2026 INSC 468 Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 1 of 23

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2446 OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9198 of 2025)

GUNJAN @ GIRIJA KUMARI

AND OTHERS …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The challenge in this appeal is directed against

judgment and order dated 22.08.2024 passed by the High

Court of Delhi at New Delhi

1, dismissing Criminal Revision

Petition No.114 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous

Application No.3181 of 2023, filed by the appellants-accused

herein.

1

Hereinafter, “High Court”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 2 of 23

2.1 In the Criminal Revision Petition, what was called in

question, was the order passed by the Court of Additional

Sessions Judge-02, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi

2 dated

26.11.2022 on framing of charges as well as order dated

30.11.2022, whereby the charges were framed. Against

appellant No.1-accused No.1 Smt. Gunjan @ Girija Kumari

w/o Shri Laxman Dass, charge came to be framed by the

trial court in respect of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r)

and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

3, whereas against all the

appellants-accused including appellant No.1, charge was

also framed under Section 506 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

4. The prayer of the appellants to

quash the said orders was rejected and the Criminal

Revision Petition came to be dismissed by the High Court.

3. The complainant and the accused persons happen to

be family members. Appellant Nos.2 and 3 and respondent

No.2-complainant are real brothers. Appellant Nos.1 and 4

are legally wedded wives of appellant Nos.2 and 3

2

Hereinafter, “trial court”.

3

Hereinafter, “SC/ST Act”.

4

Hereinafter, “IPC”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 3 of 23

respectively. The wives hail from castes other than

Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Their husbands ,

that is appellant Nos.2 and 3 as well as respondent No.2-

complainant, belong to Scheduled Castes. By virtue of

marriage, the wives, it was contended, also stood to belong

to caste and community of their husband’s as well as that of

respondent No.2-complainant. The facts on record and the

pleadings suggest that a dispute existed between the parties

in respect of the properties of their late father named Shri

Nand Kishore, situated at Hari Nagar and Ramesh Nagar.

3.1 First Information Report

5 No.42 of 2021 came to be

registered on 30.01.2021 with the Kirti Nagar Police Station,

pursuant to a complaint lodged by respondent No.2 -

complainant. It was inter-alia stated that on the day of the

incident, that is on 28.01.2021, the appellants misbehaved

with the complainant. According to the complainant,

appellant No.1 hurled casteist abuses against respondent

No.2-complainant and the other appellants gave threats.

5

Hereinafter, “FIR”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 4 of 23

3.1.1 It was stated in the complaint that when the friends

of respondent No.2-complainant named Chandra Prakash @

Chini and Bobby had come to meet him, appellant No.1, by

making caste-based slurs, using words like chura, chamar,

harijan, dirty drain etc., addressed and insulted the

complainant and his wife. It was stated that the accused

were trying to break open the lock of the house when the

incident took place.

3.1.2 The narration in the complaint was prefaced by

mentioning that appellant No.1, who belonged to a

particular upper caste, was in the habit of using abusive

words as above and that it was for over one year that

appellant No.1 had been harassing by addressing the

complainant, his wife and their child with derogatory words

as above, from her balcony or from the ground floor in the

house particularly when some friends or other person s

would come.

3.2 The complaint resulted into registration of FIR as

above, culminating into Sessions Case being SC No. 253 of

2021 upon completion of the investigation. The trial court,

in its order dated 26.11.2022, viewed that the charges were

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 5 of 23

required to be framed. It actually framed the charges as per

order dated 30.11.2022 under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of

the SC/ST Act against appellant No.1 and under Section 506

read with Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. The

High Court rejected the challenge to the said orders and

maintained the charges by the impugned judgment and

order.

3.3 According to the High Court, charges were properly

framed inasmuch as at the stage of framing of charges, the

court was not required to evaluate the evidence, nor was

supposed to hold a mini trial. According to the High Court,

there were allegations in the complaint that the appellants

acted in furtherance of common intention, that appellant

No.1 hurled abuses towards respondent No.2-complainant

and that the appellants also threatened to kill him and to

falsely implicate him in a molestation case. The High Court

observed that witness Chandra Prakash, in his statement

recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973

6 corroborated the statement of respondent

No.2-complainant made in the complaint to go to show that

6

Hereinafter, “Cr.PC”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 6 of 23

the caste-based remarks were used against respondent

No.2-complainant and the offences as per the charges

framed were committed.

4. Heard learned counsel Mr. Avadh Bihari Kaushik for

the appellants as well as learned Additional Solicitor General

Ms. Archana Pathak Dave assisted by learned advocate-on-

record Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria and other learned

advocates on behalf of the respondents.

4.1 Assailing the impugned judgment and order, it was

submitted on behalf of the appellants that neither the

offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act

were made out from the statements and contents of the FIR,

more particularly, when the offence under the SC/ST Act

was not shown to have been committed at “a place within

public view” which was an essential requirement to

constitute the offences in question, nor the averments in the

complaint revealed the ingredients of offence under Section

506 read with Section 34, IPC. On the other hand, learned

counsel for the respondents supported the impugned

judgment and order, urging to dismiss the appeal.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 7 of 23

5. While examining the challenge to the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court and in turn, the

merits of the order of framing of the charge passed by the

trial court, the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the

SC/ST Act, which are the offences alleged against appellant

No.1 and for which she has been charged, may be looked

into.

5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as

under,

“3. Punishments for offences atrocities. —3(1)

Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste

or a Scheduled Tribe,—

(a) to (q) ………..

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates

with intent to humiliate a member of a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe

in any place within public view;

(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled

Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste

name in any place within public view;”

5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act

can be said to have been committed when a person not

belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe

intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to

humiliate a person belonging to Scheduled Caste o r

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 8 of 23

Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence

under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any

member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is

abused by caste name in any place within public view.

5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to

be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with

an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who

does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The

common essential for constituting the offence under both

the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-

clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub-clause (s) have

taken place “in any place within public view”.

5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under

Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is

about punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation

whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in

Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another

with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to

the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 9 of 23

interested, and when the same is done with an intent to

cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation.

Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several

persons in furtherance of common intention.

5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge

framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in

respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and

3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few

decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and

purport of the phrase “in any place within public view”

pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be

fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is

constituted.

5.5 In Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through

Standing Counsel and Another

7

, the place where the

informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him

‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car

which was parked at the gate of the premises of his

employer. This Court held that such place was “a place

7

(2008) 8 SCC 435

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 10 of 23

within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was

not committed in a public place and hence did not come

within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was

negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the

expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the

provision and the expression ‘public place’.

5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within

public view’ could not be confused with the expression

‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private

place yet can be within public view,

“….It could have been a different matter had the

alleged offence been committed inside a

building, and also was not in the public view.

However, if the offence is committed outside the

building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the

lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane

outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly

be a place within the public view. Also, even if the

remark is made inside a building, but some

members of the public are there (not merely

relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence

since it is in the public view….”

(Para 28)

5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this

Court in Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and

Another

8

in respect of the concept of ‘place within public

8

(2020) 10 SCC 710

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 11 of 23

view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations

in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in

Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the

allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was

stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within

the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was

not the case of the informant that any member of the public

was present at the time of the incident in the house. The

Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the

abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public view’

was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses

whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not

the persons present within the four walls of the building.

5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar vs. State

represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Lalgudi Trichy and Others

9

, this Court considered its own

decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma

(supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as

under,

“It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within

public view’, the place should be open where the

9

2025 SCC OnLine SC 215

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 12 of 23

members of the public can witness or hear the

utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the

alleged offence takes place within the four corners

of the wall where members of the public are not

present, then it cannot be said that it has taken

place at a place within public view.”

(Para 11)

5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the

allegations in the FIR at their face value, what was alleged

was that when the complainant was in the office, the

accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant

and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the

complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him.

Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later

to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus

noticed that the incident had taken place within the four

corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not

“a place within public view”.

5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri

Rithesh Pais vs. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.

and Another

10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which

the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet

10

ILR 2022 KAR 4613

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 13 of 23

material showed that the hurling of the abuses had

happened in the basement and within the walls of the

basement, holding that the basement of the building was not

“a place within public view”.

5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from

the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is

that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r)

and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of

the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste-

based abuses must take place at “a place within public

view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even

happens to be a private place, then in such eventuality a

public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what

happens there or what is taking place that will only make

the “place within public view”.

6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement

that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse,

towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the

same a necessary condition for constituting the offence

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 14 of 23

under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be

attentively noticed.

6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse,

on 28.01.2021, the statements were made by respondent

No.2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of

harassing and hurling caste-based slurs at him for over a

year and that they used to do it when some other persons or

friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from

their balcony or at the ground floor of the house.

6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous

conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening

on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute

to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section

3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of

such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No.1 -

complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such

general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to

allegation about the commission of offence.

6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date

that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 15 of 23

when the appellants were trying to break open the house of

respondent No.2-complainant. According to respondent

No.2-complainant, appellant No.1 hurled casteist slur in an

abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-

accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent

No.2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in

molestation charge.

6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere

it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No.1

and other appellants are stated to have abused and

threatened respondent No.1-complainant, took place where

there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of

occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was

conspicuously absent.

6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place

within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of

the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in

the FIR clearly indicated that the place of occurrence of the

incident was inside the residential house. Referring to the

facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the

FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 16 of 23

incident. Secondly, point No.5(b) in the FIR mentioned the

place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh

Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home.

Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No.2 -

complainant in point No.6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it

was the place of residential house where the occurrence took

place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the

very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar,

Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence.

6.6 Respondent No.2-complainant named two witnesses,

one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash.

Not only that both were the friends of respondent No.2-

complainant, from their statements, nothing could be

elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love

Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain

(complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house

where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his

house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash stated that “he

went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant

Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his

house, the accused interjected”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 17 of 23

6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged

incident took place in a private place and within four walls

of the house of respondent No.2-complainant and the

appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation

in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No.2-complainant

had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and

for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in

respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident

for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that

any independent member of public was present to witness

the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house

place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a

residential house in no way becomes “a place within public

view”.

7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting

point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The

complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening

of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A

reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural

and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the

complaint giving the initial and primary description could be

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 18 of 23

treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there

would be a scope and room for improvisation.

8. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and

Others

11

, this Court laid down the acid test that if the

contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make

out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered

with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh

Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place

within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet

failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language

employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the

SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute

the offence did not come out from and were not satisfied in

the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to have not

been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed.

8.1 In Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and

Others

12

, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in

the nature of non-mentioning of the name of material

witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the

11

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

12

(2018) 9 SCC 137

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 19 of 23

hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that

context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not

be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain

essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the

present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself

may have been staged”.

8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Another

13

, this Court found absence of

requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act

holding that the offence was not committed at “a place

within public view”. It was observed that even though the

appellant in that case might have abused the complainant,

but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not

warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly

in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to

constitute the offence.

9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable

in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not

disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence

13

(2023) 17 SCC 615

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 20 of 23

alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged

in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents

of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is

sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to

proceed criminally against any accused named therein or

any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest

and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein.

For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and

3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant

case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a

place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and

absent.

9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to

become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have

happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a

principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The

other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation”

and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity

when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive

utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within

public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 21 of 23

requirement that the place must be one “within public view”

can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the

offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non

for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act.

10. This leaves the Court to the charge framed under

Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC against all the

appellants. As noted hereinabove, the offence of criminal

intimidation as defined under Section 503, IPC and made

punishable under Section 506, IPC requires that whoever

threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation

or property and when such threat is with the intent to cause

alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. The

“intent to cause alarm ” is an pivotal aspect and

consideration to judge whether the offence of criminal

intimidation is made out or not.

10.1 In the present case, even after closely reading the

averments in the complaint, it is difficult to come to the

conclusion that the appellants-accused exerted threat with

an intent to cause “alarm” to respondent No.2-complainant.

The submission could be countenanced that the element of

“alarm” to the complainant was “absent”. Even otherwise,

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 22 of 23

the offence under Section 506, IPC was alleged against the

appellants to conjunct the same with the offence alleged

under the SC/ST Act which are not made out.

10.2 As far as the charge under Section 34, IPC is

concerned, nothing is suggested either from the facts or

attendant circumstances that the appellants-accused had

any common intention to do a criminal act and that they

acted in furtherance of such common intention. In that view,

it would be an abuse of the process of law and would amount

to harassment to the appellants to subject them to the

criminal proceedings in relation to Section 506 read with

Section 34, IPC.

11. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, it is

evident that the charge could not have framed and was

wrongly framed by the trial court against the appellants-

accused for the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of

the SC/ST Act and under Section 506 read with Section 34,

IPC. The judgment and orders dated 22.08.2024 passed by

the High Court of Delhi, dismissing the Criminal Revision

Petition No.114 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.9198 of 2025 Page 23 of 23

Application No.3181 of 2023, are not sustainable in eye of

law.

12. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court

dated 22.08.2024 as well as both the above orders of the

trial court dated 26.11.2022 and 30.11.2022 are hereby set

aside.

13. FIR No. 42 of 2021 dated 30.01.2021 registered with

the Police Station, Kirti Nagar, Delhi and the charge-sheet

filed against the appellants-accused for the offences under

Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act as well as for

the offences under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC

stand quashed.

14. The appeal is allowed.

In view of disposal of the appeal as above, the

interlocutory applications, if any, shall not survive.

……………..……………………...J.

[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA ]

………………………….J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 11, 2026.