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CGHC010016982022 2026:CGHC:33371

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPC No. 429 of 2022

Reserved on 08.07.2026

Pronounced on 03. 0 8 .2026

Harishankar S/o Sukhai Aged About 60 Years, Caste-Ahir, R/o Village-

Govindgarh, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - Ranglal S/o Mansai, Aged About 65 Years, Caste-Gond, R/o Village-

Govindgarh, Tahsil And District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

2 - Sundari D/o Late Sarju Yadav, aged about 62 years, Caste-Ahir, R/o

Village- Sanwaranwa, Tahsil Bhaiya-Than, District- Surajpur,

Chhattisgarh

3 - Balobai W/o Mohit Panika Aged About 75 Years R/o Village-

Govindgarh, Tahsil and District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh

4 - The Commissioner, Surguja Division Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh

5 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, District- Surajpur,

Chhattisgarh

... Respondent(s)

(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)

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For Petitioner(s):Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla and Mr. Ravi Singh,

Advocates

For Respondent

No.1

For Respondent/

State

:

:

Mr. Pradeep Kumar Jogi, Advocate appears

on behalf of Mr. Vinod Kumar Tekam,

Advocate

Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, Panel Lawyer

SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

C A V Order

1.By way of this petition, the petitioner has called in question the

legality and validity of the order dated 7.12.2021 passed by the

Commissioner, Sarguja Division at Ambikapur, whereby, the said

authority has allowed the revision filed by respondent No.1 -

Ranglal.

2.The petitioner seeks the following reliefs in the writ petition :

10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may graciously be

pleased to issue a writ of mandamus, certiorari or

of like nature to quash the order dated 07/12/2021

(Annexure P/1) affirming the order passed by the

Sub Divisional Officer, Surajpur (C.G.)

10.2 That, a command/direction may kindly be issued

to the respondent No. 2 to produce the entire

records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for

the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court.

10.3 Any other relief which is deemed fit and proper

may also be awarded to the petitioner including

cost of the petition.

3.The background facts giving rise to this petition are that the

Commissioner, Sarguja Division, allowed the Revision preferred

by respondent No.1 - Ranglal vide the impugned order dated

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7.12.2021, passed under Section 170-B of the CG Land Revenue

Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), thereby setting

aside the orders passed by the Additional Collector, Sarguja (now

Surajpur) as well as the SDO (R), Surajpur. The Additional

Commissioner has further directed the reversion of the subject

land in favour of respondent No.1, who is the Legal Heir (son) of

the original tribal owner namely Mansai Gond. Respondent No.1

(a member of aboriginal tribe) moved an application under Section

170-B of the Code before the Sub Divisional Officer (R), Surajpur

alleging that respondent- Sarju Ahir (since deceased) belongs to

the ‘Ahir’ Caste (a non-tribal community), although he had married

Sonjhariya Gond, a member of aboriginal tribe, in the year 1940.

Mansai Gond executed a registered sale-deed dated 9.2.1968 in

favour of Sonjhariya Bai for a consideration of Rs.600/- in respect

of subject land originally recorded under Khasra Nos.173/2,

174/2, 175/2 {admeasuring 0.10, 0.20 and 0.35 decimal}. The

said land was subsequently renumbered during settlement as

Khasra No.155 admeasuring 0.26 RA and remained in the actual

possession of late Sonjharia Bai. Subsequently, vide a separate

sale-deed dated 17.11.1975, Mansai Gond sold two other distinct

land parcels bearing Khasra No.153 (admeasuring 0.09 RA) and

Khasra No.330 (admeasuring 0.13 RA) in favour of Balobai –

respondent No.3 herein {tribal}, (W/o Mohit Panika {non-tribal}).

The above purchaser allegedly illegally purchased the same by

falsely impersonating herself as Balobai D/o Manjhi Ram

Gond. It was further alleged that taking undue advantage of

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the demise of Ranglal’s father and the subsequent minority of

Ranglal, the said purchaser occupied the subject land. It was

contended that Sonjhariya Bai and Balobai, both had lost their

tribal status by marrying Sarju Ahir (since deceased) and Mohit

Panika respectively. In view of the fraudulent misrepresentation

and illegal possession during the owner’s minority, the

transactions are non est in the eye of law, warranting immediate

reversion of the land under Section 170-B of the Code. The

concerned SDO, after initiating proceedings on an application filed

by respondent No.1-Ranglal, issued notice to the respondents and

called for a report from the concerned Patwari. After conducting a

detailed enquiry, the SDO(R) recorded a finding that no element

of fraud or illegal suppression of caste status was ever

established during the enquiry. As such, the challenge under

Section 170-B of the Code raised by respondent No.1 after

substantial lapse of time, is misconceived. During the course of

enquiry, the SDO (R ) recorded the statements of Sarju Ahir and

Balobai Panika, however, respondent No.1 – Ranglal did not

adduce any oral or documentary evidence. In his statement and

reply, Sarju Ahir stated that since Sonjharia Bai died issueless, the

subject land was mutated in his name as her husband and legal

heir. Mansai Gond, who sold the land to Sonjharia Bai, never

disputed the validity of the subject transaction during his lifetime.

Similarly, in her reply, Balobai stated that she has been in lawful

possession of the subject land in pursuance of a registered sale-

deed executed on 17.11.1975. Her father belonged to Gond Caste

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and her marriage to Mohit Panika took place in 1976 and the sale-

deed was executed before her marriage. Thus, since the sale-

deed was executed prior to her marriage, she held full tribal status

at the time of the transaction. On the basis of the material on

record, mainly the reply submitted by the respondents, the

concerned SDO(R) recorded a categorical finding that when the

subject land was transferred, both the parties were tribals and

later on, due to the death of the wife of Sarju Ahir namely

Sonjhariya Bai and inter-caste marriage of Balobai with Mohit

Panika, the application has been moved by respondent No.1

regarding benami transfer of tribal land to non-tribal and reversion

of the said land. The concerned SDO observed that the subject

transactions were originally executed between two tribal persons

and as such, the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code would

not be attracted and thereby, dismissing the application vide order

dated 16.3.2000. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the SDO

(R), Surajpur, respondent No.1 filed a revenue appeal before the

Collector, Sarguja (Ambikapur). The Collector, upon evaluating the

record, affirmed the findings of the concerned SDO, holding that

the transactions were inter-tribal in nature and further that Section

170-B of the Code has no application to transfers between tribal

persons and thereby, dismissed the appeal vide order dated

31.3.2003. Pertinently, subsequent to the dismissal of the appeal,

Sarju executed a sale-deed dated 7.10.2003 in favour of

Harishankar (the present petitioner – a non-tribal). Aggrieved by

the order of dismissal, respondent No.1 preferred a revision

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before the Commissioner, Sarguja Division at Ambikapur. In this

revision, respondent No.1 contended that though the sale-deed

was executed in favour of Sonjhariya Bai, actual physical

possession of the land was held by Sarju, who belongs to ‘Ahir’

Caste (a non-tribal community). Respondent No.1 further

contended that the revenue authorities committed an error of law

in holding that Section 170-B of the Code is inapplicable only

because the transactions were between two tribal persons.

The Commissioner meticulously examined the matter and held

that a transaction(s) cannot be held outside the purview of Section

170-B of the Code, only on the ground that it purports to be an

inter-tribal transfer(s). It was observed that whether a transaction

is fraudulent must be determined by examining whether the actual

possession was transferred to a non-tribal person, particularly

when the transaction was never notified before the competent

revenue authority within the statutory time limit prescribed under

Section 170-B of the Code. Further, non-tribal possession,

coupled with the non-furnishing of mandatory information to the

concerned SDO as required under Section 170-B(1), casts a

cloud over the transaction(s), which renders it fraudulent and

illegal under the Code. As a consequence, the statutory

presumption under Section 170-B operates against the party

currently in possession of land, who, in the present case, is the

petitioner. Accordingly, vide impugned order dated 7.12.2021, the

Commissioner directed the reversion of the land in favour of

respondent No.1 (tribal). Being aggrieved by the impugned order

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dated 7.12.2021 passed by the Commissioner, Sarguja Division,

the petitioner has filed the present petition on the ground that the

same is not in accordance with law.

4.Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla and Mr. Ravi Singh, Counsel for the

petitioner submit that the provisions contained under Section 170-

B of the Code are not attracted to the facts of the present case.

The subject transaction was executed between two members of a

Scheduled Tribe and the same remained unchallenged by late

Mansai Gond, father of respondent No.1, during his lifetime. They

further submit that the possession was duly delivered to and

enjoyed by late Sarju Ahir and subsequently by his legal heir(s).

Further, the requirement of furnishing information regarding

occupation under Section 170-B is not attracted, as the subject

land was initially acquired by Sonjhariya Bai, a member of

Scheduled Tribe. After her demise, the property was inherited by

her husband Sarju Ahir. Though a non-tribal, Sarju Ahir held the

possession of the property in his capacity as the natural legal heir

of his tribal wife. Learned counsel also submit that since both

transferor- Mansai Gond and transferee Sonjharia Bai were

members of Scheduled Tribe, the transaction falls outside the

scope of the statutory restrictions. Additionally, Sonjharia’s

acquisition of the land remains unaffected by her marriage to a

non-tribal, as she continues to retain her birth status as a member

of the ‘Gond’ Scheduled Tribe. They further submit that the sale-

deed dated 9.2.1968 was valid in law and upon passing of

Sonjharia Bai, ownership of the property lawfully devolved upon

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her husband Sarju Ahir, by right of succession. Hence, the sale-

deed dated 7.10.2003 executed by Sarju Ahir in favour of

Harishankar (the present petitioner) was in accordance with law

and cannot be called in question. Learned counsel further submit

that mere non-furnishing of information to the concerned authority

would not ipso facto disentitle the petitioner to his lawful

occupation of the land. The concerned Commissioner committed

a grave error of law in setting aside the concurrent well-reasoned

orders passed by the concerned SDO (R)/the Prescribed Officer

and the concerned Additional Collector, vide the impugned order,

which is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel further submit that

the concerned SDO dismissed the application only on the ground

that the transaction was between tribal parties and there was

nothing to demonstrate any fraud, collusion, misrepresentation or

benami transaction. As such, even if this Court concludes that

Section 170-B of the Code is attracted to inter-tribal transactions,

the matter requires a proper enquiry to establish whether the

transaction was fraudulent and the matter may remanded back to

the concerned SDO to conduct a proper enquiry and pass

appropriate orders in accordance with law.

5.Per contra, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Jogi, Advocate on behalf of Mr.

Vinod Kumar Tekam, learned counsel for respondent No.1

Ranglal submits that the Commissioner rightly appreciated the

entire facts and circumstances of the case while ordering

reversion of the subject land in favour of respondent No.1 (tribal),

which warrants no interference. It is contended that the conclusion

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previously arrived at by the revenue authorities i.e. the concerned

SDO and the concerned Collector, to the effect that Section 170-

B is inapplicable owing to the transaction being inter-tribal is

legally unsustainable. He further submits that despite specific

plea of fraud having been raised, the subordinate revenue

authorities failed to evaluate the same. The Commissioner, upon a

detailed analysis of the record, rightly held that Section 170-B of

the Code can be invoked even in transactions between tribals, if

fraud is alleged. Thus, the Commissioner rightly passed the order

in favour of respondent No.1, son of late Mansai Gond, the

original title holder of the subject land.

6.No one appears on behalf of respondents 2 & 3 herein.

7.Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, learned counsel for the State submits that

there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the

Commissioner. After due consideration, the Commissioner rightly

held that even transactions between tribals can be examined

under Section 170-B of the Code, particularly since physical

possession of the land was found to be with a non-tribal. Even

otherwise, since Sarju Ahir, a non-tribal, did not report possession

to the competent authority, the legal presumption under Section

170-B operates against the petitioner. He submits that the

petitioner is a non-tribal, who purchased the land from Sarju Ahir,

another non-tribal. However, since the subject land originally

belonged to an aboriginal tribe, prior permission under Section

165 of the Code was mandatory, which was never obtained.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Commissioner

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was fully justified in passing the impugned order, which does not

warrant any interference.

8.Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the

documents annexed with the petition.

9. Upon a meticulous anaylsis of the rival submissions, the following

Questions arise for determination by this Court :

1) Whether a transaction between members of

a Scheduled Tribe falls outside the purview of

enquiry under Section 170-B of the Code?

2) Whether the non-tribal spouse of a tribal

woman can alienate land originally belonging to

her to a non-tribal purchaser, treating it to be

non-tribal land, without obtaining permission

from the Collector under Section 165(6) of the

Code?

(3) Whether the transaction in question has

ever been enquired by the Prescribed Authority

in accordance with law?

Question No.1

10.In addressing this question, it is pertinent to bear in mind the

legislative intent behind Section 170-B of the Code. It was

enacted as a protective measure to stop and undo fraudulent

transfers of tribal land. The clear object of the statute is to prevent

illegal alienations and protect tribal owners from exploitation by

non-tribals. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well

as this Court have held that even where a transaction appears on

record to be between tribal persons, it requires an enquiry. In

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numerous instances, while the transaction was purportedly shown

between tribals, the actual possession of the tribal land was found

to be held by non-tribals under the guise of a benami transaction.

Further, under the said provision, the SDO(R) being the

prescribed authority, is empowered to initiate proceedings suo

motu or on the basis of a report or complaint submitted by the

revenue officials. Upon taking cognizance of the matter, the officer

is competent to conduct an enquiry and pass appropriate orders

for the reversion of the land to the tribal owner.

11.For ready reference, Section 170-B is reproduced below :

170-B Reversion of land of members of aboriginal tribe which

was transferred by fraud.

(1) Every person who on the date of commencement of the Madhya

Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter

referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of

agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has

been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of

Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October,

1959 and ending on the date of the commencement of Amendment

Act, 1980 shall, within two years of such commencement, notify to

the Sub-Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may

be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in

possession of such land.

(2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by sub-

section (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed

that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land

without any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the

expiration of the period aforesaid revert to the person to who it

originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs.

([2-A) If a Gram Sabha in the Scheduled area referred to in clause

(1) of Article 244 of the Constitution finds that any person, other

than a member of an aboriginal tribe, is in possession of any land of

a Bhumiswami belonging to an aboriginal tribe, without any lawful

authority, it shall restore the possession of such land to that persons

to whom it originally belonged and if that person is dead to his legal

heirs :

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Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the

possession of such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-

Divisional Officer, who shall restore the possession of such land

within three months from the date of receipt of the reference.]

(3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (1), the Sub-

Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed

necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that

the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate

right he shall declare the transaction null and void and pass an

order revesting the agricultural land in the transferor and, if he is

dead, in his legal heirs.

(3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (1) the Sub-

Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be necessary

about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the

member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate

right he shall declare the transaction null and void and-

(a) Where no building or structure has been erected on the

agricultural land prior to such finding pass an order

revesting the agricultural land in the transferer and if he be

dead, in his legal heirs,

(b) Where any building or structure has been erected on the

agricultural land prior to such finding, he shall fix the price

of such land in accordance with the principles laid down for

fixation of price of land in the [Right to Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (No.30 of 2013)] and order the

person referred to in sub-section (1) to pay to the transferor

the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the

price actually paid to the transferor :

Provided that where the building or structure has been

erected after the 1st day of January, 1984 the provisions of clause

(b) above shall not apply :

Provided further that fixation of price under clause (b) shall

be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case

before the Sub-Divisional Officer.

12.In the matter of Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and

others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 692 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1207,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court held the following in in para 8 :

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8. It is well known that some of the aboriginal tribes are

nomadic and some indulge in crimes traditionally and

historically. The purpose of settling land with the tribals mostly

which is done at very concessional rates and at times even

without involving an obligation to pay the land revenue, is so

done with a view to see that the aboriginals settle at one place

abandoning nomadism and picking up tilling the soil as their

vocation by settling at one place and earning livelihood by

labour and toil. It is also well known that creamy layers have

developed and even as amongst socially unprivileged some

have acquired affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may indulge

in exploiting his fellow beings. Possibility cannot be ruled out

where a non-tribal may manage to have land transferred

apparently but not in reality in the name of a tribal and taking

advantage of his status, affluence or any other means,

conferring him with capacity to exploit, may till the land to his

own advantage depriving the aboriginal tribal from the benefits

of the land settled by the State with him. All such cases are

taken care of by Section 170-B. The purpose of enacting

Section 170-B of the Code is very wide. The object sought to

be achieved, as its drafting indicates, is to gather and make

available all statistics with the State officials so as to find out

how much land belonging to aboriginal tribals is in possession

of anyone to whom it does not belong as on the cut-off date.

The information having been collected, the enquiry under sub-

section (3) shall be directed towards finding out the nature of

transaction resulting in transfer of land — whether such

transaction of transfer has resulted in the aboriginal tribal

having been defrauded of his legitimate right in the land. Sub-

sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 1980, have to be read

as part of one whole scheme. If the submission of Shri

Gambhir is correct then the object of enquiry under sub-

section (3) would have been to find out if such transaction of

transfer has resulted in an aboriginal tribal having been

defrauded of his legitimate right by a person not belonging to

an aboriginal tribe. But that is not so. Nowhere in the entire

scheme of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170-B, as

enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the

applicability of the provision to such transactions of transfer as

were entered into by a member of an aboriginal tribe in favour

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of a member not belonging to an aboriginal tribe. No exception

has been enacted by the legislature so as to exclude from the

purview of Section 170-B transactions of transfer between two

persons both of whom are members of aboriginal tribes. Had it

been so, the legislature would have specifically said so. The

language of the section as drafted in 1980 is clear and

unambiguous and does not admit of any doubt so far as this

aspect is concerned.

(emphasis supplied )

13.From a bare reading of provisions of Section 170-B of the Code

and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that Section 170-B of the Code,

would also attract in a transaction between members of the tribe.

14.Now, coming back to the facts and circumstances of the present

case, the initial transaction in the present case was between two

tribal individuals namely Mansai Gond and Sonjharia Bai.

However, a perusal of the record shows that Sonjharia Bai was

married to Sarju Ahir (a non-tribal), who remained in actual

possession and occupation of the subject land even during her

lifetime. After the death of Sonjharia, the land was got mutated in

the name of Sarju Ahir. Taking advantage of this mutation, Sarju

Ahir sold the property to the present petitioner, who is also a non-

tribal. When an application was moved by respondent No.1

Ranglal S/o Mansai Gond alleging a fraudulent transaction, the

SDO dismissed the application without conducting any due

enquiry, only on the ground that since the initial transaction was

between two tribals, as such, it fell outside the purview of Section

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170-B of the Code.

15.It is unfortunate that the concerned Additional Collector

committed a material irregularity by failing to appreciate that an

allegation of fraud committed against a tribal must be duly

examined, notwithstanding that the subject transaction was

purportedly between two members of Scheduled Tribe.

Conversely, the Commissioner, Sarguja Division rightly examined

the matter in its true perspective, observing that inter-se tribal

transactions warrant close scrutiny under Section 170-B of the

Code, particularly when the actual possession rests with a non-

tribal and specific pleas of fraud are raised by respondent No.1.

However, having found that the prescribed authority had failed to

conduct the enquiry contemplated under Section 170-B, the

Commissioner ought not to have proceeded to finally direct

reversion of the land. The question as to whether the transaction

was fraudulent and whether the statutory presumption stood

rebutted could have been determined only after a full-fledged

enquiry by the competent authority. To that extent, the impugned

revisional order cannot be sustained.

16.In view of the above, Question No.1 is answered accordingly.

Question No.2

17.To properly appreciate the statutory restriction regarding the

transfer of land, it is relevant to reproduce Section 165(6) of the

Code which reads as below:-

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165. Rights of transfer.

xxxx

(6)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the

right of bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been

declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government

by a notification in that behalf, for the whole or part of the

area to which this Code applies shall-

(i)in such areas as are predominately inhabited by aboriginal

tribes and from such date as the State Government may, by

notification, specify, not be transferred nor it shall be

transferable either by way of sale or otherwise or as a

consequence of transaction of loan [or will (bequest)] to a

person not belonging to such tribe in the area specified in

the notification;

(ii) in areas other than those specified in the notification

under clause (i), not to be transferred or be transferable

either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence

of transaction of loan [or will (bequest)] to a person not

belonging to such tribe without the permission of a

Revenue Officer not below the rank of Collector, given

for reasons to be recorded in writing

[Provided that the provision of this sub-section shall not be

applicable to the land acquired under the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (No. 30 of 2013).]

Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section the

expression "otherwise" shall not include lease.

xxxx

18.A plain reading of the aforesaid clause reveals that Section 165(6)

of the Code begins with a non-obstante clause which imposes

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restrictions upon the transfer of land belonging to Bhumiswami

who is a member of a notified Schedule Tribe. The intention of

the legislature is clear i.e. not merely to impose ordinary restraint

upon alienation of land but to grant statutory protection to

preserve tribal ownership and prevent landlessness and economic

dispossession of Schedule Tribes. Any interpretation deviating

from the objective of Section 165(6) would frustrate the very

purpose for which the provision was enacted.

19.In Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and

others, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 65 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC

1308, wherein the Court explained the purposive interpretation to

be accorded to protective legislation governing tribal land. The

relevant paragraphs are reproduced below :

15. Tribal areas have their own problems. Tribals are

historically weaker sections of the society. They need the

protection of the laws as they are gullible and fall prey to

the tactics of unscrupulous people, and are susceptible to

exploitation on account of their innocence, poverty and

backwardness extending over centuries. The Constitution

of India and the laws made thereunder treat tribals and

tribal areas separately wherever needed. The tribals need

to be settled, need to be taken care of by the protective

arm of the law, and be saved from falling prey to

unscrupulous device so that they may prosper and by an

evolutionary process join the mainstream of the society.

The process would be slow, yet it has to be initiated and

kept moving. The object sought to be achieved by the

1950 Act and the 1956 Regulations is to see that a

member of an aboriginal tribe indefeatably continues to

own the property which he acquires and every process

known to law by which title in immovable property is

extinguished in one person to vest in another person,

should remain so confined in its operation in relation to

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tribals that the immovable property of one tribal may come

to vest in another tribal but the title in immovable property

vesting in any tribal must not come to vest in a non-tribal.

This is to see and ensure that non-tribals do not succeed

in making inroads amongst the tribals by acquiring

property and developing roots in the habitat of tribals.

16. In support of the proposition that the expression

“transfer of immovable property” is capable of being

assigned an extended meaning depending on the context

and the setting in which it has been used so as to include

therein such transactions as would not otherwise and

ordinarily be included in its meaning, we may refer to a

few decided cases.

18. In Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu [1992 Supp

(2) SCC 77] the term “transfer” as used in Section 71-A of

the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, came up for the

consideration of the Court. “Transfer” was not defined in

the Act. It was held that considering the situation in which

the exercise of jurisdiction is contemplated, it would not be

proper to confine the meaning of “transfer” to transfer

under the Transfer of Property Act or a situation where

“transfer” has a statutory definition. What exactly is

contemplated by “transfer” in Section 71-A is where

possession has passed from one to another and as a

physical fact the member of the Scheduled Tribe who is

entitled to hold possession has lost it and a non-member

has come into possession, would be covered by “transfer”.

Their Lordships observed: (SCC p. 80, para 7)

“7. The provision is beneficial and the

legislative intention is to extend protection to a class

of citizens who are not in a position to keep their

property to themselves in the absence of protection.

Therefore when the legislature is extending special

protection to the named category, the court has to give

a liberal construction to the protective mechanism

which would work out the protection and enable the

sphere of protection to be effective than limit by (sic)

the scope.”

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Their Lordships referred to three earlier decisions of this

Court, namely,  Manchegowda v. State of

Karnataka [(1984) 3 SCC 301 : (1984) 3 SCR

502] , Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar  v. State of

Maharashtra [(1985) 1 SCC 479 : (1985) 2 SCR

224] , Gamini Krishnayya v. Guraza Seshachalam [AIR

1965 SC 639 : (1965) 1 SCR 195] and a decision of the

House of Lords in D (a minor) v. Berkshire County

Council [(1987) 1 All ER 20 : 1987 AC 317 : (1986) 3 WLR

1080 (HL)] laying down the proposition that a broad and

liberal construction should be given to give full effect to

the legislative purpose.

19.State of M.P. v. Babu Lal [(1977) 2 SCC 435] is an

interesting case showing how this Court dealt with an

artistic device employed by a non-tribal to deprive a tribal

of his land. The M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 imposed

restrictions on the transfer of land by members of a

Scheduled Tribe. Babu Lal, a non-tribal, filed a suit for

declaration against Baddiya, a Bheel, notified Scheduled

Tribe, for declaration that his name be recorded in the

revenue record as bhumiswami over the land of Baddiya.

Baddiya did not contest the suit and the parties filed a

compromise conceding to the claim of Babu Lal. The

State Government intervened and filed a petition in the

High Court seeking a writ of certiorari, submitting that the

entire proceedings in the suit were in contravention of

sub-section (6) of Section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue

Code, 1959. The judgment of the civil court based on

compromise was sought to be quashed. The High Court

dismissed the petition holding that the State could pursue

the alternative remedy of filing a suit for declaration that

the decree was null and void. In appeal by special leave,

this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and

issued a writ of certiorari to quash the judgment and

decree passed in the civil suit. It was held: (SCC p. 436,

para 5)

“5. One of the principles on which certiorari is

issued is where the Court acts illegally and there is

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error on the face of record. If the Court usurps the

jurisdiction, the record is corrected by certiorari. This

case is a glaring instance of such violation of law. The

High Court was in error in not issuing writ of

certiorari.”

20. The law laid down by this Court is an authority for the

proposition that the court shall step in and annul any such

transaction as would have the effect of violating a

provision of law, more so when it is a beneficial piece of

social legislation. A simple declaratory decree passed by a

civil court which had the effect of extinguishing the title of

a member of a Scheduled Tribe and vesting the same in a

non-member, was construed as “transfer” within the

meaning of Section 165(6) of the M.P. Land Revenue

Code, 1959. Thus, we are very clear in our minds that the

expression “transfer of immovable property” as defined in

clause (f) of para 2 of the 1956 Regulations has to be

assigned a very wide meaning. Any transaction or dealing

with immovable property which would have the effect of

extinguishing title, possession or right to possess such

property in a tribal and vesting the same in a non-tribal,

would be included within the meaning of “transfer of

immovable property”

20.Coming back to the facts of the present case, in light of the

principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, and taking into consideration the objective of

Section 165(6) of the Code, this Court is of the considered view

that that if Section 165(6) is interpreted by examining only the

identity of the transferor at the time of sale, it would amount to a

literal construction of the provision, which would frustrate the very

purpose for which it was enacted. The necessary legal implication

of such construction would be that if an aboriginal tribal woman

dies leaving her non-tribal husband as her only legal heir, the land

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would lose its protective character and the statutory shelter

granted under Section 165(6) would no longer be applicable. It is

quite well settled that whenever a legislation is beneficial in

nature, it must always be interpreted in a manner that advances

and furthers its objective, rather than circumvention. Where two

interpretations are possible, the Court must adopt the one that

advances and furthers the objective of the legislation.

21.Admittedly, the word “transfer” used in Section 165(6) of the Code

must be given an expansive meaning, otherwise the restriction

imposed by the statute would be diluted merely because the

ownership has devolved by way of inheritance upon a non-tribal

spouse. Adopting a contrary interpretation would result in the

erosion of the statutory shelter granted under this provision.

22.In view of the above, this Court is of the view that it is imperative

that the safeguards prescribed under Section 165(6) of the Code

is strictly complied with before alienating such land in favour of a

non-tribal purchaser.

23.In view of the aforesaid, Question No.2 is answered accordingly.

Question No.3

24.Another important aspect requiring consideration is whether any

enquiry as contemplated under Section 170-B of the Code, was

conducted by the prescribed authority. A perusal of the order

dated 16.3.2000 passed by the concerned SDO, it appears that

the SDO was perhaps influenced solely by the fact that the

transaction was between tribals and thereby, completely failing to

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examine the allegation of fraud committed by Sarju Ahir, as

complained by respondent No.1.

25.The concerned prescribed authority is vested with broad statutory

powers under Section 170-B of the Code to enquire into land

transaction and scrutinize whether any such transfer is vitiated by

fraud. This includes benami or fake deals where the land is shown

on paper to be between two tribals, but actual physical possession

is kept by a non-tribal. Moreover, an enquiry of this nature

mandates that the SDO record oral and documentary evidence of

both the parties, which is an essential procedural requirement that

was omitted in the present case.

26.In the matter of Jagdeesh Choudhary Vs. The Board of

Revenue and others reported in 2013 SCC Online Chh 27, the

following has been held in para 7 & 8:

7. The Legislature has empowered the Sub-Divisional

Officer to pass an order of return of land to the original

owner, member of aboriginal tribe, under sub-sections (1)

& (2) of Section 170B of the Code in case the person in

possession of the land originally owned by the member of

aboriginal tribe, failed to notify the same to the Sub-

Divisional Officer. As per intent of the legislature, under

sub-section (3) of Section 170B of the Code the Sub-

Divisional Officer is also empowered to enquire into the

matter on the basis of information received inter aliathe

Sub-Divisional Officer is under obligation to hold an

enquiry under sub-section (3) of Section 170B of the Code

before passing final order on the basis of information

received.

8. As per order impugned the Sub-Divisional Officer has

initiated inquiry under subsection (3) but exercised the

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jurisdiction and passed the order under sub-section (1) &

(2) of Section 170B of the Code. Considering the fault on

the part of the petitioner, which has been explained by the

petitioner, by passing the order impugned without holding

any inquiry in terms of sub-section (3), the Sub Divisional

Officer has committed an illegality and failed to follow the

procedure prescribed and also failed to exercise the

jurisdiction vested in it. The said order has been affirmed

by the first appellate Court and the revisional Court i.e. the

Collector and the Commissioner, and thereby all the

aforesaid revenue authorities have committed an illegality

resulting into miscarriage of justice. Right vested upon the

person on the basis of an legal document cannot be

brushed without following the procedure prescribed but in

the present case aforesaid revenue authorities have failed

to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with law and to

follow the procedure prescribed. Therefore, all the orders

impugned are not sustainable under the law and require

interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction in terms

of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

27.Reverting to the facts of the present case, considering the

procedural and substantive defects, this Court is of the view that a

proper enquiry, as envisaged under Section 170-B of the Code,

ought to be conducted by the concerned SDO (R). The SDO(R)

shall call for a report from the subordinate revenue authorities,

afford due opportunity to the parties to lead oral as well as

documentary evidence and thereafter, pass a reasoned order in

accordance with law, either directing reversion of the land or

otherwise.

28.In view of the aforesaid, Question No.3 is answered accordingly.

29.In light of the foregoing discussion, without expressing any opinion

24

on the merits of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion

that the matter requires a proper enquiry and adjudication afresh

by the concerned SDO (R). Accordingly, the order dated

16.3.2000 passed by the concerned SDO and the order dated

31.3.2003 passed by the concerned Additional Collector are

hereby set-aside and the impugned order dated 7.12.2021 passed

by the Commissioner, Sarguja Division (Ambikapur), so far as it

relates to reversion of the subject land to respondent No.1, is also

set-aside. The matter is remanded back to the concerned

SDO (R) to conduct a proper enquiry and pass an appropriate

order in accordance with law, after affording a due opportunity of

hearing and leading evidence to all the parties.

30.Considering that the dispute pertains to the year 2000 and the

subject sale deed pertains to the year 09.02.1968, the concerned

SDO(R) is directed to conclude the proceedings and pass a

reasoned order within three months from the date of receipt of a

copy of this order.

31.The parties are directed to appear before the concerned SDO on

10.8.2026.

32.Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned

SDO forthwith.

33.With the aforesaid observations/directions, the Writ Petition is

finally disposed of. Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Shyna Ajay