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Harjinder Singh Vs The State Of Punjab & Anr.

  Supreme Court Of India Special Leave Petition Civil/1891/2024
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Case Background

The case revolves around the tragic suicide of Dharminder Singh, allegedly abetted by Varinder Singh and others. The legal battle began when Dharminder Singh’s father, Harjinder Singh, challenged the High ...

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Document Text Version

2025 INSC 634 SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 1 of 17

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ……………….. OF 2025

(@ SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024)

HARJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, preferred by the

complainant-father (“the appellant”) of the deceased

Dharminder Singh, assails the judgment

dated 21 November 2023 of the High Court of

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (“the

High Court”) allowing Criminal Miscellaneous

Petition No. 31120 of 2022 under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). By the

impugned judgment the High Court set aside an

order dated 04 July 2022 passed by the Additional

Sessions Judge, Sangrur (“the Trial Court”)

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 2 of 17

summoning Varinder Singh (hereinafter

“respondent no. 2”) to face trial under Section 306

read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(“IPC”) in First Information Report No. 51 of 2016

registered at Police Station Amargarh,

District Sangrur, Punjab.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as

follows:

3.1 On 13 March 2016 an acid attack was allegedly

committed upon Dharminder Singh by ten

persons. That occurrence was recorded as

FIR No. 30 of 2016 under Sections 323, 324, 341,

506, 148, 149 and 326-A IPC; respondent no.2

was not named therein.

3.2 On 10 May 2016 at around 8.30 am in the

morning, Dharminder Singh and his paternal

uncle Jagdev Singh were standing near their

abadi land on Jagowal Road when

Gurmail Singh, respondent no. 2, Santokh Singh

and Iqbal Singh, accompanied by an unidentified

person, allegedly stopped their white car and

taunted the deceased, stating that he and his

family “should die of shame” for not having taken

action against the acid-attack assailants.

3.3 The deceased returned home in distress, locked

himself in a room, and left the house alone at

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 3 of 17

about 04:00 p.m. When he did not return by

evening, a search party found his bicycle, clothing

and footwear near the Hussainpur canal.

On 13 May 2016 his body was recovered from the

canal head at village Salar. The appellant lodged

a complaint the same day; FIR No. 51 of 2016

(“the FIR in question”) was registered under

Sections 306/34 IPC, naming, inter alia,

respondent no. 2.

3.4 During investigation the police accepted the plea

of alibi advanced by respondent no. 2, who

produced, among other things, a parking-lot slip,

outpatient records, a medicine bill and CCTV

footage from PGI Chandigarh timed 06:30 a.m.

onward on 10 May 2016. Endorsing these

materials, the investigating officer filed a report

under Section 173 (2) CrPC on 02 August 2016

classifying respondent no. 2 as “innocent”.

Consequently, only the remaining accused were

committed to the Court of Session.

3.5 On an application by the Public Prosecutor the

Trial Court, by order dated 20 January 2017,

summoned respondent no. 2 under Section 193

of CrPC. Therefore, Respondent no. 2

successfully challenged that order before the

High Court. By the impugned order

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 4 of 17

dated 24 November 2021 the High Court

quashed the summoning on the ground that

there had been no committal order qua

respondent no. 2, while granting liberty to invoke

Section 319 CrPC if credible evidence emerged

during trial.

3.6 During the trial, on 08 March 2022 the appellant

testified as PW-1, narrating the confrontation

of 10

th May 2016 and hence attributing direct

participation to respondent no. 2. The Public

Prosecutor relying on the statement of PW-1 as

well as on the statement of Jagdev Singh recorded

under Section 161 CrPC moved an application

under Section 319 CrPC to summon

respondent no. 2.

3.7 By order dated 04 July 2022 the Trial Court

allowed the application, observing that PW-1’s

sworn testimony, corroborated by Jagdev Singh’s

statement, disclosed a prima-facie case and that

the plea of alibi was a matter for trial.

Respondent no. 2 was directed to appear

on 02 August 2022 to stand trial alongside the

existing accused for the offence under

Section 306 IPC.

3.8 Respondent no. 2 approached the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC, asserting that the Trial

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 5 of 17

Court had disregarded what he described as

“scientific and documentary proof” of his

whereabouts in Chandigarh at the relevant time

and insisting that only substantially stronger

evidence could justify his addition to the array of

accused. The High Court, persuaded with the

submission, was of the view that the Trial Court

ought to have weighed the investigation record,

including the parking slip, CCTV footage and

associated inquiries, set aside the summoning

order on 21 November 2023, concluding that the

material adduced fell short of the rigor demanded

for invoking Section 319 CrPC.

4. The appellant has approached this Court

contending, inter alia, that the High Court

misapplied the threshold for exercise of power under

Section 319 CrPC, prematurely evaluated an

untested alibi and disregarded direct eyewitness

evidence. It is in these circumstances that the

matter now engages our consideration.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the

following submissions:

5.1 The police, while filing the final report under

Section 173 (2) CrPC, conflated two distinct

occurrences: the acid‑attack of 13 March 2016

(FIR 30/2016), in which respondent no. 2 was

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 6 of 17

not named, and the incident of 10 May 2016 that

forms the gravamen of the present FIR.

Respondent no. 2’s alibi materials relate only to

10 March 2016 and were erroneously treated as

exonerating him for the later incident.

5.2 Respondent no. 2 has furnished no cogent alibi

for 10 May 2016. The documents he now relies

on, parking ticket, OPD card, CCTV clip and

supporting statements, were never exhibited

before the Trial Court nor tested in

cross‑examination; their veracity can be

adjudicated only at trial.

5.3 The eye ‑witness Jagdev Singh, whose

Section 161 statement specifically attributes the

fatal taunts to respondent no. 2, corroborates the

sworn testimony of PW‑1. Taken together, this

constitutes prima‑facie “evidence” arising in the

course of trial, satisfying the threshold for

exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC.

5.4 The High Court characterised the confrontation

of 10 May 2016 as mere “teasing” and

concentrated on the previous acid‑attack, thereby

undervaluing an independent offence of abetment

to suicide that was proximate in time and

casually linked to the deceased’s death.

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 7 of 17

5.5 By resting its decision on investigation‑stage

material concerning 10 March 2016, the High

Court prematurely evaluated an unproven alibi

and overlooked the settled principle that the

burden of establishing such a defence lies

squarely on the accused and must be discharged

through evidence at trial.

5.6 Section 319 CrPC is intended to prevent the real

perpetrator from escaping trial; once ocular

testimony discloses a direct role, the Court is

obliged to summon the person concerned. The

Trial Court’s order of 04 July 2022 correctly

applied this standard, whereas the High Court’s

interference under Section 482 CrPC amounts to

a pre‑trial acquittal on disputed facts.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents, respondent

no.1 (State of Punjab) and respondent no.2, have

submitted the following arguments:

6.1 The police investigation, supported by a

parking-slip timed 06.30 a.m., OPD

documentation, medical-store bill, CCTV footage

and mobile-tower records, indicate that

respondent no. 2 was at PGI Chandigarh

on 10 May 2016. Moreover statements of the

parking-attendant and chemist, as well as a

village-level inquiry, corroborate this. These

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 8 of 17

materials were scrutinised up the chain of

command and the final report under

Section 173(2) CrPC recorded respondent no. 2’s

innocence, which the prosecution never

challenged.

6.2 Section 319 CrPC demands evidence stronger

than that required even for framing a charge. The

testimony of PW-1 merely reiterates the FIR

narrative, while Jagdev Singh’s version remains a

Section 161 statement, inadmissible until he

enters the witness box. No fresh or compelling

material emerged after the High Court had earlier

(24 November 2021) quashed the Section 193

summons; the prosecution is essentially seeking

a second bite on the same record.

6.3 The time-distance matrix reinforces the alibi:

village Jagowal is about 90 km from Chandigarh,

and the CCTV still shows respondent no. 2 at PGI

at 12:09 p.m., making his presence at the village

confrontation improbable.

6.4 The Trial Court, in summoning respondent no. 2,

ignored the “scientific and documentary”

evidence and treated the untested alibi as a

matter for trial, thereby reversing the

investigative conclusion without any stronger

contra-proof. The High Court correctly intervened

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 9 of 17

under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the Trial

Court was required to weigh the entire record,

including the investigation dossier, before

exercising an extraordinary power meant to be

sparingly used.

6.5 Finally, respondents contend that conflating the

acid-attack FIR of 13 March 2016 (in which

respondent no. 2 was never named) with the

present FIR has led to misplaced suspicion;

repeated attempts to summon him, despite a

consistent exoneration, amount to harassment

rather than pursuit of justice.

7. Having considered the arguments and submissions

of the parties and having examined the material on

record, the issue that falls for consideration before

us is whether the evidence led justified the Trial

Court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to

summon respondent no. 2, and whether the High

Court was right in setting that order aside at the

threshold.

8. We shall first examine the scope of Section 319 (1)

of the CrPC which has been reproduced hereunder:

“319. Power to proceed against other persons

appearing to be guilty of offence.

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or

trial of, an offence, it appears from the

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 10 of 17

evidence that any person not being the

accused has committed any offence for which

such person could be tried together with the

accused, the Court may proceed against such

person for the offence which he appears to

have committed.”

The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized

of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose

complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that

emerges in Court. It is an exception to the general

rule that an accused stands trial only upon

charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure

that the trial does not proceed without a participant

who, on the material now available, appears to share

criminal liability. The power is extraordinary and

therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it

is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative

conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie

case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must

act.

9. The Constitution Bench of this Court in

Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab

1, observed that

Section 319 CrPC is designed to ensure that every

1

(2014) 3 SCC 92

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 11 of 17

participant in a crime is brought before the Court

and its provisions are therefore to be interpreted

constructively and purposively, so that the true

offender does not slip through procedural gaps. The

relevant paras of the judgement are hereunder:

“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles

20 and 21 of the Constitution of India

provides a protective umbrella for the smooth

administration of justice making adequate

provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious

trial so that the accused does not get

prejudiced after the law has been put into

motion to try him for the offence but at the

same time also gives equal protection to

victims and to society at large to ensure that

the guilty does not get away from the

clutches of law. For the empowerment of the

Courts to ensure that the criminal

administration of justice works properly, the

law was appropriately codified and modified

by the legislature under CrPC indicating as to

how the Courts should proceed in order to

ultimately find out the truth so that an

innocent does not get punished but at the

same time, the guilty are brought to book

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 12 of 17

under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined

under the Constitution and our laws that

have led to several decisions, whereby

innovating methods and progressive tools

have been forged to find out the real truth

and to ensure that the guilty does not go

unpunished.

9. The presumption of innocence is the

general law of the land as every man is

presumed to be innocent unless proven to be

guilty. Alternatively, certain statutory

presumptions in relation to certain class of

offences have been raised against the

accused whereby the presumption of guilt

prevails till the accused discharges his

burden upon an onus being cast upon him

under the law to prove himself to be innocent.

These competing theories have been kept in

mind by the legislature. The entire effort,

therefore, is not to allow the real perpetrator

of an offence to get away unpunished. This is

also a part of fair trial and in our opinion, in

order to achieve this very end that the

legislature thought of incorporating

provisions of Section 319 CrPC. It is with the

said object in mind that a constructive and

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 13 of 17

purposive interpretation should be adopted

that advances the cause of justice and does

not dilute the intention of the statute

conferring powers on the Court to carry out

the abovementioned avowed object and

purpose to try the person to the satisfaction

of the Court as an accomplice in the

commission of the offence that is the subject-

matter of trial.”

10. Hence, in our considered opinion, the power under

Section 319 CrPC is triggered not by conjecture but

by “evidence” that surfaces in Court. In the present

case, narrated in detail how, on the morning

of 10 May 2016, respondent no. 2, together with

others, stopped a car, confronted the deceased and,

in the Punjabi vernacular, told him that he and his

family ought to drown themselves for failing to

retaliate. PW-1 further described the immediate

impact of those words: the deceased broke down,

secluded himself, and a few hours later left home

never to return alive.

11. The primary argument of Respondent no. 2 rests on

his alibi. An alibi, however, is a plea in the nature of

a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely

on the accused. Here, the documents relied upon,

parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 14 of 17

clip, have yet to be formally proved. Until that

exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces

of paper. To treat them as conclusive at the

threshold would invert the established order of

criminal proceedings, requiring the Court to

pronounce upon a defence before the prosecution is

allowed to lead its full evidence. Even assuming the

documents will eventually be proved, their face

value does not eclipse the prosecution version. The

parking slip is timed at 06:30 a.m.; the chemist’s

bill and CCTV images are from 12:09 p.m. The

confrontation is alleged at 08:30 a.m. A road

journey from Jagowal to Chandigarh of roughly

ninety kilometres in a private vehicle can

comfortably be accomplished within the intervening

window. More importantly, abetment to suicide is

not an offence committed at a single moment. It may

consist of a build-up of psychological pressure

culminating in self-destruction, and the law

punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it

occurs.

12. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the

police, having once accepted the alibi, were the best

judges of its authenticity and that their conclusion

should not be lightly brushed aside. The submission

overlooks the scheme of the CrPC. Once cognizance

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 15 of 17

is taken and trial commences, the investigating

agency’s view yields to the Court’s independent

assessment. If, in the midst of that trial, evidence

implicating a new participant surfaces, the Court is

duty-bound to act on it. Section 319 CrPC would be

rendered otiose if an Investigating Officer’s earlier

opinion could freeze the array of accused for all time.

13. It was next argued that PW-1’s deposition merely

reproduces the FIR. We are unable to agree. A first

information report is only an initial version; a

statement under oath, recorded in Court, is

substantive evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to

conceive of what stronger material could be

demanded at the summoning stage short of a

confession. The threshold is not proof beyond

reasonable doubt; it is the appearance of

involvement which is apparent from evidence

adduced in the proceeding. That threshold was

satisfied here.

14. We believe that the High Court, in interfering under

Section 482 CrPC, placed decisive reliance on the

investigation dossier and characterised the

10 May 2016 episode as mere “teasing”. Such a

description underplays both the content and the

effect of the words spoken. If the allegations is true,

telling a physically challenged man that he and his

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 16 of 17

family should die, and doing so in the immediate

aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not

banter. Sensitivity to the social context, where

honour and shame weigh heavily, was called for. The

offence, no doubt, will have to be established at the

trial. The Trial Court will also decide whether on

facts the offence is established, keeping in view the

law laid down by this Court in Mahendra Awase vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh

2

and other judgments

interpreting Section 306 IPC.

15. Having regard to the purpose of Section 319 CrPC,

we see no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. On

the contrary, non-summoning of respondent no. 2

would have risked a truncated trial and a possible

failure of justice. The High Court, by elevating

unproved defence documents above sworn

testimony, adopted an approach that was neither

consistent with the text of Section 319 CrPC nor

consonant with the realities of a case involving a

vulnerable victim. The Court’s intervention, in effect,

foreclosed the prosecution from testing the alibi and

deprived the Trial Court of jurisdiction expressly

conferred upon it.

2

2025 SCC OnLine SC 107

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 17 of 17

16. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal succeeds

and is allowed. The judgment and order

dated 21 November 2023 passed by the High Court

of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No. 31120 of

2022 is set aside.

17. The order of the Trial Court dated 04 July 2022

summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the

offence punishable under Section 306 IPC shall

stand revived. Respondent no. 2 shall appear before

the Trial Court within four weeks from today and

thereafter abide by all further orders of the Trial

Court. It will be open to the Trial Court to regulate

the conditions of his release, if any application for

bail is moved, in accordance with law.

18. All observations made herein are confined to the

present adjudication under Section 319 CrPC and

shall not influence the final appreciation of evidence

by the Trial Court.

19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

……………………………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH)

……………………………………J.

(K .V. VISWANATHAN )

NEW DELHI

MAY 06, 2025

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