As per case facts, the appellant challenged a detention order passed by the Commissioner of Police under a Maharashtra Prevention Act, which the High Court had dismissed. The detention was ...
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 286 of 2000
PETITIONER:
HASAN KHAN IBNE HAIDER KHAN
RESPONDENT:
R.H. MENDNOCA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/2000
BENCH:
S. RAJENDRA BABU & S.N. PHUKAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2000 (2) SCR 272
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PHUKAN, J. Leave granted.
The appellant challenged the order of detention dated 12 the April, 1999,
passed by the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Murnbai under sub-section (1)
of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 read
with Government Order, Home Department (Special) dated 30th March, 1999,
detaining the appellant with a view to prevent him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order before the High Court
of Bombay by filing a writ petition which was dismissed and hence this
appeal.
Before the High Court, the detention order was challenged on two grounds,
namely (1) the documents supplied to the appellant were illegible and (2)
if the alleged prejudicial activities of the detenu were accepted on their
face value, they would demonstrate a breach of law and order and not public
order. The High Court rejected both the grounds. Before this Court only
ground No. 2 has been canvassed. We may refer to some of the grounds of
detention which require out consideration in view of the contentions raised
on behalf of the appellant.
In the grounds of detention, reference had been made to a criminal
proceeding registered against the appellant and his associates with
reference to occurrence which took place on 9.12.98. Harishchandra Gupta
went near his place of business and noticed that his younger brother was
being assaulted by the appellant and his associates and when he rushed to
see his brother, appellant and his associates assaulted him and when
Harishchandra Gupta and his brother sought for help, none dared to come
forward for their help.
Gist of the statements of witnesses "A and B" recorded have been stated in
the grounds of detention and their entire statement have also been produced
before this Court. From the statement of witness "A", we find that /the
appellant is a notorious goonda of the locality and with his associates
moved about armed with deadly weapons and collected money from the
residents and assaulted those who refused to pay. The appellant with his
associates went to the fruit stall of this witness and took out a chopper
and started threatening him by using filthy language and on seeing the
incident the nearby vegetable and fruit vendors started running away with
their baskets. The passerby also ran away to fright. From the statement of
witness "B", we find that the appellant and his associates used to collect
money from the businessmen on threats of assault and out of fear of the
appellant none could dare to inform the police.
This Court in Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat and
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Ors., [1999] 5 SCC 613 considered the expression "acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" and referring to earlier
decision of this Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta,
Commissioner of Police, [1995] 3 SCC 237 held that the fallout and the
extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that
they travel beyond capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to
prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a
section of society and it is the decree of disturbance and its impact upon
the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which
determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to
a breach of "law and order" or it amounts to breach of "public order".
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant has urged that the above
activities of the appellant were stray incidents and as such did not
disturb the public order. Applying the above ratio to the grounds of
detention, we find that the appellant extorted money from businessmen and
also gave threats to the people the public place and thereby undoubtedly
affected the even tempo of life of the society, therefore, such activities
cannot be said to be mere disturbance of law and order. The contention of
Mr. Jain has no force.
Mr. Jain has further urged that the criminal proceeding which was started
on the complaint of Harishchandra Gupta was under Sections 341, 323, 334,
504, 506(II) and 34 IPC and all these Sections were bailable and in fact
bail was granted and, therefore, this act cannot be said to disturb public
order. From the grounds of detention, we find that when Harishchandra Gupta
and his brother sought for help, none came forward for their help out of
fear of the appellant and this fact would show that the activities of the
appellant disturbed the life of the people of the area.
In the grounds of detention, reference was made to the conviction of the
appellant under MRTP Act. According to Mr. Jain, this cannot be a ground
for detention of the appellant. Mr. Dhabe, learned senior counsel for the
respondent, has rightly submitted that reference was made to the above
conviction only to show the past criminal history of the appellant.
Mr. Jain has further submitted that there was delay in passing the
detention order. We find that the inquiry was completed during the last
part of February at the level of Deputy Commissioner of Police and the
final order was passed on 12.4.1999. It cannot be said that there was undue
delay and action was being taken in a routine manner, as after completion
of inquiry matter had to be examined at various levels and finally the
orders were passed by the Commissioner.
For the reasons stated above we hold that the High Court rightly dismissed
the petition and we find no reason to interfere with the order of the High
Court.
The appeal is dismissed.
The Supreme Court's pivotal ruling in *Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan v. R.H. Mendnoca and Ors.*, addressing the critical distinction between Public Order vs. Law and Order Detention and the application of Preventive Detention under MPDA Act, is now thoroughly analyzed and available on CaseOn. This judgment, delivered on March 14, 2000, by a bench comprising Justices S. Rajendra Babu and S.N. Phukan, offers crucial insights into the criteria for preventive detention under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (MPDA Act).
The appellant, Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan, challenged an order of detention issued on April 12, 1999, by the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai. The order was passed under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the MPDA Act, read with a Government Order dated March 30, 1999. The objective was to prevent Hasan Khan from engaging in activities detrimental to the maintenance of public order. His writ petition challenging this detention was dismissed by the Bombay High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant's alleged prejudicial activities constituted a breach of 'public order'—justifying preventive detention—or merely amounted to disturbances of 'law and order,' which would typically be handled under ordinary criminal law.
The Supreme Court referred to its previous judgments, particularly *Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat and Ors.* [1999] 5 SCC 613, which, in turn, relied on *Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police* [1995] 3 SCC 237. These rulings establish a clear distinction: for an activity to be considered prejudicial to 'public order,' its 'fallout and the extent and reach' must be so significant that they 'travel beyond capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a section of society.' The determining factor is the 'degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality.'
The appellant challenged his detention on two main grounds before the High Court: illegible documents and the nature of his activities. While the illegibility argument was rejected by the High Court and not pressed in the Supreme Court, the core of the appeal rested on whether his actions disturbed 'public order' or merely 'law and order.'
The grounds of detention detailed specific incidents:
The Court observed that these activities—extorting money, threatening people in public, and instilling pervasive fear—undoubtedly 'affected the even tempo of life of the society.' Such actions, by creating a climate of fear that prevented ordinary citizens from seeking help or reporting crimes, transcended simple law and order breaches and squarely impacted public order.
For legal professionals analyzing the nuances of preventive detention and public order jurisprudence, **CaseOn.in 2-minute audio briefs** offer an invaluable tool, providing concise, digestible summaries of specific rulings like *Hasan Khan* to quickly grasp complex legal arguments.
The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's decision. It affirmed that the appellant's activities, characterized by widespread extortion, threats, and the generation of pervasive fear that paralyzed the community, went beyond mere disturbances of law and order and genuinely prejudiced the maintenance of public order. Consequently, his preventive detention under the MPDA Act was justified, and the appeal was dismissed.
This judgment serves as a fundamental guide for understanding the intricate distinction between 'public order' and 'law and order,' a frequently debated topic in preventive detention laws. For lawyers, it clarifies the thresholds and factual circumstances under which seemingly ordinary criminal acts can escalate to affect public order, justifying stringent measures like preventive detention. It underscores the importance of examining the 'fallout and extent' of an individual's actions on the community. For law students, it provides a practical application of constitutional principles related to personal liberty versus state security, offering insights into statutory interpretation (specifically the MPDA Act) and the standard of review applied by higher courts in such cases.
Disclaimer: All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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