RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M)

Reserved on: 20.04.2026

Pronounced on: 06.07.2026

Uploaded on: 06.07.2026

HANS RAJ AND OTHERS

-APPELLANTS

V/S

KANWAR VIJAY SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL

REPRESENTATIVES

-RESPONDENT

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present: Mr. Ashish Gupta, Advocate

for the appellants.

Mr. Ajay Jain, Advocate

for the respondent (i) to (iii).

Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Sr. Advocate, with

Mr. Shobhit Sharma, Advocate

for the respondent (iv) to (vi)

***

KULDEEP TIWARI, J.

1. The instant Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the

appellants (defendants before the trial Court) assailing the concurrent

judgments and decrees dated 05.06.1989 and 01.09.1992, rendered by the

learned trial Court and the learned first appellate Court, respectively,

whereby the suit instituted by the respondent (plaintiff before the trial

Court) was decreed and the appeal preferred by the appellants was

dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis shall

hereinafter be referred to according to their status before the trial Court.

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FACTUAL MATRIX

2. The genesis of the present appeal lies in a suit instituted by

the plaintiff seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the

defendants from raising any permanent construction or from converting

the kacha construction under their tenancy into a pucca one on the site

described in the plaint. The plaintiff further sought a declaration that any

pucca construction raised by the defendants over the site of the old kacha

structure without his permission would not entitle them to claim any

compensation therefor. In addition thereto, the plaintiff also sought

recovery of arrears of rent amounting to ₹116.67/-.

3. The plaintiff founded his claim primarily upon the judgment

and decree dated 09.06.1952 passed in Civil Suit No.387 of 1951,

instituted for the ejectment of the predecessors-in-interest of the

defendants, namely, Sawai, Nathu and Daya Ram. It was pleaded that the

plaintiff’s father had inducted the aforesaid predecessors-in-interest as

tenants over the suit property at an annual rent of ₹40/- under rent deeds

dated 19.04.1935, 19.04.1935, 15.02.1943, 18.01.1945 and 22.03.1946,

which were exhibited as Ex.P1 to Ex.P5, respectively. It was further

averred that, in the year 1951, the plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No.387 of

1951 seeking their ejectment, which culminated in the judgment and

decree dated 09.06.1952 in his favour. The judgment and decree were

proved on record as Ex.P6 and Ex.P7, respectively. By virtue of the said

decree, the plaintiff was declared to be the owner/landlord of the suit

property, while the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants were held to

be tenants thereunder. It was, therefore, pleaded that the defendants, being

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 3

successors-in-interest of the judgment-debtors against whom the decree of

ejectment had been passed, had stepped into their shoes and were

consequently bound by the said judgment and decree.

4. It was further pleaded that although the plaintiff had initiated

execution proceedings for enforcement of the decree (Ex.P7), the

execution application came to be dismissed in view of a compromise

arrived at between the parties, whereby the defendants were permitted to

continue in possession of the suit property as tenants on the same terms

and conditions as embodied in the earlier rent deeds (Ex.P1 to Ex.P5). It

was also averred that the defendants had instituted Civil Suit No.178 of

1977 in respect of a property other than the suit property, claiming

ownership thereof. However, the said suit was dismissed vide judgment

dated 31.10.1977.

5. Upon notice, the defendants caused appearance and filed

their written statement contesting the suit. At the outset, they pleaded that

the plaint was vague and defective and was, therefore, liable to be rejected

under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They further

asserted that they had no knowledge of any decree having been passed

against them and that, in any event, any such decree, if in existence, was

not binding upon them. The defendants also set up a specific plea of

ownership over the suit property and categorically denied the existence of

any landlord-tenant relationship between themselves and the plaintiff.

Consequently, it was pleaded that they were fully entitled to raise

construction over the suit property and were under no obligation to pay

any rent to the plaintiff. In the alternative, the defendants also raised the

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 4

plea of adverse possession.

6. Upon completion of the pleadings, the learned trial Court

framed the necessary issues, whereafter both parties adduced evidence in

support of their respective stands. Upon appreciation of the pleadings and

the evidence on record, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in its

entirety vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.06.1989. It was

held that the rent deeds (Ex.P1 to Ex.P5) conclusively established that the

plaintiff’s father had inducted the predecessors-in-interest of the

defendants as tenants over the suit property. The decree (Ex.P7) passed in

Civil Suit No.387 of 1951, directing the ejectment of the said tenants, was

held to be a clear affirmation of the landlord-tenant relationship between

the parties. The trial Court further held that the defendants had stepped

into the shoes of the original tenants, namely, Sawai, Nathu and Daya

Ram, and that defendant No.2, Nathu, had, in fact, been impleaded as

defendant No.2 in Civil Suit No.387 of 1951 as well, as was evident from

the Shajra Nasab exhibited as Ex.P17. It was further held that, following

the dismissal of the execution application pursuant to the compromise, the

defendants had been permitted to continue in possession of the suit

property as tenants on the same terms and conditions as contained in the

earlier rent deeds, subject to payment of annual rent at the rate of ₹40/-.

The trial Court also recorded a categorical finding that, by denying the

subsistence of the landlord-tenant relationship, the defendants had

forfeited their tenancy rights, thereby entitling the plaintiff to recover

possession of the suit property. The alternative plea of adverse possession

raised by the defendants was also rejected.

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 5

7. Deriving grievance from the findings and conclusi ons

recorded by the learned trial Court, the defendants preferred a first appeal.

The learned first appellate Court, however, affirmed the findings returned

by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree

dated 01.09.1992. It is against the aforesaid concurrent judgments and

decrees that the instant Regular Second Appeal has been instituted by the

defendants.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS/

DEFENDANTS

8. The foremost submission advanced by learned counsel for

the defendants is that the very identification of the suit property is

erroneous and, therefore, the entire foundation of the plaintiff’s case

stands vitiated. It is contended that the suit property involved in the

present proceedings is not the same property that formed the subject

matter of Civil Suit No.387 of 1951 instituted for ejectment. In this

regard, it is pointed out that even the learned first appellate Court has

recorded a finding noticing a discrepancy in the western boundary of the

suit property. It is further contended that the said finding is inherently

contradictory and self-defeating, inasmuch as, while the learned first

appellate Court has observed that the site plan (Ex.P11) depicts a gali

(lane) on the western side of the suit property, the judgment dated

09.06.1952 (Ex.P6) rendered in Civil Suit No.387 of 1951 describes the

western boundary as consisting of houses and chhanas. It is submitted

that all four boundaries must correspond for the proper identification of

the property, which is not the case in the present proceedings.

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 6

Consequently, it is argued that the property involved in the earlier suit is

distinct from the suit property involved in the present proceedings and,

therefore, the judgment and decree dated 09.06.1952, pertaining to a

different property altogether, cannot be held to be binding upon the

defendants.

9. The next limb of the submissions advanced on behalf of the

defendants is founded upon the plaintiff’s own pleadings in the earlier

litigation, wherein he had admitted that the suit property had been leased

to a third party. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed

upon the judgment dated 31.10.1977 rendered in Civil Suit No.178 of

1977 instituted by the defendants, wherein the plaintiff had specifically

pleaded that the suit property had been leased to one Kirpal Singh and not

to the defendants or their predecessors-in-interest. It is, therefore, argued

that once the plaintiff himself admitted that the suit property had been

leased to Kirpal Singh, any claim for possession ought to have been

directed against the said lessee alone. It is not the case that the defendants

had re-entered into possession, rather it has been claimed that the

defendants remained in continuous possession since the time of their

ancestors. Thus, if the suit property had been leased in favour of a third

party, it would unequivocally establish that the defendants were not in

possession thereof as tenants under the plaintiff.

10. Proceeding further, learned counsel contends that the plaintiff

has utterly failed to establish that any compromise had, in fact, been

arrived at between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants

after the passing of the judgment and decree of ejectment dated

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 7

09.06.1952. It is submitted that although an execution application was

filed for enforcement of the said decree, the same came to be dismissed as

unsatisfied vide order dated 22.10.1955. There is no documentary

evidence whatsoever to establish the existence of any compromise

whereby the defendants or their predecessors-in-interest were permitted to

continue as tenants over the suit property. It is further contended that the

mere oral testimony of the plaintiff in support of his own case is

inherently self-serving and cannot be accepted in the absence of

independent corroboration. It is further contended that, upon the passing

of the decree of ejectment, the relationship of landlord and tenant stood

terminated and, therefore, the plaintiff’s plea that a fresh tenancy was

thereafter created necessarily implies a break in the continuity of the

earlier tenancy. The plaintiff cannot simultaneously contend that the

tenancy continued uninterruptedly under the original rent deeds (Ex.P1 to

Ex.P5) and also assert that a fresh tenancy came into existence pursuant to

the alleged compromise. These two pleas are mutually destructive. It is

further contended that once the relationship of landlord and tenant had

ceased to exist, the defendants’ continued possession thereafter acquired

protection by virtue of adverse possession. However, this aspect has not

been properly appreciated by either the learned trial Court or the learned

first appellate Court.

11. Lastly, learned counsel for the defendants submits that the

plaintiff has failed to establish his ownership over the suit property in

accordance with law. It is argued that the plaintiff was required to succeed

on the strength of his own title by producing cogent documentary

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 8

evidence, such as a title deed, sale deed, mutation entry, revenue record or

any other document evidencing his ownership over the suit property.

However, no such document was ever produced. To lend vigour to this

submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered in

“Nagar Palika, Jind vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate”, 1995 AIR (Supreme

Court) 1377, and “Chetukuri Madhava Reddy vs. Manda Savithramma

and another”, Appeal Suit No.267 of 2011, Decided on: 24.03.2025.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE LEGAL

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF (SINCE

DECEASED)

12. Learned counsel representing the legal representatives of the

deceased plaintiff jointly rebutted the elaborate submissions advanced on

behalf of the defendants. It is submitted that, with regard to the issues as

to whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and entitled to

recover possession thereof, whether the defendants are tenants in respect

of the suit property, and whether they have forfeited their tenancy rights,

the learned trial Court has returned categorical findings that the

defendants denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between

themselves and the plaintiff and thereby forfeited their tenancy rights.

Consequently, the plaintiff has been held entitled to recover possession of

the suit property. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has

also recorded a specific finding that the predecessors-in-interest of the

defendants, namely Sawai, Nathu and Daya Ram, were inducted as

tenants over the suit property and were, vide judgment and decree dated

09.06.1952 passed in Civil Suit No.387 of 1951, held to be tenants and

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 9

ordered to be ejected therefrom, while the plaintiff was declared to be the

owner thereof. It is contended that the findings recorded in the judgment

and decree (supra) have attained finality and, therefore, cannot be assailed

by the defendants in the present proceedings.

13. Furthermore, reliance has been placed upon Civil Suit

No.178 of 1977 instituted by defendants/appellants No.1, 3 and 4,

wherein they claimed exclusive possession of the site and asserted

ownership on the basis of adverse possession. However, even in the said

proceedings, reliance was placed upon the judgment and decree dated

09.06.1952 to hold that the defendants were tenants, and accordingly, the

suit filed by the defendants was dismissed vide judgment dated

31.10.1977.

14. Consequently, it is contended that once Civil Suit No.387 of

1951 filed by the plaintiff seeking ejectment of the predecessors-in-

interest of the defendants was decreed, and Civil Suit No.178 of 1977

filed by defendants No.1, 3 and 4 was dismissed, the findings regarding

the plaintiff’s ownership and the tenancy of the predecessors-in-interest of

the defendants, in respect of the suit property, have attained finality.

15. Resting their arguments, learned counsel submit that the

defendants, by adopting contradictory stands, namely, (i) they are owners

by adverse possession, (ii) they have inherited rights through their

forefathers, (iii) they are not tenants etc., cannot, at the same time,

contend that the suit property is different. The very plea of adverse

possession advanced by the defendants estops them from disputing the

identity of the suit property (emphasis supplied). It is further contended

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 10

that the plea of adverse possession is also untenable, as none of the

essential ingredients thereof stand satisfied. In support, reliance has been

placed upon the verdict rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State

of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and others”, 2012(1) RCR (Civil) 17.

REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT REGULAR SECOND

APPEAL

16. Having heard learned counsel for the contesting litigants and

upon a meticulous survey of the record, this Court is constrained to draw

an inference that none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the

defendants merit acceptance. The reasons for rejecting the said

submissions are penned down hereinafter.

17. The preliminary submission raised on behalf of t he

defendants pertains to the incorrect identification of the suit property. A

perusal of the record reveals that the defendants, in their written

statement, have not specifically denied the contents of paragraph 1 of the

plaint on merits, nor has it been specifically denied that the plaintiff is the

owner of the suit property delineated by letters ABCDEFG, as shown in

the site plan appended with the plaint. Likewise, the contents of paragraph

2 of the plaint have also not been specifically denied that the kacha

construction within the suit property marked ABCDEFG was let out to the

defendants. Consequently, the defendants are deemed to have admitted

the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint and are, therefore,

estopped from raising any dispute regarding identification of the suit

property.

18. Furthermore, this Court finds merit in the submission of

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 11

learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff that

once the defendants have set up a plea of ownership by adverse

possession, they cannot simultaneously dispute the identity of the suit

property. The plea of adverse possession rules out any ambiguity with

regard to identification of the suit property. This aspect has already been

examined in detail by the learned first appellate Court, which, after

considering the alleged discrepancy in the western boundary, has affirmed

the finding that the suit property is the same as that involved in Civil Suit

No.387 of 1951. The finding of fact cannot be interfered with in the

absence of any perversity, which the defendants have failed to

demonstrate. Consequently, the findings recorded by the learned Courts

below in this regard do not warrant interference and are accordingly

affirmed.

19. The second submission advanced on behalf of the defendants

is that the suit property was leased out to a third party and not to the

defendants or their predecessors-in-interest. However, the record clearly

establishes that the plaintiff’s father, namely Jawahar Singh, had let out

the suit property to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants vide rent

deeds (Ex.P1 to Ex.P5) executed between 1935 and 1946, the originals

whereof were exhibited as Ex.P18 to Ex.P22. The defendants have failed

to cast any doubt on the authenticity of the said documentary evidence.

Further, the Shajra Nasab (Ex.P17) placed on record reflects that

defendant/appellant No.3, Dayala, is the successor-in-interest of Sawai,

while defendant/appellant No.1 is the grandson of Saudagar, who was a

defendant in the earlier civil suit. Notably, defendant/appellant No.1,

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 12

Hans Raj, while appearing in the witness box as DW4, did not deny that

his grandfather’s name was Saudagar. It is, therefore, clearly established

that the defendants are the successors-in-interest of the original tenants,

namely Sawai and Daya Ram, while the third original tenant, Nathu, is

himself one of the defendants in the present proceedings. In the earlier

Civil Suit No.387 of 1951, vide judgment and decree dated 09.06.1952,

the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants, as well as defendant Nathu

himself, were declared tenants, while the plaintiff was declared to be the

owner of the suit property. No evidence to the contrary has been adduced

by the defendants so as to persuade this Court to take a view different

from that taken by the Courts below. Accordingly, this submission is also

rejected.

20. The third submission advanced on behalf of the defendants

relates to the absence of proof of any compromise between the

predecessors-in-interest of the defendants and the plaintiff after the

passing of the judgment and decree of ejectment dated 09.06.1952. This

contention stands negated by the testimony of PW3 Raghbir Singh and

PW4 Phuman Singh, who categorically deposed that the defendants had

entered into a compromise with the plaintiff and were permitted to

continue as tenants over the suit property on the same terms and

conditions as embodied in the rent deeds (Ex.P1 to Ex.P5). This evidence

was found sufficient by both the Courts below to hold that the tenancy

continued even after the decree of ejectment. Consequently, the learned

trial Court held that since the defendants remained in possession of the

suit property even after passing of the decree of ejectment, their tenancy

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 13

stood protected in terms of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act,

1882.

21. Insofar as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, it is

well settled that mere assertion of adverse possession does not convert

permissive possession into hostile possession. A tenant cannot claim

adverse possession against the landlord so long as the tenancy subsists. In

the present case, the rent deeds clearly establish that the predecessors-in-

interest of the defendants were inducted as tenants by the plaintiff’s

father. The decree of ejectment dated 09.06.1952 was never executed, as

the execution application was dismissed vide order dated 22.10.1955

pursuant to a compromise between the parties, whereby the defendants

were permitted to continue as tenants on the same terms and conditions as

the original rent deeds. Thus, the possession of the defendants remained

permissive in nature. Once possession is permissive, the plea of adverse

possession against the true owner is legally unsustainable. It is the settled

position of law that a party asserting adverse possession must specifically

plead and prove all its essential ingredients. In the present case, the

defendants have failed to discharge this burden. Accordingly, the plea of

adverse possession has been rightly rejected by both the Courts below.

22. In Mukesh Kumar’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has observed that the doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a

great many legal minds and time has come for change. It has further been

held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity,

and extent, and that a plea is required at the least to show when possession

becomes adverse. In the present case, the plea of the defendants that

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 14

possession became adverse after the judgment and decree dated

09.06.1952 has already been rejected hereinabove, as the tenancy

continued and the possession remained permissive.

23. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukesh Kumar’s case (supra) are extracted

hereunder:-

“12. The Trial Court relied on the judgment of this Court in

S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254 wherein this

Court has laid down that the adverse possession must be adequate

in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the

least to show when possession becomes adverse. The Court also

held that long possession is not necessarily adverse possession.

35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his

favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is

for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to

establish adverse possession. Though we got this law of adverse

possession from the British, it is important to note that these days

English Courts are taking a very negative view towards the law of

adverse possession. The English law was amended and changed

substantially to reflect these changes, particularly in light of the

view that property is a human right adopted by the European

Commission. This Court in Revamma (supra) observed that to

understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v.

St. Marylebone Property Co., [1962] 2 WLR 1020 : [1962] 2 All

ER 288 can be considered where House of Lords referring to

Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16 termed adverse

possession as a negative and consequential right effected only

because somebody else’s positive right to access the court is

barred by operation of law. As against the rights of the paper-

owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of

competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a

long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against

the owner of the property who has ignored the property.

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 15

43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish

“bad faith” adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved

through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their

own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong

signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that

only those who had established attachments to the land through

honest means would be entitled to legal relief.

44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse

possession, the Parliament might simply require adverse

possession claimants to possess the property in question for a

period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an

extension would help to ensure that successful claimants have

lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to

be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears

might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the

frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those

claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it,

while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title.

51. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh

look of the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the

Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate

either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the

alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse

possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary,

Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs,

Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance

with law.”

24. The fourth and final submission advanced on behalf of the

defendants is that the plaintiff has failed to establish his title over the suit

property. However, this contention is also devoid of merit, inasmuch as in

Civil Suit No.387 of 1951, the plaintiff was declared owner of the suit

property vide judgment and decree dated 09.06.1952, which has attained

finality and is binding upon the defendants.

RSA-2288-1992 (O&M) 16

FINAL ORDER

25. In summa, the instant Regular Second Appeal is dismissed

being devoid of merit, and the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by

the learned trial Court and the learned first appellate Court are hereby

affirmed.

26. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of

accordingly.

(KULDEEP TIWARI)

July 06, 2026 JUDGE

devinder

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether Reportable : Yes/No