As per the case facts, multiple appeals were filed concerning land acquisition proceedings and the determination of compensation. The reason for the appeal to the Supreme Court was to clarify ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS………………………OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.16631-16632/2018)
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MR. DEEPAK AGGARWAL & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.13883/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16585/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16569/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16612/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16628/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 32828/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.26059/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.28961/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.28941/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.28959/2018
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C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.28949/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.2886/2019
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.7504/2019
C.A.NO………… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 8299/2019
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.9194/2019
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.14181/2019
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.15674/2019
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.13884/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16583/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16580/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16613/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16574/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16562/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16564/2018
C.A.NO……………. /2022 @ SLP(C)No.16607/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16604/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18939/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16595/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16560/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16582/2018
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C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16573/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16591/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16587/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16558/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16610/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16614/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16570/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16567/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22288/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18942/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16629/2018
C.A.NO…………… …./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 33145/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28962/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28954/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28940/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28939/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28956/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28953/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28951/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28948/2018
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C.A.NO………… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 37195/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28952/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18950/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19705/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16626/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16622/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16621/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18947/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16620/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18973/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18969/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19703/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18945/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18968/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18962/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19697/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18957/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18958/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18960/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18964/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19706/2018
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C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18949/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18941/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22291/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24221/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24218/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24227/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24224/2018
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No………… ……./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 31330/2018
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No… ……………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 31858/2018
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 32821/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.26058/2018
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 33273/2018
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 33276/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.28946/2018
C.A.NOs……………./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.2881-2883/2019
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No… …….………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 171/2020
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18943/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18938/2018
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18948/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.18946/2018
C.A.NOS…………./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.23433-23444/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19711/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22292/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22294/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22295/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22290/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22298/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.23446/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.23445/2018
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2880/2019
C.A.NOS.……………./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.2988-2990/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2884/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2877/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2878/2019
C.A.NO………./ 2022 @ SLP(C)No.2885/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2887/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.2879/2019
C.A.NOS.……….……./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.2888-2890/2019
C.A.NOS……… ……../2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.3775-3778/2019
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.3782/2019
C.A.NO………./ 2022 @ SLP(C)No.3780/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.3786/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.3788/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.6496/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.5149/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.5148/2019
C.A.NOS.……… …./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.7496-7498/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.6729/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7469/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7505/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7506/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.6732/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7471/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.6735/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7499/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7909/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7912/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.5939/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7490/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7501/2019
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7466/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7715/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7915/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7916/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7907/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7908/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.8380/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7910/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7911/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7906/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7914/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.7917/2019
C.A.NOS.…………./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.9186-9187/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9188/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.8381/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9197/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9180/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9191/2019
C.A.NO………./ 2022 @ SLP(C)No.8600/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.8379/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10001/2019
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10000/2019
C.A.NO………… …./2022 @ SLP(C)No…..………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No.9289/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9176/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9189/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10002/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10604/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10003/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.9196/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10995/2019
C.A.NO………./ 2022 @ SLP(C)No.9202/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.10063/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14490/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14551/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14533/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14466/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.17439/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16415/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14556/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14594/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19500/2019
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14271/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.16423/2019
C.A.NOS……………./2022 @ SLP(C)Nos.17933-17934/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.19012/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24752/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14253/2020
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.22217/2019
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No………… ……./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 10499/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.14262/2019
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 21828/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.23354/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.23357/2019
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 22667/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.20183/2019
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 26930/2019
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 26936/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24751/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.24754/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.23704/2019
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C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.27500/2019
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.15601/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 410/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 524/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 530/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No… ……………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11217/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11218/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No………………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11219/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No…… …………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11220/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11221/2020
C.A.NO……… ……./2022 @ SLP(C)No… ……………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11222/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 11379/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No… ……………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 22557/2020
C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No… ……………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 23618/2020
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C.A.NO……………./2022 @ SLP(C)No……… ………./2022 @
SLP(C)D.No. 25048/2020
C.A.NO………./2022 @ SLP(C)No.113/2022
J U D G M E N T
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Overlapping issues are involved in this bunch of cases. The
point of polemics, which is common in all these cases, pertain to
the meaning and interpretation of the word “initiated” employed in
Section 24(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for
brevity “the 2013 Act”) with reference to land acquisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity “the
L.A. Act”). Going by the appellants in the appeals arising from
SLP(C)Nos.16631-16632 of 2018, including the State of Haryana,
the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development
Corporation and the appellants or respondents in certain other
appeals sailing along with them (hereinafter referred to as Party
‘A’), for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, issuance and
publication of a Notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act,
1894 alone would amount to initiation of acquisition proceedings
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thereunder. Per contra , the contesting parties, viz., the
respondents therein and appellants in other appeals who hold the
contra view, (hereinafter referred to as Party ‘B’) would contend
that it is the declaration that the land is required for a public
purpose under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act that would mark the
point of initiation of acquisition proceedings thereunder. To
buttress the respective contentions, the parties rely on various
decisions of this Court as also of different High Courts. We may
hasten to add that the decisions of various High Courts cited before
us would also reflect the cleavage in opinion among the High
Courts on this issue.
Legal background
3. The legal background from which the stated question stems
may be encapsulated thus:
The L.A. Act was a general law relating to acquisition of land
for public purposes and also for companies, and for determination
of amount of compensation to be made to the owner/holder of the
property concerned upon acquisition. Inadequacy of the
provisions in the L.A. Act in addressing various issues such as
rehabilitation and resettlement of affected parties of such
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acquisition led to the enactment of the 2013 Act and the
consequent repeal of the L.A. Act. However, Section 114 of the
2013 Act carries provisions not only for repeal but also for saving
the L.A. Act to certain extent in given circumstances, from the
prejudicial effect of repeal under sub-section (1) thereof, in the
manner provided specifically in the 2013 Act. Section 114 of the
2013 Act reads thus:
“Repeal and saving.-
(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is
hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal
under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice
or affect the general application of section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard
to the effect of repeals.”
When an enactment is repealed, normally some of its
provisions are saved by a repealing provision. The extent and
scope of such provisions under the repealed Act would depend
upon the ‘Repeal and Saving’ provision under the repealing Act.
4. Thus, as per sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the 2013 Act,
the L.A. Act was repealed and at the same time, sub-Section (2)
thereof carries a saving clause. As per sub-Section (2) thereof, the
15
repeal under sub-Section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect
the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, with respect to the effect of repeals. Hence, to know the
actual impact of the saving clause it is only proper and profitable
to refer to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act before entering into
the task of interpretation of the provisions under the L.A. Act
which remains saved for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013
Act and the scope of further operation of such provisions.
5. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897)
deals with the effect of repeals. It reads thus :-
“S.6 Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any
[Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment
hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,
unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the
time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any
enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed; or
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(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment
incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid, and any such
investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced, and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed
as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been
passed.”
(emphasis added)
6. Section 24 of the New 2013 Act is also to be extracted for a
proper consideration of the common question(s) involved in the
above appeals. It provides thus :-
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of
1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain
cases.– (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said
Land Acquisition Act has been made,
then, all provisions of this Act relating to
the determination of compensation shall
apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has
been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said
Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act
has not been repealed.
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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of
1894), where an award under the said section 11
has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical
possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall
initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made
and compensation in respect of a majority of land
holdings has not been deposited in the account of
the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in
the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the
said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.”
7. At this juncture it is only appropriate to refer to the decision
of this Court in Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development
Corpn. Vs. Mahesh & Ors. reported in (2022) 2 SCC 772. It was
held therein that in terms of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,
Section 114 of 2013 Act as well as Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act would not apply to the extent hindered by Section
24(1) of the 2013 Act for the following reasons:
(i) Section 114 of the 2013 Act while a ccepting the
applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act made its
application subject to ‘save as otherwise provided’ in the 2013 Act;
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(ii) Section 6 of the General Clauses Act itself provided that
the general savings would not apply when legislative intent is
contrary.
In this context it is also apposite to refer to the decision of this
Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalatha S. Guram
reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 explaining the effect of a non-
obstante clause. This Court held:
“A Clause beginning with the expression
“notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or
in some particular provision in the act or in some
particular act or in any law for the time being in
force, or any contract” is often than not appended to
a Section in the beginning with a view to give the
enacting part of this Section in case of a conflict an
overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the
contract mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is
equivalent to saying that inspite of the provision of
the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non-
obstante clause or any contract or document
mentioned in the enactment following it will have its
full operation or that the provisions embraced in the
non-obstante clause would not be an impediment
for operation of the enactment”.
(emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of the aforesaid decisions what needs to be looked
into is the extent and scope of the applicability of the provisions
under the L.A. Act, despite its repeal, by virtue of section 24 of the
2013 Act. A perusal of Section 24 would reveal that passing of
19
an Award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act is the key factor in
deciding the manner and nature of continuance of the land
acquisition proceedings. A scanning of Section 24(1)(a) would
reveal that if land acquisition proceeding was initiated under the
L.A. Act, but no award was passed under Section 11 thereof, then,
all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the “determination of
compensation” would apply. At the same time, if upon initiation
of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, an award under
Section 11 of the L.A. Act was passed, then, such proceedings
shall continue under the provisions of the L.A. Act itself, as if the
same had not been repealed.
9. Party ‘B’ who canvass the position against the view that
issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) is the point
of initiation, would contend that land acquisition proceedings
could not be held as initiated, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a)
of the 2013 Act, unless Section 6 declaration under the L.A. Act
was issued in respect of the land proposed to be acquired before
01.01.2014, the date on which the 2013 Act came into force. At
the same time, the contention of Party ‘A’ is that land acquisition
proceedings should be taken as initiated under the L.A. Act when
Section 4(1) Notification under the L.A. Act was issued and
20
published in the official gazette of the appropriate Government.
Obviously, when land acquisition proceedings have been initiated
and an award was also passed under section 11 of the L.A. Act,
such proceedings, thereafter, could be continued only under the
provisions of the L.A. Act, as if had not been repealed. It is in the
aforesaid rival contentions and the impact of ‘initiation’ of land
acquisition proceedings in the context and purpose of Section 24
of the 2013 Act that the construction of the word “initiated” used
under Section 24(1) became necessary.
10. We have already noted the stand of the parties on the
question of point of initiation of acquisition proceedings under the
L.A. Act, for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. To
buttress the contention, Party ‘A’ mainly reliance is placed on the
decisions in Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs.
State of Rajasthan [(1975) 4 SCC 296)]; and V.K.M. Kattha
Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana [(2013) 9 SCC 338]. In
the light of those decisions, they would contend that without
issuance of Section 4(1) Notification acquisition under the L.A. Act
could not be effected. It is further contended that without such a
notification, it would not be lawful for any officer, either generally
or specially authorised by the appropriate Government on their
21
behalf, and also for his/her servants and workmen to enter upon
and survey and take levels of any land in the locality concerned
or lawfully do such further actions specified and permissible
under Section 4(2) of the L.A. Act. The sum and substance of
their manifold contentions is that issuance of Section 4(1)
Notification for acquisition under the L.A. Act is not a mere
formality and it is the point of initiation of acquisition proceedings
under the L.A. Act.
11. On the other hand, Party ‘B’ would contend that issuance
and publication of Section 4(1) Notification is a mere formality
only to enable the authorised officer and workmen for carrying out
preliminary steps for acquisition of the land proposed to be
acquired. Nonetheless, they would admit that without the
issuance of a notification thereunder acquisition proceedings
under the L.A. Act would not be possible. Their contention is that
Section 4(1) notification carries only a formal decision as to
whether any particular land is needed or likely to be needed for a
public purpose and it is only under Section 6 of the L.A. Act that
ultimately a firm declaration would be made as to the requirement
of the land mentioned in the preliminary notification for public
purpose. Hence, according to Party ‘B’, for all purposes, it alone
22
could be and should be treated as the point of initiation of
acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act. To drive home their
contention, reliance is mainly placed on the decisions in Babu
Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay & Ors. (AIR 1960 SC 1203)
and M/s. Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. Vs. Gustavo Ranato
Da Cruz Pinto & Ors. [(1985) 2 SCC 152.
12. The succinct narration of the rival contentions itself would
reveal the diverse contentions of the parties made relying on
different decisions to support their respective stand on the
question relating to what would amount to initiation of acquisition
proceedings under the L.A. Act, for the purpose of Section 24(1) of
the 2013 Act.
13. In Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. case
(supra) a Constitution Bench held thus: -
“Land acquisition proceedings commence with
the notification under Section 4 of the Act.”
It is true that the Constitution Bench was not considering
the question whether it is issuance and publication of a
notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act or the declaration
that the land is required for public purpose under Section 6 of the
L.A. Act, that tantamounts to initiation or commencement of the
23
land acquisition proceedings under L.A. Act . In fact, the
Constitution Bench was considering the challenge against the
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Rajasthan Land
Acquisition Act, 1953. But then, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
in Civil Appeal No.6392 of 2003 titled as ‘Laxman Lal (Dead)
Through LRs. & Anr. V. State of Rajasthan’ held that Section 4
of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is identical to Section 4 of the
L.A. Act and Section 6 of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is similar
to Section 6 of the L.A. Act. Therefore, the declaration of the
position of Section 4 of the L.A. Act by the Constitution of Bench
that land acquisition proceedings commence with the notification
under Section 4 of the Act cannot be ignored neither on the
ground that it was held so while considering the said provisions
in the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act nor on the ground that it
was not made upon consideration of the question as to whether it
is Section 4 or Section 6, of the L.A. Act that marks the point of
initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act.
14. As noted hereinbefore, the decision in V.K.M. Kattha
Industries (P) Ltd. case (supra) is by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court. Paragraphs 13 to 14 (both inclusive) therein would reveal
that after extracting Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the L.A. Act, in
24
paragraph 14 the three-Judge Bench held: “Among the above
provisions, Section 4 of the Act empowers the appropriate
Government to initiate proceedings for the acquisition of land”. It
was so held by the Bench while considering the contention of the
appellant therein that publication of notification under Section 4
(1) of the L.A. Act was not in accordance with the mandate
provided in the statute and while looking into the scheme of the
L.A. Act for answering the same.
15. Now, we will look into the decisions cited by the Party ‘B’
viz., in Babu Barkya Thakur’s case and in M/s Fomento Resorts
& Hotels Ltd. In Babu Barkya Thakur’s case (supra), this Court
considered the purpose and object of the notification under
Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The same was explained in paragraph
17 therein thus:-
“The purpose of the notification under
Section 4 is to carry on a preliminary
investigation with a view to finding out after
necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if
necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil
whether the land was adapted for the purpose
for which it was sought to be acquired. It is
only under Section 6 that a firm declaration
has to be made by Government that land with
proper description and area so as to be
identifiable is needed for a public purpose or
for a Company. What was a mere proposal
25
under Section 4 becomes the subject matter of
a definite proceeding for acquisition under the
Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any
defect in the notification under Section 4 is
fatal to the validity of the proceedings,
particularly when the acquisition is for a
Company and the purpose has to be
investigated under Section 5-A or Section 40
necessarily after the notification under Section
4 of the Act.”
16. That apart, in paragraph 7 in Babu Barkya’s case it is stated
thus:
“The proceedings begin with a Government
notification under Section 4 that land in any locality
is needed or is likely to be needed for any public
purpose. On the issue of such a notification it is
permissible for a public servant and workmen to
enter upon the land to do certain acts specified
therein, with a view to ascertaining whether the land
is adapted for the purpose for which it was proposed
to be acquired as also to determine the boundaries
of the to be included in the scheme of acquisition”.
In Babu Barkya Thakur’s case, the Constitution Bench was
considering the challenge to the constitutionality of the land
acquisition proceedings with particular reference to the
notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The contentions of the
appellant therein, as can be seen from paragraph 6 therein, were
that notification under section 4 of the L.A. Act was illegal, that
the land acquisition proceedings were in violation of Articles 14,
26
19 and 31 of the Constitution and that the acquisition was not for
public purpose and was malafide. It was in the said
circumstances that in paragraph 17 the Constitution Bench held
as above.
17. In Fomento Resorts’ case (supra) the above extracted
recital from Babu Barkya Thakur’s case was quoted with
agreement and then, held thus:- “…Though preliminary steps for
initiation of acquisition proceedings are necessary and those can
only be taken by the authority of the notification under Section 4
as mentioned in the decision of Babu Barkya Thakur Vs. State
of Bombay the initiation of the acquisition proceedings for all
practical purposes being after Section 6 notification. Satisfaction
is necessary for proceedings for acquisition under Section 6 of the
Act but Section 4 unlike Section 6 does not require for the
issuance of the notice to be satisfied but it might act only “when
it appears” to it then the land is needed or is likely to be needed
for any public purpose”. It is relying on the aforesaid decisions
that Party ‘B’ would contend that for all practical purposes,
Section 6 declaration is the initiation of acquisition proceedings
under the L.A. Act. In other words, the contention of Party ’B’ is
that Section 6 declaration is the point of initiation of land
27
acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act is founded on what this
Court observed in the above extracted portions of the said
decisions.
18. It is to be noted that in Fomento Resort’s case (supra) in
paragraph 13, it is stated that ‘to complete the acquisition
proceedings, notification under Section 6 of the Act is required.’
19. A careful scanning of all the decisions cited by both sides
would thus reveal that all those decisions hold that land
acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act begin with the
publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4. A
declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act is one of the steps
under the L.A. Act which ultimately culminates into the
conclusion of the proceedings by making an Award and taking
over possession of the acquired land. A declaration under Section
6 cannot be made without holding an inquiry unless urgency
clause under Section 17 is applied. Publication of a notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act is condition
precedent for taking further steps. Hence, such a notification is
the starting point of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act.
The initiation of the proceedings is by the publication of the
notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act.
28
20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid position and also the
observation in another Constitution Bench decision
viz., in Offshore Holdings Private Limited V. Bangalore
Development Authority [(2011) 3 SCC 139 that ‘a statute should
be construed with reference to the context and its provisions to
make a consistent enactment i.e. ex visceribus actus’. We will
consider the question as to what exactly is the purport of
employing the expression ‘initiate’, with reference to the L.A. Act,
under Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.
21. We are of the considered view that while construing the
expression ‘initiated’ used in Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act with
reference to commencement of acquisition proceedings under the
L.A. Act, the decision in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of
Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213 is also to be borne in mind. In Ambica
Quarry Works’ case while construing the words ‘may be renewed’
this Court held that all interpretations must subserve and help
implementation of the intention of the Act concerned.
22. The legislative intention behind bringing up the 2013 Act
was to have a unified enactment facilitating land acquisition for
industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a
29
timely and transparent manner and at the same time, providing
for just and fair compensation, to make adequate provision for
rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for affected persons
and their families. As a preamble its objects and reasons have
been given in the 2013 Act thus:
“An Act to ensure, in consultation with
institutions of local self-government and Gram
Sabhas established under the Constitution, a
humane, participative, informed and transparent
process for land acquisition for industrialisation,
development of essential infrastructural facilities
and urbanisation with the least disturbance to the
owners of the land and other affected families and
provide just and fair compensation to the affected
families whose land has been acquired or
proposed to be acquired or are affected by such
acquisition and make adequate provisions for
such affected persons for their rehabilitation and
resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative
outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that
affected persons become partners in development
leading to an improvement in their post
acquisition social and economic status and for
matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.”
23. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legislative intention we will
have to construe Section 24 and also the word ‘initiated’ employed
in section 24(1), of the 2013 Act. The word ‘initiated’ has to be
construed with a view to implement the aforesaid twin purposes
of providing fair and just compensation and facilitating
30
acquisition of land for industrialization, infrastructure and
urbanization projects. We have already referred to the impact of
‘initiation’ of land acquisition proceedings and its culmination in
an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act and also non -
culmination in such an award.
24. For a proper and purposive construction of the word ‘initiated’,
in the contextual situation it will not be inappropriate to look into
the legislative history of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as well, as
explained in the written submission filed on behalf of
HSIIDC/STATE/COMMITTEE dated 11.04.2022 . However, we do
not deem it necessary to refer to or to deal with it, in detail. In
short, it is stated therein that the events happened prior to the
drafting of Section 24, as it exists on the statute book today, is a
safe guide to cull out the legislative intent in formulating Section
24 in the 2013 Act, by the legislature. Furthermore, it is stated
therein that the legislature was fully aware of the fact that lands
acquired under the L.A. Act were already being used for several
public purposes and more particularly for infrastructural projects
and large number of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act,
relating large number of public projects for various public
purposes, are in progress at various stages. Hence, lapsing of
31
everything would be seriously detrimental to public interest and at
the same time, the interest of land holders is also taken into
account. The consideration of all such relevant aspects and the
pros and cons made the legislature to come up with a balancing
provision under Section 24(1)(a) and clauses therein, in the 2013
Act. This was incorporated as a balancing provision for controlling
the extent of retrospectivity and for curtailing the erosion of rights
of land holders.
25. However, in resistance, all the learned counsel appearing for
Party ‘B’ would contend that the question requires to be considered
on a totally different angle. It is contended that Section 24 of the
2013 Act and the word ‘initiated’ used under clause (a) of sub-
section (1) thereof must be read and understood consistent with
and in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also
contended that permitting continuance of proceedings initiated
under the L.A. Act would violate Article 300-A of the Constitution.
26. The contentions raised by Party ‘B’ based on violation of
Articles 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India are only to be
repelled. Right to property had ceased to be a fundamental right.
True that it is a human right as also constitutional right. Hence,
32
compulsory acquisition by scrupulous adherence to the
procedures authorised by law would not violate Article 300-A of
the Constitution. Article 21 mandates that no person shall be
deprived of life or personal liberty, except according to procedures
established by law. In this context the decision in State of M.P.
Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639] assumes
relevance. Paragraph 28 therein reads thus:-
“28. However, in case of land acquisition, “the plea
of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article
21 is unsustainable”. (Vide Chameli Singh Vs.
State of U.P. and Samantha vs. State of A.P.). This
Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is
not only a constitutional right but also a human
right. (Vide Lachhman Dass Vs. Jagat Ram and
Amarjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab).
However, in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar Vs.
Stte of Gujarat this Court held:
30. Thus it is clear that right to property under
Article 300-A is not a basic feature or structure of
the Constitution. It is only a constitutional right…
58. … The principle of unfairness of the procedure
attracting Article 21 does not apply to the
acquisition or deprivation of property under
Article 300-A giving effect to the directive
principles.”
27. Bearing in mind the twin purposes mentioned hereinbefore, we
are of the view that they can only be achieved if the word ‘initiated’
is taken as the point of time when section 4 (1) notification is
33
issued and published under the L.A. Act, in the Official Gazette.
Such a construction would embrace more number of affected
persons within the fold of affected persons entitled to higher
amount of compensation by application of the 2013 Act in the
matter of determination of compensation. As a necessary sequel
more extent of land in respect of which acquisition proceedings
have been initiated, for public purposes, under the L.A. Act for the
various ongoing and proposed projects, would remain protected
from lapsing. In this context, it is to be noted that all the parties
in all the appeals in unison would admit the fact that
determination of compensation based on the 2013 Act would be
beneficial to the persons affected by acquisition and entitled to be
compensated. The words ‘initiate’ or ‘initiated’ are not defined
under the L.A. Act and also under the 2013 Act. Hence, to ascribe
its meaning the dictionary meaning of the word has to be looked
into.
In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
The word “initiate” has inter alia been defined
thus:-
“to begin or set going; make a beginning of;
perform or facilitate the first actions, steps, or
stages of;”
In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word
“initiate” is defined as:
34
“to begin, commence, enter upon, to
introduce, set going, originate.”
In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the
legislative intention we have no hesitation to hold that the point of
initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act for the
purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act , is issuance and
publication of Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette of the
appropriate Government.
28. We think it only befitting to supplement further reasons for
supporting our conclusion as above. A perusal of Section 4 of the
L.A. Act would reveal that a preliminary Notification under Section
4(1) is issued whenever it appears to the appropriate Government
that land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any
public purpose. The said formal expression of the decision takes
concrete shape and forms only on its Publication in the Official
Gazette. It is only upon issuance and publication of a Notification
under Section 4(1) that any officer, either generally or specially
authorised by the appropriate Government and his servants and
workmen could lawfully enter upon and survey and take levels of
any land in such locality in terms of sub-Section (2) thereof. In the
35
circumstances, it is only worthy to refer to Section 4 as a whole.
They read thus :-
“S.4. Publication of preliminary notification and
power of officers thereupon. –
Whenever it appears to the [appropriate
Government] the land in any locality [is needed or]
is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for
a company], a notification to that effect shall be
published in the Official Gazette [and in two daily
newspapers circulating in that locality of which at
least one shall be in the regional language], and the
Collector shall cause public notice of the substance
of such notification to be given at convenient places
in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such
publication and the giving of such public notice,
being hereinafter referred to as the date of the
publication of the notification)].
Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer,
either generally or specially authorized by such
Government in this behalf, and for his servants and
workman, - to enter upon and survey and take levels
of any land in such locality; to dig or bore into the
sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain
whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set
out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken
and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed
to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries
and line by placing marks and cutting trenches;
and, where otherwise the survey cannot be
completed and the levels taken and the boundaries
and line marked, to cut down and clear away any
part of any standing crop, fence or jungle;”
29. Section 4(2) would reveal that besides entering upon and
surveying and taking levels of any land in the locality concerned,
the officer authorised by the Government through the Notification
36
is also empowered to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other
acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for all
purposes; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be
taken and the intended line of work (if any) proposed to be made
thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing
marks and cutting trenches and such other activities mentioned
under sub-Section (2) thereof. In such circumstances, the fact is
that it is the issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification
that will empower the authorised officer and workmen to enter into
and do such permissible acts and activities. This fact was noted in
Babu Barkya Thakur’s case as well.
30. In the decision in Shiv Kumar and Anr. Vs. Union of India
and Ors. [(2019)] 10 SCC 229] a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that a purchaser of land in respect of which notification under
Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act issued and published (after the
issuance of Section 4 notification under the L.A. Act) did not
acquire any right in the land concerned and such sale is ab initio
void and such a person would have no right to claim that land
under the policy of law. Section 23 of the L.A. Act deals with
matters to be considered in determining compensation. Going by
37
the said provision, the market value of the land in question was to
be decided taking the market value at the date of the publication
of the notification under Section 4. Going by the settled position,
a vital defect in the Section 4(1) notification under the L.A. Act
cannot be cured by issuing and publishing a declaration under
Section 6 of the L.A. Act and in such circumstances, it would entail
annulment of both the notifications and also the acquisition
proceedings. All the aforesaid aspects would reveal that issuance
and publication of a valid Section 4(1) Notification, was the
foundation for acquisition of land in any locality under the L.A.
Act. All the above reasons will fortify our conclusion and justify
the rejection of the contention that Section 4(1) notification is
nothing but a mere formality and got no real relevance or
importance in the process of land acquisition under the L.A. Act.
31. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved
in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to
whether Section 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to
01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or
survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification
under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014.
38
32. We think that while considering those questions we will have
to bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013
Act and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in
the manner in which it now exists. We have already dealt with
those aspects. One crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a)
has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of
Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition
proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to 01.01.2014,
the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not
culminated in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all
the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of
compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus,
it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an award in terms of
Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have
been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013
Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would
apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would
mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings
should continue, but all the provisions relating to the
determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be
applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act
39
would come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt
with respect to the position that between the initiation of land
acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice
under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which
compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are
various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in
accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the
2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all
provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of
compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings
initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how
the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period
till the proceedings reach the stage of determination of
compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect.
The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they
are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted
either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner
provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a),
the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone
can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only
a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation
40
to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that
what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken
during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation
are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that
without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a)
would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the
2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in Ambica Quarry
Works’ case (supra) assumes relevance. Any construction of the
said provision without taking into the legislative intention, referred
hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very
objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest
to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow
the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A
uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such
proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should
go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the
intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the
persons affected shall have definite idea about the manner in
which procedures would be conducted. The Party ‘B’ would not be
justified in describing such situations of necessity and the
consequential application of provisions which are actually saved
41
on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring
the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in
Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013
Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the
contentions of Party ‘B’ that Section 4(1) notification issued prior
to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that
Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after
01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and
formalities shall be continued till the determination of
compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of
compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view
of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings
during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.
33. Having decided the common questions as above we are of the
view that all the other issues involved in the individual appeals
have to be considered on their own merits and subject to this
judgment in respect of all the stated common questions.
34. To conclude, we hold that for the purposes of sub-section (1)
of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act
42
shall be treated as initiated on publication of a notification under
sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. We further hold that
when Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is
applicable, the proceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act.
However, only for the determination of compensation amount, the
provisions of the 2013 Act shall be applied.
35. We have already observed that other issues are also involved
in the captioned appeals besides the common questions and
issues which we have answered in this judgment. Hence taking
note of involvement of other legal and factual issues in these
appeals shall be listed before appropriate Bench for disposal on
their own merits.
…………… ....................,J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
…………… ....................,J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
…………… ....................,J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
NEW DELHI;
28 July, 2022
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