IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

(i) CRA-D-1438-2024 (O&M)

Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy

...Appellant

VERSUS

National Investigation Agency

...Respondent

(ii) CRA-D-958-2026 (O&M)

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy

...Appellant

VERSUS

National Investigation Agency

...Respondent

Reserved on: September 02, 2026

Date of Pronouncement: September 14, 2026

Uploaded on: September 14, 2026

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ARCHANA PURI

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU

Argued by:Mr.Animesh Sharma, Mr.Sudhir Passi,

Mr.Japandeep Singh Brar and Mr.Gurfateh Singh Khosa, Advocates

for the appellant (in CRA-D-1438-2024).

Mr.Aman Sapiah and Mr.Rahul Rana, Advocates

for the appellant (in CRA-D-958-2026).

Mr.Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, Special Prosecutor,

for the respondent-NIA

Mr.Rajiv Vij, Additional Public Prosecutor, UT Chandigarh.

****

ARCHANA PURI, J.

These are twin appeals filed by the appellants to assail the

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -2-

orders of denial of regular bail, dated 18.09.2024 and 16.05.2026

respectively, in case FIR No.RC-03/2024/NIA/DLI dated 08.03.2024.

In pursuance of the notice issued, learned Special Prosecutor for

National Investigation Agency appeared and filed separate replies. Learned

Addl. Public Prosecutor for U.T. Chandigarh also appeared.

Counsel for the parties heard and with their able assistance, we

have perused the documents on record.

The essential facts, to be noticed are as follows:-

That, FIR No.4 dated 20.01.2024, under Sections 384, 336, 506, 120-

B IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, was registered at Police

Station North, Sector-3, Chandigarh. Later, on the basis of the investigation

conducted, Chandigarh Police invoked Sections 10, 11, 13, 18 and 18B of

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. As per the version put forth, on

18.01.2024, at about 4.38 p.m., complainant Kuldeep Singh had received a

whatsapp call from a foreign phone number and the caller introduced

himself as Kali/Kala and conveyed to the complainant that he has been

assigned a duty by Goldy Bhai and further directed him to fulfill the demand

of Goldy Bhai. On 19.01.2024, at about 4.14 a.m., firing was done at the

house of the complainant i.e. House No.71, Sector-5, Chandigarh. On the

same very day, at about 3.31 p.m., the complainant received calls from

another foreign number, but he did not respond. Subsequently, complainant

received a whatsapp voice note from the same mobile number. The sender

identified himself as Goldy Brar, who acknowledged that the early morning

firing at the complainant’s house was done, on his instructions. Goldy Brar

then threatened the complainant to pay Rs.3 crore extortion money.

During the investigation, the Chandigarh Police had arrested as many

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -3-

as eight persons, who were given numbers as A-1 to A-8. Appellant-

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy is A-1 and appellant-

Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy is A-8. Considering the seriousness of the

offences, the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under

Sub-section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National

Investigation Agency Act, 2008, had directed the NIA to take up the

investigation of the requisite FIR and thereupon, the case in question was

registered as RC-03/2024/NIA/DLI under Sections 10, 11, 13, 18 and 18B of

UP (P) Act and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act against Goldy and

others and took over the investigation.

During the course of investigation, it became evident that the

arrested accused of the present case i.e. A-1 to A-8, were the members of

terrorist gang formed by Designated Individual Terrorist (DIT) Satwinder

Singh alias Goldy Brar (A-9), with the assistance of his associate Gurpreet

Singh @ Goldy Rajpura (A-10). This terrorist gang was formed for carrying

out unlawful and terror activities in India. Goldy Brar had assigned his

associate Gurpreet Singh @ Goldy Rajpura to recruit members to the terror

gang, whereupon, Amritpal Singh @ Gujjar (A-4) was recruited. A-10

promised A-4 to give money in return for executing various tasks assigned

by A-10. Goldy Rajpura introduced Amritpal Singh @ Gujjar (A-4) to

Goldy Brar (A-9).

On further instructions of Goldy Brar and Goldy Rajpura, Amritpal

Singh @ Gujjar recruited Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy

(A-1) as well as Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy (A-8) and various other persons

i.e. A-2, A-3 and A-5. The investigation established that A-4 Amritpal

Singh @ Gujjar revealed the conspiracy hatched by A-9 and A-10 for

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -4-

targeting affluent businessmen for extortion, upon which, Gagandeep Singh

@ Goldy agreed to help A-4. After the incident of firing at Sector-5,

Chandigarh, Amritpal Singh @ Gujjar handed over pistols, magazines and

live rounds to Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy, with the directions to conceal

them.

Investigation also evidently spelt that when A-4 was recruited in the

terror gang of Goldy Brar, appellant-Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy (A-8)

arranged a rented room for A-4 and his associates, which became a regular

meeting point for A-4 and his associates, till 20.01.2024. Even, Gagandeep

Singh @ Goldy was himself a regular visitor to that place.

Furthermore, both Goldy Brar (A-9) and Goldy Rajpura (A-10)

had arranged arms and ammunition for the terror gang, which were shown to

appellant (A-8) and confided that the weapons have been provided by Goldy

Brar (A-9). From the date of procurement to the day of attack in Sector-5,

Chandigarh, appellant-Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy was aware of the

weapons, procured on the instructions of Goldy Brar, fro the instant

conspiracy. Subsequent to the carrying out of the attack upon the

complainant’s house on 19.01.2024, the members of said terror gang,

inclusive of Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy, continued meeting for other

criminal activities. Also, it became evident that recce was got conducted,

wherein, A-8 had participated. Even, after conducting of second recce, the

target continued to received death threats from A-10, even after the arrest of

the accused in the present case.

After conducting of the recce in Rajpura, Amritpal Singh @ Gujjar

had handed over the weapons used in the crime at Sector-5 Chandigarh, to

his associate Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy, who concealed them, knowing

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -5-

itself that the weapons had been used in the crime. Thereafter, as per the

instructions, he handed over the arms and ammunition to Shubham Kumar

@ Giri @ Pandit.

Further, it emerged that Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy had arranged

accommodation for the members of the terror gang. He also concealed the

weapons used in the crime. He kept two magazines and seven live cartridges

with himself, which were thereafter, recovered in pursuance of the

disclosure statement made by him. He also accompanied his co-accused to

conduct recce of new extortion target after 19.01.2024 attack in Chandigarh,

which indicates his readiness to be available for the criminal illegal task,

assigned by the foreign based handlers.

Based on the evidence, collected during the course of the

investigation, final report was filed on 20.07.2024 under Section 120-B, 201

IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act as well as Section 18 of UA(P)

Act against ten accused persons and wanted accused, including the

appellants in question, as incriminating role came forth in the crime and

conspiracy in the criminal task. Finding the prima facie case, the charge was

framed against eight arrested accused including the appellants on

03.10.2024.

Charge was framed against appellant-Gurwinder Singh @

Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy (A-1) under Sections 120-B, 307, 384 IPC,

Sections 16, 18, 18-B and 20 of UAPA as well as Sections 25(1A), 25(1AA)

and 25(1B) of the Arms Act. Against appellant-Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy,

the charge was framed under Sections 120-B, 201 IPC, Sections 18, 18-B of

UAPA as well as Sections 25(1A), 25(1AA), 25(1B) and 27(2) of the Arms

Act.

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -6-

In the final report presented to the Special Court, NIA had also

given the detailed background of the Designated Individual Terrorist

Satwinder Singh @ Goldy Brar and the manner of association of various

other persons, entering into conspiracy to create terror and violent acts in

India, while his location is in US/Canada. It also gave the modus operandi

of accused A-1 to A-10, being members of the terrorist gang formed by the

notified terrorist Goldy Brar. The details of the manner of association of

both the appellants, in the same gang and about the role assigned to them

and fellow companions was also given.

In the reply filed by NIA, the details of linkage of the appellants

in the terrorist gang and their involvement was revealed by NIA.

In the light of the aforesaid, at the very outset, learned counsel

for both the appellants, in unison, have assiduously submitted that the

appellants have been falsely implicated. In fact, they were never named in

the FIR. There is no incriminating evidence against them. Appellant

Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy is in custody since 17.02.2024 and appellant

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy is in custody since

23.01.2024. The trial is going on at a snail’s pace. The long custody, in

such circumstances, in itself is a good ground for grant of bail, while

invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In fact, counsel submits

that the factum of long undue delay in progress of the trial and long

incarceration of the appellants, have been totally ignored by the Special

Judge, which renders the orders impugned, unsustainable and deserve to be

set aside. Further, it is also submitted that even the recovery has been

implanted upon them.

To so substantiate their claim, learned counsel for the appellants

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -7-

have relied upon Gurjant Singh @ Janty vs. State of Punjab, 2024 NCPHHC

168260, wherein, it was held that the bail under UAPA can be granted, when

the accused has been in long custody and no substantial evidence is found

against him and the trial is unlikely to conclude in a reasonable time. Also,

reliance has been placed upon Sarabjot Singh @ Sabhi Sandhu vs. State of

Punjab, 2024 NCPHHC 145358, wherein, it was held that long period of

incarceration under UAPA, without substantial evidence and no likelihood

of trial concluding soon, entitles an accused to bail, invoking Article 21 of

the Constitution of India. Even, reliance has been placed upon Rameez Raja

vs. State of Punjab, 2025(1) RCR (Criminal) 163, Athar Parwez vs. Union of

India, 2024 SCC Online SC 3762 and Union of India vs. K.A.Najeeb, 2021

(3) SCC 713.

On the other hand, Special Prosecutor for the respondent-NIA

has resisted the grant of bail to both the appellants. In fact, he made

reference to the various documents, forming part of the final report, to

emphasize that there is sufficient evidence collected during the course of

investigation to prove the incriminating roles of the appellants. Since,

sufficient material of linkage with the terror gang is evidently there and

witnesses have also been examined to so substantiate, to which he made

reference, therefore, he submits that provisions of Section (5) of 43D of

UAP Act, are completely applicable to this case and therefore, bail has been

very rightly denied to the appellants.

Further, the Special Prosecutor submits that till date, 35 witnesses, out

of 137 cited witnesses have been examined. 23 witnesses are the protected

witnesses. Further, other material witnesses, including the independent

witnesses are yet to be examined. Thus, he submits that release of the

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -8-

appellants on bail, will hamper the efforts made to carry on the trial in

purity. In fact, he submits that the role assigned and the active preparatory

participation of the appellants is there. He refers to the various documents,

copies whereof, have been placed on record, to establish linkage of the

appellants with the terror group and their incriminating roles, spelt out.

Thus, looking at this evidence, learned Special Prosecutor submits that it is

quite obvious that there is every likelihood that in the eventuality of bail

granted, the appellants shall interfere in the progress of the trial, by

influencing the key witnesses, hampering the process of justice. Further, he

submits that long incarceration in itself is no ground for grant of bail, when

there is material coming forth to establish case against the appellants.

To substantiate his claim, learned Special Prosecutor has relied upon,

Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, 2024 INSC 92, Mamta

and another vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) and another, 2022 INSC 626 as

well as Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2026 INSC 2.

While laying special emphasis upon Gurfisha’s case (supra), learned

Special Prosecutor submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the

aspect of delay in conducting of the trial under UAP Act and thereupon,

addressed the question, vis-a-vis, the prosecution under UAP Act, when

delay and prolonged incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail, what

should be the principled approach by which a constitutional Court is to

examine such a plea. In the light of the same, Special Prosecutor has also

made reference to various paragraphs of the judgment, wherein, the

balancing of interest of the accused as well as the State, was made and

thereupon, law was laid down to proceed further in the bail applications.

Thus, concluding his arguments, learned Special Prosecutor for NIA,

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -9-

made a prayer for denial of bail to both the appellants.

In view of the submissions aforesaid, it is apt t make reference

to Gurfisha’s case (supra), wherein, observations made by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, are reproduced, as herein given:-

“30. Article 21occupies a central place in the constitutional

scheme. The right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence

that any deprivation must conform to procedure established by

law, are foundational guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has

been recognised as an important facet of this guarantee. It

follows that pre-trial incarceration cannot, by the mere passage

of time, be permitted to assume the character of punishment.

31. At the same time, Article 21has never been understood as

operating in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is

not that liberty will be unregulated, but that deprivations of

liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unfair. The

expression “procedure established by law” reflects that balance.

The UAPA, as a special statute enacted to address offences

alleged to affect the security of the State and the stability of

civic life, represents a legislative judgment as to the conditions

under which bail may be granted at the pre-trial stage. Section

43D(5)of UAPA embodies the exercise of that judgment.

32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a

constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory

restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of

personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not

likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period,

constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail

notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates

as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can

be no second opinion on the said principle.

33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying

down a mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time

becomes determinative in every case arising under a special

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -10-

statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does not support a

construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory

regime enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special

category.

34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into

guilt. It is an inquiry into whether continued detention remains

constitutionally permissible in the circumstances of the case.

That inquiry is necessarily contextual. Context includes the

nature of the allegation, the statutory field, the stage of the

proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the trial, the causes

contributing to delay, and the risks attendant upon release.

Delay cannot be detached from these considerations and treated

as a solitary determinant.

35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether

Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is

how Article 21is to be applied where Parliament has expressly

conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to

implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an

either-or approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured

blending of statutory and constitutional considerations. What is

required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to

both.

36. The appellants have urged that their continued incarceration

over a prolonged period, coupled with the pace at which the

trial has progressed, warrants their enlargement on bail

notwithstanding the statutory embargo contained in Section

43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Prolonged custody undoubtedly implicates the constitutional

guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the

Constitution, and such a plea cannot be rejected on the basis of

duration alone without a careful and fact-sensitive examination.

At the same time, the Court is required to examine whether the

narrative of delay, as projected, is borne out by the record, and

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -11-

whether such delay is of a nature that constitutionally displaces

the statutory mandate.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also made observations, with

regard to various aspects of delay to be considered, for the purposes of grant

of bail or not. While considering the claim of the appellants in the ibid case,

it was also observed that the appellants in present appeal, may not stand on

identical factual footing, in all respects with the co-accused, whose appeal

was considered by the High Court. It was also observed that since, they

arise from the same trial, they are required to be considered.

Further also, it is apt to make reference to the observations made by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in succeeding paragraphs, as herein given:-

“42. The approach of addressing delay-related concerns through

calibrated judicial supervision, rather than automatic

enlargement on bail, stands reinforced by the decision of this

Court in Union of India v. Saleem Khan. In that case, despite

the accused having remained in custody for over five years and

the trial not having commenced, this Court declined to interfere

with the rejection of bail qua one accused, while upholding bail

granted to another, thereby reiterating that delay-based pleas

must necessarily be adjudicated on an accused-specific footing.

Significantly, even while acknowledging the constitutional

imperative of a speedy trial, the Court did not eclipse the

statutory rigour under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA but instead

directed expeditious conclusion of the trial and cautioned

against any conduct on the part of the accused that may further

protract the proceedings. The decision thus affirms that

prolonged custody, though a matter of concern, does not

operate as an automatic ground for grant of bail where the

statutory threshold continues to be attracted.

43. Viewed cumulatively, the record does not support the

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -12-

absolute proposition that the appellants have remained

“innocently incarcerated” without any contribution to delay, nor

does it disclose a situation where the delay is so wholly

unjustified as to override the statutory embargo contained in

Section 43D (5). The appropriate constitutional response, at this

stage, lies in ensuring vigilant oversight of the trial and its

expeditious progression, rather than in eclipsing the statutory

mandate governing bail in offences of the present nature. The

plea of delay in the facts of the particular case, therefore, does

not warrant enlargement on bail, though it justifies continued

judicial emphasis on the timely conduct of the proceedings.

44. It is in this sense that the plea of delay must first be

examined to see whether it arises in a manner that warrants

constitutional scrutiny of continued custody. Broadly stated, the

Court must consider whether the custody undergone is

substantial, whether the proceedings have made meaningful

progress, and whether there exists a realistic prospect of

conclusion of trial within a reasonable period. The Court must

also take note of the causes contributing to delay, including

whether delay is attributable to the inherent complexity of the

prosecution or to the conduct of parties, including the accused.

45. A finding that these circumstances exist does not, by itself,

compel bail. It merely calls for the next level of constitutional

consideration. At that stage, the Court is required to examine

whether, notwithstanding delay, continued detention remains

constitutionally justified having regard to the statutory context

and the facts of the case. This examination is not a free-ranging

balancing exercise; it is structured by legally relevant

considerations.

46. One such consideration is the gravity of the alleged offence

in its statutory setting. Under the UAPA, Parliament has

legislatively characterised certain conduct as implicating the

security of the State and the peace of society. That legislative

characterisation does not conclude the judicial inquiry, but it is

not constitutionally irrelevant. It forms part of the context in

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -13-

which the Article 21claim is assessed.

47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the

accused. Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying

degrees of participation, ranging from peripheral acts to

strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality. The

constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be

assessed uniformly for all accused regardless of role. Where the

attribution suggests a central or organising role in the alleged

design, the need for circumspection before constitutional

intervention displaces a statutory embargo is correspondingly

greater. Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic,

prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive

character.

48. Another consideration is the prima facie strength of the

accusation at the limited threshold contemplated by Section

43D(5). At this stage, the Court does not weigh evidence, test

defences, or conduct a mini trial. Yet, the constitutional inquiry

cannot proceed as if all allegations are identically situated.

Whether the prosecution material, taken at its highest, discloses

a prima facie nexus between the accused and the statutory

ingredients is a circumstance that informs the assessment of

continued detention.

49. Consideration must also be given to the integrity of the trial

process and the risks associated with release. Depending on the

nature of the case, these may include the possibility of

influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence, or

undermining the fairness of the proceedings. In prosecutions

alleging organised activity, the assessment of such risks may

differ from that in ordinary criminal cases. This is not to

presume guilt, but to recognise that bail decisions are

necessarily forward-looking in terms of ensuring an effective

trial.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while making reference to the

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K.A.Najeeb’s case (supra), had also observed as herein given:-

“52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb(supra) must

be understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable

detention. Prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious

constitutional concern and carries great weight. It is not,

however, the sole determinant. The Court must consider, in

totality, whether continued detention has become

constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard to the role

attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie

material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the

availability of intermediate remedies.

53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article

21structured content in a field where the Constitution itself

recognises competing interests. Nor does it render Section

43D(5) absolute. It recognises that statutory restraint must yield

in an appropriate case where detention becomes punitive by

reason of unreasonable and unjustified delay. What it excludes

is a mechanical override based on time alone, divorced from

legal context.”

It was observed that when the composite evaluation, yields a

clear conclusion that continued detention has crossed the bounds of

constitutional permissibility, that the Court may justifiably intervene,

notwithstanding statutory restrictions. It also made reference to Gurwinder

Singh’s case (supra), in paragraphs No.58 and 59 and also observations were

made in paragraph No.60, which are reproduced as under:-

“58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court

expressly cautioned against the mechanical invocation of

prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving

serious offences under special enactments. The judgment

reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the legislative context,

and the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -15-

merely because the trial has taken time. 59. This Court in CBI

v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while Article 21 remains

paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced from

competing constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that

claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of

circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate

organised criminality or matters of public interest. Delay,

though undoubtedly significant, was held not to assume the

character of an absolute or solitary determinant. The emphasis,

once again, was on structured judicial reasoning rather than on

formulaic outcomes.

60. Read together, these decisions do not dilute the

constitutional guarantee of personal liberty; they explain the

manner in which it is to be applied. They do not support an

approach of automatic displacement of statutory restraint, but

instead emphasise a contextual and measured exercise of

judicial scrutiny.”

While taking into consideration, K.A.Najeeb’s case (supra), it

also made observations, as herein given:-

“61. To read Najeeb (supra) as mandating bail solely on

account of prolonged incarceration, irrespective of the statutory

context or the nature of the allegations, would be to attribute to

the decision a consequence it neither intended nor supports.

Such a construction would also lead to an interpretive

absurdity, whereby a special statute enacted by Parliament to

address offences implicating the sovereignty, integrity, and

security of the State would stand effectively neutralised by the

mere passage of time, even at a pre-trial stage. Such an outcome

cannot be countenanced in constitutional adjudication.

Accordingly, the finding in Najeeb(supra) is properly situated

as a constitutional safeguard to be invoked in appropriate cases,

and not as a mathematical formula of universal application.”

Further also, while considering the provisions of Section

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -16-

43D(5) of UAP Act, it was observed that the expression “prima facie true”,

which lies at the heart of Section 43D(5), does not invite a detailed

examination of evidence, nor does it require the Court to assess the

probability of conviction. The Court is not called upon to weigh the

probative value of evidence, to assess its admissibility, or to determine

whether the prosecution version will ultimately withstand trial.

Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court also called upon the Court to

examine the role attributed to the individual accused and that the provision

does not demand mechanical denial, nor casual grant of bail, but a principled

application of statutory standard, within its clearly defined limits.

Considering the aforesaid, it is apt to make reference to the

observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs No.80 to

82, which are reproduced here under:-

“80. From the foregoing discussion, certain propositions

governing the application of Section 43D(5)emerge with clarity.

First, the provision embodies a deliberate legislative departure

from ordinary bail jurisprudence, premised upon the distinctive

nature of offences under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second,

the expression “prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial

inquiry which is neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring

the Court to examine whether the prosecution material, taken at

face value, discloses the essential statutory ingredients of the

alleged offence. Third, the inquiry is necessarily accused-

specific, directed to the role and attribution qua the individual,

and does not admit of collective or undifferentiated treatment

merely because allegations arise from a common transaction or

conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under Section 43D(5)is not a

forum for evaluating defences, weighing evidence, or

conducting a mini- trial; judicial restraint at this stage is not an

abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the statutory mandate.

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -17-

These propositions, read together, define the contours of judicial

power and responsibility under the provision.

81. The correct application of Section 43D(5), therefore,

requires the Court to undertake a structured inquiry confined to

the following:

i. whether the prosecution material, accepted as it stands,

discloses a prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients

of the offence alleged;

ii. whether the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and

meaningful nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity

proscribed under the Act, as distinguished from mere association

or peripheral presence; and

iii. whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual

accused, without embarking upon an assessment reserved after

full- fledged trial.

82. Where these requirements are met, the statutory restraint on

the grant of bail must operate with full force; where they are not,

the embargo stands lifted. This approach preserves the

legislative purpose of the Act, and ensures that the exceptional

nature of the bail regime under Section 43D(5)is neither diluted

by overreach nor distorted by mechanical application.”

Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also rejected the appeals

filed, vis-a-vis, the denial of bail to the accused, while considering the

material to be suggestive of involvement, at the level of planning,

mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised

acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, therefore, was held to be attracted qua the

appellants, whose appeals were rejected. Furthermore, it was observed that

the complexity of prosecution, the nature of evidence relied upon and the

stage of the proceedings, do not justify their enlargement on bail, at that

stage.

CRA-D-1438-2024 and connected appeal -18-

The above case law sums up the manner, in which the balancing

of interest of the accused and the protective manner, to proceed while

considering the interest of the State, has to be made. One is as important as

the other but not the one above the another. These all factors touched and

considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, have to be looked into and an

attempt be made by the Courts to create a balance, while watching the

interest of both the sides and evaluate the material, brought on record.

Of course, there cannot be any strait-jacket formula to be adopted to

adjudicate on the matters of grant/denial of bail. Each case, has to be

adjudicated in its own factual background. One distinctive circumstance,

may lead to different decision. However, the Courts ought to remain

sensitized that the appreciation of the material brought on record, is not with

the purpose of conducting of mini trial. It is only to pin point, as to whether,

there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against the

persons concerned, are prima facie true or not.

Adverting to the case in hand, more particularly, the copies of

the documents prepared/produced, during the course of trial, to which

learned Special Prosecutor had made reference to, apparently linkage of the

appellants to the gang involved in spreading terror and violent acts in the

country, is evident at this stage. Of course, merits/demerits of the same shall

be the subject matter of appreciation, at the final stage. Anyhow, it fulfills

the requirements of Section 43D(5) of the ibid Act.

Learned Special Prosecutor has referred to the documents

prepared, during the course of investigation, copies whereof, have been

placed on record. He made reference to the arrest memo of accused

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy, dated 23.01.2024 as well as

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the search memo. Thereupon, he also made reference to the disclosure

statement of aforesaid accused (A-1) dated 25.01.2024, regarding his role in

the instant crime, where he disclosed that he conducted recce of House

No.71, Sector-5, Chandigarh on 18.01.2024 along with fellow accused A-4,

A-2 and A-5. He also disclosed about subsequent stay at Hotel Satkar and

then returning to House No.71, Sector-5, Chandigarh, on next day morning,

for carrying out firing and further about the positioning of the persons, near

that house, during the course of incident. Pursuant to his disclosure

statement, even visitor entry register of Hotel Satkar and DVR containing

CCTV footage of the hotel were recovered. Further, seizure memo relating

to the same was also prepared.

The entry of the visitor register on 18.01.2004 was allegedly made by

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy, who furnished his Aadhaar

Card, at the time of taking a room. Seizure memo of DVR, containing

CCTV footage of Hotel Satkar was also prepared, visibly depicting

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy (A-1), besides fellow

accused. On the basis of the disclosure statement, even Splendor motorcycle

as well as two live rounds were also recovered. Even, the clothes worn by

Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy, which was also visible in

CCTV footage, were also taken into possession. Even, the comparison of

the handwriting of Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy with the

recitals of the entry made in the visitor register, was done; CFSL report was

obtained, which allegedly confirmed about the specimen questioned

signatures to be of the same person. Likewise, report of CFSL came forth of

the confirmation about two live rounds recovered from the accused, to be

constituting ammunition falling within the purview of Arms Act.

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Furthermore, on the record, is the technical report, which connects the

location of stay of Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy with his

fellow companions at Hotel Satkar and further also, his proceeding at the

place of recce.

Besides the aforesaid, counsel had also made reference to the

statements of the various witnesses recording during the course of the trial,

but however, this Court is intentionally not making reference to the same,

lest it may hamper the interest of either side. Otherwise also, no mini trial, as

such, is to be conducted, at this stage. Broadly the documents, coming forth,

are to be considered.

No doubt, arrest of appellant-Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy was

effected on 17.02.2024 and Gurwinder Singh @ Gurvinder Singh @ Laddy

on 23.01.2024, but this long detention is one of the circumstance, to be

considered, while considering the interest of the appellants and also of the

State, vis-a-vis, other circumstances spelt out, as held in Gulfisha’s case

(supra).

In the case in hand, charge was framed on 03.10.2024. As

evident from the record, there were 137 cited witnesses and 35 have already

been examined till date. The protected witnesses were 23 and out of them,

20 have been examined and NIA was not inclined to examine other three

witnesses.

Such being the position, firstly it be noted that there are other material

witnesses, including independent witnesses, who are yet to be examined.

Though, the Special Prosecutor had made reference to the role assigned to

the appellants, as deposed by the witnesses, but however, this Court is

intentionally not making reference to their testimonies. Anyway, it is

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evident that more witnesses are yet to be examined. Ever since the framing

of charge, 35 witnesses have already been examined. One cannot lose sight

of the fact that the evidence, generally in such cases, is quite lengthy and

consumes lot of time in recording of the same.

The complexity of the prosecution and nature of evidence relied

upon and the stage of the proceedings, ought to be taken into consideration.

Such being the state of affairs, in any case, it cannot be said that the trial is

proceeding at snail’s pace, for which, the bail is to be granted to the

appellants. The allegations are quite grave. The participation in the

conspiracy by the appellants associating terrorist gang is there. The material

on record, spells about the involvement of the appellants, in the conspiracy,

knowing fully well, the consequential implications of the same, even though,

it is a preparatory act.

Section 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, provides

punishment for conspiracy and therein, it specifically states about, whoever

conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or [incites,

directly or knowingly facilitates], the commission of, a terrorist act or any

act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, and it provides

punishment for the same.

In the case in hand, the association, as such, of conducting of

the recce, spells out the involvement in the conspiracy, even though, it was a

preparatory act, knowing fully well the consequential implications of the

same. Even Gagandeep Singh @ Goldy, concealed the weapons and made

arrangement for stay of the fellow companions, after conducting recce.

Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances and making

the balance of the same and to secure the trial being conducted in continuity,

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thereby, having no scope of winning over or breaking of the witness or

obstruction of their examination, during the course of the trial and also

considering the complexity of the prosecution, the nature of evidence relied

upon and further about the number of witnesses already examined, the same

do not, in any manner, justify the enlargement of the appellants, on bail, at

this juncture.

To so conclude, another factor which also weighs the mind of

this Court is that creating of more exclusive Courts for NIA in Punjab is

under way, which shall soon become operational. Precisely, on this account,

there is hope for the continuation of the trial of this case, to be put on high

track, thereby, leading to expeditious conclusion of the trial, which is so

expected and desired from the Special Court. At the same time, the

prosecution is also expected to make efforts to ensure presence of the

witnesses and further to make an effort to avoid recording of the multiple

witnesses to prove the same fact from the bunch of multiple facts, to

establish the guilt of the appellants. This shall also considerably reduce the

time consumed in conducting and concluding of the trial, which ultimately is

also beneficial to reduce the detention period of the accused persons.

Working in this harmony shall in itself watch the interest of the accused

also.

Considering the composite evaluation of the entire material on

record and more particularly, considering the involvement of the appellants,

as spelt out, we are not inclined for granting benefit of bail to the appellants.

Hence, the appeals are hereby dismissed.

However, the observations aforesaid, are circumscribed only for

the purposes of the disposal of the present appeals and the same shall have

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no bearing on the merits of the case, pending before the trial Court, in any

manner.

(ARCHANA PURI)

JUDGE

(MANDEEP PANNU)

JUDGE

September 14, 2026

Vgulati

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether reportable Yes/No