586

A GUNDAJI SATWAJI SHINDE

v.

RAMCHANDRA BHIKAJI JOSHI

December 5, 1978

B [P. N. SIUNGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]

Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Born. Act LXVII of

1948)-&. 63, 70, 85 & 85A-S. 70 made Mamlatdar authority to decide whe·

ther a person ·was an agriculturist-s. SSA barred jurisdiction of civil court in

questions arising under s. 70--Suit for specific perfonnance of sale of agricul·

tural land in civil court-Civil court lvhcthcr ·cotnpetent to decide incidental

C question if vendee is an agriculturist.

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B

Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 prohi·

bits the sale

of agricultural land to a person who is not an agriculturist.

One

of the duties of the Mamlatdar, under s. 70. of the Act, is to decide whether a

person

is an agriculturist

and "\ivhether a transfer or acquisition of land i5 invalid

being in contravention of the Act. Section

85 bars the jurisdiction of a civil

court to

settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act

i3 required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar, or the autho­

rity 1nentioned in the section.

The Bombay High

Court in a case coming before it on the interpretation

of

1. 85 held that \'here in a suit in a civil court an issue arises which has to

be decided under the provisions of

s.

70, the civil court should refer the parties

to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act to get the question decided

~nJ such c;ecision \vculd be binding on the civil court. Taking note of this deci­

sion

s.

S5i\. \'as added to the Tenancy Act, enabling the civil court to iefer the

issue to fi:1e competent authority to decide which the jurisdiction of the civil

court iR-barred under s. 85.

The plaintiff's ~uit for ~pecific performance of a contract for sale of land

w~ re~istcd by the defendant alleging that since he (the plaintiff), was not an

a~riculturist, he was prohibited by s. 63 of the Tenancy Act from purchasing

agricultural 1and and the contract being contrary

to the provisions

o! the Act

is not capable of being specifically enforced.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that he 'vas not

an agriculturist. It held that the issue \Vhethcr or not the plaintiff was an agri­

culturist being: incidental in a suit for specific performance of a contract the

civil court had jurisdiction to decide such incidental issues. On app~ul the High

Court held that the civil court which had jurisdiction to entertain a :>uit for

specific performance, it would have jurisdiction

to decide the incidental issue

whether the plaintiff was an agriculturist

or not.

The question before the

Supreme Court was where in a suit for specific per­

formance,

an issue arose whether the plaintiff was an agriculturist or not on

the date of agreement whether the civil court would have jurisdiction to decide

the issue

or it is required to refer it to the

~famlatdar under s. 70 read with

s. SSA. Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the trial court for·

disposal.

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G. S. SIITNDE V. R, B. JOSHI 587

HELD : 1. The Legislature having expressly ousted the juri:i;diction of the civil

court to settle, decide or deal with any question \1.rhich is by or under the Tenancy

Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any of the authorities therein

mentioned the authority

to decide the issue whether the

vendee was an agricul­

turist would be the Mamlatdar as provided in s. 70(a). [592 G]

2. Th,~ expression "any issues which are required to be settled, decided or

dealt \'ith by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues

under this Act" in s. 85A would only mean that, if upon contest an issue which

is required To be settled, dec;dcd and dealt with by the competent authority under

the Tenancy ,\ct o.rfr.;es, notwithstanding the fact that such an issue arises in a

properly

constitulcd civil suit cognizable by the civil court, it would

have to

b'c referred to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. [594H-595 Bl

3. Ii.Jere because jurisdiction is conferred on the Mamlatdar to decide whe­

ther a person is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Tenancy Act, it does

not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the civil conrt to decide that i'lsue if it

arises b<:fore it in a civil suit. Unless the },1amla~dar is const~~utcd an exclusive

forum to dc·.::de the question, conf~rn1cnt of su::h juri~dtction \.Ould not oust

the juri~,diction of the civil court. It is settled la\V that exclusion of jurisdiction

of the civil court is not to be readily inferred but that such exclus:on must either

be explicity expressed or clearly implied. [592 D-EJ

Secreftay of State v. Mask, 67 IA 222: referred to.

4. The finding of the competent authority under the Ten;:;,ncy Act is D:1ade

binding on the civil court. The jurisdiction of the civ] court to 'lettlc, decide

or deal \Vith any issue \Vhich is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by

any competent authority under the Act is totally oustc:d. TI1i<> would lead to

the condusion th:tt the Mamlatdar while perfonn:ng the function and discharg­

ing his duties conferred on hin1 by s. 70 \.\·oultl con'ltilutc an exclusive fo~u1n.

Section 70(a) requires the ~farnlatdar to dC"c.de \'hcthcr a pcr<;on is an agricui­

turist. Therefore, if an issue arises in a ci•il 1:ourt whether a per-,on ::.; an agri­

culturist \.vithin the meaning of the Tenan~y Act, the larnlatdar ;_!lane \Ou!d

have exdusiYc jurisdiction under the Act to dcc:dc the s:i.r.1e and the juri!:,di('.Jio:-i

of the civil court is ousted. The civil ccurt, as required b'll s. SSA, 1viil b~,ve to

fran1e ;:in i~c·n.: and refer it to the 11amlntd2r and on the refcrcn~c hcing

answered back, io dispose of the suit in accordance v,rith the decis:on rc:ordEd by

the c~_i1n;:;e'crit ai1thc::·it:,r. [593(1, 59~. CJ

Dhondi Tukal'(/!t! ltiali v. Dadoo Piraji Adf:alc, 55 Born. LR 663, Tritnhak

Sopana Ginne v. Gangaran1 Mhataraba Ylidav, 55 Born. LR 56; approYcd.

Mu;·,;,1rniya ln1an1 Haider Bax Razi·i v. Rabari (Jovindbhai 1?.atnab.liai &

B

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Ors. 11969] l S.C.R. 785. rxphined. G

Bhin1aji Shanker Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vi1happa Udapudf & Anr., [1966] 1

SCR 145 at 150: !shrrrlal Thakorelal Alnu~ula v. Motibhai ]\ia~jihhai, [1966] 1

SCR 367; Jambu Rao Satappa Kocheri v. Neminath Appayya Hancnunanr;aver,

[19681 3 SCP~ 706; and I\Too:· A1ohd. Khc!n Chou~c Khan S01:dagar v. Eakil'appa

Bhannappa lvfachenahalli & Ors., [1978] 3 SCC 188; r>::ferl'cd to.

CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1280 o' 1969. H

Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 7-9-1968 of the Bombay

High Court in LP.A. No. 117 of 1968.

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588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.R.

U. R. Lala, Nanjul Kumar and K. J. John for the Appellant.

R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj for Respondents J-5 ( d).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DESAI, J.-This appeal by certificate arises out of Special Civil

Suit No. 39/66 filed by the appellant-original plaintiff for specific

performance of a contract dated 15th December 1965 for sale of land

admeasuring 45 acres 5 gunthas bearing Survey No. 25 situated in

Sholapur Mouje Dongaon in Maharashtra State for a consideration of

Rs. 42,000/-out of which Rs. 5,000/-were paid as earnest money and

a further amount of Rs. 5,000/-was paid on 22nd April 1966 when

the period for performance of the contract for sale was extended by

six months, which suit was dismissed by the trial Court and the plain­

tiff's First Appeal No. 117

/68 was dismissed by the Bombay High

Court.

Plaintiff claimed specific performance of a contract dated 15th

December 1965 coupled with supplementary agreement dated 26th

April 1966 for sale of agricultural land. This snit

was resisted by the

defendant,

inter alia, contending that the land which was the subject­

matter of contract was covered by the provisions of the Bombay Ten­

ancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ('Tenancy Act', for short) and

as the. inteµding purchaser, the plaintiff was not an agriculturist within

the meaning of the Act, section

63 of the Tenancy Act prohibited him

from purchasing the land and, therefore, as the agreement was con­

trary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act the

same cannot be speci­

fically enforced. The plaintiff sought to repel the contention by pro­

ducing a certificate Ext. 78 issued by the Mamlatdar certifying that the

plaintiff

was an agricultural labourer and the bar imposed by s. 63 of

the Tenancy Act would not operate.

Plaintiff also contended that if

the Court does not take note of Ext. 78, an issue on the pleadings

would arise whether the plaintiff

is an agriculturist and in view of the

provisions contained in

s.

70(a) read with ss. 85 and SSA of the Ten­

ancy Act the issue would have to be referred to the Memlatdar for

decision and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to decide the

issue. Th" tri1'1 Court held that the certificate Ext. 78 had no cvi­

dentiary value and was not valid. On the question of the plaintiff being

an agriculturists the trial Court itself recorded a finding that the plaintiff

was not an agriculturist.

On the question of jurisdiction to decide the

issue whether the plaintiff

is an agriculturist, the trial Court was of the

opinion that it being an incidental issue in a suit for specific perform­

ance of contract, which suit the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try, it

will also have jurisdiction to decide the incidental or subsidiary

issue

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G. s. SHINDE v. 1'., B. JOSHI (Desai, !.)

589

and recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not an agriculturist. In

accordance with these findings the plaintiff's rnit was dismissed. Jn

appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court agreed with the finding of the

trial Court with regard to the validity ofj certificate Ext. 78. On the

question of jurisdiction of the trial Court to decide the issue about the

plaintiff being

an agriculturist, the High Court agreed with the trial

Court observing that Civil Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to enter­

tain a suit for specific perfonnance, and

\Vhi1e considering the n1ain

issue whether specific performance should be granted or not, c'vil Court

will have to consider whether there are prima facie any facts on ac­

count of which granting of specific performance would result into a

transaction forbidden by law and, therefore, civil Court w111 have juris­

diction to decide the subsidiary issue whether the plaintiff

is an agricul­

turist. The

High Court accordingly dismissed the appeal while agree­

ing with the trial Court that the plaintiff had failed

to prove that he

was an agriculturist and specific performance of contract for sale of

agricultural land cannot be granted in his favour.

Mr. Lalit for the appellant did not invite us to determine the vali-

dity of certificate Ext.

78 certifying that plaintiff is an agricultural lab­

ourer. Therefore, the question which must engage our attention

is whe-

ther Civil Court

will have jurisdiction to decide an issue arising in a

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snit for specific performance of contract for sale of agricultural land

governed by the provisions of the Tenancy Act that the person seeking E

specific performance

was or was not an agriculturist and, therefore,

ineligible

to purchase the land in view of the bar imposed by s. 63 of

- ~ the Tenancy Act. This necessitates examination of the relevant pro­

visions of the Tenancy Act.

Section 2(2) of the Tenancy Act defines agriculturist to mean a

person who cultivates land personally. The expression 'land' is defined

in

s. 2 ( 8) to mean ; (a land which is

use<l for agricultural purposes or

which is so used but is left fallow and includes the sites of farm build­

ings appurtenant to such land; and (b) for purposes of sections in­

cluding ss. 63, 64 and 84C (i) the sites of dwelling houses occupied

by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or artisans and land appurtenant

to such dwelling houses;

(ii) the sites of

structures used by agricultu­

rists for allied pursuits. Section 63 which forbids transfer of agricul­

tural land to non-agriculturists, reads as under :

"63. (1) Save as provided in this Act-

( a) no sale (including sales in execution of a decree of

a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or

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590 SUPREME COURT REP{IRTS [1979] 2 S.C.R.

A for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue), gift, ex­

change

or lease of any land or interest therein, or

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c

(b) no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which

the possession of the mortgaged property

is delivered to the

n1ortgagee,

shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist

or who being au agriculturist

will after such sale, gift, exchange,

lease

or mortgage, hold land exceeding two-thirds of tl1e ceil­

ing area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural

Lands (Ceiling

on Holdings) Act, 1961, or who is not au

agricultural labourer;

Provided that the Collector

or an officer authorised by the

State Government in this behalf may grant permission for

such sale, gift, exchange, lease

or mortgage, on such condi­

tions as may be

prescribed".

D The next important section in this context is s. 70 which defines duties

and prescribes function of the Mamlatdar, the relevant portion of which

reads

as under :

E

"70. For the purposes of this Act the following shall be

the duties and functions to be performed

by the Mamlatdar :

(a) to decide whether a person is an agriculturist;

x x x x x

(mb) to issue a certificate under section 84A, and decide

under section 84B

or 84C whether a transfer or acquisition

F of land is invalid and to dispose of land as provided in sec­

tion

84C".

Section 85 bars jurisdiction of the civil Courts to decide certain

issues and

s. 85A provides for reference of issues required to be decided

under the Tenancy

Act to the competent authority set up under the

G

'l;enancy Act. They are very material for decision of the point herein

raised and they may be reproduced in extenso :

H

"85. (I) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle,

decide or deal with any question (including a question whether

a person

is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whe­

ther any such tenant

is or should be deemed to have purchased

from his landlord the land held by him) which

is by or

under

this Act required to be· settled, decided or dealt with by the

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G. s. SHINDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, J.) 591

Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, the Collector or the A

Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in appeal or revision or the

State Government in exercise of their powers of control.

(2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Col­

lector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal or the State

Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any B

Civil or Criminal Court.

Explanation-For the purposes of this

Section a Civil

Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the

Mamlatdars' Courts Act, 1906".

"85A.. (1) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court invol­

ves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or

dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or

deal with such issues under this Act, (hereinafter referred to

as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the

suit and refer such issues

to such competent authority for de­

termination.

(2)

On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the

competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues

in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall com­

municate its decision to the Civil Court and such court shall

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thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure E

applicable thereto.

Explanation-For the purpose of this section a

Civil Court

shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mam­

latdars'

Courts Act,

1906".

There is no controversy that the land purported to be sold by the

contracts for sale of land Exts.

82 and 83 is land used for

agricultural

purposes and is covered by the definition of the expression 'land' in s.

2(8) (a). The plaintiff thus by the contracts for sale of land Exts. 82

and 83 purports to purchase agricultural land. Section 63 prohibits

sale of land inter alia, in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist.

If, therefore, the plaintiff wants to enforce a contract for sale of agri­

cultural land in his favour he has of necessity to be an agriculturist.

The defendant intending vendor has specifically contended that the

plaintiff not being an agriculturist

he is

not entitled to specific perfor­

mance of the contract. Therefore,

in a suit filed by the plaintiff for Specific performance of contract on rival contentions a specific

issue would arise whether the pfaintiff is an agriculturist because if he

is not, the Civil Court would be precluded from enforcing the contract

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592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.R.

A as it would be in violation of a statutory prohibition and the contract

would be unenforceable as being prohibited by law and, therefore, op­

posed to public policy.

The focal point of controversy

is where in a suit for specific per­

formance an issue arises whether the plaintiff

is an agriculturist or not,

B would the

Civil Court have jurisdiction to decide the issue or the Civil

Court would have to refer the issue under

s. 85A of the Tenancy Act

to the authority constituted under the Act,

viz., Mamlatdar.

Uninhibited by the decisions to

which our attention was invited,

the matter may be examined purely in the light of the relevant pro-

C visions

of the statute. Section

70(a) constitutes the Mamlatdar a forum

for perfonning the functions and discharging the duties therein speci­

fically enumerated. One such function of the Mamlatdar is to decide

whether a person

is an agriculturist. The issue arising before

th·~ Civil

Court is whether the plaintiff is an agriculturist within the meariing of

the Tenancy Act.

It may be that jurisdiction may be conferred on the

D Mamlatdar to decide whether a person

is an agriculturist within the

meaning

of the Tenancy Act but it does not ipso facto oust the jurisdic­

tion of the civil Court to decide that issue if it arises before it in a civil

suit. Unless the Mamlatdar is constituted an exclusive forum to decide

the question hereinabow mentioned confennent of such jurisdiction

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would not oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It is settled law

that the exclusion of the jurisdiction

of the civil courts is not to be rea­

dily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed

or clearly implied (sec

Secretary of

State i-. Mask)('). However, by

an express provision contained in s. 85 the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court

to settle, decided or deal with any question which is by or under

the Tenancy Act required to be settled, decided or dealt by

the com­

petent authority

is ousted. The Court must give effect to the policy

underlying the statute set out in express terms in the statute. There

is, therefore, no escape from the fact that the legislaure has expressly

ousted the jurisdiction

of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with

any question which

is by or under the Tenancy Act required to be

settled, decided or dealt with by any of the authorities therein mentioned

and in this specific case the authority would be the Mamlatdar

as pro-

vided

in s.

70(a).

When the Tenancy Act of 1948 was put on the statute book, s. ~SA

did not find its place therein. A question arose while giving eifoct

to the provisions contained in ss. 70 and 85 as to what should be done

where in a suit in a civil Court an issue arises

to settle, decide or

(l) 67 I.A. 222.

.

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G. s. S!IlNDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, J.) 593

deal with which the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted under s. 85.

The Bombay High Court which had initially

to deal with this problem,

resolved the problem

by holding that in such a situation the civil suit

should

be stayed and the parties should be referred to the competent

authority under the Tenancy Act to

get the question decided by the

authority and on such decision being brought before the Civil Court,

it

will be binding on the civil Court and the civil Conrt will have to

dispose of the suit in accordance therewith.

While

so resolving the

problem immediately facing the Court, an observation was made that

provision should

be introduced in the Tenancy Act for enabling the

civil Court to transfer the proceeding to the competent authority under

the Tenancy Act having jurisdiction to decide the issue and iu respect

of which the jurisdiction of the

Civil Court is barred (see Dhondi Tuka­

ram Mali v. Dadoo Piraji Adgale) ('). The Legislature took note of this

suggestion and promptly introduced s. 85A in the Tenancy Act by

Bombay Act

XIII of 1956. The legislative scheme that emerges from

a combined reading of

ss. 70, 85 and 85A appears to be that when in

a civil suit properly brought before the

Civil Court an issue arises on

rival contentions between the parties which

is required to be settled,

decided or dealt with

by a competent authority under the Tenancy Act,

the

Civil Court is statutorily required to stay the suit and refer such

issue or issues to such competent authority under the Tenancy Act for

determination.

On receipt of such reference from the civil Court the

competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues

in accord­ance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act and shall communicate

its decision to

tl1e civil Court and such court shall, thereupon dispose of

the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto.

To avoid

any conflict of decision arising out

of multiplicity of jurisdiction by civil

Court taking one view of the matter and the competent authority under

the Tenancy Act taking a contrary or different

view, an express provi­

sion

is made ins. 85(2) that no order of tl1e competent authority made

under the Act shall

be questioned in any civil Court. To complete

the scheme, sub-s. (2) of

s. 85A provides that when upon a reference

a decision

is recorded by the competent authority under the provisions

of the Tenancy Act and the decision

is communicated to the civil Court,

such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the

procedure applicable thereto.

'.fhus, the fmding of the competent

authority under the Tenancy Act

is made binding on the civil Court. It

would thus appear that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle,

decide, or deal with any issue which

is required to be settled, decided

or dealt with by any competent authority under the Tenancy Act

is

totally

0usted. This would lead to inescapable conclusion that the

(1) 55 Born. LR. 663.

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594

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1979] 2 S.C.R.

Mamlatdar while performing the function and discharging duties as are

conferred upon

him by s.

70, would constitute an exclusive forum,

to the exclusion of the civil Court, to decide any of the questions tbat

may. arise under any o:f the snb-<:Iauses of s. 70. Section 70(a)

reqwres the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is an agriculturist.

Therefore,

it an issne arises in a civil Court whether a person is an

agriculturist within the meaning of the Tenancy Act, the Mamlatdar

alone would have exclusive jurisdiction under the Tenancy Act to decide

the same and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

is ousted. The Civil

Court as reqnired

by a statutory provision contained in s.

~5A, will

have

to frame the issue and refer it to the Mamlatdar and on the

reference being answered back,

to dispose of the suit in accordance

... ..,.

with the decision recorded by the competent authority on the relevant

issue.

To translate it into action, if the Mamlatdar were to hold that

the plaintiff is not an agriculturist, obviously his suit for specific

performance in the Civil

CO\Ufl would fail because he is ineligible to

purchase agricultural land and enforcement of such a contract wonld

be violative of statute and, therefore, opposed to public policy.

The High Court was of the view that the jurisdiction

of 1he Civil

Court

to settle, decide or deal with any question which arises under

the Tenancy

Act and which is required to be settled, decided or dealt

with by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act would alone be

barred under

s. 85.

Proceeding therefrom, the High Court was of the

opinion that if an issue arises in a properly constituted civil suit which

the civil Court

is competent to entertain, an incidental or subsidiary issue

which may arise with reference to provisions of the Tenancy Act, the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court

to decide the same would not be ousted

because the issue is not required to be decided

or dealt with under

the Tenancy Act. This view overlooks and ignores the provision

contained in

s. 85-A. There can be a civil suit properly constituted

which the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain but therein

an issue may arise upon a contest when contentions are raised by the

party against whom the civil suit

is filed.

Upon such contest, issues

will have

to be framed on points on which parties are at

varianc~ and

which have to be determined to finally dispose of the 'uit. If any

such issue arises which

is reqnired to be settled, decided or dealt with

by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, even if it arises

iii

a civil suit, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, clccide and deal

with the same would

be barred by the provision contained in s

.. 85 and

the civil Court will have to take recourse to the provision contained in

s. 85A for reference of the issue to the competent authority under the

Tenancy Act. Upon a proper construction the expression "any issues

which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority

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G. s. SHINDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, !.) 595

competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act" iu

s. SSA would only mean that if upon assertion and denial and conse­

quent contest an issue arises in the context of the provisions of the

Tenancy Act and which

is required to be settled, decided

and dealt

with

by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, then notwith­

standing the fact that such an issue arises

in a properly constituted

civil suit cognizable

by the Civil Court, it would have

!r> be referred

to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. Any Nher view

of the matter would render the scheme of

ss.

SS and SSA infructuous

and defeat the legis4tive policy (see Bhimaji Shallker Kulkarni v.

Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi & A nr.) (1) The construction suggested

by the respondent that the bar would only operate if such an issue

arises only in a proceeding under the Tenancy Act, could render

s.

SSA

infructuous or inoperative or otiose. Neither the Contract Act nor the

Transfer

of

Property Act nor any other statute except the Tenancy Act

prohibits a non-agriculturist from buying agricultural la_nd. The prohi­

bition was enacted

in s. 63 of the

Tenancy Act. Therefore, if a persOlfi

intending to purchase agricultural land files a suit for enforcing a con­

tract entered into

by him and if the suit is resisted on

tlie ground

that the plaintiff

is ineligible to buy agricultural land, not for any

other

reason except that it is prohibited by s. 63 of the Tenancy Act, an

issue whether plaintiff is an agriculturist would directly and substantially

arise in

view

of the provisions ol the Tenancy Act. Such an issue

would indisputably arise under the Tenancy Act though not in a pro­

ceeding under the Tenancy Act. Now, if, s. 85 bars the jurisdiction

'(Jf the Civil Court to decide or deal with an issue arising under the

Tenancy Act and if

s. 85A imposes an obligation on the civil CQurt

to refer such issue to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act,

it would

be no answer to the provisions to say that the issue is

an

incidental issue in a properly constituted civil suit before a civil Court

having jurisdiction to entertain the same.

In fact s. 85A comprehends

civil suits which civil Courts are competent to decide but takes note of

the situation where upon a contest

an issue may arise therein which

would be required to be settled, decided or dealt

with by the competent

authority under the Tenancy Act, and, therefore, it

is made obligatory

for the

civil Court not only not

to arrogate jurisdiction to itself to

decide the same treating it as a subsidiary or incidental issue, but to

refer the same to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act.

This is an inescapable legal position that emerges from a combined

reading of

ss.

SS and SSA. This can be clearly demonstrated by an

illustration. Plaintiff may file a suit on title against a defendant for

possession of land on the allegation that defendant

is a trespasser. The

(ll [1966] l S.C.R. 145 at

150.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979) 2 S.C.R.

defendant may appear and contend that the land is agricultural land

and

he is a tenant. The suit on title for possession is clearly within the

jurisdiction of the civil Court.

Therefore. the civil Court would be

competent to entertain the suit. But upon the defendant's contest the

issue would be whether he

is a tenant of agricultural land. Section.

70(a) (ii) read with ss. 85 and 85A would preclude the civil Court

from dcali!lg with or deciding the issue. In a civil suit nomenclature

<Jf the issue as principal or subsidiary or substantial or incidental issue

is hardly helpful because each issue, if it arises, has to be determined

to mould the final relief. Further, sections

85 and

SSA oust jurisdiction

of civil Court not in respect of civil suit but in. respect of questio,ns

and issues arising therein. and s. SSA mandates the reference of such

issues

as are within the' competence of the competent authority. If there

is an issue which had to be settled, decided or dealt with by competent

authority under the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the civil

Court,

notwithstanding the fact that it arises in an incidental manner in a

civil suit,

will be barred and it will

have to be referred to the competent

authority under the Tenancy Act. By such camouflage of treating

issues arising

in. a suit as substantial or incidental or principal or subsi­

diary, civil Court cannot arrogate to

itsclfi jurisdiction which is statu­

torily ousted. This unassailable legal position. emerges from the

relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act.

Turning to some of the precedents to which our attention was

in.vite<l, it would

be advantageous to refer to the earliest decision of

the Bombay

High Court which had the opportunity to deal with the

scheme of law

un.der discussion in. Trimbak

Sopana Ginne v. Gangaram

Mhatarba Yadav('). In. that case plaintiff filed a suit against the

defendant for actual poosession. on the allegation. that the defendan~

was a trespasser and the defendant contested the suit contending that

he

was a protected tenant within the meaning of the Tenancy Act.

The trial Court came to the conclusion that an issue would arise whether

the defendant

was a protected tenant and such an issue was

triable

by the Mamlatdar under s. 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, and the trial

Court had no jurisdiction. to try the issue. Accordingly the trial Court

ordered the plaintiff to present the suit to the proper court.

It may

be noticed that at the relevant time

s. 85A was not introduced in the

Tenancy Act.

In an appeal by the plainti!I the appellate court

reversed·

the finding that a suit on, title for posses§ion. alleging that the defendant

was a trespasser was a properly constituted civil suit and if in such

a suit defendant raises a contention. that he

is a protected tenant it

would be a subsidiary issue and would not oust the jurisdiction of the

(I) 55 Born. L.R. 55.

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G. s. SHINDE v. R. ll. JOSHI (Desai, J.) 597

Court because if the civil Court proceeding with the suit comes to the

conclusion that the defendant is a trespasser it would be fully compe­

tent to dispose of the suit. The defendant carried the matter to; the

High Court and Chagla, C.J., analysing the scheme of ss. 70 and 85

of the Tenancy Act, held that in order to avoid the conflict of jurisdic­

tion and looking to the scheme

of the sections, the legislature has

left to the Mamlatdar to decide the issue whether the defendant

is a

protected tenant or not and it implies that he must decide that the

defendant is not a trespasser in order to hold that he

is a tenant or

protected tenant, and that he must also hold that he is a trespasser

in order to determine that he

is not a tenant or a protected tenant,

and· even while strictly construing the prov1s1ons of a

statute ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court, the conclusion is

inescapable that all questions with regard to th~ status of a party, when

the party claims the status of a protected tenant, are left to be deter­

mined by the Revenue Court and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

is ousted.

This very contention kept ou figuring before the Bombay High Court

and

J.

C. Shah, J. in one of the Second Appeals before him analysed

some cooflicting decisions bearing on the interpretation of ss. 70 and

85 specifically with regard to the ouster of jurisdiction

of civil court to

settle, decide

or deal with those questions which are required to be

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settled, decided

or dealt with by the competent authority under

the E

Tenancy Act, and referred th~ matter to a Division Bench. The Divi-

sion Bench in

Dhondi Tukaram Mali, (supra) while affirming the

ratiq

in Trimbak Sopana Girme, (supra) further obserevd that thd Jcgislature

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should by specific provision provide for transfer of such suits where

issues arise in respect of which the competent authority under the

Tenancy Act is constituted a forum of exclusive jurisdiction so as to F

avoid the dismissal of the suit by the civil Court

or being kept pending

for a long time till the competent authority disposes of the issue which • it alone is competent to determine. The legislature took note of this

decision

of the Bombay High Court and introduced s. 85A by

Bombay

Act XIII of 1956 which came into force from 23rd March 1956.

In Bhimaji Shanker Kulkarni, (supra) this very question o.rose in

a suit filed by the plaintiff for possession of the suit property on

redemption of a mortgage and taking of accounts on the allegation,

that defendant no. 1 was a usufructuary mortgagee under a mortgage

deed, dated 28th June 1945. The defendants pleaded that the transac-

G

tion of June 28, 1945 was an advance lease and not a mortgage, and H

they were protected tenants within the meaning of the Tenancy Act.

The trial Court passed a decree holding that the transaction evidenced

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598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 2 S.C.R.

by the deed is a composite document comprising of a mortgage and a

lease

and on taking

account• of the mortgage debt it is found that

plaintiff owed nothing to the defendants on the date of the suit aRd

the mortgage stood fully redeemed. A further direction in the decree

was that the plaintiff is

at liberty to seek his remedy for possession

of the suit

lands in the revenue courts. The plaintiff carried the matter

in appeal

to the appellate court who partly allowed

tlte appeal affirming

that the inortgage is satisfied and nothing is due under the mortgage

and the direction of the trial

Court that

plaintifI w:is at liberty to seek

his remedy for possession of the suit Jands in th0 r::~

1

:cnue courts \vas

confir111ed and the rest of the decree, n<.1.n1cly, Lh~~t the t:o~JJ11cnt Ext.

43 evidencing the transaction \Vas a co1npc.,·itc docun1cnt sbo\ving a

mortgage

and

a lc?se was set aside and a direction \V<ts fivcn that the

record and proceedi_ngs do go back to the trial cc:>urt who should give

three months' time

to the plaintiff for

!\ling proper proceedings in the

1"cnancy Court for determining as to v . .r11ethcr dcfc:1dant 1 i~ a tenant.

Some consequential order \Va~ also n1~H'.~. ·r11c pluintiff :::~.rricd the

matter in second appeal to t:;c High Court of Mysore w

1

1:ch, while

dismissing the appeal observed that the civil court had

no

jorisdiction

to determine the nature of the tr:i.nsa::tio1~ v;hcn the conteiltion ._,.as

that it evidenced advance lt~asc fo11o·\ved by lhc tcn~::1cy of defendant

no. 1 and, therefore, the only proper dircctio~ is the one given by th•

trial Court to refer the isstfe to the Marnlatdar ;_'.s to \Vhcther 1he

defendant is a lessee under Ex~. 43 and 0-1 the r21'crcncc being ans\Ycrcd

back, the suit should be. disposed of in accoid~ince ·therewith. The

plaintiff brought the matter before th;s Court. Tc:is Court in terms

approved the decision of the B;:;;11bay r1~f~'-Court !n Dlzondf :·rikar1.un

Mali (supra) observing as tlllder:

"Jn Dhondi Tukaram's case the Court expressed the hope

that the legislature would n1ake ~,uitable ;Jr1cnd1r..c

1

1ts. i11 the

Act. The Bombay Legislature approved of the decision,

and gave effect

to it by

intnxlnci'1g s. f'5A by the a!"ending

Bombay Act XIII of 1956. Section 85A proceeds upon the

assumption

that though the Civil Court has

otherwise juris­

diction to try a sujt, it \Vill have no _:urisdiction to try an

issue arising in the suit, if the issue _ii; re.quired to be s~ttled,

decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or otlitr competent

authority under the Act, and on that assumption, s. 85A

provides for suitable machinery for reference of the issue to

the Mamlatdar for his decision. Now, the /.;J'.:rn

1

;,tdn hos

jurisdiction under s. 70 to decide the several i•sues sr-cified

therein "for the purposes of this Act", and before the i:l'.ro­

duction of s. 85A, it was a debatable point whether the

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G. s. SHINDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, !.) 599

expression "for the purpose• of this Act" meant that the

Mamlatdar had jurisdiction

to decide those issues only in some

proceeding before him under some specific provision of the

Act, or whether

he had jurisdiction to decide those issues

even though they arose for decision in a suit properly

cognisable by a Civil Court,

so that the jurisdiction

0£ the Civil Court to try those issues in the suit was taken

away by

s. 85 read with s.

70, Dhondi Tukaram's case

settled the point, and held that the Mamlatdar

had.

exclusive

jurisdiction to decide those issues even though they arose for

decision

in a suit properly cognisable by a Civil Court. The

result

was somewhat startling, for normally

the Civil Court

has jurisdiction to try all the issues arising in a suit properly

cognisablc by it. But having regard to the fact that the

Bombay Legislature approved 0£ Dhondi Tukaran1's case and

gave effect to it by introducing

s. 85A, we must hold that

the decision correctly interpreted the law

as it stood before

the enactment of

s. 85A. It follows that independently of

s. 85A and under the law as it stood

before s. 85A came mto

force, the Courts below were bound to refer to the Mamlat,hr

the decision of the issue whether the defendant is a tenant".

It would thus appear that even when a properly constituted suit

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ia brought to the civil Court having jurisdiction to try the same, prima E

facie on a contention being raised by the defendant an issue may arise

which the Civil Court would not be competent to try and the legislature

stepped in to avoid the conflict of jurisdiction by introducing s. 85A

maldng it obligatory upon the Civil Court to refer such an issue to

the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. Any controversy that

such an issue

is a primary issue or a subsidiary issue and

hence Iriable F

by Civil Court must be said to have been resolved by laying down

that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction ro try the same even if

•uch an issue arose in a properly constitued civil suit cognisable by

the

civil Court. And the ratio of the decision is that a contention

raised by the defendant may have the necessary

effect to oust the

jurisdiction

of the civil Court in

resp""t of the contention which is to G

be disposed of

before the suit can be disposed of one way or tl1e other.

In lshverlal

Thakorelal Almaula v. Moabhai NaRjibhai, (') the plain­

tiff appellant had filed a suit against the defendant respondent in the civil

Court for pcssession of agricultural land and me·sne profits. The defen-

dant contended that he was a tenant who was entitled to the protection H

of the Tenancy Act

in view of the proviso to s. 43C of the Tenancy Act

(l) [1966] l

S.C.R. 367.

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600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.R.

despite the fact that at the relevant time the suit land was not governed

by the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The trial Court decreed the

suit but in first appeal the District Judge reversed the decree of the trial

Court and dismissed the suit

as in his view under the proviso to s. 43C

incorporated in the Tenancy Act by Bombay Act

XIII of 1956 the res­

pondent continued to enjoy

the, protection of the Tenancy Act and the

civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant a decree for possession 01 the

land in dispute. A second appeal to the High Court by the original

plaintiff was dismissed

in limine and the matter came up before this

Court by special leave. This Court first affirmed that whatever may have

been the position before Act

XIII of 1956, the legislature has unequivo­

cally expressed an intention that even in a suit properly instituted in a

civil Court, if any issue arises which

is required to be decided by the

re­

venue Court, the issue shall be referred for trial to that Court and the

suit shall be disposed of in the light of the decision. The Legislature

has clearly expressed itself that issues required under Act 67 of 1948,

viz., Tenancy Act, to be decided by a revenue court, even

if arising in

a civil

rnit, must be decided by the re.venue Court and not by the Civil

Court. The view expressed by the Bombay High Court in P~ndurcrng

Hari v. Shanker Maruti('), and the Gujarat High Court in Kalichararl

Bhajan'al Bhayya v. Rai Maharlaxmi & Anr. ('), that in such suit the

civil Court is competent

to adjudicate upon the issues which are by Act

67 of 1948 required to be decided

by the revenue Court, was disappro­

ved. This Court

held that the question whether the defendant being

a tenant on the day on which the Tenancy

Act was put into operation

and whether he retained the protection in view of the proviso to

s. 43C

was within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under the Ten­

ancy Act and, therefore, the District Judge was in error in dismissing the

suit.

It was necessary for him to refer the very question for

determina­

tion to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act and it was not

open to him to dispose of the suit. Accordingly the appeal was allowed

and the matter was remanded to the District Court with a direction that it

should restore the appeal to its original number and proceed according

to law. This decision does not depart from the ratio in

Bhimji Shanker

Kulkarni's case (supra).

It was,, however, said that a suit for specific performance of a con­

tract for sale of land is cognizable by the Civil Court and its jurisdiction

would not be ousted merely because contract,

if enforced, would violate

some

provision"s of the Tenancy Act. If contract when enforced would

(1) 62 Born. L.R. 873.

(2) 4 Guj. L.R. 145.

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G. s. SIIINDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, J.) 601

violate some provisions of the Tenancy Act it may be that the competent

authority under the Tenancy Act may proceed to take action

as

permis­

sible under the law but the Court cannot refuse to enforce the contract.

And while so enforcing the contract the Court need not refer any subsi­

diary issue to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act because if

there

is any violation of the Tenancy Act the same would be taken care

of by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act in view of the po­

wer conferred upon the Malmlatdar under s. 84C of tk Tenancy Act. In

this connection reference was made to Naminath Appayya Hanamman­

naver v. Jantbu Rao Satappa Kocheri('). We need not examine this deci­

sion

in detail because an appeal against the decision of Mysore High

Conrt granting dectee for specific performance was brought to this Cciurt. A brief resume of the fact in Jambu Rai Saiappa Kocheri v.

Neminath Alvpayya Hanll{rlmal1/laver('), is necessary to grasp the ratio

of this decision.

In a snit for specific performance the defendant con­

tended that if

the contract is enforced it would violate s. 35 of the Ten­

ancy Act in that the plaintiff's holding after the appointed day would ex­

ceed the ceiling and the acqnisition in excess of the ceiling is invalid. A

contention appears to have been raised that the question whether an

acquisition in excess of the ceiling would be invalid would be within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under s. 70Gmb) and that the

Civil Court cannot decide or deal with this question and a reference

ought to have been made to the Mamlatdar. Negativing this conten­

tion it was observed that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain

and decree a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell land. If

upon the sale being completed it would violate some provision of the

Tooancy Act an enquiry has to be made under ·s. 84C and s. 84C pro­

vides that if an acqnisition of any land is or becomes invalid under any

of the provisions

of the Tenancy Act, the Mamlatdar may suo motu in­

quire into the question and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not valid. This inquiry has to be' made after the acquisition of

title pursuant to a decree for specific performance. It is in the con­

t;,xt of these facts that it was held that even though civil Court has no

jurisdiction to determine whether the acquisition would become invalid

biJ.t there is nothing in s. 70 or any other .provision of the Act which ex­

cludes the Civil Court's jurisdiction

to decree specific performance of a

contract to transfer land which would

be anterior to the acqnisition.

While disposing of this contention this Court took note of the

fact thaJ:

the transfer may not be invalid at all because the purchaser m;iy have

already disposed of his prior holding and

it was further observed that

(!) A.I.R. 1966 Mysore 154.

(2) (1968] 3

S.C.R. 706.

20-978 SCI/78

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602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.R.

when the scheme of the Act is examined it becomes clear that the legis­

lature has not declared the transfer or acquisition invalid, for

s. 84C

provides that the land in

excess of the ceiling shall be at the disposal of

the Government when an order is made by the Mamlatdar. The invali­

dity of the acquisition

is, therefore, only to the extent to which the hold-

ing exceeds the ceiling prescribed by law and involves the consequence

that the land shall vest in the Government.

It would thus transpire

that after the acquisition

is completed, the question may arise whether

ceiling has been exceeded and in that event the Mamlatdar in a

suo

nwtu

inquiry can declare the transfer invalid to the extent the holding exceeds

the ceiling. The distinguishing feature of the present

case. is that s. 63

bars purchase of agricultural land by one who

is not an agriculturist

and,

therefore, the disqualification is at the threshold and unless it is cross­

ed the Court cannot decree a suit for specific performance of contract for

sale of agricultural land and in order to dispose of the contention which

stands in the forefront a reference to the Mamlatdar under

s.

70 read with

ss. 85 and 85A is cnevitablc. Therefore, there is no conflict between

D ~e decision in Kulkarni's case and lambr.uao's case (supra) nor the

latter decision, overrules the earlier one.

In fact,

Kulkarni's case

(s!lpra)

was not referred to in lambr.uao's case (supra}

because the ques­

tion before the Court was entirely different from the one in Kulkami's

case (supra).

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In

Mussamiya Imam Haider Bd;x Razvi v. Rabari Gavindbhai Ratna­

bhai & Ors.,(') the question that came up for consideration of this

Court was whether when in a suit

in the civil Court for possession of

agricultural

land a contention is raised that defendant has become a

statutory owner on the tillers' day under s. 32 of the Tenancy Act imply­

ing that he was a tenant on 1st April 1957, would the civil Court have

jurisdiction to decide the question of past tenancy in the context of s. 70

·of the Tenancy Act ? The contention was negatived observing that s.

70 imposes a duty on the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is a

tenant but the sub section does not cast a dnty upon him to decide v.he­

iber a person was or was not a tenant in the past, wbetber recent or re­

mote. Approaching from this angle ,it was held that the contention whe­

ther a defendant has become a statutory owner on the tillers' day involv­

ing the question of past tenancy was not within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the Mamlatdar and, therefore, the civil Court hllS jurisdiction to decide

the question. In the context of the language employed ins. 70(b) which,

as it then stood, did not confer jurisdiction on the Mam!atdar to decide

the question of past tcnaucy, it cail be said that the civil Court's juris­

diction to decide the same was not ousted. It appears that the question

(I) (1969] I S.C.R. 785.

G. s. S!IINDE v. R. B. JOSHI (Desai, J.) 6 03

was argued in the context of s. 70 only and has been answered in tho

context of the language employed in s. 70(b) only. Otherwise, the

qnestion whether a person has become a statutory owner on the tillers'

day, i.e. on 1st April 1957 which would imply whether the person so

contending was a tenant of the land on 1st April 1957 and hence would

become the owner of the land by operation of law, was exclusively with­

in the purview of the Tribunal set up under

s. 67 in chapter VI of the

Tenancy Act. Section 67 imposes a duty on the

State Government to

set up Agricultural Land Tribunal for each taluka or mahal or for such

area

as the

State Government may think fit. Section 68 prescribes the

duties o( the Tribunal which inter alia include the duty to decide any dis­

pute under

ss. 32 to 32R (both inclusive). A dispute under s. 32 would

comprehend whether the plaintiff was the owner of the land on

the

til·

Jers' day i.e. 1st April 1957 and the person claiming to have become a

statutory owner by operation of law

on that day should of necessity be

a tenant and that this question would be within

the exclusive jurisdic­

tion of the Tribunal a·s provided bys. 68. Section 85 refers to the Tri­

bunal meaning Agricultural Land Tribunal to be a competent authority

to settle, decide and deal with the question set out in

s. 68 and it would

have exclusive jurisdiction to settle, decide and deal with the same. No

submission was made in

Mussamiya's case (supra) with reference to the

provisions contained in chapter

VI and especially s. 68 and, therefore,

that decision cannot lend support to the submission that past enancy

being a subsidiary issue, as such

was within the competence of the Civil

Court.

A question similar to the one under discussion in the; context of

provisions contained in ss. 132, 133 and 142(1)(a) of Mysore Land

Reforms Act,1961, came

up before this Court very recently in

Noor

Mohd. Khan Ghouse Khan Soudagar v. Fakirappa Bharmappa Machena­

halii & Ors.('). The majority decision, after approving Kulkarni,

(supra) and distinguishing Mussamiya, ('supra) and referring to Dhondi

Tukaram,

(supra) held that a

question arose during the pendency of

the suit and the execution proceeding whether by the final allotment of

the land to the appellant, respondent no. 1 had ceased to be a tenant

in view of s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. This question accord­

ing to the opinion of the majority fell squarely and exclusively within the

jurisdiction of the revenue authorities and the civil Court had no juru­

diction to decide it and a reference to the competent authority was inevi­

table, and no discretion was left in the Civil Court in this behalf. So

observing, the majority upheld the decision of High Court which had

<lJ {1978) 3 s.c.c. 188.

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604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 2 S.C.R.

A set aside the decree of the trial Court awarding possession because in

the opinion of the High Court no actual delivery of possession can be

given against the person claiming to be a tenant unless the requirements

of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, were satisfied. It may be

noticed that

the, scheme of the provisions in Mysore Land Reforms Act,

1961, under discussion in tl1e decision were in pari materia with the

R scheme of ·ss.70, 85 and 85A of the Tenancy Act.

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Tims, both on principfo and on authority there is no escape from

the conclu'sion that where

in a suit properly constituted and

cognizable

by the Civil Court upon a contest an issue arises which is required to

be settled, decided or dealt with by a competent authority under the Ten­

ancy Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal

with the same is not only ousted but the civil Court is undur a statutory

obligation to refer the issue to the competent authority under the Ten­

ancy Act to decide the same and upon

the reference being answered back,

to dispose

of the suit in accordance with the decision of tl1c competent

authority under the Tenancy Act.

If plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract for sale of

agricultural land governed by

tho provisions of the Tenancy Act in the

Civil Court and the defendant appeared and raised a contention that in

view of the provisions contained in

s. 63 of the Tenancy Act the plain­

tiff being

not an agriculturist he is barred from purchasing the Jami, the

issue would arise whether the plaintiff

is an agriculturist.

Such an issue

being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar, it is incumbent

upon the Civil Court to refer the issue to the competent authority under

the Tenancy Act and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to decid·2 or deal

with the same.

That

issue arises in th" suit from which the present

appeal arises and both

the. trial Court and the High Court were in error

in clutching at a jurisdiction which did not vest in them and, therefore,

on this ground alone this appeal will succeed.

·

Accordingly this appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court dis­

missing the suit, affirmed by the High Court,. is set aside and the suit is

remanded

to the trial Court to proceed further according to law in the

light of the observations made

in this judgment. Co'sts would

abide

the final outcome of the suit in the trial Court.

As the case is very old one, the trial Court and the competent autho­

rity to which a reference would be made pursuant to the direction in

this judgment, should give top priotity to .the matter and d.ispose it of as

expeditiously

as possible.

N.V.K.

:·! Apperil aijowed.

,

··~