Neeta Sawant CARAPL NO. 430 of 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 430 OF 2025

Nalin Vallabhbhai Patel and Another …..APPLICANTS

: VERSUS :

Atharva Realtors and Others ….RESPONDENTS

Mr. Rohaan Cama with Mr. Manish Gala, Mr. Aayush Yadav, Mr. Minil

Shah and Ms. Alpa Gala i/b Mr. Nilesh N. Gala for the Applicants.

Mr. V.M. Chavdawith Ms. M.V. Chavan and Ms. Reva Kulkarni for

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Mr. Kapil Shah with Mr. Vatsal Parmar i/b M.K. Juris Associates for

Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

JUDG. RESD. ON : 11 MARCH 2026.

JUDG. PRON. ON : 1 APRIL 2026.

JUDGMENT:

1) This Application, �led under Section 11 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) for appointment of an

arbitrator, raises an interesting issue as to whether an arbitrator can be

appointed when the Court has expressly refused to extend the mandate of

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the earlier arbitrator by rejecting the Petition �led under Section 29A of

the Arbitration Act. The Court is thus tasked upon to decide the issue as

to whether refusal by the Court to extend the mandate under Section 29A

of Arbitration Act would bring to an end the very arbitral proceedings

making it impermissible to appoint another arbitrator to decide the same

dispute.

2) Disputes and differences between the parties have arisen out

of performance of Deed of Assignment of Development Rights dated 6

December 2010. Petitioners had �led Commercial Arbitration Petition No.

1310 of 2019 under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act in this Court seeking

interim measures. In that Petition, this Court referred the parties to

arbitration in view of arbitration agreement contained in clause 17 in the

Deed of Assignment of Development Rights. By order dated 14 November

2019, this Court appointed a sole Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes

and differences between the parties by converting Section 9 Petition into

application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrator so

appointed by order dated 14 November 2019 expressed inability to take

up the reference and accordingly by order dated 13 January 2020, this

Court substituted the Arbitrator. The learned sole Arbitrator passed order

under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act on 31 August 2020. Nothing

happened thereafter for a considerable period of time. Applicants

thereafter �led Commercial Arbitration Petition No.221 of 2024 under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act seeking extension of mandate of the

arbitrator. By order dated 18 October 2024, this Court refused to extend

the mandate of the Arbitrator observing that the Applicants had

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abandoned the arbitration proceedings. Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.

29786 of 2024 preferred by the Applicants came to be dismissed by the

Apex Court by order dated 14 February 2025.

3) Applicants have thereafter issued notice dated 10 July 2025

contending inter alia that the cause of action for arbitration continues and

accordingly made demand for appointment of arbitrator for adjudication

of the disputes. Respondent was called upon to either consent for the

suggested Arbitrator or to suggest name of other nominee arbitrator.

Since the Respondent did not consent for appointment of the arbitrator,

the present Application is �led under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act

for appointment of arbitrator.

4) Respondent has appeared in the Application and has opposed

the same inter alia submitting that appointment of arbitrator is now

impermissible in the light of termination of arbitration proceedings by

this Court vide order dated 18 October 2024, which is upheld by the Apex

Court.

5) Mr. Cama, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner

has submitted that order dated 18 October 2024 passed by this Court

merely refuses to extend the mandate of the arbitrator on account of lack

of suf�cient cause for explaining the delay in �ling application under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. He submits that the said order does

not come in the way of this Court appointing an arbitrator. That unlike

Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code) which

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provides for speci�c bar for new suit in the event of earlier suit being

dismissed for non-prosecution, there is no such similar provision in

Section 29A or anywhere in the Arbitration Act. That Section 29A only

tests the aspect of suf�cient cause for delay in conduct of arbitration and

prosecution thereof. Therefore, order dated 18 October 2024 can be only

read to mean that the Court concluded that there was no suf�cient cause

for extending the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. That the same would

not tantamount to abandonment of arbitration clause or of arbitral

proceedings. He relies on judgment of this Court in Tata Motors

Passengers Vehicles Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Ghosh Brothers Automobiles &

Ors.

1

in support of his contention that there is a vast difference between

the concepts of termination of mandate of the arbitrator and termination

of the arbitral proceedings themselves. He relies on judgment of this

Court in Khorshed E. Nagarwalla vs. Daryus Soley Panthakey

2

in support

of his contention that only mandate of the arbitrator gets terminated

under Section 14 and not the arbitral proceedings. That when provisions

of Section 29A are read together with Section 32, the present case

contemplates termination of mandate of arbitrator and not of arbitral

proceedings.

6) Mr. Cama further submits that even if it is assumed arguendo

that there was any embargo against appointment of arbitrator qua the

same issue and same reliefs, there is a continuing entitlement of the

Applicant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. That there is

1 Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 26333 of 2025 decided on 12 February 2026

2 2010 (4) Mh.L.J. 936

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a continuous obligation on the part of the contesting Respondents to

deliver the �ats including the 8 �ats on 16

and 17 �oor. He invites my

attention to Af�davit in Reply in which Respondents have admitted the

obligation to provide the �ats to the Applicant. That since cause of action

is continuous, the arbitration agreement also continues and that

therefore, there is no embargo on this Court to appoint the arbitrator for

adjudication of such continuous disputes.

7) Mr. Cama further submits that the defence of Respondents

about abandonment of earlier arbitral proceedings is misplaced as the

said defence does not mean that there is abandonment or non-existence

of the arbitration clause. That existence of arbitration clause is not in

dispute and there is no question of same being abandoned. That there is

no valid termination of mandate of arbitral proceedings under Section 32

of the Arbitration Act. Without prejudice, he submits that the issue of

abandonment, waiver, res judicata, etc cannot be decided by Reference

Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. He relies on judgment of

Apex Court in SBI general Insurance Company Limited vs. Krish

Spinning

3

, Motilal Oswal Financial Services Limited vs. Santosh

Cordeiro and Anr.

4

and Cox and Kings Limited vs. SAP India Private

Limited and Anr.

5

and of this Court Rajuram Sawaji Purohit vs. The

Shandar Interior Private Limited

6

.

3 (2024) 12 SCC 1

4 2026 SCC OnLine SC 6

5 (2025) 1 SCC 611

6 Commercial Arbitration Application (L) No. 25035 of 2024 decided on 10 October 2025

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8) Mr. Cama further submits that the order passed by this Court

in Fedbank Financial Service Ltd. vs. Narendra H Shelar

7

has no

application to the present case as the same does not lay down any ratio

and turns squarely on facts of that case. Reference was sought in that case

in respect of the very same arbitration and the case did not involve issue

of continuous cause of action. He also submits that this Court in Fedbank

Financial (supra) did not consider the issue of interplay between Sections

29A and 32 of Arbitration Act. That the law is subsequently developed

which does not permit the Reference Court to decide the issue of

abandonment, waiver, res judicata, etc. He also relies on judgment of

Constitution Bench of Apex Court in Re : Interplay between arbitration

agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp

Act, 1899

8

. On above broad submissions, Mr. Cama would pray for making

reference of disputes to arbitrator.

9) The Petition is opposed by Mr. Chavda, the learned counsel

appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He submits that since this Court

has refused to extend mandate of arbitration, Applicant is precluded from

seeking reference in respect of the same arbitration. That legislative

intent behind insertion of Section 29A is speedy resolution of arbitral

proceedings as held in Mohan Lal Fatehpuria vs. M/s. Bharat textiles

and Ors.

9

and Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited vs. Berger Paints

India Limited

10

.

7 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 5252

8 (2024) 6 SCC 1

9 SLP (C) No. 13759 of 2025 decided on 10 December 2025

10 (2025) 10 SCC 802

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10) Mr. Chavda further submits that termination of mandate of

Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A implies termination of arbitral

proceedings so far as the party at fault is concerned. That the expression

‘termination’ used in Section 29A of the Arbitration Act has been

interpreted by the Apex Court in Rohan Builders (supra) holding that

arbitral proceedings will get terminated in absence of extension of time

limit under Section 29A. That the effect of the judgment is that once the

Court, in its wisdom, does not extend the time limit for arbitral

proceedings, the same stands terminated at least so far as the party at

fault is concerned. That only a faultless party is entitled to initiate fresh

arbitral proceedings.

11) Mr. Chavda further submits that permitting a defaulting

party to maintain fresh arbitration would tantamount to review of the

order rejecting extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration

Act. That upon conjoint reading of provisions of the Arbitration Act, the

only plausible view that emerges is that while considering the Section 11

Application �led after rejection of Section 29A Application, the Court

needs to examine whether Section 29A Application was dismissed due to

the Applicant’s fault or for any other reason such as default on the part of

the Tribunal. That in the present case, the Section 29A application is

dismissed by holding the Applicant responsible and that therefore, there

is no question of making fresh reference by undertaking the exercise of

reversal of Section 29A order, which is already con�rmed by the Apex

Court. That provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of the Code would also apply

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even if not expressly provided for in view of stringent timelines under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act.

12) Mr. Chavda further submits that Section 29A is a self-

contained code and that provisions contained in Sections 14, 15 or 32 of

the Arbitration Act cannot be imported to interpret the same. That this

Court needs to decide the issue of permissibility to make reference and

the same cannot be left out to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. Lastly,

he submits that the present Application is otherwise barred by limitation.

He denies that there is any continuous cause of action. He would

accordingly pray for dismissal of the Application.

13) Mr. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent

Nos.3 and 4 also opposes the Application submitting that there is gross

abuse of process of law highlighting the negligent manner in which

previous arbitral proceedings were prosecuted by the Applicant. That

Respondent Nos.3 and 4 were never involved in the negotiation process.

He would therefore pray for dismissal of the Application.

14) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for

my consideration.

15) Applicant is desirous of having the disputes and differences

with the Respondents arising out of the Deed of Assignmen t of

Development Rights dated 6 December 2010 adjudicated throug h

Arbitration. There is no dispute to the position that clause 17 of the Deed

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of Assignment and Development Rights dated 6 December 2010 contains

arbitration agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication of the

disputes was earlier constituted by this Court vide order dated 14

November 2019 passed in Commercial Arbitration Petition No.1310 of

2019. The learned sole Arbitrator so appointed was substituted by this

Court by order dated 13 January 2020. The order further directed that the

time to complete the arbitration would commence from the date when the

substituted Arbitrator entered upon the reference to his arbitration.

16) It appears that the time limit for making Award under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act commenced on 10 August 2020. The

Arbitral Tribunal passed order dated 31 August 2020 deciding the

application �led by the Applicant under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act.

It appears that after disposal of Section 17 Application, no further

proceedings in the arbitration took place for a considerable period of

time. The Applicant approached this Court seeking extension of mandate

of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act by �ling

Commercial Arbitration Petition No.221 of 2024 on 26 April 2024. This

Court has however dismissed the Petition by refusing to extend the

mandate of the Arbitrator by recording following �ndings:

10. After having heard Learned Counsel and perusing the judgments

upon which reliance was placed, I have no hesitation in holding that the

Petitioner has not made out any suf�cient cause as to why the mandate

of the Tribunal should be extended under Section 29A(5) of the

Arbitration Act. I say so because, viz.

A. Even accepting the Petitioners’ case that there were

settlement talks between the Parties, the record clearly bears out

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that these settlement talks did not fructify into a settlement as is

clear from the Petitioners’ own email dated 20th April 2022. The

Petitioners did absolutely nothing post this to seek an extension

of time until the �ling of the present Petition which is over 2

years. There is also no explanation as to why the Petitioner had

waited for over two years from this date to �le the present

Petition.

B. Additionally, to accept the Petitioners’ contention that there

is no time prescribed for �ling a Petition under Section 29A,

would in my view be to turn Section 29A on its head. The very

provisions of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act lay down the

stringent timelines in which Arbitration proceedings have to be

conducted. Section 29A(5) itself makes it clear that the extension

of period referred to in sub-section(4) is to be granted only if the

Court is satis�ed that suf�cient cause is shown for extending the

mandate. This would therefore in my view include the conduct of

the Parties so as to demonstrate that the Parties were diligently

pursuing the arbitration proceedings. The judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohan Builders (supra)

itself makes it expressly clear that extension under Section

29A(5) was not to be granted mechanically on �ling of the

application. In my view, the Petitioners’ conduct alone would

disentitle the Petitioner to seek an extension of time. Even

accepting the Petitioners’ case that the mandate expired on 1st

March 2022 the present Petition has been �led on 26th April

2024, which delay in my view is adequate to show that the

Petitioner was not serious in pursuing the arbitration.

C. Equally, the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. (supra) and

Hari Shankar Singhania & Ors. (supra) would not apply since the

said judgments were delivered considering the power of

condonation of delay under general of law of limitation and not

in the context of Section 29A. Additionally, it is crucial to note

that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Hari Shankar Singhania & Ors. was in the context of section 20 of

The Arbitration Act, 1940 and not Section 29A.

D. In my view, it is plainly clear that after the passing of the

Interim Order dated 31st August, 2018, the Petitioners have

abandoned the arbitration proceedings. Nothing prevented

the Petitioners from approaching this Court earlier and equally,

nothing prevented the Petitioners from keeping the Learned

Arbitrator, who is a Former Judge of this Court informed of the

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settlement talks etc. That is the least that was expected from the

Petitioner, infact from both Parties. Once Parties had committed

themselves to the stringent timelines under the Arbitration Act,

the Parties were then bound to ensure that the settlement talks

etc. were also conducted and concluded within these timelines or

then applied for an extension of time at that stage itself and not

belatedly as has been done in the present case.

(emphasis and underlining supplied)

17) Thus, this Court refused to extend the mandate of Arbitral

Tribunal holding that the settlement talks had failed by 20 April 2022 and

nothing was done thereafter for over two years. This Court took into

consideration Applicant’s conduct for denying the extension of mandate.

Most importantly this Court recorded a �nding that after passing of

interim order dated 31 August 2018 (sic 2020) the Applicant had

‘abandoned the arbitration proceedings’. This Court held that nothing

prevented the Applicant from approaching the Court or at least from

informing the learned Arbitrator about settlement talks. This Court

further held that it was the duty of the parties to ensure that the

settlement talks were conducted and concluded within reasonable time.

18) The order passed by this Court on 18 October 2024 refusing

to extend mandate of Arbitral Tribunal was challenged by Applicant by

�ling Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.29786 of 2024 before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, which has been dismissed by order dated 14 February

2025.

19) After being unsuccessful in getting the mandate of t he

Arbitral Tribunal extended under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, the

Applicant issued notice dated 10 July 2025 nominating an Arbitrator for

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resolution of disputes between the parties by referring to clause 17 of the

Deed of Assignment of Development Rights dated 6 December 2010. The

notice dated 10 July 2025 repeatedly asserts that there are continuous

obligations on the Respondents and that their acts constituted continuing

defaults. Another notice dated 18 July 2025 was addressed by the

Applicant once again nominating Arbitrator for resolution of the disputes.

This is how the present Application is �led seeking appointment of the

Arbitrator.

20) The issue that arises for consideration is whether an

Arbitrator can be appointed by this Court under Section 11(6) of the

Arbitration Act when this Court has already refused to extend mandate of

the earlier Arbitral Tribunal.

21) Section 29A of the Arbitration Act has been added to the

Arbitration Act by the 2015 Amendment for ensuring completion of

arbitral proceedings in a timely manner without undue delays. Section

29A of the Arbitration Act provides thus:

29A. Time limit for arbitral award.—

(1)The award in matters other than international co mmercial

arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of

twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-

section (4) of section 23:

Provided that the award in the matter of internation al

commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible and

endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve

months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4)

of section 23.

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(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the

arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be

entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may

agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period speci�ed in sub-

section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six

months.

(4) If the award is not made within the period speci�ed in sub-

section (1) or the extended period speci�ed under sub-section (3),

the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court

has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so speci�ed,

extended the period:

Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section,

if the Court �nds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons

attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees

of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding �ve per cent. for each month of such

delay.

Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5)

is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the

disposal of the said application:

Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of

being heard before the fees is reduced.

(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the

application of any of the parties and may be granted only for suf�cient

cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court.

(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be

open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or

all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall

continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence

and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under

this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and

material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the

arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in

continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs

upon any of the parties under this section.

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(9) An application �led under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the

Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to

dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of

service of notice on the opposite party.

(emphasis and underlining supplied)

22) Thus, the Award in the domestic arbitration is required to be

made by the Arbitral Tribunal within a period of 12 months from the date

of completion of pleadings, which period can be extended by six months

with the consent of the parties. Under sub-section (4) of Section 29A of

the Act, if the Award is not made within the time speci�ed in sub-section

(1) or within the extended period agreed between the parties, the

mandate of arbitrator(s) terminates unless the Court extends the time.

Thus, what terminates under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act is the

‘mandate of the arbitrator’. Second proviso to sub-section (4) provides

that when Application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of

the Arbitrator shall continue till disposal of the Application. Thus, what is

contemplated under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act is essentially

extension of and termination of ‘mandate of the arbitrator’ and not the

‘mandate of arbitration proceedings’. In similar manner, Sections 14 and

15 of the Arbitration Act also deal with termination of mandate of

arbitrator. Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act provide thus:

14. Failure or impossibility to act.—

(1) The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate and he shall be

substituted by another arbitrator, if—

(a) he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his

functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay;

and

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(b) he withdraws from his of�ce or the parties agree to the

termination of his mandate.

(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to in

clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the

parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate.

(3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section 13, an arbitrator

withdraws from his of�ce or a party agrees to the termination of the

mandate of an arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of

any ground referred to in this section or sub-section (3) of section 12.

15. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator.—

(1) In addition to the circumstances referred to in section 13 or section

14,the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate—

(a) where he withdraws from of�ce for any reason; or

(b) by or pursuant to agreement of the parties.

(2) Where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute

arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable

to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.

(3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where an arbitrator is

replaced under sub-section (2), any hearings previously held maybe

repeated at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an order or ruling of the

arbitral tribunal made prior to the replacement of an arbitrator under

this section shall not be invalid solely because there has been a change

in the composition of the arbitral tribunal.

23) As contradistinct from termination of mandate of arbitrator

under Sections 14, 15 and 29A of the Arbitration Act, Section 32 provides

for termination of arbitral proceedings. Section 32 of the Arbitration Act

provides thus:

32. Termination of proceedings.—

(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the �nal arbitral

award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2).

(2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the

arbitral proceedings where—

(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent

objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a

legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a �nal settlement of

the dispute,

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(b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or

(c) the arbitral tribunal �nds that the continuation of the

proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or

impossible.

(3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34, the mandate

of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the

arbitral proceedings.

24) Thus, arbitral proceedings get terminated by �nal Award or

by withdrawal of claim by the Claimant or by termination of proceedings

with agreement of parties or when the Tribunal �nds that continuation of

proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible. Under sub-section (3)

of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal

terminates with termination of arbitral proceedings. Thus, Sub-section (3)

of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act once again makes a distinction

between concepts of ‘termination of mandate of arbitrator’ and

‘termination of arbitral proceedings’. This Court had an occasion to

consider distinction between the concepts of termination of mandate of

arbitrator and termination of mandate of arbitral proceedings in Tata

Motors Passenger Vehicles Ltd. (supra) and has held that mere

termination of mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal does not result in

automatic termination of arbitral proceedings. This Court held in

paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 24 as under:

21) However, there is difference between the concepts of

termination of mandate of arbitrator and termination of arbitral

proceedings. Mere termination of mandate of arbitrator does not

automatically result in termination of arbitral proceedings, and in

such an event the reference continues and merely a vacancy occurs in

the chair of the arbitrator, which can be �lled up under Section 15(2) of

the Arbitration Act. However, the distinct concept of termination of

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arbitral proceedings is dealt with under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act

which provides thus:

xxx

22) The position that mere termination of mandate of the arbitrator

does not result in automatic termination of arbitral proceedings is well

settled and reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the

Apex Court in Dani Wooltex Corporation (supra) in which the Apex

Court has held in Paras-12 to 14 as under:

12. The Arbitration Act has two provisions for

terminating an arbitrator's mandate. Sections 14 and

15 are the relevant sections. The arbitrator is

empowered to withdraw from his of�ce, which

terminates his mandate. However, the arbitral

proceedings continue by the arbitrator's substitution.

13. The order of termination passed by the learned

arbitrator, in this case, gives an impression that he was of

the view that unless parties move the Arbitral Tribunal

with a request to �x a meeting or a date for the hearing,

the Tribunal was under no obligation to �x a meeting or a

date for hearing. The appointment of the Arbitral

Tribunal is made with the object of adjudicating upon the

dispute covered by the arbitration clause in the

agreement between the parties. By agreement, the parties

can appoint an arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal. Otherwise,

the Court can do so under Section 11 of the Arbitration

Act. An arbitrator does not do pro bono work. For him, it

is a professional assignment. A duty is vested in the

learned arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate

upon the dispute and to make an award. The object of the

Arbitration Act is to provide for an ef�cient dispute

resolution process. An arbitrator who has accepted his

appointment cannot say that he will not �x a meeting to

conduct arbitral proceedings or a hearing date unless the

parties request him to do so. It is the duty of the Arbitral

Tribunal to do so. If the claimant fails to �le his

statement of claim in accordance with Section 23, in view

of clause (a) of Section 25, the learned arbitrator is bound

to terminate the proceedings. If the respondent to the

proceedings fails to �le a statement of defence in

accordance with Section 23, in the light of clause (b) of

Section 25, the learned arbitrator is bound to proceed

further with the arbitral proceedings. Even if the

claimant, after �ling a statement of claim, fails to appear

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at an oral hearing or fails to produce documentary

evidence, the learned arbitrator is expected to continue

the proceedings as provided in clause (c) of Section 25.

Thus, he can proceed to make an award in such a case.

14. On a conjoint reading of Sections 14 and 15, it is

apparent that an arbitrator always has the option to

withdraw for any reason. Therefore, he can withdraw

because of the parties' non-cooperation in the

proceedings. But in such a case, his mandate will be

terminated, not the arbitral proceedings.

23) Similarly, this Court in Kifayatullah Haji Gulam Rasool (supra)

has held in paras-11, 12, 16 and 17 as under:

11. Section 14 speci�es the grounds for terminating the mandate

of an arbitrator and method of doing so. The grounds for

terminating the mandate are : (i) the arbitrator becomes de

jure or de facto unable to perform his function or (ii) for some

other reasons fails to act without undue delay or (iii) the

arbitrator withdraws from his of�ce or (iv) the parties agree to

the termination of his authority as an arbitrator; whereas three

methods can be employed for terminating the mandate of the

arbitrator. They are (a) by withdrawal of the arbitrator from his

of�ce (b) by agreement of parties and (c) by decision by the

Court.

12. Section 15 provides for additional grounds for termination of

the mandate and for appointment of substitute arbitrator. The

additional grounds provided are (a) where he withdraws from

of�ce for any reason or (b) by or pursuant to the agreement of the

parties. Though sub-section (1) purports to state additional

grounds for termination of authority of an arbitrator but one of

the grounds mentioned therein is covered by the grounds set out

in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14. On the authority of

the arbitrator being terminated, a substitute arbitrator in place of

arbitrator whose authority is terminated has to be appointed and

such appointment, as per sub-section (2) is required to be made

by following the same procedure as followed while appointing

the arbitrator who is being substituted.

16. On the above backdrop let us consider the legal provisions

providing for commencement and termination of the arbitration

proceedings.

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(a) Section 21 of the Act provides for commencement of

the arbitral proceedings. This section provides that in the

absence of an agreement between the parties to the reference,

the arbitral dispute in respect of a particular dispute shall

commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be

referred to the Arbitration is received by other party. If in the

arbitral agreement parties provide any other mode for

commencement of the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral

proceedings will commence in accordance therewith.

(b) Section 25 incorporates the course of action arbitral

Tribunal may adopt in the event of party committing any of the

three defaults mentioned in this section. The provision of section

25 is intended to enable the arbitral tribunal not to allow any

proceedings to drag on at the instance of one or the other party.

What is contemplated in this section is an order passed by

arbitral Tribunal terminating arbitral proceedings. No such order

has been passed by the arbitral tribunal in this case as such even

provision of section 25 is not available to the petitioners. The

said provision cannot be invoked before this Court. However, the

petitioners are at liberty to obtain appropriate orders in this

behalf from the arbitral Tribunal but not from this Court.

(c) Section 32 of the Act makes provision for termination

of the arbitral proceedings. Under this section it is provided, that

the arbitral proceedings shall automatically stand terminated

when �nal award is made. Hence, for automatic termination of

the arbitral proceedings, arbitral award has to be �nal. Reading of

section 32 unequivocally provides that only ‘�nal award’ shall

terminate the arbitral proceedings. The �nal award is one which

decides or completes decision of claims presented.

The arbitral proceedings can also be terminated by an

order of the arbitral Tribunal which order can only be passed

when claimant withdraws the claim or when the parties to the

reference agree on the termination of the proceeding, or the

arbitral Tribunal �nds that continuation of the arbitral

proceeding has become unnecessary or impossible. As per clause

(b) of sub-section (2) of section 32 the parties to the agreement

have also been given liberty to terminate arbitral proceedings but

such a request must be made to the arbitral tribunal by the

parties to the proceedings and it must be accepted by the arbitral

Tribunal by an order passed in that behalf. As per sub-section (3)

the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, can also be brought to an

end with termination of arbitral proceedings subject to section 33

and sub-section (4) of section 34 of the Act.

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17. In the above premises, the Act makes speci�c provision for

commencement and termination of the arbitral proceedings. In

the instant case, none of the events as contemplated under

section 32 of the Act have taken place. No �nal award has been

passed. No joint request depicting agreement of parties have

been made to the arbitral tribunal to terminate proceedings. No

orders have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal as contemplated

under sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Act. Therefore, it

cannot be said that the arbitral proceeding have come to an

end. I, therefore, hold that the arbitral proceedings have not

come to an end even though the mandate of the arbitrators

have come to an end.

24) Therefore, mere withdrawal by the learned Arbitrator from the

arbitral proceedings vide letter dated 18 March 2021 has not resulted in

termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32 of the Arbitration

Act. The reference continued notwithstanding the withdrawal by the

learned Arbitrator.

(emphasis supplied)

25) The distinction between the concepts of termination of

mandate of arbitrator and termination of arbitral proceedings is also

highlighted in Division Bench judgment of this Court in Khorshed E.

Nagarwalla (supra) in which it is held in the context of provisions of

Section 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act as under:

4. Both the provisions if read would show what is terminated is the

mandate of the arbitrator and not the provision for arbitration.

Section 11(2) thereafter provides that in the event of vacancy in the

arbitral tribunal and the parties not agreeing to appoint an arbitrator,

any aggrieved party can move under section 11(5) of the said Act

requesting the Chief Justice or his designate to �ll in the vacancy. Thus,

the Act itself contains provisions for reconstitution of the Tribunal even

in the case where the named arbitrator expires.

(emphasis supplied)

26) Thus, when the time limit speci�ed in Section 29A of the

Arbitration Act expires and the Court refuses to extend the same, the

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mandate of the arbitrator terminates. Does this mean that the arbitral

proceedings still continue and can Court appoint a substitute arbitrator in

such circumstances? There appears to be no direct judgment on the issue

with elaborate discussion on distinction in the concepts of termination of

mandate of arbitrator under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act and

termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32. However, in

Fedbank Financial Services Limited (supra), learned Single Judge of this

Court had an occasion to deal with similar situation. In case before this

Court, the sole Arbitrator had entered upon the reference and after �ling

of statement of claim and statement of defence, nothing had happened at

all. The Respondent therein therefore �led an application for closure of

the proceedings on the ground that the same were not concluded within

one year. The Applicant therein �led an Application under Section 29A of

the Arbitration Act, which was dismissed by this Court. Thereafter, the

Applicant therein �led Application under Section 11 of the Arbitration

Act for start of the process all over again by appointing the arbitrator. In

the light of the above factual position, this Court passed following order

in Fedbank Financial Services Ltd. (supra).

5. The Respondent then �led an application for closure of the

proceedings saying that they had not been concluded within one year.

On this the learned sole arbitrator made an application that since time

had not been extended, there being no application by the Petitioner

under Section 29-A of the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, the

arbitration proceeding was closed with the mandate terminated. Parties

were set at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law. This

order passed by the learned sole arbitrator was on 18 th July 2019.

6. Ms. Bhogale cannot dispute the fact that the Petitioner was late in

�ling a Section 29-A Petition. It did �le that Petition, Arbitration

Petition No. 1271 of 2019. I dismissed it on 9 th January 2020.

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7. The situation therefore is that an arbitration previously invoked with

a nomination agreed by the Respondent has now come to an end. The

Arbitral tribunal mandate has been terminated. There is no extension of

time.

8. What the Petitioner now seeks is to start the process all over again by

presenting this application under Section 11. This is a second go-around

for the same arbitration.

9. The opposition from the Respondents is that there must be some

limit. The emphasis in arbitration law is on a speedy and time-bound

disposal. If a Petitioner invoking arbitration is itself remiss in diligently

prosecuting the arbitration, the submission is that it surely cannot be

open to the Petitioner to come back to Court and constantly seek to

reopen the arbitration like this. If such constant circular actions are

permitted, then conceivably there would be no end to arbitration at all

and no �nality to the disputes. The arbitration law cannot possibly aid, it

is submitted, a party who is not vigilant in prosecuting its rights and

remedies.

10. I agree. There is no explanation for the delay.

The order of the arbitral tribunal, though short, does not in any way

assist the Petitioner.

11. I do not see how an arbitration clause can be constantly revived and

brought back to life again and again like this. If the Petitioner has any

rights under the contract in question it is at liberty to pursue those but

its arbitral remedy must surely be considered to be closed.

12. The application is dismissed.

27) Thus, in Fedbank Financial Services Ltd. (supra) this Court

refused to make reference by appointing arbitrator holding that the

arbitration clause could not be constantly revived and brought back into

life again and again. This Court agreed with submission of the

Respondent therein that arbitration law cannot aid a party who is not

vigilant in prosecuting its rights and remedies. However, this Court left

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open the remedy other than arbitration for the Applicant in respect of

rights under the contract.

28) Perusal of the judgment in Fedbank Financial Services Ltd.

(supra) would indicate that the argument of difference between

termination of mandate of Arbitrator under Section 29A of the Arbitration

Act and termination of the arbitration proceedings under Section 32 of

the Arbitration Act was not raised before this Court. It therefore becomes

dif�cult to accept that Fedbank Financial Services Limited (supra) lays

down an abstract proposition of law that in no case, application for

appointment of Arbitrator can ever be made after refusal by the Court to

extend the mandate of the Arbitrator under Section 29A of the Arbitration

Act.

29) There can be myriad reasons why the Award is not made

within the time limit speci�ed in Section 29A of the Arbitration Act.

Sometimes parties may be responsible for the delay and sometimes even

the Arbitral Tribunal may be responsible for delay. In a case where

Arbitral Tribunal is responsible for the delay in concluding the arbitral

proceedings and in making the Award and if the Court refuses to extend

mandate of the Arbitrator under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act,

can it be contended that the arbitral proceedings would also end? The

answer, to my mind, appears to be in the negative. No doubt under sub-

section (6) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, the Court has power to

substitute the Arbitrator and this power of substitution is to be

necessarily exercised keeping in mind the conduct of the Arbitrator. In a

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given case where the appointed Arbitrator does not make progress in the

proceedings and parties are not at fault, the Court can substitute the

Arbitrator while extending the mandate under Section 29A. But there may

be a case that the Court does not substitute the Arbitrator but also does

not grant extension of mandate of the Arbitrator under Section 29A(4) of

the Arbitration Act. Whether parties can be made to suffer for the acts of

the Arbitrator in such a situation? The answer can obviously not be in the

af�rmative. This is also because mere termination of mandate of

Arbitrator under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act does not

automatically result in termination of arbitration proceedings under

Section 32 of the Arbitration Act.

30) A converse however is true. With termination of mandate of

arbitration proceedings, the mandate of Arbitrator also comes to an end

under sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act. The Arbitration

Act otherwise does not recognize the concept that termination of

mandate of Arbitrator under Sections 14, 15 or 29A of the Arbitration Act

brings to an end the very arbitration proceedings. In my view therefore, it

is dif�cult to accept an abstract principle that in every case where the

Court refuses to extend the mandate of Arbitrator, the arbitral

proceedings themselves would automatically come to an end and that the

Court would be precluded from making appointment of another Arbitrator

under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

31) Therefore, in my view, appointment of arbitrator after refusal

by Court to extend mandate of previous arbitrator under Section 29A

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would depend on facts of each case and the question as to ‘who is at fault’

would provide the key for solving the problem. If parties are responsible

for delay and Court has refused to extend the mandate on account of

conduct of parties, the arbitral proceedings will have to be treated as

having been terminated. This is necessary because if the arbitral

proceedings are not treated to have been terminated, parties at fault

would get another bite at the cherry by seeking appointment of another

arbitrator. Finding recorded by Section 29A Court against them would

become redundant and they would be free to get another Arbitrator

appointed even though the Court has consciously refused to extend

mandate of the previous Arbitrator. If fresh arbitrator is appointed by

exercise of powers under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act after Section

29A Court refuses to extend the mandate of arbitrator by recording a

�nding that the Claimant had abandoned the arbitration, exercise of

power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act would tantamount to

review of the order passed under Section 29A.

32) In the present case however, the Applicant is found to be

extremely negligent in prosecuting arbitral proceedings before the

previous Arbitrator. This Court has recorded a speci�c �nding that the

Applicant had abandoned ‘the arbitration proceedings’. The issue for

consideration is whether in such circumstances, the principle of expiry of

mandate of arbitrator not resulting in automatic expiry of mandate of

Arbitral Tribunal can be applied in the present case? The answer to this

question also appears, to my mind, to be in the negative. When this Court

did not extend the mandate of the previous arbitrator on account of

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conduct of the Applicants and has held that the Applicants had

abandoned the arbitration proceedings, appointing another arbitrator at

the behest of the Applicants would be like rewarding them for their faults.

33) Considering the facts of the present case, if this Court, in

exercise of referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act

proceeds to appoint an arbitrator, it would virtually sit in appeal, if not

review, over the �ndings recorded while deciding the Petition under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. When the Court exercising powers

under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act has recorded an emphatic

�nding that ‘the Petitioners have abandoned the arbitration proceeding’, this

Court cannot reward them by providing an opportunity to arbitrate the

disputes. The doors of arbitration are closed for them by Section 29A

Court. What Applicant is seeking to do in the present case is an attempt

to overreach the �ndings recorded by Court while refusing to extend the

mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Such an attempt

cannot be countenanced in law. As observed above, there may be cases

where the Court can refuse to extend mandate of Arbitrator for reasons

not attributable to the parties and in such circumstances, it is possible

that referral Court can exercise powers under Section 11(6) of the

Arbitration Act to appoint a substitute arbitrator by concluding that the

arbitration proceedings still continues. But that principle cannot be

applied in the present case.

34) Thus, on conjoint reading of provisions of Sections 11, 29A

and 32 of the Arbitration Act, the position that emerges is that

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application for appointment of Arbitrator is not maintainable in a case

where the Court has refused to extend mandate of the arbitrator under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act due to fault of the Applicant. It is only

in cases where refusal to extend mandate of the Arbitrator under Section

29A of the Arbitration Act is due to reasons other than fault of the

Applicant, the referral Court would be justi�ed in entertaining and

deciding the application for appointment of arbitrator under section 11

(6) of the Arbitration Act. I am forti�ed in my view, by judgment of the

Apex Court in Rohan Builders (supra). The issue before the Apex Court in

Rohan Builders (supra) was slightly different i.e. whether an application

for extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act can be �led

after expiry of the period for making the arbitral Award. The Apex Court

has held that such an application for extension of time under Section 29A

(4) and (5) of the Arbitration Act is maintainable even after expiry of

12/18 months. However while answering the issue, the Apex Court has

drawn distinction between a ‘faultless party’ and the ‘party at fault’. In

paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Apex Court has refused to give

restrictive or normal interpretation to the language used under Section

29A (4) of the Arbitration Act and has held that narrow interpretation

would present an additional challenge by relegating a ‘faultless party’ to a

fresh reference or appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act,

thereby impeding the arbitration rather than facilitating it. It is held by

the Apex Court in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment as

under:

12. The word "terminate" in Section 29-A(4) has to be read in the context

of the said provision. 19 It should not be read as an isolated word with a

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strict dictionary meaning, but rather in conjunction with the

surrounding words and expressions which warrant recognition and

consideration. This evinces the legislative intent. Secondly, the

legislative preference for the term "terminate" over "suspend" is

apparent, since the word "suspend" could cause incongruity and a legal

conundrum if no party �les an application for an extension of time. In

such a scenario, the arbitral proceedings would stand suspended ad

in�nitum. Therefore, the legislature by using the word "terminate"

intends to af�rm the principle of party autonomy. Resultantly, if neither

party moves an application for an extension of time for making the

award, the arbitration proceedings are terminated. Consequences follow.

Clearly, the use of the word "suspension" would have led to infeasible

rami�cations.

13. The word "terminate" in Section 29-A(4) makes the Arbitral Tribunal

functus of�cio, but not in absolute terms. The true purport of the word

"terminate" must be understood in light of the syntax of the provision.

The absence of a full stop after the word "terminate" is noteworthy. The

word "terminate" is followed by the connecting word "unless", which

quali�es the �rst part with the subsequent limb of the section i.e.

"unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so

speci�ed, extended the period". The expression "prior to or after the

expiry of the period so speci�ed" has to be understood with reference to

the power of the court to grant an extension of time.

14. Accordingly, the termination of the arbitral mandate is conditional

upon the non-�ling of an extension application and cannot be treated as

termination stricto sensu. The word "terminate" in the contextual form

does not re�ect termination as if the proceedings have come to a legal

and �nal end, and cannot continue even on �ling of an application for

extension of time. Therefore, termination under Section 29-A(4) is not

set in stone or absolutistic in character. 

15. An interpretive process must recognise the goal or purpose of the

legal text. Section 29-A intends to ensure the timely completion of

arbitral proceedings while allowing courts the �exibility to grant

extensions when warranted. Prescribing a limitation period, unless

clearly stated in words or necessary, should not be accepted. Bar by

limitation has penal and fatal consequences. This Court in North Eastern

Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. v. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. 21

observed: (SCC p. 812, para 37)

"37. ... When no limitation stands prescribed it would be

inappropriate for a Court to supplant the legislature's wisdom by

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its own and provide a limitation, more so in accordance with

what it believes to be the appropriate period."

16. Courts should be wary of prescribing a speci�c period of limitation in

cases where the legislature has refrained from doing so.  If we give a

narrow and restrictive meaning to Section 29-A(4), we would be

indulging in judicial legislation by incorporating a negative stipulation

of a bar of limitation, which has a severe annulling effect. Such an

interpretation will add words to widen the scope of legislation and

amount to modi�cation or rewriting of the statute. If the legislature

intended such an outcome, it could have stated in the statute that "the

Court may extend the period only if the application is �led before the

expiry of the mandate of the arbitrator, not after". Indeed, there would

have been no need to use the phrase "after the expiry of the period" in

the statute. In other words, a rigid interpretation would amount to

legislating and prescribing a limitation period for �ling an application

under Section 29-A, when the section does not conspicuously so state.

Rather, the expression and intent of the provision are to the contrary.

17. In our opinion, a restrictive interpretation would lead to rigour,

impediments and complexities. A party would have to rush to the court

even when the period of arbitral mandate of twelve months has not

expired, notwithstanding the possibility of a consent-based extension of

six months under Section 29-A(3). Narrow interpretation presents an

additional challenge by relegating a faultless party to a fresh reference

or appointment of an arbitrator under the A&C Act 23, thereby

impeding arbitration rather than facilitating it.

(emphasis and underlining supplied)

35) Thus, in paragraph 17 of the judgment in Rohan Builders

(supra) it is held that narrow interpretation presents an additional

challenge by relegating a ‘faultless party’ to a fresh reference or

appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act. These �ndings

clearly suggest that if mandate of the arbitrator is not extended under

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, the faultless party can seek a fresh

reference for appointment of an Arbitrator.

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36) Thus, the key is to determine whether the party is at fault or

is faultless. If the party is found to be at fault, on account of whose

conduct, the Court has refused to extend mandate of an arbitrator under

Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act, the application for making fresh

reference or appointment of arbitrator must necessarily be rejected. On

the other hand, if the party applying under Section 11(6) is faultless, its

application for appointment of an arbitrator would not only be

maintainable but it would be the duty of the Court to appoint the

arbitrator for ensuring adjudication of disputes between the parties on

merits.

37) Mr. Cama has strenuously urged before me that this Court

needs to conduct limited enquiry into the aspect of existence of

arbitration agreement and leave the rest of the issues for being decided by

the Arbitral Tribunal. It is contended that the objection raised by the

Respondents essentially relating to waiver, acquiescence, res judicata etc.

can be considered and decided by the Arbitrator. Reliance is placed on

judgments of the Apex Court in State Bank of India General Insurance

Company Limited vs. Krish Spinning (supra), Motilal Oswal Financial

Services Limited (supra), Cox and Kings Ltd. (supra) and Re: Interplay

between arbitration agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 and Stamp Act, 1899 (supra). I am unable to agree. The enquiry

before me is not whether the claims sought to be adjudicated by the

Applicant are barred by principles of waiver, acquiescence or res judicata.

The issue is about exercise of jurisdiction by the referral Court under

Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Though there may exist arbitration

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agreement between the parties, if the mandate of the arbitral proceedings

has been terminated, this Court cannot exercise referral jurisdiction

under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and appoint an arbitrator where

the reference itself is not in existence. The present application is

premised on an assumption as if only the seat of the arbitrator is vacant

but the reference and the mandate of the arbitral proceedings continue.

This assumption itself is faulty. Neither the chair of the arbitrator is

vacant nor the reference is alive. The arbitration proceedings have come

to an end and therefore, no arbitrator can be appointed by this Court in

exercise of referral jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

Therefore, reliance by Mr. Cama on judgments of the Apex Court in SBI

General Insurance Company, Motilal Oswal, Cox and King and Re :

Interplay (supra) is inapposite. Similar is the position in respect of

judgment of this Court in Rajuram Sawaji Purohit (supra) in which the

Award was set aside under the Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and

thereafter application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act was �led for

appointment of an arbitrator on lines of Section 43(4) of the Arbitration

Act. It was sought to be urged by the Respondent therein that the claim

was time barred as Section 34 order was pending challenge before Section

37 Court. It is in the light of those facts that this Court proceeded to

exercise referral jurisdiction by appointing the Arbitrator leaving open the

issue of limitation. The issue before this Court in Rajuram Sawaji

Purohit (supra) was altogether different and the said judgment has no

application to the facts of the present case.

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38) In my view therefore, this Court needs to adjudicate the issue

as to whether arbitrator can be appointed or not, and the issue cannot be

left open to be decided by the arbitrator as once the Arbitral Tribunal is

constituted, it cannot decide whether reference made by the Court is valid

or not.

39) Mr. Cama has also sought to suggest that the Applicant has

invoked the arbitration afresh in respect of a continuous cause of action.

He has taken me through contents of notices dated 10 July 2025 and 18

July 2025 in support of his contention that there is a continuous cause of

action and that a fresh reference can be made by ignoring the previous

round of arbitration in respect of continuous defaults on the part of the

Respondent. I am afraid, this argument cannot be accepted. Both the

notices refer to previous invocation notice dated 21 December 2018 and

state that the same are issued ‘in view of the continuing breach’. Both the

notices thereafter refer to the interim order dated 31 August 2020,

handing over of possession of �ve �ats in pursuance of the interim Award

and failure to comply with further directions in the impugned Award by

handing over possession of balance �ats and depositing amounts received

against sale of two �ats in escrow account. Thus, both the notices dated

10 July 2025 and 18 July 2025 speci�cally refer to the previous round of

arbitration. It is therefore, dif�cult to accept the case of the Applicants

that the reference is sought in respect of a fresh cause of action. There is

nothing pleaded in the application to the effect that the Applicants are

not seeking adjudication of disputes which formed part of previous round

of arbitration or that they are seeking adjudication of only those disputes

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in respect of which any fresh cause of action has arisen. In fact the

contention of ‘continuous cause of action’ is premised on an assumption

that the Applicants also want to arbitrate the disputes covered by

previous arbitration, in respect of which the cause continues. It is not the

case of the Applicants that arbitration is sought in respect of a ‘fresh

cause of action’ which has arisen after termination of previous arbitral

proceedings. The argument of alleged continuous cause of action is thus

raised only to seek an escape out of consequence of order passed by this

Court on 18 October 2024 and by the Apex Court on 14 February 2025.

40) In view of the discussion above, this Court is unable to make

a reference nor can appoint the Arbitrator since the arbitration

proceedings have come to an end in the present case.

41) Consequently, the Commercial Arbitration Application is

dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

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NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Digitally signed by

NEETA SHAILESH

SAWANT

Date: 2026.04.01

20:17:38 +0530