentions the Tribunal did not record a finding on this

contention. The Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection

and set down the reference for final hearing by its order

dated July 14, 1980.

The employer in each reference filed special civil

application under Art. 227 of the Constitution in the High

Court of Judica-

378

ture at Bombay. All the five special civil applications came

up before the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court for

final hearing and they were disposed of by a common judgment

The High Court held that the iron ore samplers, the workmen

represented by the appellant association are not involved in

any work connected with or related to a major port. The High

Court further held that the industrial dispute in which iron

ore samplers are involved is not an industrial dispute

concerning the major port within the meaning of Sec- 2 (a)

(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 nor are the workmen

comprehended in the expression 'Dock Workers' as defined in

the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and

therefore the Central Government is not the appropriate

Government for referring the industrial dispute to the

Tribunal. Dealing with the second limb of the submission

that the Central Government itself can be said to be the

State Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and

Diu, the High Court held that the Central Government is not

the State Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman

and Diu under Sec 2 (a) (ii) of the Act but it is the

administrator appointed under Art, 239 of the Constitution

of India who is the State Government for the Union Territory

of Goa Daman and Diu and he is the appropriate Government

within the meaning of Sec. 2 (a) of the Act. The High Court

felt that if the Central Government is also held to be the

State Government for this purpose there would be two State

Governments for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu

and this would lead to utter confusion: The High Court

accordingly concluded that the Administrator is the

appropriate Government for the purpose of Sec 2(a) of the

Act and therefore the Central Government was not the

appropriate Government and had no jurisdiction to make the

impugned references. In accordance with this finding, the

High Court made the rule absolute quashing the references.

Hence these appeals by special leave.

The question that must engage our attention is whether

in relation to the industrial dispute between the employees

represented by the Association and the employer which is the

appropriate Government which can exercise power under Sec.

10 of the Act. Sec. 10 provides that 'where the appropriate

Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists

or is

379

apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer

the dispute etc. to a Tribunal for adjudication.' There are

two A provisos to the section. which are not material for

the present purpose. Thus the power is conferred on the

appropriate Government to make the reference for

adjudication of an industrial dispute which either exists or

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is apprehended.

'Appropriate Government' is defined in Sec. 2 (a) of

the Act to mean C(i) in relation to any industrial dispute

concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority

of the Central Government (omitting the words not relevant

for the present purpose), a major port. The ( central

Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial

dispute, the State Government.'

The employer contended that the employees represented

by the Association in each case are iron ore samplers and

they are not connected with the work of a major port or

their duties are not ancillary or incidental to the working

of a major port and therefore, Sec. 2 (a) (i) would not be

attracted. As a corroleory, it was submitted that the case

would fall in the residuary clause (ii) and therefore, the

State Government would be the appropriate Government. The

employees repelled the contention by saying that they are

employees working in a major port and the industrial dispute

directly touches the functioning and administration of a

major port and therefore, the Central Government is the

appropriate Government. Alternatively it was contended on

behalf of the Association/appellant herein that any rate in

relation to a Union Territory, there is no State Government

and the Central Government, if it at all can be said to be

one, is the only Government and in the absence of a State

Government the Central Government will also have all the

powers of the State Government and therefore, the Central

Government would be the appropriate Government for the

purpose of making the reference. It is the second limb which

we propose to examine in these appeals because in our

opinion it goes to the root of the matter and the appeals

can be finally disposed of by answering this contention.

Before we deal with the contention on merits, it is

necessary to focus attention on constitutional and statutory

provisions relevant to the contention.

380

Art. 239 (1) provides that 'save as otherwise provided

by Parliament by law, every Union Territory shall be

administered by the President acting, to such extent as he

thinks fit through an Administrator to be appointed by him

with such designation as he may specify.' Art. 239A which

was inserted by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act.

1962 confers power Parliament by law to create local

legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain

Union Territories including Goa, Damen and Diu. The law by

which the local legislature and/or Council of Ministers are

created will also specify their constitution, powers and

functions in each case. By sub-art.(2) it was ensured that

such law when enacted shall not be deemed to be an amendment

of the Constitution for the purpose of Art. 368. Art. 240

confers power on the President to make regulations for the

peace, progress and good government of the Union Territories

specified therein. Art. 246 (4) provides that 'Parliament

has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any

part of the territory of India not included in a State

notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in

the State List.' The expression 'Central Government' has

been defined in Sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897

(omitting the words not relevant for the present purpose) as

under:

"(8) "Central Government" shall-

(a) .- ...... - .. ; ...

....................................

(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the

commencement of the Constitution, mean the President, and

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shall include,

(i)

(ii)

(iii) in relation to the administration of a

Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting

within the scope of the authority given to him under

Article 239 of the Constitution."

The expression 'State Government' is defined in Sec. 3

(60) (omitting the words not necessary for the present

purpose,) as under:

"(60) "State Government",

381

(a) ............................. ... ....

(b) .......................................

(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the

commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,

1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union

Territory, the Central Government ;"

The expression 'Union Territory' is defined in Sec. 3

(62A) to mean "Union Territory specified in the First

Schedule to the Constitution and shall include any other

territory comprised within the territory of India but not

specified in that Schedule."

Parliament enacted the Government of Union Territories

Act, 1963 ('1963 Act' for short). Its long title reveals the

object underlying the enactment, namely to provide for

Legislative Assemblies and Council of Ministers for certain

Union Territories and for certain other matters. Union

Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu is governed by the 1963 Act

(See Sec. 2 h). The expression 'Administrator' has been

defined in Sec. 2 (a) of the 1963 Act to mean 'the

Administrator of a Union Territory appointed by the

President under Art. 239.' Sec. 18 specifies the extent of

legislative power of the Legislative Assembly of a Union

Territory to encompass any of the matters enumerated in the

State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule.

Sec. 44 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers

in each Union territory with the Chief Minister at the head

to aid and advise the Administrator in exercise of his

functions in relation to matters with respect to which the

Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory has power to

make laws except in so far as he is required by or under the

Act to act in his discretion or by or under any law to

exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. There is

a proviso to Sec 44 (1) which sheds light on the position of

the Administrator and powers of the Council of Ministers.

According to the proviso in the event of a difference of

opinion between the Administrator and the Ministers of any

matter, the Administrator shall refer it to the President

for decision given therein by the President etc. Thus the

executive power of the Administrator extends to all subjects

covered by the legislative power. But in the event of a

difference of opinion the President

382

decides the point. When President decides the point, it is

the Central Government that decides the point. And that is

binding on the Administrator and also the Ministers. Section

45 provides that 'the Chief Minister of a Union Territory

shall be appointed by the President.' Section 46 confers

power on the President to make rules for the conduct of

business. Section 55 provides that 'all contracts in

connection with the administration of a Union Territory are

contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the

Union and all suits and proceedings in connection with the

administration of a Union Territory shall be instituted by

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or against the Government of India.' In exercise of the

power conferred by Article 240, the President has infer alia

enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962. By

clause (3) of the regulation, the Acts enumerated in the

Schedule appended to the Act were extended to the Goa, Daman

and Diu subject to the modifications, if any, specified in

the Schedule. The Schedule includes Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 as a whole without any modification.

Section 10 (l) of the Act confers power on the

appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute for

adjudication to one or the other of the various authorities

enumerated in the section. Thus the power is the power of

the appropriate Government to make the reference. The

cotention which found favour with the High Court is that in

relations to the industrial dispute raised by the workmen

represented by the Association by broadly described as iron

ore samplers. the appropriate Government is the State

Government and not the Central Government and that as the

reference in this case is made by the Central Government,

the same being without jurisdiction, the Industrial

Tribunal did not acquire any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon

the same.

Would it be constitutionally correct to describe

Administration of a Union Territory as State Government ?

Article 1 provides that 'India, that is Bharat, shall be a

Union of States'. Sub-article (2) provides that 'the States

and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the

First Schedule'- Sub-article (3) introduced a dichotomy

between the State as understood in the Constitution and the

Union Territory when it provides that 'the territory of

India shall comprise-(a) the territories of the States, and

(b) the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule.

The provisions of Part

383

VI of the Constitution do not apply to the Union

Territories. Part VI of the Constitution which deals with

States clearly indicates that A the Union Territory is not a

State. Therefore, the Union Territory constitutionally

speaking is something other than a State. As far as the

States are concerned, there has to be a Governor for each

State though it would be permissible to appoint the same

person as Governor of two or more States. Part VIII provides

for administration of Union Territories. Article 239

conferred power on the president for administration of Union

Territories unless otherwise provided by an act of

Parliament. Therefore, apart from the definitions of the

expressions 'Central Government', 'State Government' and

'Union Territory' as enacted in the General Clauses Act,

1897, the Constitution itself makes a distinction between

State and its Government called the State Government and

Union Territory and the Administration of the Union

Territory. Unless otherwise clearly enacted, the expression

'State will not comprehend Union Territory' and the 'State

Government' would not comprehend Administration of Union

Territory. Now if we recall the definition of three

expressions 'Central Government' (Section 3 (8), 'State

Government' (Section 3 (60)) and Union Territory' ( Section

3 (62A)) in the General Clauses Act, it would unmistakably

show that the framers of the Constitution as also the

Parliament in enacting these definitions have clearly

retained the distinction between State Government and

Administration of Union Territory as provided by the

Constitution. It is especially made clear in the definition

of expression 'Central Government' that in relation to the

Administration of a Union Territory, the Administrator

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thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to

him under Article 239 of the Constitution, would be

comprehended in the expression 'Central Government'. When

this inclusionary part is put in juxta-position with

exclusionary part in the definition of the expression 'State

Government' which provides that as respects anything done or

to be done after the commencement of the Constitution

(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall mean, in a State,

the Governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central

Government, the difference conceptually speaking between the

expression 'State Government' and the 'Administration of a

Union Territory' clearly emerges. Therefore, there is no

room for doubt that the expression 'Administration of a

Union Territory', Administrator howsoever having been

described, would not be comprehended in the expression state

Government' as used in any enactment. These definitions have

been modified to being them to their present format by

384

adaptation of laws (No. 1) Order 1956. Section 3 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that in all General Acts

and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act

unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or

context, the words defined therein will have the meaning

assigned therein. lndisputably the lndustrial Disputes Act,

1947 is' a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the

General Clauses Act and the relevant definitions having been

recast to meet the constitutional and statutory

requirements, the expressions 'Central Government, 'Stale

Government' and 'Union Territory' must receive the meaning

assigned to each in the General Clauses Act unless there is

anything repugnant in the subject or context in which it is

used. No such repugnancy was brought to our notice.

Therefore, these expressions must receive the meaning

assigned to them.

The High Court after referring to the definitions of

the aforementioned three expressions as set out and

discussed herein first observed that on a careful reading of

the definition, it appears 'that in relation to the

administration of a Union Territory, the administrator

thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to

him under Article 239 of the Constitution is the Central

Government.' So far there is no dispute. The High Court then

observed that it must follow that the Administrator is the

State Government in so far as the Union Territory is

concerned, and it is so provided in the definition of the

State Government in Section 3(60) of the General Clauses

Act.' The High Court fell into an error in interpreting

clause (c) of Section 3 (60) which upon its true

construction would show that in the Union Territory, there

is no concept of State Government but wherever the

expression 'State Government' is used in relation to the

Union Territory, the Central Government would be the State

Government. The very concept of State Government in relation

to Union Territory is obliterated by the definition. Our

attention was, however, drawn to the two decisions of this

Court in Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors.(') and the

decision of this Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Shri Moula Bux & Ors.(2) in which with reference to Part

States, some observations have been made that the authority

conferred under Article 239, as it then stood, to administer

Part States has

(1) [1955] S.C.R. 549.

(2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 794.

385

not effect of converting those States into the Central

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Government, and that under Article 239 the President

occupies in regard to Part States, a position analogous to

that of a Governor in Part A States and of a Rajpramukh in

Part in States.' It was also observed that 'though the Part

States are centrally administered under the provisions of

Article 239, they do not cease to be States and become

merged with the Central Government.' It was then urged that

by the amendment to Articles 239 and 240 by the Constitution

(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and introduction of Article

239 A and 239 by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment)

Act, 1962, only the nomenclature of the Part States has

undergone a change, now being described as Union Territory,

but the position the Union Territory is the same as it was

as Part States and therefore, the view taken in the

aforementioned decisions that the administration of Part

States could appropriately be described as State Government

would mutatis mutandis apply to the administration of Union

Territories. In other words, it was said that they can be

appropriately described as State Governments for various

purposes. Both the decisions were rendered prior to the

amendment of Part VIII of the Constitution in 1956 and the

insertion of the Articles 239 A and 239 in 1962 and more

specifically after the enactment of the 1963 Act. The

concept of Union Territory with or without a Legislative

Assembly and with or without a Council of Ministers with

specified legislative and executive powers have been set out

in the 1963 Act. Coupled with this, modifications were made

in the definitions of aforementioned three expressions.

Therefore, the two decisions are of no assistance in

resolutation of the present controversy.

It was then pointed out that the definition of the

expression 'appropriate Government' in Section 2(a)(i) of

the Act unless it is shown in relation to any industrial

dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the

authority of the Central Government or the enumerated

industries or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an

oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, the

appropriate Government will be the Central Government and in

any other case a State Government- It was therefore,

submitted that unless it is shown that in relation to the

industrial dispute raised by the Association, the

appropriate Government would be the Central Government, the

case would fall under the residuary provision, namely, that

in relation to any other industrial dispute, the appro-

386

priate Government would be the State Government. The

submission does not commend to us because before one can say

that the appropriate Government is the State Government in

relation to an industrial dispute, there has to be some

State Government in which power must be located for making

the reference. If there is no State Government but there is

some other Government called the Administration of Union

Territory, the question would arise whether in such a

situation the Administration of Union Territory should be

described as State Government for the purpose of Section

2(a)(i) read with Section 10(1) ?

The High Court clearly fell into an error when it

observed that the inclusive definition of the expression

'State Government' does not necessarily enlarge the scope of

the expression, but may occasionally point to the contrary.

Let as assume it to be so without deciding it. But where the

High Court fell into the error was when it held that the

President representing the Central Government and the

Administrator, and appointee of the President and subject to

all orders of the President constitute two different

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governments for a Union Territory. The position, the power,

the duties and functions of the Administrator in relation to

the President have been overlooked. On a conspectus of the

relevant provisions of the Constitution and the 1963 Act, it

clearly transpires that the concept of State Government is

foreign to the Administration of Union Territory and Article

239 provides that every Union Territory is to be

administered by the President. The President may act through

an administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus the

delegate of the President. His position is wholly different

from that of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ

with his Minister and he must then obtain the orders of

the President meaning thereby of the Central Government.

Therefore, at any rate the administrator of Union Territory

does not qualify for the description of a State Government,

Therefore, the Central Government is the 'appropriate

Government'.

If the Central Government as the appropriate

Government has made the reference, the High Court was

clearly in error in quashing the reference.

Learned counsel for the appellant-Association made

an alter native submission that the workmen involved in the

dispute are workmen working in a major port and are dock

workers and there

387

fore, also the Central Government will be the

appropriate Government for the purpose of making reference

under Sec. 10(1). This contention found favour with the

Tribunal. The High Court reached a contrary conclusion

observing that the iron ore samplers are not involved in any

work connected with or related to a major port nor are they

dock workers. We do not propose to examine this alternative

submission because if the reference is held to be competent,

it is not necessary to undertake elaborate examination of

the second contention to sustain the reference. It is,

however, urged that this aspect is likely to figure again

before the Tribunal while examining the industrial dispute

referred to it for adjudication on merits. In this situation

the proper thing is to keep the contention between the

parties open. The Tribunal will be at liberty to examine

this contention whether iron ore samplers are involved in

any work connected with or related to a major port or are

dock workers. The Tribunal may come to its own decision

uninfluenced by the view taken by the High Court and if the

question does require examination the same will have to be

examined over again.

Accordingly, all these five appeals are allowed and

the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and

the award of the Tribunal on the preliminary point

especially about the competence of the Central Government to

make the reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, for the reasons hereinmentioned is

confirmed. The respondents shall pay the costs of the

appellant in each case quantified at Rs. 1,000 in all Rs.

5,000 shall be paid by the respondents to the appellant as

costs.

As the dispute is an old one, hanging resolution for

years, the Tribunal is directed to give top priority to it

and dispose it of on merits within a period of six months

from today,

N.V.K.

Appeals allowed.

388

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