IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

FAO-6590-2012 (O&M)

Date of Decision: September 26, 2025

Harjinder Kaur and others

...Appellants

VERSUS

Nirmal Singh and others

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ARCHANA PURI

Present:Mr.Raj Kumar Rana, Advocate

for the appellants.

Respondent No.1 ex-parte.

Mr.Rohit Kumar, Advocate

for respondent No.2

Mr.Sukhdarshan Singh, Advocate

for respondent No.3.

****

ARCHANA PURI, J.

The appellants-claimants have filed the appeal, thereby, seeking

enhancement of the compensation awarded by learned Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, on account of death of Bahadur Singh, in a motor vehicular

accident. Along with the appeal, applications for seeking condonation of

delay of 2 years 6 months and 25 days in filing the appeal as well as for

seeking condonation of delay of 24 days in re-filing the appeal have also

been filed.

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The essential facts, to be noticed, are as follows:-

That, on 14.07.2007, Bahadur Singh along with other persons, was

going from Patiala to village Hulka, P.O.Manakpur, P.S. Banur, Tehsil

Rajpura, District Patiala. At about 9.00 p.m. when they were waiting for

some vehicle, near Ghariyanwala Chowk, Patiala, Constable Gurmail Singh

and Langri Dhani Ram also came there. All of them had taken lift in jeep

bearing temporary registration No.PB-10BQ-Temp.2007-8500, upto Banur.

The jeep was driven, on the correct left hand side of the road, at a moderate

speed. At 10.00 p.m., when they travelled only 4 kms. towards Banur and

had reached near Stephan Chemical Factory, on Rajpura-Zirakpur road, in

the meanwhile, a truck bearing registration No.PB-03Q-9183 came from

behind and struck against the rear portion of the jeep. As a result of this

accident, Bahadur Singh and Gurmail Singh, fell on the road due to the jerk

and other occupants also had fallen in the pits of the road. Besides others,

Bahadur Singh was taken to Civil Hospital, Rajpura, where from, he was

referred to GMCH, Sector-32, Chandigarh but enroute to hospital, he died,

on account of injuries sustained in the accident in question.

The legal representatives of deceased Bahadur Singh i.e. widow

and three minor children as well as mother of the deceased, had filed claim

petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act and the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, vide impugned Award dated 09.11.2009 had awarded

compensation to the extent of Rs.18,09,500/-. Against the Award, the appeal

in hand was filed in the year 2012. Along with the same, applications for

seeking condonation of delay, as noticed in the earlier portion of the

judgment, were also filed.

At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellants-claimants

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submitted that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not just

compensation, as per the settled law. He contends that the future prospects,

as such, have not been taken. Even, the loss of dependency has been

erroneously worked upon. Under the conventional heads also, the

compensation calls for enhancement.

So far as, the condonation of delay is concerned, it is contended

by the counsel that there was a reason that the appellants-claimants were not

aware of the provisions of filing an appeal. It was only on account

Santparkash Kaur, who was minor at the relevant time of filing of the claim

petition, gained majority and became aware of availability of remedy of

appeal, that the appeal in hand was filed. In fact, widow of deceased was

under shock and therefore also, the appeal, as such, was not filed and the

requisite delay had accrued.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has

refuted the reason assigned for seeking condonation of delay. In fact, it is

submitted that even, qua the legal disability suffered by the Santparkash

Kaur, who was minor at the time of filing of the claim petition, will not be of

any assistance to the appellants to secure order of condonation of delay.

In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon

Section 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, which reads as herein given:-

“6. Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute a

suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at

the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a

minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make

the application within the same period after the disability has

ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time

specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule.

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(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed

period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or

where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by

another disability, he may institute the suit or make the

application within the same period after both disabilities have

ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so

specified.

(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that

person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make

the application within the same period after the death, as would

otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3)

is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents,

affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections

(1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under disability dies

after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him

under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit

or make the application within the same period after the death,

as would otherwise have been available to that person had he

not died.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’

includes a child in the womb.

7. Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of several

persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application

for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a

discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person,

time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge

can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one

of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the

concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from every

kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any

immovable property.

Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the Manager

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of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law

shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the

concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in

management of the joint family property”

Section 6 of the Limitation Act,1963 as reproduced aforesaid,

enables a person disabled by reason of minority, insanity or idiocy to

institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a ‘decree’, within

a period of limitation provided, after the disability has ceased. The

provision applies only with respect to a suit or an application for the

execution of a decree and not in an appeal or any other proceedings. Even, it

is important to make reference to the definitions as provided in Section 2 and

more particularly, clause (l), which though, does not define a suit, but

provides that ‘a “suit” does not include an appeal or an application’. An

appeal, an application and a suit, are dealt with differently, insofar, as the

Limitation Act is concerned, as evident from Section 3 also. In this context,

it is pertinent to note that the distinction, insofar, Section 5 of the Limitation

Act is there, which provides for admission of an appeal or any application,

other than an application under any of the provisions of Section XXI of the

CPC, even after the prescribed period, if sufficient cause is shown to satisfy

the Court.

In this context, reference is made to New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

Vs. Gopu and another, 2025 INSC 511, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, while dealing with legal disability, as provided under Section 6 and 7

of the ibid Act, observed, as herein given:-

“10. It is pertinent that till the Act of 1963 came into effect

applications for execution of the decree were not specifically

excluded from the purview of the provision allowing

FAO-6590-2012 -6-

condonation of delay, (Section 5(b) of the Limitation Act of

1871 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908) which was

excluded for the first time under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. It

has been held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not

apply to a suit in Ajay Gupta v. Raju, (2016) 14 SCC 314.

Likewise legal disabilities specified in Section 6 creates an

exemption and enables the period of limitation to run from the

date on which the disability has ceased, only in the case of a

suit or an application for the execution of a decree; the last of

which we already noticed is excluded under Section 5.

11. In this context, we refer to the decision of the Full Bench of

the High Court of Allahabad in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan,

(1890) SCC Online All 1 [ILR (1890) 12 ALL 461 (FB)] and

make the following extract from Mahmood, J’s opinion which

was concurred by all the other three Hon’ble Judges:

“What effect the minority of some of the defendants has

upon the case is the subject of the second question as

enunciated by me. And upon this point, I am of the

opinion that the defendants-respondents have no case. It

is true that some of them are minors, but they are duly

represented by guardians whose interests are the same as

theirs, and the fact of minority could not prevent the

guardians from showing due diligence on behalf of the

minors. It is noticeable that Section 7 of the Limitation

Act, in extending the period of limitation on account of

minority, refers only to suits and applications and makes

no mention of appeals, and its provisions are, therefore,

unavailable to the minor defendants.”

Section 7 referred to in the above extract is from the: Limitation

Act (XV of 1877) and the provisions we are concerned with also

is similarly worded, without any mention of appeals.

12. In Musthafali v. Subair, 1991 SC Online Ker 269, the High

FAO-6590-2012 -7-

Court of Kerala considering the word ‘suit’ used in Section 6

and defined in the Limitation Act held that the proceedings

under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act are in the nature

of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure; since the lis is

instituted by presentation of an application, which is more or

less like a plaint. The Division Bench of the High Court relied

on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H.

Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v.

State of Rajasthan, 1963 SCC Online SC 119 which held

“A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or

petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claimant is

not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil

court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling

within Section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure..” [sic

paragraph 5].

Impliedly, the exemption by reason of a disability applies to the

institution of an original proceeding or an application for

execution of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of

an appeal. Appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding

and if, as is the case here, when the original proceeding was

instituted at the time of minority, why should there be a

subsequent disability inferred, when the natural guardian, the

father, who instituted the appeal was alive and did not suffer

from any disability himself, even when the appeal period stood

expired. The above observation of ours may not be taken as

Section 6 being applicable to appeals, which the legislature did

not intend.”

In the case under consideration, in the aforesaid authority, it

was observed that the father, as a natural guardian had instituted the original

proceeding before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, filed for

compensation, for the death of his wife, in a motor vehicle accident, with

both the minor children were arrayed as claimants, represented by the father,

FAO-6590-2012 -8-

the natural guardian. However, the father did not choose to file an appeal

from the Award. In fact, the Insurance Company had filed an appeal from

the Award of the Tribunal. Thereupon, also the father and the two minor

children were made party and they appeared through counsel. The father did

not choose to file an appeal seeking enhancement of the claim amounts.

However, the father did not chose to file cross appeal, seeking enhancement

of the claim amount. In this context, it was observed that the father, who is

natural guardian took a conscious decision, not to file an appeal and was

satisfied with the Award. Even though, in the application for condonation of

delay, filed therein, various pleas, with regard to the father, having married

and the children being abandoned, who were in the care of their

grandparents, were asserted but these were held to be not substantiated,

which otherwise also, by any such substantiation, would not have enabled

the filing of an appeal under Section 6, the exemption under which, based on

a disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution of a decree.

Therein, also it was observed that the intention of the legislature being very

clear, it is not for the Courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced

sympathies. Even, it was further held that Section 5 has no application in the

facts of the case, insofar, as the long delay occasioned, especially when in

the original proceedings, the children were represented by the father, the

natural guardian.

Consequently, qua the case under consideration, it was

concluded about the appeal filed to be grossly delayed and hence, not

maintainable.

In the case in hand, apart from asserting about the one of the

daughters to have attained majority and only thereupon, having come to

FAO-6590-2012 -9-

know about the availability of the remedy of appeal to be there, it was also

in a vague manner stated about the widow of the deceased to be under shock.

What is to be understood by ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, has been elaborately considered by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the latest decision rendered in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. Vs.

Karnataka Housing Board and others, 2025 INSC 1104, wherein, it was

observed, as herein given:-

“116. As already discussed in the foregoing parts, for the

purpose of seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, the party has to demonstrate the existence of a

“sufficient cause” “within the prescribed period” to the

satisfaction of the court. Thus, establishment of “sufficient

cause” is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of

delay. Insofar, as what is meant by the phrase “sufficient

cause”, neither Section 5 nor the Limitation Act itself provide

any guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be.

Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate

reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial

interpretation and Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of

2019 Page 74 of 170 exercise of discretion upon the facts and

individual circumstances of each case.

117. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of

judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the

sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved.

Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock

and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay.

The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an

exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is

attributable to the applicant. Although the actual period of

delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay

which would be the decisive factor.

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118. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with

the bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised

over technicalities, as one motivation underlying such rules is

to prevent parties from using dilatory tactics or abusing the

judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore

sometimes necessary, despite it appearing liberal or

magnanimous. The expression “sufficient cause” should be

given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.

119. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the

legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply

the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of

justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the

institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being

adopted in such matters, which was termed justifiable, this

Court lamented that the message had not percolated down to

all the other courts in the hierarchy and, accordingly, emphasis

was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice-oriented

approach. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10

SCC 531]

120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or

an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest

range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases,

delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is

satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must

distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An

“explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and

lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the

circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to

point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it

is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to

distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although

people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same

thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two,

there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj

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Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531]”

Therein, to emphasise upon the principles governing

‘sufficient cause’, as summarized in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing

Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors, (2013) 12 SCC 649,

was also taken into consideration and reproduced therein, which are as

follows:-

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can

broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,

non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for

condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to

legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in

their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to

the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be

applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the

technical considerations should not be given undue and

uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate

causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the

counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking

condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof

should not affect public justice and cause public mischief

because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the

ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate

the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a

totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and

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a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine

of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be

attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach

whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party

relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be

taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is

that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of

justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot

be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds

urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be

vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such

a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with

fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to

the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully

scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm

of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning

and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing

a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”

Besides, considering the aforesaid principles, furthermore, some

guidelines, taking note of the present scenario, were also given by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, which reads, as herein given:-

“22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be

drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner

harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone

delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis

on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be

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dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual

philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard

being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious

effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the

adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate

institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-

serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be

exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of

course, within legal parameters.”

In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v. Special Deputy

Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, the Hon’ble Court summarized

the principles governing the exceptions imagined under ‘sufficient cause’

vis-à-vis substantive justice, as herein given:-

“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the

law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is

evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there

should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy

rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed

of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a

fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed

differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict

sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal

approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial

justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to

defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of

the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the

delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of

power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even

if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as,

where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due

diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it

does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if

the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in

filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in

condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the

parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning

the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,

tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

(Emphasis supplied)”

Considering the aforesaid, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Shivamma’s case (supra), dilated further on the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ as

provided under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and furthermore, has also

provided a guideline for the Courts to adopt pragmatic approach and while

drawing a distinction between a case, where delay is inordinate and a case,

where the delay is of few days. Relating to the same, it was also observed

that in the former case, the consideration of prejudice to the other side, will

be a relevant factor, so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the

latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a

liberal approach.

In the light of the aforesaid, each case for condonation of delay,

based on existence or absence of sufficient cause, has to be decided on its

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own facts. Exercise of this discretion at times, call for liberal and justice-

oriented approach by the Courts, where, certain leeway could be provided, if

circumstances, so called for. However, the condonation of delay, being a

discretionary power, available to the Court, do not mean that the Courts are

not required to consider the existence of ‘sufficient cause’. Exercise of

discretion, must necessarily depends upon the sufficiency of the cause

shown and the degree of the acceptability of the explanation, the length of

delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of ‘sufficient cause’ being

shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, the delay of the shortest

range may not be condoned, whereas, in certain other cases, the delay of

long period can be condoned, if the explanation is satisfactory and

acceptable.

Now, adverting to the case in hand, as already observed

aforesaid, it should be noted that in the appeal, there is delay of 2 years 6

months and 25 days, in filing the appeal and 24 days in re-filing the appeal.

Firstly, coming to the application filed for seeking condonation of

delay in filing the appeal, the detail whereof, has already been reproduced in

the earlier portion of the judgment, it is pertinent to mention that though, it

makes reference to appellant No.2, who is daughter of deceased Bahadur

Singh, having become major and having been impleaded in her independent

capacity, but no further details, as such, were given with regard to her

having attained majority. Anyhow, as Section 6 is not applicable, so far as,

appeal in hand, is concerned, it matters not much. But however, at a

subsequent stage, much later, an additional affidavit was filed, where, it is

stated that she attained majority on 02.10.2011. It is claimed that she had

visited the office of trial Court counsel on 01.09.2012 and then she came to

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know about the remedy of appeal available to her and the appeal was

thereafter filed. She also stated therein about the counsel having disclosed

that he had advised her mother, but perhaps, she being under mental shock,

could not understand the advice.

It has been rightly contended by learned counsel for the

respondent, while making reference to the reply that in fact, Santparkash

Kaur, daughter of deceased, at first instance, had not filed any affidavit

along with the application. In fact, it is her mother, Harjinder Kaur, who had

filed the affidavit and she had stated herself, to be under mental shock. This

assertion in itself is not sufficient. The plea of Harjinder Kaur-widow,

having become dumb struck, does not stand substantiated by any material. It

is understandable, on account of death of her husband, Harjinder Kaur, must

have passed through a traumatic state of mind, but the period of delay, to be

considered is quite inordinate and suffice to meet the same, had the medical

record, as such, been produced, thereby, specifying her ailment, but nothing,

as such, came forth.

The duration of delay is a weighing factor. The provision for the

limitation has been made, not with the object of destroying party’s right, but

to ensure that the parties approach the Courts, without unreasonable delay.

However, extension of prescribed period, can be considered by the Courts, if

sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, is made out. The burden to

establish ‘sufficient cause’ lies upon the party, seeking condonation, and the

Court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bonafide, and free of

negligence. However, in the case in hand, but for the bald assertion about

widow of deceased to be under mental shock, there is no other material

coming forth, to so substantiate this unfortunate condition, as alleged.

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In the light of the same, the requisite ‘sufficient cause’, capable

of extending the limitation, as such, by way of condonation, does not stand

established. Thus, no case is made out for condonation of delay in filing and

re-filing the appeal. Hence, the applications for seeking condonation of

delay, are hereby dismissed. Consequently, FAO-6590-2012 also stands

dismissed.

September 26, 2025 (ARCHANA PURI)

Vgulati JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes

Whether reportable Yes/No