CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

JUDGEMENT

RESERVED ON

JUDGEMENT

PRONOUNCED

ON

OPERATIVE PART

PRONOUNCED OR

FULL

UPLOADED ON

01.04.2026 21.05.2026 FULL PRONOUNCED 21.05.2026

Harpreet Singh @ Happy ...Appellant

Versus

State of Punjab and another …Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA

HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR

Present: Mr. R.S. Bains, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. Amarjeet, Advocate

for the appellant.

Mr. Akshay Kumar, A.A.G., Punjab.

Mr. Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, Special Public Prosecutor

for the respondent-NIA.

****

ANOOP CHITKARA, J.

FIR No. Dated Police Station Section

152 19.10.2018 Sultan Wind,

Amritsar

124A, 153A, 153B, 120-B

AND

RC No. Dated Police Station Section

19/2020/

NIA/DLI

05.04.2020 - 124A, 153A, 153B, 120-B IPC, 17,

18, 19 of UAPA and 25/54/59 of

Arms Act

Bail Application number before the Sessions Court BA/411/2025

CNR No. PBSA01001043-2025

Date of Decision 17.02.2025

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1. Aggrieved by the dismissal of regular bail by the Special Judge, NIA, Punjab vide

order dated 17.02.2025, the appellant had come up before this Court by filing the present

appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.

2. Per custody certificate, the appellant has the following criminal antecedents:

Sr. No. FIR No. Date Offenses Police Station

1. 01 01.01.2022 52-A of Prison Act Division No.7

3. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant would have no objection

whatsoever to any stringent conditions that this Court may impose, including that if the

appellant repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a

sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years, the State may file an application to

revoke this bail before the concerned Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall

have the authority to cancel this bail, and to which the appellant shall have no objection.

Counsel for the appellant further submits that he shall not use his right of speech expression

beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

4. The State’s counsel opposes the bail.

5. Facts of the case are being taken from the reply dated October 16, 2025, filed by the

Special Public Prosecutor of the National Investigative Agency and the relevant portion

reads as follows:

“2. That during investigation, other accused persons namely Bikramjit

Singh @Vicky (A-3), Manjeet Singh @ Manjit Singh @ Manga (A-4),

Jatinder Singh @ Goldy (A-5), appellant/accused Harpreet Singh @

Happy (A-7), Gurwinder Singh @ Gurpreet Gopi (A-6), Harmeet Singh

@ Raju (A-8), Roofel @ Rufal @ Rahul Gill (A-9), Sukhmandar Singh

@ Gopi (A-10) and Kuldeep Singh @ Kuldip Singh @Keepa (A-11)

were arrested by Punjab Police. Investigation established that they

received funds from abroad sent by members of 'Sikhs for Justice' and

the same were used for furthering terror activities and other preparatory

acts i.e. attempts to procure weapons for terror activities in India and to

get arms training in Pakistan.

5. That, investigation has established that the appellant/accused

Harpreet Singh @ Happy (A-7) was member of the terrorist gang

formed by and on the directions of US based chief proponent of Sikhs for

Justice (SFJ) Gurpatwant Singh Pannun (A-12) for carrying out

unlawful activities /terrorist acts, varying from pasting anti-India

posters to targeting leaders of other communities and burning of

business installations. These acts were conspired/ planned /executed

with intention to create religious disharmony/disaffection towards

Government of India and to strike terror in the minds of general public,

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so that majority of Sikhs residing in Punjab, Delhi and other parts of

India supports their secessionist campaign "Khalistan Referendum

2020" or "Punjab Referendum 2020" which is aimed to establish a

sovereign Khalistan state, carved out from Indian territory, contrary to

territorial integrity of Union of India. He was arrested on 31.10.2018 by

Punjab Police.

6. That, investigation further established that appellant/accused

Harpreet Singh @ Happy (A-7) was closely associated with co-accused

Bikramjeet Singh @ Vicky (A-3), Gurwinder Singh @ Gopi (A-6) and

Manjit Singh @Manga, who were also members of the same terrorist

gang whose members were given different tasks to be executed, such as

affixing banners of "Khalistan Referendum 2020", burning of business

installations, procurement of weapons for armed struggle against Union

of India and for committing other unlawful acts. That, when

appellant/accused Harpreet Singh @ Happy (A-7) was based in

Singapore, he used to send funds to co-accused Manjit Singh @Manga

(A-4) and later, when appellant/accused A-7 needed a person to avenge

the sacrilege of Guru Granth Sahib, co-accused Manjit Singh Manga

had introduced Bikramjeet Singh @ Vicky (A-3) with appellant A-7 for

carrying out revenge against the sacrilege incidents. Appellant/accused

A-7 then attempted to arrange funds for procurement of weapons for co-

accused Bikramjeet Singh @ Vicky (A-3), who wanted to use these

weapons for avenging the sacrilege incidents.

Appellant/accused A-7 later visited Kashmir with A-3 Bikramjeet

and A-6 Gurwinder Singh to procure weapons for the same purpose.

Appellant/accused Harpreet Singh @ Happy (A-7) along with co-

accused Bikramjit Singh @Vicky (A-3) and Gurwinder Singh @

Gurpreet @ Gopi (A-6), visited Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) in the

year 2018 in his car (Alto) to procure weapons for targeted killings in

Punjab, in the guise of taking revenge of sacrilege of Guru Granth Sahib

and to create communal disharmony in the state.

7. That, investigation has also established the association of

appellant/accused Harpreet Singh @ Happy (A-7) with co-accused

Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky (A-3) and Gurwinder Singh @ Gurpreet @

Gopi (A-6) by virtue of the CDR analysis of the mobile phones of

accused and statements of protected witnesses. By virtue of the

CDR/tower location analysis and statements of witnesses, it has also

been established that appellant/accused had visited Kashmir along with

co-accused A-3 and A-6 for procurement of weapons. Moreover, A-11

also had incriminating images in his mobile phone, which included

SFJ's Khalistan Referendum material.”

6. Counsel for NIA submits that once there is sufficient evidence, there is no reason to

presume absence of prima facie, as such there is no occasion to grant bail to accused-

appellant (A-7).

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7. This Court is not doubting about presence or absence of evidence for the reason that

once charges were framed, it was for the applicant to challenge the same which he did not,

as such there is more than prima facie case against the appellant. Further, this Court is not

deciding the present appeal on merits of the case but is more concerned about Article 21 of

Constitution of India i.e. right of life.

8.As per the custody certificate dated 28.03.2026, the custody of the appellant in

this FIR is 07 years, 04 months and 20 days.

9. In Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra, SLP (CRL)-6888-2015, decided

on May 04, 2016, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[2]. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. Charges have

been framed against the accused appellant under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18,

18A, 18B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1967, amended 2008 and Sections 387, 419, 465, 467,

468, 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Undoubtedly, the charges are serious but the seriousness of the charges

will have to be balanced with certain other facts like the period of

custody suffered and the likely period within which the trial can be

expected to be completed.

[3]. The accused appellant has been in custody since April, 2011 i.e. for

over five years. The trial is yet to commence in as much as the learned

State Counsel has submitted that the 9th of May, 2016 is the first date

fixed for the trial. There are over 200 witnesses proposed to be examined.

The accused appellant is a lady. She has also been acquitted of similar

charges leveled against her in other cases. Taking into account all the

aforesaid facts we are of the view that the accused appellant should be

admitted to bail.

10. In UOI v. KA Najeeb, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 443; 2021-INSC-50, Feb 01, 2021, a three-

Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[3]. The prosecution case in brief is that one Professor TJ Joseph while

framing the Malayalam question paper for the second semester B.Com.

examination at the Newman College, Thodupuzha, had included a

question which was considered objectionable against a particular religion

by certain sections of society. The respondent in association with other

members of the Popular Front of India (PFI), decided to avenge this

purported act of blasphemy. On 04.07.2010 at about 8AM, a group of

people with a common object, attacked the victim-professor while he was

returning home with his mother and sister after attending Sunday mass at

a local Church. Over the course of the attack, members of the PFI

forcefully intercepted the victim’s car, restrained him and chopped off his

right palm with choppers, knives, and a small axe. Country-made bombs

were also hurled at bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds

and to prevent them from coming to the aid of the victim. An FIR was

consequently lodged against the attackers by the victim-professor’s wife

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under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H),

307, 149 of IPC; and Section 3 of Explosive Substances Act.

[4]. It emerged over the course of investigation that the attack was part of

a larger conspiracy involving meticulous pre-planning, numerous failed

attempts and use of dangerous weapons. Accordingly, several dozen

persons including the present respondent were arraigned by the police. It

was alleged that the respondent was one of the main conspirators and the

provisions contained in Sections 153A, 201, 202, 212 of IPC, along with

Section 16, 18, 18-B, 19 and 20 of the UAPA were also thus invoked

against him. However, owing to him being untraceable, the respondent

was declared an absconder and his trial was split up from the rest of his

co-conspirators. The co-accused of the respondent were tried and most of

them were found guilty by the Special Court, NIA vide order dated

30.04.2015 and were awarded cumulative sentence ranging between two

and eight-years’ rigorous imprisonment.

[18]. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like

Section 43-D (5) of UAPA per-se does not oust the ability of

Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of

the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as

the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well

harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are

expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the

rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of

trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of

incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the

prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the

possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of UAPA being used as

the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional

right to speedy trial.

[19]. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the

charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to

societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have

outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in

mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the

unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court

appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An

attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to

lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt

and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of

our Constitution have been well protected.

[20]. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent

on bail is that Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less

stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the

competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not

guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail;

there is no such pre-condition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D (5)

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of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent

Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like

gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence,

influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by

absconsion etc.

[21]. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with

the impugned order. However, we feel that besides the conditions to be

imposed by the trial Court while releasing the respondent, it would

serve the best interest of justice and the society-at-large to impose some

additional conditions that the respondent shall mark his presence every

week on Monday at 10 AM at the local police station and inform in

writing that he is not involved in any other new crime. The respondent

shall also refrain from participating in any activity which might enrage

communal sentiments. In case the respondent is found to have violated

any of his bail conditions or attempted to have tampered the evidence,

influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any other way, then the

Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail forthwith. The appeal is

accordingly dismissed subject to above- stated directions.

11. In Thawaha Fasal v. UOI, [2021] 8 S.C.R. 797, Oct 28, 2021, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court holds,

[4]. On 1st November 2019, the complainant who is the Sub-Inspector of

Police attached to Pantheerankavu Police Station in Kozhikode city in

Kerala found that the accused nos.1 to 3 were standing in suspicious

circumstances in front of Medicare Laboratory in Kozhikode city. After

seeing the police vehicle, the accused no. 3 ran away. However, the

accused nos.1 and 2 were apprehended. The accused no.1 was carrying a

shoulder bag and the accused no.2 was carrying a red plastic file. Nine

items were seized from the shoulder bag of the accused no.1. From the

red plastic file of the accused no.2, two items were seized. The First

Information Report was registered on the same day under Sections 20, 38

and 39 of the 1967 Act alleging that the accused nos. 1 and 2 were the

members of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) [for short “CPI

(Maoist)”] which is a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Clause

(m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act which is listed at Item No. 34 in the

First Schedule to the 1967 Act. By the order dated 18th April 2020, the

Government of India granted sanction in exercise of powers under

Section 45 of the 1967 Act to prosecute the accused no.1 for offences

punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act. Under the same

order, a sanction to prosecute the accused no.2 for the offences

punishable under Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act was granted. As

can be seen from the order dated 18th April 2020, NIA had

recommended for grant of sanction under the aforesaid Sections. It is

pointed out across the Bar by Shri S.V. Raju, the learned Additional

Solicitor General of India (ASG) that the case is fixed for framing of

charge. However, it was also pointed out across the Bar that a report from

the Forensic Science Laboratory is not yet received.

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[33]. Thus, as far as the accused no.1 is concerned, it can be said he was

found in possession of soft and hard copies of various materials

concerning CPI (Maoist). He was seen present in a gathering which was a

part of the protest arranged by an organisation which is allegedly having

link with CPI (Maoist). As regards the accused no.2, minutes of the

meeting of various committees of CPI (Maoist) were found. Certain

banners/posters were found in the custody of the accused no.2 for which

the offence under Section 13 has been applied of indulging in unlawful

activities. As stated earlier, sub-section (5) of Section 43D is not

applicable to the offence under Section 13.

[34]. Now the question is whether on the basis of the materials forming

part of the charge sheet, there are reasonable grounds for believing that

accusation of commission of offences under Sections 38 and 39 against

the accused nos.1 and 2 is true. As held earlier, mere association with a

terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section 38 and mere

support given to a terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section

39. The association and the support have to be with intention of

furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation. In a given case, such

intention can be inferred from the overt acts or acts of active participation

of the accused in the activities of a terrorist organization which are borne

out from the materials forming a part of charge sheet. At formative young

age, the accused nos.1 and 2 might have been fascinated by what is

propagated by CPI (Maoist). Therefore, they may be in possession of

various documents/books concerning CPI (Maoist) in soft or hard form.

Apart from the allegation that certain photographs showing that the

accused participated in a protest/gathering organised by an organisation

allegedly linked with CPI (Maoist), prima facie there is no material in the

charge sheet to project active participation of the accused nos.1 and 2 in

the activities of CPI (Maoist) from which even an inference can be drawn

that there was an intention on their part of furthering the activities or

terrorist acts of the terrorist organisation. An allegation is made that they

were found in the company of the accused no.3 on 30th November, 2019.

That itself may not be sufficient to infer the presence of intention. But

that is not sufficient at this stage to draw an inference of presence of

intention on their part which is an ingredient of Sections 38 and 39 of the

1967 Act. Apart from the fact that overt acts on their part for showing the

presence of the required intention or state of mind are not borne out from

the charge sheet, prima facie, their constant association or support of the

organization for a long period of time is not borne out from the charge

sheet.

[39]. It is true that without recording a satisfaction as contemplated by

sub-section (5) of Section 43D, the order granting bail to the accused

no.1 could not have been confirmed by the High Court. However, we

have examined the material against both the accused in the context of

sub-section (5) of Section 43D. Taking the materials forming part of the

charge sheet as it is, the accusation against both the accused of the

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commission of offences punishable under Sections 38 and 39 does not

appear to be prima facie true.

12. In Ashim @ Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya @ Asim Harinath Bhattacharya

@ Aseem Kumar Bhattacharya v. National Investigation Agency, Dec 01, 2021, [2021] 9

S.C.R. 607 607, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[6]. The appellant was arrested on 6th July, 2012 on the basis of a

production warrant sent to Nagpur Central Jail, Maharashtra. The

appellant was in jail earlier in connection with another case(FIR No.

28/2007 dated 11th May, 2007) in which he was acquitted by the

competent Court of jurisdiction by a judgment dated 15th February,

2014.

[7]. It has come on record that there are 298 prosecution witnesses in the

calendar of witnesses as referred to in the charge sheet but it has been

stated in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that the prosecution

in all likelihood may examine only 100 to 105 prosecution witnesses.

[8]. The charges against the accused appellant are undoubtedly serious

but the charges will have to be balanced with certain other factors like the

period of incarceration which the appellant has undergone and the

likelihood period within which the trial can be expected to be finally

concluded. That apart, the appellant is 74 years of age.

[9]. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the appeal

filed by the accused appellant seeking post arrest bail and submits that

the delay is in no manner be attributable to the prosecution and this Court

may direct the trial Court to take up the case on day-to-day basis and

conclude the trial at the earliest.

[10]. That the requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of

the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred

to as “Act 2008”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by

a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and

have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to

be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in

consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated

under Section 11 of the Act 2008 but the ground realities are totally

different as in the instant case, after the charge-sheets came to be filed

way back in 2012, the charges have been framed after 7 years of filing of

the charge-sheet on 20th June, 2019.

[11]. We have to balance the nature of crime in reference to which the

appellant is facing a trial. At the same time, the period of incarceration

which has been suffered and the likely period within which the trial can

be expected to be completed, as is informed to this Court that the

statement of PW-1/de-facto complainant has still not been completed and

there are 298 prosecution witnesses in the calendar of witness although

the respondent has stated in its counter affidavit that it may examine only

100 to 105 witnesses but indeed may take its own time to conclude the

trial. This fact certainly cannot be ignored that the appellant is in custody

since 6th July, 2012 and has completed nine and half years of

incarceration as an undertrial prisoner.

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[12]. This Court has consistently observed in its numerous judgments that

the liberty guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution would cover within

its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to

justice and a speedy trial is imperative and the undertrials cannot

indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely

trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for

a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to

enlarge him on bail.

[13]. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not

consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. While deprivation

of personal liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of

deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. At the same time,

timely delivery of justice is part of human rights and denial of speedy

justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of justice.

[15]. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the appellant

accused has made out a case for grant of post-arrest bail pending trial.

13. In Jahir Hak v. State of Rajasthan, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 101, Apr 11, 2022, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court holds,

[10] No doubt, in the said case, as pointed out by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the State, the Court was dealing with an order

passed by the High Court granting bail, whereas, in this case, the

converse is true, that is, the impugned order is one rejecting the

application for bail. The fact remains that the appellant has been in

custody as an undertrial prisoner for a period of nearly 8 years already.

The appellant, it may be noted, is charged with offences, some of which

are punishable with a minimum punishment of 10 years and the sentence

may extend to imprisonment for life. Learned counsel for the appellant

also points out that one of the co-accused namely Shri Aadil Ansari has

been released on bail on 30.09.2020 by this Court. No doubt, in this

regard, we keep in mind the submission of the State that the role

attributed to the said accused is different.

[11] The condition in Section 43D(5) of the Act of 1967 has been

understood to be less stringent than the provisions contained in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, as already noticed by us.

We would think that in the nature of the case against the appellant, the

evidence which has already unfolded and above all, the long period of

incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived

when the appellant be enlarged on bail. We bear in mind the fact that the

prosecution seeks to examine as many as 109 witnesses of which only 6

witnesses have been fully examined so far. Accordingly, we allow the

appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct that the appellant shall be

released on bail subject to such conditions as shall be fixed by the trial

Court.

14. In Ramjan Gani Palani v. NIA, [2022] 4 S.C.R. 1050, Apr 27, 2022, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court holds,

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[9]. We have perused the impugned order and carefully considering the

arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, duly recorded in

paras 8 and 9 of the impugned judgment and are of the prima facie view

that there is sufficient material on record to deny the discretionary relief

of bail to the petitioner. Much is sought to be made of the five Ghol fish

netted by the petitioner and his crew members over five days of

remaining on the high seas by referring to the high market value of the

prize catch. The petitioner would be entitled to justify his presence in the

fishing boat, at the scene of crime which is sought to be described as a

sheer coincidence during the trial. The explanation offered by the

petitioner of having responded to the call “Mohammed-Mohammed-

Ramzan-Ramzan” on Channel No.8, instead of Channel No.16 which is

the specifically earmarked channel for communication with fishermen

and for Ship-to-Ship contact, would also be available to him at that stage.

But at the threshold, this appears to be a case where the petitioner has

been fishing in troubled waters and as per the respondent No.1/NIA, has

got caught in his own net.

15. In Yedala Subba Rao and Anr. v. UOI, 2023-INSC-382, Apr 17, 2023, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court holds,

[21]. We have examined material relied upon against the appellants in

paragraph 5 of the additional affidavit of the respondent as well as the

chargesheet. Taking the material against the appellants as it is and

without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to form

an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the

UAPA are prime facie true. Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail

under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 43D will not apply in this case.

We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this Judgment

are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited purposes of

examining the case in the light of the proviso to subsection (5) of Section

43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted uninfluenced by these

observations.

[22]. As narrated earlier, the appellants are in custody for four and half

years. The charge has not been framed and the prosecution proposes to

examine more than 140 witnesses. Some of the accused are absconding.

Thus, there is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future.

16. In Vernon v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 10 S.C.R. 867; 2023 INSC 655, July 28,

2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[43]. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) [National

Investigation Agency -vs- Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC

1]reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal

-vs- State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two earlier

decisions of this court in the cases of State -vs- Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962

SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh -vs- State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC

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118), the factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were

discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the

character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the

accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being

secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tempered

with; the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant

factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants’ case

founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the

aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have

lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the

appellants have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against

them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied

to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the

1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available against them at this

stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the

appellants, pending final outcome of the case under the others provisions

of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.

17. In Pradeep Rameshwar Sharma v. NIA, 2023-INSC-755, CRA No. 2505 of 2023,

Aug 23, 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[6]. The case of the prosecution put forth is that the appellant who is a

retired police officer, in connivance with Sachin Waze another senior

police officer had planted gelatin sticks in a Scorpio Vehicle near the

residence of a prominent businessman. In that regard, apart from

referring to the role of Sachin Waze who is alleged to have also

conspired with Mansukh Hiren to park this Scorpio Vehicle, the

allegation is also that the appellant had a role with Sachin Waze in the

murder of Mansukh Hiren. It is in that background, the charge as alleged

is made against the appellant herein.

[10]. In that regard, as already referred to, the appellant was arrested as

far back as 17.06.2021 and has been in custody throughout, except for the

brief period when this Court had released him on interim bail so as to

attend to the medical treatment of his wife. In so far as the appellant is

concerned, he has been interrogated and a charge sheet has been filed.

Since all witnesses out of more than 300 witnesses named are to be

examined and, in that regard, further investigation under Section 173(8)

is pending, and a supplementary charge sheet would be filed, the process

will not conclude in the near future. In so far as the role alleged against

the appellant, as already noted by the High Court the charge sheet does

not disclose that the appellant was involved in the conspiracy of planting

gelatin sticks in the Scorpio vehicle. As per the charge, the appellant is

stated to have conspired with Sachin Waze and others to eliminate

Mansukh Hiren which is a matter of circumstantial evidence to be proved

by the prosecution.

18. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, SLP (Criminal) No.10047 of

2023, 2024-INSC-92, February 07, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

[18]. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal

offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted

phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances

justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail

applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant

bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the

words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)– ‘shall not be released’ in

contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC -

‘may be released’ – suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail,

the exception and jail, the rule.

[19]. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In

dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely

examining if there is justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must

be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the

Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’

standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by

Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This

standard can be contrasted with the standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which

is used by Courts while hearing applications for ‘discharge’. In fact, the

Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has noticed this

difference, where it said:

“In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the

Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing

that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is

lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for

considering a discharge application or framing of charges in

relation to offences under the 1967 Act.”

[20]. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail

must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and

after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a

conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail

is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail

application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing

witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-

section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on

granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the

restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for

the time being in force on grant of bail.

[21]. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a

bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP

Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test :

1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?

1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an

offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final

report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;

2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of

the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439

CrPC (‘tripod test’)? On a consideration of various factors such as

nature of offence, length of punishment (if convicted), age,

character, status of accused etc., the Courts must ask itself :

2.1 Whether the accused is a flight risk?

2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the accused tampering with

the evidence?

2.3 Whether there is apprehension of accused influencing

witnesses?

22. The question of entering the ‘second test’ of the inquiry will not

arise if the ‘first test’ is satisfied. And merely because the first test

is satisfied, that does not mean however that the accused is

automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that

he successfully passes the ‘tripod test’.

[32]. The Appellant’s counsel has relied upon the case of KA Najeeb

(supra) [(2021) 3 SCC 713] to back its contention that the appellant has

been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid down in the

said case. While this argument may appear compelling at first glance, it

lacks depth and substance. In KA Najeeb’s case this court was

confronted with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-accused,

other co-accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced to

imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore this court’s decision

to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending

sentence that the respondent accused might face upon conviction and

since the respondent-accused had already served portion of the maximum

imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court took it as a factor

influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb’s case the

trial of the respondent-accused was severed from the other co-accused

owing to his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being

separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses

that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused therefore

this court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion of trial in near

future. However, in the present case the trial is already under way and 22

witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. As

already discussed, the material available on record indicates the

involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed

by members of banned terrorist organization involving exchange of large

quantum of money through different channels which needs to be

deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on

bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of

the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere

delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant

case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid

argument on the behalf the appellant cannot be accepted.

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

[33]. Hence, we are of the considered view that the material on record

prima facie indicates the complicity of the accused as a part of the

conspiracy since he was knowingly facilitating the commission of a

preparatory act towards the commission of terrorist act under section 18

of the UAP Act.

[34]. For the aforementioned reasons the bail application of the Appellant

is rejected and consequently the appeal fails…

19. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, [2024] 7 Digital SCR 992;

2024-INSC-645, July 03, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[8]. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time,

the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an

accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of

India.

[9]. Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have

forgotten a very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be

withheld as a punishment.

[18]. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in

everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond

redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing

with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and

every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is

responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may

be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental

neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the

manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with

indigence or other privations.

[19]. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned

has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an

accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not

oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is

serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of

the crime.

[20]. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a

convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an

accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed

aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.

[21]. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency

as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a

speedy trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article

21 of the Constitution.

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

[22]. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.

The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.

[23]. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms

and conditions which the trial court may deem fit to impose. However,

we on our own would impose the condition that the appellant shall not

leave the limits of Mumbai city and shall mark his presence at the

concerned NIA office or police station once every fifteen days. Any other

condition which the trial court may deem fit to impose, it may do so in

accordance with law.

20. In Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1054; 2024 INSC 534, July

18, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[5]. First Information Report (FIR) was lodged against the appellant by

the informant Inspector Tej Bahadur Singh under Sections 121A, 489B

and 489C of IPC. It came to be registered as Crime No. 01 of 2015.

Informant stated that fake Indian currency notes of the denomination of

Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 500, totalling a sum of Rs. 26,03,500.00, were

recovered from the possession of the appellant on 22.02.2015 at about

09:10 PM from the Indo-Nepal border. He was apprehended by a

constable of the ATS team and brought to the ATS Headquarter. In the

course of investigation, the appellant disclosed his name as Sheikh Javed

Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari, resident of Narayani Parsa,

Belwa, Nepal. In addition to the fake Indian currency notes, one

Nepalese driving licence of the appellant and one Nepalese citizenship

certificate also of the appellant were recovered besides two mobile

phones. According to the police, appellant had confessed that he was

engaged in the illegal trade of supplying counterfeit Indian currency

notes in Nepal. The appellant was arrested on 23.02.2015.

[32]. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that right to life and

personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is

overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained

from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory

provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-

undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been

infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the

way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever

stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of

constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part.

In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline

to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular

statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of

our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb

(supra) being rendered by a three Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of

two Judges like us.

[33]. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the

considered view that continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be

justified. We are, therefore, inclined to grant bail to the appellant.

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

[34]. Consequently, we pass the following order: -

(i) The impugned order dated 03.04.2023 of the High Court is set

aside and quashed;

(ii) Appellant is directed to be released on bail subject to fulfilment of the

following conditions: -

(a) Trial court shall impound the passport and/or citizenship document(s)

of the appellant. If those are in the custody of the prosecution, those shall

be handed over to the trial court.

(b) Appellant shall not leave the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court;

he shall furnish his address to the trial court.

(c) He shall appear before the trial court on each and every date of the

trial.

(d) In addition to the above, the appellant shall mark his attendance

before the police station which the trial court may indicate once in every

fortnight till conclusion of the trial.

(e) He shall not tamper with the evidence and shall not threaten the

witnesses.

(iii) If there is any violation of the bail conditions as above, it would be

open to the prosecution to move the trial court for cancellation of bail.

21. In Jalaluddin Khan v. UOI [2024] 8 S.C.R. 633; 2024-INSC-604, Aug 23, 2024, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[19]. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge sheet, it is not possible to

record a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences

punishable under the UAPA is prima facie true. We have taken the

charge sheet and the statement of witness Z as they are without

conducting a mini-trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is

impossible to record a prima facie finding that there were reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of

commission of offences under the UAPA was prima facie true. No

antecedents of the appellant have been brought on record.

[20]. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was no reason to

reject the bail application filed by the appellant.

22. In Athar Parwez v. UOI, [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1093; 2024-INSC-995, Dec 17, 2024, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[19]. Long incarceration and unlikely likelihood of trial being completed

in near future has also been taken as a ground for exercising its

constitutional role by the Constitutional Courts to grant bail on violation

of Article 21 of the onstitution of India which guarantees trial to be

concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial

would justify such invocation leading to a conclusion of violation of Part

III the Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to release

an undertrial on bail…

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

[31]. It is thus apparent that the first test as has been laid down by the

various judgments of this Court referred to above, stands satisfied

relating to Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, 1967…

[32]. The Appellant was arrested on 12.07.2022. He has undergone

custody for more than two years and four months. Chargesheet was filed

on 07.01.2023 but till date charges have not been framed which is an

admitted position. There are 40 accused and 354 witnesses cited by the

prosecution to be examined. There can be no doubt that the trial is not

likely to complete soon, and as has been laid down by various judgments

of this Court as has been referred to above, the Appellant cannot be

allowed to languish in jail indefinitely and that too without a trial. If such

an approach is allowed Article 21 of the Constitution of India would

stand violated….

23. In Harpreet Singh Talwar v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 291; 2025 INSC 662,

May 13, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[25]. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions

advanced by both sides and upon careful perusal of the material on

record, we are of the view that the Appellant has not been able to make

out a case for grant of regular bail at this stage.

[26]. We say so for the reason that despite no direct recovery of

contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he

played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of

narcotics concealed as talc through M/s Magent India—which he

allegedly controlled through a proxy. The consignment, although not

seized with heroin, shares structural and logistical similarities with those

where heroin was ultimately found.

[27]. The charge against the Appellant must also be evaluated in light of

the broader matrix of facts, including

(i) his alleged meetings in Dubai with a principal foreign accused;

(ii) the transfer of documents through intermediaries for the

clearance of a flagged consignment;

(iii) efforts to retrospectively fabricate invoices and assign

responsibility to others;

(iv) the use of multiple firms allegedly connected to him to

obfuscate the true nature of the transactions; and

(v) his telephonic calls to certain co-conspirators.

These aspects, supported by the statements of protected witnesses and

circumstantial linkages, currently meet the threshold of prima facie

satisfaction regarding the Appellant’s complicity.

[28]. This Court is cognizant of the fact that no heroin or narcotic

substances were directly recovered from the consignment linked to the

Appellant. However, the investigative narrative does not rest solely on

physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and

facilitation. In such cases, the absence of direct seizure is not dispositive,

particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

entities, and barter-based compensation—features which, according to

the prosecution, mark the smuggling architecture employed in the present

matter.

[29]. The Appellant faces serious charges, which allegedly carry grave

societal ramifications, including the facilitation of cross-border drug

trafficking—an offence with well-documented links to organised crime

and public health degradation. The seizure in the connected consignment

is part of what the Prosecution claims to be the largest heroin bust in

Indian history, valued at over INR 21,000 crores. The scale and

sophistication of the operation, involving foreign syndicates, shell firms,

medical visas, and false documentation, elevates this case far beyond

routine NDPS violations.

[30]. This Court also cannot ignore the fact that multiple key witnesses

still remain to be examined, and the trial while underway, will take time

in completion. Out of 24 most vulnerable or material witnesses, two have

died, and two others are untraceable. One of the deceased witnesses, a

retired Customs Officer, was found dead on the very day he was

scheduled to record his statement under Section 164 CrPC. The risk of

witness tampering or elimination—whether directly attributable to the

Appellant or not—is a real and present concern that militates against the

grant of bail at this stage.

[31]. Moreover, the Appellant’s criminal antecedents, though not

involving prior accusations under the NDPS Act, include multiple DRI

and customs proceedings involving smuggling of cigarettes,

undervaluation of imports, and alleged complicity in corruption offences.

These antecedents are relevant only for the limited purpose of evaluating

the Appellant’s propensity to interfere with the process of justice if

enlarged on bail.

[32]. NIA has also highlighted that several accused remain absconding,

including the primary foreign conspirators. In that context, the

Appellant’s foreign travel, overseas connections, and financial capacity

cannot be overlooked in evaluating the possibility of flight risk. These

are not speculative concerns but flow directly from the Appellant’s prior

conduct and profile.

[33]. We are conscious of the settled principle that pre-trial incarceration

should not translate into punitive detention. The Appellant has been in

custody since 24.08.2022, and while we do not find that this duration

alone warrants bail under the present circumstances, the Appellant shall

remain at liberty to renew his prayer for bail after a period of six months,

or upon substantial advancement in the trial, whichever is earlier. Such a

course would allow the Prosecution to complete the examination of its

core witnesses while preserving the accused’s right to seek release at a

later and more appropriate stage.

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[34]. Before parting with this matter, we deem it necessary to clarify that,

at this stage, it would be premature and speculative to extend the

allegations against the Appellant to the domain of terror financing. While

the prosecution has invoked provisions of the UAPA and has broadly

linked the smuggling enterprise to trans-national syndicates with

suspected affiliations, there is no compelling reason to currently link the

Appellant and proscribed terrorist organisations, either within or outside

the country. The evidentiary foundation to sustain such a grave allegation

must be clear and compelling—something that, can be seen only after a

substantial portion of evidence is led by both the parties.

[35]. In light of the foregoing discussion, and without expressing any

opinion on the merits of the case, we dismiss the instant appeal with the

following directions:

i. We are not inclined to enlarge the Appellant on regular bail at

this stage. He shall be at liberty to renew his plea for regular bail

after a period of 6 months, or at a stage where the ongoing trial has

progressed substantially;

ii. The NIA is directed to submit to the Special Court an additional

list of witnesses who, in its assessment, are sensitive or material,

inasmuch as their testimony may have a direct bearing on the role

of the Appellant or other co-accused in the ongoing trial and

connected investigation;

iii. The Special Court is directed to list the matter twice in a month

and record the statements of Prosecution witnesses on a continuous

and uninterrupted basis; and

iv. If the Presiding Officer of the Special Court has not been posted

thus far, we request the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of

Gujarat to do the needful within a week.

24. In CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato (2025) Criminal Appeal No. 5400-5401 Of 2025, 2025-

INSC-1418, Dec 11, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,

[21.3]. Lastly, when it comes to the sum total of circumstances not

being considered, we are not particularly impressed by that ground. It is

a matter of record that an earlier application for bail, about a decade ago

in the year 2016, had been rejected with the High Court recording that

examination of the remaining witnesses should be completed within a

year. If in 2022, the Court finds that despite such direction and also the

passage of nearly six years, the same could not be achieved, it cannot be

said to have not considered the case in its proper light. Second, the trial

being at an advanced stage is also not something that can be, in this

case, a ground to send the respondent-accused behind bars. The trial is

of the year 2010, and as we stand at the end of 2025, still 28 witnesses

are to be examined. We may note the glacial pace at which the trial has

proceeded cannot justify the incarceration of the accused, particularly

when they have already been in prison for a dozen years, and once out,

have not given the authorities reason to seek urgent cancellation, or

even stay on the impugned judgment when this Court issued notice, or

even anytime thereafter.

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[22]. In spite of these grave circumstances as discussed in Para 21.1, the

High Court granted bail which, we are of the view, it ought not to have.

It is clear that the alleged acts of the accused were to register opposition

to the manner in which an internal security situation was dealt with by

the forces of the State. While the Constitution permits the members of

the public, be at whichever group/section of society they belong to, to

oppose, within the permits of the law a stand taken by the State- such

acts of barbarity cannot be excused. Even more so when unsuspecting

humans are given the most horrific, painful deaths. In view of the

discussion made above that the rights of an individual are always

subservient to the nation’s interest, the High Court fell in error in

granting bail. It is a well-established position however that this Court

does not interfere against the grant of bail unless circumstances

warranting such an exercise of power are plainly present in a given set

of circumstances. In view of the discussion made in Paras 21.2 and 21.3

we are of the view that interfering with the liberty of the accused, at this

stage, particularly when nothing else holds against them, would not be

justified. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the appellant could

not bring to our notice subsequent development which would justify

this interference as serving any fruitful purpose.

25. In the light of the Judicial Precedents of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,

considering the nature of allegations against the appellant and keeping in mind the stage of

trial, and the pre-trial custody, we are of the considered opinion that further pre-trial

incarceration would cause grave injustice to the appellant.

26. Further, the appellant, through his counsel, undertakes not to indulge in any Anti-

India activity and also that he would not cross the limits of his speech and expression

beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and considering the

entire facts and the pre-trial custody, which on the face of it, is excessive for the purpose of

pre-trial custody and the undertaking given by the appellant through counsel, we are of the

considered opinion that his further custody is not required.

27. Without commenting on the case's merits, in the facts and circumstances unique and

peculiar to this case, and for the reasons mentioned above, the appellant makes a case for

bail.

28. Given the above, provided the appellant is not required in any other case, the

appellant shall be released on bail in the FIR captioned above, subject to furnishing

personal bonds and two surety bonds of Rs. 1 Lac each, to the satisfaction of the concerned

trial Court and due to unavailability before any nearest Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty

Magistrate/ Ilaqa Magistrate.

29. The appellant shall abide by all statutory bond conditions and appear before the

concerned Court(s) on all dates. The appellant shall not tamper with the evidence,

influence, browbeat, pressurize, induce, threaten, or promise, directly or indirectly, any

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witnesses, Police officials, or any other person acquainted with the facts and circumstances

of the case or dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Police or the Court.

30. The appellant shall not seek any unnecessary adjournment, and if he does so, the

State shall have the right to apply for cancellation of bail.

31. The appellant shall mention his current address, phone number, e-mail, if any, and

present address, native address, and in case of change, he shall inform the SHO of the

police station concerned through a registered letter by mentioning the case number.

Additionally, he shall also inform the concerned Court before whom the bonds were

furnished.

32. Given the background of allegations against the appellant, it becomes paramount to

protect the members of society as well as the integrity of the country, and incapacitating the

accused would be one of the primary options until the filing of the closure report,

discharge, or acquittal. Consequently, it would be appropriate to restrict the possession of

firearms. This restriction is being imposed based on the preponderance of evidence of

probability and not of evidence of certainty, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt; and as such, it

is not to be construed as an intermediate sanction. Given the nature of the allegations and

the other circumstances peculiar to this case, the appellant shall surrender all weapons,

firearms, and ammunition, if any, along with the arms license, to the concerned authority

within fifteen days of release from prison and inform the Investigator of compliance.

However, subject to the Indian Arms Act, 1959, the appellant shall be entitled to renew and

take it back in case of acquittal in this case, provided that this is otherwise permissible

under the concerned rules. Restricting firearms would instill confidence in society; it would

also restrain the accused from influencing the witnesses and repeating the offense.

33. The conditions mentioned above imposed by this court are to endeavor to reform

and ensure that the accused does not repeat the offense. In Mohammed Zubair v. State of

NCT of Delhi, 2022:INSC:735 [Para 28], Writ Petition (Criminal) No 279 of 2022, Para 29,

decided on July 20, 2022, A Three-Judge bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that “The

bail conditions imposed by the Court must not only have a nexus to the purpose that they

seek to serve but must also be proportional to the purpose of imposing them. The courts,

while imposing bail conditions must balance the liberty of the accused and the necessity of

a fair trial. While doing so, conditions that would result in the deprivation of rights and

liberties must be eschewed.”

34. In Md. Tajiur Rahaman v. The State of West Bengal, decided on 08-Nov-2024, SLP

(Crl) 12225-2024, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds in Para 7, “It goes without saying that if

the petitioner is found involved in such like offence in future, the concession of bail granted

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to him today will liable to be withdrawn and the petitioner is bound to face the necessary

consequences.”

35. This bail is conditional, with the foundational condition being that if the appellant

repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a sentence of

imprisonment for more than three years, the State shall file an application to revoke this

bail before the trial Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall have the authority

to cancel this bail, and as per their discretion, they may cancel this bail.

36. In addition to the above conditions, the Appellants shall abide by all the following

conditions as were ordered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Gulfisha Fatima v.

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026-INSC-2, Jan 05, 2026. It is clarified that the conditions

mentioned in Gulfisha Fatima supra are to be preferred over the following conditions

imposed by this Court:

[434]. vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any

information, statement, article or post whether in print, electronic or

social media concerning the present case or its participants till conclusion

of the trial.

viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address or

attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or virtually till

conclusion of the trial.

ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic form or

physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters, banners, etc in any

form whatsoever.

xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour throughout

and in the event of any offence committed during the pendency of the

trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek for revocation of the bail

granted by filing such application before the Trial Court and in the event

of such application being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own

merits.

[435]. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or

in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be

open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily

after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants.

37. Any observation made hereinabove is tentative and is not an expression of opinion

on the case's merits, and it shall have no bearing on the trial or on the case of the co-

accused, and the trial Court shall not advert to these comments.

38.We have suspended the sentence primarily on the grounds of custody. As such, we

clarify that the sentence undergone in the present FIR, as per the above-mentioned custody

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CRA-D-914-2025 (O&M)

certificate, shall not be treated as custody of the present applicant/convict in any other case

except this one, till the pendency of the present appeal.

39. It is clarified that this bail order shall not be considered as a blanket bail order in

any other matter and is only limited to granting bail in the FIR mentioned above.

40. In Amit Rana v. State of Haryana, CRM-18469-2025 [in CRA-D-123-2020, decided

on 05.08.2025], a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in paragraph 13,

holds that “To ensure that every person in judicial custody who has been granted bail or

whose sentence has been suspended gets back their liberty without any delay, it is

appropriate that whenever the bail order or the orders of suspension of sentence are not

immediately sent by the Registry, computer systems, or Public Prosecutor, then in such a

situation, to facilitate the immediate restoration of the liberty granted by any Court, the

downloaded copies of all such orders, subject to verification, must be accepted by the Court

before whom the bail bonds are furnished.”

41. Given the above, the impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed in terms

mentioned above. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(ANOOP CHITKARA)

JUDGE

(SUKHVINDER KAUR)

JUDGE

21.05.2026

Jyoti Sharma

Whether speaking/reasoned YES

Whether reportable NO

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