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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Before:

The Hon’ble Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya

WPA 25183 of 2025

Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

With

WPA 25184 of 2025

Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

With

WPA 25185 of 2025

Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

With

WPA 25187 of 2025

Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.

Vs.

he State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the petitioners : Mr. Partha Pratim Roy

Mr. Samrat Chakraborty

Mr. Saikat Gayen

….. advocates

For the State

In WPA 25183 of 2025 : Mr. Jaharlal Dey

Ms. Sukla Das Chandra

…… advocates

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For the State

In WPA 25184 of 2025 : Mr. Suman Ghosh

Mr. Arka Mondal ……. advocates

For the State

In WPA 25185 of 2025 : Mr. Chandi Charan De, AGP

Ms. Saswati Chatterjee ……. advocates

For the State

in WPA 25187 of 2025 : Mr. Supriyo Chattopadhyay

Mr. Suman Dey ….……. advocates

For the respondent no. 7 : Mr. Rajdeep Bhattacharya ……. advocate

For the Private Respondent

nos. 7 to 10 : Mr. Sanjib Kumar Mukhopadhyay

Md. Nasim Ali

Ms. Nargish Parveen ……. advocates

Reserved on : 20.01.2026

Judgment on : 20.03.2026

Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The petitioners have prayed for setting aside the orders of the District Land

and Land Reforms Officer, Murshidabad dated 02.05.2024 and 28.02.2025.

By the order dated 02.05.2024 the application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal under

Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 1955 (for short “the 1955

Act”) challenging an order dated 17.01.2020 passed by the Prescribed

Authority under Section 50 of the 1955 Act was allowed thereby condoning

the delay in preferring the said appeal. By the order dated 28.02.2025, the

appeal under Section 54 of the 1955 Act was allowed thereby setting aside

the orders of the Prescribed Authority in the mutation cases under Section

50 of the 1955 Act with a direction upon the Block Land and Land Reforms

Officer, Murshidabad- Jiyaganj to rehear the mutation cases afresh.

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2. Petitioners claim to have acquired title in respect of the plots in question by

dint of purchase from the erstwhile recorded owners. Petitioners claim to

have mutated their names in respect of the said plots. Petitioners also claim

to be in possession of the said plots. Upon enquiry from the office of the

Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, petitioners came to know that the

Sub-Divisional Land and Land Reforms Officer was taking steps for

inclusion of the names of the private respondents in terms of the order

passed by the District Land and Land Reforms Officer. After obtaining the

certified copies of the proceedings started at the instance of the private

respondents for recording their name in the Record of Rights, the petitioners

came to know that the private respondents filed four appeals against the

vendors of the petitioners challenging the orders passed in the Mutation

cases by the Prescribed Authority. The petitioners state that from the

certified copies of the proceedings initiated for recording the names of the

private respondents in the Record of Rights, the petitioners came to know

that the appeals were filed accompanied by applications under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act and such applications were allowed without serving any

notice upon the petitioners or their vendors. The petitioners further state

that the appellate authority passed the order dated 28.02.2025 without

issuing any notice either upon the petitioners or their vendors.

3. Mr. Roy, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the

appellate authority ought not to have condoned the delay in preferring the

appeal under Section 54 of the 1955 Act without giving any opportunity of

hearing to the petitioners. He submitted that the appellate authority

exceeded its jurisdiction in condoning the delay ex parte thereby taking

away the valuable right of the petitioners without giving them any

opportunity to contest the application for condonation of delay. In support of

such contention he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Division

Bench of this Court in the case of Samir Kumar Sarkar vs. State of West

Bengal and Ors

1

.

1 (2015) 1 CHN 6 (DB).

Page 4 of 19

4. Objection against maintainability of these writ petitions was raised by the

State and the private respondents.

5. Mr. Dey, learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the West

Bengal Land Reforms and T enancy Tribunal was established for the

adjudication and trial by such tribunal of disputes relating to and/or arising

out of land reforms or tenancy in land and other matters under the specified

Act and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. He further

contended that the jurisdiction of all courts, excepting the Division Bench of

the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India and the Supreme Court of India , regarding any

adjudication and trial of such disputes, claims, objections and applications

and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto have been

excluded. He also contended that the jurisdiction of the High Court under

Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has not been taken away by

the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 but the

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India is restricted only before the Division Bench of the High Court as the

Tribunal was established to provide relief to litigants expeditiously and to

reduce the pressure of the High Court. He further contended that the West

Bengal Land Reforms Act is a “specified Act” under Section 2(r) of the West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 (for short “the 1997

Act”) and in view of the provisions laid down under Section 6, 7 and 8 of the

1997 Act, this Court should not entertain these writ petitions. In support of

such contention, the learned Additional Government Pleader placed reliance

upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India

2

.

6. Mr. Dey also placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Division

Bench in the case of Ananda Koley vs. State of West Bengal and Ors

3

.;

2 (1997) 3 SCC 261

3 (2016) 3 WBLR 577

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and Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs. Anchit Agarwal

4

in support of

the aforesaid contention. He also placed reliance upon a judgment and order

dated 11.10.2018 passed by the co-ordinate bench in the case of Rita Basu

and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.

5

in support of his contention

that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not

maintainable before the Single Bench, if the issue is in relation to or arising

out of an Act which is a “specified Act” under the 1997 Act.

7. Mr. Mukhopadhyay, learned advocate appearing for the private respondents

contended that it is upon the aggrieved party to move the Tribunal for

obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute and the High Court

should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set

up under the Statute. He contended that an alternative and efficacious

remedy is available under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy

Tribunal Act 1997 before the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy

Tribunal (for short “WBLRTT”) and this Court should not permit the

machinery created under the 1997 Act to be bypassed. He, thus, contended

that this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not

be entertained. In support of such contention he placed reliance upon a

decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered on November 12, 2025 in

the case of Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union of India

6

.

8. In reply, Mr. Roy, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner contended

that existence of an alternative remedy does not by itself bar the High Court

from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or the

order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. In support of such

contention he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

4 2023 (1) CHN(CAL) 493

5 WP 1205 of 2010

6 Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012.

Page 6 of 19

in Magadh Sugar and Energy Limited vs. State of Bihar and others

7

.

He contended that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has

been allowed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to contest the

same and, therefore, there has been a violation of the principles of natural

justice. He, therefore, contended that the existence of an alternative remedy

provided under the 1997 Act cannot be a bar in exercising the jurisdiction

by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Roy

placed reliance upon an order dated January 13, 2026 passed by a co -

ordinate bench in the case of Md. Masidul Islam vs. State of West Bengal

and Ors.

8

in support of his contention that a writ petition is maintainable

before the Single Bench when no order has been passed by the Tribunal.

9. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials on

record.

10. Petitioners are aggrieved by the orders passed by the appellate authority

allowing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the

subsequent orders allowing the appeals thereby setting aside the orders

passed by the Prescribed Authority.

11. The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of the remedy

provided under the 1997 Act this Court should entertain the instant

application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

12. The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 received the

assent of His Excellency the Governor of the State on 12.12.1997. The said

Act was promulgated to provide for the setting up of a Land Reforms and

Tenancy Tribunal in pursuance of Article 323(B) of the Constitution of India

and for adjudication and for trial by such Tribunal of disputes, claims,

objections and applications relating to, or arising out of land reforms or

tenancy and other matters under a specified Act and for matters connected

7 (2022) 16 SCC 428

8 WPA No. 27327 of 2025

Page 7 of 19

therewith or incidental thereto. “Specified Act” is defined under Section 2(r)

of the 1997 Act which includes the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

13. On the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Court,

The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra

Kumar (supra)

9

held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts

under Article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution and

the power of judicial review cannot wholly be excluded. It was further held

that the Tribunals created under Article 323A and 323B of the Constitution

have the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory

provisions and rules except the vires of the legislation which creates the

particular Tribunal. The Constitution Bench held that such Tribunals will

function as the courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for

which they have been constituted and all decisions of those tribunals will,

however, be subject to Judicial Review of the Division Bench of High Courts

under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and from the decision of

the Division Bench of the High Court, the aggrieved party could move the

Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 78, 92 and 99 of the said Report

held as follows-

“78………………….. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review

over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and

in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and

essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic

structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the

Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can

never be ousted or excluded.”

“92. ……………………. In the view that we have taken, no appeal from

the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party

will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High

9

(1997) 3 SCC 261

Page 8 of 19

Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution.”

“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of

Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude

the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles

226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of

the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other

legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would,

to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon

the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court

under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic

structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted,

other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplem ental role in

discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the

Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-

B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the

constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of

these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division

Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal

concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like

courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they

have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to

directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question

the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which

creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid

and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have

indicated.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. It, therefore, follows from the decision of the Constitution Bench that it is

not open for the litigants to approach the High Courts directly in respect of

the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.

16. In State of W.B. v. Ashish Kumar Roy

10

the Hon’ble Supreme Court

reiterated the observations of the Constitution Bench decision in the case of

L. Chandra Kumar (supra)

11

and it was held that as long as the tribunal

constituted performs a supplementary role, without exclusion of the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 and under Article

10 (2005) 10 SCC 110

11 (1997) 3 SCC 261

Page 9 of 19

32 of the Constitution of India, the validity of the legislation constituting

such tribunals could not be doubted. It was further held that the Tribunals

would act as authorities of first instance whose decision could be challenged

before the Division Bench of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Leelavathi N. vs. State of Karnataka

12

reiterated the principles of law laid down in Radha Krishan Industries vs.

State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

13

which is extracted hereinafter.

“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1. The power Under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can

be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for

any other purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ

petition.One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is

where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved

person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the

writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right

protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of

the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly

without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its

powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case

though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an

efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.

27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the

remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be

had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the

discretionary remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of

exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and

discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High

Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if

the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the

controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view

would not readily be interfered with.”

12

2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253

13

(2021) 6 SCC 771

Page 10 of 19

18. Leelavathi N.(supra)

14

also noticed the decisions rendered by three Hon’ble

Judges of the Supreme Court in PHR Invent Educational Society vs. UCO

Bank & Ors

15

, wherein after reiterating the well-known exceptions when a

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be entertained

in spite of availability of an alternative remedy, it was clarified that the High

Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India if an effective alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved person or

statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains

a mechanism for redressal of grievance. The Hon’ble Supreme Cou rt in

paragraph 35 of the said reports held thus-

“35. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in PHR Invent

Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others, reported in (2024) 6 SCC

579, has held as under:

"37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain

exceptions when a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution could

be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of

them are thus:

(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with

the provisions of the enactment in question;

(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial

procedure;

(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and

(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the

principles of natural justice.

38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a

petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative

remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which

the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for

redressal of grievance."

(Emphasis Supplied)

14

2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253

15

(2024) 6 SCC 579

Page 11 of 19

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Leelavathi N. (supra)

16

after perusal of the

judgments, in paragraph 36 of the Reports, concluded that where an

efficacious alternate remedy is available, the High Court should not

entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters

falling squarely within the domain of the Tribunals.

20. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in Magadh Sugar

and Energy Limited

17

(supra) that the existence of an alternative remedy

does not itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution in certain contingencies. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court further observed that the High Court has the discretion not

to entertain a writ petition when an effective alternative remedy is provided

by law.

21. From the aforesaid discussion, it logically follows that exercise of discretion

by the High Court to entertain an application under Article 226 of the

Constitution would largely depend upon whether the alternative remedy

available to the aggrieved person is an effective one or not.

22. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Ananda Koley (supra)

18

after

noting the provisions of Article 323 B of the Constitution of India and the

interpretation of the same as made in the case of L. Chandra Kumar

(supra)

19

held that a tribunal created under Article 323B of the Constitution

is a Court of first instance and in a case coming within the jurisdiction of

the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, the Court setting

under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of

first instance. The Hon’ble Division Bench held that there are two

distinguishable features so far as the tribunals created by virtue of any

16

2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253

17

(2022) 16 SCC 428

18 (2016) 3 WBLR 577

19 (1997) 3 SCC 261

Page 12 of 19

statute whether the power conferred from the provisions of Article 323A or

323B of the Constitution of India, which are as follows-

(i) The Tribunal is a court of first instance and under the

provisions of Section 8 of the 1997 Act the jurisdiction of a

Court sitting under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India has been ousted to act as the Court of first instance and

that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution of

India.

(ii) The Tribunal created under the provisions of Article 323A of the

Constitution of India or by virtue of the provisions of the Act

which is legislated by the State Legislature in exercise of power

conferred on it by the provision of Article 323B of the

Constitution of India is competent to examine the vires of any

provision of an Act save and except any provision of an Act

which creates that tribunal.

23. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited

(supra)

20

after considering the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra)

21

and Ashish Kumar Roy (supra)

22

held that it indubitably follows that for adjudication of any dispute which

touches upon any provision of a specified Act under the West Bengal Land

Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997, one must approach the Tribunal

at the first instance and all other civil courts including the High Court

except the Division Bench exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article

226/227 of the Constitution of India do not have any power and jurisdiction

to entertain such dispute.

24. From the aforesaid discussion it logically follows that the jurisdiction of the

single bench of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the

20 2023 (1) CHN (CAL) 493

21 (1997) 3 SCC 261

22 (2005) 10 SCC 110

Page 13 of 19

Constitution of India has been expressly excluded by virtue of Section 8 of

the 1997 Act in respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction, power and

authority of the WBLRTT.

25. The decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Rita Basu (supra)

23

supports the aforesaid view taken by this Court wherein it was held that the

writ petition before the Division Bench without exhausting the remedy

before the Tribunal is not maintainable. It was further held that the writ

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable

before the Single Bench of the High Court.

26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain (supra)

24

reiterated the

proposition of law laid down in the Constitution Bench decision in the case

Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes

25

that when it is open to the

aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal for obtaining redress in the

manner provided by the statute, the High Court normally will not permit by

entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the

machinery created under the statute to be bypassed and will leave the party

applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.

27. This Court shall now consider whether the remedy provided under the 1997

Act is an effective one or not.

28. Section 6 of the 1997 Act deals with the jurisdiction, power and authority of

the Tribunal. Section 6 states that the Tribunal shall, with effect from such

date as may be appointed by the State Government by notification in that

behalf, exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in relation to any order

made by an authority under a specified Act; an application complaining

inaction or culpable negligence of an Authority under a specified Act; an

appeal against an order of the Mines Tribunal appointed under Section 36 of

the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953; applications relating to

23 WP 1205 of 2010

24 Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012

25 AIR 1964 SC 1419

Page 14 of 19

matters under any provision of a specified Act or matters relating to any

constitutional validity of any Act under the provisions of a specified Act; and

adjudication of matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which stand

transferred from the High Court and other Authorities to the Tribunal in

accordance with the provisions of that Act.

29. Section 7 of the 1997 Act states that the Tribunal shall with effect from the

date appointed by the State Government under Section 6 exercise the

jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that date

by any Court including the High Court except the writ jurisdiction under

Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India exercised by a Division

Bench of the High Court but excluding the Supreme Court, for adjudication

or trial of disputes and applications relating to land reforms and matters

connected therewith or incidental thereto and other matters arising out any

provisions of a specified Act.

30. Section 8 of the 1997 Act deals with the exclusion of jurisdiction of courts. It

states that on and from the date from which jurisdiction, power and

authority becomes exercisable under that Act by the Tribunal, the High

Court except where the Court exercises its jurisdiction under Articles 226

and 227 of the Constitution of India by a Division Bench , or any Civil Court

except the Supreme Court shall not entertain any proceeding or application

or exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or

trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter

connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any

provision of a specified Act.

31. Section 10(1) of the 1997 Act states that a person aggrieved by any order

passed by any authority or any action taken either by an authority or by the

State Government may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal for the redressal of

his grievance.

32. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 states when an application under sub-section

(1) has been admitted by the Tribunal it shall decide and dispose of such

Page 15 of 19

application as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily within six months

from the date of such admission or from the date of receipt of records from

the concerned authority or the State Government as the case may be. Thus,

the statute mandates expeditious disposal of matters before the WBLRTT.

33. Sub-section (7) of Section 10 enables the Tribunal to pass interim orders

subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. Sub-section (7) of Section 10 lays

down the conditions for making interim orders. Section 10(7) reads as

follows-

“(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this

Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no interim order

(whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) shall be

made on, or in any proceeding relating to, an application made under

sub-section (1) unless—

(a) copies of such application and of all documents in support of the plea

for such interim order are duly furnished seven days in advance to each

of the parties against whom such application is made or is proposed to

be made;

(b) an opportunity of being heard is given to each of the parties against

whom such application is made:

Provided that the Tribunal may pass an interim order as an exceptional

measure if it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is

necessary so to do for preventing any loss being immediately caused to

the applicant:

Provided further that if the application referred to in sub-section (1) is

not decided and disposed of within a period of six months from the date

of the interim order, the interim order shall, if it is not vacated earlier,

stand vacated on the expiry of the period as aforesaid unless, for

special reasons or in the interest of justice, the interim order is varied,

modified or extended by the Tribunal.”

34. Section 13 of the 1997 Act provides for execution of order passed by the

Tribunal. It states that an interim order in and an order finally disposing of

any matter or proceeding by the Tribunal, including an order as to costs

may be executed in such manner as may be prescribed. Rule 8 of the West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Rules, 1997 lays down the

manner in which the orders of the Tribunal may be executed.

Page 16 of 19

35. Section 15 of the 1997 Act vests power upon the Tribunal to punish for

contempt of the Tribunal.

36. Section 16 of the 1997 Act deals with the powers of the Tribunal. Section 16

reads as follows-

“16. Power of Tribunal to take evidence on oath etc.—The Tribunal

shall for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested

in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a

suit, in respect of the following matters:—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and

examining him on oath or affirmation;

(b) requiring the discovery, inspection and production of documents;

(c) examining witness or issuing commissions for the examination of

witness;

(d) reviewing its decisions;

(e) dismissing an application or proceeding for default or deciding it ex

parte;

(f) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application or proceeding

for default or any order passed by the Tribunal ex parte;

(g) such other matters as may be prescribed.”

37. Thus, the Tribunal constituted under the 1997 Act has the power to review

its decisions. It also has the power to dismiss an application for default or

proceed ex parte. Tribunal has the power to restore any application which

was dismissed for default and also set aside any order passed ex parte.

38. After going through the aforesaid provisions of the 1997 Act and the Rules

framed thereunder, this Court is of the considered view that the WBLRTT is

equipped with all the powers to effectively and holistically deal with a matter

presented before it. To the mind of this Court, the machinery provided under

the 1997 Act is an effective one.

39. Prior to the amendment effected by the West Bengal Act 7 of 2001 which

was given retrospective effect from 03.08.1998, Clause (a) of Section 6 of the

1997 Act read as follows- “an order in original made by an Authority under

the specified Act”. By virtue of the said amendment the words “an order in

original” have been substituted by the words “any order”. The object behind

Page 17 of 19

such amendment was that any order, whether it is original or appellate,

interim or final that has been made by an Officer or Authority or functionary

exercising powers or discharging functions as such under a “specified Act”

has to be challenged by any person aggrieved against such order before the

Tribunal.

40. In view of the statutory mandate under 1997 Act, this Court holds that any

order passed by an “Authority” as defined under Section 2(b) of the 1997 Act

can be challenged only before the WBLRTT at the first instance and the

jurisdiction of this High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution

exercised by a judge sitting singly would stand excluded in view of the

specific bar created under Section 7 read with 8 of the 1997 Act and all

decisions of the WBLRTT shall be subject to Judicial Review by the High

Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution exercised by the Division

Bench of the High Court.

41. In the case on hand, the orders passed by the Appellate authority in appeals

filed under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 have been

challenged in these writ petitions. The orders under challenge in these writ

petitions squarely falls under clause (a) of Section 6 of the 1997 Act.

42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the orders

impugned herein can be assailed only before the WBLRTT at the first

instance and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India exercised by a judge sitting singly would stand

excluded.

43. The 1997 Act created a machinery for the purpose of adjudication of the

disputes and matters falling under the specified Act. This Court has already

held that the machinery created under the 1997 Act is an effective

alternative remedy. By applying the well settled proposition of law laid down

in Thansingh Nathmal

26

(supra) as reiterated in Rikhab Chand Jain

27

26

AIR 1964 SC 1419

27

Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012

Page 18 of 19

(supra), this Court is not inclined to permit the petitioner to bypass the

WBLRTT i.e., the machinery created under the 1997 Act by entertaining

these applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

44. In the case of Samir Kumar Sarkar (s upra)

28

an application under Article

226 of the Constitution of India was filed before the Hon’ble Division Bench

challenging inaction on the part of the WBLRTT in not extending some

interim protection during the pendency of the Original Application before the

WBLRTT. In the said reported case also, the Tribunal was approached at the

first instance and thereafter an application under Article 226 was filed

before the Hon’ble Division Bench.

45. However, in the case on hand the petitioner has directly approached this

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an order

passed by an authority under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The

decision in Samir Kumar Sarkar (supra) being distinguishable on facts

cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.

46. The issue that fell for consideration before the co-ordinate bench in the case

of Md. Masidul (supra)

29

was when the West Bengal Administrative

Tribunal is non-functional due to non-availability of Chairman and

members, litigants on issues concerning State Government service are

required to approach the single bench of the High Court or Division Bench

without approaching the single bench. In that case the Tribunal was non-

functional due to non-availability of the Chairman and members. The said

decision is distinguishable on facts as it is not the case of the petitioner

herein that the WBLRTT is non-functional. Thus, the said decision also

cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.

47. The Hon’ble Division Bench in Mobile Store Limited vs. Joint

Commissioner, Commercial Taxes and others

30

after noticing that the

28 (2015) 1 CHN 6 (DB).

29 WPA No. 27327 of 2025

30

2022 SCC Online Cal 4116

Page 19 of 19

Tribunal was non-functional on account of lack of quorum held that the

assesses are entitled to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The said decision being distinguishable on facts

cannot be applied to the case on hand.

48. For all the reasons as aforesaid the writ petitions stand dismissed as not

entertained and the petitioners are left free to approach the appropriate

forum in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that this Court has

not gone into the merits of the claims and counter claims of the respective

parties and all the observations made hereinbefore are only for the purpose

of supporting the ultimate conclusion and the same shall not prejudice the

parties in future proceedings. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.

49. Urgent photostat certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties

upon compliance of all formalities.

(HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J.)