2026 INSC 2 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 13988/2025)
GULFISHA FATIMA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) …..RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 14030/2025)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 14132/2025)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 14165/2025)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 14859/2025)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 15335/2025)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____/2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 17055/2025)
2
J U D G M E N T
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 4
1.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 5
1.2. CASE OF PROSECTION AS PROPOUNDED UNDER FIR NO. 59 OF 2020 ........ 6
1.3. CHARGESHEET: ........................................................................................................... 8
2. CONSIDERATION OF PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PLEA UNDER ARTICLE 21. ......................................................... 10
3. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 43D(5) AND THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AT THE BAIL STAGE .................................................................... 21
4. SCOPE OF “TERRORIST ACT” UNDER SECTION 15 AND THE STATUTORY
CONTEXT .............................................................................................................................. 26
5. INDUVIDUALISED ROLE AND DIFFERNTIATION IN TREATMENT OF THE
PRIME CONSPIRATORS WITH OTHERS. ..................................................................... 30
6. SHARJEEL IMAM – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO. 14030 OF 2025 ............... 35
6.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ..................................................... 35
6.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ........................................ 37
6.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ........................................................................ 41
6.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ......................................................................... 42
6.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: .............................................................. 43
7. UMAR KHALID – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14165 OF 2025: ......................... 54
7.1. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ....................................................... 54
7.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: .................................................. 56
7.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ........................................................................ 59
7.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ......................................................................... 60
7.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: .............................................................. 61
8. SHIFA UR REHMAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14859 OF 2025 ................... 76
8.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: ............................................ 76
8.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ........................................ 78
3
8.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ........................................................................ 80
8.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT .......................................................................... 82
8.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: .............................................................. 82
9. SALEEM KHAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO. 15335/2025 ......................... 87
9.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: ............................................ 87
9.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ........................................ 89
9.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ........................................................................ 92
9.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ......................................................................... 94
9.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: .............................................................. 95
10. MEERAN HAIDER – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14132 OF 2025 ................ 100
10.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ................................................... 100
10.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ...................................... 103
10.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ...................................................................... 105
10.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ....................................................................... 107
10.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ............................................................ 108
11. SHADAB AHMED - APPELLANT IN SLP(CRL.) NO. 17055/2025 ................. 113
11.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ................................................... 113
11.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ...................................... 114
11.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ...................................................................... 116
11.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ....................................................................... 117
11.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ............................................................ 118
12. GULFISHA FATIMA – SLP (CRL.) NO. 13988/2025 .......................................... 123
12.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: .......................................... 123
12.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ...................................... 125
12.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ...................................................................... 127
12.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ....................................................................... 128
12.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ............................................................ 129
13. FINAL CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS ............................... 134
13.1. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS DECLINED ................................ 136
13.2. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS GRANTED ................................. 137
13.3. CONDITIONS GOVERNING RELEASE ON BAIL .............................................. 138
13.4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION ............................................................................. 140
4
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Heard. Leave Granted.
2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 2022 and connected matters,
by which the High Court affirmed the rejection of bail applications filed by the
appellants. The appellants stand arraigned as accused in FIR No. 59 of 2020
registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi, arising out of the incidents that occurred
in several parts of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereinafter referred to
as “Delhi Riots”) in February 2020.
3. At the inception, the appellants were booked under Sections 147, 148, 149
and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-
sheet came to be filed alleging offences under Sections 120B read with Sections
109, 114, 124A, 147, 148, 149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353,
395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as
also under Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention
of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
4. The appellants before this Court are Sharjeel Imam [SLP (Crl.) No. 14030
of 2025], Umar Khalid [SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025], Shifa Ur Rehman [SLP
(Crl.) No. 14859 of 2025], Mohd. Saleem Khan [SLP (Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025],
Meeran Haider [SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of 2025], Shadab Ahmed [SLP (Crl.) No.
17055 of 2025], and Gulfisha Fatima [SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025].
5. The prosecution case, as placed before the Court, proceeds on the footing
that the incidents of violence were not isolated or spontaneous, but were the
outcome of a larger conspiracy in which several accused persons are alleged to
have participated at different stages and in different capacities. While the FIR and
the impugned judgment are common, the role attributed to each appellant, the
5
nature of the allegations, and the material relied upon by the prosecution are not
uniform.
6. Before this Court, certain submissions have been advanced which are
common to all the appeals, particularly on the question of prolonged incarceration
and the plea founded on Article 21 of the Constitution. At the same time, each
appeal also raises issues which are specific to the appellant concerned and which
turn on the role attributed, the prosecution material relied upon, and the findings
recorded by the courts below.
7. The judgment, therefore, first notices the broad factual background of the
case and the prosecution narrative as emerging from FIR No. 59 of 2020 and the
charge-sheets filed pursuant thereto. It then considers the plea of prolonged
incarceration and the statutory framework governing the grant of bail under
Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The scope of
a “terrorist act” under Section 15 of the Act is also examined, to the extent it bears
upon the submissions advanced.
8. Thereafter, the appeals are taken up one by one. In each case, the
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and the response of the
prosecution are noticed, followed by the findings of the Trial Court and the High
Court. The role attributed to the appellant is then considered in the light of the
statutory requirements and the principles governing the grant of bail under the
UAPA.
9. It is in this manner that the present batch of appeals falls for consideration.
1.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
10. FIR No. 59 of 2020 is one of the FIR’s registered for the cause of the riots
that took place in Delhi NCR in the month of February 2020. The prosecution
story reveals how the riots were allegedly orchestrated and executed by the
Appellants herein.
6
11. The prosecution case is founded on allegations of a pre-planned criminal
conspiracy involving several accused persons, including the present appellants. It
is alleged that the conspiracy was hatched with the object of orchestrating riots in
the National Capital Territory of Delhi as a form of protest against the enactment
of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 and the proposed National Register of
Citizens.
12. According to the prosecution, the conspiracy culminated in the deliberate
incitement of widespread communal violence on and around 22nd, 23rd, and 24th
February 2020. The acts allegedly committed during this period were not
spontaneous but were the outcome of coordinated efforts to inflame tensions,
mobilise crowds, and execute violent actions across various parts of Delhi.
13. The riots are stated to have resulted in grave consequences, including the
loss of 54 lives, among them a senior police officer and an Intelligence Bureau
official, as well as grievous injuries to several police personnel and civilians. In
addition, extensive damage was caused to over 1,500 public and private
properties, alongside substantial intangible harm to public order, social harmony,
and the nation at large.
14. Before proceeding to the further analysis of the matter, it would be apposite
to advert to the contents of First Information Report No. 59 of 2020 (hereinafter
referred to as “the FIR”), as well as the contents of the charge-sheet and the
supplementary charge-sheets filed by the Investigating Officer before the
competent Court, which are discussed in the succeeding section.
1.2. CASE OF PROSECTION AS PROPOUNDED UNDER FIR NO.
59 OF 2020
15. First Information Report No. 59 of 2020 constitutes the genesis of the
present case and sets out the allegations of conspiracy attributed to the appellants
herein, which are stated to have culminated in the riots that occurred on 23rd,
7
24th, and 25th February 2020. Before proceeding further with the analysis, it is
necessary to reproduce the contents of the said FIR.
16. FIR 59 of 2020 was registered by the PS, Crime Branch New Delhi on
06.03.2020. Sub-Inspector Shri. Arvind Kumar, posted with the Crime Branch,
Delhi claims to have received information from an informant regarding the
communal riots that occurred in Delhi on 23rd, 24th and 25th February 2020.
According to the information so received, the riots were allegedly the outcome of
a pre-planned conspiracy orchestrated by the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU
‘for short’) student Umar Khalid along with his associates, who were stated to be
affiliated with different organisations.
17. It is alleged that, as part of the said conspiracy, Umar Khalid delivered
provocative speeches calling upon people to come out on the streets and block
roads during the visit of the then President of the United States of America, Mr.
Donald Trump, on 24th and 25th February 2020. The alleged objective of such
actions was to internationalise a narrative that minorities in India were being ill-
treated and tortured. It is further alleged that women and children were
deliberately mobilised to come out on the streets in various localities of Delhi to
escalate tensions and precipitate communal violence.
18. The FIR further reveals that, in several areas including Maujpur,
Kardampuri, Jafrabad, Chand Bagh, Gokulpuri, Shiv Vihar and adjoining
localities, weapons and incendiary materials such as firearms, petrol bombs, acid
bottles, stones, slingshots and other dangerous substances were allegedly
stockpiled in homes in advance. It is alleged that the task of mobilising people
from different places to participate in the riots was assigned to one Danish,
resident of Bhajanpura, Delhi. Specific reference is made to 23rd February 2020,
when women and children allegedly blocked the road under the Jafrabad Metro
Station to create public disruption, and to the pre-planned evacuation of children
from minority schools in the concerned areas.
8
19. On the basis of the aforesaid information, a daily diary entry bearing DD
No. 03 was made. Thereafter, an FIR was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149
and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Pursuant to the directions of the senior officer,
a copy of the FIR was forwarded to the Police Station, Special Cell, Lodhi
Colony, for investigation.
20. Subsequent to the registration of the FIR, the appellants herein were
apprehended on different dates in connection with FIR No. 59 of 2020. The dates
on which the appellants were apprehended in relation to the present FIR are set
out hereunder:
SL.
No.
SLP. (Crl.)
No.
Name Of Appellant Date of Arrest
1. 13988/2025 Gulfisha Fatima 11.04.2020
2. 14030/2025 Sharjeel Imam 28.01.2020
3. 14132/2025 Meeran Haider 01.04.2020
4. 14165/2025 Umar Khalid 01.10.2020
5. 14859/2025 Shifa Ur Rehman 26.04.2020
6. 15335/2025 Mohd Saleem Khan 25.06.2020
7. 17055/2025 Shadab Ahmed 20.05.2020
1.3. CHARGESHEET:
21. Upon registration of the FIR, the Crime Branch undertook investigation
and filed the main charge-sheet on 16.09.2020 against fifteen accused persons,
which included some of the appellants herein, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran
Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed. The main
charge-sheet alleged that the said accused persons were part of a larger conspiracy
9
which culminated in the riots that took place on 23rd, 24th, and 25th February
2020 in Delhi. It was alleged therein that the accused had committed offences
punishable under Sections 120B read with Sections 109, 114, 124A, 147, 148,
149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452,
454, 468, 471, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Sections 13, 16,
17, and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short, “UAPA”),
Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of
Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (for short, “PDPP Act”). Upon filing of the
main charge-sheet, the learned Trial Court
1
took cognizance of the offences
against the accused named therein. Thereafter, the State filed its first
supplementary charge-sheet on 22.11.2020, arraying three additional accused
persons, including the remaining two appellants herein, namely Umar Khalid and
Sharjeel Imam, and the Court, vide order dated 22.11.2020, took cognizance of
the offences against them as well. The State subsequently filed three further
supplementary charge-sheets on 23.02.2021, 02.03.2022, and 07.06.2023.
22. The charge-sheets filed by the State disclose the alleged role attributed to
each of the accused/appellants and the contours of the larger conspiracy
purportedly orchestrated by them, commencing from the period immediately after
the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019 (for short, “CAB”) was passed by the
Central Cabinet on 04.12.2019, and culminating in the riots that occurred in
various parts of Delhi and the National Capital Region on 23rd, 24th, and 25th
February 2020.
23. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice the principal submission
urged on behalf of all the appellants at the threshold. The submission rests on the
length of custody undergone and the plea that continued incarceration, in the
absence of early conclusion of trial, offends the guarantee of personal liberty
1
Additional Sessions Judge -03, (Shahdara), Karkardooma Court, Delhi
10
under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is this submission which the Court
proposes to examine first.
2. CONSIDERATION OF PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PLEA UNDER ARTICLE 21.
24. During the course of arguments advanced before this Court, a fervent plea
was addressed on behalf of the appellants resting on constitutional grounds. It
was primarily urged that prolonged incarceration, coupled with the absence of
any realistic prospect of early conclusion of trial, rendered continued detention
constitutionally impermissible and mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution is at
peril. At the outset, it was repeatedly stated that the appellants did not seek an
examination of the merits of the prosecution case, and that the consideration
ought to remain confined to the issue of delay alone.
25. It was submitted that the appellants had been in custody for a substantial
length of time; that the progress of trial had been slow; and that the complexity
of the prosecution rendered the likelihood of its early conclusion uncertain.
Reliance was placed on decisions of this Court recognising that personal liberty
cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural stagnation, and that prolonged pre-
trial incarceration may, in appropriate cases, justify constitutional intervention
notwithstanding statutory restrictions on bail. These submissions, though pressed
individually, were broadly common in substance.
26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the plea of
delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the course of submissions and
rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the nature of the allegations, the
statutory framework invoked, and the role attributed to individual appellants. This
was not a departure from the original submission, but a reflection of the legal
reality that the constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum. To
allay the concern expressed that the appeals would be decided without adequate
11
delineation of governing principles, this Court considers it appropriate to set out
the framework within which the issues are addressed.
27. Accordingly, before turning to the case of each appellant, it becomes
necessary to first address certain questions of general application. These include
the manner in which pleas founded on delay are to be assessed in prosecutions
under special statutes, the contours of the statutory restraint embodied in the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the principles governing the
formation of prima facie satisfaction under Section 43D(5) of the Act. This
exercise is intended to provide the legal setting within which individual roles and
allegations are thereafter examined.
28. At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify the legal contours within which
the plea of delay operates in prosecutions under the UAPA. Delay engages Article
21 at two distinct constitutional planes. First, delay may be of such magnitude
and character that continued detention becomes per se unconstitutional,
irrespective of the strength of the prosecution case. Second, delay may be pressed
as a circumstance to contend that the statutory satisfaction under Section 43D(5)
stands diluted or displaced. The present case, on an examination of the record,
does not meet either threshold. The inquiry that follows is therefore confined to
whether the delay alleged is of such a nature as to constitutionally eclipse the
statutory embargo, and not whether delay exists in the abstract.
29. We may at the outset clarify the limited compass of the present discussion.
This Court is not engaged in any abstract comparison between the Constitution
and a statute, nor in declaring that delay must invariably prevail over statutory
restrictions, or that delay can never warrant constitutional relief. The question is
more precise: in prosecutions under the UAPA, when delay and prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail, what is the principled approach by
which a constitutional court is to examine such a plea.
30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The right
to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation must conform
12
to procedure established by law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a
speedy trial has been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It follows
that pre-trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to
assume the character of punishment.
31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operating in
isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will be
unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable,
or unfair. The expression “procedure established by law” reflects that balance.
The UAPA, as a special statute enacted to address offences alleged to affect the
security of the State and the stability of civic life, represents a legislative
judgment as to the conditions under which bail may be granted at the pre-trial
stage. Section 43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
2
, this Court recognised a constitutional
safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to
render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial
is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional
courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there
can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes determinative in
every case arising under a special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does
not support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime
enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special category.
34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt. It is an
inquiry into whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible in
the circumstances of the case. That inquiry is necessarily contextual. Context
2
(2021) 3 SCC 713
13
includes the nature of the allegation, the statutory field, the stage of the
proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the trial, the causes contributing to delay,
and the risks attendant upon release. Delay cannot be detached from these
considerations and treated as a solitary determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 is
superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how Article 21 is to be applied
where Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in relation to
offences alleged to implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an
either-or approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory
and constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny
that gives due regard to both.
36. The appellants have urged that their continued incarceration over a
prolonged period, coupled with the pace at which the trial has progressed,
warrants their enlargement on bail notwithstanding the statutory embargo
contained in Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Prolonged custody undoubtedly implicates the constitutional guarantee of
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and such a plea cannot be
rejected on the basis of duration alone without a careful and fact-sensitive
examination. At the same time, the Court is required to examine whether the
narrative of delay, as projected, is borne out by the record, and whether such delay
is of a nature that constitutionally displaces the statutory mandate.
37. The present prosecution arises out of FIR No. 59 of 2020 and involves
multiple accused persons, voluminous documentary and electronic evidence, and
allegations of a structured and continuing conspiracy. The record reflects that
compliance under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was completed
only on 05.08.2023, after which the Trial Court directed that arguments on charge
would commence on a day-to-day basis from 11.09.2023 onwards. The nature of
the prosecution, the number of accused, and the breadth of material necessarily
14
render the proceedings complex and time-consuming. The mere passage of time,
therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation.
38. What assumes significance is that the procedural history and order sheets
do not support the assertion that the delay is attributable to prosecutorial inaction
or judicial inaction. The common counter affidavit and the Trial Court’s orders
record that, at various stages, the prosecution expressed readiness to proceed,
including readiness to commence arguments on charge, while objections, requests
for deferment, and issues relating to sequencing of arguments were raised on
behalf of the accused. At the stage of compliance under Section 207 CrPC itself,
the Trial Court noted that despite repeated directions, certain accused declined to
receive copies of the charge-sheet in the manner directed, insisted on alternate
modes of supply, or filed successive applications, necessitating further procedural
orders and contributing to delay at the pre-charge stage. These aspects emerge
from the record and are not matters of conjecture.
39. The plea of delay has also undergone judicial scrutiny in respect of a co-
accused arising out of the very same FIR. In Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of
Delhi)
3
, the High Court of Delhi undertook a detailed examination of the Trial
Court order-sheets and, after tabulating the procedural history, recorded
categorical findings that the alleged inordinate delay could not be attributed either
to the prosecution or to the Trial Court. The High Court noted repeated
adjournments sought on behalf of the accused, reluctance to commence
arguments on charge despite directions for day-to-day hearing and recorded the
Trial Court’s expression of distress at the inability to move forward
notwithstanding consensus schedules arrived at amongst the defence. The High
Court expressly rejected the contention that bail under Section 43D (5) of the
UAPA could be granted solely on the ground of delay in such circumstances,
holding that the statutory embargo cannot be permitted to be circumvented by
3
2023 SCC OnLine Del 3472
15
delay attributable, at least in part, to the manner in which the defence conducted
the proceedings.
40. This Court is conscious that the appellants in the present appeal may not
stand on identical factual footing in all respects with the co-accused whose appeal
was considered by the High Court. Nevertheless, the findings recorded therein
are relevant insofar as they arise from the same trial, the same order-sheets, and
the same procedural milieu. They negate the overarching portrayal that the
appellants have remained in custody solely on account of prosecutorial inertia or
a dormant trial.
41. At the same time, the Court does not proceed on the assumption that the
entire delay can be laid at the door of the accused, nor does it characterise the
proceedings as free from institutional or systemic constraints. This is not a casual
prosecution, nor one involving a narrow factual canvas. The law has taken its
course, albeit at a pace dictated by the complexity of the case, the number of
accused, and the nature of issues raised. The constitutional concern arising from
prolonged custody is therefore acknowledged, but it does not, on the present
record, translate into a finding that continued detention has become punitive or
unconscionable solely by reason of delay.
42. The approach of addressing delay-related concerns through calibrated
judicial supervision, rather than automatic enlargement on bail, stands reinforced
by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Saleem Khan.
4
In that case,
despite the accused having remained in custody for over five years and the trial
not having commenced, this Court declined to interfere with the rejection of bail
qua one accused, while upholding bail granted to another, thereby reiterating that
delay-based pleas must necessarily be adjudicated on an accused-specific footing.
Significantly, even while acknowledging the constitutional imperative of a
speedy trial, the Court did not eclipse the statutory rigour under Section 43D(5)
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1754
16
of the UAPA but instead directed expeditious conclusion of the trial and cautioned
against any conduct on the part of the accused that may further protract the
proceedings. The decision thus affirms that prolonged custody, though a matter
of concern, does not operate as an automatic ground for grant of bail where the
statutory threshold continues to be attracted.
43. Viewed cumulatively, the record does not support the absolute proposition
that the appellants have remained “innocently incarcerated” without any
contribution to delay, nor does it disclose a situation where the delay is so wholly
unjustified as to override the statutory embargo contained in Section 43D(5). The
appropriate constitutional response, at this stage, lies in ensuring vigilant
oversight of the trial and its expeditious progression, rather than in eclipsing the
statutory mandate governing bail in offences of the present nature. The plea of
delay in the facts of the particular case, therefore, does not warrant enlargement
on bail, though it justifies continued judicial emphasis on the timely conduct of
the proceedings.
44. It is in this sense that the plea of delay must first be examined to see
whether it arises in a manner that warrants constitutional scrutiny of continued
custody. Broadly stated, the Court must consider whether the custody undergone
is substantial, whether the proceedings have made meaningful progress, and
whether there exists a realistic prospect of conclusion of trial within a reasonable
period. The Court must also take note of the causes contributing to delay,
including whether delay is attributable to the inherent complexity of the
prosecution or to the conduct of parties, including the accused.
45. A finding that these circumstances exist does not, by itself, compel bail. It
merely calls for the next level of constitutional consideration. At that stage, the
Court is required to examine whether, notwithstanding delay, continued detention
remains constitutionally justified having regard to the statutory context and the
facts of the case. This examination is not a free-ranging balancing exercise; it is
structured by legally relevant considerations.
17
46. One such consideration is the gravity of the alleged offence in its statutory
setting. Under the UAPA, Parliament has legislatively characterised certain
conduct as implicating the security of the State and the peace of society. That
legislative characterisation does not conclude the judicial inquiry, but it is not
constitutionally irrelevant. It forms part of the context in which the Article 21
claim is assessed.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused.
Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of participation,
ranging from peripheral acts to strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality.
The constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed
uniformly for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a
central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for circumspection
before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory embargo is
correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic,
prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character.
48. Another consideration is the prima facie strength of the accusation at the
limited threshold contemplated by Section 43D(5). At this stage, the Court does
not weigh evidence, test defences, or conduct a mini trial. Yet, the constitutional
inquiry cannot proceed as if all allegations are identically situated. Whether the
prosecution material, taken at its highest, discloses a prima facie nexus between
the accused and the statutory ingredients is a circumstance that informs the
assessment of continued detention.
49. Consideration must also be given to the integrity of the trial process and
the risks associated with release. Depending on the nature of the case, these may
include the possibility of influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence, or
undermining the fairness of the proceedings. In prosecutions alleging organised
activity, the assessment of such risks may differ from that in ordinary criminal
cases. This is not to presume guilt, but to recognise that bail decisions are
necessarily forward-looking in terms of ensuring an effective trial.
18
50. The Court must also bear in mind that it is not confined to a binary choice
between continued custody and unconditional release. Where delay becomes a
matter of constitutional concern, appropriate directions for expeditious trial,
prioritisation of witnesses, or periodic review of progress may be issued. Such
measures are constitutionally significant responses that address the vice of delay
while respecting the statutory framework. The liberty to renew a prayer for bail
upon continued stagnation may also be preserved.
51. There is a further constitutional aspect that warrants articulation. Article 21
protects individual liberty. It also, within the same guarantee of life, reflects the
State’s obligation to protect the life and security of the community. In
prosecutions alleging threats to public order and national security, the Court
cannot be unmindful that both dimensions are engaged. The constitutional order
is not served by an approach that treats liberty as the sole value and societal
security as peripheral. Both must be accommodated through reasoned
adjudication.
52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb(supra) must be understood
as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention. Prolonged
incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional concern and carries great
weight. It is not, however, the sole determinant. The Court must consider, in
totality, whether continued detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable,
having regard to the role attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie
material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the availability of
intermediate remedies.
53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured
content in a field where the Constitution itself recognises competing interests.
Nor does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It recognises that statutory restraint
must yield in an appropriate case where detention becomes punitive by reason of
unreasonable and unjustified delay. What it excludes is a mechanical override
based on time alone, divorced from legal context.
19
54. Having set out the above governing approach, this Court, in the later part
of this judgment would apply these principles in a calibrated manner viz. to the
claim of each of the appellants. The Court will examine, in relation to each
appellant, the role attributed and whether the statutory threshold under Section
43D(5) is attracted on the prosecution material taken at its highest. Thereafter,
where the plea of delay and prolonged incarceration is pressed, the Court will
consider whether the circumstances warrant constitutional intervention in terms
of the principles noticed above, or whether appropriate directions for expeditious
trial would adequately address the concern expressed under Article 21.
55. It is in this disciplined manner, and in faithful regard to both statutory
design and constitutional principle, that the present appeals are proposed to be
adjudicated.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing
approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty,
integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that
automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for
heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined
by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations,
including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role
attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength
of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under
the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed
cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate
so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
57. Thus, when the composite evaluation yields a clear conclusion that
continued detention has crossed the bounds of constitutional permissibility that
the Court may justifiably intervene notwithstanding statutory restrictions.
20
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab
5
, this Court expressly cautioned
against the mechanical invocation of prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail
in cases involving serious offences under special enactments. The judgment
reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the legislative context, and the prima
facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken
time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato
6
reiterated that while Article 21
remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced from competing
constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that claims to liberty must be
examined in the totality of circumstances, particularly where allegations
implicate organised criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though
undoubtedly significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or
solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial
reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes.
60. Read together, these decisions do not dilute the constitutional guarantee of
personal liberty; they explain the manner in which it is to be applied. They do not
support an approach of automatic displacement of statutory restraint, but instead
emphasise a contextual and measured exercise of judicial scrutiny.
61. To read Najeeb (supra) as mandating bail solely on account of prolonged
incarceration, irrespective of the statutory context or the nature of the allegations,
would be to attribute to the decision a consequence it neither intended nor
supports. Such a construction would also lead to an interpretive absurdity,
whereby a special statute enacted by Parliament to address offences implicating
the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State would stand effectively
neutralised by the mere passage of time, even at a pre-trial stage. Such an outcome
cannot be countenanced in constitutional adjudication. Accordingly, the finding
5
(2024) 6 SCC 1
6
2025 INSC 1418
21
in Najeeb(supra) is properly situated as a constitutional safeguard to be invoked
in appropriate cases, and not as a mathematical formula of universal application.
62. Before parting with the discussion on delay, it is clarified that the
observations herein are confined to the present stage of the proceedings. The
constitutional concern arising from prolonged custody has been duly considered
on the basis of the record as it presently stands. In the event of continued and
unexplained stagnation of the trial, it shall remain open to the appellants to avail
such remedies as are permissible in law. The Trial Court is expected to accord due
priority to the matter and ensure that the proceedings are carried forward with
reasonable expedition.
63. The discussion thus far has been confined to the constitutional plea
founded on delay and prolonged incarceration. That inquiry, though necessary,
does not conclude the consideration of the present appeals. The question that now
arises is the manner in which the prayer for bail is to be examined where the
prosecution is governed by a special statutory regime.
3. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 43D(5) AND THE SCOPE
OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY AT THE BAIL STAGE
64. The issues arising before this Court at the stage of consideration of bail
engage multiple facets of law, including the nature of the statutory framework,
the limits of judicial scrutiny at the pre-trial stage, and the manner in which
allegations under a special enactment are required to be assessed. In order to
address these aspects in a structured and principled manner, it becomes necessary
to examine the scheme of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and in
particular the scope and content of Section 43D(5), which regulates the exercise
of judicial discretion in such matters. An understanding of this framework
provides the necessary foundation for evaluating the material placed on record
and the role attributed to each accused in accordance with law.
22
65. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is a special statute enacted
to address forms of criminal conduct which, by their very nature, transcend
ordinary breaches of penal law and implicate the sovereignty, integrity, and
security of the State. Parliament, in framing the Act and in subsequently
strengthening its provisions, has proceeded on the legislative understanding that
such offences are rarely confined to isolated acts, but are more often the
culmination of organised, sustained, and conspiratorial activity unfolding over
time.
66. The statutory scheme of the Act reflects this understanding. Chapters IV
and VI do not confine criminal liability to the final execution of a terrorist act
alone. They extend culpability to preparatory conduct, facilitation, abetment, and
conspiracy, recognising that the threat sought to be addressed by the statute often
materialises long before any overt act of violence is committed. The law thus
proceeds on a process-based conception of criminality rather than an event-based
one.
67. It is within this legislative backdrop that Section 43D(5) assumes
significance. The provision constitutes a conscious departure from the general
principles governing the grant of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Parliament has imposed a calibrated restriction on the power of courts to grant
bail in respect of offences under Chapters IV and VI, reflecting its assessment
that the ordinary presumption in favour of pre-trial liberty requires modification
where allegations pertain to activities threatening the foundations of the State.
68. At the same time, Section 43D(5) does not exclude judicial scrutiny. Nor
does it mandate denial of bail by default. The restriction operates only upon the
Court being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against the accused is prima facie true. The provision thus preserves
the judicial function, while carefully defining its contours at the pre-trial stage.
69. This Court has, on several occasions, examined the scope and application
of Section 43D(5) in diverse factual settings. Decisions such as National
23
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
7
, Vernon v. State of
Maharashtra
8
, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra
9
, Athar Parwez v.
Union of India
10
, and Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India
11
disclose a consistent
judicial approach to the provision, notwithstanding variations in factual context.
The present analysis seeks not to restate those authorities individually, but to distil
the governing principles that emerge from them and to apply those principles in
a structured and coherent manner.
70. The expression “prima facie true”, which lies at the heart of Section
43D(5), does not invite a detailed examination of evidence, nor does it require the
Court to assess the probability of conviction. Equally, it does not reduce the
judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of the prosecution’s assertions. The
statutory standard contemplates a threshold inquiry of limited but real content.
71. At this stage, the Court is required to examine whether the material relied
upon by the prosecution, taken at face value and without rebuttal, discloses the
essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused. The inquiry is
one of statutory plausibility, not evidentiary sufficiency. The Court tests the
allegations against the legal ingredients of the offence, not against possible
defences or competing factual narratives.
72. The discipline imposed by Section 43D(5) necessarily circumscribes the
nature of judicial scrutiny permissible at the bail stage. The Court is not called
upon to weigh the probative value of evidence, to assess its admissibility, or to
determine whether the prosecution version will ultimately withstand trial. Any
exercise approximating a mini-trial at this stage would transgress the statutory
boundary deliberately drawn by Parliament.
7
(2019) 5 SCC 1
8
(2023) 8 SCC 1
9
(2021) 16 SCC 720
10
2024 SCC OnLine SC 124
11
2024 SCC OnLine SC 742
24
73. Such premature adjudication is not merely procedurally inappropriate; it
carries institutional consequences. It risks prejudging issues reserved for trial,
distorting the adversarial process, and undermining the legislative intent
underlying the special bail regime. Section 43D(5) therefore demands judicial
restraint, not judicial abstention, at the pre-trial stage.
74. A salient feature of Section 43D(5) is its express reference to “such
person”. The statutory text mandates an inquiry that is accused-specific rather
than case-centric. The provision does not permit a collective or undifferentiated
approach to bail merely because multiple accused are arraigned in the same
prosecution or alleged conspiracy.
75. The Court is thus required to examine the role attributed to the individual
accused, as emerging from the prosecution material, and to determine whether
such attribution bears a prima facie nexus to the offences under Chapters IV or
VI. This inquiry does not involve ranking degrees of culpability or pronouncing
upon guilt. It serves the limited purpose of determining whether the statutory
threshold is crossed qua the accused before the Court.
76. In cases alleging conspiratorial conduct, it becomes necessary to
distinguish between the existence of a conspiracy and the position occupied by
an accused within the alleged framework. While conspiracy may supply the
overarching context, Section 43D(5) requires attention to the nature, extent, and
character of participation attributed to the individual.
77. At the threshold stage, the inquiry is directed towards whether the
prosecution material suggests conspiratorial centrality or merely conspiratorial
association. Conduct which, on the prosecution’s own showing, reflects
conceptualisation, direction, orchestration, or mobilisation of unlawful activity or
terrorist activity, stands on a different footing from conduct alleged to be episodic,
peripheral, or substitutable. This distinction does not determine guilt; it informs
the statutory assessment of whether continued restraint on liberty is justified at
the pre-trial stage.
25
78. The cumulative effect of the statutory scheme and the jurisprudence of this
Court is that Section 43D(5) operates as a gatekeeping provision. It requires the
Court to undertake a focused, accused-specific, and legally disciplined inquiry,
confined to determining whether the prosecution material, taken at its highest,
satisfies the statutory threshold of prima facie truth.
79. Any departure from this calibrated approach, whether by converting the
bail stage into a forum for adjudicating defences or by treating the invocation of
the statute as determinative of the outcome, would unsettle the careful balance
struck by Parliament. The provision demands neither mechanical denial nor
casual grant of bail, but a principled application of the statutory standard within
its clearly defined limits.
80. From the foregoing discussion, certain propositions governing the
application of Section 43D(5) emerge with clarity. First, the provision embodies
a deliberate legislative departure from ordinary bail jurisprudence, premised upon
the distinctive nature of offences under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second,
the expression “prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial inquiry which is
neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring the Court to examine whether the
prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the essential statutory
ingredients of the alleged offence. Third, the inquiry is necessarily accused-
specific, directed to the role and attribution qua the individual, and does not admit
of collective or undifferentiated treatment merely because allegations arise from
a common transaction or conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under Section 43D(5)
is not a forum for evaluating defences, weighing evidence, or conducting a mini-
trial; judicial restraint at this stage is not an abdication of duty but a fulfilment of
the statutory mandate. These propositions, read together, define the contours of
judicial power and responsibility under the provision.
81. The correct application of Section 43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to
undertake a structured inquiry confined to the following:
26
i. whether the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, discloses a
prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients of the offence
alleged;
ii. whether the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and
meaningful nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity
proscribed under the Act, as distinguished from mere association or
peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual
accused, without embarking upon an assessment reserved after full-
fledged trial.
82. Where these requirements are met, the statutory restraint on the grant of
bail must operate with full force; where they are not, the embargo stands lifted.
This approach preserves the legislative purpose of the Act, and ensures that the
exceptional nature of the bail regime under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted by
overreach nor distorted by mechanical application.
83. The discussion thus far has been directed to the manner in which the
statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) is to be applied at the stage of bail. That
inquiry sets out how the Court is to examine the prayer for bail under a special
enactment. The inquiry must now turn to what the accusation is that is sought to
be tested against that threshold. This necessarily requires an examination of the
statutory meaning and scope of a “terrorist act” under the Act.
4. SCOPE OF “TERRORIST ACT” UNDER SECTION 15 AND THE
STATUTORY CONTEXT
84. During the course of arguments, a fervent and sustained debate emerged
not merely on the threshold under Section 43D(5), but on a more foundational
premise, namely, what the statute itself comprehends as a “terrorist act” and,
correspondingly, the legal character of the allegations sought to be brought within
27
Chapters IV and VI of the Act. On behalf of the appellants, it was urged that the
prosecution narrative, even if taken at its highest, discloses at best a situation of
public disorder, and that the invocation of the UAPA proceeds on an overstretched
understanding of terrorism. The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that
the statutory definition is not confined to conventional forms of violence, and that
Parliament has consciously employed a broader formulation to capture conduct
which threatens the unity, integrity, security, including economic security, or
sovereignty of India, and which disrupts civic life in the manner contemplated by
the Act. The submissions, in substance, invited the Court either to proceed on
assumed notions of what constitutes terrorism, or to anchor its analysis firmly in
the legislative definition enacted by Parliament.
85. In this backdrop, and before proceeding to an accused-specific evaluation
of the material on record, it becomes necessary to clarify the statutory meaning
and setting of Section 15. The prima facie satisfaction contemplated by Section
43D(5) is not a matter of impression or gravity alone; it is a satisfaction referable
to defined statutory ingredients. Unless the legal contours of the offence alleged
are first identified, the subsequent assessment of individual role risks proceeding
without a clear statutory reference point, and may result in either an unduly
restrictive or an unduly expansive application of the threshold. It is for this reason
that the Court considers it appropriate to briefly notice the scope of Section 15,
and its inter-relationship with allied provisions, so that the analysis which follows
proceeds on a clear legal foundation and is thereafter applied, with the necessary
care and precision, to each appellant individually.
86. Section 15 of the Act defines what constitutes a “terrorist act” for the
purposes of the statute. The definition is structured around two essential elements.
First, the act must be done with intent to threaten, or be likely to threaten, the
unity, integrity, security, including economic security, or sovereignty of India, or
with intent to strike terror in the people or any section thereof. Second, the act
28
must be of such a nature as to cause, or be likely to cause, the consequences
enumerated in the provision.
87. The means by which such acts may be committed are not confined to the
use of bombs, explosives, firearms, or other conventional weapons alone.
Parliament has consciously employed the expression “by any other means of
whatever nature”, which expression cannot be rendered otiose. The statutory
emphasis is thus not solely on the instrumentality employed, but on the design,
intent, and effect of the act. To construe Section 15 as limited only to conventional
modes of violence would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its plain
language.
88. The consequences contemplated under Section 15 further illuminate the
legislative understanding of terrorism. Apart from death or destruction of
property, the provision expressly encompasses acts which disrupt supplies or
services essential to the life of the community, as well as acts which threaten the
economic security of the nation. This reflects Parliament’s recognition that threats
to sovereignty and security may arise through conduct that destabilises civic life
or societal functioning, even in the absence of immediate physical violence.
89. The Act further recognises that such acts may be the result of collective
and coordinated effort. Section 18 makes punishable conspiracy, attempt,
abetment, advice, incitement, and knowing facilitation of a terrorist act, as also
acts preparatory to its commission. The statutory scheme thus contemplates that
terrorist activity may involve multiple actors performing different roles towards
a common unlawful objective.
90. Read together, Sections 15 and 18 disclose a legislative design wherein
Section 15 defines the nature of acts which Parliament has characterised as
terrorist acts, while Section 18 ensures that criminal liability is not confined only
to the final execution, but extends to those who contribute to the commission of
such acts through planning, coordination, mobilisation, or other forms of
concerted action. Whether particular conduct ultimately attracts Section 15
29
directly, or Section 18 read with Section 15, depends upon the role attributed and
the statutory ingredients alleged to be satisfied.
91. At the stage of consideration under Section 43D(5), the Court is not
required to finally classify the conduct or determine the precise provision under
which liability would ultimately arise. The inquiry is confined to whether, on the
prosecution material taken at face value, there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused’s conduct bears a prima facie nexus to a terrorist act as
defined under the Act, whether as a direct participant or as a conspirator or
facilitator.
92. In light of the foregoing discussion, the plea of delay stands addressed at a
general level. The consideration that follows is therefore confined to the
individual role attributed to each appellant and the prima facie satisfaction
recorded against them under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, without reopening the issue of delay except to the extent
it bears upon individual attribution.
93. The Court has thus traversed the submissions on prolonged incarceration
and the constitutional framework within which such pleas are to be examined in
prosecutions under a special statute. The contours of the statutory restraint
contained in Section 43D(5) have been delineated, and the scope and meaning of
a “terrorist act” under Section 15 of the Act, read with the allied provisions, have
also been clarified.
94. The arguments before us made it evident that while certain submissions
were urged on common grounds, the ultimate determination cannot rest on
general propositions alone. The application of the law must necessarily turn on
the role attributed to each accused, the nature of the material relied upon, and the
manner in which the courts below have appreciated the same.
95. It therefore becomes necessary to examine each appeal independently,
bearing in mind the statutory framework already discussed, and to assess whether
the threshold contemplated under Section 43D(5) is attracted in the case of each
30
appellant and, if so, whether the facts of the individual appeal warrant any
departure on constitutional grounds. It is this exercise that the Court would now
propose to undertake.
5. INDUVIDUALISED ROLE AND DIFFERNTIATION IN TREATMENT
OF THE PRIME CONSPIRATORS WITH OTHERS.
96. Before we proceed to individually analyse each of the role attributed to
each of the accused, we would like to reiterate the obvious but very important
distinction while considering the bail applications in general and under special
statutes like UAPA.
97. The record discloses that all the appellants do not stand on an equal footing
as regards culpability. The allegations against the principal accused indicate a
central and directive role in conceptualising, planning, and coordinating the
alleged terrorist act, whereas the material against certain co-accused reflects
conduct of a subsidiary or facilitative nature. The hierarchy of participation,
emerging from the prosecution’s case itself, requires the Court to assess each
application individually, rather than proceed on the premise of equivalence. Such
differentiation is intrinsic to criminal adjudication and operates irrespective of the
uniformity of charges framed.
98. In the case of the alleged masterminds i.e., Sharjeel Imam and Umar
Khalid, the prosecution material comprises direct, corroborative, and
contemporaneous evidence, including recoveries, digital communication trails,
and statements indicative of managerial responsibility. In contrast, the
involvement of others is sought to be established mainly through associative or
peripheral conduct. The Court cannot ignore that where evidentiary strength
varies materially between accused persons, the need for continued detention
likewise varies. Detention that remains necessary to secure ongoing prosecutorial
31
objectives for the principal offenders may not retain the same necessity for those
of limited attribution.
99. The alleged masterminds are stated to have exercised command authority
and to possess the ability to mobilise or influence individuals within and outside
their immediate circle. Such allegations, when supported by preliminary material,
compel heightened caution regarding the possibility of interference with
witnesses or reactivation of dormant networks. As against this, co-accused with
no independent capacity to mobilise resources or exert organisational leverage do
not present the same systemic risk. The logic of detention cannot be applied
homogenously where the risk profiles of the accused are markedly dissimilar.
100. The gravity of the alleged act is unquestionably serious however, public
interest and national security concerns may be engaged to a materially different
degree depending on the role of each accused. The continued detention of those
alleged to be the architects of the conspiracy may be required to safeguard broader
security interests and deter future acts, whereas the rationale for continued
incarceration of minor participants is comparatively attenuated once the
investigative purpose is exhausted. The Court is therefore justified in calibrating
its approach, ensuring that the pursuit of security does not eclipse the principle of
proportionality.
101. It is well recognised that Article 21 rights, though not absolute, require the
State and the Court to justify continued custody with reference to the specific
individual before it. Treating all accused identically irrespective of their roles
would risk transforming pre-trial detention into a punitive mechanism divorced
from individual circumstances. The constitutional mandate demands a
differentiated inquiry: where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those
whose roles are limited, the balance between individual liberty and collective
security may call for conditional release, while the same balance may tilt
differently for those alleged to have orchestrated the offence.
32
102. The statutory restrictions under special enactments do not preclude the
Court from recognising distinctions between accused persons based on the quality
of material, the nature of involvement, and the necessity of further detention.
103. At this stage, the Court must be careful not to confuse two distinct legal
exercises. One is the determination of criminal liability, which belongs to trial.
The other is the regulation of personal liberty pending trial, which is the limited
concern of bail. The law of conspiracy explains how several persons, acting at
different levels and at different points of time, may be bound together by a
common design. That doctrine answers the question of liability. It does not
answer, by itself, the separate question of how long and on what basis the liberty
of each individual may be restrained before guilt is proved. Bail adjudication
therefore necessarily proceeds on a different plane. It requires the Court to look
at what is attributed to each accused, how that attribution fits within the statutory
ingredients, and whether continued detention, at that stage, serves a legitimate
purpose recognised by law. This exercise does not dismantle the prosecution case
of conspiracy, nor does it rank culpability. It merely ensures that pre-trial
detention does not become indiscriminate or automatic, and that statutory
restraint operates with reason, proportion, and fidelity to individual attribution.
Seen thus, differentiation is not an exception to conspiracy law, but a
constitutional discipline imposed upon the exercise of bail jurisdiction.
104. A cumulative and comparative reading of the FIR and the successive
charge-sheets discloses a discernible differentiation in the nature, scope, and
hierarchy of roles attributed to the accused persons. The prosecution narrative
itself delineates Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam as occupying a position distinct
from the remaining accused, both in terms of conceptual involvement and
command over the alleged conspiracy.
105. At the outset, Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are prima facie attributed a
central role and alleged to be ideological drivers of the alleged conspiracy. The
material relied upon against them is predominantly in the nature of speeches,
33
meetings, digital communications, and alleged strategic deliberations,
commencing immediately after the passage of the CAB/CAA. The charge-sheets
attribute to them the role of formulating the protest strategy, including the alleged
transition from sit-in demonstrations to chakka jams, selection of locations, and
articulation of the broader political objective sought to be advanced. Their alleged
acts are thus situated at the planning and preparatory stage, extending over a
prolonged period.
106. In contradistinction, the remaining accused namely Gulfisha Fatima,
Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, Shadab Ahmad, Athar
Khan, and others are consistently described as local-level facilitators. Their
alleged involvement is site-specific and operational, confined to particular
localities such as Seelampur, Jafrabad, Chand Bagh, Jamia, and Shaheen Bagh.
The allegations against them relate primarily to on-ground mobilisation, logistical
coordination, funding at the local level, stockpiling of materials, and execution of
directions allegedly received from above, rather than formulation of the
overarching strategy.
107. The charge-sheets further reveal a vertical chain of command, wherein
conspiratorial - level decisions and strategic directions are alleged to have
emanated from the top, while implementation was carried out through
intermediaries such as DPSG members, JCC coordinators, and protest site
organisers. This internal structuring of the prosecution case itself negates any
suggestion of homogeneous or indivisible culpability among all accused. The
distinction between those alleged to have exercised centralised command and
control and those alleged to have acted as field-level operatives is repeatedly
emphasised through the attribution of roles, reliance on different categories of
evidence, and the geographical confinement of acts.
108. Even in the narrative concerning escalation into violence, the role
attributed to the remaining accused is largely proximate and reactive, arising from
developments at specific protest sites. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, on the
34
other hand, are alleged to have operated remotely away from the sites of violence,
with no direct attribution of participation in acts of arson, assault, or destruction
of property. The prosecution case thus proceeds on the footing that the former
category of accused were involved in facilitating execution, whereas the latter
were involved in conceptualisation and supervision.
109. This differentiation assumes critical legal significance. Once the
prosecution itself projects varying degrees of proximity, control, and
participation, the law mandates an individualised assessment of culpability,
particularly in the context of stringent penal provisions. The alleged role of an
accused at the level of ideological articulation or protest coordination cannot,
without a demonstrable and proximate nexus to acts of violence, be equated with
the role of those alleged to have engaged in facilitation of riots or violent acts.
110. Accordingly, the material placed on record, when examined in its entirety,
establishes that Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam stand on a qualitatively different
footing from the remaining accused, both in the prosecution narrative and in the
evidentiary basis relied upon. This structural distinction cannot be ignored and
must inform any judicial determination relating to culpability, parity, or the
applicability of penal provisions requiring a heightened threshold of intent and
participation. Having thus delineated the structural and evidentiary differentiation
emerging from the prosecution case itself, it becomes necessary for the Court to
examine the bail pleas in an accused-specific manner. The exercise that follows
is not one of adjudicating culpability, which lies exclusively within the domain
of trial, but of assessing whether the statutory threshold governing pre-trial liberty
is attracted qua each appellant. It is in this limited but essential context that the
Court now proceeds to consider the submissions advanced on behalf of each
accused individually, bearing in mind the role attributed, the nature of material
relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings.
35
6. SHARJEEL IMAM – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO. 14030 OF 2025
6.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
111. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Sri Siddhartha Dave submits
that the appellant is a final year Ph.D. scholar of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
with an established academic background including B.Tech and M.Tech degrees,
Masters in Modern History and Philosophy, and having cleared the National
Eligibility Test. It is urged that the appellant had no criminal antecedents
whatsoever prior to 2020, and that his involvement in the present set of cases
stems solely from speeches and protest-related activities undertaken during the
anti-CAA movement.
112. It is submitted that the present proceedings arise out of FIR No. 59 of
2020, pertaining to an alleged conspiracy relating to the incidents in North-East
Delhi in February 2020. The FIR was initially registered under IPC provisions
alone, and only subsequently were offences under Chapters III, IV and VI of the
UAPA, along with serious IPC offences, added. It is pointed out that at the
inception of the FIR, only one individual was named, and the appellant was not
among them.
113. Learned Senior Counsel emphasized that, as a matter of record, the
appellant was not in Delhi after the second week of January 2020, and had already
been taken into custody on 28 January 2020 in another case. Despite this admitted
position, the appellant was arrayed as an accused in the present FIR through a
supplementary charge sheet and was arrested on 25 August 2020, nearly six
months after registration of the FIR.
114. It is submitted that the prosecution case against the appellant in the
present FIR is founded entirely on material recovered in FIR No. 22 of 2020,
namely four speeches delivered at different places, the formation of a WhatsApp
group titled “Muslim Students of JNU”, alleged involvement in the Shaheen Bagh
36
protest, and pamphlets opposing the Citizenship Amendment Act. These very
acts, it is urged, already form the subject matter of a separate prosecution, in
which the appellant has been granted bail, and in respect of which judicial
findings exist that the speeches do not contain any call for violence.
115. Learned Senior counsel submitted that even on the prosecution’s own
showing, there is no allegation against the appellant of having participated in any
meeting where violence was planned, of having discussed use of arms, of any
recovery of weapons or incriminating material from him, or of his presence at any
site of violence in North-East Delhi. It is further submitted that there is no
allegation of any communication or connectivity between the appellant and the
other accused persons, including participation in WhatsApp groups such as
DPSG, Pinjra Tod or JCC.
116. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the record
demonstrates that the appellant repeatedly spoke against violence as a means of
protest, that he was already in custody well before the incidents of February 2020,
and that even the prosecution witnesses do not place him at Shaheen Bagh or any
protest site after the first week of January. It is further pointed out that the
WhatsApp group “Muslim Students of JNU” is stated to have become inoperative
after mid-January 2020, and that the appellant is not an accused in any FIR
relating to the actual incidents of rioting or violence.
117. Learned Senior Counsel submits that, in these circumstances, the
statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is not met. It is urged that
protest-related speech, pamphleteering, and mobilisation for non-violent
demonstrations, even if assumed to be politically charged, do not by themselves
disclose offences under Chapters IV or VI of the UAPA, absent any proximate
intent, preparation, or nexus to violence as contemplated under Section 15 of the
Act.
118. It is further submitted that the scale of the prosecution itself demonstrates
the oppressive nature of continued incarceration. The prosecution has filed
37
multiple charge sheets, the case involves twenty accused persons, proposes to
examine more than nine hundred witnesses, and relies upon voluminous
documentary material. The matter remains at the stage of arguments on charge,
and there is no proximate progression to trial in the conventional sense.
119. Learned Senior Counsel then places reliance on the principle of parity. It
is pointed out that several co-accused in the same FIR, including Natasha Narwal,
Devangana Kalita, Asif Iqbal Tanha, Safoora Zargar, Faizan Khan and Ishrat
Jahan, have already been granted bail, some on merits. It is submitted that
challenges to these bail orders have been dismissed by this Court, and it has been
clarified that co-accused are entitled to rely on parity.
120. It is urged that the appellant stands on a better footing than those already
on bail. Unlike them, the appellant is not alleged to have been present in Delhi
during the relevant period, not alleged to be present near the sites of violence, not
shown to be connected with any of the co-accused through calls or messages, and
not alleged to have participated in any meeting where violence was discussed.
Even the solitary meeting attributed to him is stated, on the prosecution’s own
material, to have been confined to mobilisation for chakka jam and not violence.
121. Learned Senior counsel therefore submits that continued incarceration of
the appellant, despite the absence of allegations of violence-related conspiracy,
lack of proximity to the incidents in question, and parity with co-accused already
on bail, cannot be sustained either on the statutory framework of the UAPA or on
constitutional principles. It is urged that the impugned judgment proceeds on an
impermissible conflation of dissent and protest with terrorist activity, warranting
interference.
6.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
122. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing for the Respondent submitted that
the appellant is not sought to be prosecuted merely for participation in protests or
38
expression of dissent, but for his distinct and foundational role in the genesis,
planning and execution of a larger criminal conspiracy which ultimately
culminated in widespread violence in Delhi. It is urged that the prosecution
material, as analysed in detail by the High Court, clearly establishes that the
conspiracy did not originate in February 2020 as a spontaneous reaction, but was
set in motion in a calibrated and phased manner from early December 2019
onwards, with the appellant being one of its principal architects from the
inception itself.
123. It is submitted that the appellant’s role is traceable to the first phase of the
conspiracy, which involved deliberate mobilisation, radicalisation and
preparation of ground conditions through organised chakka jams, blockage of
arterial roads, and disruption of essential services. The High Court has noted that
this phase was not spontaneous, but involved prior planning, coordination and
dissemination of instructions, and that the appellant played a central role in
conceptualising and operationalising this strategy through meetings, digital
platforms and public speeches.
124. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the prosecution relies upon
contemporaneous electronic evidence, including WhatsApp chats recovered from
the appellant’s device, which demonstrate that the appellant created and
administered the WhatsApp group “Muslim Students of JNU”. This group, as
recorded by the High Court, functioned as a coordinating mechanism for
mobilisation, identification of protest sites, dissemination of protest strategy and
synchronisation of chakka jams across locations. The appellant’s leadership role
in this group is corroborated by witness statements and digital footprints forming
part of the charge-sheet material.
125. It was further submitted that the appellant was involved in the drafting,
printing and circulation of pamphlets in early December 2019, which deliberately
invoked communally sensitive themes such as Babri Masjid, Kashmir and alleged
existential threats to the Muslim community. The High Court has relied upon
39
statements of the printer and other witnesses who have attributed authorship and
coordination of these pamphlets to the appellant. It is urged that these pamphlets
were not neutral political literature but were designed to mobilise crowds through
emotive and incendiary narratives, thereby laying the foundation for mass unrest.
126. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant’s speeches form a
crucial link in the chain of conspiracy. In particular, the High Court has noted that
in his speech at Jamia Millia Islamia on 13 December 2019, delivered shortly
before violence erupted in the area, the appellant articulated a strategy of choking
Delhi through organised chakka jams, including blocking roads and disrupting
essential supplies such as water and milk. It is urged that the speech reflects
conscious awareness that such disruption would inevitably escalate into violence,
and that the appellant framed such escalation as an acceptable and necessary
consequence of the agitation.
127. It was submitted that the appellant’s repeated assertion of opposing
violence cannot be examined in isolation. The High Court has correctly observed
that conspiracy is to be inferred from cumulative conduct, and that a conspirator
may outwardly disavow violence while simultaneously engaging in acts designed
to create conditions where violence becomes unavoidable. The appellant’s
conduct in planning road blockades, paralysing public movement and provoking
confrontation with law enforcement must therefore be viewed cumulatively and
not in a compartmentalised manner.
128. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant attended
and participated in conspiratorial meetings at Jangpura and within the JNU
ecosystem, where the strategy of chakka jam and escalation of protests was
discussed. The High Court has relied upon witness statements, photographic
material and call-detail and location evidence to record the appellant’s presence
and participation in these meetings. It is urged that following these meetings,
further coordination groups were created, evidencing a clear progression from
planning to execution.
40
129. It was submitted that the appellant’s role was not geographically confined
to Delhi. Acting as a mobiliser and ideologue, the appellant travelled to Aligarh
and other locations to replicate and export the protest model, aligning regional
protests with the broader Delhi-centric strategy. The High Court notes that this
was done in coordination with other conspirators, demonstrating that the
conspiracy was pan-regional in conception and execution, and not localised or
spontaneous.
130. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant played a decisive
role in the creation and sustenance of the Shaheen Bagh protest site, which
evolved into a prolonged 24x7 blockade of a major arterial road. The High Court
records that the appellant issued instructions, addressed gatherings, and
consciously distinguished between symbolic protest and disruptive blockade,
opting for the latter. It is urged that the sustained nature of the blockade evidences
intentional paralysis of civic life, squarely attracting the mischief contemplated
under Chapter IV of the UAPA.
131. It was submitted that the argument of the appellant’s absence from Delhi
during February 2020 does not exculpate him at the bail stage. The High Court
has correctly noted that the appellant’s role was foundational and preparatory, and
that liability for conspiracy does not require physical presence at the scene of
violence once the plan has been set in motion. The riots, it is urged, were the
logical culmination of the earlier phases of mobilisation and disruption in which
the appellant played a central role.
132. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the statutory threshold under
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is clearly satisfied. When the prosecution material
is taken at face value, as mandated at the bail stage, it discloses acts intended to
threaten the unity, integrity and security of the nation by paralysing the National
Capital through orchestrated disruption and violence. The High Court’s finding
that the appellant’s role is grave and foundational cannot be characterised as
speculative or perverse at this stage.
41
133. It was further submitted that the plea of parity is misconceived. The High
Court has distinguished the appellant’s role from that of other accused who have
been granted bail, noting that the appellant stands apart as a planner, mobiliser
and ideological driver whose actions pre-date and shape the later stages of the
conspiracy. Parity cannot be invoked mechanically to neutralise a qualitatively
distinct and graver role.
134. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju finally submitted that the prosecution material,
taken cumulatively, satisfies the “prima facie true” test under Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA, and that this is not a fit case for grant of bail. The State accordingly
prays that the appeal be dismissed.
6.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
135. The Trial Court vide order dated 11.04.2022, passed in IA. No. 81/2021 in
SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by the Appellant. The Court held
that the material on record disclosed prima facie involvement of the appellant in
a deep-rooted and well-orchestrated criminal conspiracy relating to the North-
East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a cumulative reading of the charge-sheet,
witness statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., WhatsApp chats of
coordinated groups, and other documentary and electronic evidence, the Court
found that the protests were not spontaneous but were deliberately planned,
escalated into chakka-jam, and thereafter converted into targeted violence,
including attacks on police and destruction of public and private property. At the
stage of bail, the Court emphasized that it was sufficient if the prosecution
material, taken at face value, disclosed the appellant’s complicity in the
conspiracy, without a detailed appreciation of evidence.
136. A decisive ground for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Applying the
principles laid down in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), the Trial
Court held that once there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the
42
accusations are prima facie true, bail must be refused. The Court recorded that
the prosecution material satisfied this threshold, showing the appellant’s role in
initiating, shaping, and sustaining the conspiracy, and therefore the bar under
Section 43D(5) squarely applied. This embargo, read with the seriousness of the
offences alleged, disentitled the appellant to the discretionary relief of bail.
137. The Trial Court also rejected the defence submissions that the appellant’s
acts were protected speech or mere calls for peaceful protest. It held that speech,
meetings, and mobilization efforts cannot be examined in isolation, and must be
assessed in the context of the entire chain of events and the object of the
conspiracy. The prosecution case, at this stage, showed that calls for chakka-jam
were not benign but were strategically designed to create confrontation, paralyse
civic life, provoke law-and-order breakdown, and culminate in communal
violence, thereby attracting offences under UAPA and the IPC. Issues relating to
intent, interpretation of speeches, admissibility of evidence, and alleged
exaggeration were held to be matters for trial, not bail.
138. Lastly, the Trial Court noted that the gravity of the offences, the manner of
execution of the conspiracy, the scale of violence, and the societal impact weighed
heavily against the grant of bail. It reiterated that at the bail stage, the Trial Court
is not required to test the prosecution case for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
only to see whether a prima facie case exists. Finding that the accusations against
the appellant were supported by substantial material and that the statutory
restrictions under UAPA were attracted, the Court concluded that the appellant
was not entitled to bail, and accordingly dismissed the bail application.
6.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
139. The High Court in the impugned order held that the material on record
prima facie showed Sharjeel Imam as one of the principal ideologues and early
architects of the conspiracy, who allegedly set the process of mobilisation in
motion immediately after the CAB/CAA developments. It was noted that he was
43
attributed the role of creating and administering WhatsApp groups, printing and
circulating large numbers of pamphlets with communal overtones, and delivering
speeches across multiple locations calling for disruptive chakka-jaams and
paralysing essential services. The High Court found that these acts, when read
together with subsequent events, demonstrated planning, preparation, and
incitement, and that conspiracy liability does not depend on physical presence at
riot sites once foundational planning and instigation are prima facie established.
140. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the High Court Court held that the
accusations against Sharjeel Imam crossed the threshold of prima facie truth,
thereby statutorily barring bail. The argument that his conduct amounted at best
to an offence under Section 13 UAPA, or that his speeches were protected
expression, was rejected at the bail stage. The High Court further held that his
judicial custody prior to the actual riots did not dilute his alleged role, since the
prosecution case was that the conspiracy had already been conceptualised and
operationalised by then. Pleas of parity, delay in trial, and evidentiary weaknesses
were found insufficient to override the statutory embargo, resulting in dismissal
of his bail appeal.
6.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
141. On 04.12.2019, immediately after the Cabinet Committee accorded
approval to the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019 (for short, “CAB”), a
WhatsApp group by the name Muslim Students of JNU (MSJ) was created. The
charge-sheet discloses that the formation of the said group was the “brainchild”
of accused Sharjeel Imam. It is further alleged that, in his chats with Arshad
Warsi, a student of Jamia Millia Islamia University (JMI), Sharjeel Imam
indicated that he was in contact with a radical communal group known as
Students of Jamia (SOJ). According to the charge-sheet, the said group was
engaged in distributing pamphlets in various mosques in Delhi against the verdict
44
of this Court in the Babri Masjid matter, which pamphlets were allegedly aimed
at mobilising students of Jamia Millia Islamia University to participate in a
protest proposed to be held on 06.12.2019 at 4:30 p.m. at the Polytechnic Lawn,
JMI, against the introduction of the CAB.
142. The charge-sheet further reveals that on 06.12.2019, pamphlets were
distributed in the areas of Jama Masjid and Nizamuddin by Sharjeel Imam along
with members of SOJ, which, according to the prosecution, allegedly contained
content capable of creating fear and insecurity among the Muslim community.
The pamphlets also carried a call to join a protest organised by United Against
Hate (UAH) on 07.12.2019 at Jantar Mantar. Chats exchanged between Sharjeel
Imam and Arshad Warsi allegedly indicate Sharjeel Imam’s intention to
participate in the Jantar Mantar protest and his plan to mobilise students from
Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Delhi University (DU) with the
assistance of MSJ. The chats of the “Core Members of MSJ” further reveal that
on 08.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam was invited to a meeting organised by Yogendra
Yadav at the basement of premises bearing No. 6/6, Jangpura Extension, Delhi.
The said meeting was allegedly convened with the objective of conspiring to
incite a “Chakka Jam”, and Umar Khalid is stated to have attended the said
meeting. The charge-sheet further states that on 10.12.2019, upon the CAB being
passed by the Lok Sabha and becoming law, members of MSJ burnt a copy of the
Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) within the JNU campus. Another WhatsApp
group titled “CAB TEAM” was formed on 08.12.2019, and chats exchanged
therein allegedly disclose a conspiracy to organise protests on 10.12.2019 at
Jantar Mantar against the CAA. The said protest allegedly drew significant
attention and was attended by several students, including Umar Khalid. On
10.12.2019, Nadeem Khan (one of the top conspirators and a close associate of
Umar Khalid,who is also a mentor of Sharjeel Imam) directed Sharjeel Imam to
visit Aligarh Muslim University to mobilize the students for the protest.
45
143. On 10.12.2019, Nadeem Khan, stated to be a close associate of Umar
Khalid and a mentor to Sharjeel Imam, allegedly directed Sharjeel Imam to visit
Aligarh Muslim University for mobilising students for the protests. On
11.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam allegedly reached Aligarh. As per the charge-sheet, on
12.12.2019, in furtherance of the alleged common conspiracy, Asif Iqbal Tanha,
an accused in the case and a prominent member of the Student Islamic
Organisation of India (SIO), issued a call for a protest march to Parliament from
JMI against the CAA, scheduled for 13.12.2019. Pursuant thereto, a new
WhatsApp group titled Muslim Students of JNU_1 was created at the behest of
Sharjeel Imam. It is alleged that on 13.12.2019, members of MSJ were directed
by Sharjeel Imam to reach Jamia Millia Islamia University, following which
protests took place at the said campus. Call Detail Record (CDR) analysis is stated
to reveal Sharjeel Imam’s presence at Jamia Millia Islamia University on the said
date.
144. On 13.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam is alleged to have distributed pamphlets and
delivered a provocative speech. The charge-sheet reproduces certain portions of
the speech, which, according to the prosecution, instigated the gathering, and
reads as follows:
“हमारी ख्वाहहश और हमारी आरजू यह है की दिल्ली में
चक्का जाम हो ““यह तो आज हुआ है, यह हचिंगारी थीइसमें
4000 लोग-3000 लोग थे | अगर organised way में हो,
और लोग आह िं गे”
“(देश की राजधानी है) जो लोग गुमराह कर रहे हैं, अरे ये
दिल्ली है भाई| ये flyover हगर जरा, पूरी दुहनया को खबर
होगी | समझ रहे हैं ना ?”
“यह हचिंगारी कहा जा गी ?आग कै से लगेगी ?”
“ लेहकन goal क्या है ?हमें चक्का जाम करना चाहते हैं
| हहल्ली के मोहल्लो में दूध बंि करना चाहते हैं, पानी बंि
करना चाहते हैं | खुलकर बोहल यार (हबलकु ल)|”
46
145. The charge-sheet further alleges that riots occurred on 13.12.2019 at Jamia
Gate No. 7, during which civilians and approximately 20 police personnel
sustained injuries, public and private property was damaged, and essential
services were disrupted. FIR No. 296/2019 was registered in respect of the said
incident. In relation to the speech delivered at Jamia Millia Islamia University,
FIR No. 22/2020 was also registered against Sharjeel Imam at Police Station
Crime Branch.
146. It is further alleged that on 15.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam convened a meeting
of the MSJ Core Committee at Teflas, a dhaba located within the JNU campus,
where further plans of action were discussed. The charge-sheet alleges that
Sharjeel Imam sought to involve organisations such as the Popular Front of India
(PFI), Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), SIO, and other groups in furtherance of the
conspiracy. On the same date, violent protests allegedly took place in Jamia Nagar
and New Friends Colony, resulting in injuries to 45 police personnel and 95
civilians. Two police booths were allegedly burnt, three police motorcycles and
one QRT Gypsy were damaged, and three DTC buses along with eight private
buses were also damaged. CDR analysis is stated to show the presence of Sharjeel
Imam at the site of the protests. FIR No. 242/2019 was registered at Police Station
New Friends Colony and FIR No. 298/2019 at Police Station Jamia in relation
thereto. The charge-sheet further alleges that Sharjeel Imam, along with members
of SOJ, facilitated the establishment of a 24x7 protest site at Shaheen Bagh,
allegedly at his behest, despite opposition from local residents. This is stated to
mark the conclusion of the first phase of the alleged conspiracy.
147. The second phase of the alleged conspiracy is stated to have commenced
on 02.01.2020, when Sharjeel Imam allegedly posted content on his Facebook
page advocating a “Chakka Jam”. On 09.01.2020, he is alleged to have conspired
with Afreen Fatima to organise a meeting at Teflas, JNU, on 10.01.2020, aimed
at mobilising crowds from JNU, Jamia, Old Delhi, and Seelampur to establish
protest sites similar to Shaheen Bagh. The stated objectives of these protest sites
47
were allegedly to enforce chakka jams and engineer riots. On 13.01.2020,
Nadeem Khan is alleged to have sent Saiful Islam and Asif Iqbal Tanha to meet
Sharjeel Imam at Jamia Millia Islamia University. CDR analysis is stated to
confirm Sharjeel Imam’s presence at JMI at the relevant time. It is further alleged
that Sharjeel Imam facilitated Nadeem Khan in raising and securing the Khureji
protest site.
148. On 16.01.2020, Sharjeel Imam is alleged to have delivered another
provocative speech, portions of which have been extracted in the charge-sheet,
wherein he purportedly referred to blocking access to the North-East and
advocated organised action through chakka jams.
“ये मैं पहले भी शायद अजज कर चूका हूँ के 5 लाख लोग हमारे
पास हो organised तो हम हहिंदुस्तान और नॉथज ईस्ट को
permanently cut कर सकते हैं,”
“असम को काटना हमारी हजम्मेदारी है असम और
इिंहिया काट कर अलग हो जायें, तभी ये हमारी बात सुनेंगे”
अगर हमें असम की मदद करनी है, तो हमें असम का
रास्ता बिंद करना होगा, फ़ौज के हल , समझ रहे हैं ? फ़ौज
के हल और जीतने भी जो भी यहा से सप्लाई जा रहा है
बिंद करो और वो बिंद कर सकते है क्योहहिंक chicken neck
मुसलमानो का है, वो जो इलाका है वो मुस्लिम अकसररयत है”
149. The charge-sheet further alleges that Sharjeel Imam delivered similar
speeches at Asonal and Chakand on 22.01.2020 and 23.01.2020, respectively,
wherein he is stated to have provoked sections of the Muslim population by
inciting them to participate in disruptive chakka jams.
150. According to the prosecution, these speeches, taken cumulatively, led to
the establishment of the Shaheen Bagh protest site, which is alleged to be the first
successful model of a “Chakka Jam”. Thereafter, several such protest sites were
allegedly created in parts of North-East Delhi. In furtherance of the alleged
48
conspiracy, riots are stated to have occurred in North-East Delhi in the last week
of February 2020. The charge-sheet thus attributes responsibility to Sharjeel
Imam, Umar Khalid, and their associates for the protests and consequential riots
that occurred on 23rd, 24th, and 25th February 2020, resulting in loss of life and
damage to public property.
151. The Court is conscious that the present appeal is argued at length on the
theme that the appellant is sought to be prosecuted for speeches and protest
mobilisation, and that continued incarceration, in the teeth of delay and the scale
of the trial, would be oppressive. At the same time, the Court cannot lose sight of
the limits of the bail stage enquiry under a special statute. The task is neither to
decide guilt nor to pronounce upon the correctness of competing interpretations
of evidence. The enquiry is confined to determining whether, on the prosecution
material as it stands and taken at face value, there exist reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true, thereby
attracting the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
152. The appellant has urged, broadly, that he was not in Delhi after the second
week of January 2020, that he was already in custody from 28.01.2020 in another
case, that he was not present at the sites of the February 2020 riots, that no
weapons were recovered from him, that he did not participate in meetings where
violence was planned, and that the prosecution against him is substantially
founded on speeches, pamphlets and a WhatsApp group which, according to him,
are already the subject matter of a separate FIR wherein bail has been granted
with observations that the speeches do not contain a call for violence. These
submissions are supplemented by a plea of parity with several co-accused who
have been enlarged on bail.
153. The State, on the other hand, has consistently urged that the appellant is
not being prosecuted for dissent or protest as such, but for a distinct and
foundational role in what is alleged as a calibrated conspiracy, which commenced
49
in the first week of December 2019 and progressed through identifiable phases.
The prosecution theory, at least at this stage, does not treat the riots of February
2020 as a sudden eruption. It treats them as the culmination of earlier phases of
mobilisation, blockade and disruption, in which the appellant is alleged to have
acted as an organiser and ideational driver.
154. In considering these rival positions, the Court must keep in view two
controlling principles already delineated earlier in the judgment. First, the
prosecution material must be read cumulatively, in its total setting, and not in
isolated fragments. Second, the Court does not, at this stage, reject prosecution
material by adopting defence explanations or by testing reliability, admissibility
or credibility as though conducting a trial. Those aspects remain within the
province of final adjudication.
155. The role attributed to the appellant in the charge-sheet narrative is not
episodic. The prosecution seeks to place him at the inception of a mobilisation
strategy and traces a continuing course of conduct from early December 2019
through January 2020. The charge-sheet refers, inter alia, to the creation of the
WhatsApp group “Muslim Students of JNU” and its “core members”, to
mobilisation through pamphlets distributed in specific localities, to participation
in meetings, to the delivery of speeches at multiple places, and to efforts aimed
at establishing or sustaining blockade style protest sites.
156. The High Court’s individual role note also proceeds on the basis that the
appellant engineered the first phase of events from 13.12.2019 to 20.12.2019, and
relies upon contemporaneous electronic records in WhatsApp groups and chats
as part of the material pointing towards planning and mobilisation. The same note
refers to chats dated 07.12.2019 suggesting planning for mass mobilisation and
links that planning to the commencement of the first phase of events on
13.12.2019.
157. At this stage, the Court is not called upon to finally pronounce on the
evidentiary worth of each digital artefact. Yet, where the prosecution places
50
reliance on contemporaneous electronic communications to attribute a
coordination and mobilisation role, the Court cannot treat such material as
irrelevant merely because the defence disputes its ultimate probative value.
158. The appellant has attempted to frame the allegation as one resting solely
on speech. The record, at least as placed by the prosecution, does not permit such
reduction. The prosecution case is of a chain comprising: (i) creation and
administration of mobilisation platforms; (ii) dissemination of written material
intended to galvanise participation; (iii) meetings and coordination; and (iv)
public exhortations articulating a strategy of disruption. At the bail stage, the
Court is concerned with whether this chain, taken at face value, is coherent and
whether it reflects a real nexus to the offences alleged.
159. A significant part of the material relied upon relates to 13.12.2019 at Jamia
Millia Islamia. The High Court records that the presence of the appellant in Jamia
Millia Islamia is reflected by CDR location of his mobile number. It further
records that the appellant organised a “chakka jam” and that this chakka jam was
differentiated from a “dharna”, as reflected in the statement of a protected
witness.
160. The statement of the protected witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as
reproduced in the High Court note, attributes to Umar Khalid the act of explaining
the difference between “chakka jam” and “dharna”, and issuing directions to the
appellant to start “chakka jam” at Shaheen Bagh on a 24x7 basis, with an
expressed intent to commence similar activity in other areas at the “right time”.
This material, if accepted at face value as the bail stage requires, supports the
prosecution’s contention that the conduct alleged is not ordinary protest, but a
planned and differentiated method of blockade and disruption.
161. The same note records, with reference to the main charge-sheet pages, that
the appellant’s speech of 13.12.2019 targeted Delhi as the capital, used the
illustration of a flyover collapse drawing worldwide attention, and exhorted Jamia
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and JNU students to execute disruptive chakka jam to such an extent that essential
services like milk and water would be paralysed or choked.
162. The defence has urged that the speech contains no direct incitement to
violence and is protected. That contention cannot be adjudicated in the manner
the defence invites at this stage. The statutory enquiry is not whether the Court,
after a full trial, would accept the prosecution’s interpretation. The enquiry is
whether the prosecution’s reading is prima facie plausible on the face of the
material and whether, read cumulatively with the other links, it contributes to a
coherent narrative of planned disruption.
163. The Court is also mindful of the appellant’s reliance on the assertion that
he opposed violence. Such an assertion does not, at the bail stage, neutralise an
allegation of conspiracy and preparatory orchestration. A conspirator may
outwardly couch the conduct in the language of non-violence while engaging in
acts intended to create conditions of confrontation and escalation. The
prosecution case is that sustained blockade, choking of essential supplies, and
deliberate paralysis of civic life are not benign political acts but steps in a planned
trajectory, which then culminated in violence.
164. The appellant’s absence from Delhi after the second week of January 2020
and his custody from 28.01.2020 are not ignored. However, these facts do not
conclude the matter in a prosecution founded on conspiracy and preparatory roles.
The prosecution case, as analysed by the courts below, is that the appellant’s role
is foundational, operating at the stage of mobilisation, organisation and strategy,
and that physical presence at the scene of the final violence is not a condition
precedent for attributing conspiracy liability.
165. At the present stage, therefore, the absence argument cannot be treated as
exculpatory. It is a matter to be tested at trial in the light of complete evidence.
The bail stage enquiry cannot be converted into a determination that once the
appellant is not physically present during the February riots, his earlier attributed
role becomes legally irrelevant.
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166. The appellant has urged that the case against him is built entirely on speech,
pamphlets and protest related activity. The Court does not accept that
characterisation as complete. The prosecution material, as presently placed,
alleges a combination of organisational acts, coordination through digital groups,
meetings and differentiated strategy of chakka jam and blockade.
167. Further, even within the speech related material, the prosecution emphasis
is not on ideological disagreement with the State or on political criticism. The
emphasis is on a proposed method of paralysing civic life and choking essential
supplies, articulated as a deliberate strategy and linked to a wider mobilisation
narrative. Whether this ultimately crosses the final line from protected expression
to criminal conduct, and whether the prosecution’s interpretation withstands trial
scrutiny, are matters for final adjudication. They cannot be conclusively decided
at the bail stage without trespassing into forbidden terrain.
168. It is necessary to record expressly that issues such as: (i) admissibility of
electronic material; (ii) compliance with procedural requirements; (iii) reliability
of witness statements; (iv) interpretative nuances of speeches; and (v) whether
any part of the prosecution case is overstated, are all matters to be addressed at
trial. At the stage of Section 43D(5), the Court proceeds on the material as it
stands.
169. When the structured inquiry delineated earlier in the judgment is applied
to the appellant, the following features assume significance. First, the prosecution
material, taken at face value, does not depict the appellant as an accidental or
peripheral participant. It depicts him as a coordinator and mobiliser at the
inception and in the first phase. Second, there is specific material placing him at
Jamia on 13.12.2019 through CDR location. Third, there is a protected witness
statement relied upon by the prosecution, attributing directions to the appellant to
commence a differentiated chakka jam at Shaheen Bagh on a 24x7 basis, with a
plan to expand to other areas at the right time. Fo urth, the prosecution relies on
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the appellant’s speech exhorting disruptive chakka jam and choking of essential
services.
170. Taken cumulatively, these elements reflect a role attribution which is not
of mere association, presence, or protest participation. The allegation is of
deliberate mobilisation, planned blockade strategy, and intentional disruption of
civic life. On the prosecution’s case, such conduct is relied upon as having a direct
nexus to the unlawful activity alleged under the Act, whether as preparatory acts,
facilitation, or conspiracy.
171. Once the prosecution material, taken as it stands, crosses that threshold, the
statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) operates with full force. The Court
cannot then enlarge the appellant on bail by proceeding as though the statutory
restraint were a matter of discretionary balancing. The statutory design, as already
noted earlier in the judgment, requires the Court to refuse bail where there exist
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true.
172. The plea of parity, though pressed with emphasis, cannot override the
statutory conclusion. Parity is not applied by numerical comparison. It is applied
by similarity of role, similarity of attribution, and similarity of the material relied
upon. The courts below have treated the appellant’s role as qualitatively distinct,
and the material noticed above indicates why the prosecution alleges a
foundational role at the early stage. In such circumstances, parity cannot be
invoked mechanically to dilute the statutory embargo.
173. The plea of delay has already been addressed at a general level in the earlier
portion of the judgment. In the appellant’s case, the Court remains mindful of the
scale of the trial. Yet, once the prima facie threshold is crossed, the appropriate
judicial response is to ensure prioritisation and expedition, not to grant bail in
disregard of the statutory mandate. The remedy for stagnation lies in calibrated
judicial supervision and directions for expeditious progress, not enlargement on
bail where the embargo is attracted.
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174. The Court accordingly finds that the prosecution material, read
cumulatively and taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true. The material relied
upon is not confined to abstract ideology. It comprises digital coordination,
attribution of planning and mobilisation, presence supported by location records,
a protected witness statement describing differentiated chakka jam strategy, and
speech material exhorting disruption and choking of essential services.
175. In view of this prima facie satisfaction, the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 stands
attracted. The Court is therefore left with no lawful option but to decline the
prayer for bail.
176. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal preferred by Sharjeel Imam arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 is dismissed. The prayer for bail is rejected.
177. It is clarified that the observations herein are confined to the present stage
of consideration under Section 43D(5) of the Act and shall not be construed as an
expression on the merits at trial. The Trial Court shall accord due priority to the
matter and ensure that the proceedings are carried forward with reasonable
expedition.
7. UMAR KHALID – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14165 OF 2025:
7.1. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
178. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Kapil Sibal, appearing on behalf of the
appellant, Umar Khalid, submitted that the prosecution record does not attribute
any overt act of violence to the appellant in relation to the incidents that occurred
in North-East Delhi between 22.02.2020 and 25.02.2020. It was pointed out that,
as borne out from the charge-sheet itself, the appellant was not present in North-
East Delhi during the period when violence ensued and, on certain crucial dates,
was not even in Delhi. No witness statement places the appellant at the site of any
55
rioting, arson, assault, or destruction of public or private property during the
relevant period, nor is any FIR relied upon to attribute such acts to him.
179. It was further submitted that no recoveries whatsoever have been effected
from the appellant or at his instance. The record does not disclose recovery of any
weapons, arms, ammunition, explosives, inflammable substances, funds, or other
incriminating articles. No physical, forensic, or electronic evidence connects the
appellant with any violent act. Despite registration of a large number of FIRs in
connection with the riots, the prosecution has not relied upon any recovery or
witness statement from those FIRs to link the appellant with actual violence.
Apart from the present FIR, the appellant was arraigned in only one other FIR
arising from the same period, in which he was granted bail and subsequently
discharged.
180. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution alleges criminal
conspiracy primarily on the basis of the appellant’s alleged participation in
meetings and protests and his alleged association with certain WhatsApp groups.
It was pointed out that the appellant neither created nor administered the
WhatsApp groups relied upon by the prosecution and was not a member of some
of the principal groups alleged to have been used for coordination. The record
indicates that the appellant did not send any message calling for violence, arson,
or unlawful acts. The messages attributed to him are confined to sharing location
pins of protest sites on dates when no violence occurred and to communications
relating to a call received from a police official. No material on record
demonstrates that any decision to commit violence was taken, conveyed, or
implemented at the instance of the appellant through such groups.
181. It was further submitted that the prosecution relies upon the alleged
presence of the appellant at various meetings and protests held between
December 2019 and February 2020. For several such meetings, no supporting
witness is cited; for others, the statements relied upon are hearsay in nature or
contradicted by the appellant’s call detail records. Photographs relied upon by the
56
prosecution show the presence of several persons who have not been arraigned as
accused. The record does not disclose any material to show that these meetings
involved planning, preparation, or execution of violence or that the appellant
exercised any command, control, or direction over participants.
182. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the only overt act specifically
attributed to the appellant is a public speech delivered by him at Amravati on
17.02.2020. The transcript of the speech, as placed on record, contains repeated
references to non-violence, civil disobedience, non-cooperation, constitutional
methods of protest, and Gandhian principles. The speech does not exhort
violence, destruction of property, or unlawful action. The prosecution record does
not disclose any material establishing a proximate or causal nexus between the
said speech and the incidents of violence that occurred in Delhi several days later.
183. It was lastly submitted that, on facts, the prosecution seeks to invoke
Sections 15, 16 and 18 of the UAPA by treating the appellant’s speech, meeting
participation, and protest activity as constituting a “terrorist act”, without alleging
use of bombs, explosives, firearms, hazardous substances, or any other lethal
means enumerated in Section 15. The record reflects that the prosecution relies
solely on the residual expression “by any other means of whatever nature” to
bring the appellant’s acts within the definition of a terrorist act. No factual
material is placed on record to show that the appellant caused, attempted to cause,
or intended to cause death, injuries, destruction of property, or disruption of
essential services by any violent or hazardous means. Apart from speech,
association, and alleged presence, no factual act is attributed to the appellant to
demonstrate commission of offences under Chapter IV of the UAPA.
7.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
184. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing for the respondent submitted that
the prosecution case, read as a whole, discloses the active and central role of the
appellant, Umar Khalid, in a larger criminal conspiracy which culminated in
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widespread violence, disruption of essential services, and communal riots in
North-East Delhi. It was contended that the case against the appellant does not
rest on isolated incidents or stray speeches, but on a continuous and coordinated
course of conduct beginning from December 2019, involving meetings,
organisational planning, mobilisation, and execution of a strategy of “chakka
jam” distinct from peaceful protest, with the deliberate object of escalating
tensions and paralysing the city.
185. It was submitted that the appellant was not a peripheral participant but an
ideologue and organiser who conceptualised and propagated the strategy of
“chakka jam”, differentiating it from a conventional dharna. Reliance was placed
on statements of protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,
electronic records, photographs, and call detail records, which prima facie show
that the appellant directed and guided co-accused persons including Sharjeel
Imam, Asif Iqbal Tanha and Saiful Islam. The State submitted that meetings held
at Jangpura, Jamia, Shaheen Bagh, Indian Social Institute, Gandhi Peace
Foundation and Seelampur demonstrate sustained involvement of the appellant
in planning and coordination, including the creation of protest committees,
WhatsApp groups, and mobilisation teams operating across multiple locations in
Delhi.
186. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant’s role
extended beyond ideological advocacy to operational coordination. The
prosecution relies upon evidence indicating that protest sites were deliberately
expanded, made permanent on a 24x7 basis, and strategically located at arterial
roads and sensitive areas. It was contended that WhatsApp groups such as DPSG,
JCC, and Jamia Awareness Campaign Team were used to disseminate
instructions, coordinate sites, and ensure uniform execution of decisions taken at
higher levels. The appellant, it was submitted, was a member of, and exercised
influence over, these groups, with witnesses stating that decisions were taken at
his instance and subsequently ratified by ground-level organisers.
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187. The State submitted that the appellant’s presence at Jamia on 13.12.2019
and 15.12.2019 coincided with incidents of violence resulting in injuries to police
personnel and civilians and damage to public and private property. Call detail
records were relied upon to establish his presence in the area at relevant times. It
was contended that witness statements attribute to the appellant directions to
initiate chakka jam at Jamia Gate No. 7 and Shaheen Bagh, and to expand such
activity to other Muslim-dominated areas. The prosecution further relies upon
meetings at Shaheen Bagh and Seelampur where, according to protected
witnesses, instructions were issued to mobilise women, stockpile materials such
as stones, bottles, acids and chilli powder, and prepare for escalation at an
opportune moment.
188. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant’s speech delivered
at Amravati on 17.02.2020 forms part of this larger factual matrix. The State
contended that the speech cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be read in
conjunction with prior meetings, subsequent coordination, and the timing of
events. It was urged that the speech, delivered without requisite permission, called
for nationwide disruption, invocation of civil disobedience, and collective
defiance, which, when coupled with the contemporaneous conspiracy and
subsequent violence, prima facie establishes intentional incitement and
preparation. The State submitted that the speech reinforced the operational
strategy already put in motion.
189. It was further submitted that the offences invoked under Sections 15, 16
and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are attracted not merely by
use of weapons or explosives, but also by acts intended to threaten the unity,
integrity, security and economic stability of the nation, including by disruption of
essential services and creation of widespread fear. The prosecution contended that
the deliberate blocking of roads, mobilisation at sensitive sites, coordination
across districts, and incitement to escalate protests into violent confrontation
constitute, at the prima facie stage, acts falling within the expansive definition of
59
a terrorist act under Section 15, particularly when read with the expression “by
any other means of whatever nature”.
190. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju lastly submitted that the appellant’s role cannot
be assessed in isolation from the collective conduct of the conspiracy. It was urged
that absence of direct recovery or individual acts of violence is not determinative
at this stage, as conspiracy by its very nature operates through division of roles.
The State contended that the prosecution material, when taken cumulatively and
at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
against the appellant are prima facie true, and that the statutory bar under Section
43D(5) stands attracted.
7.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
191. The Trial Court vide order dated 28.05.2024, rejected the second bail
application (IA No. Bail Application Registration No. 441/2024 in SC No.
163/2020) filed by the appellant primarily on the ground that no genuine change
in circumstances had been shown since the rejection of the first bail application
vide order dated: 24.03.2022, I.A. No. 92/2021 in SC No. 163/2020. Although
the appellant asserted change in circumstances, the Court noted that none were
specifically pleaded or substantiated. Withdrawal of the SLP before the Supreme
Court on the ground of “change in circumstances” did not, by itself, create a fresh
cause for reconsideration of bail, especially when earlier findings had attained
finality.
192. The plea of delay in trial and prolonged incarceration was also rejected.
The Court found that there was no delay attributable to the prosecution rather,
proceedings were held up due to objections and applications moved by the
accused persons themselves. Relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, the
Court held that in cases under the UAPA, delay alone cannot justify grant of bail
considering the gravity of the offences and the restrictive statutory framework.
60
193. The Court further held that reliance on Vernon v. State of Maharashtra
did not advance the appellant’s case. It observed that the judgment did not dilute
the embargo under Section 43D(5) UAPA and that the Delhi High Court, while
dismissing the earlier appeal, had already carried out the required “surface
analysis” of the probative value of evidence and concluded that the accusations
against the appellant were prima facie true. Subsequent Supreme Court judgments
had reaffirmed the law laid down in Watali and Gurvinder Singh.
194. Finally, the Court held that it was bound by the concurrent findings of the
Trial Court and the Delhi High Court rejecting bail, which had attained finality
after withdrawal of proceedings before the Supreme Court. The plea of parity
with co-accused was rejected, as the appellant’s role had already been
independently examined and distinguished. In view of the statutory bar under
Section 43D(5) UAPA and the prima facie findings on record, the Court found no
merit in the application and dismissed it.
7.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
195. The Court held that the prosecution material, taken cumulatively, disclosed
prima facie involvement of Umar Khalid as a key conspirator and mobiliser in
the larger conspiracy that culminated in the February 2020 Delhi riots. It was
noted that he allegedly played a central role in conceptualising and directing mass
mobilisation against the CAA/NRC through coordinated meetings, formation and
control of multiple WhatsApp groups (including JCC and DPSG), and delivery
of speeches at various locations. The Court found that the prosecution narrative
attributed to him a leadership role in escalating protests into disruptive chakka-
jaams and, thereafter, into violence, including alleged directions to intensify
agitation during strategically sensitive periods. At the bail stage, the Court
emphasised that conspiracy must be assessed holistically and not by isolating
individual acts or speeches.
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196. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the
Court held that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
against Umar Khalid were prima facie true, thereby barring the grant of bail. The
pleas of protected speech, absence from riot sites, lack of recoveries, parity with
co-accused, change in circumstances, and prolonged incarceration were rejected.
The Court clarified that the bail orders granted to other co-accused were expressly
directed by the Supreme Court not to operate as precedents and that Umar
Khalid’s alleged role was qualitatively graver. Issues relating to credibility of
witnesses, admissibility of evidence, and interpretation of speeches were held to
be matters for trial, leading to dismissal of the bail appeal.
7.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
197. Umar Khalid is described in the FIR as the principal conspirator behind the
larger conspiracy which, according to the prosecution, culminated in the riots
during the last week of February 2020. The charge-sheet alleges that Umar Khalid
progressed from being a propagator of the slogan “Bharat Tere Tukde Honge,
Insha Allah Insha Allah” to playing a central role in the formulation and execution
of the present criminal conspiracy, which is alleged to constitute a terrorist act.
The first overt act attributed to Umar Khalid, as per the charge-sheet, is stated to
have occurred on 05.12.2019, when, acting on his directions, Sharjeel Imam
created the WhatsApp group Muslim Students of JNU (MSJ). It is further alleged
that Umar Khalid participated in the protest held on 07.12.2019 at Jantar Mantar,
where he, along with Yogendra Yadav and Sharjeel Imam, purportedly agreed to
utilise social media as a platform for large-scale indoctrination and mobilisation
of youth for the purpose of enforcing a “Chakka Jam” as a mode of protest against
the Citizenship Amendment Act.
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198. On 08.12.2019, Umar Khalid is alleged to have attended a meeting held at
premises bearing No. 6/6, Jangpura Extension, Delhi. The said meeting, which
was led by Yogendra Yadav, is stated in the charge-sheet to have resulted in a
decision to further the alleged conspiracy of enforcing “Chakka Jams” with the
objective of engineering riots. The charge-sheet is stated to contain a photograph
of the meeting attended by Umar Khalid on 08.12.2019 at the aforesaid premises.
After the conclusion of the meeting, a WhatsApp group titled “CAB Team” was
allegedly created for the purpose of organising anti-CAA protests and for mass
mobilisation of the Muslim community. In furtherance of the discussions held in
the said group, a protest is stated to have taken place on 10.12.2019 at Jantar
Mantar, Delhi, which was also attended by Umar Khalid.
199. On 13.12.2019, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, Sharjeel Imam is
stated to have been introduced by Umar Khalid to students of Jamia Millia Islamia
University. It is further alleged that Umar Khalid stated that he had explained to
Sharjeel Imam the distinction between a dharna and a chakka jam, and that, at the
relevant point of time, they were planning to enforce chakka jams across Delhi
with the stated objective of overthrowing the Government, which, according to
the prosecution, was described by them as a “Hindu Government” acting against
the Muslim community. Umar Khalid is further alleged to have directed Sharjeel
Imam, Saif-ul-Islam, and Asif Iqbal Tanha to initiate a chakka jam at Gate No. 7
of Jamia Millia Islamia University and to have instructed Sharjeel Imam to
commence a chakka jam at Shaheen Bagh.
200. On 15.12.2019, Umar Khalid is alleged to have visited Jamia Millia Islamia
University in furtherance of the common conspiracy. At Jamia, he is stated to
have instigated a gathering of local students, which allegedly culminated in
rioting. Thereafter, Sharjeel Imam, acting on the directions of Umar Khalid, is
alleged to have moved to Shaheen Bagh and blocked Road No. 13 at Shaheen
Bagh. On 16.12.2019, Umar Khalid is further alleged to have directed Asif Iqbal
Tanha and Saif-ul-Islam to constitute a student body for organising anti-
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CAA/NRC protests at Jamia in a planned and organised manner. On 17.12.2019,
in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and on the directions of Umar Khalid,
students of Jamia Millia Islamia University, including other appellants herein,
namely Shifa-ur-Rehman and Meeran Haider, are stated to have gathered at Gate
No. 7 of the University. On further directions of Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan,
the Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC) is alleged to have been formed by Asif
Iqbal Tanha and Saiful Islam. The charge-sheet describes the JCC as the
brainchild of Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan, allegedly created to mobilise a
larger number of students for the protests. On 19.12.2019, a protest march
organised by “Hum Bharat Ke Log” (Swaraj Abhiyan and United Against Hate)
from the Red Fort to Shaheed Park, ITO, and a separate protest march organised
by Left parties at Mandi House, allegedly took place. Despite denial of
permission and imposition of prohibitory orders under Section 144 CrPC in the
area, Umar Khalid, Yogendra Yadav, and others are stated to have participated in
the protest march and were detained along with 293 other persons.
201. On 20.12.2019, Saif-ul-Islam and Asif Iqbal Tanha are alleged to have
constituted another committee, namely the Jamia Awareness Campaign Team
(JACT), on the directions of Umar Khalid, with the stated objective of
maximising mobilisation of the Muslim population in Muslim-dominated areas
of Delhi for establishing 24×7 protest sites aimed at enforcing “Chakka Jams”.
As per the statements of protected witnesses, Umar Khalid, along with Nadeem
Khan, is alleged to have directed one Amanullah to visit Muslim-dominated
localities and mobilise residents for the protests, while also encouraging greater
participation of women and children, with the purported intent that the presence
of women and children would deter the police from dismantling the protest sites.
It is further alleged that on 26.12.2019, a meeting was held at the Indian Social
Institute, Lodhi Colony, which was attended by Umar Khalid and others, in
continuation of the alleged conspiracy. Subsequently, on 28.12.2019, another
WhatsApp group titled Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG) was created for the
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purpose of disseminating decisions taken by its members among organisers of
various protest sites for execution of the alleged conspiracy. Umar Khalid is stated
to have been a member of the said group.
202. On 02.01.2020, a meeting was convened by the administrator of the DPSG,
namely Rahul Roy, at the Gandhi Peace Foundation, which was attended by Umar
Khalid. As per the charge-sheet, it was reiterated in the said meeting that more
protest sites, similar to Shaheen Bagh, be established, with women and children
placed at the forefront so as to avoid police action. On 08.01.2020, Khalid Saifi,
associated with DPSG and United Against Hate (UAH), is alleged to have
organised a meeting at the office of the Popular Front of India (PFI) at Shaheen
Bagh, which was attended by Umar Khalid and Tahir Hussain. The charge-sheet
relies upon chats dated 20.01.2020 and 21.01.2020 exchanged in the DPSG
group, which are stated to have led to the creation of three 24×7 sitting protest
sites, with Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan allegedly exercising control over the
said sites. On 23.01.2020 and 24.01.2020, in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy, Umar Khalid is stated to have visited the Seelampur protest site and
addressed the gathering assembled there. Thereafter, he is alleged to have held a
clandestine meeting with Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita, Tasleem, and
others, during which, according to the prosecution, Umar Khalid instigated local
women of Seelampur to stockpile knives, bottles, acid, stones, chilli powder, and
other dangerous articles with the intent to engineer riots. Statements of protected
witnesses have been relied upon in the charge-sheet in respect of the meeting
allegedly held on 23.01.2020.
203. The charge-sheet further alleges that Umar Khalid attended a meeting
organised by the Welfare Party of India (WPI) at Jantar Mantar, Delhi, on
10.02.2019. In the said meeting, Umar Khalid is alleged to have instructed
residents of Jahangirpuri to instigate illegal Bangladeshi residents of the area to
participate in the activities forming part of the alleged conspiracy.
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204. On 17.02.2020, Umar Khalid is alleged, as per the charge-sheet, to have
delivered a provocative speech at Amaravati, Maharashtra. It is stated that
although he was not among the persons permitted to address the gathering, he
nevertheless made a speech. In the said speech, he is alleged to have exhorted
people to take to the streets and to demonstrate, during the visit of the then
President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, what was portrayed as
the ill-treatment of minorities by the Government of India.
205. The charge-sheet further alleges that on 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020, acting
upon the speeches of Umar Khalid and in accordance with the directions issued
by him and other alleged executors of the conspiracy, protesters under the guise
of women-led 24×7 sit-in protests near Madina Masjid, Seelampur, moved and
occupied the 66 Foot Road near Jafrabad Metro Station, thereby completely
blocking traffic, constituting a “Chakka Jam”. Thereafter, in pursuance of and in
furtherance of the common conspiracy, on 23.02.2020, protesters from other
protest sites in North-East Delhi and other parts of the city are alleged to have
moved from their respective sites to pre-decided points on major roads and
blocked, or attempted to block, traffic entirely, thereby enforcing coordinated
chakka jams. The charge-sheet states that these blockade points were strategically
selected so as to effect a simultaneous and coordinated traffic paralysis across
large parts of the city. According to the prosecution, the intent behind these
blockades “was not to create traffic chaos but to ensure communal skirmish, as is
evident from the movement from predominantly minority clusters, where 24×7
sit-in dharnas were being held, to areas of mixed population for causing the
chakka jam.”
206. On 23.02.2020, it is alleged in the charge-sheet that protesters from various
sites moved in a coordinated manner to pre-designated locations to block traffic
across the city. In furtherance of the common conspiracy, and subsequent to the
enforcement of the chakka jams, the conspirators are alleged to have launched
attacks on police personnel and non-Muslims, and to have caused extensive
66
damage to government and private property through arson, vandalism, and other
violent acts, thereby engineering large-scale riots. The charge-sheet alleges that
firearms, petrol bombs, acid, sharp-edged weapons, iron rods, sticks, stones
hurled through pre-fabricated large-sized slingshots, and other means were
employed to attack and kill police personnel, government employees, and
members of the public. It is further alleged that a petrol pump was set ablaze in
an attempt to cause a large-scale explosion, which could have resulted in mass
casualties and created widespread terror. Access to essential services, including
hospitals, medical stores, the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), other public
transport systems, schools, colleges, and universities, is stated to have been
severely disrupted, leading to the postponement of board examinations and
deprivation of essential supplies to the general public.
207. The charge-sheet further states that on 24.02.2020, disillusioned by the
scale and magnitude of the violence unleashed by the key conspirators, certain
members of the DPSG WhatsApp group threatened to expose all those
responsible for the riots. According to the prosecution, several telephonic
conversations took place between Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan during this
period. Among these, reliance is placed on a call between Jahanvi Mittal and
Tabrez, wherein Jahanvi Mittal is alleged to have warned Tabrez who had
allegedly arranged the presence of approximately 300 women protesters to
maintain silence regarding the transportation of women from Jahangirpuri to
Seelampur–Jafrabad and their alleged participation in the riots on the previous
day. The cumulative effect of these communications, as per the charge-sheet, is
stated to indicate that the conspirators, having panicked due to the conduct of
certain members of their group, decided to adopt what is described as an “ultimate
guerrilla strategy” of attributing the violence and resultant carnage to law
enforcement agencies.
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208. The charge-sheet ultimately attributes the orchestration of the protests and
the resultant riots to Umar Khalid, describing him as the principal architect of the
events that unfolded.
209. The appellant presses, in substance, three propositions: first, that no overt
act of violence is attributed to him and no recoveries have been effected; second,
that his alleged presence in meetings, association with groups, and a speech at
Amravati cannot be transmuted into offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
UAPA; and third, that the prosecution case is an impermissible conflation of
protest with terrorism. These submissions are framed with care. Yet they must be
tested against the only inquiry open to this Court at this stage: whether the
prosecution material, taken as it stands and read cumulatively, furnishes
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant are
prima facie true, thereby attracting the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5).
210. Two foundational clarifications are necessary. One, the Court is not
assessing whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed; it is assessing whether
the prosecution case, as presented, crosses the statutory threshold at the bail stage.
Two, conspiracy cases, particularly those alleged to unfold in phases, do not
disclose themselves through a single piece of evidence; they are built through a
chain of circumstances, organisational decisions, communications, and role
allocation. The law does not demand that every conspirator execute the terminal
act; it demands a prima facie nexus between the accused and the unlawful design,
inferred from cumulative conduct.
211. The prosecution narrative, as pleaded, is not episodic. It is architectural. It
asserts a phased progression: mobilisation and indoctrination; institutionalisation
through committees and digital platforms; expansion of protest sites into
permanent blockades; preparation for escalation; and culmination in coordinated
chakka jams and widespread violence. The role attributed to Umar Khalid is not
of a late entrant nor of a peripheral sympathiser. It is that of an organiser and
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coordinator who, according to the prosecution, supplied the “method”, the
“timing”, and the “linkage” between dispersed sites and actors.
212. The factual record placed by the prosecution repeatedly returns to a
distinction that is central to the case: the differentiation between a conventional
dharna and a chakka jam. This is not treated as semantics. It is treated as strategy.
A dharna may be expressive; a chakka jam, as alleged, is disruptive by design.
The prosecution case is that the sustained choking of arterial roads, replication of
blockade sites, and the movement of crowds from minority clusters into mixed-
population areas were not accidental expressions of dissent, but calibrated acts
meant to generate confrontation, overwhelm law enforcement, and create
conditions for violence.
213. It is in this backdrop that the material regarding 13.12.2019 at Jamia is
relied upon. The prosecution relies upon a protected witness statement that the
appellant explained the distinction between dharna and chakka jam, projected
certain co-accused as his “team”, and issued directions for initiation of chakka
jam at Gate No. 7 of Jamia and at Shaheen Bagh, with an express reference to
expansion “at the right time”. At this stage, the Court does not test whether the
witness is truthful; it tests whether, if the statement is taken at face value, it links
the appellant to the alleged design in a meaningful manner. It does. It is not a
statement of mere association; it is a statement of direction and role allocation.
214. The appellant urges that he was not present at riot sites in the critical period.
That submission, even if assumed correct, does not answer the prosecution case,
because the prosecution does not pitch him as an executor of the terminal
violence; it pitches him as a person involved in shaping the method and seeding
the strategy earlier. In a phased conspiracy, physical absence at the final scene is
not the end of the inquiry; it may, at best, shift the inquiry upstream, to see
whether the accused is linked to the preparatory and coordinating stages.
215. The appellant emphasises lack of recoveries, absence of weapons, and
absence of forensic linkage. In ordinary IPC bail jurisprudence, these factors
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often have weight. Under a special statute alleging a wider conspiracy with
distributed roles, these factors cannot be made decisive. A conspiracy organiser
may leave no recoveries because the organisers do not carry the instruments that
the executors use. If recoveries were treated as a universal requirement,
conspiracy cases would be structurally immunised at the bail stage for those who
organise rather than execute. The statute does not contemplate such a result.
216. The law does not require the prosecution to demonstrate, at the bail stage,
that the accused personally caused death or destruction, or personally stocked
explosives, before Section 43D(5) can apply. It requires the Court to see whether
the material discloses a prima facie case of involvement in the unlawful activity
alleged. Here, the prosecution material is pressed to show that the appellant’s role
is traced through meetings, committees, instructions, coordination mechanisms,
and alleged preparation for escalation. If that chain is prima facie visible, the
absence of recoveries does not break it.
217. The appellant’s submissions treat meetings as innocuous, and committees
as routine protest organisation. The prosecution case treats them as the
infrastructure of the conspiracy. The Court must therefore ask: does the material
suggest continuity of role across time, rather than episodic presence? The charge-
sheet material, as summarised in the accused-wise narrative already set out,
places the appellant at repeated decision points: the Jangpura meeting of
08.12.2019; the Jamia phase of mid-December; the formation and functioning of
JCC/JACT as mobilisation structures; the creation and operation of DPSG as a
dissemination mechanism; the meetings at ISI, Gandhi Peace Foundation and
Shaheen Bagh; and the January Seelampur phase alleged to involve preparation
for escalation.
218. At this stage, the Court does not decide whether each meeting was
conspiratorial. But where multiple meetings across weeks and months are alleged,
and where witness material and electronic records are pressed to place the same
accused at several of these junctures, the Court is entitled to view continuity itself
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as a relevant circumstance. Continuity is the difference between a participant and
an organiser in the prosecution narrative.
219. The appellant says he did not create certain WhatsApp groups. That may
be ultimately matter of trial. At the bail stage, it is not determinative. The
prosecution does not allege that guilt arises from creating a group; it alleges that
groups functioned as coordination platforms through which decisions taken at
higher level were transmitted to multiple sites for execution. Membership,
participation, and the alleged influence exercised through or around such
platforms is what the prosecution presses.
220. The record, as placed, indicates that the appellant is shown as a member of
DPSG and that protected witness material speaks to the coordinating character of
such groups. Whether the appellant sent incriminating messages is not the only
relevant factor. In a coordination structure, some speak, others steer. A
conspirator’s role may be inferred from where he is placed in the architecture, not
only from what he typed in a chat window.
221. The appellant places heavy reliance on the Amravati speech, urging that it
repeatedly invokes non-violence and constitutional protest. The prosecution urges
that the speech forms part of a larger matrix of mobilisation and was delivered in
temporal proximity to the culminating phase. At this stage, the Court must resist
from committing two errors. The first is to criminalise speech merely because it
is politically charged. The second is to immunise a continuing course of conduct
merely because it contains language of non-violence.
222. In conspiracy jurisprudence, outward disavowal and inward design may
co-exist; public caution does not necessarily negate private preparation. That is
why the law insists on cumulative assessment. The speech, in isolation, cannot
decide the case. Equally, the speech cannot be extracted from the timeline and
used as a complete answer to allegations of meetings, directions, and preparatory
acts alleged over months. The Court therefore treats the speech as one
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circumstance in a chain, to be evaluated with other material, not as a standalone
verdict of innocence or guilt.
223. The prosecution case places emphasis on “timing” and “trigger”. It alleges
that sustained blockades were designed to mature into a coordinated paralysis
across the city, and that the Jafrabad blockade and movement to strategic points
occurred on 22–23 February in a synchronised manner. It further alleges that the
escalation into violence was not incidental but contemplated. The appellant’s
absence from the riot scene therefore does not end the inquiry; the inquiry shifts
to whether the prosecution material prima facie links him to the strategy that was
executed when the “right time” arrived.
224. At this stage, the charge-sheet narrative and the protected witness
statements relied upon are pressed to show that the appellant was engaged at
earlier phases in shaping the method and expanding the sites, and that preparatory
discussions in January included alleged directions for stockpiling and readiness
for escalation. The Court cannot pronounce on their truth. It can, however, record
that such material, if accepted as the prosecution places it, links the appellant to
the alleged design and the timing of its culmination.
225. The appellant urges that continued incarceration is oppressive. This Court
has already addressed delay as a constitutional concern and has indicated that the
remedy for stagnation lies in judicial supervision and expedition, not automatic
enlargement on bail. In the case of the present appellant, the record also discloses
that his earlier bail rejection has been subjected to judicial scrutiny and has not
been displaced by any subsequent event affecting the prosecution’s core
attribution. When a statute imposes a high threshold and the case is conspiracy-
centric, repeated bail reconsideration on the same material is not the norm. A
meaningful change in circumstances must be shown. Save delay, which has been
addressed separately, none is shown.
226. Delay can warrant a more searching constitutional scrutiny. But it does not
authorise the Court to dilute the statutory threshold by undertaking credibility
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findings. The balance must be maintained: constitutional concern is real, but
statutory restraint is equally real. Where the prima facie threshold continues to be
crossed, delay is met through expeditious trial directions and continued judicial
monitoring, not by negating Section 43D(5).
227. It is necessary, at this juncture, to clarify the juridical distinction
between ordinary public disorder, which may arise even in the course of
legitimate protest, and the prosecution’s pleaded case of systemic disruption. Not
every disruption of traffic, not every blockade, and not every law-and-order
incident engages the statutory framework of the UAPA. The statute is attracted
only where the conduct alleged, taken cumulatively, is capable of being
understood as threatening the unity, integrity, security, or sovereignty of the
nation, or as creating a climate of fear and paralysis transcending ordinary
disorder.
228. The prosecution case, as placed before this Court, does not proceed on the
footing that the protests merely inconvenienced commuters or strained policing
resources. It proceeds on the footing that a deliberate method of agitation was
conceived and executed, namely sustained and replicated “chakka jams” at
strategically selected arterial locations, with the object of choking movement
across the National Capital, disrupting essential services, and overwhelming the
administrative capacity of the State.
229. The factual narrative placed on record repeatedly emphasises that the
blockade points were not randomly selected. The prosecution alleges that they
were deliberately located so as to (i) cut off major transit routes, (ii) bring protest
activity from minority-dominated clusters into areas of mixed population, and
(iii) ensure that disruption was not localised but city-wide. The pleaded
movement of protesters from established sit-in sites to pre-designated choke
points across North-East Delhi on 22nd and 23rd February 2020 is pressed as
evidence of this systemic design.
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230. At the bail stage, the Court does not pronounce on whether this design is
ultimately proved. It asks whether the prosecution material, taken at face value,
supports the allegation that the disruption was not episodic, but coordinated,
sustained, and scalable. When viewed through that lens, the allegations of
meetings, directions, replication of protest sites, and synchronised movement
across locations assume a significance distinct from ordinary protest activity.
231. The Court is therefore unable, at this stage, to accept the characterisation
of the events as mere public disorder incidental to protest. The prosecution case,
as pleaded, is that the blockade strategy itself was the instrument of coercion,
designed to paralyse civic life and generate confrontation. That distinction is
material at the stage of applying Section 43D(5).
232. A further dimension of the prosecution case concerns communal harmony,
which lies at the heart of public order in a plural society. The prosecution does
not merely allege that violence occurred in areas of mixed population. It alleges
that the movement of protest activity into such areas was itself deliberate, with
the intent to trigger confrontation and skirmish.
233. The factual narrative already set out records the prosecution’s assertion that
protesters moved from predominantly minority clusters, where 24×7 sit-in
protests were being held, into mixed-population areas at pre-selected times and
locations. This movement is alleged to have been accompanied by stockpiling of
potentially harmful materials, as per protected witness statements, and by
preparations to escalate confrontation when police intervention or counter-
mobilisation occurred.
234. At the bail stage, the Court cannot test whether the protected witness
statements regarding stockpiling or inducement of local residents will ultimately
withstand scrutiny. What the Court can do is to examine whether, if those
statements are accepted as they stand, they support an allegation that the agitation
was not confined to symbolic protest, but contemplated engineered confrontation
along communal fault lines.
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235. The prosecution case, taken cumulatively, pleads precisely this: that the
blockade strategy was designed not merely to inconvenience, but to provoke, to
polarise, and to create a breakdown of communal peace. Where such an allegation
is supported, at least prima facie, by statements, chronology, and alleged
coordination, the Court cannot trivialise it as an inevitable by-product of protest.
236. It is this pleaded design to fracture communal harmony, rather than the
expression of dissent per se, which distinguishes the prosecution case from a
narrative of innocent protest. Whether that design is ultimately proved is a matter
for trial. Its prima facie articulation is sufficient to inform the bail-stage inquiry.
237. The prosecution further places the events within a broader security context.
It alleges that the sustained and coordinated disruption of major arterial routes,
combined with the timing of escalation, was intended to create a perception of
instability in the National Capital, impair the functioning of essential services,
and project an image of administrative paralysis.
238. The factual narrative records allegations of disruption to transport
networks, obstruction of access to hospitals and medical facilities, interruption of
public transport services including the metro, and interference with the normal
functioning of civic institutions. The prosecution also alleges that the timing of
escalation was calibrated to coincide with a period of heightened international
attention, thereby magnifying the impact of the disruption.
239. At the bail stage, the Court does not determine whether these allegations
ultimately satisfy the ingredients of a “terrorist act” under Section 15. What the
Court examines is whether the prosecution has pleaded a case that goes beyond
localised violence or protest-related disorder, and whether the alleged acts are
capable, at least prima facie, of engaging the statutory conception of threats to
security and public order at a national level.
240. When sustained blockades are alleged to be executed across multiple
locations, when essential civic life is alleged to be paralysed, and when violence
is alleged to erupt in a coordinated manner following such blockades, the Court
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cannot, at this stage, rule out the applicability of the statutory framework merely
because the acts are couched in the language of protest.
241. The appellant has urged that his conduct must be viewed through the prism
of political dissent and constitutional protest. This Court reiterates that dissent
and protest occupy a protected space in a constitutional democracy. That
protection, however, does not extend to a pleaded design which, if accepted as
true, involves systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory
steps towards violence.
242. The prosecution does not rely on a single speech, a single meeting, or a
single blockade. It relies on a course of conduct, spread over weeks, involving
repeated meetings, formation of coordinating bodies, issuance of directions, and
alleged preparations for escalation. The Court cannot, at the bail stage, segregate
this course of conduct into isolated benign fragments and assess each in
abstraction.
243. To do so would amount to substituting a compartmentalised analysis for
the cumulative approach mandated by law in conspiracy cases, particularly under
a special statute. The correct inquiry is whether the material, taken as a whole,
discloses a prima facie case that the accused was part of an agreement or design
to engage in unlawful activity of the nature alleged. On the prosecution material
placed before us, that inquiry must be answered in the affirmative.
244. Having regard to the prosecution material as placed, including the
chronology of meetings, the alleged articulation and propagation of the chakka
jam strategy, the operation of coordinating committees and groups, the protected
witness statements alleging preparatory and escalation-related discussions, the
pleaded movement of protest activity into mixed-population zones, and the
alleged systemic disruption of civic life in the National Capital, this Court is
satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for believing that the accusations against
Umar Khalid are prima facie true.
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245. The defence submissions, though weighty and articulated with care, would
require this Court to adjudicate upon credibility, resolve factual disputes, and
choose between competing inferences. That exercise lies beyond the permissible
limits of a bail inquiry under Section 43D(5).
246. The statutory embargo is therefore attracted. The appeal filed by Umar
Khalid in SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 is dismissed. The prayer for bail is
rejected.
247. It is clarified that the observations herein are confined to the consideration
of bail and shall not influence the Trial Court in the adjudication of the matter on
merits. The Trial Court shall endeavour to proceed with the trial expeditiously.
8. SHIFA UR REHMAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14859 OF 2025
8.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
248. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Salman Khurshid for the appellant
submitted that the impugned judgment dated 02.09.2025, whereby the High
Court declined to enlarge the appellant on bail, suffers from a fundamental
infirmity inasmuch as it overlooks the undisputed fact that the appellant has been
in continuous custody since 26.04.2020. It was urged that the appellant has
already undergone more than five years and six months of pre-trial incarceration,
while the trial has not progressed beyond the stage of framing of charges. Learned
senior counsel submitted that the prosecution case rests on an extraordinarily
voluminous record, consisting of a main charge-sheet and two supplementary
charge-sheets running into more than twenty thousand pages, with several
hundred witnesses cited, rendering the likelihood of an early conclusion of trial
wholly illusory. It was contended that the prolonged incarceration of the
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appellant, in such circumstances, assumes a punitive character and offends the
guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
249. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the appellant is a person of
clean antecedents and has never misused the liberty granted to him. Attention was
invited to the fact that the appellant was granted interim bail on two occasions by
the Special Court, on 25.11.2023 and 11.11.2024, and on both occasions he
surrendered within time and strictly complied with all conditions imposed. It was
emphasized that there is not even an allegation that the appellant attempted to
abscond, tamper with evidence, or influence witnesses. Learned senior counsel
submitted that the appellant did not contribute to the delay in the proceedings,
having concluded his arguments on charge in a single sitting and having not
sought unrelied documents, and therefore, continued detention cannot be justified
on grounds traditionally recognised in bail jurisprudence.
250. It was then submitted that even on a prima facie appreciation of the
prosecution material, the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 2(o)
and 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are not made out qua the
appellant. Learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant is not a member of
the DPSG WhatsApp group, which forms the fulcrum of the alleged conspiracy.
His inclusion in one JCC group was, at best, incidental and subject to a clear
restriction that alumni members would neither chair meetings nor speak. It was
contended that there is no material to indicate that the appellant incited violence,
facilitated riots, or indulged in any act intended to threaten the unity, integrity, or
sovereignty of the nation, and that participation in protests against a
parliamentary enactment, by itself, cannot be elevated to the level of terrorist
activity.
251. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the prosecution seeks to
sustain continued incarceration of the appellant on the basis of statements
recorded under Section 161 CrPC and certain call detail records, which, at this
stage, do not constitute substantive evidence. It was urged that even the
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statements of protected witnesses, read in their entirety, do not attribute any
specific overt act of violence, financing, or conspiratorial role to the appellant.
With regard to the allegation of a meeting dated 22.02.2020 at the AAJMI office,
learned senior counsel submitted that the material does not establish either the
presence or the participation of the appellant, as the statements refer generally to
“office bearers” without singling him out.
252. It was lastly submitted that the principle of parity has been completely
overlooked by the High Court. Learned senior counsel pointed out that co-
accused, against whom allegations of equal or greater gravity were levelled, have
been enlarged on bail, and that the role attributed to the appellant is neither
distinguishable nor more serious so as to warrant continued detention. It was
urged that denial of bail to the appellant alone, despite prolonged incarceration
and parity with similarly placed co-accused, results in manifest inequality and is
contrary to the settled principles governing bail under Article 21.
253. In conclusion, learned Senior Counsel submitted that statutory rigours
cannot be permitted to eclipse constitutional guarantees, particularly where
incarceration has become unduly long and the conclusion of trial is not
foreseeable in the near future. It was urged that the appellant is the sole
breadwinner of his family, comprising his elderly mother, wife, and two young
children, and that continued detention would cause irreparable hardship without
advancing the ends of justice. Learned Senior Counsel therefore prayed that this
Court may be pleased to interfere with the impugned order and enlarge the
appellant on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate.
8.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
254. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submitted that the present case
does not concern a mere protest or dissent, but a carefully planned and executed
criminal conspiracy which culminated in large-scale violence, arson, and loss of
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life during the North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. It was urged that the
appellant, Shifa-ur-Rehman, was not a peripheral or incidental participant, but
played a significant and decisive role in furtherance of the conspiracy. The State
submitted that the impugned order correctly appreciates the gravity of the
offences, the nature of the allegations, and the material collected during
investigation, and therefore does not warrant interference.
255. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant, being the
President of the Alumni Association of Jamia Millia Islamia and a member of the
Jamia Coordination Committee, functioned as a key financier and logistic
facilitator of the protest sites which were subsequently escalated into violent
“Chakka Jaam” and riot situations. Statements of several protected witnesses
recorded under Section 164 CrPC consistently disclose that the appellant
collected funds in cash, distributed money to organisers and participants,
arranged daily wages, and ensured uninterrupted functioning of multiple protest
sites across Delhi. These acts were not isolated but formed part of a concerted
design to sustain and escalate unrest.
256. It was then submitted that the appellant was in continuous coordination
with the principal conspirators, including Umar Khalid and other co-accused,
during the relevant period. Call detail records and WhatsApp communications
placed on record demonstrate sustained contact between the appellant and other
conspirators at crucial stages. Learned counsel submitted that secret meetings
were held at the AAJMI office, including the meeting dated 22.02.2020, where
decisions were taken to intensify protests and trigger violence in North-East
Delhi. The appellant’s presence and role in these meetings is supported by sworn
statements of protected witnesses and corroborative electronic material.
257. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State further submitted that the plea of
prolonged incarceration cannot be considered divorced from the seriousness of
the offences and the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act. At the stage of bail, the Court is only required to
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assess whether the accusations are prima facie true and not to conduct a detailed
evaluation of evidence. The material on record, including witness statements,
documentary evidence, recoveries, seizure of fake bills, and evidence of cash
transactions routed through the appellant, clearly satisfies the threshold of prima
facie involvement. The delay in trial, it was urged, is attributable to the magnitude
and complexity of the case involving multiple accused, voluminous records, and
hundreds of witnesses.
258. It was also submitted that the plea of parity is misconceived and
unsustainable. Bail jurisprudence mandates an assessment of individual role, and
parity cannot be claimed mechanically. The appellant’s role as the financial
backbone of the conspiracy, ensuring funds and logistics for sustained protest and
eventual violence, places him in a distinct and graver category. The State
submitted that the appellant cannot equate himself with other accused who may
have been granted bail on different factual considerations and on materially
different roles.
259. Lastly, learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the offences alleged strike
at the very foundations of public order and societal peace. The riots were not
spontaneous but the outcome of a calibrated plan executed under the guise of
protest, resulting in loss of innocent lives, injuries to police personnel, and
widespread destruction of property. Grant of bail in such circumstances would
undermine the statutory object of the special enactment and erode public
confidence in the administration of justice. The State, therefore, prayed that the
appeal be dismissed and the impugned order refusing bail be upheld.
8.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
:
260. The Trial Court vide order dated 07.04.2022, passed in IA. No. 73/2021 in
SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by the Appellant. The Court
found that the material placed on record, including the charge-sheet, statements
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of witnesses recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., electronic evidence,
and WhatsApp chats of coordinated groups, disclosed prima facie involvement of
the accused in a deep-rooted and well-orchestrated criminal conspiracy relating
to the North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a cumulative reading of the
prosecution material, the Court held that the protests were not spontaneous but
were deliberately planned, escalated into chakka-jam, and thereafter converted
into organised violence, including attacks on police personnel and destruction of
public and private property.
261. The Trial Court emphasised that at the stage of bail it was not required to
undertake a meticulous examination of evidence or conduct a mini-trial. Applying
the settled principles governing bail in cases under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, the Court held that the prosecution material must be taken at
face value and assessed in its totality. On such assessment, the Court was satisfied
that there existed reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against
the accused were prima facie true, thereby attracting the statutory restrictions on
grant of bail.
262. The Trial Court rejected the submissions of the accused based on parity,
absence of direct overt acts, and alleged exercise of the right to protest. It held
that in a case of conspiracy, individual roles are not to be viewed in isolation and
that it is sufficient if the material indicates conscious participation in the common
design. The Court further held that claims of peaceful protest and lack of direct
violence did not neutralise the prima facie case of involvement in a larger
conspiratorial framework leading to riots.
263. A decisive ground for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with the
restrictions under Section 437 Cr.P.C. In light of the gravity of the offences, the
nature and scale of the alleged conspiracy, and the prima facie satisfaction
regarding the accusations, the Trial Court held that it was legally barred from
granting bail and accordingly dismissed the bail application.
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8.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT
264. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution material,
taken cumulatively, disclosed prima facie involvement of Shifa-ur-Rehman as a
key financier and organiser in the execution of the larger criminal conspiracy
culminating in the North-East Delhi riots. Being the President of AAJMI, he was
alleged to have misused his position to facilitate and sustain multiple protest sites
across Delhi by raising and disbursing funds, including cash transactions, and by
allowing AAJMI premises to be used for JCC meetings, planning, and logistical
coordination. Witness statements, recoveries of documents, and bank and cash-
trail material were held to prima facie indicate that funds were mobilised not
merely for peaceful protest but for sustaining chakka-jaams and their escalation.
At the bail stage, the Court found that his role as a financial enabler and organiser
was integral to the operationalisation of the conspiracy.
265. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the
Court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations
against Shifa-ur-Rehman were prima facie true, thereby barring bail. The pleas
that AAJMI was a lawful organisation, that the funds were used only for
legitimate protest expenses, that there was no direct incitement, and that parity
existed with co-accused released on bail were rejected. The Court clarified that
the role attributed to Shifa-ur-Rehman as a fundraiser and coordinator was
qualitatively distinct and more serious, and that questions regarding source,
quantum, and use of funds are matters for trial. Consequently, the bail appeal was
dismissed.
8.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
266. According to the charge-sheet, Shifa-ur-Rehman, stated to be the President
of the Alumni Association of Jamia Millia Islamia (AAJMI), is alleged to have
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played an active role in the funding and execution of the riots in Delhi. The
charge-sheet alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was entrusted with significant
responsibilities in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy hatched by Umar Khalid
and Sharjeel Imam. It is further alleged that he collected funds and distributed the
amounts so collected for the purpose of engaging women, children, and girls to
assemble at protest sites, with the intent that the presence of such groups would
deter the police from taking stringent action at the protest locations.
267. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was closely
associated with Umar Khalid, described as the principal conspirator, and that he
remained in constant contact with him. It is alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman also
attended secret conspiratorial meetings. The charge-sheet records several
instances of fund-raising activities conducted at the office of AAJMI in
connection with the protests.
268. It is further alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman, along with other co-accused,
was instrumental in the establishment of 24×7 protest sites. According to the
charge-sheet, he regularly visited these protest sites and instigated participants to
organise chakka jams under the guise of peaceful protests. Call Detail Records
(CDRs) are relied upon to assert his frequent presence at the protest sites.
269. Statements of protected witnesses “Alpha”, “Bond”, “James”, and
“Hector” are relied upon to allege that, in his capacity as President of AAJMI,
Shifa-ur-Rehman was responsible for raising substantial funds to finance the
protests. The charge-sheet further alleges that, in order to avoid detection and to
leave no financial trail, Shifa-ur-Rehman fabricated false bills of expenditure in
the name of AAJMI. Copies of the purportedly fabricated bills have been
produced along with the charge-sheet. It is alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman
collected a minimum amount of Rs. 7–8 lakhs, the majority of which was received
in cash.
270. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was among the
principal individuals responsible for sourcing and sustaining the protests. Apart
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from his alleged role in funding, it is stated that he participated in a conspiratorial
meeting held on 22.02.2020, wherein it was purportedly agreed that the protests
should be escalated to the next stage by enforcing chakka jams and engineering
violent riots.
271. According to the prosecution, the primary role attributed to Shifa-ur-
Rehman was to provide financial and logistical support to all protest sites. The
charge-sheet asserts that the funding and logistical assistance allegedly provided
by him played an instrumental role in the riots that occurred in Delhi between
23.02.2020 and 26.02.2020, under the ostensible cover of protests against the
CAA/NRC.
272. Upon a prima facie consideration of the material presently relied upon by
the prosecution, the role attributed to Shifa-ur-Rehman does not disclose
participation at the level of conceptualisation or strategic command of the alleged
conspiracy. The allegations principally pertain to logistical facilitation, fund-
raising, and coordination at identified protest sites, premised upon directions
purportedly originating from persons situating themselves above him in the
asserted hierarchy. In the absence of demonstrable material suggesting that he
exercised autonomous decision-making authority over the alleged broader
design, his continued incarceration as a pre-trial measure does not presently
appear warranted.
273. The prosecution asserts that Shifa-ur-Rehman was associated with fund-
raising activities and implementation of protest-site requirements however, the
evidentiary material does not indicate that he retained control over the
deployment of such funds, nor that he exercised selective discretion over strategic
decisions concerning escalation. The record discloses that the appellant’s actions
were derivative in nature, aligned to instructions transmitted by others, and
largely confined to sustaining logistics rather than shaping the trajectory of the
protests. Such attribution, while relevant to trial, does not justify indefinite pre-
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trial detention when weighed against the limited and executory nature of his
alleged role.
274. The State’s apprehension that the appellant may re-establish operational
linkages or interfere with witnesses must be evaluated in light of present
circumstances. There is no material to demonstrate that the appellant retains any
functional capacity to mobilise resources or coordinate activities independent of
the structures that, according to the prosecution itself, acted under higher-level
guidance and have since ceased to exist in the form alleged. The risks articulated
by the State can be effectively neutralised through conditions restricting public
engagement pertaining to the case, prohibiting contact with witnesses, and
mandating regular court attendance.
275. While the seriousness of the events culminating in violence during the
relevant period cannot be discounted, this Court is mindful that gravity alone
cannot eclipse the constitutional requirement of individualized examination of the
necessity of pre-trial detention. The appellant’s role, as narrated, is not linked to
instigation of violence, procurement of weapons, or direct involvement in acts of
physical aggression. In the absence of a proximate and continuing nexus between
the appellant and the capacity to compromise the integrity of the proceedings,
further incarceration would assume a punitive character incompatible with settled
constitutional jurisprudence under Article 21.
276. The Court is also conscious that pre-trial detention serves limited and
clearly defined purposes securing the presence of the accused, preventing
obstruction of justice, and safeguarding public interest where demonstrable risk
persists. In the present case, none of these objectives appear incapable of being
achieved through calibrated restrictions short of incarceration. The absence of
material suggesting an enduring organisational infrastructure capable of being
reactivated through the appellant’s efforts weighs significantly against the
necessity of continued custody.
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277. It is further noted that the prosecution’s submissions rely substantially on
the appellant’s positional proximity to individuals alleged to have played a
strategic role. Mere associative proximity, without corresponding evidence
demonstrating capacity to exert influence or direction, does not satisfy the
threshold required to curtail liberty at the post-investigative stage. The appellant’s
purported involvement in facilitative tasks, while forming part of the evidentiary
matrix to be assessed at trial, cannot be a standalone basis for extending pre-trial
detention where imposition of protective conditions offers an adequate safeguard.
278. Where the prosecution narrative itself draws a distinction between strategic
architects and operational facilitators, judicial scrutiny at the bail stage must
remain attentive to proportionality in attribution. The material presently relied
upon depicts the appellant as a conduit within a hierarchically structured
mobilisation, rather than as a node of independent initiative. Elevating such a role
to one warranting prolonged custodial deprivation would risk diluting the
constitutionally embedded principle that pre-trial restraint must correlate to
demonstrated necessity rather than inferred association.
279. Finally, while the evidentiary record merits thorough adjudication at trial,
the Constitution mandates that liberty be curtailed only where compelling
grounds grounded in present necessity exist. The prosecutorial hypothesis of a
broader conspiracy, though serious, cannot become a charter for undifferentiated
incarceration of all alleged participants irrespective of their individual function
or continuing capacity. In the circumstances disclosed, and given the availability
of stringent safeguards to address the apprehensions raised, the balance of
constitutional considerations favours the appellant’s release on terms ensuring
non-interference with the proceedings and adherence to all conditions imposed
by the Court.
280. Having regard to the differentiated standing that the prosecution narrative
itself assigns to the appellant, particularly when contrasted with the alleged
principal conspirators Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, and in view of the
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absence of any present investigative requirement necessitating custodial
detention, this Court finds that pre-trial liberty can be secured without prejudicing
the administration of justice. Accordingly, subject to conditions designed to
ensure his availability for trial, prevent any contact with prosecution witnesses,
and restrain public commentary bearing upon the merits, the appellant is held
entitled to be enlarged on bail. It is clarified that the observations herein are
confined to the determination of bail and shall not be construed as expressing a
view on the merits of the prosecution’s case.
9. SALEEM KHAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO. 15335/2025
9.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
281. Learned Counsel Sri Gautam Khazanchi appearing for the appellant
submitted that the appellant, Mohd. Saleem Khan, aged about 54 years, is a
permanent resident of Chand Bagh, Delhi, carrying on business, with deep roots
in society, and has been in continuous judicial custody for over five years in FIR
No. 59 of 2020 registered by the Crime Branch, Delhi, arising out of the North-
East Delhi riots of February 2020 . It was submitted that the appellant has no
criminal antecedents except three FIRs arising out of the same incident, and in
two of those FIRs, namely FIR No. 60 of 2020 and FIR No. 136 of 2020, the
appellant has already been granted regular bail by competent courts, on
substantially the same material relied upon by the prosecution .
282. He further submitted that the gravamen of the allegation against the
appellant in the present FIR is one of conspiracy under the UAPA, without any
allegation of commission of a terrorist act, use of arms or weapons, funding of
violence, delivery of inflammatory or hate speeches, or direct participation in acts
of arson or rioting. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution case
itself records that the appellant is not a member of any of the WhatsApp groups
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such as JCC, DPSG, MSJ or SOJ, which form the backbone of the alleged
conspiracy narrative, and that the appellant has not sent a single message, directly
or indirectly, in any of those groups . It was urged that there is no documentary
evidence whatsoever in the form of messages, emails or call records to show any
communication between the appellant and the so-called principal conspirators.
283. Learned Counsel submitted that the allegation of the appellant having
attended so-called “secret meetings” is founded entirely on belatedly recorded
statements of witnesses, recorded months, and in some instances nearly a year,
after the arrest of the appellant. It was submitted that even these allegations are
contradicted by the prosecution’s own material, including CCTV footage, which
does not show the presence of the appellant at the alleged meetings on crucial
dates. These aspects, it was urged, are matters for trial and cannot be treated as
conclusive at the stage of bail, particularly to justify prolonged incarceration .
284. He further submitted that the only overt allegation sought to be pressed
against the appellant is that he allegedly turned away or dislocated a CCTV
camera with the aid of a wiper. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that this very
allegation formed part of FIR No. 60 of 2020, in which the appellant was granted
regular bail by the High Court after a detailed consideration, holding that such
footage by itself was insufficient to prolong incarceration and that the extent of
conspiracy, if any, could only be determined at trial . It was submitted that the
prosecution cannot be permitted to rely upon the same material repeatedly to
justify continued detention of the appellant in multiple proceedings.
285. Learned Counsel further submitted that the appellant’s conduct throughout
has been exemplary. The appellant has been granted interim bail on six occasions
by the Trial Court and the High Court for various humanitarian and family
reasons, including medical needs of his children and family obligations. On each
occasion, the appellant surrendered punctually, without seeking extension, and
there is not a single allegation of misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence,
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influencing witnesses, or attempting to evade the process of law. It was submitted
that the appellant, therefore, fully satisfies the triple test governing grant of bail .
286. On the aspect of delay, learned Counsel submitted, briefly, that despite
filing of the main charge-sheet and four supplementary charge-sheets, charges
have not yet been framed, the prosecution proposes to examine more than 850
witnesses, and the trial is at the stage of arguments on charge, rendering early
conclusion wholly illusory.
287. He lastly submitted that the principle of parity has been completely
overlooked. Co-accused Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal
Tanha, against whom far graver and more direct allegations of conspiracy,
mobilisation and instigation were levelled, have been granted bail by the High
Court, which orders have been affirmed by this Hon’ble Court. The appellant,
whose alleged role is demonstrably peripheral and significantly weaker, continues
to remain incarcerated, resulting in manifest arbitrariness and unequal treatment.
288. Learned Counsel, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to
enlarge the appellant on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit,
in the interest of justice, liberty and parity.
9.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
289. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing on behalf of the respondent
submitted that the present case is not one of mere presence at a protest or passive
association, but of deep and active participation in a well-orchestrated criminal
conspiracy which culminated in large-scale violence, arson, destruction of public
and private property, and loss of multiple innocent lives during the North-East
Delhi riots of February 2020. It was submitted that the appellant, Mohd. Saleem
Khan (Accused No. 14), played a pivotal local role in executing the conspiracy at
Chand Bagh and adjoining areas, acting in coordination with members of the
DPSG and other key conspirators.
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290. It was submitted that the material on record, clearly establishes that the
appellant was not a peripheral actor but an integral ground-level executor of the
conspiracy. Protected witnesses VENUS and GOLD have categorically deposed
that the appellant was one of the initiators and organisers of the Chand Bagh
protest site from mid-January 2020 onwards, along with other accused persons,
and that he actively participated in mobilising crowds, delivering inflammatory
speeches, and sustaining the protest infrastructure, including arrangements for
food, shelter and logistics .
291. Learned ASG further submitted that on the intervening night of 16–17
February 2020, at around 2:00 AM, a secret conspiratorial meeting was held at
the Chand Bagh protest site, which was attended by the appellant along with other
key accused including Athar, Shadab, Saleem Malik @ Munna, Gulfisha Fatima,
Devangana Kalita and others. In this meeting, the roadmap for escalating peaceful
sit-ins into disruptive chakka-jam at strategically chosen arterial roads was
finalised, with the express objective of provoking confrontation with police and
engineering riots. This meeting is corroborated by multiple protected witnesses
including BRAVO, JOHNY and KILO, whose statements consistently name the
appellant as a participant in the deliberations .
292. It was submitted that in furtherance of the conspiracy, another meeting was
held in the intervening night of 20–21 February 2020 at Ayaz’s office in Chand
Bagh, which the appellant attended along with DPSG members. Protected witness
PLUTO has deposed that during this meeting, explicit exhortations were made to
“set Delhi on fire”, that weapons, petrol and finances were ready, and that
violence on a large scale was inevitable unless roads were blocked and clashes
ensued. The appellant’s presence and participation in this meeting are specifically
spoken to by PLUTO in his statement under Section 164 CrPC .
293. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the conspiracy moved from
planning to execution on 22 February 2020, when, pursuant to these meetings,
chakka-jam was first enforced at Jafrabad Metro Station by mobilising crowds
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from Chand Bagh and Seelampur. This was followed by meetings convened and
attended by the appellant on the night of 22 February 2020 at Ayaz’s basement,
where organisers of various protest sites were informed that chakka-jam had been
successfully executed at Jafrabad and were directed to replicate the same in their
respective areas. CCTV footage and witness testimonies establish the appellant’s
role in convening and attending these meetings.
294. It was further submitted that on 23 February 2020, the appellant, along with
Athar, Shadab and Saleem Malik @ Munna, physically shifted the Chand Bagh
protest from a side location to the main Wazirabad–Ghaziabad road, thereby
enforcing chakka-jam at a critical arterial road and deliberately moving protests
from Muslim-majority lanes to mixed-population areas to maximise
confrontation. Protected witnesses BRAVO and HECTOR have deposed that this
coordinated action directly led to escalation of violence, stone-pelting, arson and
attacks on police personnel and civilians .
295. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju emphasised that when the conspirators realised
that the scale of violence was being curtailed due to CCTV surveillance, another
conspiratorial meeting was held on the night of 23 February 2020, wherein it was
decided that CCTV cameras must be destroyed or disabled. Witness RADIUM
has categorically stated that Athar informed the group that the task of breaking
CCTV cameras had been assigned to the appellant and Saleem Malik @ Munna.
In pursuance thereof, CCTV footage demonstrates that on 24 February 2020,
multiple CCTV cameras in the area were systematically dislocated or covered,
including one instance where the appellant himself is seen dislocating a CCTV
camera .
296. It was submitted that once CCTV surveillance was neutralised, large-scale
violence erupted on 24 February 2020, resulting in brutal attacks on police
personnel, including the killing of Head Constable Ratan Lal, grievous injuries to
senior police officers, and the murder of Intelligence Bureau officer Ankit
Sharma, besides widespread arson and destruction. The State submitted that the
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appellant is not only charged in the present conspiracy case but is also an accused
in connected cases relating to murder and rioting, reflecting the gravity and
continuity of his role .
297. On the issue of parity, learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that parity
cannot be claimed in abstract, divorced from individual role. The appellant’s role,
as borne out from multiple independent protected witnesses, electronic evidence,
CCTV footage and chain-of-command analysis, is materially distinct and far
more direct than those accused who have been granted bail. The appellant
functioned as a key local executor translating strategic conspiracy into physical
action on the ground.
298. On delay, learned ASG submitted briefly that the complexity of the case,
the multiplicity of accused, the scale of violence, and the volume of evidence,
including hundreds of witnesses and electronic records, necessarily require time,
and such delay cannot be used to dilute the statutory embargo under Section
43D(5) of the UAPA where a strong prima facie case exists.
299. Learned ASG therefore submitted that, on a cumulative assessment of the
material, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against
the appellant are prima facie true, that his release would pose a serious threat to
public order and the integrity of the trial, and that the present case does not
warrant exercise of discretion in favour of bail. The State accordingly prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.
9.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
300. The Trial Court vide order dated 22.03.2022, passed in IA. No. 96/2021 in
SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by the Appellant. The Trial
Court found that the prosecution material disclosed prima facie involvement of
the appellant in a large-scale, deep-rooted criminal conspiracy connected with the
North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic reading of the charge-
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sheet, supplementary charge-sheets, CCTV analysis, witness statements
(including protected witnesses), and WhatsApp group communications
(DPSG/JCC), the Court held that the riots were not spontaneous but were
systematically planned to escalate protests into chakka-jam and thereafter into
organised violence, including attacks on police, destruction of CCTV cameras,
arson, and use of deadly weapons. At the stage of bail, the Court emphasised that
the individual role of the accused cannot be viewed in isolation and must be
assessed in the context of the entire chain of conspiracy.
301. A decisive reason for rejection of bail was the statutory bar under Section
43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with the
additional restriction under Section 437 Cr.P.C. The Court applied the principles
laid down in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Thwaha Fasal v.
Union of India (supra), holding that if, on a perusal of the charge-sheet and case
diary, there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima
facie true, the accused cannot be released on bail. The Court recorded that the
prosecution material, taken at face value, crossed this statutory threshold, thereby
attracting the embargo on bail.
302. The Trial Court rejected the defence contentions relating to delay in arrest,
clean antecedents, alleged absence of independent public witnesses, and claims
that the accused was merely a spectator or a peaceful protester. It held that
criminal conspiracy is rarely proved by direct evidence and is ordinarily
established through circumstantial evidence, conduct of the accused, and the
cumulative effect of surrounding circumstances. Alleged contradictions in
witness statements, admissibility of evidence, and the defence plea that the
accused was not part of WhatsApp groups or meetings were held to be matters
for trial, not for determination at the bail stage.
303. Finally, the Trial Court underscored the gravity and societal impact of the
offences, noting the loss of life, large-scale damage to public and private property,
and serious threat to public order. It reiterated that at the bail stage, the Court is
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not required to conduct a mini-trial or weigh evidence meticulously, but only to
assess broad probabilities. Taking a cumulative view of the prosecution material
and the statutory restrictions under UAPA and Cr.P.C., the Court concluded that
the appellant had failed to dislodge the prima facie case against him, and
consequently held that he was not entitled to bail, leading to dismissal of the bail
application.
9.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
304. The High Court in the impugned order found that the prosecution material
prima facie established Mohd. Saleem Khan’s role as a local executor of the
conspiracy, particularly in relation to events at Chand Bagh during 23–24
February 2020. He was alleged to have participated in secret meetings where
plans were discussed to escalate protests into violence and, significantly, to have
acted upon instructions to disable government-installed CCTV cameras. The
Court noted that CCTV footage and witness statements prima facie showed
Saleem Khan physically dislocating CCTV cameras, which was considered a
crucial preparatory act enabling rioters to operate with impunity. His role was
thus viewed as facilitating the transition from protest to large-scale violence,
including the attacks that resulted in deaths and grievous injuries to police
personnel.
305. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the Court held that the accusations
against Saleem Khan met the threshold of prima facie truth, creating a statutory
bar to bail. The arguments that he was not a member of major WhatsApp groups,
that he had already been granted bail in other FIRs (including one relating to
CCTV damage), or that the evidence was insufficient, were rejected. The Court
clarified that the present proceedings concerned a larger conspiracy FIR under
the UAPA, and that acts such as disabling CCTV cameras assumed grave
significance in that context. Issues relating to overlap of FIRs, alleged double
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jeopardy, and evidentiary weaknesses were held to be matters for trial, leading to
dismissal of his bail appeal.
9.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
306. Mohd. Saleem Khan is alleged by the prosecution to be one of the principal
local actors who actively participated in the conspiracy and the violent protests
that took place during the last week of February 2020.
307. According to the charge-sheet, Mohd. Saleem Khan was part of the group
that established a 24×7 protest site at Chand Bagh. The members associated with
the said protest site are alleged to have played a significant role in instigating and
engineering the riots that occurred during the last week of February 2020. The
statements of protected witnesses “VENUS” and “GOLD” are relied upon to
disclose and corroborate the role attributed to Mohd. Saleem Khan in the
orchestration of the riots.
308. It is further alleged that on 17.02.2020, Mohd. Saleem Khan attended a
meeting held during the night hours at the Chand Bagh protest site, which was
attended by members of the Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG). As per the
charge-sheet, approximately twenty persons attended the said meeting, including
Saleem Khan. During the meeting, a roadmap for the execution of the final phase
of the alleged conspiracy namely, the escalation of chakka jams into disruptive
chakka jams and the organisation of violence and riots was purportedly outlined
by co-accused Athar Khan.
309. According to the prosecution, there was a clear and cogent understanding
among the key participants who attended the said meeting that the protest sites,
then located on side lanes in Muslim-dominated areas, were required to be shifted
and converted into chakka jams at carefully selected locations on arterial and busy
roads situated in proximity to areas of mixed population. The stated objective of
such relocation was to engineer riots and to paralyse the normal movement of
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traffic and the flow of public life. It is further alleged that the enforcement of
chakka jams, which would inevitably necessitate police intervention, was
intended to be followed by confrontation with, and attacks upon, police personnel
and members of the public, as well as damage to and destruction of public
property through the use of firearms, deadly weapons, arson, and other means
during the engineered riots. In support of these allegations, reliance is placed on
the statement of protected witness “BRAVO”.
310. The prosecution further alleges that Mohd. Saleem Khan attended another
meeting held during the intervening night of 20/21.02.2020 at the office of one
Ayaz in Chand Bagh, Delhi. According to the prosecution, the plan allegedly
conspired by the participants of the meetings held on 17.02.2020 and between
20.02.2020 and 22.02.2020 was executed by protesters from Chand Bagh,
including Mohd. Saleem Khan, when they moved from the protest site to the
Jafrabad Metro Station on the evening of 22.02.2020. Statements of protected
witnesses are relied upon to assert the presence of Saleem Khan at the protest
held at Jafrabad Metro Station. It is further alleged that Saleem Khan invited
persons to attend a conspiratorial meeting held at Chand Bagh on 22.02.2020,
which allegedly culminated in the protest of 23.02.2020 on the main road near
the Mazar and the enforcement of a chakka jam on the Wazirabad–Ghaziabad
Road.
311. It is further alleged that on the night of 23.02.2020, after riots had erupted
in North-East Delhi but were perceived to have fallen short of the intended scale
of violence, a conspiratorial meeting was convened at the residence of one
Mukhtyar in Chand Bagh by DPSG members Athar and Shadab Ahmad. The
meeting is stated to have been attended by absconding accused Suleman Siddiqui
and Ayub. During the said meeting, Athar is alleged to have conveyed that
Nadeem Khan was dissatisfied with the limited escalation of violence due to the
presence of CCTV cameras and had instructed that the cameras be covered and
destroyed. It is alleged that Athar thereafter assigned Saleem Khan and Salim
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Malik alias Munna the task of damaging the CCTV cameras, while Shadab
Ahmad stated that similar acts would be carried out through his own team.
312. The charge-sheet further relies upon reverse mapping of accused persons
arrested for grave offences committed during the North-East Delhi riots, which is
stated to trace their actions back to a clandestine conspiratorial meeting held at
Chand Bagh on the intervening night of 16/17.02.2020, thereby revealing a clear
chain of command. Several accused persons involved in offences of murder,
rioting, arson, and attempts to murder, including those linked to the killings of
Head Constable Ratan Lal, Rahul Solanki, and Ankit Sharma,are stated to have
either attended the said meeting or remained in regular contact with its
participants, particularly DPSG members Athar Khan, Shadab Ahmad, Gulfisha
Fatima, and Khalid Saifi. The mapping is relied upon to demonstrate coordinated
roles, including the destruction of CCTV cameras, assignment of specific targets,
financing of weapons and ammunition, and operational execution, culminating in
the framing of charges against key conspirators in multiple FIRs pertaining to
mass violence and attacks on police personnel.
313. At the present stage of consideration, the allegations against Mohd. Saleem
Khan primarily situate him as a local operative associated with meetings at the
Chand Bagh protest site, allegedly tasked with site-level mobilisation in
furtherance of directions issued by others. The record does not prima facie
disclose autonomous authority over the larger conspiracy, nor any material to
suggest that he occupied a position from which strategic escalation or
coordination across protest sites could be directed. In view of the differentiated
role attributed to him, this Court finds that his continued pre-trial detention
requires a more narrowly tailored justification than what is presently
demonstrated.
314. While the prosecution places reliance on his alleged attendance at meetings
preceding the escalation of protests into chakka jams, the material does not
disclose that Saleem exercised control over either the initiation of such meetings
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or formulation of their outcomes. The attribution is largely derivative, reflecting
execution of tasks discussed by others and limited to coordination within the
Chand Bagh–Jafrabad cluster. The evidentiary foundation relied upon, even if
taken at its highest, does not presently establish that Saleem possessed
independent command capacity or strategic discretion warranting ongoing
incarceration solely on the basis of his associative presence at key locations.
315. The assertion that Saleem participated in the destruction of CCTV cameras
and in facilitating the movement of protestors to designated sites raises matters
for trial, however, pre-trial detention cannot be perpetuated merely because
violent acts are alleged in proximity to his presence, unless a direct and continuing
ability to influence or repeat such conduct is shown. There is no material before
this Court indicating that he presently retains access to organisational resources,
communication networks, or mobilising power that could enable interference
with the administration of justice. The legitimate concerns of the State can be
sufficiently guarded by supervision and tailored restrictions.
316. It is settled that the seriousness of the alleged acts, while relevant, does not
displace the constitutional requirement that pre-trial detention serve a
demonstrable and continuing necessity. In the absence of any plea or evidence
that Saleem’s custodial presence is required for further investigation, and given
that the prosecution narrative itself delineates him as an executor rather than an
originator or planner of the alleged conspiracy, this Court is unable to conclude
that the threshold of necessity under Article 21 remains satisfied. The balance
between individual liberty and collective security therefore tilts in favour of
conditional release.
317. The Court is cognisant that the architecture of the prosecution case relies
on a theory of layered participation, wherein actions undertaken at individual
protest sites are said to feed into a broader conspiratorial framework. Even
assuming this structure to be correct for the limited purpose of bail, the role
attributed to Saleem does not presently transcend the operational. His alleged
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activities do not indicate that he functioned as a conduit between the principal
architects and secondary actors beyond his immediate geographical sphere. In the
absence of such interlinking conduct, imputing to him a continuing capacity to
destabilise public order would be speculative rather than evidentiary.
318. Furthermore, the prosecution has not demonstrated that witnesses
associated with the Chand Bagh protest remain vulnerable to intimidation or
inducement at the hands of Saleem. In these circumstances, the apprehension of
evidence tampering must be founded on concrete risks rather than on the mere
gravity of the offences alleged.
319. The Court also notes that prolonged incarceration without demonstrable
necessity risks conflating punitive detention with preventive detention, contrary
to the settled constitutional position that the former cannot be imposed before
conviction save to secure legitimate trial-related objectives. A restrictive reading
of personal liberty is impermissible where targeted conditions could be imposed.
The imposition of such calibrated measures achieves the dual purpose of
safeguarding societal interests and upholding constitutional fidelity.
320. Lastly, the overarching narrative advanced by the prosecution emphasises
the systemic nature of the alleged conspiracy. However, systemic allegations
require systemic evidence an associative presence or execution of logistical tasks,
without more, does not justify a presumption of continuing threat in the post-
investigative stage. Judicial scrutiny at the bail stage must remain sensitive to the
distinction between contextual participation and autonomous agency. In the
present facts, this distinction militates against further curtailment of Saleem’s
liberty, and reinforces the principle that deprivation of liberty cannot be sustained
without distinct and ongoing justification anchored in necessity rather than
inference.
321. Having considered the differentiated attribution of roles among the
accused, this Court notes that the prosecution places Umar Khalid and Sharjeel
Imam at the apex of the alleged conspiracy, whereas Saleem is projected as a site-
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level participant whose presence and conduct derive meaning primarily from
directives purportedly issued by others. This structural distinction, coupled with
the absence of ongoing investigative necessity and the availability of strict
conditions to minimise any risk to the proceedings, persuades the Court that
continued incarceration of Saleem would not be proportionate. Accordingly, he is
held entitled to be released on bail subject to conditions enumerated below.
Nothing herein shall be construed as an opinion on guilt or innocence.
10. MEERAN HAIDER – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14132 OF 2025
10.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
322. Learned Senior counsel Sri Siddharth Aggarwal for the Appellant submits
that the Appellant has been in continuous judicial custody since 01.04.2020 and
has, as on date, undergone incarceration of over five years and five months as an
under-trial prisoner in the present case. It is urged that investigation qua the
Appellant stands concluded, as admitted by the prosecution before the Trial Court
in August 2024, and that he is not required for any further custodial interrogation.
It is contended that despite filing of multiple charge-sheets over a period of more
than four years, the trial has not commenced and there is no realistic likelihood
of its conclusion in the near future, particularly in view of the initially cited 960
witnesses and over 1200 relied-upon documents, even if the prosecution now
claims that the witness list would be pruned.
323. It is further urged that the Appellant has been arrested exclusively in the
present FIR and is not in custody in any other case. Learned counsel submits that
the Appellant is a well-educated individual, aged about 34 years, having
completed B-Tech, MBA and M-Phil, and has continued his academic pursuits
even while in custody. It is contended that the Appellant satisfies the triple test
for grant of bail, inasmuch as he is not a flight risk, has deep roots in society, has
cooperated with the investigation throughout, and there is no allegation of
tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Reliance is placed on the fact
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that when interim bail was granted for a short duration in August 2024, the
Appellant strictly complied with all conditions.
324. On the aspect of parity, learned Senior Counsel submitted that several co-
accused who were allegedly part of the core conspiracy, including those who were
members of the principal WhatsApp groups relied upon by the prosecution,
present in alleged secret meetings, or physically present at riot-affected areas,
have been granted bail. It is argued that the Appellant stands on a better footing,
as he is not alleged to have participated in any of the two secret meetings relied
upon by the prosecution, was not present at any riot site, and there is no CCTV
footage, recovery of weapons, or physical evidence connecting him to acts of
violence. It is contended that parity is pressed strictly on factual comparison and
not on any alleged dilution of statutory standards under the UAPA.
325. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even according to the
prosecution’s own case, as reflected in the charge-sheet, the Appellant has been
categorised as having a comparatively lesser role, being placed in the third
category out of four classes of accused. It is urged that this categorisation itself
contradicts the finding in the impugned judgment that the Appellant played a
“significant role” in the alleged conspiracy. It is argued that the High Court failed
to reconcile this internal inconsistency in the prosecution’s own material.
326. On merits, it was submitted that the principal allegation against the
Appellant relates to financing. Learned Senior Counsel contended that even as
per the prosecution, the alleged contribution attributed to the Appellant is between
Rs.2.33 lakhs and Rs.2.86 lakhs, out of an alleged total expenditure of
approximately Rs.1.60 crores, constituting less than two percent of the total. It
was urged that notwithstanding this, the Appellant has been described as a “key
fundraiser”, which is wholly disproportionate and unsupported by evidence. It is
further submitted that the Appellant has furnished a detailed explanation for the
small sums reflected in the diary/register seized from him, stating that the
amounts pertained to his proposed election campaign, personal expenses
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following the death of his mother and his father’s medical treatment, and for
providing food and water at protest sites. It is contended that no finding has been
returned on this explanation.
327. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Appellant is not alleged to have
been a member of the principal WhatsApp groups such as DPSG or MSJ, which
are claimed by the prosecution to be central to the alleged conspiracy. It is urged
that no incriminating message authored by the Appellant has been placed on
record, read out, or relied upon. It is further submitted that mere membership of
WhatsApp groups, absent any unlawful object or inciting content, cannot attract
liability under the UAPA.
328. It was also submitted that none of the speeches attributed to the Appellant
are provocative or inciteful. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the
transcripts placed on record show that the speeches emphasise constitutional
values, secularism, democracy and peaceful protest. It is urged that the specific
allegation that the Appellant delivered a provocative speech on 22.02.2020 at
Nizamuddin is demonstrably false, as no transcript of such speech has been
placed on record by the investigating agency.
329. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Appellant was not present
at any of the riot-affected sites, was not part of the alleged meetings at Chandbagh
or Seelampur, and that there is no CCTV footage, still photograph, or recovery
linking him to acts of violence. It is urged that statements recorded under Sections
161 and 164 CrPC do not disclose any overt act attributable to the Appellant that
would constitute offences under the UAPA.
330. It was contended that the prolonged incarceration of the Appellant violates
his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution,
particularly when he has already undergone more than half of the maximum
sentence prescribed for several of the alleged offences. Learned Senior Counsel
submitted that continued detention in the face of an indeterminate trial timeline
amounts to punitive incarceration without adjudication of guilt.
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331. On the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, it was urged that the
prosecution material, even if taken at face value, does not disclose a prima facie
case of the Appellant’s involvement in terrorist acts or conspiracy, and therefore
the statutory bar is not attracted. It was submitted that the High Court has
mechanically applied the embargo without undertaking the requisite prima facie
evaluation of the material specific to the Appellant.
332. In conclusion, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the cumulative effect
of prolonged custody, completion of investigation, absence of direct evidence,
comparative parity with co-accused on bail, and lack of any likelihood of early
trial, warrants grant of bail to the Appellant, and that denial thereof would result
in grave and irreparable prejudice.
10.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
333. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submits that the present case does
not arise from an isolated incident or a spontaneous law-and-order situation, but
from a deep-rooted, premeditated and carefully orchestrated criminal conspiracy
which culminated in large-scale violence in North-East Delhi in February 2020.
The investigation in FIR No. 59 of 2020 has revealed that the conspiracy was
executed in a phased manner beginning from December 2019, with the deliberate
objective of converting protests into permanent sit-in sites, escalating them into
disruptive chakka-jam, and thereafter triggering targeted violence. It is submitted
that the acts forming part of this conspiracy were intended to create widespread
fear, disrupt normal civic life and destabilise public order, thereby attracting the
stringent provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
334. It was urged that the Appellant, Meeran Haider, Accused No. 3, was not a
marginal or passive participant but an active conspirator from the inception. His
involvement surfaces even during the first phase of riots in December 2019, prior
to the February 2020 violence, and thus demonstrates continuity and depth of
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participation. The State submits that the material on record clearly establishes that
the Appellant was embedded within the organisational framework executing the
conspiracy. He was a member of United Against Hate, a component of the Delhi
Protest Support Group, and also a core member of the Jamia Coordination
Committee, which functioned as the operational arm of the conspiracy.
Statements of protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC name the
Appellant as a regular participant in daily meetings and secret meetings
concerning protest sites, mobilisation and logistics, thereby prima facie
establishing his knowing and voluntary involvement.
335. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the role of the Appellant was
operational, supervisory and managerial in nature. He functioned as an organiser
and administrator of multiple permanent protest sites, entrusted with their
maintenance, coordination and continuity in furtherance of the common design.
Electronic material recovered during investigation, including chats from the
Appellant’s own device, shows him identifying protest locations, assigning
responsibilities and coordinating personnel across sites. It is further submitted
that the Appellant actively participated in mobilisation and escalation, exhorting
protestors to engage in chakka-jam and to confront police personnel, thereby
facilitating the transition from protest to violence. These acts, it is urged, were
integral to the execution of the conspiracy and cannot be characterised as
protected dissent or lawful protest.
336. On the issue of financing and strategy, learned counsel submits that the
Appellant actively collected, handled and channelled funds meant for sustaining
protest sites and riot-related activities. Multiple witnesses examined under
Sections 161 and 164 CrPC have stated that they handed over money to the
Appellant during the relevant period, and cash recoveries were effected from
concealed locations within his residence. The State submits that the explanation
now sought to be offered regarding the source and purpose of these funds raises
disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated at the stage of bail. It is
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further urged that the Appellant was privy to core strategic decisions of the
conspirators, including internal role allocation and narrative management, and
that he remained in real-time communication with key conspirators and foot-
soldiers during the critical period of 22–24 February 2020, monitoring execution
and participating in coordinated attempts to shift blame and public perception
once violence had erupted.
337. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju finally submited that the absence of the
Appellant from the physical site of rioting or the lack of recovery of weapons is
immaterial in a conspiracy of this nature, where roles are distributed and liability
attaches equally to planners, organisers, financiers and supervisors. The plea of
parity is misconceived, as the Appellant is not similarly situated to co-accused
who have been granted bail, his role being distinct in nature and gravity. It was
urged that prolonged incarceration by itself cannot override the statutory embargo
under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA once the accusations are prima facie true. At
the stage of bail, the Court is not required to conduct a detailed evaluation of
defence explanations. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the material on
record clearly discloses the Appellant’s active and central involvement in the
conspiracy, attracting the statutory bar to bail, and that any grant of bail at this
stage would defeat the object of the special statute and undermine the
administration of justice.
10.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
338. The Trial Court vide order dated 04.12.2024 in IA. No. 208/2024 in S.C.
163 of 2020, rejected the second bail application filed by the Appellant on the
ground that, the order dated 05.04.2022 in IA No. 94/2021, dismissing the
applicant’s first bail application was passed after a detailed consideration of the
facts and merits, wherein the Court, upon perusal of the charge sheet and
accompanying documents, found the allegations against the applicant to be prima
106
facie true. The Court also rejected the contention that prolonged trial by itself
warranted bail, held that the statutory embargo under Section 43(D) of the UAPA
as well as Section 437 Cr.P.C. was applicable, and consequently found the
applicant not entitled to bail. Since the said dismissal occurred after filing of the
charge sheet and the stage of the case remains unchanged, the Court holds that
entertaining the present bail application on the same grounds, notwithstanding
submissions regarding changed circumstances and reliance on judgments, would
amount to an impermissible review of the earlier order dated 05.04.2022. having
noted the order of the trial court rejecting 2
nd
bail application, it becomes
imperative for us to set out the reasons for dismissal of the 1
st
bail application of
the appellant which is given in the subsequent paragraphs.
339. The Trial Court held that the material placed on record disclosed prima
facie involvement of the appellant in a large-scale, deep-rooted and well-
orchestrated criminal conspiracy culminating in the North-East Delhi riots of
February 2020. On a holistic reading of the charge-sheet, its annexures, case
diary, witness statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., WhatsApp chats
(including DPSG/JCC), speeches, and other documentary and electronic material,
the Court found that the protests against CAA/NRC were not organic but were
strategically planned to escalate into chakka-jam and thereafter into widespread
violence, targeting police, public order, and property. At the bail stage, the Court
emphasized that it was not required to conduct a detailed trial-like evaluation, and
that the prosecution material, taken at face value, sufficiently connected the
appellant to the conspiracy.
340. A decisive ground for rejection was the statutory embargo under Section
43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with Section 437
Cr.P.C. Relying extensively on NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watalli (supra) and
Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India
12
, the Court reiterated that if, upon perusal of
12
(2022) 14 SCC 766.
107
the charge-sheet and case diary, there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusations are prima facie true, bail must be refused. Applying this standard,
the Court concluded that the prosecution material crossed the statutory threshold
and therefore the bar under Section 43D(5) squarely operated against the
appellant.
341. The Trial Court rejected the defence contention that the appellant’s acts
were protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution as peaceful
protest or dissent. It held that while the right to protest is sacrosanct, the charge-
sheet portrays a conspiracy under the guise of protest, aimed at paralysing civic
life, blocking arterial roads, provoking confrontation, and ultimately triggering
communal violence. The Court further held that issues relating to interpretation
of speeches, credibility of witnesses, admissibility of documents, alleged absence
from riot sites, and claimed lack of direct overt acts are matters for trial, and
cannot dilute the prima facie satisfaction required at the bail stage in a UAPA
case.
342. Lastly, the Trial Court noted the gravity and societal impact of the offences,
the scale of violence, loss of life, and damage to public and private property, and
reiterated that conspiracy is seldom proved by direct evidence and must be
assessed cumulatively. Taking a holistic view of the material, the Trial Court held
that the appellant’s role could not be examined in isolation and that the
prosecution had established reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations
were prima facie true. In view of the statutory restrictions under UAPA and the
additional bar under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the Court concluded that the appellant
was not entitled to bail, and accordingly dismissed the bail application.
10.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
343. The High Court in the impugned order found that the prosecution material
prima facie established Meeran Haider’s role as an active executor and fundraiser
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within the conspiracy, closely working with other conspirators and alleged
masterminds. He was alleged to be a core JCC member, part of multiple
WhatsApp groups receiving directions from DPSG, and to have played a key role
in mobilising protestors, managing protest sites, and raising and disbursing funds.
The Court noted recoveries of cash, registers recording monetary transactions,
bank-account analysis, call-detail records, and witness statements suggesting that
funds were received and utilised for sustaining protests and for escalating chakka-
jaams into violence. He was also alleged to have exhorted protestors to collect
weapons and intensify confrontations with police, which, at the bail stage, was
sufficient to connect him to the execution of the conspiracy.
344. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the High Court held that the
accusations against Meeran Haider met the threshold of prima facie truth, creating
a statutory bar to bail. The arguments based on completion of investigation,
alleged change in circumstances, long incarceration, parity with co-accused
granted bail, and claimed benign use of funds were rejected. The Court
emphasised that funding and mobilisation form a critical preparatory stage of a
conspiracy, and that the role attributed to Meeran Haider was distinct from those
released on bail. Holding that evidentiary assessment and credibility issues must
be tested at trial, the Court concluded that no case for bail was made out and
dismissed the appeal.
10.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
345. As per the charge-sheet, Meeran Haider, stated to be a member of United
Against Hate (UAH), along with students of Jamia Millia Islamia University, is
alleged to have played a significant role in the implementation of the protests that
ultimately culminated in violence. The charge-sheet alleges that Meeran Haider
was one of the core members of the Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC) and
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that he participated in clandestine meetings convened in relation to the
establishment and management of protest sites. According to the charge-sheet and
the statement of protected witness “Bond”, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman,
Arib Hassan, Asif Iqbal Tanha, Saiful Islam, and Safoora Zargar were the
principal members of the JCC.
346. The charge-sheet further alleges that Meeran Haider acted as an organiser
of several protest sites. Chats exchanged between Meeran Haider and Tasleem,
dated 20.01.2020, are relied upon to show that Meeran Haider was responsible
for managing eight protest sites as part of the alleged conspiracy. It is further
alleged that he instigated participants at these sites to enforce chakka jams and
thereafter to escalate the same into violent riots by attacking members of the
general public and police personnel.
347. Statements of witnesses Akib Aman and “Platinum” are relied upon to
allege that Meeran Haider collected funds for organising the protests that took
place during the first two months of 2020. According to protected witness
“Robert”, Meeran Haider collected funds and contributed the same to the corpus
of AAJMI through its General Secretary, Areeb, for the purpose of facilitating
riots.
348. The charge-sheet further records the recovery of an amount of ₹1,45,000
allegedly belonging to Meeran Haider, which is stated to have been kept by his
sister, Shahjeen Khatoon, at his behest. Witness Shahjeen Khatoon is stated to
have testified that the said amount was recovered upon the arrest of Meeran
Haider. It is further alleged that Meeran Haider acted directly under the directions
of Sharjeel Imam.
349. It is further alleged that on 22.02.2020 at approximately 22:17 hours,
Tasleem Ahmed sent a message from Jafrabad to Meeran Haider reporting the
commencement of a chakka jam. According to the charge-sheet, this
communication indicates that Meeran Haider was responsible for coordinating
certain protest sites.
110
350. On the night intervening 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020, during the
occurrence of the riots, Meeran Haider is alleged to have ensured the participation
of Jamia students in the protests by circulating messages on WhatsApp groups. It
is further alleged that after each chakka jam was executed, Meeran Haider would
receive reports confirming the success of the particular blockade.
351. On 24.02.2020, following alleged threats by certain members of the DPSG
to expose those responsible for the violence, the charge-sheet states that Umar
Khalid called Meeran Haider to inform him about the next course of action.
352. A prima facie appraisal of the prosecution material indicates that the role
ascribed to Meeran Haider is fundamentally that of an organiser and coordinator
of designated protest sites within the Jamia network, acting largely upon
instructions communicated through alleged higher-level actors. The record does
not presently disclose that he possessed autonomous decision-making authority
over the alleged overarching design, nor that he exercised strategic control over
the escalation of protests. His alleged participation does not, on its face value,
justify the continued curtailment of his liberty at the pre-trial stage.
353. The allegation that Meeran Haider coordinated protest sites and facilitated
participation of students, including the organisation of resources, is materially
distinct from assertions of conceptual leadership or command. Insofar as the
evidentiary substratum does not presently establish that he exercised meaningful
discretion over the initiation of violence or the transition of protests into chakka
jams, this Court is unable to hold that prolonged incarceration is necessary solely
to reflect the gravity of the charge.
354. The apprehensions expressed by the State regarding the possibility of
Meeran Haider re-mobilising student populations or exerting influence over
former protest networks cannot be accepted in the abstract. No material has been
placed to show that such organisational structures continue to operate or that the
appellant retains access to resources or networks capable of compromising the
integrity of the proceedings. The risks invoked by the prosecution can be
111
effectively mitigated through stringent conditions prohibiting contact with
prosecution witnesses, restricting participation in public assemblies touching the
subject matter, and securing regular attendance before the trial court.
355. It is a settled principle that the seriousness of the allegations, though
relevant, does not obviate the constitutional requirement that deprivation of
liberty must be necessary for legitimate investigative or trial-related objectives.
The prosecution does not assert that custodial interrogation of Meeran Haider is
required at this stage, nor that his continued detention is indispensable for
securing further evidence. Absent such necessity, the Court must ensure that
preventive detention does not incrementally assume a punitive character,
particularly where the role attributed to the appellant is situational and derivative
rather than originating or directive.
356. The Court further recognises that the evidentiary framework relied upon
does not, at this stage, attribute to the appellant any independent role in securing
financial resources or channelling funds towards the alleged conspiracy beyond
logistical facilitation incidental to protest management. The distinction between
episodic facilitation and sustained financial stewardship bears directly on the
question of continuing necessity, for it is only the latter that might prima facie
justify custodial restraint on the ground of potential resource-based reactivation.
In the absence of such linkage, the appellant’s liberty cannot be curtailed merely
on apprehensions rooted in past associations.
357. Moreover, the records placed before the Court indicate that critical
electronic communications, organisational documents, and statements of
witnesses forming the backbone of the prosecution narrative have already been
secured. No plea has been advanced asserting that further custodial presence of
the appellant is necessary to extract residual evidence or confront him with newly
discovered material. Where the investigatory stage has effectively matured and
the appellant’s participation appears circumscribed by directive structures no
112
longer demonstrably operational, the constitutional presumption of liberty must
regain primacy.
358. The Court also takes note that the prosecutorial depiction of a multi-layered
mobilisation architecture requires careful calibration when translated into
determinations of pre-trial necessity. If layered participation is accepted as the
structural premise, proportionality requires that liberty restrictions correspond to
the specific layer of agency attributed to the appellant. To conflate operational
responsibility with command responsibility at the bail stage would risk imposing
a regime of undifferentiated incarceration antithetical to the principle that liberty
may only be withheld where contemporaneous and individualised grounds
compel such curtailment.
359. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the objectives of securing the
integrity of the trial, preventing witness influence, and guarding against re-
mobilisation can be achieved through targeted restrictions rather than continued
custody. Conditions such as periodic reporting, prohibition on participation in
assemblies relating to the subject matter, and restraints on electronic
communication with identified individuals are proportionate safeguards that align
constitutional fidelity with legitimate State interests. Accordingly, subject to the
imposition of such conditions, the balance of considerations favours enlargement
on bail, without this Court expressing any view on the ultimate culpability of the
appellant.
360. In light of the differentiated hierarchy of roles disclosed by the prosecution
narrative wherein Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are alleged to occupy a
central, directive position, and Meeran Haider is alleged to have acted within an
executory framework shaped by their directions this Court is persuaded that
continued incarceration of the appellant is not proportionate to the limited
attribution presently established. Accordingly, subject to conditions ensuring his
presence during trial, non-interference with witnesses, and a restraint on public
commentary touching the merits of the case, the appellant is held entitled to be
113
enlarged on bail. It is clarified that the observations herein are limited to the
determination of bail and shall not prejudice the trial in any manner.
11. SHADAB AHMED - APPELLANT IN SLP(CRL.) NO. 17055/2025
11.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
361. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddharth Luthra for the appellant submitted
that the appellant has been in continuous custody since 20.05.2020 in FIR No. 59
of 2020, Police Station Crime Branch, arising out of the alleged larger conspiracy
relating to the North-East Delhi riots. It was urged that the appellant has
undergone incarceration for more than five years and six months, while the case
has not progressed beyond the stage of arguments on charge. The prosecution has
cited about 835 witnesses and placed over 1,000 documents on record, apart from
filing four supplementary charge-sheets, and the delay in commencement of trial
is wholly unrelated to the conduct of the appellant.
362. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant’s implication in the
present FIR is founded primarily on FIR No. 60 of 2020, Police Station Dayalpur,
relating to the death of Head Constable Rattan Lal, and FIR No. 136 of 2020,
Police Station Dayalpur, relating to the burning of a Maruti showroom. It was
pointed out that the appellant has already been granted bail in both these cases,
the High Court having granted bail in FIR No. 60 of 2020 on 03.09.2021 and the
Trial Court having granted bail in FIR No. 136 of 2020 on 21.12.2020, and
therefore the continued incarceration of the appellant in the present case, which
substantially rests on the same factual foundation, is wholly unjustified.
363. It was further submitted that even as per the prosecution case, the alleged
mobilisation and violence at Chand Bagh occurred between noon and about 1:00
PM on 24.02.2020. The appellant’s Call Detail Records, which form part of the
charge-sheet, conclusively establish that the appellant was present at his residence
in Jagatpuri till 12:19 PM and reached the vicinity of the alleged place of
114
occurrence only at 1:13 PM, after the incident had concluded. In the absence of
any CCTV footage, video recording or independent electronic material showing
the appellant’s presence or participation, the belated witness statements alleging
instigation or violence are generic and omnibus and stand contradicted by the
electronic evidence.
364. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution has repeatedly
shifted its stand to fill lacunae, initially alleging physical presence and instigation
on 24.02.2020 and subsequently introducing a theory of an alleged meeting on
23.02.2020, sought to be supported by statements recorded more than a year after
the incident. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Dilawar Balu
Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135, to submit that such delayed
and shifting versions erode the credibility of the prosecution case. It was lastly
urged that the appellant is entitled to bail on the ground of parity, as similarly
situated co-accused, namely Asif Iqbal Tanha, Natasha Narwal and Devangana
Kalita, have already been granted bail, and that continued detention of the
appellant would be wholly disproportionate and unjustified.
11.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
365. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submitted that the appellant is a
key conspirator and local executor of the larger criminal conspiracy which
culminated in the organised and targeted violence in North East Delhi in February
2020. The material on record establishes that the appellant was an active member
of the DPSG network and worked in concert with other core conspirators to
escalate protests into disruptive chakka-jaam and thereafter into violent riots,
particularly at Chand Bagh, pursuant to conspiratorial directions issued through
meetings and coordinated communications.
366. It was submitted that the prosecution has placed cogent and consistent
material showing the appellant’s participation in a series of conspiratorial
115
meetings, including meetings at the Indian Social Institute, Lodhi Road, and
secret night meetings held on 16/17 February, 20/21 February and 23 February
2020 at Chand Bagh. These meetings were convened to finalise the roadmap for
converting sit-in protests into disruptive chakka-jaam on arterial roads and
thereafter engineering violence. Protected witnesses, including Jupiter, Silver,
Gold, Bravo and Johny, have deposed that the appellant attended these meetings,
issued directions to protest organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches and
coordinated execution at the Chand Bagh protest site.
367. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the reliance placed on Call
Detail Records is wholly misconceived and ignores the settled law governing
criminal conspiracy. Physical presence at the precise moment of violence is not
determinative where the material establishes planning, coordination and
assignment of roles. The evidence on record shows that in the conspiratorial
meeting held on the night of 23.02.2020, the appellant undertook to get CCTV
cameras covered or destroyed through his team. This is corroborated by protected
witness Radium and supported by CCTV footage and forensic analysis showing
systematic dislocation and covering of government cameras between 12:05 PM
and 12:45 PM on 24.02.2020, immediately preceding the coordinated attack on
the police at about 1:00 PM.
368. It was lastly submitted that the gravity of the offences, including murder of
Head Constable Ratan Lal, brutal attacks on police officers, large-scale arson and
destruction of public property, coupled with the appellant’s central and
operational role in the conspiracy, disentitle him to the discretionary relief of bail.
The plea of parity is untenable, as the appellant’s role is distinct and supported by
a continuous chain of prima facie evidence. The State therefore prayed that the
application for bail be rejected.
116
11.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT :
369. The Trial Court vide order dated 13.10.2022, passed in IA. No. 101/2022
in SC 163/2020 rejected the bail application filed by the Appellant. The Trial
Court held that the charge-sheet and accompanying material disclosed prima facie
involvement of the appellant in a large-scale, deep-rooted and meticulously
planned criminal conspiracy which culminated in the North-East Delhi riots of
February 2020. On a holistic assessment of the prosecution case, including
witness statements, protected witness testimonies, WhatsApp chats of
DPSG/JCC, and CCTV analysis, the Court found that the protests were not
organic or spontaneous but were strategically designed to escalate into chakka-
jam and thereafter into organised communal violence. The appellant’s role was
not to be viewed in isolation, and his participation in key meetings and
coordination with other conspirators formed part of the larger conspiracy.
370. A decisive reason for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with the
additional restriction under Section 437 Cr.P.C. Relying extensively on NIA v.
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India
(supra), the Court reiterated that at the bail stage, it is sufficient if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, and that
the degree of satisfaction required is lighter than at the stage of trial or discharge.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the prosecution material, taken
at face value, clearly crossed the statutory threshold, thereby barring the grant of
bail.
371. The Court rejected the defence submissions that the appellant was merely
a volunteer at a peaceful protest site, that DPSG was not a banned organisation,
or that there was no direct evidence such as CCTV footage showing him
committing violent acts. It held that criminal conspiracy is rarely proved by direct
evidence and is ordinarily established through circumstantial evidence, conduct,
117
and the cumulative effect of surrounding circumstances. Alleged inconsistencies
in witness statements, delay in recording statements, admissibility of electronic
evidence, and claims of false implication were held to be matters for trial, and
could not be examined in depth at the bail stage.
372. Finally, the Court underscored the gravity, scale, and societal impact of the
offences, noting the loss of lives, including that of a police officer, grievous
injuries to several public servants, and extensive damage to public and private
property. It reiterated that conspiracy cases require a holistic view of the entire
chain of events, and that the appellant had failed to dislodge the prima facie case
established by the prosecution. In view of the statutory restrictions under UAPA
and Cr.P.C., and the serious nature of the allegations, the Court held that the
appellant was not entitled to bail and accordingly dismissed the bail application.
11.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
373. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution material,
when assessed cumulatively, disclosed prima facie involvement of Shadab
Ahmed as an active participant in the execution phase of the larger criminal
conspiracy culminating in the North-East Delhi riots. He was alleged to be a
member of the DPSG WhatsApp group, a regular attendee of key conspiratorial
meetings (including those held at Chand Bagh in February 2020), and one of the
organisers managing the Chand Bagh–Mustafabad protest site. The Court noted
that witness statements and electronic evidence prima facie indicated his role in
mobilising protestors, coordinating chakka-jaams, and concurring with plans to
escalate protests into violence, including discussions relating to arson, attacks on
police, and destruction of public property. His role, though not that of a
mastermind, was held to be integral to the operationalisation of the conspiracy.
374. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the
Court held that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
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against Shadab Ahmed were prima facie true, thereby barring the grant of bail.
The Court rejected pleas based on lack of direct overt acts, alleged contradictions
in protected witness statements, parity with co-accused enlarged on bail, and the
fact that he had been granted bail in other FIRs arising out of the riots. It was
clarified that the present case related to a larger conspiracy under the UAPA,
distinct from other FIRs, and that evidentiary inconsistencies and credibility
issues are matters for trial. Consequently, the bail appeal was dismissed.
11.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
375. It was alleged that accused Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan, both stated to
be members of the Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG) and participants in the
DPSG WhatsApp group, functioned as local operatives executing the larger
conspiracy allegedly orchestrated by the principal conspirators to engineer riots
under the guise of protests. According to the prosecution, the plan involved a
calibrated escalation of peaceful sit-ins into chakka jams, which were thereafter
intensified into disruptive blockades accompanied by violence. It is further
alleged that both Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan regularly attended DPSG
meetings held at the Indian Social Institute, along with members of the Jamia
Coordination Committee (JCC) and leaders of various protest sites across Delhi.
At these meetings, the progress of the alleged conspiracy was reviewed and
operational directions were issued, including through the DPSG WhatsApp
group. Documentary material relied upon by the prosecution is stated to indicate
that twelve such meetings were held between December 2019 and February 2020.
376. Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan are further alleged to have played an active
role in executing the protest plan at Chand Bagh as devised by DPSG members.
Statements of protected witnesses “Silver”, “Gold”, “Venus”, and “Saturn” are
relied upon to support the prosecution case regarding the execution of the plan
and the specific role attributed to Shadab Ahmad therein.
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377. It is further alleged that Shadab Ahmad was present at a meeting held at
the Chand Bagh protest site at approximately 02:00 a.m. on 17.02.2020.
According to the prosecution, this meeting played an instrumental role in shaping
the protests that occurred between 22.02.2020 and 24.02.2020. Call Detail Record
(CDR) analysis is relied upon to place Shadab Ahmad at the said meeting.
Statements of protected witnesses “Bravo”, “Johnny”, “Lambda”, and “Kilo” are
also relied upon to describe the planning undertaken at, and the participation of
Shadab Ahmad in, the meeting held on 17.02.2020.
378. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shadab Ahmad also participated in
another meeting held during the intervening night of 20.02.2020 and 21.02.2020.
As noted hereinabove, the said meeting is alleged to have played a significant
role in the protests and incidents of violence that took place on 22.02.2020 and
23.02.2020.
379. According to the prosecution, the aforesaid meetings of 17.02.2020 and
20/21.02.2020 were crucial in the execution of the protests that culminated in
violence on 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020. Pursuant to these meetings, protesters
are alleged to have carried out violent acts at the Jafrabad Metro Station.
Statements of protected witnesses “Echo” and “Sodium” are relied upon to
corroborate the occurrence of, and deliberations at, the conspiratorial meeting
held on 20.02.2020 and 21.02.2020.
380. It is further alleged that on the night of 22.02.2020, DPSG members Shadab
Ahmad and Athar Khan convened a meeting at the basement of one Ayaz in
Chand Bagh, which was attended by organisers of various protest sites in North-
East Delhi as well as persons who were later arrested in connection with riot-
related cases. At the said meeting, it is alleged that they informed the attendees
that the Jafrabad chakka jam had been successfully executed in furtherance of the
conspiracy and directed them to replicate the same in their respective areas to
trigger riots. Thereafter, on 23.02.2020, Shadab Ahmad, Athar Khan, and others
are alleged to have shifted the Chand Bagh protest to the main Wazirabad–
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Ghaziabad Road, resulting in a disruptive chakka jam, attacks on police personnel
and civilians, and extensive damage to public and private property. As the
violence allegedly did not escalate to the desired level, another conspiratorial
meeting is stated to have been held that night at the residence of one Mukhtyar,
where it was decided to destroy CCTV cameras to facilitate further violence.
Specific tasks for disabling the cameras were allegedly assigned to identified
members, with CCTV footage relied upon to corroborate the presence and
coordination of the accused.
381. The charge-sheet further relies upon reverse mapping of persons arrested
for grave offences committed during the North-East Delhi riots, which is stated
to trace a clear chain of command to a clandestine meeting held at Chand Bagh
at around 02:00 a.m. on 17.02.2020. According to the prosecution, several key
perpetrators of murders, rioting, arson, and other serious offences were either
present at the said meeting or remained in regular contact with its participants,
particularly DPSG members Shadab Ahmad, Athar Khan, Gulfisha Fatima, and
Khalid Saifi. The mapping is relied upon to allege coordinated roles in the
commission of murders, acts of rioting and arson, destruction of CCTV cameras,
assignment of specific targets, and financing of weapons and ammunition,
culminating in the framing of charges against core conspirators in FIR No.
60/2020 relating to mass violence and the killing of Head Constable Ratan Lal. It
is further alleged that, after the alleged role of DPSG in the riots came to light,
members were instructed to delete WhatsApp chats, following which Shadab
Ahmad and Athar Khan were removed from the DPSG group after executing their
purported roles in organising the riots in North-East Delhi.
382. Upon a prima facie assessment of the material relied upon by the
prosecution, the role attributed to Shadab Ahmad appears to be that of a site-level
executor associated with Chand Bagh and related protest clusters, whose presence
at certain meetings is alleged to have facilitated operational coordination
following directions emanating from others. The evidence presently placed on
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record does not disclose that he occupied an authoritative position in
conceptualising the alleged conspiracy or that he exercised independent control
over its strategic formulation. His alleged association with chakka jam planning,
while relevant to trial, does not by itself sustain the continued deprivation of
liberty at the pre-trial stage in the absence of material showing autonomous
command or unilateral decision-making authority.
383. The prosecution narrative stresses Shadab’s attendance at late-night
meetings and his participation in conveying instructions to organisers of protest
sites. However, even taken at its highest, this depiction situates him as a conduit
for information and coordination rather than as an architect of escalation. The
allegations neither establish that he devised the strategy to engineer violence nor
that he exercised discretion over the location, timing, or modality of the alleged
unlawful acts. The attributed conduct is derivative and execution-centred, and the
evidentiary record does not presently disclose that he shaped or altered the
trajectory of the protests in a manner warranting further custodial curtailment.
384. The State expresses apprehension that Shadab’s enlargement on bail may
enable reactivation of dormant networks or interference with witnesses. However,
there is no cogent material to suggest that he presently retains the organisational
capacity or influence necessary to mobilise individuals or resources independent
of the structures that, by the prosecution’s own account, operated under a
hierarchical command led by others. The risks articulated can be effectively
addressed by imposing conditions restraining his interaction with co-accused and
witnesses, restricting participation in assemblies concerning the subject matter,
and ensuring regular attendance before the trial court.
385. The Court remains mindful that the alleged acts culminated in serious
violence yet, the gravity of the incident cannot be the sole criterion to perpetuate
detention when the individual’s attributed role is operational rather than directive.
The prosecution has not demonstrated that Shadab’s custodial presence is
required for ongoing investigation or that further evidence is contingent upon his
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continued incarceration. In the absence of such necessity, indefinite pre-trial
detention would assume a punitive character inconsistent with constitutional
guarantees of personal liberty under Article 21, particularly where the alleged
conduct is neither shown to be ongoing nor presently repeatable in a manner
jeopardising the proceedings.
386. The Court further notes that the documentary and electronic evidence
forming the backbone of the prosecution case has already been secured and
subjected to forensic processes, and no submission has been advanced suggesting
that Shadab’s custodial presence is indispensable for recovery of additional
material. The absence of any pending investigative step requiring his
confrontation or custodial interrogation weighs significantly against continued
deprivation of liberty, for pre-trial detention cannot be justified merely to await
the vicissitudes of trial when the evidentiary record is substantially crystallised.
387. Moreover, while the prosecution advances the thesis of layered
participation culminating in coordinated disruptions across multiple sites, it is
incumbent upon the Court to maintain proportionality between the attributed
layer of involvement and the nature of liberty restriction imposed. Insofar as
Shadab is alleged to have functioned at an executory tier without demonstrated
autonomy over escalation or violence, extending pre-trial detention would risk
conflating operational participation with strategic authorship, contrary to the
requirement that liberty be curtailed only upon individualised and
contemporaneous necessity.
388. The Court is also persuaded that calibrated conditions can adequately
address the State’s concerns regarding potential interference with the
administration of justice. In the absence of material demonstrating that measures
would be insufficient, continued incarceration cannot be sustained.
389. In these circumstances and bearing in mind that the constitutional
presumption favours liberty unless its curtailment is demonstrably necessary for
legitimate and current purposes of investigation or trial, the Court finds no
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compelling grounds to justify the further confinement of Shadab Ahmad. The
differentiated hierarchy of roles articulated by the prosecution underscores that
his alleged conduct, while forming part of the evidentiary matrix for trial, does
not presently establish a continuing threat warranting custodial restraint. Subject
to strict compliance with conditions imposed by the Court, enlargement on bail
remains the proportionate course.
390. Having regard to the differentiated nature of involvement disclosed by the
prosecution itself where Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are alleged to have
conceptualised and directed the overarching plan, whereas Shadab Ahmad is
alleged to have acted as a local-level facilitator of decisions taken elsewhere. This
Court finds that the threshold of necessity for continued detention is not fulfilled
in his case. Conditional release can sufficiently secure the interests of justice.
Accordingly, subject to stringent conditions as imposed below, the appellant is
held entitled to be enlarged on bail. These observations are confined to the
adjudication of bail and shall not be construed as expressing a view on the merits.
12. GULFISHA FATIMA – SLP (CRL.) NO. 13988/2025
12.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
391. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Abhishek Manu Singhvi for the Appellant
submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court declining bail suffers
from a fundamental error in approach, inasmuch as it proceeds on broad
generalisations about the nature of the alleged conspiracy while completely losing
sight of the specific role attributed to the present Appellant. It was urged that the
Appellant has remained in custody since April 2020, now for more than five and
a half years, without charges even being framed, and that the denial of bail in such
circumstances amounts to a punitive pre-trial incarceration wholly alien to settled
constitutional principles.
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392. He further submitted that on a plain reading of the charge sheets and the
material relied upon by the prosecution, no overt act of violence is attributed to
the Appellant at any protest site. The allegations, at the highest, pertain to
participation in and organisation of protests in the Seelampur–Jafrabad area,
which, as borne out from the record itself, remained peaceful, with no recoveries,
no injuries, no MLCs and no contemporaneous evidence of rioting or use of
weapons. It was emphasised that the Appellant was not a member of the alleged
conspiratorial WhatsApp groups such as DPSG, which the prosecution itself
projects as the backbone of the conspiracy narrative.
393. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court has gravely erred in
rejecting the Appellant’s claim of parity. Co-accused Devangana Kalita and
Natasha Narwal, who are alleged to have played a more proximate role in the
supposed conspiracy and were admittedly members of DPSG, have been on bail
since June 2021, which bail was affirmed by this Hon’ble Court. The role
attributed to the Appellant is not only similar but demonstrably lesser, and yet she
continues to remain incarcerated. The finding that parity is unavailable is thus
unsupported by the record and internally inconsistent with the prosecution’s own
case.
394. He further submitted that the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA cannot be read in isolation or as a charter for indefinite detention. This
Hon’ble Court has repeatedly held that where there is no likelihood of the trial
concluding within a reasonable time, constitutional courts are duty-bound to
intervene to protect personal liberty. In the present case, with nearly a thousand
witnesses cited, voluminous documentary material, and arguments on charge still
pending, there is no realistic prospect of trial commencing, let alone concluding,
in the near future.
395. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the impugned judgment
proceeds on conjectures rather than evidence, particularly while relying on
belated and uncorroborated statements of protected witnesses, recorded months
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after the alleged events, without independent support from call records,
recoveries, or contemporaneous material. The High Court, it was urged, has
selectively relied upon incriminatory fragments while ignoring exculpatory
material, thereby falling into a clear error of law at the stage of bail.
396. He lastly submitted that the continued incarceration of the Appellant, a
young woman, despite the absence of any direct allegation of violence, despite
clear parity with co-accused already enlarged on bail, and despite extraordinary
delay in the progress of the case, results in a manifest violation of Article 21 of
the Constitution. It was therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased
to set aside the impugned judgment and enlarge the Appellant on bail, on such
terms and conditions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interests of justice.
12.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
397. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the role of Gulfisha Fatima,
Accused No. 5, is clearly delineated in the charge sheets and supporting material,
which establish her as a key local executor of the larger criminal conspiracy. She
was not a passive protestor but was entrusted with operational responsibility of
the Seelampur–Jafrabad protest site, owing to her status as a local resident with
deep community access. The prosecution case is that directions issued by
principal conspirators were channelled through Gulfisha Fatima for on-ground
execution at this site, making her an indispensable link in the conspiracy chain .
398. It was further submitted that Gulfisha Fatima actively participated in
conspiratorial meetings, including the meeting held on 23.01.2020 at Yameen
House, Seelampur, attended by Umar Khalid, Natasha Narwal and Devangana
Kalita, where instructions were issued for stockpiling red chilli powder, acid,
bottles and sticks. Witnesses examined under Section 164 CrPC have specifically
named Gulfisha Fatima as being present in this meeting. Her presence is not
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incidental but forms part of the preparatory stage of the conspiracy, preceding the
escalation of protests into violence.
399. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that Gulfisha Fatima also attended
the clandestine meeting held in the intervening night of 16/17.02.2020 at Chand
Bagh, where the final roadmap for escalating chakka-jam into violent riots was
discussed. Witnesses have deposed that representatives of North-East Delhi
protest sites, including Gulfisha Fatima, were present and agreed to intensify road
blockades and orchestrate violence. This meeting constitutes the immediate
precursor to the events of 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020 and directly links Gulfisha
Fatima to the execution phase of the conspiracy.
400. It was further submitted that pursuant to these meetings, Gulfisha Fatima
actively mobilised women protestors, used coded language to communicate
instructions, and facilitated distribution of stones, chilli powder and other
material at the Jafrabad protest site. Statements of witnesses recorded under
Section 164 CrPC specifically attribute to her the act of instigating women
protestors and providing them with materials used to attack police personnel and
civilians. These acts are not symbolic or peripheral but constitute direct
participation in chakka-jam and the subsequent violent riots on 22.02.2020 and
23.02.2020, leading to registration of FIRs for serious offences including attempt
to murder and murder.
401. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that Gulfisha Fatima
remained in continuous contact with other co-accused persons, including Athar
Khan, Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita and Tasleem Ahmad, and that real-time
updates from the Seelampur–Jafrabad site were communicated to principal
conspirators. The prosecution has also relied upon witness statements indicating
that Gulfisha Fatima received funds from co-accused Tahir Hussain for utilisation
in riots. At the stage of bail, these materials clearly satisfy the threshold of “prima
facie true” under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
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402. He lastly submitted that the plea of parity raised by Gulfisha Fatima is
wholly misconceived, as her role as a local executor and facilitator at a critical
protest site distinguishes her from other accused who have been granted bail. The
gravity of her specific acts, her proximity to the execution of violence, and the
statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA disentitle her from any
discretionary relief. It was therefore prayed that the appeal filed by Gulfisha
Fatima be dismissed and the order declining bail be affirmed.
12.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
403. The Trial Court vide order dated 16.03.2022 passed in IA. No. 72/2021 in
SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by the Appellant. The Trial
Court held that the allegations against the appellant disclosed prima facie
involvement in a large-scale and deep-rooted criminal conspiracy culminating in
the North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic reading of the charge-
sheet, case diary, witness statements, and electronic material, the Court found
sufficient material indicating that the protests were not spontaneous but were
engineered, escalated into chakka-jam, and thereafter into targeted violence, with
prior meetings, coordinated roles, and preparatory acts. At the stage of bail, the
Court emphasized that it was not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation
of evidence, and that the prosecution material, taken at face value, revealed the
appellant’s complicity in the conspiracy.
404. A central reason for rejection was the statutory bar under Section 43D(5)
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Applying the law laid down in
National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watalli (supra), the
Court held that once there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
is prima facie true, bail must be refused. The Court found that the material
collected by the investigating agency satisfied this threshold, and therefore the
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embargo under Section 43D(5) squarely operated against the appellant, in
addition to the rigour of Section 437 Cr.P.C. applicable to serious offences.
405. The Court also rejected the appellant’s arguments seeking bail on parity
with co-accused who had been granted bail by the High Court. It held that parity
cannot be claimed mechanically, particularly in conspiracy cases where roles may
differ, and when the statutory bar under UAPA applies. The Court further noted
that the High Court orders relied upon by the appellant did not dilute the
obligation of the trial court to independently assess whether the accusations
against the present appellant were prima facie true under Section 43D(5).
Consequently, parity was held to be inapplicable.
406. Lastly, the Trial Court found no merit in the defence contentions regarding
alleged infirmities in witness statements, admissibility of electronic evidence, or
claims of false implication. Relying on settled law, it held that questions of
admissibility, credibility, and contradictions are matters for trial, not for
determination at the bail stage. Considering the gravity of offences, the nature of
the conspiracy, the material indicating coordinated violence, and the statutory
restrictions on grant of bail, the Court concluded that the appellant was not
entitled to bail, and accordingly dismissed the bail application.
12.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
407. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution material,
when viewed cumulatively, disclosed prima facie involvement of Gulfisha Fatima
in the execution of the larger criminal conspiracy culminating in the North-East
Delhi riots of February 2020. She was alleged to have actively managed and
guided multiple protest sites in the Seelampur–Jafrabad area, including the
creation of a 24×7 sit-in at Madina Masjid, Seelampur, and the establishment of
additional local protest points. The Court noted material indicating her
participation in conspiratorial meetings, her role in mobilising women protestors,
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creation and administration of WhatsApp groups for coordination, use of code
words to signal chakka-jaams, and alleged involvement in stockpiling materials
for violence. These acts, assessed on broad probabilities, were held sufficient at
the bail stage to connect her to the execution of the conspiracy rather than mere
presence at protests.
408. Applying the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the Court held that
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against Gulfisha
Fatima were prima facie true, thereby creating a statutory bar to bail. The pleas
of parity with co-accused granted bail, absence of recoveries, alleged lack of
direct incitement, and prolonged incarceration were rejected. The Court clarified
that her role, particularly in local mobilisation, coordination of protest sites, and
alleged instigation of violence, was distinct from that of the co-accused released
on bail, and that issues of credibility and evidentiary weight must be tested at
trial. In view of the seriousness of the allegations and the statutory embargo, the
bail appeal was dismissed.
12.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
409. Gulfisha Fatima, stated to be a member of the organisation Pinjra Tod, is a
local resident of Seelampur and, as per the charge-sheet, is alleged to have been
one of the principal executors of the plan purportedly hatched by Umar Khalid
and Sharjeel Imam. The protest site at the 66 Foot Road, Seelampur, is stated to
have been assigned to Gulfisha Fatima along with Natasha Narwal and
Devangana Kalita, both of whom are alleged members of the Delhi Protest
Support Group (DPSG) and its associated WhatsApp group. Gulfisha Fatima is
alleged to have been responsible for coordinating the Seelampur/Jafrabad protest
site. It is further alleged that directions issued by DPSG were conveyed to
Gulfisha Fatima by Natasha Narwal and Devangana Kalita for implementation at
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the ground level. Being a resident of the locality, Gulfisha Fatima is stated to have
facilitated access to the area and to have instigated local residents to participate
in the protests. The charge-sheet further alleges that on 26.12.2019, Gulfisha
Fatima created a WhatsApp group titled “Warriors” for the purpose of mobilising
women and inciting them to engage in violence.
410. On 15.01.2020, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have been among the key
individuals who initiated a women- and child-centric protest site at Seelampur
near Madina Masjid, in accordance with the alleged plan of the conspirators. She,
along with Devangana Kalita, is stated to have attended a conspiratorial meeting
convened by Umar Khalid on 23.01.2020 at a purportedly secret office located at
Yameen House, Seelampur. As noted hereinabove, in the said meeting, Umar
Khalid is alleged to have issued directions for stockpiling red chilli powder, acid,
bottles, and sticks. It is further alleged that pursuant to the said meeting, Gulfisha
Fatima stockpiled chilli powder, wooden sticks (dandas), acid, bottles, and other
materials, and that she used coded language to transmit directions of the
conspirators to the protesters. Statements of protected witness “Echo” are relied
upon in the charge-sheet in support of these allegations.
411. On 17.02.2020, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have attended a meeting held
at the Chand Bagh protest site during the night hours, which is stated to have been
attended by members of DPSG. According to the charge-sheet, approximately
twenty persons attended the said meeting, including Gulfisha Fatima. At the said
meeting, a roadmap for execution of the final phase of the alleged conspiracy
namely, escalation of chakka jams into disruptive chakka jams and the
organisation of violence and riots- is stated to have been outlined by co-accused
Athar Khan. The charge-sheet relies upon electronic evidence to assert the
presence of Gulfisha Fatima at the said meeting.
412. The charge-sheet further alleges that on 22.02.2020, Gulfisha Fatima not
only instigated women to participate in the protests but also actively participated
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in the protest held at the Jafrabad Metro Station. In connection with the riots that
occurred at the said location, FIR No. 48/2020 is stated to have been registered.
413. It is further alleged that on 23.02.2020, in furtherance of the conspiracy,
approximately 300 women from the Jahangirpuri area were first transported to
Shaheen Bagh and thereafter taken to the Jafrabad chakka jam site, where DPSG
members, namely Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita, and Gulfisha Fatima, are
alleged to have supplied stones and red chilli powder to them for use in attacks
on police personnel and non-Muslims, thereby instigating violence. The charge-
sheet further alleges that leaders of the Pinjra Tod group associated with the
Chand Bagh protest site were actively orchestrating the riots. Statements of
protected witnesses “Helium” and “Sierra” are relied upon to substantiate the
alleged role of Gulfisha Fatima in the incidents of violence.
414. According to the charge-sheet, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have been one
of the leading executors of the orchestrated violence that occurred on 23.02.2020,
which is stated to have resulted in loss of innocent lives and extensive damage to
public property.
415. The charge-sheet further alleges that Gulfisha Fatima was financially
supported by co-accused Tahir Hussain in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
416. At this stage, a prima facie evaluation of the material placed on record
indicates that Gulfisha Fatima’s alleged role, though not insignificant, is confined
to the operational execution of directions purportedly transmitted through other
actors. The prosecution narrative does not attribute to her any determinative
authority in conceptualising or directing the alleged conspiracy; rather, she is
projected as a ground-level facilitator at Seelampur/Jafrabad. Where the
evidentiary foundation itself distinguishes between those who are alleged to have
architected the larger design and those alleged to have acted upon instructions,
this Court is persuaded that her role remains materially distinct from that of the
principal conspirators.
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417. The allegation that Gulfisha Fatima mobilised local women and
coordinated protest-site logistics, though relevant to the prosecution’s case, does
not presently disclose that she exercised independent command, resource control,
or strategic oversight over multiple protest sites. The prosecution itself asserts
that directions were conveyed to her by others higher in the asserted hierarchy. In
these circumstances, this Court finds that the level of attributed agency and
control does not justify continued incarceration once the investigative purpose
stands substantially fulfilled.
418. The apprehension that her release may lead to interference with witnesses
or revival of the alleged operational network is considerably attenuated by the
absence of material suggesting that she retains any autonomous capacity to
mobilise persons or resources in the current circumstances. It is undisputed that
the structures relied upon by the prosecution both formal or informal no longer
exist in their asserted form, and the appellant’s present ability to exert influence
is neither pleaded with specificity nor supported by contemporaneous material.
The imposition of stringent conditions can sufficiently safeguard against any
residual risk.
419. It bears reiteration that the gravity of the incidents in question, though
serious, cannot eclipse the constitutional demand for individualized assessment
of necessity in pre-trial detention. Prolonged incarceration premised solely on the
seriousness of allegations, absent a proximate and continuing nexus between the
appellant and present threats to the administration of justice, would amount to a
punitive measure inconsistent with settled principles. In view of her alleged
executory role and absence of demonstrable present capacity to influence
proceedings, continued custody does not meet the threshold of necessity.
420. This Court is cognisant of the appellant’s status as a woman and the settled
principle that gender, while not conferring immunity from criminal law, remains
a relevant consideration in determining the necessity of continued pre-trial
detention. The appellant has remained in custody for a substantial period, and
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there is no material to indicate that her release would pose an irremediable risk
that cannot be addressed by restrictive conditions. The law does not envisage
incarceration as a measure of deterrence at the pre-trial stage, particularly where
the individual concerned is a woman with no prior criminal antecedents and
whose alleged actions stem from a ground-level facilitating role.
421. The allegations attributed to the Appellant i.e. assignment of protest sites,
coordination of local mobilisation, participation in meetings of DPSG members,
and logistical execution of protest activities are substantially identical to the
allegations against co-accused Natasha Narwal and Devangana Kalita, who
allegedly conveyed DPSG directions to the Appellant and jointly coordinated the
Seelampur/Jafrabad protest sites.
422. Once bail has been granted to co-accused who stand on the same factual
and legal footing in terms of alleged roles, meetings, communications, and
purported execution on the ground, continued incarceration of the Appellant
violates the settled principle of parity.
423. The prosecution’s evidentiary foundation against the Appellant including
statements of protected witnesses , alleged electronic presence in meetings,
reliance on WhatsApp groups, and alleged mobilisation of women mirrors the
nature and quality of evidence relied upon against co-accused Natasha Narwal
and Devangana Kalita, who were enlarged on bail despite similar reliance on
anonymous witness testimony, electronic traces of presence, and allegations of
mobilisation and logistical facilitation.
424. In the absence of any distinguishing material against the Appellant, denial
of bail would constitute hostile discrimination vis-à-vis similarly situated co-
accused, offending Article 14 and the doctrine of parity. Accordingly, and keeping
in view the differentiated footing on which the prosecution itself places Gulfisha
Fatima as compared to the alleged masterminds Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam,
this Court is of the considered view that further detention is not warranted at this
stage. Subject to conditions ensuring regular attendance before the trial court,
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restrictions on contact with prosecution witnesses, and abstention from public
commentary relating to the case and further conditions enumerated hereinbelow.,
the appellant is held entitled to be enlarged on bail. Nothing stated herein shall be
treated as an expression on merits or an assessment of guilt.
425. The appellant’s continued detention must also be weighed against the
constitutional imperative to ensure that the administration of criminal justice does
not operate in a manner that disproportionately burdens women, especially where
the investigative agency has concluded its inquiry against her and no custodial
interrogation is sought. While gender alone cannot dictate the outcome, it forms
a legitimate factor in the proportionality assessment under Article 21, and in the
present factual matrix where the appellant’s alleged participation lacks the
strategic centrality attributed to the principal conspirators this consideration
reinforces the conclusion that her pre-trial liberty can be secured through
appropriate conditions rather than prolonged incarceration.
13. FINAL CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
426. The present batch of appeals has required the Court to engage with
questions that lie at the intersection of personal liberty and collective security.
The guarantee of liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution is of
foundational importance, and no constitutional court can be unmindful of the
gravity of restraining liberty before guilt is adjudicated. At the same time, the
Constitution does not conceive liberty in isolation. The security of the
community, the integrity of the trial process, and the preservation of public order
are equally legitimate constitutional concerns. When bail is sought in
prosecutions governed by a special statute, the Court is required to undertake a
difficult and sensitive balancing exercise, conscious that neither liberty nor
security admits of absolutism.
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427. While undertaking this exercise, the Court cannot proceed on any
consideration except restricting the contours of inquiry confining to law. Where
Parliament has prescribed a distinct statutory threshold for the grant of bail, and
where the prosecution places prima facie material suggesting organised and
deliberate activity affecting public order and security of the Nation, the Court
cannot turn a Nelson’s eye to such material merely because incarceration is
prolonged or liberty is invoked in the abstract. Equally, where continued detention
is not shown to be necessary to serve a legitimate purpose recognised by law, the
Court must not hesitate to restore liberty, subject to stringent conditions that
safeguard the larger public interest.
428. The position of law that emerges may be stated with clarity. The right to
personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 is of seminal importance, and
prolonged pre-trial incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional concern. At
the same time, where Parliament has, in the context of a special statute,
conditioned the grant of bail upon the satisfaction of a defined statutory threshold,
a constitutional court cannot treat such restraint as avoidable. Section 43D(5) of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, represents a legislative judgment
that offences alleged to implicate the security of the State warrant a distinct bail
regime. The constitutional role of the Court, therefore, is neither to mechanically
enforce the statutory embargo nor to neutralise it by invocation of liberty as
straight-jacket formula, but to apply it with disciplined scrutiny. Where the
prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for
believing the accusation to be prima facie true, the statutory restraint must
ordinarily operate. Where it does not, liberty must prevail. Article 21 thus
commands the manner of application of the statute; it does not dissolve the
statutory condition itself.
429. It is in this constitutional and statutory framework that the individual
appeals have been examined based on facts obtained. The Court has consciously
avoided a collective or uniform approach. Each appellant has been assessed on
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the basis of the role attributed, the nature of material relied upon, and the stage of
the proceedings, strictly within the limited compass of adjudication for grant of
bail.
13.1. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS DECLINED
430. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material, taken at face value as
required at this stage, discloses a prima facie attribution of a central and formative
role by the appellants in appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and
SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 i.e., Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged
conspiracy. The material suggests involvement at the level of planning,
mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts.
The statutory threshold under Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, therefore stands attracted qua these appellants.
431. While the period of incarceration undergone by these appellants is
substantial and has been duly considered, the Court is not persuaded that, on the
present record, continued detention has crossed the threshold of constitutional
impermissibility so as to override the statutory embargo. The complexity of the
prosecution, the nature of evidence relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings
do not justify their enlargement on bail at this juncture as noticed in detail in the
discussion made hereinabove. Hence, the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 stands rejected.
432. We reiterate that courts are under a constitutional obligation to ensure that
criminal proceedings, particularly those involving prolonged pre-trial
incarceration, should progress with utmost expedition and the accused are not left
to languish in jail. At the same time, the Court is mindful that pre-trial detention,
even when justified by statute, cannot be permitted to continue without regard to
the progress of the trial. The restraint on liberty contemplated by law must
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proceed alongside a meaningful advancement of the prosecution. In the present
case, having regard to the reliance placed upon protected witnesses, this Court
considers it appropriate to provide a defined point for consideration of their
prayer for grant of bail. We are of the opinion that on the completion of the
examination of the protected witnesses relied upon by the prosecution, or upon
the expiry of a period of one year from the date of this order, whichever is earlier,
these two appellants would be at liberty to renew their prayer for grant of bail
before the jurisdictional Court. In the event of such prayer being made it shall be
considered on its own merits, having regard to the stage then reached in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, and without being influenced by the
impugned orders or the present order. This course gives effect to the statutory
discipline embodied in Section 43D(5) of UAPA while ensuring that the
constitutional guarantee under Article 21 operates as a continuing check against
continued incarceration without there being any substantial progress of the trial.
13.2. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS GRANTED
433. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025 (Gulfisha
Fatima), SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of 2025 (Meeran Haider), SLP (Crl.) No. 14859
of 2025 (Shifa-ur-Rehman), SLP (Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025 (Mohd. Saleem Khan),
and SLP (Crl.) No. 17055 of 2025 (Shadab Ahmed) are allowed as the Court is of
the view that, having regard to the role attributed, the nature of the material relied
upon, and the present stage of the proceedings, continued incarceration is not
shown to be indispensable to the conduct of a fair trial, provided strict safeguards
are imposed. The grant of bail in their favour does not reflect any dilution of the
seriousness of the allegations, nor does it amount to a finding on guilt. It
represents a calibrated exercise of constitutional discretion, structured to preserve
both liberty of the individual and security of the nation.
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13.3. CONDITIONS GOVERNING RELEASE ON BAIL
434. The appellants granted bail shall be released subject to the following
conditions, which are imposed not as matters of form, but as substantive
safeguards in the interest of national security, public order, and the integrity of
the trial process.
i. Each of the appellants shall execute a personal bond in the sum
of ₹2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only) with two local
sureties of the like sum to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
ii. The appellants shall remain within the National Capital Territory
of Delhi and shall not leave its territorial limits without prior
permission of the Trial Court. Any request for travel shall
disclose reasons and such prayer/request shall be considered by
the Trial Court strictly on its merits
iii. The appellants shall surrender their passports, if any, before the
Trial Court. Where no passport exists, an affidavit to that effect
shall be filed. We direct the respondent to intimate all the
immigration authorities in the country not to permit their exit
from the country in any manner whatsoever, without express
permission from the Trial Court.
iv. The appellants shall furnish their current residential addresses,
contact numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Investigating
Officer as well as to the Trial Court. The appellants shall not
change their place of residence or contact particulars without
giving at least seven days’ prior written intimation to the
Investigating Officer and the Trial Court.
v. Each of the appellants, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider,
Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed,
shall personally appear twice a week, that is on Monday and
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Thursday between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, before the Station
House Officer, Police Station Crime Branch, Delhi Police,
Office of the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Jai
Singh Marg, New Delhi – 110001 and mark their attendance.
The Station House Officer shall maintain a separate register of
attendance in respect of each of these appellants and shall
furnish a monthly compliance report to the Trial Court, which
shall be placed on the main record of the case.
vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly
contact, influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness
or any person connected with the proceedings, nor shall they
associate with or participate in the activities of any group or
organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final
report.
vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any
information, statement, article or post whether in print,
electronic or social media concerning the present case or its
participants till conclusion of the trial.
viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address
or attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or
virtually till conclusion of the trial.
ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic
form or physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters,
banners, etc in any form whatsoever.
x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall
appear on every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons to
be recorded by the Trial Court to its satisfaction and they shall
not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying the
proceedings.
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xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour
throughout and in the event of any offence committed during the
pendency of the trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek
for revocation of the bail granted by filing such application
before the Trial Court and in the event of such application being
filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own merits.
435. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or in the
event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be open to the Trial
Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily after affording opportunity
of hearing to the appellants.
13.4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
436. Before we conclude, it bears reiteration that a principle lies at the heart of
constitutional adjudication in matters of this nature. The Constitution guarantees
personal liberty, but it does not conceive liberty as an isolated or absolute
entitlement, detached from the security of the society in which it operates. The
sovereignty, integrity, and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of
public order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional values which
Parliament is entitled to protect through law. Where a special statutory framework
has been enacted to address offences perceived to strike at these foundations,
courts are duty-bound to give effect to that framework, subject always to
constitutional discipline.
437. In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity,
ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory
threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction. Criminal law does not mandate
identical outcomes merely because allegations arise from the same transaction.
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Those alleged to have conceived, directed, or steered unlawful activity or terrorist
activity stand on a different legal footing from those whose alleged involvement
is confined to facilitation or participation at a different level. To disregard such
distinctions would itself result in arbitrariness.
438. The present decision reflects this constitutional method. It neither endorses
the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused. It applies the law as
it stands, recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must
also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety.
This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional
duty.
439. Before parting, it is necessary to reiterate the limited nature of the present
determination. The Court has not examined the merits of the prosecution case
beyond the confines mandated at the stage of consideration of an application
seeking bail, nor has it expressed any opinion on the ultimate culpability of any
of the accused. All observations are confined to the material presently on record
and to the statutory and constitutional standards governing pre-trial liberty under
a special enactment.
440. Having regard to the nature of the prosecution and the period of
incarceration already undergone, it is considered appropriate to direct that the
Trial Court shall proceed with the matter with due expedition and shall endeavour
to ensure that the examination of witnesses, particularly the protected witnesses
relied upon by the prosecution, is taken up and carried forward without delay.
441. The prosecution shall take all necessary steps to secure the presence of its
witnesses on the dates fixed and the parties shall refrain from seeking
adjournments except for reasons which are unavoidable. The Trial Court shall be
at liberty to regulate the proceedings in accordance with law so as to ensure that
the trial is not unnecessarily prolonged, while at the same time safeguarding the
rights of all parties.
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442. It is clarified that these directions are issued in furtherance of the obligation
to ensure a fair and timely trial and shall not be construed either as an expression
on the merits of the prosecution case or as a constraint on the discretion of the
Trial Court in the conduct of the proceedings.
443. The Trial Court shall remain free to adopt such measures as are permissible
in law to ensure that the trial proceeds with continuity and at a reasonable pace,
consistent with the requirement of fairness and the orderly administration of
criminal justice.
444. There would be something amiss in this judgment, if we do not place on
record the able and arduous assistance rendered by learned Senior Counsels led
by Shriyuths Kapil Sibal, Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Salman Khurshid, Siddharth
Luthra, Siddhartha Dave, Siddharth Aggarwal and learned Advocate Gautam
Khazanchi and their team of lawyers appearing for appellants including the
painstaking efforts put in by Sri. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India
and Sri. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India and their team
appearing for respondent – State, the Law Clerks-cum-Research Associates for
assisting this Court in rendering this judgment expeditiously in the background
of voluminous records, lengthy arguments and catena of judgments relied upon.
.……………………………., J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
.……………………………., J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]
New Delhi;
January 05
th
, 2026.
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