1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 22957 OF 2017

HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Vikram Nath, J.

1. This civil appeal by the original writ petitioners before the

High Court, assails the correctness of the judgment and order

dated 11.09.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High

Court dismissing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2887 of 2008 whereby

challenge was made to declare Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land

Reforms Act, 1954

1 unconstitutional being ultra vires Articles 14,

15, 254 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

1

Hereinafter referred to as “1954 Act”

2

FACTS:

2. Genealogy (pedigree) relevant for the case is as follows:

From the above pedigree it is clear that the appellants are the

widow and daughter of Ishwar Singh whereas the contesting

respondent nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of Ishwar Singh. The dispute

relates to the agricultural property held by Mukhtiar Singh. He had

three sons viz Mahinder Singh, Jagdish Singh and Ishwar Singh.

All of them pre-deceased him. Mukhtiar Singh died on 06.06.1997

and his inheritance relating to the branch of Ishwar Singh was

succeeded by his grandsons (sons of Ishwar Singh i.e. Jaidev and

Amit - respondent nos. 3 and 4) under Section 50(a) of the 1954

Act. Revenue records were corrected accordingly.

3. It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 50 of the 1954

Shri Mukhtiar Singh

(Died On 06.06.1997)

Son (1)

Shri Mahinder Singh

(Died in 1975)

Son (2) Shri Jagdish

(Died in 1976)

1. Kuldeep( Son) 2. Kulbeer (Son)

Son (3) Ishwar

(Died in 1985)

Widow Daughter Son Son

(Petitioner No.1) (Petitioner No.2) JaidevAmit

(Respondent No.3) (Respondent No.4)

3

Act:

“50. General order of succession from

males. - Subject to the provisions of Section 48 and

52, when a Bhumidhar or Asami being a male dies,

his interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance

with the order of the succession given below:

a) Male lineal descendants in the male line

of the descent:

Provided that no member of this class shall

inherit if any male descendant between him

and the deceased is alive:

Provided further that the son or sons of a

predeceased on how low so ever shall inherit

the share which would have devolved upon

the deceased if he had been then alive:

b) Widow

c) Father

d) Mother, being a widow;

e) Step mother, being a widow;

f) Father’s father

g) Father’s mother, being a widow;

h) Widow of a male lineal descendant in

the male line of descent;

i) Brother, being the son of same father as

the deceased;

j) Unmarried sister;

k) Brother’s son, the brother having been

a son of the same father as the

deceased;

l) Father’s father’s son;

m) Brother’s son’s son;

n) Father’s father’s son’s son;

o) Daughter’s son.”

4

4. The appellants by way of a petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India challenged the validity of Section 50(a) of the

1954 Act as they were denied any rights in the inheritance along

with respondent Nos.3 and 4.

5. The relief as claimed before the High Court in the writ petition

is reproduced below:

“a) To declare clause (a) of S.50 of the Delhi Land

Reforms Act, 1954 unconstitutional being ultravires

Articles 14, 15, 254 and 21 of the Constitution of

India;

(b) To declare the Petitioners “bhumidhar” having

equal rights of succession at par with the respondent

Nos. 3-4 in the property inherited by them detailed in

Annexure P-3;

(c) To grant any other relief in the interest of justice.;

(d) To grant cost of litigation.”

6. The challenge before the High Court was on the grounds of:

(i) violation of Article 14; (ii) women being discriminated despite

world over the rights of women were being empowered; (iii) Hindu

Succession Act, 1956

2 would prevail over the 1954 Act.

7. Division Bench of the High Court considered the various

submissions advanced and placing reliance on the fact that 1954

2

Hereinafter referred to as the “1956 Act”

5

Act had been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution

much prior to the judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati

vs. State of Kerala

3, and also in view of Article 31(B) of the

Constitution of India extending immunity to such legislation,

dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated

11.09.2009. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been

preferred.

8. Initially, respondent Nos.3 and 4 had put in appearance. It is

thereafter an I.A. was filed by the Advocate on Record to seek

discharge from the case. Such I.A. was allowed on 05.05.2022.

Shri Anand Yadav, Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to

assist the Court.

9. We may briefly note the submissions advanced by the learned

counsel for the appellants as also the learned Amicus.

Appellant’s arguments:

10. Briefly stated the following arguments were raised on behalf

of appellants:

a. Succession provided in 1956 Act will prevail over the

succession provided in 1954 Act in view of Article 254 of

3

1973 (4) SCC 225

6

the Constitution, as there is clear repugnancy.

b. Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act having been deleted by an

amendment in 2005, there would be no justification to

apply the provisions of succession given in the 1954 Act as

the same would now be governed by the 1956 Act.

c. After the judgement in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs.

Rakesh Sharma & Ors.

4

, the repeal of Section 4(2) of 1956

Act would relate back being retrospective and also that the

amendment in Section 6 of 1956 Act would be held to be

retrospective.

d. The provisions of Section 50(a) of the 1954 Act are violative

of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India as there is

clear discrimination on the ground of sex.

e. Reliance was placed upon the judgment in the case of Babu

Ram vs. Santokh Singh and others

5

for the proposition

that provisions of 1956 Act will apply.

4

(2020) 9 SCC 1

5

(2019) 14 SCC 162

7

Respondent’s (Amicus) arguments:

11. On behalf of the respondents, learned Amicus made the

following submissions, which are briefly recorded herein:

a. Sections 51 to 53 of the 1954 Act cannot be challenged

being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution in

view of the Articles 31(A) and 31(B) of the Constitution and

the 1954 Act falling in the Ninth Schedule to the

Constitution since 1964.

b. The provisions in the 1954 Act are in consonance with the

settled succession of agricultural land throughout the

country for various reasons laid down in the preamble and

the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the statute.

c. Provisions of the 1954 Act are not at all affected by deletion

of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.

d. 1956 Act is a general law whereas 1954 Act is a special law

and therefore, 1954 Act will govern the succession in

respect of agricultural land.

e. The succession provided under the 1954 Act is a m ove

toward the Uniform Civil Code inasmuch as the succession

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applies across the board to all land holders irrespective of

religion, caste or creed and personal laws of any religion do

not carve out any exception.

f. A settled law for decades should not be disturbed.

12. Before the High Court the validity of Section 50(a) of the 1954

Act was challenged on the ground that it ultra vires Articles 13,

14, 19, 21 and 254 of the Constitution.

13. In support of the submissions, the appellants who were the

petitioners before the High Court relied upon the judgments in the

cases of (i) Kesavananda Bharati

(ii) Waman Rao and Ors. vs.

Union of India

6

and (iii) I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of

Tamil Nadu & Ors.

7

. The High Court dealt with the judgments in

detail and its ultimate analysis was that none of the judgments

relied upon were of any help to the appellants. The consistent

stand of this Court was that all the legislations included in the

Ninth Schedule to the Constitution before the Judgment in the

case of Kesavananda Bharati that is 24.04.1973, would stand

protected under Article 31B of the Constitution and, therefore, the

6

1981 2 SCC 362

7

(2007) 2 SCC 1

9

challenge to the validity of provisions of the 1954 Act must fail.

14. The reasoning given by the High Court, as stated above, is

the correct interpretation of the judgments of the Court referred to

above and as such does not warrant any interference. We may also

make a note that, before us learned counsel for the appellants has

neither raised this argument nor there is any challenge to the

aforesaid reasoning of the High Court. It may also be pertinent to

note that before the High Court other arguments were not

addressed. However, as the same have been raised, they are being

dealt with hereinafter.

15. We will now deal with the arguments raised by the counsel

for the appellants and the respondents in response thereto.

I. Repugnancy - Article 254 of the Constitution

16. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently urged

that the 1954 Act would be hit by Article 254 of the Constitution

for the reason that the 1956 Act is enacted by the Parliament

whereas the 1954 Act is a State Act. It is also submitted that the

1956 Act is a special law and the 1954 Act a general law.

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17. Article 254 of the Constitution reads as follows:

“254. Inconsistency between laws made by

Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of

States

(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature

of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law

made by Parliament which Parliament is competent

to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with

respect to one of the matters enumerated in the

Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of

clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether

passed before or after the law made by the

Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be,

the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by

the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the

repugnancy, be void

(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State

with respect to one of the matters enumerated in

the Concurrent List contains any provision

repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made

by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that

matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of

such State shall, if it has been reserved for the

consideration of the President and has received his

assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent

Parliament from enacting at any time any law with

respect to the same matter including a law adding

to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made

by the Legislature of the State.”

18. The question of repugnancy arises only if both the Parliament

and the State legislature have made law with respect to any one of

the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III). In the

present case two enactments of 1956 and 1954 are relatable to

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Entries in List III and List II respectively. The relevant Entries in

List III is Entry Nos.5 and 7 whereas relevant Entry of List II is

Entry No.18. The said Entries are reproduced below:

“List II – State List

Entry 18: Land, that is to say, right in or over land,

land tenures including the relation of landlord and

tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and

alienation of agricultural land; land improvement

and agricultural loans; colonization.

List III – Concurrent List

Entry 5: Marriage and divorce; infants and minors;

adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint

family and partition; all matters in respect of which

parties in judicial proceedings were immediately

before the commencement of this Constitution

subject to their personal law.

xxx xxx xxx

Entry 7: Contracts, including partnership, agency,

contracts of carriage, and other special forms of

contracts, but not including contracts relating to

agricultural land.”

19. Apart from the fact that a bare reading of Article 254 reflects

that it refers to repugnancy in law made with respect to matters

enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III), this Court has also

laid down that question of repugnancy would not come into

existence unless it is first established that both enactments are

under the Concurrent list (List III). In this respect it would be

12

appropriate to refer to the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in

the case of M/s. Innoventive Industries Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank and

Ors.

8

. It is held therein that the question of examining repugnancy

would not apply at all unless it is first established that both

enactments under the Central and the State are with respect to

matters enumerated under the Concurrent list (List III).

Consequently, it is submitted that Article 254 would have no

application to the present case at all. Paragraph 51 lays down the

propositions after discussing in detail the law on the point. For the

present case, the proposition 51.1 is relevant which reads as

follows:

“51. The case law referred to above, therefore, yields

the following propositions:

51.1. Repugnancy under Article 254 arises only if

both the Parliamentary (or existing law) and the

State law are referable to List III in the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India.”

In the present case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter

enumerated in List III but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II. Thus,

no question of repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 of

the Constitution.

8

(2018) 1 SCC 407, page 450, para 50-51.

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20. The other part of the argument relating to 1956 Act being a

special law and 1954 being a general law is completely

misconceived. In a series of judgments, not only of this Court but

also of different High Courts, it has been expressed that any State

enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures is a special law.

Reference may be had to a judgment of this Court in the case of

Parshanti Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation

9

.

II. Deletion of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act:

21. Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act read as follows:

“4. Overriding effect of Act:

(1) ………………

(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared

that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to

affect the provisions of any law for the time being in

force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of

agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or

for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such

holdings.”

22. Till 2005, to be specific 09.09.2005, when the Hindu

Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005

was enacted, the aforesaid

provision remained on the statute. It is not in dispute that the

9

(1997) 11 SCC 157

14

property in question is agricultural property, and therefore, in

1997 at the time when Mukhtiyar Singh died, the devolution of

interest (inheritance) would be determinable on the said date, in

accordance with the law existing at that time. In 1997 Section 4(2)

of the 1956 Act, was very much on the statute, its subsequent

deletion would not have any impact on the rights of inheritance,

which had already accrued and crystallised, prior to the

amendment. Therefore, on facts deletion of Section 4(2) of the

1956 Act would not help the appellants.

23. It is well settled that all amendments are deemed to apply

prospectively unless expressly specified to apply

retrospectively or intended to have been done so by the

legislature. Reference may be had to the following decisions:

[L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of

Central Excise

10

; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of

Maharashtra

11

; Union of India v. Zora Singh

12

.]

In the present case there is no such intention reflecting from the

amending Act.

10

(2020) SCC Online SC 705, para 27;

11

(1994) 4 SCC 602 para 26;

12

(1992)1 SCC 673, para 12;

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24. By virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the repeal

of an enactment would not affect the previous operation of such

an enactment. In Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE

13

,

this Court has held that repeal is to be treated similarly as an

omission and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply

equally to an omission as it would apply to a repeal. On account of

Sections 6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omission of

Section 4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation of the

said Section 4(2). Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the aforesaid report are

reproduced below:

“12. From this it is clear that when Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act speaks of the repeal of any

enactment, it refers not merely to the enactment as

a whole but also to any provision contained in any

Act. Thus, it is clear that if a part of a statute is

deleted, Section 6 would nonetheless appl y.

Secondly, it is clear, as has been stated by referring

to a passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England in Fibre

Board judgment, that the expression “omission” is

nothing but a particular form of words evincing an

intention to abrogate an enactment or portion

thereof. This is made further clear by the Legal

Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C. Burton,

1979 Edition. The expression “delete” is defined by

the Thesaurus as follows:

“Delete:- Blot out, cancel, censor, cross off, cross

out, cut, cut out, dele, discard, do away with, drop,

edit out, effect, elide, eliminate, eradicate, erase,

excise, expel, expunge, extirpate, get rid of, leave

13

(2016) 3 SCC 643, para 12.

16

out, modify by excisions, obliterate, omit, remove,

rub out, rule out, scratch out, strike off, take out,

weed, wipe out.”

Likewise the expression “omit” is also defined by

this Thesaurus as follows:

“Omit:- Abstain from inserting, bypass, cast

aside, count out, cut out, delete, discard, dodge,

drop, exclude, fail to do, fail to include, fail to insert,

fail to mention, leave out, leave undone, let go, let

pass, let slip, miss, neglect, omittere, pass over,

praetermittere, skip, slight, transire.”

And the expression “repeal” is defined as follows:

“Repeal:- Abolish, abrogare, abrogate, annul,

avoid, cancel, countermand, declare null and void,

delete, eliminate, formally withdraw, invalidate,

make void, negate, nullify, obliterate, officially

withdraw, override, overrule, quash, recall, render

invalid, rescind, rescindere, retract, reverse, revoke,

set aside, vacate, void, withdraw.”

13. On a conjoint reading of the three expressions

“delete”, “omit”, and “repeal”, it becomes clear that

“delete” and “omit” are used interchangeably, so

that when the expression “repeal” refers to “delete”

it would necessarily take within its ken an omission

as well. This being the case, we do not find any

substance in the argument that a “repeal” amounts

to an obliteration from the very beginning, whereas

an “omission” is only in futuro. If the expression

“delete” would amount to a “repeal”, which the

appellant’s counsel does not deny, it is clear that a

conjoint reading of Halsbury’s Laws of England and

the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove both lead to

the same result, namely, that an “omission’ being

tantamount to a “deletion” is a form of repeal.”

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25. The deletion of Section 4(2) took place w.e.f 09.09.2005.

Therefore, the effect of the deletion can only be in respect of

successions which opened on or after 09.09.2005. This is because

under Section 6(b) and 6(c) of the General Clauses Act repeal

cannot affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed

and cannot affect the previous operation of any enactment so

repealed and cannot affect any right which may have been

acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is to be held that

succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of the

descendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on account

of the said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.

Therefore, the deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective

effect.

26. There is one more reason, why the existence of Section 4(2)

in the 1956 Act and its deletion will not have any impact in the

present case. The reason is that the 1954 Act, as held above is a

special law, dealing with fragmentation, ceiling, and devolution of

tenancy rights over agricultural holdings only, whereas the 1956

Act is a general law, providing for succession to a Hindu by religion

as stated in Section 2 thereof. The existence or absence of Section

4(2) in the 1956 Act would be immaterial.

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III. Effect of the judgment given in the case of Vineeta Sharma:

27. The argument advanced by the l earned counsel for the

appellants is that the applicability of amendment in Section 6 and

the deletion of Section 4(2) from the 1956 Act would have

retrospective effect, which is also of no help to the appellants. Once

we are holding that succession in the present case with respect to

the property in question is governed by the 1954 Act, any

amendment even if it has a retrospective effect in the 1956 Act will

have no bearing or impact on the provisions of succession

governed by the 1954 Act. Moreover, this Court in the judgment

of Vineeta Sharma has given retrospective application only to

Section 6 of the 1956 Act as amended in 2005. There is no

declaration regarding deletion of Section 4(2) being retrospective.

This argument, therefore, also fails.

IV. Gender bias/ women empowerment :

28. Once it is upheld that there can be no challenge to the 1954

Act as the said legislation is included in the Ninth Schedule of the

Constitution of India, this argument also has no legs to stand.

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V. Effect of the judgment in the case of Babu Ram:

29. Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Babu Ram

is of no help to the appellant. The case of Babu Ram related to

State of Himachal Pradesh where there is no State enactment

legislated covering the matters mentioned in Entry 18 of List II that

is to say that the State of Himachal Pradesh has no local

enactment covering agricultural land tenures. It was in such

circumstances that this Court held that succession of agricultural

land would be governed by the 1956 Act. It would be worthwhile to

mention that in the judgment of Babu Ram itself this Court

clarified that had there been a state enactment covering the field

of Entry 18 List II of Seventh Schedule, the rights over agricultural

land would have been governed by the same. Paragraphs 21 and

22 which are relevant are reproduced hereunder:

“21. In the present case, it is nobody’s case that the

matter relating to succession to an interest in

agricultural lands is in any way dealt with by any

State legislation operating in the State of Himachal

Pradesh or that such legislation must prevail in

accordance with the principles under Article 254 of

the Constitution of India. The field is occupied only

by Section 22 of the Act insofar as the State of

Himachal Pradesh is concerned. The High Court

was, therefore, absolutely right in holding that

Section 22 of the Act would operate in respect of

succession to agricultural lands in the State.

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22. Though, succession to an agricultural land is

otherwise dealt with under Section 22 of the Act, the

provisions of Section 4(2) of the Act, before its

omission, had made it clear that the provisions of

the Act would not apply in cases inter alia of

devolution of tenancy rights in respect of

agricultural holdings. Thus, the effect of Section

4(2) of the Act before its deletion was quite clear

that, though the general field of succ ession

including in respect of agricultural lands was dealt

with under Section 22 of the Act, insofar as

devolution of tenancy rights with respect to

agricultural holdings were concerned, the

provisions of Section 22 would be inapplicable. The

High Court of Bombay was, therefore, absolutely

right in its conclusion. However, with the deletion

of Section 4(2) of the Act, now there is no exception

to the applicability of Section 22 of the Act. But we

are not called upon to consider that facet of the

matter.”

30. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails and is

accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

…..……..........................J.

[HEMANT GUPTA ]

………….........................J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

NEW DELHI

SEPTEMBER 20, 2022.